Wikipedia:Deletion review/Log/2017 August 30

30 August 2017

Johnvr4's userspace pages

User:Johnvr4/sandbox (talk|edit|history|logs|links|watch) (article|XfD|restore)

User:Johnvr4/Operation Red Hat (talk|edit|history|logs|links|watch) (article|XfD|restore)

User:Johnvr4/sandbox4 (talk|edit|history|logs|links|watch) (article|XfD|restore)

This material relates to Japan and weapons of mass destruction and specifically to Japan and weapons of mass_destruction #U.S. weapons of mass destruction and Japan which includes Operation Red Hat. There were numerous misrepresentation of facts in all previous deletions of this material going back to 2013 and they continue today. Recently, after ongoing and heated conversations with these editors, my drafts were nominated for deletion. The drafts contain all diffs from the original deletion (first edit of User:Johnvr4/Operation Red Hat) to the most recent versions (last edits of User:Johnvr4/sandbox or User:Johnvr4/sandbox4) for comparison. Two of the involved editors blatantly and knowing misrepresented the facts when they stated the drafts were not being edited or improved. Further, they knowingly misrepresented the facts when they stated the material was stale, abandoned, Fake, not being condensed, had the exact same unresolved issues from the last time it was deleted, or was unsuitable on the main page. The simple fact is that the majority of that draft material at User:Johnvr4/Operation Red Hat- with dozens of newer sources added since the initial 2013 deletion had been condensed by creating new main space articles or by moving it to an appropriate existing article- all of which are of main space right now where the material has been there since it was moved -and each of these editors are very well aware of it and have been for some time. Examples of those pages are available:U.S. weapons of mass destruction and Japan, 1968 Kadena Air Base B-52 crash, U.S. nuclear weapons in Japan, United States military anti-plant research, MK ULTRA, etc. Only the remainder of material that had not yet been moved to the main page was here: User:Johnvr4/sandbox. In fact, the nominating editor has repeatedly stated his motivation for deleting material not only in my the drafts but on the main page is based upon his misunderstanding of the subject as he repeatedly refuses to acknowledge what the reliable sources present and relentlessly challenges any use that does not fit his faulty understanding. Talk:U.S._nuclear_weapons_in_Japan#Terrorist_threat_and_weapons_removed_in_1972-_Apparent_POV I have documented that behavior as well as that editors own statements that describe such behavior several times.

He previously acknowledged the value of keeping this material so here I'll just quote him, "This article requires further cleanup, and focusing on the primary topic, as well as investigation of sources. There is also an enormous amount of useful material in the previous versions that deserves to be in a wide range of other CW, BW, and Vietnam War related articles. Buckshot06 (talk) 19:08, 10 June 2013 (UTC)"

This week he has deleted two highly reliable sources for that material perhaps because they also disprove and directly contradict assertion that two involved editors (and Others) have been making literally for years.

He has fiercely contested those moves and is still actively contesting it (for example here): Talk:U.S._nuclear_weapons_in_Japan#Terrorist_threat_and_weapons_removed_in_1972-_Apparent_POV and here:[1]

Each of my latest attempts to improve the draft were deleted as is described in the links below. These editors who misrepresented the facts were well aware of those ongoing efforts to improve prior to misrepresenting them to other the editors- which ended in deletion. They are also aware of my allegations about their behavior: User_talk:Johnvr4#MfD_debate and User_talk:Johnvr4#Red_Hat_content

Diffs can be compared to verify progression of the drafts vs. the 2013 deletion and the non-accuracy of their assertions. A plethora of previous conversation is available to prove my version of the facts regarding policy-based improvements in text and sources is accurate and theirs is dubious.

I provided this information to the deleting editor here: User_talk:Premeditated_Chaos#Deletion_of_userspace_material but she would not hear it and made further misrepresentations that falsely stated among other assertions: that I didn't present any policy arguments with regard to Stale or Fake articles or time components, "and has never been improved such that it would be policy-compliant in mainspace." Despite the obvious inaccuracy, that editor refused but also counter-accused me of misrepresentation of some fact but would not specify how or why she felt that way.

I requested undeletion by providing that same info here: Requests_for_undeletion#User:Johnvr4.2Fsandbox_.26_User:Johnvr4.2FOperation_Red_Hat but was unsuccessful.

Enough about editor behavior. An Administrator can look at what has been deleted and the links I provided. I can also provide any further clarification wherever it is needed.

I ask that the drafts be restored so that I can finish making policy compliant improvements and in addressing valid concerns of other editors. Further, I ask that steps be taken and steps be taken to address the obviously bogus assertions put forth in the deletion nomination by two involved editors that should have known better.

All of the five justifications for restoration apply: 1.if someone believes the closer of a deletion discussion interpreted the consensus incorrectly; 2. if a speedy deletion was done outside of the criteria or is otherwise disputed; 3.if significant new information has come to light since a deletion that would justify recreating the deleted page; 4.if a page has been wrongly deleted with no way to tell what exactly was deleted; or 5.if there were substantial procedural errors in the deletion discussion or speedy deletion.

Please at least perform a temp restore to view the diffs and to discuss the numerous and super-obvious ongoing efforts to improve it. Johnvr4 (talk) 20:55, 30 August 2017 (UTC)

Note: the MfD discussion took place at Wikipedia:Miscellany for deletion/OpRedHat. Buckshot06 (talk) 08:16, 31 August 2017 (UTC)

Request reformatted for legibility and condensed under one header.  Sandstein  13:09, 31 August 2017 (UTC)

• Endorse and kudos to PMC for handling this whole process with grace. She made the right call based on the discussion, previous AfD, and policy. The MfD was closed correctly. There was not a consensus to retain the information, and there was one to delete it. TonyBallioni (talk) 14:56, 31 August 2017 (UTC)
• Endorse the central argument for deletion here was not that the drafts were abandoned. It was that the drafts had not been improved to anything like mainspace standards and there was no prospect of this happening. Johnvr4 did make numerous edits to them, but those edits did not address the concerns which led to the deletion of the material in the first place. For example a major concern in the original AfD was the length and excessively large scope of the article, which was about 204KB at the time. None of the pages listed here was less than 211KB at the time of deletion. There is consensus that drafts which are unsuitable for mainspace should not be kept in userspace indefinitely, and while there is no fixed time limit I can't fault the participants for deciding that four years is too long. Hut 8.5 19:28, 31 August 2017 (UTC)

Note responding to Hut 8.5:

Can we recheck the size of the three pages? I feel that there is no way that those three pages- all three with three different subjects (two were condensed versions) were all the same size. I assert that they had to be three very different sizes. Yet size to my knowledge is not a Justification for deletion either- especially in a draft that was in the process of being broken up into several different articles.

The central Argument was that the drafts were stale. Quote: "At Wikipedia:Miscellany_for_deletion/OpRedHat I have nominated your stale userpage for deletion. Regards Buckshot06 (talk) 02:21, 18 August 2017 (UTC)"

I'd like to add that the nominating editor and I have numerous content disputes (the scope of the draft is absolutely one of our content disputes)[2]. Policy: "It is also inappropriate to request deletion because of an editorial dispute. Such disputes are not resolved by deleting the whole page; instead, use dispute resolution".

Regarding the MfD, There is also no way that all or most issues that caused the draft to be deleted in the first place have not been corrected in my versions or were not in the process of being corrected this week. For example, one editor User:Moe_Epsilon at the [AFD] fabricated a concern about my editing and claimed "I cooked something up." Then that editor made all types of other ridiculous assertions that are disproved by this source (plus the ones already mentioned) which I added only minutes before buckshot06 deleted the entire sandbox4 draft just this week! The Diffs that were deleted (which I cannot see because I am not an administrator) would prove that I did not write that passage- but there is no just way to see it now since all the diffs are gone. The diffs would prove that Buckshot06 himself put that nonsense that got the page deleted right back on the main space and abused all of the sources he cited.[3] Note also that buckshot06's POV version is missing most of the majority and minority viewpoints in every single one of the sources he has cited.

That was one reason that the original deletion was unfair in the original AFD and is why assertions that those problems were not ever fixed are utterly ludicrous. That alone justifies restoration. #4.if a page has been wrongly deleted with no way to tell what exactly was deleted;

Please stop making untrue assertions such as this one: "but those edits did not address the concerns which led to the deletion of the material in the first place." Do not base decisions on such false statements and assertions that are not remotely true. If an editor is going to make such assertions the please at least perform a temp restore and provide a specific example so I can disprove it right here and now. Leaving it Indefinately?[4]

Time: You cant fault the participants for thinking "Four years..."? Here is the fault: Editors should look at the dates on these pages to recalculate time and then please stop making the freaking misrepresentations about "the drafts had not been improved to anything like mainspace standards and there was no prospect of this happening". How can that be said with a straight face? These are main space pages are where the text from my draft was moved to: U.S. weapons of mass destruction and Japan, 1968 Kadena Air Base B-52 crash, U.S. nuclear weapons in Japan, United States military anti-plant research, MK ULTRA, etc.

Last consensus is not a vote. Johnvr4 (talk) 04:03, 1 September 2017 (UTC)

I'm not going to respond to the entire wall of text above, I suggest you try condensing your response into a paragraph or two. Yes, the pages were different sizes, and I never said they were the same size: one was 211,018 bytes, one was 282,555 bytes, and one was 210,990 bytes. At the time of userfication the page was 203,864 bytes. Obviously the length/scope issue has not been remotely addressed. "Editors should look at the dates on these pages to recalculate time"? The content was userfied on 11 June 2013 and deleted on 25 August 2017. That's over four years. If you want to argue that the MfD nomination was factually incorrect then I suggest you look at the MfD nomination itself and not something the nominator once wrote on your talk page. This isn't the place to redo the MfD, or to rehash content disputes going back years. DRV is here to decide if there were any irregularities with the deletion, or to consider any new information/evidence which was not considered by the discussion to see if the issue should be reopened. Hut 8.5 06:53, 1 September 2017 (UTC)

• Comment, since I was pinged with your mention of my name. Let me make one thing clear John: I did not fabricate a concern with your editing behavior because your editing is concerning. I take a look at your contributions since 2012, which started with you editing the Operation Red Hat article, and not much has changed between now and then and you operate on the same level of a single purpose account. You have only edited a small handful of article topics and I can't look through your editing history and find an example of you making major changes to an article and then not having a major dispute on the talk page. Your contributions have either been deleted outright, reverted partially or debated upon heavily. That is concerning. I told you back in 2013 that was concerning because I took a single reference you supplied, which was used several times in your writing, and it wasn't factually accurate according to what the references said. That is a large reason why the article was deleted in the first AFD. You are more than welcome to start over, find references and provide content in the main space of the article on Operation Red Hat if it is missing by using reliable references. You don't need your old user space for it and honestly it isn't worth trying to "fix it." After five years, I trust you know how to do it better than you did at the start, so start over and let it go. Regards, — Moe Epsilon 05:12, 1 September 2017 (UTC)
• Comment I would endorse Moe Epsilon's statements. While I really do not think it's my place to comment one way or another at this DRV, the list of editors that have raised significant concerns about Johnvr4's editing includes Anotherclown and BrownHairedGirl, as well as myself. Buckshot06 (talk) 05:30, 1 September 2017 (UTC)
• Comment: not commenting on the appropriateness of the deletion at this stage, but reading through the various pages that are linked to this case gives me pause for concern. John: please consider how the language you use to characterise other users' actions can impact upon them and how it influences neutral editors reading your concerns. For instance, PMC made an honest mistake in providing you with an incorrect link and instead of accepting that and moving on, you vilified her. Equally, the way in which you ascribe motivations to other editors also concerns me. WP:AGF is part of the five pillars. I understand that you are frustrated but the way in which you are characterising other editors and their actions here is a problem. Regards, AustralianRupert (talk) 13:14, 1 September 2017 (UTC)
• Comment: I thank you for your comments above. Not only were the drafts different sizes, they had entirely different content on different subjects. One third of the initial draft had been moved out my sandbox in the last few months per editor concerns (especially the nominating editors concern) and there was still material enough for two or three more articles. My rough estimate of the sizes: -User:Johnvr4/Operation Red Hat had 28,000 words (36,000 words include 250 references) while -User:Johnvr4/sandbox has 20,000 words (35,832 words include 177 references). Of that: 8500 words devoted to Red hat and 9333 words devoted to Red Hat & Okinawa herbicides (with 900 words already in the process of being cut long before the nomination.

I have no idea why Buckshot06 would even attempt to endorse Moe's sentiments given these conversations [5], [6] where he was made fully aware of both his (and Moe's) AfD judgement error. In addition, Buckshot06 simply resurrected an old version that (as of today) it looks like I wrote about half of-But I not write it [7] while Moe, says this,"I take a look at your contributions since 2012, which started with you editing the Operation Red Hat article, and not much has changed between now and then". It's just silly..

The time comment (also irrelevant to deletion policy) was about the age of my edits to move material out from my sand box and into main articles. Please look at those dates before making assertions that the draft material was not being condensed. Please let us look at the draft again if there are perceived sourcing issues or other concerns after it is restored. Buckshot06 and I have long argued about that content and the use of sources and each others motivations. We both want to improve the article but have very different versions of what those sources present which again is no reason to nominate for deletion the version I am still actively working on and that is entirely constant with majority/minority factors that come from those sources. Perhaps my comments about characterizations were misunderstood. There are Facts (either from sources or in XfD) and there are editors assertions about those facts- which are two separate things. One should look at our past disagreements in comparison to what reliable sources say. I am certain that no editor has time for it but if they did, they would know my frustration comes from Buckshot06's inability to acknowledge what the reliable sources that are cited say to determine relevance while he'll say I won't listen. This has borne out numerous times. I am frustrated but that not the excuse for requesting undeletion or in a perception of not assuming good faith. I am not good with formal processes. Any lack of respect is from long hours of senseless heated disagreement over content which according to WP policy is not a reason to delete it. I spent a lot of time on improving many articles and taking the valid concerns of other editors into consideration- especially with breaking up the draft into several articles because it was too big. That is clearly evidenced in my recent edits to those pages and comments to support each change when challenged despite each assertion to the contrary. Moe's four year old concern of "cooking stuff up in my spare time" that caused the page deleted was bogus as were those of several others. Moe accused me of inserting dubious text about night moves of chemicals that I had absolutely nothing to to with. The entire edit history that would prove this was deleted this week in MfD. If a TempRestore request were granted, the diffs would clear it up all for us. This comment may also help clarify the date and time calculation as well as the alleged intent to leave it my userspace in perpetuity. I proved that and this week provided a brand new source that addressed the four year old concern anyway. If Moe or any other editors want to take another look at the giant truckload of new sources published on the subject, newly added references or my use of them since its original deletion then I would welcome that. The new sources would disprove all concerns about relevance. If they don't then I'm am open to modifying it and I'm sure there are still many mistakes to find and fix before it is finished. For the record BHG's concern was strictly about four year old stuff and Buckshot06 interpretation is of her statement well... Well, it's right here:[8]. PMG and I are Okay- I think. I don't think vilify was the correct word, It was entirely accidental on her part but I in fact did list and quote the guiding WP policy in previous deletion/undeletion discussions. I also spent a lot of time looking for DRV at DR which also frustrated me even more and the one link on my talk page (the one I kept clicking on and following...) wasn't fixed. If any one was offended by my comments, let us please understand there are long-standing content disputes over this material with the nominating editor that do not appear remotely resolved. I appreciate the concerns expressed above and I will try to govern the language in my assertions accordingly. Johnvr4 (talk) 15:05, 1 September 2017 (UTC)

• I feel able to endorse this deletion because WP:MfD does have a criterion for "they have lingered in userspace for an extended period of time without improvement to address the concerns that resulted in their deletion at AfD". However, a lot of the discussion above is inappropriate for this venue. If there are significant concerns that Johnvr4 is a single-purpose account, then there are places to talk about that ---- but they don't belong on DRV. We are here to review decisions about the deletion of content.—S Marshall T/C 17:27, 1 September 2017 (UTC)

• Going off on a slight tangent ---- am I right in thinking we couldn't have applied that reasoning to a draft? The phrasing at WP:MfD strongly indicates that the criterion used only applies in other people's userspace. Reviewing this MfD has shown me that we need much better and tighter rules about deleting drafts.—S Marshall T/C 17:27, 1 September 2017 (UTC)

Thank you S Marshall. That observation is not a tangent at all. For what it is worth, I provided and stated the relevant WP:STALEDRAFT policy here User_talk:Premeditated_Chaos#Deletion_of_userspace_material as the first step of Review and I also told Buckshot06 the same thing over nine months ago. "In a RfC held in March 2016, the community held the view that drafts have no expiration date and thus, cannot and should not be deleted on the grounds of their age alone. In another RfC held in April 2016, the community made the following decisions...

Should old user space drafts have an expiration date? "There is consensus that userspace drafts should have no expiration date. They can be deleted, but it should be done on grounds different than solely the age of the draft or the period the draft has not been edited."

(Also WP:UP/RFC2016 RfC for stale drafts policy restructuring)

In my view, that decision negates the initial nomination and both of the WP:votes cast that were used to delete it at WP:Miscellany_for_deletion/OpRedHat Thank youJohnvr4 (talk) 20:54, 1 September 2017 (UTC)

Well, I'm sorry, but the fatal flaw in that argument is that the deleted material wasn't in draft space. It was in userspace (and thus I endorsed the deletion).—S Marshall T/C 21:08, 1 September 2017 (UTC)

I'm not sure I follow your reasoning about a "fatal flaw" as WP:USER (and WP:ABOUTSAND) policy clearly covers userspace drafts and the userspace drafts are what I am requesting to be restored. Userspace drafts and the policies that govern them are the thing we are discussing here. Again, Should old user space drafts have an expiration date? "There is consensus that userspace drafts should have no expiration date..." If possible, could you please clarify the "fatal flaw" reasoning so we can understand your position? Perhaps I am missing something. Johnvr4 (talk) 01:33, 2 September 2017 (UTC)

Per MfD, userspace drafts that were userfied from deleted AfD articles may be considered for deletion if "they have lingered in userspace for an extended period of time without improvement to address the concerns that resulted in their deletion at AfD." That is the argument that the MfD hinged on, not simple staleness/age. ♠PMC♠ (talk) 02:43, 2 September 2017 (UTC)

• Exactly so. My "tangent" was to say we could do this in userspace but I couldn't see any equivalent rule that would apply to draft space; the implication being that we need to tighten our rules on draft space.—S Marshall T/C 13:40, 2 September 2017 (UTC)

I see the problem now. The flaw in that argument (and of the nominator) is that time components are not relevant to deletion, extended period of time is not defined and has absolutely no deadline in policy *Wikipedia:Drafts#Deleting_a_draft "Drafts that have not been edited in six months may be nominated for deletion under criterion for speedy deletion WP:G13 but there is a rough consensus against the alternative proposal to delete draft namespace redirects after six months." (see WP:ABANDONED where editors are encouraged "to Make use of Wikipedia:Miscellany for Deletion to search for stale drafts that are put up for deletion. MfD does not get a lot of participation, so please vote on entries." Votes are not consensus) Under G13, the drafts should have been WP:REFUNDed here: [9], Any contention that I have made thousands of edits to that sandbox draft and none of them improved it (which has been culled by 1/3 in the last few months) or that the new pages I created or updated directly from the draft material (again in the last few months) did not improve Wikipedia is simply absurd and it could not possibly assume good faith on my part. I provided examples of those pages and links to that material and diffs and the approximate word count page sizes after the moves the prove it was being condensed and moved to other main pages. Next the reasons for AfD deletion and the efforts to address them were discussed above with specific examples of an issue that caused it to be deleted at AfD was resolved with a new source literally minutes before it was nominated for deletion. WP:ATD-I has user space vs name space drafts, when to move/delete and speaks of a policy change as of August 2017 where "incubated articles require keep-alive edits every few months to avoid deletion, which is not an issue if the draft is retained in user space." Can anyone elaborate on last months policy change?

The nominator also left a message on my talk page (Reasons for deletion of your sandbox) that where he admitted his confusion that WP:STALEDRAFT applies, made the faulty Fake article assertion again where he again falsely accuses me of intending to leave each draft there indefinitely which is patently false. Per his assertion of WP:FAKEARTICLE: "When a userspace page reaches a point where it can be included as an article..." Yet he wants it deleted because it in not ready, or does meet the policy definition of article just yet and most importantly he doesn't agree with content.

Please note that he admitted to me in his recent message that the entire issue that brought this action "was disputed content" Where WP:Deletion policy is that "It is also inappropriate to request deletion because of an editorial dispute. Such disputes are not resolved by deleting the whole page; instead, use dispute resolution". Johnvr4 (talk) 14:03, 2 September 2017 (UTC)

• Request: Temprestore Johnvr4 (talk) 14:22, 2 September 2017 (UTC)
• Request: Any editor asserting that the sandbox draft material was not being improved recently needs to state for the record that they have reviewed the WP:PAGEHIST and Diffs of the sandbox and the user page (they both started identical to each other) and of the pages listed above where the sandbox material was moved to as well as the dates of those moves. Johnvr4 (talk) 14:22, 2 September 2017 (UTC)
• Comment:I assert for the record that the sandbox draft material being improved- recently (1.5 hours before it was nominated for deletion). Any contention that it wasn't is false. Johnvr4 (talk) 14:16, 2 September 2017 (UTC)

Test edit for diffs

Red Hat deployment operations YBA, YBB, YBF
Part of Cold War
The location of Okinawa Prefecture and the Ryukyu Islands
Type	Strategic deployment
Location	Chibana Depot, Okinawa, Japan
Planned	1961
Planned by	Edgewood Arsenal, U.S. Department of Defense
Commanded by	General John Joseph Hayes
Objective	Chemical weapon deployment from U.S. to Japan
Date	Activation began: December 1, 1962 (1962-12-01) YBA: April 1963 to May 1963 YBB: October 1963 to May 1964 YBF April 1965 to May 1965 Red Hat mission ended: November 29, 2000 (2000-11-29)
Executed by	U.S. Navy, U.S. Army Technical Escort Unit, 267th Chemical Company)
Outcome	U.S. chemical agents deployed to Okinawa, Japan under Project 112
Casualties	none

Operation Red Hat

For other uses, see Red Hat (disambiguation).

See also: Japan and weapons of mass destruction, Chemical Corps, United States chemical weapons program, and Unconventional warfare

U.S. chemical weapons were stored on the island of Okinawa from the early 1950s until 1971. Additional shipments of Project RED HAT chemical weapons under Project 112 were made in the early 1960s and arrived in increment operations code-named YBA, YBB, YBF.

A series of accidents and incidents led to changes in public perception, policy changes, and new laws that governed redeployment of weapons of mass destruction and their reduction and eventual destruction. According to former Okinawa High Commissioner Lt. Gen. James B. Lampert, "Operation Red Hat was one of the U.S. military’s most controversial and emotionally charged projects.” Debate and controversy about the impact of that legacy continues today.

Prior to 2012 the U.S. military action "RED HAT" generally referred to the internationally publicized 1971 redeployment of the 267th Chemical Company and all chemical weapons from Okinawa to Johnston Atoll in the central Pacific Ocean under Operation Red Hat. A document discovered in 2012 shows that the 267th Chemical Platoon, then stationed on Okinawa, had the mission of operating Site Two, for DoD Project 112 and the materials delivered and stored in the Red Hat storage area (RHSA) for this purpose have clouded the full scope of the Red Hat mission.

The basing of U.S. weapons of mass destruction in Japan includes nuclear weapons, Project 112, and the Red Hat military operation. The WMD legacy includes national security sites, surveillance, military occupation, forced leasing of civilian-owned land, environmental contamination, public deception, military defoliants, anti-crop agents, and biological warfare research. Each of these subjects have added to the controversy surrounding the history of weapons of mass destruction formerly kept on Okinawa.

The RED HAT Mission 1961-2000

Background

Seal of the U.S. Army Chemical Corps. Insignia consists of a cobalt blue, Benzene ring superimposed over two crossed gold retorts

Following World War II Okinawa was kept for its nuclear deterrence and strategic importance during the Cold War. From the early 1950s the United States Army forward-deployed nuclear and chemical weapons on Okinawa in response to North Korean aggression and allegations of use of chemical weapons by the communists. Counter allegations were linked to U.S. covert biological warfare research involving WWII axis war criminals from Japan and to alleged biological attacks launched from Okinawa.

Counterinsurgency techniques and intelligence lessons were honed on Okinawa from experiences in Korea and Vietnam. Covert research that included both biological agents and chemical agents for anti-crop use as well as defoliants was conducted on Okinawa in support of crop-destruction and defoliation operations during the war in Vietnam. The Okinawa research was conducted in the early 1960s and was linked to Project 112. From 1962-1974 the United States Department of Defense carried out a secret overseas large-scale Chemical, Biological, Radiological (CBR) test program called Project 112 which included large scale land and sea-based field tests such as Project SHAD under the command of the Deseret Test Center. Project 112 included research, development, logistics and evaluation programs as well as the staged forward deployment and storage of newer munitions and agents such as VX nerve gas.

A biography of General John Joseph Hayes, the commanding officer responsible for overseeing the Red Hat mission, explained that some of the poisonous agents brought, stored, and later removed from Okinawa under Operation Red Hat, had been present on the island since at least 1952. Hayes had served in the early 1960s as deputy commander of the United States Army Research, Development and Engineering Command and had a long-lasting influence in chemical and biological field programs.

U.S. Military documents show that during 1953 U.S. biological warfare planning and exercises such as project BROWN DERBY had proven the logistical feasibility of supplying antipersonnel biological attack munitions to an overseas Air Force with only a 5-day notice. The same year the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved in principle the shipment of "toxics" to United States Army Forces in The Far East (USAFFE) with implied approval for the shipments from U.S. Army Forces in Europe (USAREUR) without the knowledge of other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nations.

Declassified U.S. documents show that Japanese intelligence officials visited Rocky Mountain Arsenal in 1962 just prior to the initial Red Hat deployment of 1963 and were aware of the chemical weapon deployment and storage arrangement on Okinawa.

A secret cable revealed that Defense Agency chief Yasuhiro Nakasone met with U.S. Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird in the United States on September 14, 1970 where Laird had said poison gas was deployed to Okinawa in 1962 upon a recommendation from Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. Laird disclosed to Nakasone that the U.S. had intelligence information that North Korea was in possession of chemical weapons. The chemical weapons stored in Okinawa, despite being a closely guarded secret, would serve as a deterrent to first use in the region. The cable was released to the public in 2015 when The Japan Times reported that the declassified Japanese diplomatic documents showed that in 1970 the U.S. government told the Japanese Government that it was storing chemical weapons in Okinawa based upon an understanding that North Korea possessed equivalent weapons. Laird continued that the belief that North Korea was in possession of these arms was no longer valid and that the U.S. chemical munitions being stored on Okinawa would soon be transferred to Johnston Atoll.

In 2017, North Korea used VX nerve agent at Kuala Lumpur International Airport in Malaysia to assassinate Kim Jong-nam the estranged elder half-brother of Kim Jong-il.

Origin of code name

Further information: Operations security

In the early 1960s, a system of using code names came back into use. The deployment plan to bring new chemical weapons to Okinawa was reportedly formulated in 1961. The same year, a request for a code name without any significance to toxic munitions was submitted by Edgewood Arsenal to the office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence. However, in 1953 Operation Top Hat concerned human test subjects in localized chemical, biological, or radiological field testing and research in decontamination.

U.S. Department of The Army Emblem incorporates a red Phrygian cap, often called the Cap of Liberty, which is supported on the point of an unsheathed sword

According to the 1971 U.S. Army film Operation Red Hat: Men and a Mission, The meaning of the RED HAT code name was very highly classified when it was first assigned on November 12, 1962 by the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence during the planning to deploy chemical agents to the 267th Chemical Platoon on Okinawa. The RED HAT name was assigned from an operational security code book, and "probably by a little old lady in tennis shoes working at the Pentagon." The Red hat deployment increments to Okinawa and their associated rail moves were assigned code names Operations YBA, YBB, and YBF.

The "RED HAT" name stuck after it was revealed in 1969 and remained in use for the redeployment operation to Johnston Island. "RED HAT" remained in use for an additional three decades throughout the chemical agent surety mission and demilitarization operation at Johnston Atoll.

Nerve agents Sarin and VX gas underwent dispersal testing including tests in tropical and jungle environments as part of the Project 112 field test program. Project 112 incorporated plans for large-scale field trials of nerve gas and other aerosolized agents in a tropical rain forest environment. The tests included "Red BEVA" (Biological EVAluation), "Red Cloud," "Red Oak," and "Red Oak II."

Certain allegations involving the use of RED HAT nerve agents during the war in Southeast Asia in Cambodia were dubbed "RED CAP".

Historical lexicon and iconography

Main article: Phrygian cap § Use in American iconography

In the lexicon of the Cold War era, "Red" was frequently understood to mean communist. Sarin was a nerve agent that could be used as either an incapacitating agent or as a lethal agent. During the War in Southeast Asia, "Sleeping gas" was understood to be a euphemism for Sarin. Sarin nerve agent was stored on Okinawa under project "Red Hat" until 1971.

In antiquity, a stylized red hat known as a Phrygian cap was a symbol of freedom from slavery and tyranny by the Greeks and Romans, and later by revolutionaries in France and the Americas. Accordingly, the Phrygian cap is sometimes called the "Cap of Liberty." In artistic representations and on flags, it signifies freedom and the pursuit of liberty. The red cap has been incorporated into the Seal and emblem of the United States Department of the Army which was also known as the "War Office Seal" where the color red in the seal denotes courage, zeal, and fortitude. Another example of the artistic use of the red Cap of Liberty is when Washington Irving's character Rip Van Winkle awakens from his long sleep in his now strange and incomprehensible post-Revolutionary War-torn village, and one of the first things he sees is something that looks like a red night cap on top of a tall naked pole and an unfamiliar flag with an assemblage of stars and stripes.

Deseret Test Center Logo with globe in aerosol cloud

Pre-deployment organization 1961-1963

Main article: Deseret Test Center

Two Chemical Corps Intelligence Agency staff members toured selected U.S. intelligence agencies in Japan, including in Okinawa, during 1961 (the third quarter of financial year 1962). The purposes of thier trip was to establish liaison with the Chemical Corps personnel, reemphasize the importance of CBR intelligence, provide on the spot guidance and discuss the establishment of a U.S. Army Chemical Corps Information and Liaison Office in Tokyo. Soon after, the Deseret Test Center was established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to administrator, Project 112, a research and development program for chemical and biological weapons that included field testing of agents.

The late author Sheldon H. Harris in Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Warfare, 1932–1945, and the American Cover Up wrote:

The test program, which began in fall 1962 and which was funded at least through fiscal year 1963, was considered by the Chemical Corps to be "an ambitious one." The tests were designed to cover "not only trials at sea, but Arctic and tropical environmental tests as well." The tests, presumably, were conducted at what research officers designated, but did not name, "satellite sites." These sites were located both in the continental United States and in foreign countries. The tests conducted there were aimed at human, animal, and plant reaction to Biological Warfare. It is known that tests were undertaken in Cairo, Egypt, Liberia, in South Korea, and in Japan's satellite province of Okinawa in 1961 or earlier.

On April 17, 1963, President Kennedy signed National Security Action Memorandum 235 (NSAM 235) authorizing:

Policy guides governing the conduct of large-scale scientific or technological experiments that might have significant or protracted effects on the physical or biological environment. Experiments which by their nature could result in domestic or foreign allegations that they might have such effects will be included in this category even though the sponsoring agency feels confident that such allegations would in fact prove to be unfounded.

Japan Group I-63 consisting of high-ranking Japanese Military, Chemical Section and Japan Defense Agency personnel, visit Rocky Mountain Arsenal, September 6 to 10, 1962.

Japan Group I-63 at Rocky Mountain Arsenal prior to Red Hat deployments

The structure of agreements regarding U.S. deployment of WMDs to Japan during the Cold War or the existence of U.S. weapons of mass destruction that were based in Japanese territory and on the island of Okinawa also allowed the Japan government to deny knowledge of these activities. In the early 1960s, Robert S. McNamara and the Kennedy Administration had secretly authorized the transfer of additional chemical weapons to a base in Okinawa, reportedly without informing any Japanese authorities.

However, prior to the Red Hat deployment, Rocky Mountain Arsenal (RMA) was visited by a Japanese military intelligence delegation. From September 6 to 10, 1962, Japan Group I-63 visited Rocky Mountain Arsenal. The Japan Group was briefed on arsenal production activities and conducted an orientation tour. The I-63 Group consisted of Major General Fujio Sato, Deputy Commandant, Fuji Combined Arms School; Major General Teruto Kunitake, Deputy Chief of Staff, Western Army Headquarters; Colonel Hideo Toyama, Chemical Chief, Chemical Section, Ground Staff Office; Mr. Taisaku Furuhata, JDA-3, Japan Defense Agency; and Major Tomomi Ando, Interpreter, U.S. Army.

The visit occurred within weeks of the training at the RMA by members of the 267th Chemical Company before the unit was deployed to Okinawa for the Red Hat project and the operation of Site 2 for Project 112.

RED HAT chemical munitions deployment operation to Okinawa as Project 112 Site 2

The 267th Chemical Platoon's mission was the operation of Site 2, DOD Project 112. Project 112 tests on Okinawa are not acknowledged by the United States Department of Defense.

On December 1, 1962, the 267th Chemical Company was activated on Okinawa as the 267th Chemical Platoon (SVC). Though the following description of the chemicals is known to be incomplete, just as NASM 235 was signed by President Kennedy, secret shipments for the Red Hat project, which were code named increment Operations YBA, YBB, and YBF brought chemical projectiles, rockets, bombs, mines, and Bulk 1-ton liquid containers reported to be Sarin (GB), Agent VX and distilled mustard agent from Concord Naval Weapons Station in Concord, California, to Chibana Army Ammunition Depot in Okinawa, Japan. The transfer increments included accompanying rail moves from Edgewood Arsenal (EA), Maryland; Tooele Army Depot, Utah; Rocky Mountain Arsenal, Colorado; Umatilla Depot Activity, Oregon; and Pueblo Depot Activity, Colorado to the port of departure at Concord Naval Weapons Station.

• Operation YBA – USNS Private Leonard C. Brostrom (T-AK-255) carried the first movement of the Red Hat chemical weapons to Okinawa from the Continental United States in April 1963. This was also referred to increment YBA, DoD Project 112 which arrived in Okinawa in May 1963.

• Operation YBB – USNS Private Leonard C. Brostrom carried the second movement of the Red Hat chemical weapons to Okinawa departing in October 1963. According to documents, it arrived some seven months later in May 1964. Available records do not explain why the transport took seven months to reach its destination.

• Operation YBF – USNS Private Francis X. McGraw (T-AK-241) carried the last movement of the Red Hat chemical weapons to Okinawa in April 1965. The final increment arrived in May 1965. The voyage lasted less than one month.

During shipment of increment YBF, there were 35 reported incidents which either resulted in, or might have resulted in, a spill or an injury. The most potentially disastrous incident occurred while the Francis X. McGraw was moving out of San Francisco harbor. The ship was reportedly carrying air to ground rockets and artillery projectiles of distilled Mustard and Sarin when another ship turned across its bow resulting in a near collision. The ships cleared each other by approximately 600 feet.

Although many details of the initial Red Hat deployment operation have been released, official records are incomplete. Because records have been lost or are still classified, it is not entirely clear which chemical, biological, or toxin agents that munitions transfers YBA, YBB, and YBF actually delivered to Okinawa.

A biography of former Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird reveals that an additional shipment of 5000 tons of chemical munitions to Okinawa was planned by Kennedy but was apparently never executed by his successors. Munitions transfers labeled 'YBC', 'YBD', and 'YBE' potentially fit into both the deployment transfer operation naming convention and the 1964–1965 time frame. Additionally, the deployment of Red Hat agents to Okinawa from Concord, California, required only three shipments, while stowage techniques due to safety concerns during the removal of chemical weapons from Okinawa to Johnston Atoll in 1971 required six shipments.

The stockpile, held at Chibana Army Ammunition Depot in what was known as the Red Hat Storage Area (RHSA), was reported to contain over 13,000 tons of chemical weapons, consisting of 2,865 tons of mustard weapons, 8,322 tons of Sarin weapons, and 2,057 tons of VX weapons. Chibana Army Ammunition Depot, adjacent to Kadena Air Base, was reorganized into the Kadena Ammunition Storage Area.

Use of CBW agents stored in Okinawa in field use and testing

Top Secret: Project 112 U.S. cover story; Foreign Affairs and Defence committee Canberra, Australia, May 18, 1965, U.S. recommends use of herbicides and pesticides as cover for Project Deseret CBW testing activities.

Allegations involving the covert use of biological agents from Okinawa in Korea (1951-1954)

Main articles: Allegations of biological warfare in the Korean War and MKULTRA

Okinawa bases were implicated as sortie launching points for germ and insect attacks on North Korea during the Korean war. The allegations of biological warfare in the Korean War included forced confessions and press statements of U.S. aircrew members such as Colonel Frank H. Schwable who had implicated U.S. airfields on Okinawa in attacks in Korea. The allegations and assertions are to this day still a matter of debate. The public allegations by captured U.S. servicemen led to indictment upon the mens release and return to U.S. that were later dismissed. The confessions led to intelligence studies of Chinese methods of brainwashing and the development of new interrogation techniques by the Central Intelligence Agency called QKHILLTOP. An investigation by the U.S. Congress revealed these techniques were eventually explored with additional development in MKULTRA. Members of Unit 731 were implicated in the allegations.

Allegations involving the covert use of anti-crop BW agents from Okinawa in Vietnam

Main article: United States military anti-plant research

See also: T-2 mycotoxin

Various researchers have shown that "ingestion of moldy grains that are contaminated with Trichothecenes has been associated with Mycotoxicosis. Rice blast or Pyricularia oryzae produces a mycotoxin called Tenuazonic acid that has been implicated in both human and animal disease." Wannemacher and Wiener note that "the rust-colored Rice Blast fungus is a disease of wheat and barley in Japan and is prevalent in the region that faces the Pacific Ocean. In the suburbs of Tokyo, an illness similar to "red mold disease" was described in an outbreak of a food borne disease, as a result of the consumption of Fusarium-infected rice. Trichothecenes Mycotoxin is a toxin that can be extracted from Wheat Stem Rust and Rice Blast and can kill or sicken, or incapacitate depending on the concentration of toxin. T-2 toxin from Trichothecenes, including nivalenol, deoxynivalenol, and monoacetylnivalenol (fusarenon-X) from Fusarium nivale, can be isolated from moldy grains and is suspected as a biological toxin agent also known as Yellow rain in Laos and Vietnam."

Following U.S. Military spraying missions during the war, the Vietnamese population near the spray tracts began to complain of various health concerns that they had never experienced after their families had been living in the area for many generations. They reported that they were faint, sick, vomiting, bled from the mouth and nose, had migraine-like headaches, and numbness in their extremities and that their livestock were also sickened and some had died from the chemicals. Further, it was said that the U.S. had deliberately introduced "chemical bacteria" into the spray which could penetrate peoples bodies and cause disease. In 1967, Saigon newspapers including Dong Nai, published reports about "a new birth abnormality", that was called "egg bundle-like fetus." An article followed revealing stillborn births with photographs of grotesquely deformed fetuses and dead infants. "The Saigon government argued that these birth defects were caused by something they called 'Okinawa bacteria' however, the U.S. dismissed these complaints as communist propaganda."

RED CAP: Allegations involving the use of RED HAT Chemicals from Okinawa in Cambodia (1968)

See also: Operation Tailwind and Operation White Wing

On August 6, 1969 the Associated Press disclosed that 50 containers of what was reported to be a lethal paralyzing gas was stolen from a U.S. depot on Okinawa during the previous week. The depot was not further identified and a spokesman claimed that the missing gas was very similar to those agents and gasses used for riot control.

During the war in Southeast Asia, chemical units as well as military civilian scientists were deployed to Vietnam. The 267th Chemical Company received two Meritorious Unit Commendations in part for participation in operations in SE Asia from February 1966 to August 1967 and July 1, 1970, to December 31, 1971. The New York Times, on May 8, 1970, reported that Sarin gas, had been stored at Bien Hoa Air Base in Vietnam. Former Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird, told The Associated Press that the U.S. military did ship, "a small amount of Sarin nerve gas to Vietnam in 1967, but never used it."

Unofficial "War Patch" of Detachment B57 "Project GAMMA" 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1970

On August 8, 1970, several publications including The Dispatch News Service reporting from Saigon as well as the Swedish newspaper, Dagens Nyheter reported cases of limited test usage of incapacitating agent or nerve gas on covert missions against communist forces in "safe havens" just outside the borders of Vietnam. Reports revealed that gas had been used in Cambodia during 1968 as an extension of a research and development project reportedly named "Waterfall" and "Red Cap."

On March 19, 1970, journalist Tom Marlowe of the Dispatch News Service in Saigon conducted an interview with Captain Arthur Jennings of the 5th Special Forces Group Combined Intelligence Center in Vietnam over a four-day period. The interview resulted in a transcript and a newspaper article submission that ran the following August.

According to the interview, the research and development division of the Department of Defense were in 1968 conducting a series of experiments with VX, a more persistent type of nerve gas at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal, long known for its vast stockpile of chemical munitions and gases. The research project was called Waterfall. The experiments were going on secrecy and had been in progress for several months. There was one drawback, the scientists had relatively little data on the actual effects on a combat target- specifically on the large concentration of troops. They had information on dispersal effects of the gas, the expected concentration level at Ground Zero, and estimates on climate conditions around the world in relation to humidity. In short, they were basing these tests on conditions in a tropical environment.

Jennings continued, the special forces in Vietnam received permission from the Pentagon to provide them with specific target information of known North Vietnamese Army (NVA) base areas along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in northeastern Cambodia for the possible use of these weapons in a test. The military "Operation Red Cap" was born even though it was on a contingency basis. If the Pentagon was satisfied that the information on these targets was accurate and there was little chance of populated civilian areas would be hit, then the okay would be given and the Air Force would make the bombing run and drop the gas canisters.

The interview revealed that prior to the drop, one of the detachments inside of Cambodia was ultimately given the assignment of getting all of the target data. The work proceeded for a few weeks when it was discovered there was a security break and that information concerning B57s' activities for the RED CAP operation were being photographed. Two Vietnamese agents working with the B57 team had been photographed speaking to high-level enemy commanders or were in possession of instant camera photographs of members of the B57 team with both their cover names and real names written on them. It was this security breach that led to the elimination of enemy double agents Inchin Hai Lam and Thai Khac Chuyen.

According to the interview details of "Red Cap" emerged after Special Forces members of a Phoenix Program MAC-V Studies and Observations Group (MAC-V SOG) B-Team, who were working in conjunction with "cowboys" from the Central Intelligence Agency's Special Activities Division were implicated in the disappearance of a foreign agent working for them. The commander of 5th Special Forces Group Col. Robert B. Rheault and seven members of Detachment B57 operating in Cambodia under Project GAMMA were arrested following the elimination of enemy double agent Thai Khac Chuyen. Col. Rheault served as inspiration for Col. Kurtz in the film Apocalypse Now.

Jenning's continued, the controversy over the colonel's going to jail provided a nice cover, so the work on RED CAP went on uninvestigated. Behind the scenes of the controversial stores in the papers over TV and radio, Operation RED CAP had proceeded as planned and two 50 kg steel containers, each containing an explosive charge to shatter the casing at a preset altitude and release the deadly nerve compound gas VX. Shortly after the drop had been made, the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MAC-V) was alerted by the Department of Defense to issue confidential bulletins to high-level military commanders in the field. The bulletins warned the commanders to be alert for an unusually virulent epidemic of 'malaria' on the K2 Front.

The eight were eventually released and the charges eventually were dismissed because the Central Intelligence Agency feared that an open trial with open testimony would be extremely dangerous to the national security and refused to provide testimony in open court. The interview revealed that by this time, RED CAP, in effect, was an actuality as the gas had been dropped. Jennings added, if the trials were carried out and the background information concerning RED CAP made it out of its folders stamped top-secret, the U.S. might have to admit to the world that it had used nerve gas in land warfare.

A related murder charge concerning Special Forces Detachment B57 with similar circumstances to the killing of Thai Khac Chuyen followed the elimination of enemy double agent Inchin Hai Lam. The media referred to these cases as the "Green Beret Affair." All charges were eventually dismissed or overturned. Veterans who were originally implicated in alleged use of gasses in Southeast Asia have refuted any knowledge of a lethal gas attack and have disputed similar allegations.

Related missions

Project GAMMA was also responsible for an intelligence and surveillance operation against Prince Norodom Sihanouk who was the Cambodian head of State. The intelligence operation, was called "CHERRY" and according to participants, was actually part of a 'rogue' CIA assassination mission, should the need ever have arisen to use it in that role.

Logo of Seventrees Corporation

CIA also ran a project called "OAK." Project "OAK" was targeted against the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), which was the main Viet Cong (VC)/(NVA) headquarters running the war. "OAK" also targeted POW camps in Cambodia and South Vietnam (COSVN was located in Cambodia). Another project of the CIA was "PINE." Projects associated with Detachment B-57, GAMMA, and the CIA's "trees" program included Cherry, Pine, Oak, Apple, Peach, Elm, and Fir. After retiring, Theodore G. Shackley who had served as former Associate Deputy Director of Operations of the United States Central Intelligence Agency and Saigon station chief was the founding partner of Seventrees Corporation. The company advertises "special security services with a global matrix of information sources, investigators and consultants" including "current and former investigators and interrogators of the CIA." Another company was Seventrees Limited which was run by Paris Theodore and manufactured lethal weapons and assassination gadgets for the CIA's Technical Services Division until the Church Committee hearings into CIA operations in 1975 where he testified during a closed session that led to the United States House Select Committee on Assassinations in 1976. Other CIA run operations into Cambodia were "Nantucket," "Vesuvius One," "Sunshine Park," and "Gunboat." All these operations had a priority mission of finding information about Caucasians in enemy areas who might have been Americans who were Missing in Action (MIA) or Prisoners of War (POW), defectors, or Soviet intelligence advisers.

Among the 141 experiments falling under Projects 112 and SHAD in the information and "fact sheets" officially released by DoD are listed "Red Oak I," "Red Oak II," "Big Piney," and "Pine Ridge." While the "Red Oak I" and "Pine Ridge" tests were completed and concerned use of nerve gases VX, and Sarin and incapacitating agent BZ in a tropical environment, no record of results exist from the "Big Piney" or "Red Oak II." The documentation states that for this reason, the Department of Defense has declared that these tests were either never conducted or were cancelled.

Project 112 development and DTC 69-14 test of Red Hat munitions (1969)

Main article: Project 112

Project 112, Phase II, 'Item 7', outlined biological and chemical agent dissemination devices for special forces, while 'Item 8' included anti-crop weapons systems for all branches and the Aero 2A aerial spray tank as TX agent (stem rust) disseminator". Crop destruction experiments were carried out in Florida using F-4 Phantom fighters to dispense pathogenic biological agents under the aegis of Project 112. Top secret documents released by Australia indicate that the United States government recommended the use of aerial herbicide and pesticide spraying as a cover to conceal Project 112 activities if observed.

On March 27, 1969 twenty-five 750lb. sarin-filled MC-1 bombs from the Red Hat chemical munitions stored in Okinawa were placed in special containers sent from the U.S. and taken by truck convoy from Chibana Army Ammunition Depot to Kadena AFB. The munitions were secured on nine pallets where they were placed aboard a C-141 and flown through Hawaii to Dugway Proving Ground for an operational test and evaluation program under Project 112's Deseret Test Center (DTC) test 69-14.

1968 near miss at Chibana Depot

Main article: 1968 Kadena Air Base B-52 crash

See also: U.S. nuclear weapons in Japan's southern islands §  B-52 crash at Kadena

B-52 #55-103 Crash site, Kadena, AFB, Okinawa, November 19, 1968

Tens of thousands of artillery projectiles at Chibana Army Ammunition Depot, September 1969

On November 19, 1968, a U.S. Air Force Strategic Air Command (SAC) B-52 Stratofortress (registration number 55-01030) with a full bomb load, broke up and caught fire after the plane aborted takeoff at Kadena Air Base, Okinawa. The burning aircraft came to rest near the edge of the Kadena's perimeter, some 250 meters from the Chibana Ammunition Depot and exploded. The plane's 30,000-pound (13,600 kg) bomb load detonated and caused a blast so powerful that it created an immense crater under the burning aircraft some thirty feet deep and sixty feet across. if the plane become airborne, it would have crashed directly into the Chibana ammunition storage depot, which stored ammunition, bombs, high explosives, and ten of thousands artillery shells and is now known to have held warheads for 19 different atomic and thermonuclear weapons systems in the hardened weapon storage areas.

Okinawans had correctly suspected at the time that the Chibana depot held nuclear weapons. Chibana depot also included 52 igloos in the Red Hat Storage Area containing Project Red Hat's chemical weapons and presumably Project 112's Biological Agents. The crash sparked fears that another potential disaster on the island could put the chemical and nuclear stockpile and the surrounding population in jeopardy and increased the urgency of moving them to a less populated and less active storage location. The B-52 Crash at Kadena Air Base led to demands to remove the B-52s from Okinawa and strengthened a push for the reversion from U.S. rule in Okinawa. A subsequent WMD accident on Okinawa was widely reported and involved nerve agents as well as an unexplained illness in the island's children near the leak. Project 112, a chemical and biological program, may have been the actual nature of the Red Hat operation Officials dispute that that biological agents were ever stored overseas.

Okinawans and Veterans are currently left with more questions than answers about the true nature of the poisonous agents brought to Okinawa.

1969 nerve agent leak

Rabbit is used as detector to check for leaks of Sarin at nerve gas production plant, Rocky Mountain Arsenal, March 20, 1970

On July 8, 1969, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird received a message informing him that rabbits were dead at Chibana. Laird knew the rabbits were housed in the Chibana chemical weapons depot on Okinawa and understood the implications of the message. Rabbits, were found to be very susceptible to nerve agents so were selected as biological monitors to detect nerve gas leaks and kept in close proximity to nerve agent munitions. It was learned that 23 servicemen and one civilian working in the Red Hat Storage Area on Okinawa were exposed to nerve agent after one weapon began to leak following maintenance by the 267th Chemical Company who were preparing to repaint using a sand blasting treatment. The sand and cleanup material from the accident remained in storage on Okinawa and then at Johnston Atoll for more than 30 years.

On July 18, 1969, The Wall Street Journal printed a story revealing that about 25 people were injured in a release of agent VX inside a weapon storage igloo at Chibana Army Ammunition Depot (OKC) on Okinawa during the previous week. In addition, the leak exposed the secret stockpile of chemical weapons present on Okinawa which was reported to be unknown to Japanese authorities. Twenty-three servicemen and one civilian were injured and required medical care for up to a week. A total of 24 persons were kept briefly under medical observation. U.S. forces would not initially confirm or deny which leaking agent was involved though it was reported to be agent VX and officially explained to be Sarin gas. In addition to disclosing Okinawa's chemical munitions, the Wall St. Journal article discussed the islands nuclear weapons, B-52s, the MGM-5 Corporal, MGM-29 Sergeant missiles. Dr. Steven J. Allen writes that "contrary to The Wall St. Journal’s claim – “Leak at U.S. Base Fells 25” – only four persons were hospitalized, briefly, and none with serious injuries."

As a result of the gas leak, residents throughout the area were required to evacuate their homes for up to two months.

The Wall Street Journal article also revealed a previous instance of possible chemical, biological warfare (CBW) contamination when over 100 Okinawan children became mysteriously ill after swimming near a U.S. base in the summer of 1968. It was later reported by Stars and Stripes that 230 Okinawan children were affected and some were hospitalized with severe burns after swimming near the village of Gushikawa on Okinawa. Only days later, Associated Press and Kyodo News Service in Tokyo published that officials from the Okinawan Council against Atomic and Nuclear Weapons submitted a report that the United States military had been experimenting with chemical and biological agents in the Okinawan Prefecture since 1963 and at four locations including the Ukibaru Jima Range in the Ukibaru islands using rabbits, rats, and goats. Steve Rabson, Professor Emeritus of East Asian Studies at Brown University writes that:

Even after removal of the weapons began by ship the following year to Johnston Island in the Pacific, Okinawan employees at the base observed white smoke rising from the depot, and suffered pain in their eyes and throats. A 1971 Government of the Ryukyu Islands investigation report concluded that the residents’ continuing complaints of eye pain, skin irritation, and coughing, as well as the inexplicable withering of local plants, were likely associated with the nearby weapons in the storage depot.

Smoke rising from Chibana in 1971 can be seen in images from the film Operation Red Hat : Men and a Mission.

Operation YZU had brought the final movement of then current chemical weapons stocks to West Germany in June 1967. The reports of a nerve gas leak on Okinawa were followed by a West German admission that American chemical agents were also stockpiled in Germany.

Public opposition to WMDs on Okinawa and in the U.S.

Red Hat Operation Noborikawa Village, Okinawa January 1971

Growing protests over the U.S. Army's role in Vietnam, the use of defoliants, the use of riot control agents both in Southeast Asia and in the U.S. heightened concern for preserving the environment and marked the beginning of the public hostility toward chemical and biological weapons. Three events particularly galvanized public attention: the Skull Valley sheep kill incident at Dugway Proving Ground, Utah; dumping at sea during Operation CHASE (Cut Holes And Sink 'Em); and the Red Hat nerve gas accident on Okinawa.

Originally, it was planned that the munitions and gas would be moved from Okinawa to either Guam, Hawaii, Alaska, or the United States. Hawaii and Guam had large populations that could be exposed to agents in an accident. Bringing the Red Hat chemical weapons to Korea, Taiwan, Philippines, Saipan, Tinian, Hawaii and Guam were all rejected as well as any plan of dumping the entire supply of chemicals at sea or destroying them in an underground nuclear detonation (along with Agent Orange) which was also under consideration.

Truck convoy moves nerve agent through Chibana weapon storage area during Operation Red Hat

Congress passed public Law 91-121 requiring a review of any Red Hat redeployment plan. One plan for redeployment into the U.S. included gas being unloaded at Naval Submarine Base Bangor in the state of Washington, and moved by rail to Portland and then eastward to Umatilla Chemical Depot, but this never happened due to public opposition and political pressure as the Governor of Oregon sought an injunction to block the shipment. A decision was then made to move the chemical agents to the Naval Operating Base, Kodiak, Alaska. As a result of this plan, legislation called the Magnuson amendment to block the funding to move chemicals was submitted to stop that shipment too.

On January 12, 1971, Congress passed an amendment (Public Law 91-672) to the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968 to prohibit the transportation of chemical weapons from the Island of Okinawa into Washington, Oregon, or Alaska. Due to public pressure throughout the U.S., the law prohibited the transfer of nerve agent, mustard agent, Agent Orange, and any chemical munitions located in other countries into any U.S. states. Public Law 91-672 further directed the U.S. Department of Defense to destroy these chemical weapons outside the United States. This law required the decision to bring the chemical weapons removed from Okinawa to Johnston Atoll but would still not allow funding for the relocation which was subsequently paid for by the Japanese government.

Most of Operation Red Hat land movements were to take place on newly built base roads that were paid for by Japan so routes would avoid the islands population as well as protestation of the operation by the Okinawans, who resented the presence of the American military and especially nuclear and chemical munitions on the island. Safety was the primary concern during the operation however several local complexities including rush to complete the mission, the heat, an empty reservoir, water rationing, and a tense political situation added to the difficulty in planning which were all part of Operation Hat. The day after Public Law 91-672 was passed, the first shipload of blister agent chemicals from Okinawa left for redeployment on Johnston Atoll.

1971 Operation RED HAT chemical munitions redeployment to Johnston Island

Operation Red Hat (1971 redeployment)
Part of Cold War
Location of Johnston Atoll in the Central Pacific Ocean
Type	Strategic redeployment
Location	Chibana Depot, Okinawa to Johnston Island 16.7234°N 169.5393°W / 16.7234; -169.5393 (Red Hat Storage Area)
Planned	1969
Planned by	U.S. Department of Defense
Commanded by	General John Joseph Hayes
Objective	Redeployment of chemical weapons
Date	Began January 13, 1971 (1971-01-13), Ended September 27, 1971 (1971-09-27)
Executed by	U.S. Navy, U.S. Army Technical Escort Unit, 2nd Logistical Command, 267th Chemical Company, 531st, and 412th Transportation Company
Outcome	U.S. chemical agents stored in Okinawa were redeployed to Johnston Atoll
Casualties	none

The redeployment operation had been planned in 1969 but was delayed over the difficulty in finding a suitable storage location. In 1970 the United States Army leased 41 acres (170,000 m²) on Johnston Atoll to store chemical weapons from Okinawa. The initial phase of Operation Red Hat involved the movement of some of chemical munitions from the Chibana Army Ammunition Depot storage sites on Okinawa to Tengan Pier, 8 miles (13 km) away. The second phase of the removal operation transferred the remaining munitions to Johnston Atoll by ship. The operation was conducted by the units assigned to the U.S Army 2nd Logistical Command and included the 267th Chemical Company, 531st Transportation Company, and 412th "Port" ["Terminal Services" or 412th Transportation] Company. Relocating the chemical weapons from their storage bunkers at Chibana to Tengan Peir required 1332 trailers in 148 convoys.

The ocean transportation portion of the Red Hat operation, used a shipping route sometimes dubbed "Kalama Express" and was overseen by the U.S. Army Technical Escort Unit (TEU) or "Tech Escort", also known as the Technical Service Unit (TSU) (now 20th CBRNE Command) who also provided additional training to members of the 267th Chemical Company on handling and storing the munitions on Johnston Atoll.

An Air Force Special Airborne Medical Care Unit (SAMCU), supported Operation Red Hat as well as a Navy diving team, Harbor Clearing Unit One (HCU-1) from the USS Grapple (ARS-7). In late June, assistance was requested in conjunction with Operation RED HAT in Okinawa. HCU-1 departed Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, for Okinawa July 6, 1971, in support of Operation Red Hat. The team of HCU-1 divers and all necessary equipment including compressors and hard hat diving rigs was air shipped to Okinawa. For the next two months, HCU-1 personnel in conjunction with explosive ordinance disposal (EOD) personnel were on continuous standby should their services be required in the event any of the dangerous chemicals being shipped were lost. By mid-September operations were complete and the dive team returned to Pearl Harbor on September 15, 1971.

USNS Sea Lift (T-LSV-9) with nerve agent at Tengan Pier, Okinawa, in July 1971 during Operation Red Hat

External videos
Operation Red Hat
Operation Red Hat : Men and a Mission (1971) Operation Red Hat: Men and a Mission (1971). The film shows the transfer of American chemical munitions from Okinawa to Johnston Atoll in 1971. Footage reveals that in 1962, Edgewood Arsenal was involved in a classified operation to ship toxic munitions to Okinawa under the code name "Red Hat."

Phase I of the removal operation took place in January, 1971 and reportedly moved a convoy of nine semi-truck trailers with approximately 150 tons of munitions and containers filled with distilled mustard (HD), a purified blister agent to Tengen Pier and then to Johnston Atoll.

• USNS Lt. James E. Robinson (T-AK-274) departed from Okinawa on January 13, 1971 and arrived at Johnston Atoll with the first load of Mustard agent projectiles January 22, 1971.

During the land portion of Phase II an additional 1,213 truck convoys delivered the chemical munitions from the Chibana Red Hat Storage Area to a new temporary Red Hat Storage area about 1 mile (1.6 km) from Tengan Pier to be placed under the command of the U.S. Army Garrison Hawaii (USARHAW). Phase II involved moving the remaining 12,500 tons of chemical munitions including additional Mustard agent (HD), nerve agents Sarin (Agent GB), and Agent VX, were moved onto ships where they were transported to Johnston Atoll on five additional voyages. The sea voyage parts of Phase II, arrived at Johnson Island between August and September 1971 completing the chemical munitions cargo discharge from Tengan Pier in Okinawa to Johnston Atoll.

Morale pin issued to Operation Red Hat participants in 1971

• USNS Sea Lift (T-LSV-9) arrived at Johnston Island on August 3, 1971, carrying Agent HD.
• Private Francis X. McGraw arrived at Johnston Island on August 18, 1971, carrying Agent GB.
• USNS Sgt. Andrew Miller (T-AK-242) arrived at Johnston Island on August 29, 1971, carrying Agent VX.
• Sea Lift arrived at Johnston Island on September 4, 1971, carrying Agent GB.
• Private Francis X. McGraw arrived at Johnston Island on September 19, 1971, carrying Agent GB.

During the loading of Sea Lift in August 1971, one pallet of 15 M55 chemical agent-filled rockets was accidentally dropped approximately 40 feet into the hold of the vessel from a crane. Although subsequent examination showed that some of the rockets had been severely damaged, no spill occurred, and there was no harm to operators or the general public.

Completion of cargo discharge from the Private Francis X. McGraw at Johnston Island on September 21, 1971 completed the munitions transport phases of Operation Red Hat, and the 276th Chemical Company completed redeployment to Johnston Atoll on September 27, 1971.

Red Hat chemical storage and demilitarization 1971-2000

Main articles: Johnston Atoll and JACADS

Johnston Island Launch Emplacement 1 after a Thor missile launch failure contaminated the island with Plutonium during the Operation Bluegill Prime nuclear test, July 25, 1962

Johnston Atoll was one of America's national nuclear test sites. In 1971 the US Army began using 41 acres of Johnston Island for chemical weapons storage in bunkers known as the Red Hat Storage Area (RHSA) or simply known as the "Red Hat Area" downwind of an area of the Atoll officially called the Radiological Control Area, but was known as "The Pluto' Yard" because it had been heavily contaminated with highly radioactive weapons-grade Plutonium from failed nuclear weapon launches. The island was left contaminated after the recovery and cleanup operations following the failure of three PGM-17 Thor ballistic missiles during the Starfish and Bluegill Prime test launches under Operation Fishbowl.

One-ton chemical containers during Operation Red Hat, 1971

Chemical weapons were stockpiled on Johnston Atoll beginning in 1971 with the weapons transferred from Okinawa during Operation Red Hat. The chemical weapons brought from Okinawa included nerve and blister agents contained in rockets, artillery shells, bombs, mines, and one-ton (900 kg) containers. Prior to the beginning of destruction operations, Johnston Atoll held about 6.6 percent of the entire U.S. stockpile of chemical weapons.

In 1985 the U.S. Congress mandated that all chemical weapons stockpiled at Johnston Atoll, mostly mustard gas, Sarin, and VX gas, be destroyed. All munitions on Johnston Island were to be destroyed by the Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System (JACADS) which was the first demonstration full-scale demilitarization plant built since the signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention by the United States. The first weapon disposal took place on June 30, 1990. Transition from the testing phase to full-scale operations began in May 1993, and in August full-scale operations began. Twice, in 1993 and 1994, the facility had to be evacuated because of hurricanes; operations were delayed for as long as 70 days during these periods. On December 9, 1993, a spill of about 500 pounds (226 kg) of Sarin (Agent GB) occurred inside the Munitions Demilitarization Building (MDB). There was no agent migration outside the building and the contingency plan was not activated. The facility suspended processing of munitions until investigation of the incident was satisfactorily completed.

The Red Hat Storage Area, (RHSA) at Johnston Island

In August 1998 the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) approved modification of a U.S. Army permit for the creation of a temporary storage area at the Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System (JACADS) on Johnston Island. The action allowed the transfer of about 50,000 gallons (189 kL) of hazardous wastewater stored in 244 old and corroded single-sided, one-ton capacity cylindrical containers into safer double-walled one-ton capacity containers. The old wastewater containers originally came from Okinawa, Japan, which the Army had stored outside on Johnston Island since 1971. EPA was concerned that without action, the old containers would have degraded and begun leaking their contents.

Operation Red Hat challenge coin commemorating 30th year of mission

241 of the old wastewater containers held decontamination solution that was used to clean containers that were filled with nerve (GB and VX) and mustard blister agents (HD) as well as components of several other older chemical agents that had been mislabeled or were otherwise not expected to be present such as Lewisite, an organoarsenic compound. The other containers held contaminated sand, laboratory waste, or other contaminated wastes.

In 1999 the contents of the wastewater containers were sampled. The traces of chemical agents detected in clean up material removed from Okinawa in 1971, including Sarin (GB), sulfur mustard (HD), Lewisite, and breakdown products of VX scientifically confirmed the presence of Agent VX on Okinawa as reported in newspaper accounts at the time.

On November 29, 2000, the last of the chemical weapons at JACADS was disposed of. The last disposal operation destroyed more than 13,000 VX filled land mines. Two years after the last chemical weapons at JACADS were destroyed, the Army submitted the plan to dismantle the facility to the EPA; it was approved in September 2002.

Disclosure of CBW testing on Okinawa

Main article: Project 112 § Criticisms after disclosure of CBW testing

It is beyond dispute that biological agents were tested in Okinawa during the early 1960s by the U.S. Army. Limited or redacted information on sea and land tests of chemical and biological agents held at locations such as Utah, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico have previously been disclosed the U.S. government. Several documents of the U.S. biowarfare program that describe the testing of pathogenic biological agents on the island have been declassified but Okinawa has not been publicly acknowledged by the United States Department of Defense as a testing location for biological agents.

During the highly controversial Operation Tailwind investigation, it was revealed by the U.S. Air Force that sarin filled bombs were removed from the RED HAT stockpile in Okinawa in 1969 and flown back to the U.S. for a Project 112 test at Dugway Proving Ground. The fact sheets for Project 112 and Project SHAD that have been released by the U.S. Department of Defense list neither RED HAT, RED CAP nor any biological research activity on Okinawa. However, officially released documents of Projects 112 and SHAD do not list Okinawa in that program nor do they list Red Hat.

The 2002 National Defense Authorization Act (Public Law 107–314) required DoD to disclose of all test locations and information concerning human exposures to chemical or biological agents whether they were part of Project 112 or not. However information concerning the U.S. military chemical warfare and biological research on Okinawa remains closed to researchers pending declassification.

The Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library holds former Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird's documents, files, and microfilm with the subject entitled Chemical Warfare and Biological Research in Okinawa. As of 2017 the large majority of these documents remain classified to date.

However, new details of the Red Hat project and the mission of the 267th Chemical Platoon emerged in 2012 when documentation was rediscovered. According to the rediscovered document, the true mission of the 267th Chemical Platoon on Okinawa was the "Operation of Site 2, DOD Project 112," for the Department of Defense (DoD) under a guise of Red Hat.

Agent Orange

During the 2000s controversy over the storage of Agent Orange on Okinawa in association with the Red Hat operation became a prominent subject in the news media.

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Development of U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine on Okinawa

(1950-1961) Military Intelligence

Main article: Military intelligence

See also: United States Army Security Agency

The Island of Okinawa was known as "The Keystone of the Pacific" to U.S. strategists and as "The Rock" to U.S. servicemen. Cold war activities on Okinawa were critical to America's ability to fight the spread of Communism or wage war in Asia. Okinawa has long been viewed as a stepping-stone to force open the remainder of Japan and Asia. Commodore Perry's gunboat diplomacy expedition to open Japan to U.S. trade began in Okinawa in 1852. By the early 1950s and the outbreak of the Korean War, Okinawa was seen as America's Gibraltar of the Pacific.

During the Korean war, the USAF flew in its two best test pilots including the famous aviator, C. E. "Chuck" Yeager to evaluate the MiG-15. In the skies above Okinawa the plane's performance, flight characteristics, and capabilities were extensively studied and compared against America's leading jet fighter, the F-86 Sabre to discover the MiG's design weaknesses and develop new tactics to exploit them. By the 1960's the jungles of Southeast Asia served as an operational laboratory to develop new unconventional warfare technology methods and build upon the lessons of guerrilla warfare techniques learned in Korea. Subsequently, a number of specialized training facilities were opened to share this knowledge. The training involved counterinsurgency tactics, intelligence gathering, and covert operations designed to identify and eliminate opposing political and paramilitary groups. Training took place in scores of continental U.S. bases and schools as well as at overseas facilities in the Philippines, Okinawa, and Germany.

President Dwight D. Eisenhower appointed a Joint Study Group in 1960 to find better ways for organizing the nation's military intelligence activities. Eisenhower ordered them to develop a concept plan that would integrate all the military intelligence of the DoD. Acting on the recommendations of the Joint Study Group, Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) of his decision to establish the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) during the spring and summer of 1961. The JCS published Directive 5105.21, "Defense Intelligence Agency" on August 1, 1961, and DIA began operations in October. In late 1962, DIA established the National Defense Intelligence College (now the National Intelligence University) in Washington.

Protests over the U.S. military footprint on Okinawa and the forced leasing of civilian-owned land for U.S. national security sites still continues on Okinawa. Reporters without borders formally complained in 2016 about the reported surveillance of Okinawan protestors as well as secret files kept on journalists who cover sensitive topics and controversies related to U.S. bases.

(1957-2011) Central Security

See also: Central Security Service and United States Army Intelligence and Security Command § History

Seal of the Central Intelligence Agency

The 1st Special Forces Group (1st SFG) was established in Japan in 1957 under Office of Strategic Services veteran Col. Frank Mills. Various secret units were assigned to to the 1st SFG which was then sent to Okinawa. A CIA team conducted demonstrations of "CIA (UW) peculiar items" for unconventional warfare during 1958 for Army Special Forces at the 1st Special Forces in Okinawa, 77th Special Forces at Fort Bragg, N.C.; and the 10th Special Forces in Bad Tolz, Germany. According to Army Field Manual FM 31-15, Operations Against Irregular Forces, May 1961, "Terrain and the dispositions and tactics of guerrilla forces furnish excellent opportunity for the employment of chemical and biological agents and riot control agents. Operations against irregular forces should evaluate the feasibility of chemical and biological operations to assist in mission accomplishment." Several U.S. Army field training manuals have similar instruction.

The Central Intelligence Agency once had it own unique logistics channel for exotic hardware such as wiretap devices, sensors, and suppressed weapons. CIA owned C-123 aircraft, U-2s, and other aircraft were based in Taiwan. A CIA training base was set up on Okinawa and in Saipan, where CIA had its own cargo ship in Guam for support. A Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) memo dated November 1961 states that the Army had established a depot on Okinawa for pre-stocking essential non-air-transportable supplies for use in Vietnam, but recommends that pre-stocking agreements be reached with the governments of Thailand and Vietnam.

Sobe Communications Site

The village of Chinen was appropriated by the United States in 1948 for the purpose of building a secret Central Intelligence Agency operated logistics base, under U.S. Army cover, known as Camp Chinen. Camp Chinen was closed after it was exposed in The Pentagon Papers The Pentagon Papers revealed a 1961 memo to General Maxwell Taylor from General Edward Lansdale a high-ranking U.S. Air Force officer assigned to the CIA which states that a CIA support base in Okinawa at Camp Chinen housed a covert prison, in addition to a paramilitary training, research and logistics facility. The memorandum read:

CIA Okinawa Support Base:

"Okinawa Station is in itself a paramilitary support asset and, in critical situations calling for extensive support of Unconventional Warfare (UW) activity in the Far East, could be devoted in its entirety to this mission. Located at Camp Chinen, it comprises a self-contained base under Army cover with facilities of all types necessary to the storage, testing, packaging, procurement and delivery of supplies-ranging from weapons and explosives to medical and clothing. Because of it being a controlled area, it can accommodate admirably the holding of black bodies in singletons or small groups, as well as small groups of trainees..."

SR-71 'Habu' over Okinawa, Japan circa 1970

"The National Security Agency has emphasized that Okinawa is at the 'forefront' of its intelligence activities." An article devoted to Okinawa in a 2003 issue of the National Secuity Agency's publication Signal Intelligence Today that was disclosed by Edward Snowden revealed that between 1963 and 2006 the Naval Security Group's Sobe AN/FRD-10 "elephant cage" in Okinawa was responsible for locating and interception of the major portion of material processed by the NSA's station in Hawaii. Wikileaks reveled that communications of members of Japan's Government were being intercepted between 2003 and 2011.

Japan is a third Party to the UKUSA Agreements in which the Japan and the U.S. share specific intercepted information including radio signal direction finding information. Signals intelligence (SIGINT) information from facilities in Japan have supported directly, planning for nuclear war, as well as planning during both the Korean and Vietnam Wars. Japanese involvement in U.S. SIGINT activities in Japan has reportedly been limited although one collaborative surveillance project was revealed by Edward Snowden.

Kadena AFB served as home base for surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft such as the Lockheed U-2 and variants of the SR-71 Blackbird however those on the Okinawa were nicknamed 'Habu' after a venomous snake native to the island. The Lockheed A-12 began arriving at Kadena from Area 51 in March 1968. The Air Force and CIA operated the A-12 and SR-71 from Okinawa which flew covert reconnaissance missions to North Korea, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia under Operation Oxcart and Project Black Shield.

(1952-2016) Counterinsurgency doctrine on Okinawa

Main articles: Counter-insurgency § United States, and Foreign internal defense § United States

Training of counterinsurgency forces in December 1971

In excess of 19,000 acres (7,700 ha) of the Yanbaru Forest were turned over to the U.S. Marine Corps for a jungle war training ground on the northern portion of the island in 1952. Marines had been training for anti-guerrilla operations in the Northern Training Area of Okinawa since at least 1958. The first explicitly counterinsurgency school opened on Okinawa in 1962. Foreign paramilitary forces were brought to Okinawa to learn US doctrine. Prior to 1961 Special Forces participation in the Vietnamese counterinsurgency was limited to the temporary Mobile Training Teams dispatched from Okinawa to assist in the training of Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) units. Logistical aid in support of the Special Forces and CIDG programs efforts in Vietnam was provided by newly created U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Support Office (CISO) which was established on Okinawa on February 27, 1963. Testing and use of herbicides, chemical, and biological agents reportedly occurred on Okinawa in and around the Northern Training Area, including the Yanbaru and Kunigami and Higashi villages. The Northern Training Area on Okinawa is operated as Marine Corps Jungle Warfare Training Center. A majority of the Yanbaru Forest was returned to the Government of Japan in December 2016.

Counterinsurgency doctrine leads to introduction of crop-destruction and defoliation herbicides in S.E. Asia (1961-1971)

Main article: Herbicidal warfare

The introduction of herbicides into the armed conflict in Vietnam represented an application of a new technique for modern warfare. Their use in a defensive role was for defoliation but their use in offensive roles was for crop denial. It was also understood that the use of atomic bombs against Japan and the charges of germ warfare in Korea would add to the difficulty in dealing with the political backlash of using unconventional weapons and tactics in Vietnam which had to be considered in any future discussions about the use of crop destruction. By the Summer of 1962, policy makers a the U.S. State Department had understood the key drawback to the concept. "The way to win guerrilla war, basically, is to win the people. Crop destruction runs counter to this basic rule.

By the time President John F. Kennedy took office in 1961, the U.S. military possessed a fairly well-developed arsenal of herbicidal agents. Military advisers as well as the herbicides sent to Vietnam by the U.S. were brought under the cover of a civil assistance program to the Republic of Vietnam. South Vietnam and CIA were the original requesters for use of defoliants and crop destruction operations in South East Asia until covert operations in Vietnam were taken over by Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). The Military Assistance Advisory Group became Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MAC-V) in 1961. Project AGILE was set up by the Advanced Research Projects Agency (now DARPA) in 1961 as a study of defoliation and crops destruction for counterinsurgency in Vietnam. AGILE was responsible for the initial DoD application of defoliants which had been requested for operational use by Military Assistance Advisory Group in March 1962.

Defoliant spray run, part of Operation Ranch Hand, during the Vietnam War by UC-123B Provider aircraft

President Kennedy personally gave the approval in principle for the start of Operation Hades on November 30, 1961. For a year afterward, all herbicide targets to be sprayed by U.S. aircraft had to receive specific Oval Office approval, and it was not until late in 1962 that President Kennedy delegated limited authority to order herbicide missions to his ambassador and military commander in South Vietnam.

A large sea shipment of military herbicides could not be easily hidden from the International Control Commission (ICC). Ambassador Frederick Nolting was concerned that when the shipment of chemicals for use in defoliation arrived by commercial ship consigned to the Military Assistance Advisory Group, he would be unable to fit it under an existing ICC credit or justification of title. He therefore recommended that these chemicals be manifested as civilian cargo consigned to the United States Operations Mission (USOM) in South Vietnam, exempting them from inspection. "Civilian" aircraft and crews to apply the chemicals would, he felt, be necessary to maintain consistency with "civilian" chemicals. He noted that both MAAG and USOM favored this course of action. A declassified memo to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs dated December 1961, states that chemicals for defoliation and crop control be shipped and delivered to the United States Civil Operations Mission (USOM), the civil advisory effort in Vietnam as "agricultural material" if deemed necessary by the State Department or the Military Assistance Advisory Group (USMAAG); if such cover was not deemed necessary then normal Military Assistance Program (MAP) procedures would apply.

A 1961 executive order of President Kennedy created the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). To the public, USAID provides civil aid to foreign countries. The assistance is typically food and agriculture support to third world countries or disaster-affected areas. However, during the War in Southeast Asia USAID was often used for cover by agents of the CIA to the point that each became nearly synonymous. The USAID mission has included providing police and paramilitary training and surplus or military-grade equipment to control insurgent activity.

The U.S. Civil Operations Mission in Vietnam was called Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) after 1967. Details under MACV Directive 525-1 governed all herbicide use by both US and Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF) troops between 1965 and 1970. In 1968, after the use of herbicides agents in defoliation was restricted, the use of those same restricted herbicides for base maintenance was allowed. As a result of restrictions and limitations placed on use of herbicides and soil sterilants, Repairs and Utilities Command contractors were ordered to suspend use of these agents. Headquarters, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam subsequently determined that the chemical control of weeds and grasses in engineer grounds-maintenance programs is a normal non-tactical Repair and Utilities function and not subject to the restrictions and guidelines placed by that command on aerial defoliation missions over tactical zones. Accordingly, the use of dioxin containing herbicides and plant growth retardants was reinstated at all Repair and Utilities and contractor-supported installations and sites. Selected standard-issue agents were authorized for use on a routine basis, and all applications were made with hand-type or power-operated ground equipment. Though, helicopter spraying of U.S. bases and perimeters was authorized until December 1971.

Logo of the "Air Wing" of The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL)- Office of Aviation, U.S. Department of State

Defoliation and crop destruction resumed for a short time before the program in Vietnam ended during controversy over concerns about its teratogenic properties. The U.S. embassy in Saigon cautioned against aerial spraying or equipping the Vietnamese (RVNAF or GVN) with such a capability, stating that the general belief was that herbicides are an American weapon and dangerous to health and food crops. A study of the program based upon solid evidence that was required by congress failed to clearly establish a military value for defoliation. For U.S. troops still occupying bases throughout RVN, the continued the use of herbicides for vegetation control was necessary past the Presidential deadline of December 1, 1971.

By June 1971, herbicide agents were no longer being sent to Southeast Asia. Surplus stocks of Herbicide Orange in Vietnam and Mississippi as well as the two ingredients of Orange that were stored in Texas became a disposal problem. After the war in Southeast Asia, tactical-use Agent Pink which contained 2,4,5-T and dioxin was sent for base maintenance usage at Naval airfields. USAID exported and sold military surplus DDT and the ingredients to make Super or Enhanced Orange (Tordon, 2,4,5-T and 2,4-D) to developing counties such as Tanzania after the chemicals had been banned for use in the United States and Vietnam due to safety concerns. The U.S. State Department's Air Wing provided dioxin-contaminated C-123K spray aircraft formerly used by U.S. Forces in defoliation operations in South East Asia to other countries in order to spray for illegal narcotics under the U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotic Matters (INM).

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Much of the island of Okinawa has been sprayed by U.S. aircraft dispensing toxic chemicals that tend to stay in to environment. During the Second World War limited aerial spray tests did occur on some Japanese-controlled islands to demarcate navigation points and to remove dense tropical foliage. Despite their availability during WWII, aerial chemical delivery systems for herbicide application were not widely implemented in the Pacific theater. The technology was, however, employed at many locations including Morotai, Palau, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa in an effort to rid regions of strategic importance of disease-carrying vectors. Vector-borne disease (malaria, dengue, filariasis, and fly-borne dysentery) was the major cause of lost man-hours for the Army Air Corps in the Pacific during WWII.

Copper acetate arsenite (Paris Green dust) and military strength formulated dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (DDT) were among the insecticides used in the Pacific to destroy adult and larval vector populations. Lead iodide was released in weather control experiments, while lead arsenate, Paris green, DDT or other pesticides were air-delivered for insect control of the island.

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Controversy over Okinawa Agent Orange and Operation Red Hat

Main article: Agent Orange § Okinawa Japan

External videos
Defoliated Island, Agent Orange, Okinawa and the Vietnam War (2012) English edition

Agent Orange is incinerated aboard MT Vulcanus during Operation Pacer HO, 1977

Operation Pacer IVY (InVentorY) was an U.S. Air force operation that collected Agent Orange in South Vietnam and removed it in 1972 aboard the ship M/T Transpacific for storage on Johnston Atoll. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) reports that 1,800,000 gallons of Herbicide Orange was stored at Johnson Island in the Pacific and 480,000 gallons at Gulfport Mississippi. Research and studies were initiated to find a safe method to destroy the materials and it was discovered they could be incinerated safely under special conditions of temperature and dwell time.

However, these herbicides were expensive and the Air Force wanted to resell its surplus instead of dumping it at sea. Among many methods tested, a possibility of salvaging the herbicides by reprocessing and filtering out the 2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin (TCDD) contaminant with carbonized (charcoaled) coconut fibers. This concept was then tested in 1976 and a pilot plant constructed at Gulfport, Mississippi. The Air Force requested permits for both methods of disposition. The disposal of the dioxin contaminated charcoal filter material became an insurmountable problem and no state would permit land filling or incineration. The filters later had the dioxin content extracted and the purified TCDD was placed in a weapon storage igloo within the Red Hat Area of Johnston Atoll.

Rusting Agent Orange Barrels at Johnston Atoll, circa 1976

From July to September 1977 during Operation Pacer HO (Herbicide Orange), the entire stock of Herbicide Orange from both storage sites at Gulfport, Mississippi and Johnston Atoll was subsequently incinerated in four separate burn events in the vicinity of Johnson Island aboard the Dutch-owned waste incineration ship MT Vulcanus.

At the direction of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, an official statement was made by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers, to Congressman and Okinawa veteran Lane Evans in response to his investigation on the subject of whether Agent Orange was stored or used on Okinawa. The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) response to Representative Lane Evans included an enclosure from the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) listing 18 Agent Orange and Operation Red Hat Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) document numbers and titles from August 1969 to March 1972. When these documents were requested under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in request NW36609, NARA responded with a November 3, 2011 denial letter explaining that "they had previously seen this list of documents on Operation Red Hat, often accompanied with verbiage noting that it came from the Joint Staff, but are unable to locate a series with such contents. Further causing confusion is the fact that series of the Joint Staff typically have three digit file identifiers, but those on the list have four-digit identifiers."

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Official Records

Leaking Agent Orange Barrels in storage at Johnston Atoll circa 1973

Plans for storing and disposing of herbicide agents with the more deadly chemical agents at Johnston Atoll required some amount of study. The records of Agent Orange and Operation Red Hat became intertwined when Red Hat chemicals were brought to Johnston Atoll in 1971 and stored with Agent Orange in 1972. Veterans searching for evidence to support their accounts of herbicide use on Okinawa were instead given a description of partially classified Operation Red Hat documents at NARA. The US defoliation and anti-crop programs were originally under the aegis of Fort Detrick biological warfare laboratory followed by CIA's Special Operations Group and the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MAC-V).

National Archives and Records Administration enclosure of Agent Orange/ Red Hat Documents provided to Congress in 2003 by Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers

Summary Report: Conference on Compatibility of RED HAT and Herbicide Orange with Readiness Activities on Johnston Island, Defense Nuclear Agency, Kirtland AFB, summarizes a 1972 meeting associated with the compatibility of Agent Orange and chemical weapon storage activities with missile and aircraft operations. Concern was generated when portions of the depot holding the Red Hat chemicals as well as nuclear weapons in Okinawa was nearly destroyed when a bomb-laden B-52 caught fire and exploded at Kadena AFB in 1968. NBC's series First Tuesday three-part episodes on poison gasses notes that publicly, a small plane crash near Denver's airport and one mile from Rocky Mountain Arsenal's nerve gas storage area generated concern about an air crash into a poison gas depot.

Michelle Gatz holds the logbook of the USNS Schuyler Otis Bland (T-AK-277)

The logbook of the USNS Schuyler Otis Bland (T-AK-277) was found by Minnesota-based Veteran Service Officer Michelle Gatz in 2012 and showed that the ship carried classified cargo to Okinawa that was offloaded under strict security in the spring of 1962. The ship's logbook recorded that it docked in Naha on Feb 2 and subsequently at White Beach, a U.S. Navy port on Okinawa's east coast on April 25 and Naha on May 19, 1962. According to Gatz, Schuyler Otis Bland had previously brought classified cargo including anti-plant agents under the guise of "agriculture products" to Vietnam and Okinawa. U.S. Air Force documents state that 20,000 gallons of anti-crops agents were already in the S.E. Asian theater prior to any defoliation agents being shipped from the United States in 1962. The first major defoliation herbicide shipment arrived in Vietnam in January 1962. Defoliation testing of targets continued during September and October 1962 using Agent Purple while crop destruction targets were sprayed in November 1962 using Agent Blue. The Schuyler Otis Bland carried the second shipment of defoliation chemical Agents Pink and Purple to South East Asia. Documents state that both shipments had been available to be flown in by the Department of Defense and Department of State for use in an emergency defoliation mission in Vietnam during January and February 1962 According the Gatz, it was possible for herbicides in Vietnam or Thailand to be air-delivered from Okinawa in barrels if necessity was urgent. Systematic testing of herbicides and calibration of herbicide delivery systems continued for several years

An Ecological Assessment of Johnston Atoll, a 2003 publication produced by the United States Army Chemical Materials Agency states that "in 1972, the US Air Force also brought about 25,000 55-gallon (208L) drums of the chemical, Herbicide Orange (HO) to Johnston Island that originated from Vietnam and was stored on Okinawa."

In September 1971 U.S. Army Fort Detrick, Maryland, the center for the Pentagon's bio-chemical weapons research, produced a report titled Historical, Logistical, Political and Technical Aspects of the Herbicide/Defoliant Program The document summarized the military's usage of Rainbow Herbicides during the Vietnam War and among the locations cited is a reference to "Herbicide stockpiles elsewhere in PACOM (United States Pacific Command)- U.S. Government restricted materials Thailand and Okinawa (Kadena)."

Excerpt of U.S. Army 1971 Fort Detrick report describes Herbicide stockpiles of U.S. Government restricted materials on Okinawa at Kadena Air Force Base, in Thailand, and Vietnam.

A 2003 publication from the United States Army Chemical Materials Agency reviewing of the impact of the military contamination on Johnston Island entitled An Ecological Assessment of Johnston Atoll, reads, "In 1971, the US Army began using 41 acres of Johnston Island for chemical weapons storage in bunkers in an area known as the Red Hat Area." the report continues stating, "in 1972, the U.S. Air Force also brought about 25,000 55-gallon (208L) drums of the chemical, Herbicide Orange (HO) to Johnston Island that originated from Vietnam and was stored on Okinawa." An Ecological Assessment of Johnston Atoll was re-discovered in 2011.

The documents are controversial because despite numerous searches and assertions by the Department of Defense that, there were no records in their possession and no records anywhere else that would substantiate these claims, the records were originally located in Department of Defense records or publications or subsequently, the National Archives and Records Administration. The publication An Ecological Assessment of Johnston Atoll was found on the Department of Defense's Chemical Material Agency website. The report was posted among a collection of records for JACADS, the chemical weapon disposal facility on Johnston Atoll that disposed of the Operation Red Hat chemicals. The sentence concerning proof of the herbicide stockpile at Kadena AFB on Okinawa and Thailand was found in Fort Detrick's 1971 environmental report Historical, Logistical, Political and Technical Aspects of the Herbicide / Defoliant Program and was discovered within 7000 pages of documents eventually turned over to Korea Veteran Steve House by Department of Defense during an environmental investigation of herbicide and chemical burial in South Korea. Steve House was the subject of the award-winning documentary Toxic Secrets and won his VA claim based on exposure to toxic chemicals.

1970. Agent White drum stored at MCAS Futenma (barrel on left). Note spillage.

1970: Airman Joe Sipala rides his motorcycle at Awase Communications Site on Okinawa next to a barrel of Agent Orange (third from left)

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Controversy over Department of Veteran Affairs rulings on Okinawa Veterans' Herbicide Exposure claims

The U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA) has used the following arguments to deny herbicide exposure claims for Okinawa Veterans: However, the information that was used to reach the U.S. Governments conclusions on herbicide use in Okinawa is likely incorrect and outdated.

In correspondence dated November 2004, the United States Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff reported that there was no evidence indicating the use or storage of Agent Orange or similar herbicides in Okinawa. In this regard, the Board notes that in August 2004 and November 2004 correspondences, the U.S. Air Force and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, respectively, informed Congress that there was no documentation suggesting the use or storage of herbicides in Okinawa.

Seal of the United States Department of Veterans Affairs

Or:

Two Department of Defense (DoD) documents [The DoD/VA have 3 (or a newer 4th) lists for herbicide use outside of Vietnam as of 2016] had been reviewed in regard to the question of whether Agent Orange was stored in Okinawa as alleged by the Veteran. The first document is a list of 71 sites within the United States at which herbicide/Agent Orange testing or use was acknowledged, but the list does not include Okinawa. The second document is titled The History of the U.S. Department of Defense Programs for the Testing, Evaluation and Storage of Tactical Herbicides and dates from December 2006; the report refers to 31 sites but does not list any site in Okinawa. The reports do not include the use of small-scale non-tactical herbicides for routine base management activities such as range management, brush clearing, weed control, etc., but commercial herbicides were used on every United States military installation in the world and do not fall under the statutes and regulations governing presumptive service connection for herbicide exposure. In support of his claim the Veteran has submitted numerous documents asserting use of tactical herbicides outside the Republic of Vietnam. Some of those documents assert use of herbicides during periods or in areas outside the Veteran's active service (e.g., alleged use of herbicides in Thailand or the Philippines, or use or storage of herbicides on Okinawa after the Veteran's discharge from service), and as such documents are not relevant to resolution of the case before the Board and they will not be considered.

And:

There simply is no competent documentation of tactical herbicides on Okinawa during the Veteran's service there, and there have apparently been no soil samples or other forensic evidence showing dioxins on that island.

The Department of Veteran Affairs sometimes remands cases to other departments such as the Joint Services Records Research Center (JSRRC) or National Archives at College Park, Modern Military Records Branch. In the case of one Veteran, a response from DoD dated December 2009 explained that "the DoD does not show any use, testing, or storage of tactical herbicides, such as Agent Orange, at any location in Okinawa; nor is there any record of small-scale brush or weed-clearing activity in Okinawa or any way to know the chemical content of any such non-tactical herbicide use." In February 2010 the Defense Personnel Records Information Retrieval System (DPRIS) responded that "a review of the DoD listing shows that Agent Orange, and other tactical herbicides, were not used, tested, disposed of, or stored in Okinawa, Japan, including at fence lines and ranges on bases in Okinawa during the period between August 1970 and July 1971". A June 2011 DPRIS report states that available Army historical records did not document the spraying, testing, transporting, storage, or use of Agent Orange in Okinawa, Japan. As such, DPRIS is unable to document that a Veteran was exposed to Agent Orange or other tactical herbicides while stationed in Okinawa, Japan.

In the case of another Veteran, it was investigated whether there was a herbicide stockpile at Kadena AFB during the Vietnam war era. Prior to the 2013 discovery of the U.S. Army document from Fort Detrick Historical, Logistical, Political and Technical Aspects of the Herbicide/Defoliant Program that confirmed that there was an military restricted herbicide stockpile not only at Kadena AFB but also in Thailand, the Joint Services Records Research Center responded to the Department of Veteran Affairs in August 2009 that there was no documentation of any use of herbicides in Okinawa during the period in question [February 1968 to March 1969]. Upon further inquiry, the JSRRC again provided a letter in February 2010 in which it indicated that the Department of Defense's inventory of herbicide operations showed no herbicide usage in Okinawa during the time the Veteran was stationed at Kadena Air Force Base. Following the Veteran's direct inquiry with JSRRC, that agency provided yet another letter in May 2011 in which it reiterated its finding that "there is no information indicating the presence of Agent Orange in Okinawa, including Kadena Air Force Base." The May 2011 letter from the JSRRC suggested further inquiry to Navy Environmental Health Center and the Alfred M. Gray Research Center for information concerning the claimed exposure to herbicides while stationed at Kadena Air Force Base in Okinawa, Japan, from February 1968 to March 1969.

In January 2013, an internal U.S. DoD investigation concluded that no Agent Orange had been transported to, stored, or used on Okinawa. The report was provided to the Government of Japan. The Department of Defense's investigation was based entirely upon attempting to discredit the newspaper reports written by Jon Mitchell. No veterans or former base workers were interviewed and no sites were visited during the DoD investigation by Dr. Alvin Young.

Due to a legal requirement concerning veterans' healthcare, "tactical herbicides" and Agent Orange are often used interchangeably. "Tactical" typically denotes a usage rather than a formulation. The herbicide 2,4,5-T, was the ingredient of Herbicide Orange that contained the TCDD dioxin contaminant. 2,4,5-T was a designated tactical anti-crop agent but was also sold commercially. Young found that samples of 2,4,5-T in Agents Pink and Green had double the TCDD dioxin concentration of Agents Purple or Orange. The term "herbicide agent" means a chemical in a herbicide used in support of the United States and allied military operations in the Republic of Vietnam during the Vietnam era, specifically: 2,4-D; 2,4,5-T and its contaminant TCDD; cacodylic acid; and picloram.

1971: Marine Scott Parton at Camp Schwab on Okinawa near Agent Orange Barrel (second from right)

Regarding a veteran's assertions of Agent Orange exposure in Okinawa, Japan, the VA has developed specific procedures to determine whether a Veteran was exposed to herbicides other than in the Republic of Vietnam or along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) in Korea. VA's Adjudication Procedure Manual, directs that a detailed statement of the Veteran's claimed herbicide exposure be sent to the Compensation and Pension (C&P) Service via e-mail and a review be requested of the inventory of herbicide operations maintained by the Department of Defense (DoD) to determine whether herbicides were used or tested as alleged. The Board is not required to accept a veteran's uncorroborated account of his active service experiences. When a veteran supplied photographs that were claimed to show a barrel containing Agent Orange in Henoko, Okinawa, it was decided by BVA that more weight of evidence would simply be placed on the extensive development previously undertaken by VA.

In the case of a Marine Veteran in October 2007, a review was requested of the DoD's inventory of herbicide operations to determine whether herbicides were used, as alleged. In response, the C&P Service indicated that a list of herbicide use and test sites outside of the Republic of Vietnam from the Department of Defense (DOD), "does not show any use, testing, or storage of herbicides in Okinawa." The C&P Service advised to refer the case to the JSRRC to corroborate the Veteran's claimed exposure. However, JSRRC will only conduct research for Marine Veteran's when they have service aboard a Naval Vessel. When a request was sent to JSRRC for verification of alleged herbicide exposure from non-tactical, commercial use on the Okinawa base, the JSRRC responded, in December 2012, stating that research had not been conducted as the Veteran was assigned to a Marine Corps unit. The JSRRC suggested that the request to the Marine Corps Archives and Special Collections Unit located in Quantico. When the Marine Corps Archives and Special Collections in Quantico, Virginia was contacted in March 2013, noting that the JSSRC had refused to research the request as it involved a Marine Corps Veteran; in an April 2013 response, that agency responded that records were enclosed in a Command Chronology for Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, Okinawa, and indicated that the reports covering 1962 to 1975 had been permanently transferred to the National Archives in College Park, Maryland and that the Command Chronology did not reflect that herbicides or any other toxic chemicals were used in Okinawa during that time frame.

In March 2013, the U.S. Army Garrison/Armed Forces Pest Management Board was contacted and it was requested that they verify the use of herbicides on or around bases in Okinawa, Japan, from 1974 to May 1976. In an April 2013 Memorandum, the Armed Forces Pest Management Board (U.S. Army Garrison Forest Glen) responded that a recently published report by Dr. Alvin Young titledInvestigations into Allegations of Herbicide Orange on Okinawa, Japan "provides the most complete data available on this subject" and that Dr. Young's findings were that "there were no documents or records to validate that Herbicide Orange was shipped to or through, unloaded, used or buried on Okinawa." An April 2013 'Formal Finding of Unavailability' noted that, based on the above-conducted research and the responses provided, it was not able to concede that the Veteran was exposed to herbicides/Agent Orange while serving at Okinawa. In July 2013, the Board again remanded the claims with directives to obtain records of the Veteran's alleged exposure to herbicides and other toxins from the National Archives in College Park, Maryland, consistent with the March 2013 memorandum provided by Marine Corps Archives and Special Collections.

In July 2013, the National Archives was contacted requesting verification of the Veteran's exposure to herbicides during his period of service in Okinawa. A December 2013 response from the National Archives, as well as the Command Chronology from July 1975 to December 1975, and an investigations report dated in January 2013 from the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, did not provide evidence of Agent Orange being used in Okinawa, Japan. When the veteran's representative contacted C&P Service via e-mail in February 2014, requesting verification of the Veteran's alleged exposure; a March 2014 reply from C&P Service reconfirmed that Agent Orange was not used, stored, or buried in Okinawa and the foregoing actions were memorialized in a May 2014 formal finding. According to the ruling, "the command chronologies and organizational data for the Veteran's unit did not establish that the Veteran was exposed to Agent Orange, to include service in Okinawa, Japan. Detailed searches conducted by C&P/DOD, the NPRC, the Marine Corps Archives and Special Collections Unit, and the Armed Forces Pest Management Board were also negative for findings related to herbicide exposure/use in Okinawa during the relevant time frame. In fact, Dr. Young's report, which provides the most complete data available on this subject, expressly found that there was there were no documents or records to validate the use of Agent Orange in Okinawa. In this case, the Board finds the exhaustive searches and related findings conducted by the various agencies/entities outlined above, to be far more probative than the Veteran's baseless assertions that he was exposed to Agent Orange/herbicides in Okinawa. Notably, the Veteran has not submitted any evidence to support his claim of exposure, or that otherwise contradict the above findings."

In a letter dated in April 2007, the Surgeon General of the Navy, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, noted the available information and evidence in support of a veteran's exposure claim but based on his review, he concluded that the veteran was not likely to have been exposed to any herbicide agent.

When a Veteran who provided numerous supporting statements from other veterans argued to the Court that the Board failed to provide adequate reasons to support its findings that certain lay statements concerning Agent Orange exposure in Okinawa were not credible, the Court offered guidance to the Board to reconsider the credibility of the statements of the appellant and his fellow veterans in light of the unusual fact that VA admits that unit records submitted for the 412th Transportation Company from 1968 to 1970 have been lost. "To the extent that VA inferred a lack of herbicides on Okinawa from the lack of documentation, the knowledge that relevant documents have been lost should counsel caution in granting probative weight to that inference."

Prior rulings and determinations of the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs have found that military herbicides including Agent Orange were present on Okinawa. However, prior Board decisions do not set a precedent for other rulings and there is no presumptive herbicide exposure for those who served on Okinawa. “Pursuant to regulation, decisions issued by the Board of Veterans’ Appeals are nonprecedential in nature,” said BVA spokesperson, Meagan Lutz. “This means that decisions by the board are considered binding only with regard to the specific case decided. Each case presented to the board is decided on the basis of the individual facts of the case, with consideration given to all evidence of record, in light of applicable procedure and substantive law.” However, when a veteran seeks benefits and the evidence is in relative equipoise, the Veteran prevails. The benefit of the doubt rule is a unique standard of proof, and "the nation, 'in recognition of our debt to our veterans,' has 'taken upon itself the risk of error' in awarding such benefits."

After a 2013 ruling conflicting with Dr. Young's 2013 report was resolved in an Okinawa veterans favor, a clarifying comment was made by DVA.

• “This BVA decision was case-specific, giving the benefit of doubt to the veteran claimant, and has no impact on Dr. Young’s report.”

- Genevieve Billia, VA public affairs specialist, March 2014

A similar BVA finding in favor of retired Marine Kris Roberts that conflicts with Dr. Young's 2013 Okinawa report was made in August 2015.

In addition to seven successful awards to date, DVA records reveal that "between 1996 and 2010, a further 132 veterans opened claims that indicated they had been exposed to Agent Orange while serving on Okinawa during the Vietnam War era".

• January 1998: "Credible evidence sustains a reasonable probability that the veteran was exposed to dioxins while serving in Okinawa." DVA concluded that that the veteran was exposed to herbicides while assigned to motor transport duties in Okinawa during 1961–1962. The ruling was the first time that a U.S. federal agency acknowledged that Agent Orange had been present on Okinawa.

• September 2008: "The veteran was exposed to herbicides used in the Vietnam conflict while serving on Okinawa in 1972 and 1973."

• November 2009: "The records pertaining to Operation Red Hat show herbicide agents were stored and then later disposed in Okinawa from August 1969 to March 1972..." Despite this finding, this claim was unsuccessful. The DVA decision states that the veteran had submitted "a summary of the use of Agent Orange in Operation Red Hat (Okinawa)" as evidence.

• July 2010: "...Cancer associated with herbicide exposure [on Okinawa] was substantiated by the information and evidence in VA possession." This decision was reversed by the VA in September 2012, and the Veteran's service connection for his medical conditions has been severed.

• October 2013: "It is at least as likely as not that the Veteran while serving on active duty in Okinawa as a motor vehicle operator was exposed to toxic herbicide, including Agent Orange. Judge Mary Ellen Larkin said, “While neither the service department nor DOD confirms the presence of Agent Orange on Okinawa during 1967 and 1968, the veteran offers a highly credible, consistent account that he was directly exposed thereto during those years while performing his assigned military duties.”

• August 2015: "The Board of Veterans’ Appeals ruled that retired Lt. Col. Kris Roberts, chief of maintenance at the installation in the early 1980s, developed cancer due to “exposure to hazardous chemicals.” The presiding judge based the decision on evidence including “photographs of barrels being removed from the ground.” "The carefully-worded ruling avoids any reference to Agent Orange, that the Pentagon denies was stored on its Okinawa bases."

• October 2015: "Resolving all doubt in the Veteran's favor,the Board concedes his exposure to 2,4-D; 2,4,5-T; these chemicals are the same as those in Agent Orange." The veteran had worked as an aircraft mechanic at Naha AFB between 1954-1958 and "submitted copies of articles suggesting that Agent Orange may have been stored and/or used on Okinawa in the 1950s to late 1960s..." "While the Veteran was not exposed to Agent Orange per se, the evidence is in equipoise as to whether he was exposed to its chemical components."

• September 2016: "Credible evidence sustains a reasonable probability that during service, while performing regular duties at the Naha Naval Port in Okinawa, Japan, the Veteran was exposed to Agent Orange from leaking barrels." However, The Board of Veterans' Appeals ruling clarified that, in granting service connection, it was not making any statement or finding as to whether Agent Orange was ever present in Okinawa, Japan during the relevant time period of October 1968 to May 1970. Rather, based upon the "unusual facts of this case" (and only this case) as expressly noted by the Court, the Board found that the evidence that Agent Orange was present in Okinawa is at least in relative equipoise to the evidence that Agent Orange was not present in Okinawa during the relevant time period." The veteran was a longshoreman assigned to the 412th Transportation Company in Okinawa from October 1968 to May 1970.

List of official statements by U.S. Department of Defense about herbicides on Okinawa

Seal of the United States Department of Defense

• "Records contain no information linking use or storage of Agent Orange or other herbicides in Okinawa."

– General Richard Myers (USAF), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), November 3, 2004.

This statement has been relied upon deny benefits. However, the assertion appears to be inaccurate and has negatively affected the claim decisions of over 100 veterans who served on Okinawa.

• "The Department of Defense has searched and found no record that the aircraft or ships transporting Herbicide Orange to South Vietnam stopped at Okinawa on their way."

– Maj. Neal Fisher, Deputy Director of Public Affairs for U.S. Forces in Japan, April 2012.

• "While we respect the veterans' service, the Department of Defense has found no records of Agent Orange being used, stored, disposed of, or transported through Okinawa." The U.S. Department of Defense said it is aware of the claims made by (Kris) Roberts, but records do not indicate that Agent Orange was ever present at Okinawa and "The Department of Defense has no records of the barrels." Last, "Our available records and environmental testing do not substantiate (Roberts’) reported assertion."

– Major Catherine T. Wilkinson, spokeswoman, Department of Defense, June 2012.

Maj. Wilkinson's statement mentioned environmental testing that had been previously conducted at this site. However, the news article which quoted the statement from Maj. Wilkinson was removed immediately after it was published. The reported assertion by base maintenance officer Kris Roberts included a Polaroid photograph (available below) of buried barrels being removed from MCAS Futenma though his photograph was not specifically addressed. The Marine Corps could not provide any records about the barrels.

• "It doesn't change our position that there is no documentary evidence that Agent Orange or similar herbicides were ever used in, stored on, or shipped through Okinawa."

- Lieutenant Colonel David Honchul, Director of Public Affairs at United States Forces Japan, January 2013.

Lt.Col. Honchul declined to comment in detail about the 1971 Fort Detrick report Historical, Logistical, Political and Technical Aspects of the Herbicide/Defoliant Program that states there was a restricted herbicide stockpile at Kadena AFB.

• "After an extensive search of all known and available records, there were no documents found that validated the allegations that Herbicide Orange was involved in any of these events, nor were there records to validate that Herbicide Orange was shipped to or through, unloaded, used or buried on Okinawa." "The Department of Defense has previously stated that it could find no records validating allegations that Herbicide Orange was transported to, used, stored, or buried on Okinawa. The present in-depth report again confirms the earlier Department of Defense statements to the Japanese Government and to the US Department of Veterans Affairs."

- Alvin L. Young, Author of Investigations into Allegations of Herbicide Orange on Okinawa, Japan, January 2013

• “The research showed that there are no source documents that validate the claims that Herbicide Orange was shipped to or through, unloaded, stored, used or buried on Okinawa,”

- Mark Wright, Defense Department spokesman, March 2014.

• When asked for comment on the August 2015 BVA ruling in favor of Marine Kris Roberts,

- Director of the Marine Corps Installations Pacific (MCIPAC) Public Affairs Office, Michael Ard, referred comment to the Office of U.S. Marine Corps Communication, who did not reply. Tiffany Carter, U.S. Forces, Japan (USFJ) media relations chief, also declined to comment on the ruling. The Department of Defense deferred comment to the Veterans Affairs Administration who also declined to discuss any of the specifics in the case.

Dr. Alvin Young's Investigation into newspaper articles about Agent Orange on Okinawa

According to the VA, Dioxin sampling sponsored by The U.S. Government at current or former bases on Okinawa has apparently never been conducted. Demands from Nago City Council for dioxin tests on the Marine Corps' Camp Schwab were turned down in September 2011.

1981: Over 100 leaking barrels are unearthed at MCAS Futenma, Photo by Marine Lt. Col. Kris Roberts, as head of MCAS Futenma's base maintenance projects

A 2012 investigation by Dr. Alvin L. Young into whether Agent Orange was ever present on Okinawa titled Investigation into Allegations of Agent Orange on Okinawa (January 2013) was funded by the U.S. Army Public Health Command and the Department of Energy's Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education. Young's initial nine-month Okinawa investigation highlighted seven "allegations" from published articles appearing in The Japan Times and The Asia-Pacific Journal authored by Jon Mitchell a Welsh-born, writer based in Yokohama who has reported veterans' accounts and the discoveries of U.S. Army documents about herbicide use including Agent Orange, Project 112, and crop destruction programs on Okinawa. Mitchell's collection of articles was condensed by Young into "allegations" that were attributed to "veterans" but did not resemble what rediscovered U.S. Army documents stated or what each veteran had claimed to have witnessed. The reported "allegations" were spliced together between the news articles and Army documents, applied to the history Young has previously written about Agent Orange and Operation Ranch Hand, and then dismissed as inaccurate, concluding that no records have been found to support the belief that Agent Orange or other military formulated herbicides were ever present on Okinawa.

On February 19, 2013 the Department of Defense held a closed-door meeting in Washington, D.C., with representatives from the Japanese Embassy and Department of Veteran Affairs that was not open to the press in order to release Young's January 2013 report. The conclusions of Dr. Alvin L. Young's report denying herbicide presence on Okinawa reportedly came as no surprise to the American veterans and Okinawans who Assert that they might have been potentially exposed to hazardous chemicals. Young has previously served as Consultant to the Under Secretary of the Air Force for Installations and Environment and as Consultant on Agent Orange to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Dr. Young has authored numerous reports that tend to downplay any negative health consequences associated with exposures to herbicide chemicals--some of which were funded by herbicide producers and manufacturers such as Monsanto, Dow Chemical Company, or the Department of Defense. The testimony of U.S. veterans or Okinawan civilians who handled the herbicides was not requested in assessing or in even having an understanding the allegations attributed to them as cited in Young's report. Some eyewitnesses to events have gone on record with personal accounts or have drawn maps that have been later confirmed by removals of buried waste- seemingly, without any publicly available report of what was removed, who buried it, or where it had been taken for disposal.

2002: 187 drums and 500 tons of contaminated soil in Chatan, Okinawa allegedly from the 1968–1969 recovery operation of a salvaged US Navy ship, USNS T-LST-600

Alvin Young's Okinawa report states that there was no further mention of the 1971 Fort Detrick report nor a stockpile at Kadena AFB in the final version of a 1974 environmental report, nor were they identified in subsequent investigations. He also stressed that there was never any Agent Orange at the Kadena AFB herbicide stockpile described in the 1971 Fort Detrick report. Young's report stated that "Herbicide Orange was shipped directly from South Vietnam to Johnson Island without stopping in Okinawa as part of Air Force Logistics Command’s Operation PACER IVY," and that "the movement of the Herbicide Orange from Vietnam to Johnston Island was NOT part of Operation Red Hat." Veterans suggested that the reason why the 1974 report failed to mention the restricted herbicide stockpile at Kadena was because the herbicides had been removed from the island in 1972 when the U.S. shipped its herbicide stockpiles from around the world to Johnston Island. Young's report however provided official confirmation that there is no record that any of the restricted herbicides that had been stockpiled at Kadena AFB as mentioned in the 1971 Fort Detrick Report were ever removed from the island.

In the Summer of 2013 Okinawa City authorities uncovered remnants of approximately 130 buried barrels at a U.S. military dumpsite near two DoD elementary school on land that was formerly part of Kadena AFB. Several of the barrels contained traces of banned herbicides including dioxin residue from the remaining contents. After the drums, soil, and groundwater samples were analyzed by the Japan Self-Defense Forces and Okinawa City, unsafe levels of 2,4,5-Trichlorophenoxyacetic acid and 2,3,7,8-Tetrachlorodibenzodioxin which is a dioxin contaminant unique to herbicide were detected. Independent tests on barrels unearthed on former U.S. military land by Nansei Environmental Laboratory on behalf of Okinawa City showed much higher levels of toxic herbicide components than test results released earlier by the Okinawa Defense Bureau.

In October 2012 Veterans Benefits Administration's Compensation Service issued contract VA-101-12-C-0006 to A.L. Young Consulting Inc. for 23 investigative reports dubbed The Agent Orange Investigation Report Series. The Department of Veterans Affairs relies on Young's reports to confirm information in veteran claims about exposure to herbicides. In addition to the reports, a supporting project was initiated on the "Development of an Archival Directory of Agent Orange Documents.” A product of the V.B.A. contract was Dr. Young's third brief in the series, Discussion Points Concerning the Continuing Allegations of Agent Orange on Okinawa (November 2013) which contained three additional "allegations" taken from newspaper articles between June and November 2013.

Criticism of Dr. Young's contracted reports

"For almost 40 years, the VA has repeatedly cited Young’s conclusions to deny disability compensation to vets that saves the Department of Veterans Affairs millions of dollars."

Young has pushed a position that, "Few veterans were exposed to Agent Orange, which contained the toxic chemical dioxin, and even if they were, it was in doses too small to harm them." In 2011 he said, "some veterans were only 'freeloaders,' making up ailments to 'cash in' on the VA’s compensation system."

"Critics, including vets, respected scientists and top government officials argue that Young’s self-labeled 'investigations' are compromised by inaccuracies, inconsistencies or omissions of key facts, and rely heavily on his previous work, some of which was funded by Monsanto Co. and Dow Chemical Co., the makers of Agent Orange.

When Vietnam vets sued the chemical companies who made the herbicides in 2004 Young served as an expert witness to defend them in the lawsuit.

"More recently, Young has proposed a new theory to support his contention that no U.S. troops were directly sprayed upon"

"Science also seems to have ended in the 1970s and early 1980s for Young". For example, Johnston Island, "the final resting place for Agent Orange before its incineration at sea, had no important problems in 1978 according to Young." "However, a 1986 AF reassessment found marine biota with up to 472 ppb dioxin, subsoil with 510 ppb dioxin, and 682,247 ppb of 2,4,5-T (Huse G, et al. 1991. Preliminary Public Health, Environmental Risk, and Data Requirements Assessment for the Herbicide Orange Storage Site at Johnston Island. Brooks Air Force Base, TX: Occupational and Environmental Health Directorate)." “Most of the stuff he talks about is in no way accurate,” said Linda S. Birnbaum, director of the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences"

"The consultant also suggested how to downplay the risk if journalists started asking questions:" “The longer this issue remains unresolved, the greater the likelihood of outside press reporting on yet another ‘Agent Orange Controversy.’” Young recommended that Air Force officials quickly cease testing and discreetly destroy the C-123 spray aircraft that were used in Vietnam. A veteran who successfully challenged Young's findings accused Young of a government-sanctioned plan to destroy evidence of any connection between the aircraft, Agent Orange and their illnesses."

"More than anyone else, 'the government’s go-to consultant' " has guided the stance of the military and U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs on Agent Orange and whether it has harmed service members."

In response to Young's new contracts, a June 27, 2014 letter was sent to then-acting DVA Secretary Sloan D. Gibson by Executive Directors of six national veteran service organizations including The American Legion, VFW, VVA, DAV and AMVETS. The letter asked the Secretary to take immediate steps to reverse the action of the Veterans Health Administration (VHA), Office of Public Health section, in retaining the consultant regarding Agent Orange issues and to review the firm’s unique contractual involvement with the VA.

Retrograde Chemicals brought to Okinawa from Vietnam

The Alvin Young investigation determined that retrograde and hazardous chemicals were brought from Vietnam and stored at Camp Kinser on Okinawa. The release of records about contamination at Camp Kinser that were identified by Young's investigation only led to more controversy about the receipt of military herbicides from Vietnam, any present contamination on Okinawa and the release of those records.

On March 25, 1971 United States Army, Vietnam (USARV) conducted the first Retrograde Movement Planning Conference. Among those present were representatives from Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), the U.S. Public Health Service, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The purpose of these meetings was to update retrograde forecasts and transportation capabilities and to provide a forum for discussing and resolving problems associated with retrograding materiel. The conferences were to be held quarterly beginning on Apr 1, 1971. In April MACV decided that, since this was a MACV program, USARV should not host the conferences, and designated MACV as the office of primary responsibility for retrograde matters. During April 1971, MACV J4 developed a database and an estimate of total in-country tonnage expected to be retrograded. This estimate was based on inputs from component services, estimates of government owned/contractor operated (GOCO) equipment, Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF) deployments, and estimates of property disposal items to be retrograded. By May the quarterly retrograde conference was changed to a monthly meeting.

Camp Kinser, Okinawa. Briefing session For Operation Red Hat, May 11, 1971, a demonstration for Japanese press of actions that would be taken in the event a chemical munition was found to be leaking during transport. Retrograde herbicides from Vietnam in striped drums are seen in the background.

An enhancement of the photograph above reveals striped drums among retrograde hazardous chemical returned from Vietnam, on Okinawa at Camp Kinser, May 11, 1971. (stack is marked with V)

Briefing session for Operation Red Hat, a demonstration for Japanese press of actions that would be taken in the event chemical munitions were found to be leaking during transport. Camp Kinser, Okinawa, May 11, 1971. Retrograde chemicals from Vietnam are in background

Records indicate that over 1000 tons of waste arrived in Okinawa during September 1968 alone. In April 1970 the U.S. Air Force began collecting Dioxin containing herbicides in the United States and Vietnam for removal operations in preparation for Operation Pacer IVY. Herbicide Orange was to be put in storage until studies for its disposition could be conducted. However, The U.S. Army, was providing other instructions for the disposal of Herbicide Orange. Around this time, Army Field Manual FM 3-3, Tactical Employment of Herbicides, December 1971 states, "Used containers and surplus quantities of [Herbicide] ORANGE should be buried in deep pits at locations where there will be the least possibility of agent leaching into water supplies or cultivated crop areas."

After the 1971 Okinawa Reversion Agreement and Reversion in 1972, a formal procedure was established for the disposal of pesticides and other retrograde, hazardous and commercial chemicals collected from all U.S. Government Agencies across the Pacific. In July 1972 Sierra Army Depot (SIAD) in California was designated as the receiving point for the chemicals collected for all branches of government that were being returned from the Pacific area for disposal or reuse. Sierra Army Depots involvement in handling and disposal of retrograde and hazardous chemicals including herbicides, and pesticides was closely coordinated with both Edgewood Arsenal and the Region IX solid and hazardous waste management branch of the EPA. While the disposal activities at Sierra Army Depot were local in nature once the materials arrived there, the nature and origin of the materials as well as the transit to the site exceeded the regional boundary and became national, if not international, in scope as far as the DOD was concerned.

One-ton chemical agent container with retrograde hazardous chemicals from Vietnam in background during a briefing session for Operation Red Hat, Camp Kinser, Okinawa, May 11, 1971

At some point in 1972 chemicals brought from Okinawa were buried in pits at Sierra Army Depot. The burial at Sierra Army Depot occurred during a time when the Department of Defense had not decided whether to destroy or reprocess the Agent Orange it owned. The buried material was removed from the ground in May 1974 and from there the trail goes cold. In 1976 Atomics International division of Rockwell International submitted a proposal with a capability to dispose of Sierra Depots herbicides. The EPA subsequently conducted site evaluations of Sierra Army Depot in the early 1990s and several dioxin and dibenzofuran compounds were detected after sampling the 1972 burial location. Planning was conducted in September 1975 in preparation for shipments of additional retrograde chemicals that arrived at Sierra Army Depot from Okinawa on November 19, 1975; December 24, 1975; and March 31, 1976. Large quantities of chemicals such as over 1,000,000 pounds of DDT in various strengths and military formulations were stored at Sierra Army Depot, of which most were excess materials returned from overseas following World War II and the Korean and Vietnam conflicts.

Young found a July 30, 1993, U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) report titled Talking Paper on Possible Toxic Contamination at Camp Kinser that was prepared by the United States Forces Japan Environmental Branch which stated: "There is no evidence that toxic dumping occurred at U.S. Army's Machinato Supply Depot which is now Makiminato Service Area (MSA), part of the U.S. Marine Corps Camp Kinser, bordering The City of Urasoe; however, there is evidence of environmental contamination by heavy metals and pesticides caused by past hazardous material storage practices." The chronology within the report noted that from 1945 to 1973 the U.S. Army stored large amounts of hazardous materials/wastes in the open along the shoreline at Camp Kinser. The chemicals were primarily retrograde shipments from Vietnam and those declared excess due to the phase down of the war effort. The report noted that the chemicals included "insecticides, rodenticides, herbicides, inorganic and organic acids, alkalis, inorganic salts, organic solvents, and vapor degreasers." Young concluded that the Camp Kinser talking paper later indicated that the stored hazardous materials at Camp Kinser did not contain herbicides. However, photographs have been found of the retrograde chemicals at Camp Kinser that appear to show the striped barrels of military formulated herbicides contained within in the chemicals shipped to Okinawa from Vietnam.

Retrograde chemicals from Vietnam are pictured at Camp Kinser, Okinawa near lumber yard. May 1971

The 1993 talking paper that Young found also noted that from April 1, 1973, through August 31, 1973, a Joint Environmental Investigative Committee consisting of members from the Environmental Branch, the U.S. Army Pacific Environmental Health Agency, and the Okinawa Prefectural Government initiated a project to clean up the MSA shoreline. Cyanide compounds were neutralized, and 27,800 pounds of ferric chloride were disposed of on the MSA facilities in a 30-foot long x 10-foot wide x 5-foot deep trench. The inorganic acids and alkalis were neutralized and flushed over the adjoining lumber yard grounds. The organic solvents and petroleum substances were transferred to a 15,000 gallon tanker for subsequent disposal, and the pesticides were repackaged from existing drums and were disposed of in a designated landfill at Camp Hansen. All of the empty pesticide drums were disposed of by smelting. Although the cleanup report mentioned the presence of herbicides and Vietnam retrograde cargo, according to Dr. Young, that same report later indicated that no herbicides or dioxins were actually found or detected. When the report was finally released three years later, it described widespread contamination by multiple chemicals and specifically mentioned the detection of "dioxin (agent orange component)" early in 1975. The report states, “Marks of leaked chemicals meet the eyes at every turn.”

A Freedom of Information Act request for the 1993 Talking Paper on Possible Toxic Contamination at Camp Kinser, Okinawa was "repeatedly stonewalled" by the U.S. Pacific Command in April 2014. In October 2014, "the U.S. authorities acknowledged they possessed the report but refused to release it, citing, among other reasons, a need 'to protect against public confusion.'" After an FOIA appeal for the document USFJ replied that "they did not have the report and needed more time to locate it." After 18 months, USPACOM eventually released an 82-page package of documents on September 23, 2015. When the documentation was examined, "herbicides" and a “high concentration” of dioxin were clearly mentioned in a USFJ report revealing in 1975 a detection of what it calls “dioxin (agent orange component).” A 1984 U.S. Navy statement in the FOIA package stated that subsequent testing one year later concluding that no herbicides were “found or detected.”

Ranch Hand Aircraft assigned to Okinawa

Top Secret: Project 112 U.S. cover story, Foreign Affairs and Defence committee Canberra, Australia, May 18, 1965

Alvin Young's report states that Okinawa veterans allege that a Fairchild UC-123K "Provider" aircraft sprayed chemicals in Okinawa and that exposures from this aircraft or others occurred when the planes were decontaminated. The report admits that a spray equipped C-124K aircraft (tail number 56-4371) that was used to spray Agent Orange in Vietnam was deployed from Phan Rang, Vietnam, to Kadena AFB, Okinawa, from January through July 1970. There was no additional information to explain why the aircraft was sent to Kadena for seven months before returning to the U.S., and this report did not discuss actual decontamination of this or any other aircraft. Previous reports authored by Young state that each spray aircraft was decontaminated before returning to the United States and that these aircraft were still so contaminated many decades later that they should be destroyed. Young's presumption was that this aircraft was one of the Operation Ranch Hand (previously Operation Trail Dust and Operation Hades) aircraft modified for the aerial dissemination of insecticides and herbicides. A report prepared by the 1st Medical Service Wing (PACAF) in April 1971, mentioned that a serious form of malaria had been introduced into Okinawa by U.S. veterans returning to the U.S. from Vietnam. A report of an outbreak of a serious form of malaria was previously used in Cambodia reportedly as a cover story for an alleged covert tactical nerve agent dispersal test on the enemy. Pesticides, especially those sprayed by aircraft, were not allowed to be used anywhere near the Kadena AFB's mosquito colony breeding areas according to a sign posted there.

Two still-marked TOP SECRET cover stories given to the Australian Government by the U.S. Embassy in the mid-1960s to hide activities for Project Deseret (Projects 112 and SHAD), the U.S. covert chemical and biological large-scale field testing program, were the "use of insecticides and herbicides to modify the environment for military use." The cover stories were in place to explain to potential observers the presence of scientists and aircraft or vehicles dispensing aerosolized chemical and biological agents.

Legacy of Environmental contamination

Pentachlorophenol (PCP) a chemical which was used as an insecticide and herbicide, spills in Okinawa, June 1971. The spill contaminated drinking water and killed fish

"Okinawa has a checkered history regarding U.S. military chemical storage and contamination." While it was widely known that there was heavy arsenic and pesticide application to control mosquitoes and Formosan termites, as well as the various accidental spills that occurred on Okinawa, an explanation of why these pesticides or other hazardous waste were buried on Okinawa or why this information is only now being released to those whose health may have been negatively affected has not been provided. The Status of Forces Agreement exempts U.S. military forces in Japan from the responsibility to rectify environmental hazards and cleanup at past or present installation sites. The final responsibility for the clean-up and monitoring of any potentially contaminated areas or the notification of the surrounding population about potential environmental dangers emanating from the past activities of the U.S. military on Okinawa lies with the host country. Under the Security Treaty Between the United States and Japan, the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) gives the U.S. military certain extraterritorial exemptions from Japanese civil and criminal law. SOFA, renewed in 1960, does not include environmental protection provisions and the Japanese government is not provided any rights to conduct on-site investigations aboard U.S. military bases. In 1995 and again in 2000, bills to revise SOFA that included new articles for environmental protection were submitted to the Japanese and the U.S. governments by The Okinawa Prefectural Government however, rather than amendments to SOFA, the Japanese government has preferred operational changes to it.

Symbol of Okinawa Prefecture

The Department of Defense has a dismal record regarding contaminating humans, land, and other natural resources such as drinking water supplies. The EPA currently oversees 140 military bases in the United States that are on the EPA National Priorities List of "Superfund" environmental cleanup sites. This number does not include any U.S. military bases outside of the U.S. Many feel that mitigating the potential damage to public image and blaming the victim seem to outweigh any legitimate health or environmental concerns of military contamination on the island. However, that view is disputed by the Department of Defense.

A U.S. State Department memo from September 2, 1975, concerning a spill of Hexavalent Chromium, a substance now recognized as a known human carcinogen, provides insight into the past relationship between the environmental concerns of employees, residents, and local government, the reporting of these concerns in the press, and the U.S. Military and State Department.

September 2, 1975

Subject: Hexavalent Chromium Pot continues to Boil

Leftist organizations and local press continue to harp on the Army leakage of engine cleaner from the Machinato Service Area, alleging that the chemicals have caused illness and even deaths and that similar problems are present at other bases. The line of argument is now that the recent Miki and Schlesinger visits have resulted in more emphasis by the government of Japan and US government on our military presence in Okinawa making this prefecture us even more of a victim as the pollution incident proves. Okinawa reps are likely to raise issue in the National Diet.

1. While the press and leftists campaign on the leak of cleaning detergent polluted with Hexa-chromium from the U.S. Army Machinato Service Area was somewhat less intense over the weekend, The issue remains very much alive.

The newspapers are full of reports (sparked by Zengunro- the military workers union) of injury, illness, and death allegedly caused by the chemical, claims that similar "dangerous" substances are in use other bases, reports of investigations (realized, aborted, or planned) by various groups, and protests delivered by organizations and individuals.

We received the mayor of Naha for over an hour on August 29 and House of Councillors member Kyan for about two hours September 2; A delegation from the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly visited us on August 28 and had a bus to tour of the service area on August 29.

2. The Governor has called on Gen. Robinson along with the demands that the U.S. military stop discharging or even using dangerous substances, provide medical examinations, treatment or compensation to endangered or affected workers, and decontaminate the polluted areas, the leftists claim again that the ultimate solution must be to eliminate US bases from Okinawa altogether. Both editorials and the politicians we have talked with are claiming that the Prime Minister Takeo Miki's visit to Washington and Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger's visit to Seoul and Tokyo have resulted in more stress by the government of Japan on defense which will place more military burden on Okinawa. The leftists maintain that Okinawa, with over half of Japan's American bases, will be even more heavily penalized as the Government of Japan (GOJ) unfairly shifts the bulk of U.S. facilities gradually from the homeland to Okinawa. Incidence of crime and pollution such as the Hexavalent-chromium leak or the ongoing problem of airfield noise are gleefully pointed to as evidence of Okinawa being made even more of a victim.

3. We have been told that reformist Okinawan reps will raise the issue in the Diet. The local Liberal Democratic Party is reportedly resisting the convening of a special Prefectural Assembly session specifically on this issue. Whether the opposition can play this all the way into a significant Diet issue would seem to be depend largely on how long it can keep the pot boiling down here and what other alleged evils they can turn up at our bases.

Unfortunately, Hexavalent Chromium has now (albeit it to a lesser degree) the same vague emotional scare of deadly toxicity that nuclear matters have, so that issue will undoubtedly be pressed.

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See also

4

References

 This article incorporates public domain material from websites or documents of the United States Government.

Further reading

• Statement on removal of chemical munitions from Okinawa (Press Release No. 610-69). July 22, 1969. 2 pp.
• Announcement of Approval of Army plan to ship chemical munitions now stored on Okinawa to Johnston Island (Press Release No. 987-70). December 4, 1970. 1 p.
• Announcement regarding completion of removal of chemical munitions from Okinawa by summer 1971 (Press Release No. 99-71). February 5. 1 p.
• Operation Red Hat Special Safety Procedures, produced by U.S. and Government of Ryukyu Islands (GRI) Joint safety committee
• Camp Kinser Briefing session for Operation Red Hat, May 11, 1971, a demonstration for Japanese press of actions that would be taken if a chemical munition was found to be leaking
• National Broadcasting Corporation's (NBC) telecast, First Tuesday, part of a three-part series on Biological Research and Chemical Agents. Filming for the report was accomplished during Tom Pettit's visit to Johnston Atoll in June 1973.

External links

• "Agent Orange on Okinawa" website of Jon Mitchell, Yokohama based journalist for The Japan Times and The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus
• Operation Red Hat : Men and a Mission – National Archives and Records Administration, 1971
• Tsuiseki: Okinawa no Karehazai (Chasing Agent Orange on Okinawa) (Koubunken 2014)(Japanese) by Jon Mitchell