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Indonesian occupation of East Timor

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The integration monument in Dili was donated by the Indonesian government to represent emancipation from colonialism, but was seen by most East Timorese as a symbol of occupation and oppression.[1]
East Timor is located at the end of the Indonesian archipelago, 400 miles (640km) northwest of Darwin, Australia.
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Map of East Timor and its major cities

Indonesia occupied East Timor from December 1975 to October 1999. Condemned by numerous resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, the occupation claimed more than 100,000 East Timorese lives.[2] It has been called a "cultural genocide"[3] and compared to the killings of the Khmer Rouge, the Yugoslav wars, and the Rwandan Genocide.[4]

A Portuguese colony for hundreds of years, East Timor experienced a period of instability in 1974. After the a coup in Portugal, the Carnation Revolution led to decolonization among many of that nation's former colonies, and left East Timor's future status uncertain. After a small-scale civil war, the pro-independence FRETILIN declared victory in the capital city of Dili and declared an independent East Timor on 28 November 1975. Claiming its assistance had been requested by East Timorese leaders, Indonesian military forces invaded on 7 December. For twenty-five years East Timor was subjected to extrajudicial executions, torture, and starvation. The 1991 Santa Cruz Massacre caused outrage around the world, and reports of other such killings were numerous. In 1996 the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to two men from East Timor, Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo and José Ramos-Horta, for their ongoing efforts to peacefully end the occupation. A 1999 vote to determine East Timor's future resulted in an overwhelming majority in favor of independence, and in 2002 East Timor became an independent nation.

The governments of the United States, Australia, and Britain were supportive of Indonesia throughout the occupation. US President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger met with Indonesian President Suharto on the day before the invasion and reportedly "gave the green light" for the invasion.[5] Australia was the only nation in the world to recognize East Timor as a province of Indonesia, and soon afterwards began negotiations with the Indonesian government to divide resources found in the Timor Gap. Other governments, including Japan, Canada and Malaysia, also supported the Indonesian government.

In retaliation for the 1999 choice for independence, paramilitary groups working with the Indonesian military undertook a final wave of violence in which most of the country's infrastructure was destroyed. After Indonesian forces left East Timor, the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor administered the territory for two years, establishing a Serious Crimes Unit to investigate and prosecute crimes committed during 1999. Its limited scope and the small number of sentences delivered by Indonesian courts have caused numerous observers to call for an international tribunal for East Timor.

Background

Main article: History of East Timor

The Portuguese first arrived in Timor in the 16th century, and in 1702 East Timor came under Portuguese colonial administration.[6] Portuguese rule was tenuous until the island was divided with the Dutch Empire in 1860.[7] A significant battleground during the Pacific War, East Timor was occupied by 20,000 Japanese troops. The fighting helped prevent a Japanese occupation of Australia, but resulted in 60,000 East Timorese deaths.[8]

When Indonesia secured its independence after World War II under the leadership of Sukarno, it did not claim control of East Timor, and aside from general anti-colonial rhetoric it did not oppose Portuguese control of the territory. A 1959 revolt in East Timor against the Portuguese was not endorsed by the Indonesian government.[9] A 1962 United Nations document notes: "the government of Indonesia has declared that it maintains friendly relations with Portugal and has no claim to Portuguese Timor...".[10] These assurances continued after Suharto took power in 1965. An Indonesian official declared in December 1974: "Indonesia has no territorial ambition ... Thus there is no question of Indonesia wishing to annex Portuguese Timor."[11]

In 1974, a coup in Lisbon caused significant changes in Portugal's relationship to its colony in Timor. The power shift in Europe invigorated movements for independence in colonies like Mozambique and Angola, and the new Portuguese government began a decolonization process for East Timor. The first of these was an opening of the political process.[12]

FRETILIN, UDT, and APODETI

When East Timorese political parties were first legalized in April 1974, three groupings emerged as major players in the postcolonial landscape. UDT, the União Democrática Timorense (Timorese Democratic Union), was formed in May by a group of wealthy landowners. Initially dedicated to preserving East Timor as a protectorate of Portugal, in September UDT announced its support for independence.[13] A week later, the Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente (Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor, or FRETILIN) appeared. Initially organized as the ASDT (Associacão Social Democrata Timorense), the group endorsed "the universal doctrines of socialism", as well as "the right to independence".[14] As the political process grew more tense, however, the group changed its name and declared itself "the only legitimate representative of the people".[15] The end of May saw the creation of a third party, Associacão Popular Democratica Timorense (Timorese Popular Democratic Association), or APODETI. Advocating East Timor's integration with Indonesia and originally named Associacão Integraciacao de Timor Indonesia (Association for the Integration of Timor into Indonesia),[16] APODETI felt that an independent East Timor would be economically weak and vulnerable.[17]

FRETILIN took power after the civil war and declared an independent East Timor on 28 November 1975.

In January 1975, UDT and FRETILIN established a tentative coalition dedicated to achieving independence for East Timor.[18] At the same time, the Australian government reported that the Indonesian military had conducted a "pre-invasion" exercise at Lampung.[19] For months, the Indonesian Special Operations command, OPSUS, had been covertly supporting APODETI through Operasi Komodo (Operation Komodo, named after the lizard). By broadcasting accusations of communism among FRETILIN leaders and sowing discord in the UDT coalition, the Indonesian government fostered instability in East Timor and, observers said, created a pretext for invading.[20] By May tensions between the two groups caused UDT to withdraw from the coalition.[21]

In an attempt to negotiate a settlement to the dispute over East Timor's future, the Portuguese Decolonization Commission convened a conference in June 1975 in Macau. FRETILIN boycotted the meeting in protest of APODETI's presence and representatives of UDT and APODETI complained that this was an effort to obstruct the decolonization process.[22] In his 1987 memoir Funu: The Unfinished Saga of East Timor, FRETILIN leader José Ramos-Horta recalls his "vehement protests" against his party's refusal to attend the meeting. "This", he writes, "was one of our tactical political errors for which I could never find an intelligent explanation."[23]

Coup, civil war, and independence

The tension reached a boiling point in the summer, when rumors began circulating of possible power seizures from both independence parties.[24] In August 1975, UDT staged a coup in the capital city Dili and a small-scale civil war broke out. Ramos-Horta describes the fighting as "bloody", and details violence committed by both UDT and FRETILIN. He cites the International Committee of the Red Cross, which counted 2,000–3,000 people dead after the war.[25] The fighting forced the Portuguese government onto the nearby island of Atauro.[26] FRETILIN defeated UDT's forces after two weeks, much to the surprise of Portugal and Indonesia.[27] UDT leaders fled to Indonesian-controlled West Timor. There they signed a petition on 7 September calling for East Timor's integration with Indonesia;[28] most accounts indicate that UDT's support for this position was forced by Indonesia.[29]

Map of East Timor's Bobonaro region, which lies on the border with Indonesian West Timor. Fighting continued in this region after the civil war, and several cities were captured by Indonesia prior to their full invasion.

Once they had gained control of East Timor, FRETILIN faced attacks from the west, by Indonesian military forces — then known as Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (ABRI) — and by a small group of UDT troops.[30] Indonesia captured the border city of Batugadé on 8 October 1975, and nearby Balibó and Maliana were taken eight days later.[31] During the Balibó raid, members of an Australian television news crew were killed by Indonesian soldiers; they became known as the "Balibo Five".[32] The Indonesian military say the deaths were accidental, East Timorese witnesses say the journalists were deliberately killed. The deaths, and subsequent campaigns and investigations, attracted international attention and rallied support for East Timorese independence.[33]

At the start of November, the foreign ministers from Indonesia and Portugal met in Rome to discuss a resolution of the conflict. Although no Timorese leaders were invited to the talks, FRETILIN sent a message expressing their desire to work with Portugal. The meeting ended with both parties agreeing that Portugal would meet with political leaders in East Timor but the talks never occurred.[34] In mid-November, Indonesian forces began shelling the city of Atabae from the sea, and captured it by the end of the month.[35]

Frustrated by Portugal's inaction, FRETILIN leaders believed they could ward off Indonesian advances more effectively if they declared an independent East Timor. National Political Commissioner Mari Alkatiri conducted a diplomatic tour of Africa, gathering support from governments there and elsewhere. According to FRETILIN, this effort yielded assurances from twenty-five countries – including the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union, Mozambique, Sweden, and Cuba – to recognize the new nation. On 28 November 1975, FRETILIN unilaterally declared independence for the Democratic Republic of East Timor.[36] UDT and APODETI leaders in and around Balibó responded the next day by declaring that region independent from East Timor and officially part of Indonesia. Portugal rejected both declarations, and the Indonesian government approved military action to begin its annexation of East Timor.[37]

Invasion

Main article: Indonesian invasion of East Timor

On 7 December 1975, Indonesian forces invaded East Timor. Operasi Seroja (Operation Lotus) was the largest military operation ever carried out by that nation.[37][38] Troops from FRETILIN's military organization FALINTIL engaged ABRI forces in the streets of Dili, and 400 Indonesian paratroopers were killed as they descended into the city. By the end of the year, 10,000 troops occupied Dili and another 20,000 had been deployed throughout East Timor.[39] Massively outnumbered, FALINTIL troops fled to the mountains and continued guerrilla combat operations.[40]

In the cities, Indonesian troops began killing East Timorese.[41] At the start of the occupation, FRETILIN radio sent the following broadcast: "The Indonesian forces are killing indiscriminately. Women and children are being shot in the streets. We are all going to be killed.... This is an appeal for international help. Please do something to stop this invasion."[42] One Timorese refugee told later of "rape [and] cold-blooded assassinations of women and children and Chinese shop owners".[43] Dili's bishop at the time, Martinho da Costa Lopes, said later: "The soldiers who landed started killing everyone they could find. There were many dead bodies in the streets — all we could see were the soldiers killing, killing, killing."[44] In one incident, a group of fifty men, women, and children – including Australian freelance reporter Roger East – were lined up on a cliff outside of Dili and shot, their bodies falling into the sea.[45] Many such massacres took place in Dili, where onlookers were ordered to observe and count as each person was executed.[46] In addition to FRETILIN supporters, Chinese migrants were also singled out for execution; five hundred were killed in the first day alone.[47]

File:Adammalik.jpg
Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik suggested that the number of East Timorese killed in the first two years of the occupation was "50,000 people or perhaps 80,000".[48]

In March 1976, UDT leader Lopez da Cruz reported that 60,000 Timorese had been killed during the invasion. A delegation of Indonesian relief workers agreed with this statistic.[49] In an interview on 5 April 1977 with the Sydney Morning Herald, Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik said the number of dead was "50,000 people or perhaps 80,000".[48]

The Indonesian government presented its annexation of East Timor as a matter of anticolonial unity. A 1977 booklet from the Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs, entitled Decolonization in East Timor, paid tribute to the "sacred right of self-determination"[50] and recognized APODETI as the true representatives of the East Timorese majority. It claimed that FRETILIN's popularity was the result of a "policy of threats, blackmail and terror".[51] Later, Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas reiterated this position in his 2006 memoir The Pebble in the Shoe: The Diplomatic Struggle for East Timor.[52] The island's original division into east and west, Indonesia argued after the invasion, was "the result of colonial oppression" enforced by the Portuguese and Dutch imperial powers. Thus, according to the Indonesian government, its annexation of the 27th province was merely another step in the unification of the archipelago which had begun in the 1940s.[53]

UN response and international law

On the day following the invasion, a committee of the United Nations General Assembly convened to debate the situation. Nations allied with Indonesia –including India, Japan, and Malaysia – wrote a resolution blaming Portugal and the Timorese political parties for the bloodshed; it was rejected in favor of a draft prepared by Algeria, Cuba, Senegal, and Guyana, among others. This was adopted as GA Resolution 3485 (XXX) on 12 December, calling on Indonesia to "withdraw without delay".[54] Ten days later the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 384 (1975), which echoes the GA resolution's call for an immediate Indonesian withdrawal.[55] One year later the Security Council expressed the same sentiment in Resolution 389 (1976), and the General Assembly passed resolutions every year between 1976 and 1982 calling for self-determination in East Timor.[56] Despite these pronouncements, however, powerful governments like China and the United States refused to endorse further action; smaller countries like Costa Rica, Guinea-Bissau, and Iceland were the only delegations calling for enforcement of the resolutions.[57] The 1982 resolution calls on the UN Secretary-General to "initiate consultations with all parties directly concerned, with a view to exploring avenues for achieving a comprehensive settlement of the problem".[58]

Legal expert Roger S. Clark notes that Indonesia's invasion and occupation violated two key elements of international law: the right to self-determination and the prohibition on aggression. Neither the petition of 7 September 1975 calling for integration nor the later resolution of the "People's Assembly" in May 1976 qualify as "informed and democratic processes impartially conducted and based on universal adult suffrage", as required by UN General Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV), which establishes the guidelines for the norms of self-determination. Other inadequacies existed in the petitions as well.[59]

Indonesia's use of military force in East Timor is cited as a violation of Chapter I of the United Nations Charter, which states: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state...." Although some observers have argued that East Timor was not a state at the time of the invasion, such claims are considered specious and mirror those made against Indonesia by the Dutch during the Indonesian National Revolution.[60] As legal scholar Susan Marks points out, even if East Timor was still considered a Portuguese colony, "there may be some doubt about the application of this provision [of UN Charter Chapter I] in the context of an armed conflict between a colonial power and its own colony, there can hardly be doubt that it applies to force by one sovereign state against another state's colony".[61]

US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, along with President Gerald Ford, met with Indonesian President Suharto and gave "the green light" one day before the invasion.[5]

US involvement

On 6 December 1975 – one day before the invasion – US President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger visited Jakarta and met with Suharto.[62] Ford told Suharto: "We understand the problem you have and the intentions you have."[62] Kissinger expressed a concern about perceptions of US involvement: "You appreciate that the use of US-made arms could create problems."[62] He also expressed a desire for Indonesian forces to wait until the US leaders had left the country: "We understand your problem and the need to move quickly but I am only saying that it would be better if it were done after we returned."[62] The CIA's senior operations officer in Jakarta at the time, C. Philip Liechty, said later: "Suharto was given the green light" for the invasion by the US.[5]

Kissinger's concern about the use of US arms derived from the fact that 90 percent of the Indonesian military's equipment at the time had been supplied by the United States.[63] Successive US administrations continued support and assistance to the Indonesian military, providing over a billion dollars of armaments over thirty years. In 1977, President Jimmy Carter increased annual arms sales from US$13 million to $112 million; between 1981–1986, Ronald Reagan presided over $500 million in arms sales to Indonesia, and the administration of George H. W. Bush conducted an average of $28 million in arms sales with Indonesia each year.[64] As he campaigned for the presidency, Bill Clinton declared that he was "very concerned about the situation in East Timor"; nevertheless, his administration approved sales of military equipment totaling one billion dollars.[65][66]

The United States was also instrumental in blocking effective action by the United Nations. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, the US Ambassador to the UN at the time, wrote later in his memoirs: "The Department of State desired that the United Nations prove utterly ineffective in whatever measures it undertook. This task was given to me, and I carried it forward with no inconsiderable success."[67] The role of the mass media in shaping US public opinion of Indonesia's invasion and occupation is covered in the Canadian documentary film, Manufacturing Consent: Noam Chomsky and the Media.

Australian involvement

In September 1974, Australian Prime Minister Gough Whitlam met with Suharto and indicated that he would support Indonesia if it annexed East Timor.[68] Although Australia supported the first UN resolution condemning the invasion (due to public pressure), the new government of Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser quickly showed signs that it was untroubled by the occupation. One report indicates that Fraser expressed approval during a visit with Suharto in October 1976; military assistance from Australia doubled in the early years of Indonesia's rule over East Timor.[69] Australia abstained from the 1976 and 1977 UN General Assembly Resolutions, and by 1978 became the first – and only – government to officially recognize East Timor as a province of Indonesia.[70] In 1984, the Minister for Foreign Affairs Bill Hayden defended Australia's realpolitik position as a way to better advocate for the suffering people of East Timor, since independence was considered impossible. He referred to the situation as a "classic instance of the apparently straightforward moral choice having potentially catastrophic consequences for all concerned".[71]

Soon after recognizing the annexation of East Timor in 1978, Australia began negotiations with Indonesia to divide resources found in the Timor Gap.

In 1979 Australia and Indonesia began drafting a treaty to share resources in the Timor Gap. The treaty was signed in December 1989, with estimates ranging from one to seven billion barrels of oil to be secured.[72] This agreement, along with general economic partnership with Indonesia, is frequently cited as a crucial factor for the Australian government's position.[73] As an official from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs said in 1974: "The plain fact is that there are only 700,000 Timorese; what we are really concerned about is our relationship with 130,000,000 Indonesians!"[74]

Given East Timor's key role in the Allied victory during the Pacific War – which prevented a Japanese invasion of Australia and ended nearly 60,000 East Timorese lives[8] – some Australians believed their government owed a special debt to the former Portuguese colony. James Dunn, a senior Foreign Affairs adviser to the Australian Parliament before and during the occupation, condemned the government's position, saying later: "What had been of vital strategic value in 1941 was, in 1974, irrelevant and dispensable."[75] Paddy Kenneally, an Australian commando during World War II, lambasted his government in 1995 for its support of Indonesia:

How did a grateful Australian Government repay [the East Timorese] for their loyalty, aid and faithfulness to Australia's fighting men during a most crucial period in Australian history? From Whitlam in 1974 to Keating in 1995 Australian Governments have abandoned and betrayed the people of East Timor. Through our governments we have waded through a sea of Timorese blood, and climbed over a mountain of Timor's dead, to sign the Timor Gap Treaty for economic gain with Timor's invaders. That is how we repaid the people of East Timor.[76]

Other governments

Britain sold dozens of BAE Hawk jets to Indonesia during the occupation, some of which were used in the "encirclement and annihilation" campaign.

Britain, Canada, Japan, and other nations supported Indonesia during the occupation of East Timor. In July 1975 the British Ambassador in Jakarta wrote to London's Foreign Office: "Certainly as seen from here, it is in Britain's interest that Indonesia should absorb the territory as soon and as unobtrusively as possible, and that if ... there is a row in the United Nations, we should keep our heads down and avoid taking sides against the Indonesian Government."[77] Britain abstained from all of the UN General Assembly resolutions relating to East Timor, and sold arms throughout the occupation. In 1978 Indonesia purchased eight BAE Hawk jets, which were used during the "encirclement and annihilation" campaign. Britain sold dozens of additional jets to Indonesia in the 1990s.[78]

Canada abstained from early General Assembly resolutions about East Timor, and opposed three. The Canadian government regularly sold weapons to Indonesia during the occupation, and in the 1990s approved over CDN$400 million in exports for spare weapons parts. A significant trading partner with Indonesia, Canada has invested billions of dollars in Indonesian mining infrastructure.[79]

Japan voted against all eight General Assembly resolutions regarding East Timor. Although its law requires human rights considerations with regard to foreign aid, Japan provided hundreds of millions of dollars in aid to Indonesia during the 1990s.[80] Dunn describes the Japanese reaction to massacres in East Timor as one of "cynical indifference".[81] The Indian government also supported Indonesia, likening the occupation – despite many differences – to its own seizure of Goa in 1961.[82] The members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), meanwhile, consistently voted against the General Assembly resolutions calling for self-determination in East Timor.[83] The government of Malaysia contacted UDT leaders in the summer of 1975 to inform them that Malaysia would not support an independent East Timor. Some reports also charged Malaysia with laundering weapons and F-86 Sabre jets for Indonesia.[84]

The government of Portugal distanced itself from the occupation, refusing to become involved in the process.[85] As the last governor of the colony said while exiled to the island of Atauro: "The position of Lisbon is one of almost complete abandonment."[86] Successive administrations in Portugal refused to pressure Indonesia or take firm positions on the issue. The exception was President Ramalho Eanes, elected in 1982, who championed the Timorese issue of self-determination. His government spoke out for action against Indonesia, and began to pressure Indonesia to end the occupation.[87] Due to domestic pressure, the Portuguese government continued pressing for improved conditions and renewed negotiations in the 1990s.[88]

1975 to 1991

As soon as Indonesian forces had secured Dili, the Provisional Government of East Timor (PGET) was established by members of APODETI and UDT.[89] Most sources describe this institution as a creation of the Indonesian military.[90] One of PGET's first activities was the formation of a "Popular Assembly" consisting of elected representatives and leaders "from various walks of Timorese life".[91] Like the PGET itself, the Popular Assembly is usually characterized as an instrument of propaganda created by the Indonesian military; although international journalists were invited to witness the group's meeting in May 1976, their movement was tightly constrained.[92] The Assembly drafted a request for formal integration into Indonesia, which the Jakarta regime described as "the act of self-determination" in East Timor.[93]

For several years, the Indonesian military (ABRI) tried to eradicate the remaining FRETILIN resistance forces and their supporters. Starting in September 1977, Indonesian forces began out what Catholic officials in East Timor called an "encirclement and annihilation" campaign.[94] 35,000 ABRI troops surrounded areas of FRETILIN support and killed hundreds of men, women, and children. Bombardments from the air and sea were followed by ground troops, destroying villages and agricultural infrastructure.[95] During a firefight with Indonesian troops in December 1978, FRETILIN's leader Nicolau Lobato was killed. His successor was Xanana Gusmão, who was instrumental in building the National Council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM), an umbrella structure for people and groups opposed to the occupation.[96]

Indonesian forces moved hundreds of thousands of people into camps, where they were subject to hunger and forbidden to leave.[97] FRETILIN radio claimed Indonesian planes dropped chemical agents, and several observers – including the Bishop of Dili – reported seeing napalm dropped on the countryside.[98] In 1981 the Indonesian military launched Operasi Keamanan (Operation Security), which some have named the "fence of legs" program. 50,000 East Timorese men and boys were ordered to march through the mountains, sweeping guerrillas into the central part of the region. The operation failed to crush the resistance, and popular resentment toward the occupation grew stronger than ever.[99] As FRETILIN troops in the mountains continued their sporadic attacks, Indonesian forces carried out numerous operations to destroy them over the next ten years. In the cities and villages, meanwhile, a non-violent resistance movement began to take shape.[100]

File:Torture in East Timor 1995.jpg
Indonesian soldiers often used torture against those suspected of opposing integration. This image was taken in a Dili prison in 1995.

At the same time, the Indonesian occupying regime carried out a widespread campaign of killing, torture, "disappearance", political imprisonment, and other abuses of human rights.[101] Starting in 1981, Indonesian officials sent thousands of prisoners to Atauro Island, where Amnesty International described the conditions as "deplorable". [102] Massacres by the Indonesian military have been documented across East Timor. In September 1981, 400 civilians killed in Lacluta, and in August 1983, 200 people were burnt alive in the village of Creras, with 500 others killed at a nearby river.[103]

Those suspected of opposing integration were often arrested and tortured.[104] In 1983 Amnesty International published an Indonesian manual it had received from East Timor instructing military personnel on how to inflict physical and mental anguish, and cautioning troops to "Avoid taking photographs showing torture (of someone being given electric shocks, stripped naked and so on)".[105] In his 1997 memoir East Timor's Unfinished Struggle: Inside the Timorese Resistance, Constâncio Pinto describes being tortured by Indonesian soldiers: "With each question, I would get two or three punches in the face. When someone punches you so much and so hard, it feels as if your face is broken. People hit me on my back and on my sides with their hands and then kicked me.... [In another location] they psychologically tortured me; they didn't hit me, but they made strong threats to kill me. They even put a gun on the table."[106] In Michele Turner's book Telling East Timor: Personal Testimonies 1942–1992, a woman named Fátima describes watching torture take place in a Dili prison: "They make people sit on a chair with the front of the chair on their own toes. It is mad, yes. The soldiers urinate in the food then mix it up for the person to eat. They use electric shock and they use an electric machine...."[107]

Violence against women

Indonesian military abuses against women in East Timor were numerous and well-documented.[108] In addition to suffering arbitrary detainment, torture, and extrajudicial execution, women faced rape and sexual abuse – sometimes for the crime of being related to an independence activist. The scope of the problem is difficult to ascertain, owing to the intense military control imposed during the occupation, compounded by the shame felt by victims. In a 1995 report on violence against women in Indonesia and East Timor, Amnesty International USA wrote: "Women are reluctant to pass on information to non-governmental organizations about rape and sexual abuse, let alone to report violations to the military or police authorities."[109]

Other forms of violence against women took the form of harassment, intimidation, and enforced marriage. The Amnesty report cites the case of a woman forced to live with a commander in Baucau, then harassed daily by troops after her release.[109] Such "marriages" took place regularly during the occupation.[110] Women were also encouraged to accept sterilization procedures, and some were pressured to take the contraceptive Depo Provera, sometimes without full knowledge of its effects.[111]

In 1999 researcher Rebecca Winters released the book Buibere: Voice of East Timorese Women, which chronicles many personal stories of violence and abuse dating to the earliest days of the occupation. One woman tells of being interrogated while stripped half-naked, tortured, molested, and threatened with death.[112] Another describes being chained at the hands and feet, raped repeatedly, and interrogated for weeks.[113] A woman who had prepared food for FRETILIN guerrillas was arrested, burned with cigarettes, tortured with electricity, and forced to walk naked past a row of soldiers into a tank filled with urine and feces.[114]

Deliberate starvation

With large sectors of the population forced into resettlement camps, food production was severely limited. Those in the camps were allowed to farm only a small area of land nearby, and constant re-use of soil made it barren.[115] Hunger and starvation began to claim thousands of lives in the late 1970s. One church worker reported five hundred East Timorese dying of starvation every month in just one district.[116] World Vision Indonesia visited East Timor in October 1978 and claimed that 70,000 East Timorese were at risk of starvation.[117] An envoy from the International Committee of the Red Cross reported in 1979 that 80 percent of one camp's population was malnourished, in a situation that was "as bad as Biafra".[118] The ICRC warned that "tens of thousands" were at risk of starvation.[119] Although the Indonesia claimed to be working through the government-run Indonesian Red Cross to alleviate the crisis, the NGO Action for World Development charged that organization with selling donated aid supplies.[116]

In 2006 the UN's Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor reported that during the occupation large numbers of people were "positively denied access to food and its sources".[120] The group's final report cites testimony from individuals who were denied food, and details destruction of crops and livestock by Indonesian troops.[121] It concluded that a minimum of 84,000 people starved to death during the occupation.[122]

Abuses by FRETILIN

The Indonesian government reported in 1977 that several mass graves containing "scores" of people killed by FRETILIN had been found near Ailieu and Samé.[123] Amnesty International confirmed these reports in 1985, and also expressed concern about several extrajudicial killings for which FRETILIN had claimed responsibility.[124] In 1997 Human Rights Watch condemned a series of attacks carried out by FRETILIN, which led to the deaths of nine civilians.[125]

Demography and economy

Portuguese was banned in East Timor and Indonesian was made the language of government, education and public commerce, and the Indonesian school curriculum was implemented. The official Indonesian national ideology, Pancasila, was applied to East Timor and government jobs were restricted to those holding certification in Pancasila training.[126] East Timorese animist belief systems did not fit with Indonesia's constitutional monotheism (see Pancasila), resulting in mass conversions to Christianity. Pre-invasion, less than 30 percent of East Timorese were Roman Catholics, and by the 1980s 80 percent were registered as Catholics.[127] Today's 90 percent Catholic population make East Timor one of the most densely Catholic countries in the world.[128]

East Timor was a particular focus for the Indonesian government's transmigration program that aimed to resettle Indonesians from densely to less populated regions. Media censorship under the "New Order" meant that the state of conflict in East Timor was unknown to the transmigrants who were predominantly poor Javanese and Balinese wet-rice farmers. On arrival they found themselves under ongoing threat of attack by East Timorese resistance fighters, and became the object of local East Timorese resentment, much of whose land had been compulsorily appropriated by the Indonesian government for transmigrant settlement. Although many gave up and returned to their island of origin, those that stayed in East Timor—and transmigrants across the archipelago generally—contributed to the integration of Indonesia.[129]

The border with West Timor was opened resulting in an influx of West Timorese farmers, and in January 1989 the territory was open to private investment. Economic life in the towns was subsequently brought under the control of entrepreneurial Bugis, Makassarese, and Butonese immigrants from South Sulawesi, while East Timor products were exported under partnerships between army officials Indonesian businessmen.[130]

The Indonesian government's primary response to criticism of its East Timor policies has been development in the region. In a series of booklets published in the 1980s and 1990s, Suharto's government describes the investments it has made to East Timor's health, education, communications, transportation, and agriculture.[131] These investments, Indonesian government officials maintain, were required to remedy "a situation of extreme backwardness resulting from a long period of negligence under more than four hundred years of colonial domination".[132]

As exiled Indonesian critic George Aditjondro points out, however, this development is offset by the negative consequences – human and economic – of the occupation itself. Agricultural production, particularly rice and coffee, dropped sharply in the early years of the occupation, as did livestock populations.[133] Other critics note that infrastructure development, such as road construction, is often designed to facilitate Indonesian military and corporate interests.[134] Aditjondro also points out that former Portuguese island colonies which became independent states, such as Cabo Verde and Sao Tome e Principe, had Gross National Products three times higher than that of East Timor in 1989.[135] The activities of PT Denok, a company controlled by Indonesian government officials, have been referred to as "the economic rape of East Timor".[136]

Santa Cruz massacre

The Santa Cruz massacre took place during a 1991 funeral procession to the grave of Sebastião Gomes.
Main article: Santa Cruz massacre

In October 1991 a delegation to East Timor consisting of members from the Portuguese Parliament and twelve journalists was planned during a visit from UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights on Torture Pieter Kooijmans.[137] The delegation was abruptly canceled when Indonesia refused to allow a reporter it considered "an ardent pro-FRETILIN and anti-Indonesian propagandist" to participate.[138] Portugal called off the delegation, demoralizing independence activists in East Timor, who had hoped for a chance to tell their story to the world.[139] Tensions between Indonesian authorities and East Timorese youths rose in the days after Portugal's cancellation. On 28 October, Indonesian troops had located a group of resistance members in Dili's Motael Church. A confrontation ensued between pro-integration activists and those in the church; when it was over, one man on each side was dead. Sebastião Gomes, a supporter of independence for East Timor, was taken out of the church and shot by Indonesian troops; conversely, integration activist Afonso Henriques was stabbed and killed during the fight.[140]

A number of foreigners had come to East Timor to observe the Portuguese delegation, including independent US journalists Amy Goodman and Allan Nairn, and British cameraman Max Stahl. They attended a memorial service for Gomes on 12 November, during which several thousand men, women, and children walked from the Motael Church to the nearby Santa Cruz cemetery. Along the way, members of the group pulled out protest banners and East Timorese flags, chanted slogans, and taunted Indonesian soldiers and police officers.[141] Organizers of the protest maintained order during the protest; although it was loud, the crowd was peaceful and orderly, by most accounts.[142] It was the largest and most visible demonstration against the Indonesian occupation since 1975.[143]

In a brief confrontation between Indonesian troops and protesters, Major Gerhan Lantara was stabbed.[144] Stahl claims Lantara had attacked a girl carrying the flag of East Timor, and FRETILIN activist Constâncio Pinto reports eyewitness accounts of beatings from Indonesian soldiers and police.[145][146] When the procession reached the cemetery, protesters continued waving flags and chanting pro-independence slogans, until a group of 200 Indonesian soldiers appeared and began shooting.[147] As Stahl filmed the massacre, Goodman and Nairn tried to "serve as a shield for the Timorese" by standing between them and the Indonesian soldiers. The soldiers began beating Goodman, and when Nairn moved to protect her, they beat him with their weapons, fracturing his skull.[148] At least 250 East Timorese were killed in the massacre.[149]

Stahl's footage, combined with the testimony of Nairn and Goodman and others, caused outrage around the world.[150] Although Indonesian authorities described the incident as a spontaneous reaction to violence from the protesters or a "misunderstanding",[151] two factors cast doubt on their characterization. One was the documented history of mass violence committed by Indonesian troops in places such as Quelicai, Lacluta, and Kraras.[152] The other factor was a series of statements from politicians and officers in Indonesia, justifying the military's violence. Try Sustrino, Commander-in-Chief for the Indonesian forces, said two days after the massacre: "The army cannot be underestimated. Finally we had to shoot them. Delinquents like these agitators must be shot, and they will be...."[153]

In response to the massacre, activists around the world organized in solidarity with the East Timorese. Although a small network of individuals and groups had been working for human rights and self-determination in East Timor since the occupation began, their activity took on a new urgency after the 1991 massacre.[154] TAPOL, a British organization formed in 1973 to advocate for democracy in Indonesia, increased its work around East Timor. In the United States, the East Timor Action Network was founded and soon had chapters in ten cities around the country.[155] Other solidarity groups appeared in Portugal, Australia, Japan, Germany, Malaysia, Ireland, and Brazil. Individuals in Indonesia – particularly students and pro-democracy activists – also spoke out against their government's violence in East Timor.[154][156]

1992 to 1998

On 20 November 1992 FRETILIN leader Xanana Gusmão was arrested by Indonesian troops.[157] In May 1993 he was sentenced to life imprisonment for "rebellion",[158] but his sentence was later commuted to 20 years.[159] This was a major frustration to the anti-occupation movement in East Timor, but Gusmão continued to serve as a symbol of hope from inside the Cipinang prison.[157] Nonviolent resistance by East Timorese, meanwhile, continued to show itself. In October 1989, at a visit to Dili by Pope John Paul II, protesters had unfurled banners reading "Free East Timor" and "Indonesia, Get Out".[160] When President Bill Clinton visited Jakarta in 1994, twenty-nine East Timorese students occupied the US embassy to protest US support for Indonesia.[161]

At the same time, human rights observers called attention to continued violations by Indonesian troops and police. A 1995 report by Human Rights Watch noted that "abuses in the territory continue to mount", including torture, disappearances, and limitations on basic rights.[162] After a series of riots in September and October 1995, Amnesty International criticized Indonesian authorities for a wave of arbitrary arrests and torture. The report indicates detainees were beaten with iron bars, kicked, lacerated, and threatened with death.[163]

Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo
José Ramos-Horta

Nobel Peace Prize

In 1996 East Timor was suddenly brought to world attention when the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Bishop Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo and José Ramos-Horta "for their work towards a just and peaceful solution to the conflict in East Timor".[164] The Nobel Committee indicated in its press release that it hoped the award would "spur efforts to find a diplomatic solution to the conflict in East Timor based on the people's right to self-determination".[164] As Nobel scholar Irwin Abrams notes:

120

— For Indonesia the prize was a great embarrassment.... In public statements the government tried to put distance between the two laureates, grudgingly recognizing the prize for Bishop Belo, over whom it thought it could exercise some control, but accusing Ramos-Horta of responsibility for atrocities during the civil strife in East Timor and declaring that he was a political opportunist. At the award ceremony Chairman Sejersted answered these charges, pointing out that during the civil conflict Ramos-Horta was not even in the country and on his return he tried to reconcile the two parties.[165]

Diplomats from Indonesia and Portugal, meanwhile, continued the consultations required by the 1982 General Assembly resolution, in a series of meetings intended to resolve the problem of what Foreign Minister Ali Alatas called the "pebble in the Indonesian shoe".[166][167]

Suharto's resignation

Main article: Fall of Suharto

The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis caused a tremendous upheaval in Indonesia, contributing to a series of riots which culminated in Suharto's resignation in May 1998, after thirty years of rule.[168] The era of reformasi was characterized by many changes, including unprecedented debate about Indonesia's relationship with East Timor. On 8 June 1998, three weeks after taking office, Suharto's successor B. J. Habibie announced that Indonesia would soon offer East Timor a special plan for autonomy.[168]

Indonesia and Portugal announced on 5 May 1999 that it had agreed to hold a vote allowing the people of East Timor to choose between the autonomy plan or independence. The vote, to be administered by the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), was originally scheduled for 8 August but later postponed until 30 August. Indonesia also took responsibility for security; this arrangement caused worry in East Timor, but many observers believe that Indonesia would have refused to allow foreign peacekeepers during the vote.[169]

1999 vote

Main article: East Timor Special Autonomy Referendum

As groups supporting autonomy and independence began campaigning, a series of pro-autonomy paramilitary groups of East Timorese began threatening violence — and indeed committing violence — around the country. Alleging pro-independence bias on the part of UNAMET, the groups were seen working with and receiving training from Indonesian soldiers. Before the May agreement was announced, an April paramilitary attack in Liquiça left dozens of East Timorese dead. On 16 May 1999, a gang accompanied by Indonesian troops attacked suspected independence activists in the village of Atara; in June another group attacked a UNAMET office in Maliana. Indonesian authorities claimed to be helpless to stop the violence between rival factions among the East Timorese, but Ramos-Horta joined many others in scoffing at such notions.[170] In February 1999 he said: "Before [Indonesia] withdraws it wants to wreak major havoc and destabilization, as it has always promised. We have consistently heard that over the years from the Indonesian military in Timor."[171]

As militia leaders warned of a "bloodbath", Indonesian "roving ambassador" Francisco Lopes da Cruz declared: "If people reject autonomy there is the possibility blood will flow in East Timor."[172] One paramilitary leader announced that a "sea of fire" would result in the event of a vote for independence.[173] As the date of the vote drew near, reports of anti-independence violence continued to accumulate.[174]

The day of the vote, 30 August 1999, was generally calm and orderly. 98.6 percent of the population cast ballots, and on 4 September UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan announced that 78.5 percent of the votes had been cast for independence.[175] Within hours, paramilitary groups had begun attacking people and setting fires around the capital Dili. Foreign journalists and election observers fled, and tens of thousands of East Timorese took to the mountains. Gangs attacked Dili's Catholic Diocese building, killing two dozen people; the next day, the headquarters of the ICRC was attacked and burned to the ground. Almost one hundred people were killed later in Suai, and reports of similar massacres poured in from around East Timor.[176] The UN withdrew most of its personnel, but the Dili compound had been flooded with refugees. Four UN workers refused to evacuate unless the refugees were withdrawn as well, insisting they would rather die at the hands of the paramilitary groups.[175] At the same time, Indonesian troops and paramilitary gangs forced over 200,000 people into West Timor, into camps described by Human Rights Watch as "deplorable conditions".[177]

When the 1999 independence vote was followed by reports of violence from across East Timor, US adviser Sandy Berger ridiculed the importance of a peacekeeping force by saying: "My daughter has a very messy apartment up in college, maybe I shouldn't intervene to have that cleaned up."[178]

When a UN delegation arrived in Jakarta on 8 September, they were told by Indonesian President Habibie that reports of bloodshed in East Timor were "fantasies" and "lies".[179] General Wiranto of the Indonesian military insisted that his soldiers had the situation under control, and later expressed his emotion for East Timor by singing the 1975 hit song "Feelings" at an event for military wives.[180][181] Governments around the world refused to pressure Indonesia into accepting an international peacekeeping force, despite abundant evidence of a desperate situation. When asked by a reporter why the US didn't support such a force, US National Security Adviser Sandy Berger replied: "My daughter has a very messy apartment up in college, maybe I shouldn't intervene to have that cleaned up."[178]

Aftermath

On 12 September President Habibie agreed to withdraw Indonesian soldiers and allow an international peacekeeping force.[182] The International Force for East Timor, or INTERFET, entered Dili on 20 September and by 31 October the last Indonesian troops had left East Timor.[183] The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was established at the end of October and administered the region for two years. Control of the nation was turned over to the Government of East Timor and independence was declared on 20 May 2002.[184] On 27 September of the same year, East Timor joined the United Nations as its 191st member state.[185]

Number of deaths

Although precise numbers are difficult to determine, the number of East Timorese killed during the occupation is likely between 103,000 and 145,000 people.[2] A 1974 Catholic church estimate of the population of East Timor was 688,711 people; in 1982 the church reported only 425,000. This led to an estimate of 200,000 people killed during the occupation, which was widely reported around the world.[186] More comprehensive research, however, shows that the number is probably smaller. Incorporating statistics on refugee movement, population growth, and the presence of migrants from Indonesia, researcher Ben Kiernan says "a toll of 150,000 is likely close to the truth".[187] The 2005 report of the UN's Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor reports a figure of at least 102,800: 18,600 unlawful executions and 84,200 starvation deaths.[188]

Many observers have called the Indonesian military action in East Timor an example of genocide.[189] In a study of the word's legal meaning and applicability to the occupation of East Timor, legal scholar Ben Saul concludes that because no group recognized under international law was targeted by the Indonesian authorities, a charge of genocide cannot be applied. However, he also notes: "The conflict in East Timor most accurately qualifies as genocide against a ‘political group’, or alternatively as ‘cultural genocide’, yet neither of these concepts are explicitly recognised in international law."[3] The occupation has been compared to the killings of the Khmer Rouge, the Yugoslav wars, and the Rwandan Genocide.[190]

Justice

Saul goes on to discuss prosecutions of responsible parties for "crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other gross violations of human rights".[3] In the years after the end of the occupation, a number of proceedings have been carried out to such an end. The 1999 UN Security Council resolution authorizing UNTAET described the history of "systematic, widespread and flagrant violations of international and human rights law" and demanded "that those responsible for such violence be brought to justice".[191] To achieve these ends, UNTAET established a Serious Crimes Unit (SCU), which has attempted to investigate and prosecute individuals responsible for such violence. However, the SCU has been criticized for accomplishing relatively little, presumably because it is funded inadequately, limited in mandate to crimes committed only in 1999, and for other reasons.[192] Indonesian trials purporting to punish those responsible for the violence were described as "manifestly inadequate" by a UN commission.[193]

Deficiencies in these processes have led a number of organizations to call for an international tribunal to prosecute individuals responsible for killings in East Timor, similar to those established in Yugoslavia and Rwanda.[193][194] A 2001 editorial by the East Timor NGO La'o Hamutuk said:

An uncountable number of Crimes Against Humanity were committed during the 1975-1999 period in East Timor. Although an international court could not pursue all of them, it ... [would] confirm that the invasion, occupation and destruction of East Timor by Indonesia was a long-standing, systematic, criminal conspiracy, planned and ordered at the highest levels of government. Many of the perpetrators continue to wield authority and influence in East Timor’s nearest neighbor. The future of peace, justice and democracy in both East Timor and Indonesia depends on holding the highest-level perpetrators accountable.[195]

In 2005, the Indonesia-Timor Leste Commission of Truth and Friendship was set up with the goal of establishing the truth relating to crimes under the occupation, and healing divisions between the countries. It has received criticism from NGOs and was rejected by the United Nations for offering impunity.

Notes

  1. ^ Sluka, Jeffrey A. Death Squad: The Anthropology of State Terror. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000. ISBN 0-8122-1711-X. p. 179.
  2. ^ a b Kiernan, pp. 593–594; CAVR.
  3. ^ a b c Saul, Ben. "Was the Conflict in East Timor ‘Genocide’ and Why Does It Matter?". Melbourne Journal of International Law. 2:2 (2001). Retrieved on 17 February 2008.
  4. ^ Budiardjo and Liong, p. 49; CIIR, p. 117.
  5. ^ a b c Pilger, John. "Blood on Our Hands" 25 January 1999. Online at johnpilger.com. Retrieved on 2 February 2008.
  6. ^ "East Timor Country Profile". Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 2008. Retrieved 2008-02-19.
  7. ^ Jolliffee, pp. 23–41.
  8. ^ a b Dunn (1996), pp. 19–22; Wesley-Smith, p. 85; Jardine, p. 22.
  9. ^ Budiardjo and Liong, pp. 3–5; Dunn (1996), pp. 28–29; Taylor (1991), p. 20.
  10. ^ Quoted in Taylor (1991), p. 20; similar assurances from Indonesian officials are quoted in Ramos-Horta, pp. 63–64.
  11. ^ Quoted in Kohen and Taylor, p. 3.
  12. ^ Jolliffee, pp. 58–62.
  13. ^ Dunn (1996), p. 53–54.
  14. ^ Quoted in Dunn, p. 56.
  15. ^ Quoted in Dunn, p. 60.
  16. ^ Dunn, p. 62; Indonesia (1977), p. 19.
  17. ^ Dunn, p. 62.
  18. ^ Dunn, p. 69; Indonesia (1977), p. 21.
  19. ^ Dunn, p. 79.
  20. ^ Dunn, p. 78; Budiadjo and Liong, p. 5; Jolliffe, pp. 197–198; Taylor (1991), p. 58. Taylor cites a September CIA report describing Indonesian attempts to "provoke incidents that would provide the Indonesians with an excuse to invade should they decide to do so".
  21. ^ Dunn, p. 84; Budiardjo and Liong, p. 6.
  22. ^ Indonesia (1977), p. 23.
  23. ^ Ramos-Horta, p. 53–54; Jolliffe confirms Ramos-Horta's protests, p. 116.
  24. ^ Dunn, pp. 149–150.
  25. ^ Ramos-Horta, p. 55; Turner, p. 82. Turner gives a number of 1,500–2,300 dead.
  26. ^ Krieger, p. xix; Budiardjo, p. 6.
  27. ^ Dunn, p. 159.
  28. ^ Indonesia (1977), p. 31.
  29. ^ Budiardjo, p. 6; Taylor (1991), p. 53; Jolliffe, p. 150; Dunn, p. 160; Jardine, p. 29. Dunn says it was "a condition of their being allowed to enter Indonesian Timor", and Jolliffe and Jardine confirm this characterization.
  30. ^ Jolliffe, pp. 167–179 and 201–207; Indonesia (1977), p. 32; Taylor (1991), pp. 59–61. Indonesia describes the soldiers as "the combined forces of the four aligned parties", referring to APODETI, UDT, and two other smaller parties; most other accounts, however, indicate that APODETI never had many troops to begin with, and UDT's forces were tiny and shattered after the fighting with FRETILIN. Taylor describes one assault carried out by "Indonesian soldiers disguised as UDT troops".
  31. ^ Jolliffe, p. 164 and 201.
  32. ^ Jolliffe, pp. 167–177. Jolliffe includes testimony from numerous eyewitnesses.
  33. ^ Vickers (2005), p. 166
  34. ^ Indonesia (1977), p. 35; Jolliffe, pp. 179–183; Taylor (1991), pp. 62–63.
  35. ^ Jolliffe, pp. 201–207; Taylor (1991), p. 63.
  36. ^ Jolliffe, pp. 208–216; Indonesia (1977), p. 37.
  37. ^ a b Indonesia (1977), p. 39.
  38. ^ Budiardjo and Liong, p. 22.
  39. ^ Ramos-Horta, pp. 107–108.; Budiardjo and Liong, p. 23.
  40. ^ Dunn (1996), pp. 257–260.
  41. ^ Hill, p. 210.
  42. ^ Quoted in Budiardjo and Liong, p. 15.
  43. ^ Quoted in Ramos-Horta, p. 108.
  44. ^ Quoted in Taylor (1991), p. 68.
  45. ^ Ramos-Horta, pp. 101–102.
  46. ^ Taylor (1991), p. 68.
  47. ^ Taylor (1991), p. 69; Dunn (1996), p. 253.
  48. ^ a b Quoted in Turner, p. 207.
  49. ^ Taylor (1991), p. 71.
  50. ^ Indonesia (1977), p. 16.
  51. ^ Indonesia (1977), p. 21.
  52. ^ Alatas, pp. 18–19.
  53. ^ Indonesia (1977), p. 19.
  54. ^ Ramos-Horta, pp. 105–106; Krieger, p. 123. Ramos-Horta recounts the linguistic debate at the UN over whether to use "deplore" (a milder term) or "condemn" the invasion.
  55. ^ Krieger, p. 53.
  56. ^ Clark (1995), p. 73.
  57. ^ Taylor (1991), p. 177.
  58. ^ United Nations General Assembly. General Assembly Resolution 37/30: Question of East Timor. New York: 23 November 1982.
  59. ^ Clark (1995), pp. 73–80.
  60. ^ Clark (1995), pp. 92–95.
  61. ^ Marks, p. 176.
  62. ^ a b c d US Department of State. "Embassy Jakarta Telegram 1579 to Secretary State, 6 December 1975". Online at The National Security Archive. Retrieved on 2 November 2007. In his 2006 memoir, Alatas confirms Kissinger's concern over the use of US-made arms on p. 20.
  63. ^ Budiardjo and Liong, p. 9; Nevins, p. 51. On 28 June 1977, New Jersey Representative Helen S. Meyner told the House Subcommittee on International Organizations that she had been told by an Indonesian general with regard to ABRI use of US arms: "Of course, these are the only weapons that we have." See Krieger, p. 239.
  64. ^ Nevins, pp. 53–54.
  65. ^ Nevins, pp. 59–61.
  66. ^ Larsen, Suzie. "Human Rights Are Not an Issue". Mother Jones. Retrieved on 21 February 2008.
  67. ^ Quoted in Nevins, p. 72.
  68. ^ Dunn, pp. 61.
  69. ^ Jardine, p. 45.
  70. ^ Dunn (1996), p. 345; Jardine, pp. 46–47; Taylor (1991), p. 170.
  71. ^ Quoted in Chinkin, p. 277.
  72. ^ Aditjondro (1999), p. 25.
  73. ^ Nevins, pp. 62–64; Dunn (1996), pp. 348–349; Chinkin, p. 286; Taylor (1991), pp. 170–171; Kohen and Taylor, p. 107.
  74. ^ Quoted in Dunn (1996), p. 124.
  75. ^ Dunn (1996), p. 120.
  76. ^ Quoted in Wesley-Smith, pp. 85–86.
  77. ^ Quoted in Budiardjo and Liong, p. 10.
  78. ^ Jardine, pp. 50–51.
  79. ^ Jardine, pp. 48–49.
  80. ^ Jardine, p. 49–50.
  81. ^ Dunn (1996), p. 311.
  82. ^ Dunn (1996), p. 312. The differences included a long-standing territorial claim by India to Goa; the absence of a decolonization program in Goa; and significant historic separations which existed in the case of East Timor, which did not hold true with regard to Goa.
  83. ^ Dunn, pp. 311–312.
  84. ^ Budiardjo and Liong, pp. 13–14.
  85. ^ Kohen and Taylor, pp. 108–111; Budiardjo and Liong, pp. 151–152.
  86. ^ Quoted in Taylor (1991), p. 171.
  87. ^ Taylor (1991), pp. 172–174.
  88. ^ Jardine, p. 67.
  89. ^ Indonesia (1977), p. 39.
  90. ^ Taylor (1990), p. 9; Kohen and Taylor, p. 43; Budiardjo and Liong, p. 15 and 96; Nevins, p. 54; Dunn (1996), p. 262; Jolliffe, p. 272. Budiardjo and Liong call it a "puppet government". Dunn comments: "In fact, the writer was told by Timorese officials who were in Dili at the time that the PGET had no separate existence or powers at all." Jolliffe notes a radio address from FRETILIN leader Nicolau Lobato claiming that the PGET had been sworn in on an Indonesian ship in Dili harbor.
  91. ^ Indonesia (1977), pp. 43–44.
  92. ^ Jolliffe, p. 289; Taylor (1990), p. 9; Dunn (1996), p. 264; Budiardjo and Liong, p. 96. Budiardjo and Liong, on p. 11, call the Popular Assembly's pretense of democracy a "preposterous claim".
  93. ^ Indonesia (1977), p. 44.
  94. ^ Taylor (1990), p. 85.
  95. ^ Dunn (1996), pp. 275–276; Taylor, pp. 85–88; Budiardjo and Liong, pp. 27–31. Taylor estimates "many thousands were slaughtered during this period".
  96. ^ Dunn (1996), p. 281.
  97. ^ CAVR, ch. 7, p. 50; Taylor, pp. 88–89; Dunn (1996), pp. 290–291. Dunn refers to a relief worker commenting that conditions in the Timorese camps were as bad as anything he'd seen elsewhere, including the Thai-Cambodia border.
  98. ^ Budiardjo and Liong, p. 35.
  99. ^ Budiardjo and Liong, pp. 41–43; Dunn (1996), p. 301.
  100. ^ Dunn (1996), pp. 303–304.
  101. ^ Taylor, pp. 100–110; Budiardjo and Liong, pp. 127–138; Jardine, pp. 52–59; Kohen and Taylor, pp. 69–91; Amnesty (1985), pp. 20–78. See also generally Turner and Winters.
  102. ^ Budiardjo and Liong, pp. 135–138; Jardine, p. 55; Taylor (1991), pp. 105–106.
  103. ^ Taylor, pp. 101–102; Nevins, p. 30; Budiardjo and Liong, pp. 127–128; Amnesty (1985), p. 23; Dunn, p. 299. Taylor quotes an eyewitness from Lacluta who testified to the Australian Senate: "Indonesian soldiers took hold of the legs of small children and threw them around in the air a number of times and smashed their heads against a rock."
  104. ^ Amnesty (1985), pp. 53–59; Turner, p. 125; Kohen and Taylor, p. 90; Budiardjo and Liong, pp. 131–135.
  105. ^ Amnesty (1985), pp. 53–54.
  106. ^ Pinto, pp. 142–148.
  107. ^ Turner, p. 143.
  108. ^ Amnesty (1995); Winters; Budiardjo and Liong, p. 132; Jardine, pp. 33–34; Aditjondro (1998).
  109. ^ a b Amnesty (1995), p. 14.
  110. ^ Aditjondro (1998), pp. 256–260.
  111. ^ Taylor (1991), pp. 158–160.
  112. ^ Winters, pp. 11–12.
  113. ^ Winters, pp. 24–26.
  114. ^ Winters, pp. 85–90.
  115. ^ Taylor (1991), pp. 92–98.
  116. ^ a b Kohen and Taylor, pp. 54–56.
  117. ^ CAVR, ch. 7.3, p. 72.
  118. ^ Quoted in Taylor (1991), p. 97.
  119. ^ Taylor (1991), p. 203.
  120. ^ CAVR, ch. 7.3, pp. 7–8.
  121. ^ CAVR, ch. 7.3, p. 147.
  122. ^ CAVR, ch. 7.3, p. 143.
  123. ^ Indonesia (1977), p. 41.
  124. ^ Amnesty (1985), p. 13.
  125. ^ Human Rights Watch. "East Timor-Guerrilla Attacks". New York: Human Rights Watch, 4 June 1997. Online at Human Rights News. Retrieved on 2 February 2008.
  126. ^ Taylor, Jean Gelman (2003), p.381
  127. ^ Taylor, Jean Gelman (2003), p.381
  128. ^ East Timor slowly rises from the ashes ETAN 21 September 2001 Online at etan.org. Retrieved on 22 February 2008
  129. ^ Vickers (2005), p. 194
  130. ^ Vickers (2003), p. 194; Taylor, Jean Gelman (2003), p.381
  131. ^ See OCLC 08011559, OCLC 12428538, OCLC 15045705, and OCLC 27301921.
  132. ^ Indonesia (1981), p. 12.
  133. ^ Aditjondro (1995), pp. 59–60.
  134. ^ Budiardjo and Liong, pp. 104–105.
  135. ^ Aditjondro (1995), p. 61.
  136. ^ Dunn (1996), p. 296.
  137. ^ Krieger, p. 257.
  138. ^ Alatas, p. 53.
  139. ^ Pinto, p. 183; Alatas, p. 57.
  140. ^ Singh, pp. 155–156; Pinto, pp. 183–184; Carey, p. 49; Alatas, p. 57. Alatas and Singh do not mention the presence of Indonesian troops at the church. Carey describes Henriques as "a Timorese member of a ninja (masked killer) unit which had broken into the Motael Church  ... to harass the sheltering students". Pinto describes him as "working for Indonesian intelligence".
  141. ^ Carey, p. 50; Jardine, p. 15; Alatas, p. 58.
  142. ^ Anderson, p. 146; Carey, p. 50; Singh, p. 157; Alatas, pp. 57–58; Amnesty (1991), p. 1. Alatas describes a peaceful procession "taken over by a small group of agitators", whose provocations included "the display of FRETILIN flags and banners" and "the shouting of anti-integration slogans".
  143. ^ Pinto and Jardine, p. 190.
  144. ^ Krieger, pp. 257–258.
  145. ^ Kubiak, W. David. "20 Years of Terror: Indonesia in Timor – An Angry Education with Max Stahl". Kyoto Journal. 28. Reprinted at The Forum of Democratic Leaders in the Asia-Pacific. Retrieved on 14 February 2008.
  146. ^ Pinto and Jardine, p. 191.
  147. ^ Carey, p. 50; Pinto and Jardine, p. 191; Anderson, pp. 149–150; Alatas, p. 58; Singh, pp. 157–159. Pinto insists that "there was no provocation", while Anderson discusses in detail the lack of orders to disperse or warning shots. Amnesty (1991) confirms these claims via eyewitness testimony.
  148. ^ Goodman, Amy and Allan Nairn. "Massacre: The Story of East Timor". 1992. Excerpted at Democracy Now, 28 January 2008. Retrieved on 14 February 2008.
  149. ^ Carey, p. 51; Jardine, p. 16. The Portuguese solidarity group A Paz é Possível em Timor Leste compiled a careful survey of the massacre's victims, listing 271 killed, 278 wounded, and 270 "disappeared".
  150. ^ Jardine, pp. 16–17; Carey, pp. 52–53.
  151. ^ Brigadier General Warouw in Amnesty (1991), p. 4
  152. ^ Carey, p. 51.
  153. ^ Quoted in Carey, p. 52. A slightly different wording ("...and we will shoot them") is quoted in Jardine, p. 17.
  154. ^ a b Jardine, pp. 67–69.
  155. ^ "About ETAN". East Timor Action Network. Retrieved on 18 February 2008.
  156. ^ CIIR, pp. 62–63; Dunn, p. 311.
  157. ^ a b Dunn (1996), p. 303.
  158. ^ Jardine, p. 69.
  159. ^ Alatas, p. 67.
  160. ^ Pinto and Jardine, pp. 108–109.
  161. ^ Jardine, p. 68.
  162. ^ "Indonesia/East Timor: Deteriorating Human Rights in East Timor". Human Rights Watch. February 1995. Retrieved on 16 February 2008.
  163. ^ "East Timor: The September and October 1995 riots: Arbitrary detention and torture". Amnesty International. ASA 21/03/96. 15 January 1996. Retrieved on 16 February 2008.
  164. ^ a b "Press Release: Nobel Peace Prize 1996". Norwegian Nobel Committee. 11 October 1996. Retrieved on 16 February 2008.
  165. ^ Abrams, Irwin. "The 1996 Nobel Peace Prize". 1996. Retrieved on 16 February 2008.
  166. ^ Kroon, Robert. "Q&A/Ali Alatas, Foreign Minister: Jakarta Goal for East Timor: Autonomy". International Herald Tribune. 3 February 1999. Retrieved on 16 February 2008.
  167. ^ Alatas, pp. 105–120.
  168. ^ a b Nevins, p. 82.
  169. ^ Nevins, pp. 86–89.
  170. ^ Nevins, pp. 83–88.
  171. ^ Quoted in Nevins, p. 84.
  172. ^ Both quoted in Nevins, p. 91.
  173. ^ Quoted in Nevins, p. 92.
  174. ^ International Federation for East Timor Observer Project. "IFET-OP Report #7: Campaign Period Ends in Wave of Pro-Integration Terror". 28 August 1999. Retrieved on 17 February 2008.
  175. ^ a b Shah, Angilee. "Records of East Timor: 1999". 21 September 2006. Online at the UCLA International Institute. Retrieved on 17 February 2008.
  176. ^ Nevins, pp. 100–104.
  177. ^ [http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/wtimor/ "Indonesia/East Timor: Forced Expulsions to West Timor and the Refugee Crisis"]. Human Rights Watch. December 1999. Retrieved on 17 February 2008.
  178. ^ a b Quoted in Nevins, p. 124; Friedman, Thomas. "Foreign Affairs; Run That by Me Again". New York Times. 19 September 1999. Retrieved on 17 February 2008.
  179. ^ Quoted in Nevins, p. 104.
  180. ^ Nevins, p. 107.
  181. ^ "Wiranto - survivor with iron will". BBC News. 13 February 2000. Online at bbc.co.uk. Retrieved on 17 February 2008.
  182. ^ Nevins, p. 108.
  183. ^ Nevins, pp. 108–110.
  184. ^ "New country, East Timor, is born; UN, which aided transition, vows continued help". UN News Centre. 19 May 2002. Retrieved on 17 February 2008.
  185. ^ "UN General Assembly admits Timor-Leste as 191st member". UN News Centre. 27 September 2002. Retrieved on 17 February 2008.
  186. ^ Dunn, pp. 283–285; Budiardjo and Liong, pp. 49–51; and Taylor, pp. 89–90.
  187. ^ Kiernan, p. 594.
  188. ^ CAVR, Executive Summary, p. 44.
  189. ^ Jardine; Taylor (1991), p. ix; Nevins cites a wide variety of sources discussing the question of genocide in East Timor, on p. 217–218.
  190. ^ Budiardjo and Liong, p. 49; CIIR, p. 117.
  191. ^ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1272 (1999). United Nations Security Council. 25 October 1999. Retrieved on 17 February 2008.
  192. ^ "UNTAET and 'Serious Crimes'". La'o Hamutuk Bulletin. 2:6–7. October 2001. Retrieved on 17 February 2008.
  193. ^ a b "East Timor: U.N. Security Council Must Ensure Justice". Human Rights Watch. 29 June 2005. Retrieved on 17 February 2008.
  194. ^ In 2002 over 125 women from 14 countries signed a statement calling for an international tribunal. Other such demands have been issued by ETAN/US, TAPOL, and – with qualifications – Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International.
  195. ^ "Editorial: Time to Get Serious About Justice for East Timor". La'o Hamutuk Bulletin. 2:6–7. October 2001. Retrieved on 17 February 2008.

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