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{| class="wikitable"
{| class="wikitable"
|+Unofficial Structure of the Establishment of Pakistan
|+Unofficial Structure of the Establishment of Pakistan
!
!Institution
!Institution
!Executive
!Executive
!
|-
|-
|
|[[Chief of the Army Staff (Pakistan)|Chief of Army Staff]]
|[[Chief of the Army Staff (Pakistan)|Chief of Army Staff]]
|[[Asim Munir (general)|Asim Munir]]
|[[Asim Munir (general)|Asim Munir]]
|
|-
|-
|
|[[Joint Staff Headquarters (Pakistan)|Joint Staff Headquarters]]
|[[Joint Staff Headquarters (Pakistan)|Joint Staff Headquarters]]
|[[Sahir Shamshad Mirza]]
|[[Sahir Shamshad Mirza]]
|
|-
|-
|
|[[Chief of the Naval Staff (Pakistan)|Chief of Naval Staff]]
|[[Chief of the Naval Staff (Pakistan)|Chief of Naval Staff]]
|[[Naveed Ashraf]]
|[[Naveed Ashraf]]
|
|-
|-
|
|[[Director-General of Inter-Services Intelligence|DG ISI]]
|[[Director-General of Inter-Services Intelligence|DG ISI]]
|[[Nadeem Anjum]]
|[[Nadeem Anjum]]
|
|-
|-
|
|[[Chief Justice of Pakistan]]
|[[Chief Justice of Pakistan]]
|[[Qazi Faez Isa|Faez Isa]]
|[[Qazi Faez Isa|Faez Isa]]
|
|-
|-
|
|[[Chief of the Air Staff (Pakistan)|Chief of Air Staff]]
|[[Chief of the Air Staff (Pakistan)|Chief of Air Staff]]
|[[Zaheer Ahmad Babar|Zaheer Ahmed Babar Sidhu]]
|[[Zaheer Ahmad Babar|Zaheer Ahmed Babar Sidhu]]
|
|-
|-
|
|[[Intelligence Bureau (Pakistan)|DG IB]]
|[[Intelligence Bureau (Pakistan)|DG IB]]
|[[Fuad Asadullah Khan|Fuad Asadullah]]
|[[Fuad Asadullah Khan|Fuad Asadullah]]
|
|-
|-
|
|[[Military Intelligence (Pakistan)|DG MI]]
|[[Military Intelligence (Pakistan)|DG MI]]
|Wajid Aziz
|Wajid Aziz
|
|-
|-
|
|[[Federal Investigation Agency|DG FIA]]
|[[Federal Investigation Agency|DG FIA]]
|Mohsin Hassan Butt
|Mohsin Hassan Butt
|
|-
|-
|
|[[Financial Monitoring Unit|DG FMU]]
|[[Financial Monitoring Unit|DG FMU]]
|Lubna Farooq Malik
|Lubna Farooq Malik
|
|-
|-
|
|[[Law enforcement in Pakistan|'''Police Service of Pakistan''']]
|[[Law enforcement in Pakistan|'''Police Service of Pakistan''']]
* [[Punjab Police (Pakistan)|IG Punjab Police]]
* [[Punjab Police (Pakistan)|IG Punjab Police]]
Line 101: Line 78:
* Afzal Mehmood Butt
* Afzal Mehmood Butt
* Amir Ahmed Sheikh
* Amir Ahmed Sheikh
|
|-
|-
|
|[[National Counter Terrorism Authority|NACTA]]
|[[National Counter Terrorism Authority|NACTA]]
|Rai Muhammad Tahir
|Rai Muhammad Tahir
|
|-
|-
|
|[[National Accountability Bureau|Chairman NAB]]
|[[National Accountability Bureau|Chairman NAB]]
|Lt Gen (R) [[Nazir Ahmed Butt]]
|Lt Gen (R) [[Nazir Ahmed Butt]]
|
|-
|-
|
|[[Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority|Chairman PEMRA]]
|[[Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority|Chairman PEMRA]]
|Muhammad Saleem Baig
|Muhammad Saleem Baig
|
|-
|-
|
|[[Federal Board of Revenue|Chairman FBR]]
|[[Federal Board of Revenue|Chairman FBR]]
|Malik Amjed Zubair Tiwana
|Malik Amjed Zubair Tiwana
|
|-
|-
|
|[[Chief Election Commissioner of Pakistan|Chief Election Commissioner]]
|[[Chief Election Commissioner of Pakistan|Chief Election Commissioner]]
|Sikander Sultan Raja
|Sikander Sultan Raja
|
|-
|-
|
|[[Establishment Secretary|Establishment Secretary of Pakistan]]
|[[Establishment Secretary|Establishment Secretary of Pakistan]]
|Inamullah Dharejo
|Inamullah Dharejo
|
|-
|-
|
|[[Interior Secretary of Pakistan]]
|[[Interior Secretary of Pakistan]]
|Azam Suleman Khan
|Azam Suleman Khan
|
|-
|-
|
|[[Defence Secretary (Pakistan)|Defence Secretary of Pakistan]]
|[[Defence Secretary (Pakistan)|Defence Secretary of Pakistan]]
|Lt Gen (R) Hamood-uz-Zaman
|Lt Gen (R) Hamood-uz-Zaman
|
|-
|-
|
|[[Foreign Secretary (Pakistan)|Foreign Secretary of Pakistan]]
|[[Foreign Secretary (Pakistan)|Foreign Secretary of Pakistan]]
|Muhammad Syrus Sajjad Qazi
|Muhammad Syrus Sajjad Qazi
|
|-
|-
|
|'''Pro-establishment Media Houses'''
|'''Pro-establishment Media Houses'''
* [[ARY News|Ary News]]
* [[ARY News|Ary News]]
Line 156: Line 113:
* Dunya News
* Dunya News
* DAWN
* DAWN
* Geo News
* PTV
* PTV
* Suno TV
* Suno TV
Line 168: Line 124:
* Shoaib Shaikh
* Shoaib Shaikh
* [[Aleem Khan]]
* [[Aleem Khan]]
|
|-
|-
|
|'''Business conglomerates:'''
|'''Business conglomerates:'''
* [[Defence Housing Authority, Islamabad|DHA]]
* [[Defence Housing Authority, Islamabad|DHA]]
Line 191: Line 145:
* [[Nawaz Sharif]]
* [[Nawaz Sharif]]
* [[Shahid Khaqan Abbasi]]
* [[Shahid Khaqan Abbasi]]
|
|-
|-
|
|'''Pro-establishment Landlords: feudals and Chieftains'''
|'''Pro-establishment Landlords: feudals and Chieftains'''
* [[Asif Ali Zardari]] (8000 acres)
* [[Asif Ali Zardari]] (8000 acres)
Line 219: Line 171:
* [[Shah Mahmood Qureshi|Shah Mehmood Qureshi]] (Makhdoom Pir of Multan)
* [[Shah Mahmood Qureshi|Shah Mehmood Qureshi]] (Makhdoom Pir of Multan)
* [[Tahir Mehmood Ashrafi|Tahir Ashrafi]] (Chairman of [[All Pakistan Ulema Council]])
* [[Tahir Mehmood Ashrafi|Tahir Ashrafi]] (Chairman of [[All Pakistan Ulema Council]])

|
|
|
|}
|}

Revision as of 02:40, 17 February 2024

Not to be confused with Establishment Division.

The Establishment (Urdu: اسٹیبلشمنٹ), also known as military establishment, is a term used in Pakistan which refers to the deep state cooperation of the Pakistan Armed Forces, the Pakistani intelligence community and other pro-military government officials and civilians. Responsible for various military coups, the military-dominated Establishment has directly ruled Pakistan for nearly half of its existence since its creation in 1947, while frequently exerting covert dominance over the political leadership during the remainder.[1][2] The Establishment in Pakistan includes the key decision-makers in the country's military and intelligence services, national security, as well as its foreign and domestic policies, including the state policies of aggressive Islamization during the military dictatorship of General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq.[3]

In the 2000s, the military establishment later reversed its support of political Islam under General Pervez Musharraf, who pursued enlightened moderation, leading Pakistan to join the United States-led War on terror and subsequently becoming designated as a major non-NATO ally by the Bush administration.[4] Furthermore, in the 2010s, General Raheel Sharif pursued a policy of hardline crackdowns on Islamist militant groups, continuing this reversal of Zia-ul-Haq's aggressive pro-Islamist policies.[5] Civilian members of the military-dominated Establishment have included: Sharifuddin Pirzada, Sahabzada Yaqub Khan, Tariq Azim,[6] A. K. Brohi,[7] Ghulam Ishaq Khan[8] and Zafar Ahmed Ansari.[9]

The core principles and values of the Establishment are the policies of treating India as an arch-rival and existential threat, the Kashmir dispute, Islamization of Pakistan, maintaining Punjab as the heartland of Pakistan, the strategic use of non-state militants and the formation of alliances with other Muslim-majority nations.[10]

Reinforcement of deep-state dominance

The Establishment is notable for its covert interventions and organisation of military coups against the civilian government, and was reportedly behind the 1953–54 Constitutional Coup in the Dominion of Pakistan.[11][12] It also organised the coups of 1958,[12] 1977,[13][14][15] and 1999.[16] The Pakistan Army has been involved in enforcing martial law against elected civilian governments under the claim of restoring law and order in the country as is its role in the Constitution of Pakistan. It has dismissed the legislative branch and parliament a total of four times since Pakistan's creation, and maintains wider commercial, foreign, and political interests in the country. Due to this imbalance of power, the Pakistani military has faced allegations of acting as state within a state.[17][18][19][20][21]

Characteristics and composition

Ayesha Siddiqa, a Pakistani journalist and scholar, notes that the Establishment is overwhelmingly dominated by the Pakistani military forces (i.e. serving and retired officers, SPDF personnel, military-sponsored think-tanks etc.), with its core members also including civil bureaucrats, politicians, media houses and major economic players.[22][23] Abubakar Siddique, a Bangladeshi writer, observed that the civilians involved with the Establishment, such as politicians and judges, are also very "pro-military".[24] American political scientist Stephen Cohen says in his book, The Idea of Pakistan:[6] "Of all of Ayub's achievements, the most enduring was an informal political system that tied together the senior ranks of the military, the civil service, key members of the judiciary, and other elites. Subsequently dubbed the "Establishment," it resembles a classic oligarchy. Pakistani politician, Mushahid Hussain, told that members of the Establishment included members of the business community; journalists, editors, and media experts; and a few academics and members of think tanks. At times, some foreign ambassadors with particularly close ties to the leadership were de facto members [...] Military officers and civilian bureaucrats above a certain level were potential members. As Hussain notes, the informality of the Establishment ensures that occupying a particular post does not confer membership.

Over time, the civil–military power equation has undergone changes, such as increased power sharing between the civilian government and the military as well as the convergence of interests in major aspects such as the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor.[25] During the tenure of General Ayub Khan, the Establishment's code and tenants included the following (as outlined in Cohen's book): India was the main, existential threat to Pakistan, and accordingly the Pakistani military was a priority in all affairs of the state.[26] Since Pakistan could not take on India alone, military alliances were important and essential to the state's survival.[26] Likewise, natural allies included other moderate Islamic states, which were seen as role models.[26] Domestically, the military was a role model for the Pakistani people. Kashmir, a Muslim-majority region that served as the core territorial conflict hotspot between India and Pakistan, was always an issue for the Establishment, to the extent that it became an integral reason for the existence of Pakistan.[26] Quick reforms and revolutions were considered problematic.[26]

Foreign aid from the United States, Japan, and then the People's Republic of China (after 1963) was a driver of the economy.[27] The Establishment ensured control over information dissemination through the media and academia.[27] Radical and/or violent Islamic groups were slowly tolerated.[27] The Establishment theoretically tolerated democratic rule and never seriously imposed Islam; the army being less tolerant of Islamists. Just by surviving, Pakistan and its Establishment would be defeating India.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, a founding member of the Establishment,[28] started looking for a new identity for Pakistan, chiefly one that it did not share with neighbouring rival India. Accordingly, Pakistan started to look towards the Middle East for "aid, ideology, and strategic cooperation"; while at the same time turning its back away from its own shared history with India in South Asia.[29] Further building on Ayub Khan-era policies, Kashmir remained important for the Establishment for a variety of reasons; most notably due to its strategic importance to Pakistan. Furthermore, it was seen as a chance for Pakistan to fulfil its vision of its founding, the two-nation theory—that of being a "homeland for oppressed Indian Muslims".[26] (Though very few, the number of those in the Establishment who want Pakistan to get out of the Kashmir conflict with India are growing.)[30] Outside of the Kashmir conflict, India as a nation was perceived as an existential threat to Pakistan in every way,[31][32][33] particularly after the 1971 secession of Muslim-majority Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan), and the latter's belief that India did not pose an existential threat, effectively endangering the two-nation theory.[34]

On 1 April 2022, Prime Minister Imran Khan announced that in context of no-confidence motion against him in the National Assembly, the "establishment" had given him three options to choose from viz: "resignation, no-confidence [vote] or elections".[35]

Unofficial Structure of the Establishment of Pakistan
Institution Executive
Chief of Army Staff Asim Munir
Joint Staff Headquarters Sahir Shamshad Mirza
Chief of Naval Staff Naveed Ashraf
DG ISI Nadeem Anjum
Chief Justice of Pakistan Faez Isa
Chief of Air Staff Zaheer Ahmed Babar Sidhu
DG IB Fuad Asadullah
DG MI Wajid Aziz
DG FIA Mohsin Hassan Butt
DG FMU Lubna Farooq Malik
Police Service of Pakistan
NACTA Rai Muhammad Tahir
Chairman NAB Lt Gen (R) Nazir Ahmed Butt
Chairman PEMRA Muhammad Saleem Baig
Chairman FBR Malik Amjed Zubair Tiwana
Chief Election Commissioner Sikander Sultan Raja
Establishment Secretary of Pakistan Inamullah Dharejo
Interior Secretary of Pakistan Azam Suleman Khan
Defence Secretary of Pakistan Lt Gen (R) Hamood-uz-Zaman
Foreign Secretary of Pakistan Muhammad Syrus Sajjad Qazi
Pro-establishment Media Houses
Business conglomerates:
Pro-establishment Landlords: feudals and Chieftains

Feudals:

Chieftains:

Clergy:

Criticism

Main article: Criticism of the Pakistan Armed Forces
Anti-establishment powershow in Bannu attended by thousands of people.

In Pakistan, many voices have been taken and there have been several protests against the Establishment but these are not shown by Pakistani media channels since they are not allowed by the Establishment.[36] In Pakistan, especially in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, there is a famous slogan "ye jo dehshatgardi hai, iske peeche wardi hai", ”یہ جو دہشت گردی ہے، اس کے پِیچھے وردی ہے “ (Those in uniform are behind terrorism).[37][38] Due to the popularity of the slogan, Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM) adopted it.[39]

In September 2020, the Pakistan Democratic Movement was formed with the main objective to remove the Establishment's association with the politics of Pakistan.[40] The Pashtun Tahafuz Movement openly criticises the Pakistan Army and accuses the Pakistani state of violating the basic human rights of Pashtuns.[41]

Apart from political movements, many journalists have also taken voice against the Establishment. Hamid Mir, Pakistan's most well-known journalist, spoke against the Establishment many times. Assassination attempts have been made on many journalists who spoke against the Establishment including Mir,[42] Asad Ali Toor,[43] and others. Prominent journalist Matiullah Jan was also abducted and Jan accused the Establishment of abducting him. [44]

In 2023 when Imran Khan was arrested after his removal from government in April 2022 and the subsequent political crisis in the country, there were large-scale protests against the Establishment's strongholds by Khan's party, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf which led to a crackdown against it.[45][46]

See also

References

Citations

  1. ^ Jaffrelot, Christophe (2015). The Pakistan Paradox: Instability and Resilience. Oxford University Press. p. 586. ISBN 978-0-19-023518-5. The civil-military establishment ruled Supreme for 60 years - from 1947 to 2007 - by crushing or betraying social movements and preventing the development of society.
  2. ^ Pakistan Extends Powerful Army Chief’s Term Archived 19 October 2019 at the Wayback Machine, Wall Street Journal, 19 August 2019. "... critics of the military say it helped Mr. Khan win the 2018 election, as a new force in Pakistani politics and it is accused of being behind a campaign against the country's two established political parties."
  3. ^ Ḥaqqānī, Husain (2005). Pakistan: between mosque and military. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. p. 131. ISBN 978-0-87003-214-1. Retrieved 23 May 2010. Zia ul-Haq is often identified as the person most responsible for turning Pakistan into a global center for political Islam. Undoubtedly, Zia went farthest in defining Pakistan as an Islamic state, and he nurtured the jihadist ideology ...
  4. ^ "A Plea for Enlightened Moderation" Archived 25 February 2020 at the Wayback Machine, by Pervez Musharraf, 1 June 2004, The Washington Post
  5. ^ Boone, Jon (15 June 2014). "Pakistan begins long-awaited offensive to root out militants from border region". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 5 August 2020. Retrieved 17 September 2020.
  6. ^ a b Cohen 2004, pp. 68–70.
  7. ^ Cohen 2004, p. 85.
  8. ^ Cohen 2004, p. 146.
  9. ^ Haqqani 2005, p. 25.
  10. ^ Baloch, Qadar Bakhsh (2006). "[Book Review] The Idea of Pakistan". The Dialogue: 136–137. ISSN 1819-6470. Archived from the original on 5 December 2019. Retrieved 6 December 2019.
  11. ^ Pakistan Constitutional Beginnings Archived 11 November 2019 at the Wayback Machine PAKISTAN – A Country Study
  12. ^ a b declassified US Intelligence. [dead link]
  13. ^ Hyman, Anthony; Ghayur, Muhammed; Kaushik, Naresh (1989). Pakistan, Zia and After--. New Delhi: Abhinav Publications. p. 30. ISBN 81-7017-253-5. Operation Fair Play went ahead … as the clock struck midnight [on 4 July 1977] ... [Later,] General Zia [told Bhutto] that Bhutto along with other political leaders of both the ruling and opposition parties would be taken into what he called 'protective custody'.
  14. ^ Dossani, Rafiq; Rowen, Henry S. (2005). Prospects for Peace in South Asia. Stanford University Press. p. 42. ISBN 978-0-8047-5085-1. Zia-ul-Haq, however, chose not to abrogate the 1973 Constitution. Rather, Zia's government suspended the operation of the Constitution and governed directly, through the promulgation of martial law regulations … Between 1977 and 1981 Pakistan did not have legislative institutions.
  15. ^ Cohen 2004.
  16. ^ Hassan Abbas (2005). Pakistan's drift into extremism: Allah, the army, and America's war on terror. M.E. Sharpe. pp. 16–40. ISBN 978-0-7656-1496-4.
  17. ^ Javid, Hassan (23 November 2014). "COVER STORY: The Army & Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan". DAWN.COM. Dawn Newspapers. Dawn Newspapers. Archived from the original on 16 August 2017. Retrieved 16 August 2017.
  18. ^ Aqil, Shah (1973). The army and democracy : military politics in Pakistan. Harvard University Press. ISBN 9780674728936.
  19. ^ Haqqani 2005
  20. ^ Aziz, Mazhar (2007). Military Control in Pakistan: The Parallel State. Routledge. ISBN 9781134074099. Retrieved 16 August 2017.
  21. ^ Chengappa, Bidanda M. (2004). Pakistan, Islamisation, Army and Foreign Policy. APH Publishing. ISBN 9788176485487.
  22. ^ "Mapping the establishment – by Ayesha Siddiqa". LUBP. 15 January 2010. Archived from the original on 5 November 2019. Retrieved 8 December 2019.
  23. ^ Ahmad, Ishtiaq; Rafiq, Adnan (3 November 2016). "Mapping the 'Establishment' - Ayesha Siddiqa". Pakistan's Democratic Transition: Change and Persistence. Routledge. pp. Chapter 3. ISBN 978-1-317-23594-1.
  24. ^ Siddique, Abubakar (15 June 2014). "The Military's Pashtun Wars". The Pashtun Question: The Unresolved Key to the Future of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Hurst. pp. Chapter 6. ISBN 978-1-84904-499-8.
  25. ^ Ahmad, Ishtiaq (3 November 2016). "Pakistan's third democratic transition". In Ahmad, Ishtiaq; Rafiq, Adnan (eds.). Pakistan's Democratic Transition: Change and Persistence. Taylor & Francis. pp. 31–33. ISBN 978-1-317-23595-8.
  26. ^ a b c d e f Cohen 2004, p. 71.
  27. ^ a b c Cohen 2004, p. 72.
  28. ^ Cohen 2004, p. 73: "In this Ayub had been egged on by his activist foreign minister, the young Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who was ambitious, ruthless, and a charter member of the Establishment."
  29. ^ Cohen 2004, p. 170.
  30. ^ Murthy, Gautam (2008). International Economic Relations. New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House. p. 71. ISBN 978-81-7835-615-0.
  31. ^ Fair, C. Christine (2014). Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War. Oxford University Press. p. 173. ISBN 978-0-19-989270-9. [...] conviction of Pakistan's defense establishment that India is fundamentally opposed to Pakistan's existence, rejects the two nation theory, and seeks every opportunity to undo history [...] the two states are thus locked in an existential conflict with no obvious resolution.
  32. ^ Cohen 2004, p. 121.
  33. ^ Haqqani 2005, p. 15.
  34. ^ Cohen 2004, p. 282.
  35. ^ "PM Imran says 'establishment' gave him three options: resignation, no-confidence vote or elections". Dawn. 1 April 2022. Archived from the original on 10 April 2022. Retrieved 1 April 2022.
  36. ^ Paley, Sofia (22 August 2019). "Pakistan's media forced into self-censorship". Index on Censorship. Archived from the original on 27 June 2021. Retrieved 27 June 2021.
  37. ^ "Hunger Strike, Protests in Pak's Balochistan After Quetta Blast". TheQuint. 14 April 2019. Archived from the original on 27 June 2021. Retrieved 27 June 2021.
  38. ^ Adeed, Farah (24 December 2018). "The rise of a 'Pashtun Spring': An open letter to Pashtuns". Global Village Space. Archived from the original on 27 June 2021. Retrieved 27 June 2021.
  39. ^ Siddiqui, Taha (13 January 2019). "The PTM in Pakistan: Another Bangladesh in the making?". aljazeera.com. Archived from the original on 27 March 2022. Retrieved 27 March 2022.
  40. ^ Zafar, Imad (26 October 2020). "Sharif checkmates Pakistani establishment". Asia Times. Archived from the original on 29 October 2020. Retrieved 26 October 2020.
  41. ^ Taha Siddiqui (13 January 2018). "The PTM in Pakistan: Another Bangladesh in the making?". Al Jazeera. Archived from the original on 13 January 2019. Retrieved 13 January 2018.
  42. ^ "Am I a traitor?". Committee to Protect Journalists. 8 May 2014. Archived from the original on 27 June 2021. Retrieved 27 June 2021.
  43. ^ "Pakistan: Journalist critical of military attacked at home". Deutsche Welle. 26 May 2021. Archived from the original on 21 June 2021. Retrieved 27 June 2021.
  44. ^ Kugelman, Michael (3 June 2021). "Pakistan's Press Enters a Dark Era". Foreign Policy. Archived from the original on 27 June 2021. Retrieved 27 June 2021.
  45. ^ Hussain, Abid (12 May 2023). "Why are Imran Khan's supporters angry with Pakistan's military?". Al Jazeera. Retrieved 8 January 2024.
  46. ^ Khuhro, Zarrar (11 May 2023). "Imran Khan's arrest has exploded Pakistan's reservoir of rage". Al Jazeera. Retrieved 8 January 2024.

Bibliography


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