Indo-Pakistani war of 1965

Indo-Pakistani War of 1965
Part of the Indo-Pakistani Wars
File:Introduction Images from the 1965 War.JPG Clockwise from top: Indian troops march off captured Pakistani SSG Commandos who were parachuted into India; An Indian fighter jet attacking a Pakistani train station; A burning Pakistani M48 Patton Tank; Pakistani F-86 Sabres on a bombing run over India; Pakistan Army attacking at the front-lines in India.
Date August - September 21, 1965 Location Indian subcontinent Result Strategic Stalemate.
Belligerents
India	Pakistan
Commanders and leaders
Joyanto Nath Chaudhuri Harbakhsh Singh	Ayub Khan Musa Khan
Casualties and losses
3,264 killed 8,623 wounded (From July to ceasefire)	3,800 killed (September 6 - 22) 4,000 - 8,000 killed/ captured (July to September 6)

The Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 was a culmination of skirmishes that took place between April 1965 and September 1965 between India and Pakistan. It was known as the Second Kashmir War which was fought between India and Pakistan over the region of Kashmir, the first having been fought in 1947. The war began following the failure of Pakistan's Operation Gibraltar which was designed to infiltrate and invade Jammu and Kashmir. The five-week war caused thousands of casualties on both sides. It ended in a United Nations (UN) mandated ceasefire.

Much of the war was fought by the countries' land forces in the region of Kashmir and along the International Border (IB) between India and Pakistan. This war saw the largest amassing of troops in Kashmir, a number that was overshadowed only during the 2001-2002 military standoff between India and Pakistan. Most of the war was fought on land by each country's infantry and armored units, with substantial backing from their air forces. Many details of this war, like those of most Indo-Pakistani Wars, remain unclear and riddled with media biases.

Pre-war escalation

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A TIME magazine cover on the war. This was the first time that the international media covered a conflict between the two neighbours on a significant scale.

A declassified US State Department telegram that confirms the existence of hundreds of "infiltrators" in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. Dated during the events running up to the 1965 war.

Since Independence, both nations were in contention over several issues, primarily on border disputes. Kashmir was a major divisive issue between both the nations, but other border disputes existed, most notably over the Rann of Kutch, a barren region in the Indian state of Gujarat. Though the erstwhile princely state of Junagadh was integrated into India, its borders, especially in the marshlands to the west were ambiguous. This gave rise to a dispute between Pakistan and India. On March 20, 1965, and again in April 1965, fighting broke out between India and Pakistan in the Rann of Kutch. Initially involving the border police from both nations, the disputed area soon witnessed intermittent skirmishes between the countries' armed forces. In June the same year, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson successfully persuaded both countries to end hostilities and set up a tribunal to resolve the dispute. The verdict, which came later in 1968, saw Pakistan gaining 350 square miles (900 km²) of the Rann of Kutch, as against its original claim of 3500 sq miles.

After its successes in the Rann of Kutch, Pakistan, under the leadership of General Ayub Khan, is said to have believed that the Indian Army was unable to defend itself against a quick military campaign in the disputed territory of Kashmir, following a loss to China in 1962. Pakistan believed that the population of Kashmir was generally discontented with Indian rule and that a resistance movement could be ignited by a few infiltrating saboteurs. This was codenamed Operation Gibraltar. However, the Pakistani infiltrators were soon discovered, aided primarily by the local Kashmiris themselves and the entire operation ended in a complete disaster.

For its part, Pakistan claimed to have been concerned by the attempts of India to absorb Kashmir - a state that is internationally recognised as "disputed", into the Indian union by way Articles 356 and 357 of the Indian Constitution allowing the President of India to declare President's Rule in the disputed state.

The war

File:Ichhogil Canal (1965 Indo-Pak War) .jpg

Pakistan's Ichogil Canal was a vital barrier that needed to be crossed by Indian troops. This bridge across the canal was destroyed by the Pakistan Army before retreating.

On August 15, 1965, Indian forces crossed the ceasefire line and launched an attack on Pakistan administered Kashmir. Pakistani reports cite this attack as unprovoked. Indian reports cite the attack as a response to the massive armed infiltrations by Pakistan. Initially, the Indian Army met with considerable success in the northern sector (Kashmir). After launching a prolonged artillery barrage against Pakistan, India was able to capture three important mountain positions. However, by the end of the month both sides were on even footing as Pakistan had made progress in areas such as Tithwal, Uri and Punch and India had gains in Pakistan Administered Kashmir (sometime referred as Pakistan Occupied Kashmir), having captured the Haji Pir Pass eight kilometers inside Pakistani territory. Following the failure of Operation Gibraltar, that resulted in territorial gains and rapid Indian advances in Kashmir, Pakistan launched a bold counter attack on September 1, 1965 to reclaim vital posts in Kashmir lost to India. This attack, called "Operation Grand Slam" was intended to capture the vital town of Akhnoor in Jammu and thus sever communications and cut off supply routes to Indian troops. Attacking with an overwhelming ratio of troops and technically superior tanks, Pakistan was on the verge of springing a surprise against Indian forces, who were caught unprepared and suffered heavy losses. India then called in its air force to target the Pakistani attack in the southern sector. The next day, Pakistan retaliated, and its air force attacked Indian forces and air bases in both Kashmir and Punjab. But Operation Grand Slam failed to achieve its aim as the Pakistan Army was unable to capture the town. This became one of the turning points in the war, as India decided to relieve pressure on its troops in Kashmir by attacking Pakistan further south.

File:Brig.Hari Singh at Barkee Capture.jpg

Lt. Col. Hari Singh of the Indian 18th Cavalry posing outside a captured Pakistani police station (Barkee) in Lahore District.

India crossed the International Border (IB) on the Western front on September 6, marking an official beginning of the war. On September 6, the 15th Infantry Division of the Indian Army, under World War II veteran Major General Prasad battled a massive counterattack by Pakistan near the west bank of the Ichhogil Canal (BRB Canal), which was a de facto border of India and Pakistan. This is where Maj. Raja Aziz Bhatti a recipent of the Nishan-E-Haider. The General's entourage itself was ambushed and he was forced to flee his vehicle. A second, this time successful, attempt to cross over the Ichhogil Canal was made through the bridge in the village of Barki, just east of Lahore. This brought the Indian Army within the range of Lahore International Airport, and as result the United States requested a temporary ceasefire to allow it to evacuate its citizens in Lahore. One unit of the Jat regiment, 3 Jat had also crossed the Ichogil canal and captured the town of Batapore (Jallo Mur to Pakistan) on the west side of the canal, threatening Lahore on the very start of the war.

The same day, a counter offensive consisting of an armored division and infantry division supported by Pakistan Air Force Sabres forced the Indian 15th Division to withdraw to its starting point. Although 3 Jat suffered minimal casualties, the bulk of the damage being taken by Ammunition and stores vehicles, the higher commanders however, had no information of 3 Jat's capture of Batapore and misleading information led to the command to withdraw from Batapore and Dograi to Ghosal-Dial. This move brought extreme disappointment to Lt-Col Desmond Hayde, CO of 3 Jat. Dograi was eventually recaptured by 3 Jat on 21 September, for the second time but after a much harder battle due to Pakistani reinforcements.

On the days following September 9, both nations' premiere formations were routed in unequal battles. India's 1st Armored Division, labelled the "pride of the Indian Army", launched an offensive towards Sialkot. The Division divided itself into two prongs and came under heavy Pakistani tank fire at Taroah and was forced to withdraw. Similarly, Pakistan's pride, the 1st Armored Division, pushed an offensive towards Khemkaran with the intent to capture Amritsar (a major city in Punjab, India) and the bridge on River Beas to Jalandhar. The Pakistani 1st Armored Division never made it past Khem Karan and by the end of September 10 lay disintegrated under the defences of the Indian 4th Mountain Division at what is now known as the Battle of Asal Uttar (Real Answer literally, or Fitting Response as the more appropriate English equivalent). The area became known as 'Patton Nagar' (Patton Town) as Pakistan lost or abandoned nearly 100 mostly US made Patton tanks.

The war was heading for a stalemate, with both nations holding territory of the other. The Indian army suffered 3,000 battlefield deaths, while Pakistan suffered no less than 3,800. The Indian army was in possession of 710 mile² (1,840 km²) of Pakistani territory and the Pakistan army held 210 mile² (545 km²) of Indian territory. The territory occupied by India was mainly in the fertile Sialkot, Lahore and Kashmir sectors, while Pakistani land gains were primarily in deserts opposite Sindh and in Chumb in the northern sector.

Aerial warfare

See Main articles: Aerial warfare in 1965 India Pakistan War.
Indian and Pakistan accounts on the air war.

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PAF F-86 aircraft which took part in the war

The war saw the Indian Air Force and the Pakistani Air Force being involved in full scale combat for the first time since independence. Though the two forces had previously faced off in the First Kashmir War during the late 1940s, it was limited in scale compared to the '65 conflict.

The two countries have made contradictory claims of combat losses during the war and hardly any neutral sources have thoroughly verified the claims of either country. The Pakistan Air Force (PAF) claimed it shot down 104 IAF planes losing only 19 in the process. Whilst the Indian Air Force (IAF) claimed it shot down 73 PAF planes losing only 35 itself. According to Indian figures, the overall attrition rate was 2.16% for Pakistan Air Force and 1.49% for IAF. India also pointed out that despite PAF claims of losing only a squadron of combat craft, Pakistan had been seeking urgent help from Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Turkey and China, for additional aircraft within 10 days of the beginning war.

Pakistan's main strike force comprised the U.S. made F-86 Sabre jets, which claimed a fair share of Indian planes, though remaining vulnerable to the diminutive Folland Gnat, nicknamed "Sabre Slayer". The F-104 Starfighter of the PAF was by far the fastest fighter plane operating in the subcontinent at that time.Unlike the PAF whose planes largely consisted of American craft, IAF flew an assortment of planes from Vampires to Hawker Hunters, many of which were outdated in comparison to PAF planes.

Tank battles

File:18Cav on move.jpg

Tanks of 18th Cavalry (Indian Army) on the move during the 1965 Indo-Pak War.

Main article: International assessments on the tank battles

The 1965 war witnessed some of the largest Tank Battles since World War II. The Pakistani Army had both a numerical advantage in tanks as well as better equipment overall. Pakistani Armour was largely American made, mainly Patton tanks but also many M4 Sherman Tanks, some M24 Chaffee Light Tanks and M36 Jackson tank destroyers with 90mm guns. The bulk of India's tank fleet were older M4 Sherman tanks, moreover, the Sherman tanks on the Indian side were of mixed quality, some were up gunned with the French High velocity CN 75 50 and could hold their own, whilst some older models were still equipped with the inferior M3 75 mm. Some Indian and all Pakistani Sherman Tanks were equipped with the same M1 76mm gun. Besides the M4 tanks India also fielded the British made Centurion Tank Mk 7 with the 105mm Royal Ordnance L7, AMX-13, PT-76, and M3 Stuart Light Tanks. Pakistan also fielded more and more modern artillery and its guns out ranged those of the Indian artillery, according to Pakistan's Major General T.H. Malik. Despite the qualitative and numerical edge of Pakistani armour, overall Pakistan was outfought on the battlefield by India which made progress into the Lahore-Sialkot sector whilst halting Pakistan's counteroffensive on Amritsar. By the end of the war, Pakistan's newer and more potent Patton M-47 and M-48s proved to be too sophisticated in Pakistani hands, and they were also sometimes employed in a faulty manner, often charging prepared defenses, such as the defeat of Pakistan's 1st Armored Division at Assal Uttar. India's tank formations saw highs and lows themselves. India's attack at the Battle of Chawinda by its own 1st Armored Division and supporting units was turned back. One true winner to emerge was India's Centurion battle tank with its 105mm gun and heavy armor which proved superior to the overly complex Pattons and their exaggerated reputations.

Naval hostilities

Pakistan's PNS Ghazi, was the only submarine between the warring nations and was claimed by Pakistan to have posed a serious threat to Indian Navy, though India denied it.

The navies of both India and Pakistan played no prominent role in the war of 1965, although Pakistani accounts dispute this. On September 7, a flotilla of the Pakistani Navy carried out a small scale bombardment of the Indian coastal town and radar station of Dwarka, which was 200 miles (300 km) south of the Pakistani port of Karachi. Codenamed Operation Dwarka, it however, did not fulfill its primary objectives and there was no immediate retaliatory response from India. Later, the Indian fleet from Bombay sailed to Dwarka to patrol off that area to deter further bombardment. Nonetheless, foreign authors have noted that the "insignificant bombardment" of the town was a "limited engagement, with no strategic value."

According to some Pakistani sources, one maiden submarine, PNS Ghazi kept the Indian Navy's aircraft carrier INS Vikrant besieged in Bombay throughout the war. Indian sources claim that it was not their intention to get into a naval conflict with Pakistan, but to restrict the war to a land-based conflict. Moreover, the ship was under refit in dry dock at that time and not even deployed. Even Pakistani defence writers have discounted claims that the Indian Navy was bottled up in harbour due to a single submarine, instead stating that 75% of the Indian Navy was under maintenance in harbour.

Further south towards Bombay, there were unconfirmed reports of underwater attacks by the Indian Navy against what they suspected were American-supplied Pakistani submarines.

Covert operations

File:SSG Commandos Parachute Drop.jpg

Pakistani troops drop from a C-130 Hercules onto Indian territory

A number of covert operations were launched by the Pakistan Army to infiltrate Indian airbases and sabotage them. The SSG (Special Services Group) commandos were parachuted into enemy territory and, according to the then Chief of Army Staff General Musa Khan, about 135 commandos were airdropped at three airfields. Given that the Indian targets (Halwara, Pathankot and Adampur) were deep into enemy territory only 22 commandos made it back alive and the stealth operation proved ineffective. Of those remaining, 93 were taken prisoner, and 20 were killed in encounters with the army, police or civilians The daring attempt proved to be an "unmitigated disaster" with one of the Commanders of the operations, Major Khalid Butt being captured. Despite the failed mission, Pakistan sources claim that it had impacted some of the planned Indian operations, as the 14 Indian Division was diverted to hunt for paratroopers, the next morning the PAF found the road filled with transport and destroyed many transport vehicles. The reason for this failure is attributed to the fact that they were not provided maps, proper briefing and worst of all with no planning or preparation In response to this India announced rewards for any Pakistani spies or paratroopers. Meanwhile, in Pakistan, there was a scare that India had retaliated with its own covert ops by sending commandos deep into Pakistan territory, but this was later known to be unfounded.

Losses

India and Pakistan hold widely divergent claims on the damage they have inflicted on each other and the amount of damage suffered by them. The following summarizes each nation's claims.

	Indian claims	Pakistani claims	Independent Sources
Casualties	-	-	2,763 Indian soldiers, 3,800 Pakistani soldiers
Combat flying effort	4,073+ combat sorties	2,279 combat sorties
Aircraft lost	35 IAF (official), 73 PAF.Other sources based on the Official Indian Armed Forces History put actual IAF losses at 71 including 19 accidents (non combat sortie rate is not known) and PAF's combat losses alone at 43.	19 PAF, 104 IAF	20 PAF, Pakistan claims India rejected neutral arbitration, India retorts that the neutral arbitration by John Fricker was nothing but a commissioned work. (Singh, Pushpindar (1991). Fiza ya, Psyche of the Pakistan Air Force. Himalayan Books. ISBN 81-7002-038-7. )
Aerial victories	17 + 3 (post war)	30	-
Tanks destroyed	128 Indian tanks, 152 Pakistani tanks captured, 150 Pakistani tanks destroyed. Officially 471 Pakistani tanks destroyed and 38 captured	165 Pakistan tanks	200 Pakistani tanks
Land area won	1,500 mi2 (3,885 km2) of Pakistani territory	2,000 mi² (5,180 km²) of Indian territory	India held 710 mi² (1,840 km²) of Pakistani territory and Pakistan held 210 mi² (545 km²) of Indian territory

There have been few neutral assessments of the damages of the war, some of the neutral assessments are mentioned below:-

• According to the United States Library of Congress Country Studies:

The war was militarily inconclusive; each side held prisoners and some territory belonging to the other. Losses were relatively heavy--on the Pakistani side, twenty aircraft, 200 tanks, and 3,800 troops. Pakistan's army had been able to withstand Indian pressure, but a continuation of the fighting would only have led to further losses and ultimate defeat for Pakistan. Most Pakistanis, schooled in the belief of their own martial prowess, refused to accept the possibility of their country's military defeat by "Hindu India" and were, instead, quick to blame their failure to attain their military aims on what they considered to be the ineptitude of Ayub Khan and his government.

• TIME magazine analyzing the conflict, reported that India held 690 Mi² of Pakistan territory while Pakistan held 250 Mi² of Indian territory in Kashmir and Rajasthan, but had lost half its armour.

Cut off from U.S. and British arms supplies, denied Russian aid, and severely mauled by the larger Indian armed forces, Pakistan could continue the fight only by teaming up with Red China and turning its back on the U.N. ... India, by contrast, is still the big gainer in the war. Shastri had united the nation as never before.

• An excerpt from Stanley Wolpert's India, summarizing the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, is as follows:

In three weeks the second IndoPak War ended in what appeared to be a draw when the embargo placed by Washington on U.S. ammunition and replacements for both armies forced cessation of conflict before either side won a clear victory. India, however, was in a position to inflict grave damage to, if not capture, Pakistan's capital of the Punjab when the cease-fire was called, and controlled Kashmir's strategic Uri-Poonch bulge, much to Ayub's chagrin.

• Dennis Kux's "India and the United States estranged democracies" also provides a summary of the war.

Although both sides lost heavily in men and materiel, and neither gained a decisive military advantage, India had the better of the war. New Delhi achieved its basic goal of thwarting Pakistan's attempt to seize Kashmir by force. Pakistan gained nothing from a conflict which it had instigated.

Ceasefire

On September 22, the United Nations Security Council unanimously passed a resolution that called for an unconditional ceasefire from both nations. The war ended the following day. The Soviet Union, led by Premier Alexey Kosygin, brokered a ceasefire in Tashkent (now in Uzbekistan), where Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and Pakistani President Ayub Khan signed an agreement to withdraw to pre-August lines no later than February 25,1966. The ceasefire though, was criticized by many hardliners and laymen alike in Pakistan who, relying solely on official reports and the controlled Pakistani press, believed that the leadership had surrendered military gains, leading to student riots. Pakistan State's reports had suggested that their military was performing admirably in the war - which they blamed as being initiated by India - and thus the Tashkent Declaration was seen as having forfeited the gains. Some recent books published by Pakistani authors, including one by ex-ISI chief titled "The Myth of 1965 Victory", allegedly exposed such Pakistani fabrications about the war, but were bought out by Pakistan Army to prevent its sale because it was "too sensitive".

India reported a number of ceasefire violations by Pakistan besides the expected exchange of small arms and artillery fire. India charged Pakistan with 585 violations in 34 days, while Pakistan countered with accusations of 450 incidents by India. India reported that Pakistan utilized the ceasefire to intrude and capture an Indian village of Chananwalla in the Fazilka sector. This was recaptured by Indian troops on 25 December. On October 10, a B-57 Canberra on loan to the PAF was damaged by 3 SA-2 missiles fired from the IAF base at Ambala. Pakistan claims that the pilot, S/L Rashid Meer flew the aircraft back but given that it suffered further damage when the nose wheel did not extend while landing, the aircraft is a possible write off. Another Pakistani Army Auster was shot down on 16 December, killing one Pakistani Army Captain. Yet again, on 2 February 1967, an AOP was shot down by IAF Hunters.

The ceasefire between the two neighboring rivals only lasted six years before war broke out once again in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971.

Intelligence failures

Indian miscalculations

File:65 war.jpg

A Life magazine cover story on the war showing an Indian soldier in Kashmir with a bazooka.

Strategic miscalculations by both nations ensured that the result of this war remained a stalemate. The Indian Army failed to recognize the presence of heavy Pakistani artillery and armaments in Chumb and suffered significant losses as a result. The "Official History of the 1965 War", drafted by the Ministry of Defence of India in 1992 was a long suppressed document that outlined intelligence and strategic blunders by India during the war. According to the document, on September 22 when the Security Council was pressing for a ceasefire, the Indian Prime Minister asked the commanding Gen. Chaudhuri if India could possibly win the war, were he to hold off accepting the ceasefire for a while longer. The general replied that most of India's frontline ammunition had been used up and the Indian Army had suffered considerable tank loss.

It was found later that only 14% of India's frontline ammunition had been fired and India held twice the number of tanks than Pakistan did. By this time, the Pakistani Army itself had used close to 80% of its ammunition. Air Chief Marshal (retd) P.C. Lal, who was the Vice Chief of Air Staff during the conflict, points to the lack of coordination between the IAF and the Indian army. Neither side revealed its battle plans to the other. The battle plans drafted by the Ministry of Defence and General Chaudhari, did not specify a role for the Indian Air Force in the order of battle. This attitude of Gen. Chaudhari was referred to by ACM Lal as the "Supremo Syndrome", a patronizing attitude sometimes attributed to the Indian army towards the other branches of the Indian Military.

Pakistani miscalculations

The Pakistani Army's failures started from the drawing board itself, with the supposition that a generally discontent Kashmiri people would rise to the occasion and revolt against their Indian rulers, bringing about a swift and decisive surrender of Kashmir. For whatever reason, the Kashmiri people did not revolt, and on the contrary provided the Indian Army with enough information for them to learn of Operation Gibraltar and the fact that the Army was battling not insurgents, as they had initially supposed, but Pakistani Army regulars. The Pakistani army failed to recognize that the Indian policy makers would attack the southern sector and open up the theater of conflict. Pakistan was forced to dedicate troops to the southern sector to protect Sialkot and Lahore instead of penetrating into Kashmir.

Telegram from USA's Karachi Embassy: "Continuing propaganda re[garding] achievements of Pak forces seems to have convinced most that only Pak forbearance saved the Indians from disaster."

"Operation Grand Slam", which was launched by Pakistan to capture Akhnoor, a town north-east of Jammu and a key region for communications between Kashmir and the rest of India, was also a failure. Many Pakistani critics have criticized the Ayub Khan administration for being indecisive during Operation Grand Slam. They claim that the operation failed because Ayub Khan knew the importance of Akhnur to India (having called it India's "jugular vein") and did not want to capture it and drive the two nations into an all out war. Despite progress made in Akhnur, General Ayub Khan for some inexplicable reason relieved the commanding Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik of charge and replaced him with Gen. Yahya Khan. A 24 hour lull ensued, which allowed the Indian army to regroup in Akhnur and oppose a lackluster attack headed by General Yahya Khan. "The enemy came to our rescue", asserted the Indian Chief of Staff of the Western Command. Later, Akhtar Hussain Malik accused Ayub Khan for planning Operation Gibraltar which was doomed to fail and for relieving him of his command at a crucial moment in the war and threatened to expose the truth about the war and the army's failure, though he later dropped the idea for fear of being banned.

Some authors have noted that Pakistan might have been emboldened by a war game - conducted in March 1965 at the Institute of Defence Analysis, USA - that concluded that in the event of a war, Pakistan would win. Other authors like Stephen Philip Cohen, have consistently viewed that Pakistan Army "acquired an exaggerated view of the weakness of both India and the Indian military... the 1965 war was a shock". Pakistani Air Marshal and Commander-in-Chief of PAF during the war, Nur Khan later said that the Pakistan Army, and not India, was to be blamed for starting the war. However propaganda in Pakistan about the war continued; the war was not rationally analyzed in Pakistan, with most of the blame being heaped on the leadership and little importance given to intelligence failures that persisted until the debacle of the 1971 war, when Pakistan was comprehensively defeated and dismembered by India, leading to the creation of Bangladesh.

Involvement of other nations

The United States of America fixed a military embargo with both countries in which it dealed military supplies and hardware to both countries (especially Pakistan). The US was apprehensive in that the ammunitions provided were displayed as a battle against communism used by the countries to fight one another. The American mindset was considered a bang to the Pakistani front due to the majority of its ammunitions being provided by America. In turn, this would cause Pakistan to believe that it could not continue war beyond September. Following the decision, other NATO allies (including the UK) discontinued providing artillery sources to the nations. Both before and during the war, China had been a major military associate of Pakistan and had invariably admonished India, with whom it had fought a war in 1962. There were also reports of Chinese troop movements on the Indian border to support Pakistan. As such, India agreed to the UN mandate in order to avoid a war on both borders. Though India's Non-Aligned Movement had a little help from nations, Pakistan gained assistance from countries of Asia that included Turkey, Iran and Indonesia. The USSR was more neutral than most other nations during the war and even invited both nations to host talks in Tashkent.

Consequences of the war

India

The war had created a tense state of affairs in its aftermath. Though the war was indecisive, Pakistan suffered much heavier material and personnel casualties compared to India. Many war historians believe that had the war continued, with growing loss and decreasing supplies, Pakistan would have been eventually defeated. India's decision to declare ceasefire with Pakistan caused some outrage among the Indian populace, who believed they had the upper hand. Both India and Pakistan increased their defense spending and the Cold War politics had taken roots in the subcontinent. The Indian Military, which was already undergoing rapid expansions, made improvements in command and control to address some shortcomings. Partly as a result of the inefficient information gathering, India established the Research and Analysis Wing for external espionage and intelligence. India viewed the American policy during the war as biased, since Pakistan had started the war but the US did little to restrain Pakistan. India slowly started aligning with the Soviet Union both politically and militarily. This would be cemented formally years later before the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971. In light of the previous war against the Chinese, the performance in this war was viewed as a "politico-strategic" victory in India. The Indian premier, Shastri was hailed as a hero in India.

Pakistan

Many Pakistanis rated the performance of their military positively. September 6 is celebrated as 'Defence Day' in Pakistan in commemoration of the successful defence of Lahore against the Indian army. Pakistani Air Force's performance was seen in much better light compared to that of the ground troops. The myth of a mobile, hard hitting Pakistan Army was badly dented in the war as critical breakthroughs were not made. Several Pakistani writers criticized the military's ill-founded belief that their "Martial Race" of soldiers could defeat India in the war. Moreover, the end game left a lot to desire as Pakistan had lost more ground than gained and more importantly did not achieve the goal of occupying Kashmir, which has been viewed by many impartial observers as a defeat for Pakistan. Many high ranking Pakistani officials and military experts later criticized the faulty planning in Operation Gibraltar that ultimately led to the war. The Tashkent declaration was further seen as a raw deal in Pakistan though few citizens realised the gravity of the situation that existed at the end of the war. Under the advice of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan's then foreign minister, Ayub Khan had raised very high expectations among the people of Pakistan about the superiority - if not invincibility - of its armed forces, but Pakistan's inability to attain its military aims during the war, created a political liability on Ayub. The defeat of its Kashmiri ambitions in the war led to the army's invincibility being challenged by an increasingly vocal opposition. And with the war creating a huge financial burden, Pakistan's economy which had witnessed rapid progress in the early 60s, took a severe beating.

Pakistan was taken aback by the lack of support by the United States, an ally with whom the country had signed an Agreement of Cooperation. USA declared its neutrality in the war by cutting off military supplies to both sides, leading Islamabad to believe that they were "betrayed" by the United States. After the war, Pakistan would increasingly look towards China as a major source of military hardware and political support. Another negative consequence of the war was the growing resentment against the Pakistani government in East Pakistan, particularly for the West Pakistan's obsession with Kashmir. Bengali leaders accused the government for not providing adequate security for East Pakistan during the conflict, even though large sums of money were taken from the east to finance the war for Kashmir. In fact despite some PAF attacks being launched from East Pakistan (present day Bangladesh) during the war, India did not retaliate in that sector, although East Pakistan was defended only by a two-infantry brigade division (14 Division) without any tank support. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was apprehensive of this situation, and the need for greater autonomy for the east led to another war between India and Pakistan in 1971..

Further reading

• An Army Its Role and Rule(A History or the Pakistan Army from Independence to Kargil 1947-1999)

By: Muhammad Ayub ISBN 0-8059-9594-3

• India-Pakistan war, 1965 Hari Ram Gupta
• Die to live: A selection of short stories based on the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war Muhammad Ismail Siddiqui.
• The war with Pakistan: A pictorial narration of the fifty days which rocked the sub-continent Dewan Berindranath
• First & Further reflections on the second Kashmir War (South Asia series) - 2 books by Louis Dupree.
• The India-Pakistan Air War of 1965 P.V.S.Jagan Mohan and Samir Chopra, Manohar Publishers
• War Dispatches Lt. General Harbaksh Singh, Lancer International
• Indian Army after Independence Maj K C Praval, Lancer International
• Battle for Pakistan John Fricker, Ian Allan
• The Indo-Pakistan Conflict Russell Brines
• India Pakistan 1965 War: Role of Tanks Lt Col Bhupinder Singh, Pub u isher Unknown.

The First Round: Indo-Pakistan War 1965 by M Asghar Khan

Sources and external links

• - WTF - Indo-Pak war of ‘65. Why did we go to war?
• IAF Combat Kills - 1965 war,(Center for Indian Military History)
• Mohammed Musa Khan (1983). My Version: India-Pakistan War 1965. Wajidalis.
• United States Library of Congress Country Studies - India
• Official History of the Indian Armed Forces in the 1965 War with Pakistan
• Story of Pakistan
• GlobalSecurity.org Indo-Pakistan War 1965
• Pakistan Columnist AH Amin analyzes the war.
• Grand Slam - A Battle of lost Opportunities, Maj (Retd) Agha Humayun Amin — very detailed roll of events and analysis
• A Critical Look at the 1965 Operations, Air Chief Marshall (retd) PC Lal — dispassionate analysis
• The India-Pakistan War, 1965: 40 Years On - From Rediff.com
• Lessons of the 1965 War from Daily Times (Pakistan)
• Pak Army's Kargil like disaster of 1965 - South Asia Tribune
• Spirit of ’65 & the parallels with today - Ayaz Amir
• Pakistan Army version of the War - PakDef.info
• Air Commodore Syed Sajjad Haider on 1965 war and surrounding events