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Sino-Vietnamese War

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Sino–Vietnamese War (Third Indochina War)
DateFebruary 17 – March 16, 1979
Location
Sino-Vietnamese border
Result Both sides claimed victory,
Belligerents
China China Vietnam Vietnam
Commanders and leaders
China Yang Dezhi
China Xu Shiyou		 Vietnam Văn Tiến Dũng
Strength
600,000+ PLA infantry and 400 tanks from Kunming and Guangzhou Military District[1]
 100,000+ from Province Militia and divisions of the Public Security Army
Casualties and losses

6900 killed, 15,000 wounded. Western sources: 25,000 killed and 37.000 wounded

[1]
21,900 casualties[2]

Over 20,000 killed and wounded. Chinese claimed 30.000 killed

Vietnam claims 100,000 civilians killed[1]

The Sino–Vietnamese War, also known as the Third Indochina War, was a brief but bloody border war fought in 1979 between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The PRC launched the offensive in response to Vietnam's invasion and occupation of Cambodia, which ended the reign of the PRC-backed Khmer Rouge and Vietnamese raids in Chinese territory near the border. After a brief incursion into Northern Vietnam, PRC troops withdrew about a month later. Both sides claimed victory in the last of the Indochina Wars of the twentieth century.

Historical background

Main article: First Chinese domination (History of Vietnam)


First Indochina War

Main article: First Indochina War

Vietnam first became a French colony when France invaded in 1858. By the 1880s, the French had expanded their sphere of influence in Southeast Asia to include all of Vietnam, and by 1893 both Laos and Cambodia had become French colonies as well.[3] Rebellions against the French throughout colonization were common up to World War I. The European war heightened revolutionary sentiment in Southeast Asia, and the independence-minded population rallied around revolutionaries such as Ho Chi Minh and others, including royalists.

Prior to their attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese occupied French Indochina, allying themselves with the Viet Minh against any possible French return.[4] During the war, the United States aided Indochina in overthrowing the Japanese occupation government.[5] The Japanese surrender in 1945 created a power vacuum in Indochina, as the various political factions scrambled for control.

The events leading to the First Indochina War are subject to historical contention.[6] When the Viet Minh hastily sought to establish the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the remaining French at first welcomed the new regime, but then staged a coup to regain the colony.[7][8] The Chinese nationalists supported French restoration, but Viet Minh efforts towards independence were backed by Chinese communists, the Japanese, and the United Kingdom. The Soviet Union at first supported French hegemony, but later supported Ho Chi Minh.[9][10] The Soviets nonetheless remained quiet compared to China, who, like the United States, had disapproved of using Japanese forces against the French.

The war itself involved numerous events that had major impacts throughout Indochina. Two major conferences were held to bring about a resolution. Finally, on July 20, 1954, the Geneva Conference (1954) resulted in a political settlement to reunite the country, signed with support from China, Russia, and Western European powers.[11] While the Soviet Union played a constructive role in the agreement, it again was not as involved as China.[12][13] The U.S. disapproved of the agreement, but swiftly moved to fill the political vacuum left behind when the Vietnamese gained their independence.

Sino–Soviet split

Main article: Sino-Soviet split

The Chinese Communist Party and the Viet Minh had a long history. During the initial stages of the First Indochina War with France, the recently founded communist People's Republic of China and the Viet Minh had close ties. In early 1950, China became the first country in the world to recognise the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and the 'Chinese Military Advisory Group' in Vietnam played an important role in the Viet Minh victory over the French.

After the death of Stalin, relations between the Soviet Union and China began to deteriorate. Mao Zedong believed the new Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev had made a serious error in his Secret Speech denouncing Stalin, and criticized the Soviet Union's interpretation of Marxism-Leninism, in particular Khrushchev's support for peaceful co-existence and its interpretation. This led to increasingly hostile relations, and eventually the Sino-Soviet split. Until Khrushchev was deposed in late 1964, North Vietnam supported China in the dispute, mainly as a result of China's support for its re-unification policy, whereas the Soviet Union remained indifferent. From early 1965 onwards, Vietnamese communists drifted towards the Soviet Union, as now both the Soviet Union and China supplied arms to North Vietnam during their war against South Vietnam and the United States.

Second Indochina War

Main article: Vietnam War

The Soviets welcomed the Vietnamese drift toward the USSR, seeing Vietnam as a way to demonstrate that they were the "real power" behind communism in the Far East.

To the PRC, the Soviet-Vietnamese relationship was a disturbing development. It seemed to them that the Soviets were trying to encircle China.

The PRC started talks with the USA in the early 1970s, culminating in high level meetings with Henry Kissinger and later Richard Nixon. These meetings contributed to a re-orientation of Chinese foreign policy towards the United States. Meanwhile, the PRC also supported the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. The PRC supported Pol Pot from fear that a unified Vietnam, in alliance with the Soviet Union, would dominate Indochina.

Cambodia

Main article: Cambodian-Vietnamese War

Although the Vietnamese Communists and the Khmer Rouge had previously cooperated, the relationship deteriorated when Khmer Rouge leader Pol Pot came to power and established Democratic Kampuchea. The Cambodian regime demanded that certain tracts of land be "returned" to Cambodia, lands that had been "lost" centuries earlier. Unsurprisingly, the Vietnamese refused the demands. According to Vietnam, Pol Pot responded by massacring ethnic Vietnamese inside Cambodia (see History of Cambodia), and, by 1978, allegedly supporting a Vietnamese guerrilla army making incursions into western Vietnam. However, it should be noted that Pol Pot massacred people of all races, including ethnic Chinese, ethnic Vietnamese and Cambodians.

Realizing that Cambodia was being supported by the PRC, Vietnam approached the Soviets about possible actions. The Soviets saw this as a major opportunity. The Vietnamese army, fresh from combat with the US's ground forces, would easily be able to defeat the Cambodian forces. This would not only remove the only major PRC-aligned political force in the area but also demonstrate the benefits of being aligned with the USSR. The Vietnamese were equally excited about the potential outcome. Laos was already a strong ally; if Cambodia could be "turned," Vietnam would emerge as a major regional power, political master of Indochina.

The Vietnamese feared reprisals from the PRC. Over a period of several months in 1978, the Soviets made it clear that they were supporting the Vietnamese against Cambodian incursions. They felt this political show of force would keep the Chinese out of any sort of direct confrontation, allowing the Vietnamese and Cambodians to fight out what was to some extent a Sino-Soviet war by proxy.

In late 1978, the Vietnamese military invaded Cambodia. As expected, their experienced and well-equipped troops had little difficulty defeating the Khmer Rouge forces. On January 7, 1979 Vietnamese-backed Cambodian forces seized Phnom Penh, thus ending the Khmer Rouge regime.

PRC vs. Vietnam: Third Indochina War

Invasion of Vietnam by the People's Republic of China

Where the first war emerged from the complex situation following WWII and the second exploded from the unresolved aftermath of political relations with the first, the Third Indochina War again followed the unsolved problems of the earlier wars. The fact remains that: "Peace did not come to Indochina with either American 1973 withdrawal or Hanoi's 1975 victory" as disputes erupted over Cambodia and relations with China.[14]

The PRC, now under Deng Xiaoping, was growing increasingly defiant, and Deng Xiaoping was speaking to American president Jimmy Carter during Deng's brief visit to the USA: "It's time to smack the bottom of unruly little children" (original Chinese words: 小朋友不聴話,該打打屁股了).[15] The USSR felt that there was simply no way that they could directly support Vietnam against the PRC; the distances were too great to be an effective ally, and any sort of reinforcements would have to cross territory controlled by the PRC or U.S. allies. The only realistic option would be to indirectly re-start the simmering border war with China in the north. Vietnam was important to Soviet policy but not enough for the Soviets to go to war over.

On February 15, 1979 the PRC publicly announced their intention to strike back the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. Few observers realized the symbolic importance of this date. It marked the expiration of the 30-year-old 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, and thus the first time that the PRC could strike back at a Soviet ally without breaking their own treaties. The reason cited for the counter strike was the supposed mistreatment of Vietnam's ethnic Chinese minority and the Vietnamese occupation of the Spratly Islands (claimed by the PRC).

Chinese forces

Two days later, on February 17, a PRC force of about 200,000 supported by 200 Type 59, Type 62, and Type 63 tanks from the PRC People's Liberation Army (PLA) entered northern Vietnam.[16] The Chinese force consisted of units from the Kunming Military Region (later abolished), Chengdu Military Region, Wuhan Military Region (later abolished) and Guangzhou Military Region, but commanded by the headquarters of Kunming Military Region on the western front and Guangzhou Military Region in the eastern front. Some troops engaged in this war, especially engineering units, railway corps, logistical units and antiaircraft units, had been assigned to assist Vietnam in its struggle against the United States just a few years earlier during the Vietnam War. Contrary to the belief that over 600,000 Chinese troops entered Vietnam, the actual number was only 200,000. However, 600,000 Chinese troops were mobilized, of which 200,000 were deployed away from their original bases.[citation needed] Around 400 tanks (specifically Type 59s) were also deployed. The Chinese troop deployments were observed by US spy satellites, and the KH-9 Big Bird photographic reconnaissance satellite played an important role.[citation needed] In his state visit to the US in 1979, the Chinese paramount leader Deng Xiaoping was presented with this information and asked to confirm the numbers. He replied that the information was completely accurate. After this public confirmation in the U.S., the domestic Chinese media were finally allowed to report on these deployments.[citation needed]

Chinese order of battle

Vietnamese Forces

Many of Vietnam's elite troops were in Cambodia keeping a tight grip on its newly occupied territory. The Vietnamese government claimed they left only a force of about 70,000 including several army regular divisions and divisions of the Public Security Army (the Vietnamese equivalent of border guards) in its northern area. However, the Chinese claimed to have encountered twice this number. This concept of using local militias to fight the enemy has been a staple of Vietnamese defense strategy since antiquity. The PLA managed to advance about twenty five kilometres into Vietnam, with fighting mainly occurring in the provinces of Cao Bang, Lao Cai and Lang Son. On March 6, the Chinese occupied the city of Lang Son. They claimed the gate to Hanoi was open, declared their punitive mission achieved, and withdrew.

Chinese casualties

To this day, both sides of the conflict describe themselves as the victor. The number of casualties is disputed, with some Western sources putting PLA losses at more than 60,000 casualties, including about 20,000 killed.[citation needed] Throughout the war, however, more than 600,000 Chinese served.[citation needed]

Vietnamese casualties

There are no independently verifiable details of Vietnamese casualties.

Vietnamese armed personnel (including regular forces and reserves who joined war; militiamen not included):

PLA sources: [1]

  • Killed: 42000
  • Wounded: 10000
  • Prisoners of War: 2000

Chinese debacle

The Chinese military was using equipment and tactics from the era of the Long March, World War II and the Korean war. Under Deng's order, China did not use their naval power and air force to suppress enemy fire, neutralize strong points, and support their ground forces.[citation needed] Therefore, the Chinese ground forces were forced into absorbing the impact of the Vietnamese forces' fire.[17] . The PLA lacked adequate communications, transport, and logistics. Further, they were burdened with an elaborate and archaic command structure which proved inefficient in the FEBA (Forward Edge of Battle Area).[18] Runners were employed to relay orders because there were few radios — those that they did have were not secure. The Cultural Revolution had significantly weakened Chinese industry, and military hardware produced suffered from poor quality, and thus did not perform well. China's goal was to force the Vietnamese to pull out their 150,000 troops from Cambodia, where their Khmer Rouge allies were being extremely pressured upon.

Aftermath

The legacy of the war is lasting, especially in Vietnam. The Chinese implemented an effective "scorched-earth policy" while retreating back to China. They caused extensive damage to the Vietnamese countryside and infrastructure, through destruction of Vietnamese villages, roads, and railroads.[19]

Border skirmishes continued throughout the 1980s, including a significant skirmish in April 1984; this saw the first use of the Type 81 Assault Rifle by the Chinese, and a naval battle over the Spratly Islands in 1988. In 1999, after many years of negotiations, China and Vietnam signed a border pact, though the line of demarcation remained secret.[20] There was a very slight adjustment of the land border at this time, resulting in land being given back to China. Vietnam's official news service reported the actual implementation of the new border around August 2001. Again in January 2009 the border demarcation with markers was officially completed. Signed by Deputy Foreign Minister Vu Dung on the Vietnamese side and his Chinese counterpart, Wu Dawei, on the Chinese side.[21] Both the Xīshā (Paracel) (Hoàng Sa: Vietnamese) (Chinese:西沙群島) and Nangsha (Spratly) (Trường Sa: Vietnamese) (Chinese:南沙群島) islands remain a point of contention.[22]

The war also resulted in the discrimination and consequent migration of Vietnam's ethnic Chinese. Many of these people fled as "boat people" who eventually resettled in Asian communities in Australia, Europe, North America, or went back to China.

The Vietnamese government continuously requested an official apology from the Chinese government for its invasion of Vietnam, but the Chinese government refused to apologize. After the normalization of relations between the two countries in 1990, Vietnam officially dropped its demand for an apology.

Relations after the war

Main article: Sino-Vietnamese relations
See also: Foreign relations of Vietnam
See also: Battle of the Paracel Islands

A catalyst to improved relations between the two communist countries was the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown, at which point Vietnam showed strong support for the Chinese measures, though ironically many Chinese officers who had served in the Sino-Vietnamese War were active in suppressing the protest movement.[citation needed] Borders remained militarized, however.

The December 2007 announcement of a plan to build a Hanoi-Kunming highway was a landmark in Sino-Vietnamese relations. The road will traverse the border that once served as a battleground. It should contribute to demilitarizing the border region, as well as facilitating trade and industrial cooperation between the nations.[23]

Reflections from international media

  • The New York Times

On March 1, 2005 HOWARD W. FRENCH wrote: Some historians stated that the war was started by Mr. Deng(China's then paramount leader Deng Xiaoping) to keep the army preoccupied while he consolidated power, eliminating leftist rivals from the Maoist era and Chinese soldiers were used as cannon fodder in a cynical political game. We were sacrificed for politics, and it's not just me who feels this way - lots of comrades do, and we communicate our thoughts via the Internet, One of the veterans was quoted as such. The attitude of the country is not to mention this old, sad history because things are pretty stable with Vietnam now. But it is also because the reasons given for the war back then just wouldn't stand now.[24]

The Chinese official name for the war was 對越自卫反击戰.

References

  1. ^ a b c Zhang Xiaoming, (actually are thought to have been 600,000 with 400 tanks)"China's 1979 War with Vietnam: A Reassessment", China Quarterly, Issue no. 184 (December 2005), pp. 851-874. Zhang writes that: "Existing scholarship tends towards an estimate of as many as 25,000 PLA killed in action and another 37,000 wounded. Recently available Chinese sources categorize the PLA’s losses as 6,900 dead and some 15,000 injured, giving a total of 21,900 casualties from an invasion force of more than 300,000."
  2. ^ Introduction to Global Military History, By Jeremy Black, P. 215
  3. ^ Dunnigan, J.F. & Nofi, A.A. (1999). Dirty Little Secrets of the Vietnam War. New York: St. Martins Press, p. 27.
  4. ^ Dunnigan, J.F. & Nofi, A.A. (1999). Dirty Little Secrets of the Vietnam War. New York: St. Martins Press, pp. 27-38.
  5. ^ Hood, S.J. (1992). Dragons Entangled: Indochina and the China-Vietnam War. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, p. 16.
  6. ^ Burns, R.D. and Leitenberg, M. (1984). The Wars in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, 1945-1982: A Bibliographic Guide. Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio Information Services, p.xx.
  7. ^ Hood, S.J. (1992). Dragons Entangled: Indochina and the China-Vietnam War. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, p. 16.
  8. ^ Burns, R.D. and Leitenberg, M. (1984). The Wars in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, 1945-1982: A Bibliographic Guide. Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio Information Services, p. xx.
  9. ^ Hood, S.J. (1992). Dragons Entangled: Indochina and the China-Vietnam War. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, p. 13-19.
  10. ^ Chen, Min. (1992). The Strategic Triangle and Regional Conflict: Lessons from the Indochina Wars. Boulder: Lnne Reinner Publications, p. 17-23.
  11. ^ Hood, S.J. (1992). Dragons Entangled: Indochina and the China-Vietnam War. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, p. 13-19.
  12. ^ Hood, S.J. (1992). Dragons Entangled: Indochina and the China-Vietnam War. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, p. 13-19.
  13. ^ Chen, Min. (1992). The Strategic Triangle and Regional Conflict: Lessons from the Indochina Wars. Boulder: Lnne Reinner Publications, p. 17-23.
  14. ^ Burns, R.D. and Leitenberg, M. (1984). The Wars in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, 1945-1982: A Bibliographic Guide. Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio Information Services, p. xxvi.
  15. ^ "In Chinese:中共對侵越戰爭八股自辯". Retrieved 2009-02-23.
  16. ^ ChinaDefense.com - The Political History of Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979, and the Chinese Concept of Active Defense
  17. ^ The Chinese Communist: Air Force in the "Punitive" War Against Vietnam
  18. ^ ocp28 - The Chinese People's Liberation Army: "Short Arms and Slow Legs"
  19. ^ History 1615: War and Peace in the 20th Century
  20. ^ BBC News | ASIA-PACIFIC | China-Vietnam pact signed
  21. ^ Thanh Nien News | Politics | Vietnam, China complete historic border demarcation
  22. ^ Thanh Nien News | Politics | Vietnam reiterates sovereignty over archipelagoes
  23. ^ Greenlees, Donald Approval near for Vietnam-China highway International Herald Tribune, 13 December 2007
  24. ^ "Was the War Pointless? China Shows How to Bury It". The New York Times. March 1, 2005. Retrieved 2009-02-28.

External links

Additional sources

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