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politics and government of
Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) (Urdu: متحدہ مجلس عمل) (United Council of Action) was a coalition of religious parties consisting of the JUI-F (Assembly of Islamic Clergy, Fazl-ur-Rahman Group), Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (Assembly of Pakistani Clergy), Tehrik-e-Jafaria Pakistan, Jamiat Ahle Hadith and a few other smaller groups. Jamaat-e-Islami was part of alliance but alliance became largely Non- Functional after political disagreement over participating or boycotting election of 2008. JUI-F, leading member of group practically left the alliance to take part in the 2008 general elections and to be a part of coalition PPP government. When JUI-F revived the Alliance in 2012 Jamaat-e-Islami refused to join it. The religious alliance formed the government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2002 and led the coalition government in Balochistan with PML(Q). It is strong in the two small provinces. It is socially ultra-conservative and economically moderate socialist. It strongly opposes US military presence in Pakistan. In the Angus-Reid pre-election polls of 22 December 2007, the MMA was in fifth place, with 4% of the vote. The MMA in the National Assembly is actually JUI-F who decided to use the name MMA at the general election in 2008 after the remaining parties in the MMA decided to not take part in the general election. It currently holds 7 seats in the National Assembly. The MMA that contested the 2002 general election has disbanded, according to the head of Jamaat-e-Islami.
The MMA was a conglomeration of distinct Islamist parties that ran under a single banner during Pakistan’s 2002 provincial elections. Islamist movements are defined as those which derive inspiration from the Islamic scriptures, the Qur'an and Hadith, and vie to capture the state. Historically, literature concerning Islamism and Muslim political institutions has been propagated via the Orientalist discourse, where the rejection of certain post-Enlightenment, national, and secular values has been translated into such movements’ retrogressive nature. In fact, much of Islamism and its ideology are critiqued as a launching pad for fundamentalism and radicalism, as political movements such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and the ‘Islamic’ revolution of Iran are highlighted. However, social science and ethnographic work has proven that Islamism emerges from middle-class lay intellectuals concentrated in urban centers. In the case of Pakistan and the MMA, Islamists united in 1993 under the Islamic Front and in 2000 under the Pakistan-Afghanistan Defense Council, yet the formation of the MMA in 2001 was the first time such a coalition entered the electoral process. It currently comprises the following notable groups:
- Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman's faction of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam or simply JUI-F. The Largest more hardline and traditional stream of thinking – with popular appeal amongst clerics and the Pashtuns and Baluch of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan.
- Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan or JUP. A traditional Barelvi political party which is popular with traditional and folk Muslims in Pakistani villages in Sindh and Punjab.
- Tehrik-e-Jafaria Pakistan or TJP. The Shia group also known as the Tehrik-e-Islami.
- Jamiat Ahle Hadith. religious political party of Pakistan deriving from the Ahl-al-Hadees movement.
Rise to power
The success of the MMA can be attributed to the context-specific, political environment of the 2002 elections, due to the region’s geopolitical significance following the Afghanistan invasion, military-civilian relations, and the threat of religion under secular authoritarian rule. Leading up to the 2002 elections, the PPP and the PML-N were severely handicapped as elite members of their respective parties were charged with corruption under the military regime, and thus, under the Legal Framework Ordinances (LFO), were rendered incapable of running for office. In addition, the government exempted the MMA from standard campaign conduct, for their use of loudspeakers, street rallies, and anti-government inflammatory rhetoric was not interfered with. Another form of assistance from the government came in the revision of article 8a of the constitution, where a graduation clause required degrees from accredited universities, which included JI and JIU-F affiliated madaris, for participation in the electoral process. Such a clause restricted the ANP in its strongholds in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, and thus favored the MMA.
However, in addition to the military prioritizing and providing several concessions to the MMA in its rise to legitimacy, ideological pragmatism as a campaign strategy lifted the party into Pakistan’s mainstream political institutions. Given the destabilized nature of the PPP and PML-N, the MMA benefited from the “ideological bankruptcy,” monopolizing on the public’s sentiment towards the U.S.’ involvement in Afghanistan. Also, in public, the MMA remained confrontational and opposed Musharraf for his partnership with the U.S. The MMA’s political program highlighted its nationalist, populist tendencies, while hindering its religious rhetoric. Leading up to the elections, the MMA composed a 15 point manifesto as follows.
- To revive fear of God, affection to the Islamic Prophet Mohammed and service to people with particular emphasis on government officials and cabinet members.
- To make Pakistan a true Islamic welfare state to ensure justice to people and eradicate corruption whatsoever.
- To ensure provision of bread, clothes, shelter, education, jobs and marriage expenses to all citizens.
- To protect basic human rights (life, property and honour) of citizens
- To create an independent, just and humane economic system where citizens will be provided opportunities for halal jobs, business, and investments.
- To ensure uniform and quick justice to every citizen, from the president to a layman.
- The develop God fearing, helping, brave and protecting police system.
- To get the entire society literate within ten years to enable everyone to know one’s rights and responsibilities.
- To ensure compulsory and free of charge education till matriculation and provide opportunities to meritorious students and scholars for advanced research.
- To protect rights of women guaranteed by Islam and restoration of their honour and prestige.
- To abolish all chronic and new feudal systems with forfeiture of illegal wealth and its distribution among the poor.
- To provide lands to peasants and formers for their livelihood and guarantee reasonable prices to their produce.
- To protect provincial autonomy and district governments, taking care of backward areas and classes and taking special steps to get them at par with developed areas.
- To get the country and people rid of imperialistic forces and their local agents.
- To extend moral, political and diplomatic help and support to all suppressed with particular emphasis on Kashmiris, Palestinians, Afghans, and Chechens.
The MMA’s manifesto relies on heavy promises towards social services, eradication of foreign imperialism, extinguish corruption and exercise justice, while highlighting local and international struggles towards autonomy. Although the implementations of Shari’a and gender segregation were cornerstones to the MMA’s ideology, such goals were vague and rarely highlighted during election campaigns. In addition, its relative passiveness against Musharraf’s incumbent regime helped the party’s cause, such as exemption from restrictions on public rallies and madrassa registration.
Such political strategies worked exemplary for the MMA in Baluchistan and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Due to the Baluchi nationalists’ fragmentation following the withdrawal of the Soviets from the region and its failure to denounce the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, the Baluchi incumbents were viewed as Musharraf sympathizers. In the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the MMA performed well due to the high volume of Pakhtuns, who received the MMA’s policies towards anti-imperialism well. The coalition consisted of large numbers of ethnic Pakhtuns, and thus was active in organizing demonstrations against the plight of Afghan Pakhtuns under siege. In Sindh, the MMA won popular support, and five out of twenty National Assembly seats, by attacking the incumbent party, the MQM. Highlighting their history of extortion and lack of progress towards addressing social concerns, the MMA rallied the masses through its madari networks to voice their position and conjure votes on Election Day.
Through utilizing the several concessions made by the military regime, exploiting ideological and public weaknesses of incumbent parties, and politicizing the Afghan invasion, the MMA was able to secure eleven percent of the popular vote and 58 seats in the National Assembly. Given the conditions of the election, which were limited and not free under the watchful eye of the military-government, the MMA’s ascension does not seem as surprising. However in the following years, leading up to the 2008 election, the MMA was exposed and held publicly accountable.
The Islamist coalition's successes in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Baluchistan, and the municipal government of Karachi were transient events, as seen in the party’s split in the 2005 elections and official collapse in the 2008 elections. Although the Military-MMA relationship is pertinent to the party’s demise, the MMA’s fate can be more accurately ascribed to its relationship to other secular institutions, individual and organizational corruption, and competing Islamisms. The MMA’s actions while serving in the government portray the party’s ideological fissures, its inadequacy in serving the public and delivering campaign promises, and its illiteracy in realpolitik. With such exposed shortcomings while serving as constituents in Pakistan’s democratic institutions, the MMA was evaluated on the basis of its performance, and was duly rejected in the subsequent provincial and national elections.
The Legal Framework Ordinance, MMA-Military relationship, and fallout with the ARD
In April 2002, General Musharraf promulgated the controversial Legal Framework Ordinance (LFO), providing 29 amendments to Pakistan’s 1973 constitution. In rejection to the executive measure, the Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy (ARD), uniting the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N), staunchly opposed the measure, as did the MMA. The 2nd Amendment, addressing Articles 41 and 58 of the constitution, authorized Musharraf to legally transfer from his post as Chief Executive to President, and provided the President the authority to dissolve Parliament at will. The 7th Amendment agitated members of the PPP, PML-N, and the MMA, whose politicians were disqualified on the basis of corruption, evading repayment of government loans, and other misconduct, rendering them unable to participate in elections. The most vehemently protested legislation was of Amendment 17, which established the National Security Council (NSC) and granted its executive seat to General Musharraf, therefore solidifying the transfer of power from the Parliament and Prime Minister to the President. In 2003, an 11-person arbitration council was set up to negotiate measures necessary to pass the Amendments in Parliament, however private settlements were offered to each party in exchange for its support of the legislation as well. Due to the PPP and PML-N’s allegiance to the ARD and the established intra-party institutions and ideology, the parties resolutely rejected the most striking aspects of the proposed legislation, which vindicated the military regime of its unconstitutional coup. However, with its various Islamist groups and thus assorted ideologies, the MMA served as the most likely party for the Musharraf regime to conciliate. In fact, the second largest group of the MMA, the JUI-F, advocated the existing government, unlike the other party pioneer, the JI.
On December 29, the 17th Amendment was ratified by Parliament after an agreement between the MMA and the Musharraf regime was reached, thus enacting the LFO into law on January 1 and allowing for the General’s transition for COAS to President. With few alterations to the original LFO, most notably Musharraf’s agreement to remove his military uniform for civilian attire, the MMA, siding with the treasury benches, approved the Amendment by two-thirds majority. The vote was boycotted by the disconcerted ARD, who witnessed the MMA recite “No LFO no, go Musharraf go” throughout the year’s parliamentary session and organized rallies against the legislation in Rawalpindi and Islamabad. Instead, the ARD declared the MMA as dissidents in the cause against Musharraf’s authoritarian regime and the restoration of the civilian government.
The reasons as to why the MMA consented to the LFO remains unclear, given the initial agreement was reached between the two parties in separate meetings between the JI’s leader Qazi Hussain Ahmed and the JUI-F’s leader Fazlur Rahman. Regardless, the ratification of the LFO undermined the credibility of the MMA due to its capricious relationship with the incumbent authoritarian regime. In fact, the ARD and other secular parties felt corroboration of such a relationship came in the form of the military’s impassivity towards the JI after evidence of its association with al-Qaeda, recognition of the MMA as the main opposition in Parliament, and the MMA’s reticence in the wake of the storming of the Lal Masjid. The MMA attempted to compensate for the military-mullah rhetoric by violently protesting against the government and its response to the Danish cartoon controversy and the promulgation of the Hasba Bill, however such sentiment further proved the MMA’s flightiness to the public, while further provoking the secular parties and institutions of the civilian government.
The marginalization of the MMA by the ARD and the Supreme Court pitted the coalition against the most significant actors of the civilian government. The party’s reliability after the LFO debacle, an incident often related to Zia ul-Haq’s RCO measures, remained questionable, and thus was heavily discriminated against by the legal and political elements of the more established civilian actors. With such partisanship against the MMA, the secular elements banded together in universally opposing the MMA, which buckled, as would any party estranged in a democratic political process.
The constituents of the ARD performed poorly in the 2002 elections due to restrictions imposed by the Musharraf-regime, leading to arrests of several leaders of the PPP and PML-N for corruption charges and violation of campaign methods. In addition, the ANP suffered substantially due to the graduation clause as made part of article 8a of the constitution, making graduate degrees from accredited universities, madrasahs included, a prerequisite for positions in the provincial and national assemblies. With such conditions, established political parties were handicapped, and thus were left ideologically bankrupt, jostling for self-preservation. As the issue most prevalent to the 2002 elections became foreign policy and economic reforms, the PPP, PML-N, and ANP did not adjust their rhetoric accordingly.
However, after 2002, as such parties became entrenched in the political process, they adapted accordingly, engaging in realpolitik while adhering to party ideology. The PPP, a secular party committed to democracy, has historically clashed with the military and authoritarian regimes, and is insistent on the preservation of the 1973 constitution. The PML-N, the first established ruling party of Pakistan after partition under Jinnah, was split in 2002 when the incumbent government formed the PML-Q  Thus, although the party was fractured, the dissent, which consisted of conservative, military loyalists, yielded a more ideologically cohesive PML-N. In addition, the coup orchestrated in 1999 ousted the PML-N, whom offered concessions to religious groups, and thus appeared antagonistic to the Musharraf-regime.
The MMA’s fresh inception into Pakistani politics as a party most used to garnering support on the street, the political processes of Parliament quickly tested its ideological strength. However, due to the competing factions within the party, each of which were self-proclaimed defendants of an Islam, MMA ideology was shirked for individual or group allegiances. Due to such ideological differences, intra-party fissures and divisions arose early in the MMA’s existence. For instance, following the 2002 elections the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Samiul Haq (JUI-S) claimed the party’s politics and policy had been usurped by the JI and JIU-F, disadvantaging the smaller constituents of the MMA. In 2004, Samiul Haq informally seceded, citing the MMA had failed in its implementation of Shari’a, had fell silent regarding military presence in tribal areas, raids on mosques, and the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan.
In 2005, a veteran of the JI was expelled from the MMA for dissenting from the party, and registering to contest an election against the coalition. Due to the MMA’s undemocratic nature and monopolization by the JI and JIUF, Pir Muhammad defected, forming a “forward bloc of ten MMA’s in the assembly.” To highlight unraveling of the party, although Qazi Hussain Ahmed, leader of the JI officially revoked Pir Muhammad’s affiliation with the MMA, Fazlur Rahman of the JUIF declared the JI dissident as an honorary member of the MMA, given he withdrew his name right before the electoral process. Issues such as these have pitted the JI and JIUF against one another in series of contentions.
The most publicized of such fissures occurred as the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Chief Minister Akram Khan Durrani defied Qazi Hussain Ahmed and the JI in attending the National Security Council meeting. Following rows of accusations of the MMA’s close relationship with the government, the coalition attempted to distance itself from the Musharraf regime, including absence from the NSC. After the 2005 earthquake in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Durrani attended the NSC in an attempt to gain federal relief funds. The issue exacerbated the once already prevalent fissure between the JI and JIUF, for the JUIF’s constituents found it necessary for Durrani to attend, whereas the JI leader vehemently opposed.
As the two most established organizations of the MMA diverted, the party began to unravel during the 2005 general elections. The JI and JIU-F fielded separate candidates in its strongholds, and aligned with the Awami National Party (ANP) and the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), respectively. Due to such a split, the two parties performed poorly, for the JI garnered 91 of the Frontier’s 986 seats for Union Council nazims, whereas the JUI-F secured 161 seats.
However, the formation of the MMA, on the basis of anti-American, anti-Musharraf, and pro-Islam platforms, coalesced solely in the context of a perceived moment of crisis. As the pressures which brought them in tandem eased, and domestic issues such as unemployment and social issues arose, the binding conditions of the coalition unraveled. As the Parliament began to functionally operate for the first time after the 1999 coup, a domestic agenda was established, thus forcing the MMA, centrally lacking organization, to engage in the democratic nature of party politics. Such processes highlighted the fissures and competing ideologies within the MMA, where interests and partisanship resulted in different responses to situations. The fact remains that the MMA’s political experience derived from establishing street power, however translating such into a coherent, effective ideology was precarious, and thus was exposed by the accountable, rigorous forces of the democratic process. The fact that the MMA lacked the resources and institutions to succeed in the democratic process can be ascribed to its competing Islamisms, where differences in the successful elections of 2002 were not buried, yet instead, evaded.
Corruption and Failure to Deliver
Without the ability to engage in realpolitik, the MMA’s limited tenure within the party became apparent, resulting in widespread organizational and individual corruption. Due to such, the MMA functioned independent of the public, and thus lost its street credibility. Withdrawal from the populist platform, the strongest cadre of MMA support, resulted in opposition by most facets of the civilian government and the public. Without legitimacy, the MMA’s preservation was implausible, for the political culture and democratic institutions did not allow for such a party to persist.
In 2003, as part of the Annual Development Report published by the World Bank, the MMA had breached several agreements with the organization, and most notably its constituents. The report delineated the widespread corruption in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government, where under-the-table favors and irregularities in the postings of officials in accordance with familiarity as opposed to merit were pervasive. In addition, The Herald reported privatization of certain sectors of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa as encouraged by the World Bank allowed government officials to pawn industries off to business associates and cronies. In fact, it is stated that a high-ranking official in Peshawar’s city government was replaced when inhibiting such transactions.
In 2005, scandal occurred in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa after the police inaction regarding a violent incident where a young woman was paraded at gunpoint in Qazi Hussain Ahmed’s native district of Nowshera. Eventually, the girl was rescued by relatives, and an immediate case was filed, yet the reaction, or lack thereof, is what sparked controversy. The MMA refused to address the issue, defending the police and its impassivity in the case. A few months later, MMA officials were accused of distributing the medical-school examinations to prominent families in Abbottabad and Peshawar. Although swift arrests were made following the incident, the image of the MMA as a supporter of the lower-middle class was tarnished, given such a leak came from within the party. Capping off the MMA’s year came the purchase of two French Alloute-II helicopters to serve as official transportation for the province’s officials. Serious claims were made against the government, for a price tag of 105 million rupees, with an additional 40-million-rupee annual maintenance fee, did not fare well for a province where about half of its resident living at or below the poverty line. With such frequent rows of corruption, the party’s legitimacy was quickly lost.
In addition, one of the driving forces to its election in 2002 was its guarantee in providing jobs and ameliorating the fragile economy of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. However, the MMA’s policies further deteriorated the economic and development progress of the province. Due to its attempted eradication of music in public spaces, local cinemas and hotels, and most notably its vehement rejection of the advertisement industry and its use of women on its billboards, tourism and federal funding for the province was severely cut. In addition, due to its lack of proper management of World Bank development funds, a large chunk of the year’s allotted funds were withheld. The MMA failed to follow the realpolitik nature of Pakistani politics, quickly pitting all other civilian parties against the coalition, and failed to provide the goods promised to its constituents in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
The MMA is the major Islamic political party of Pakistan. It is opposed by a number of secular political parties which reject the MMA's aspirations to establish a complete theocracy in Pakistan. Though Pakistan is a Muslim country and its constitution declares Shar'iah as the law, there is not a unified consensus on what is shariah and what is not. Although the MMA has been able to exert a great deal of power over the poorest and least educated provinces of Pakistan (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan), it has been completely prevented from influencing Pakistan's foreign policy. The MMA is highly opposed to Pakistan's friendship with the United States and Pakistan's dedication to counter-terrorism and regional stability. Nor has the MMA been able to influence Pakistan's monetary and banking policies, whereas the MMA has demanded in Parliament that the interest banking system be banned (the MMA's opposition has pointed out that the government itself would be unable to continue to operate without borrowing money from foreign banks). Some Pakistanis are suspicious of the MMA, as the MMA, by virtue of its nature as a professedly religious Islamic party, openly states it desires the establishment of a theocracy, and does not believe in the Western notion of a democracy. The MMA's definition of democracy which is identical to theocracy is unacceptable to the MMA's opponents.
The MMA have sought to implement controversial legislation in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, such as the proposed Shariat and Hisbah bills. The bills are disputed – some Pakistanis regard this as a serious abuse of government power and violation of human rights, while Islamic parties regard it as the implementation of legitimate Islamic laws, in line with the constitution of Pakistan, which makes it avowedly clear the fact that Pakistan is an Islamic republic with the law of Shari'a supreme. The Governor of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has vowed that it will not be implemented and President Pervez Musharraf filed a reference against it in Pakistan's Supreme Court. The 9 member bench of the court declared certain clauses unconstitutional and directed the Governor not to sign it into law until it is revised. In a detailed verdict released on September 1, 2005, the Supreme Court stated that other clauses of the bill can be challenged as well. However, the elected senate approved over 90% of the bill.
War on Terror
Besides of their severe criticism of the War on Terrorism, ambiguous attitude towards terrorism, and opposition to President Musharraf, the MMA have not interfered in anti-terrorism operations, whether it is law enforcement or military or paramilitary action. The MMA has not supported the operations either.
"Hudood" Law controversy
The MMA threatened to resign from national and provincial assemblies in protest after Pakistan's parliament amended laws to transfer rape cases from its 'Sharia' courts to civil courts.
Sharia courts in Pakistan, which claim to be based on Islamic law, try rape cases under "Hudood" Ordinances instituted in 1979. According to critics of the ordinance, a rape victim could face adultery (or fornication if unmarried) charges unless she can produce four male Muslim witnesses of good character to her rape. Failing to do so entails a maximum sentence for adultery is death by stoning. However, Mufti Taqi Usmani, an instrumental figuring in making the Hudud Laws, has stated "If anyone says that she was punished because of Qazaf (false accusation of rape) then Qazaf Ordinance, Clause no. 3, Exemption no. 2 clearly states that if someone approaches the legal authorities with a rape complaint, she cannot be punished in case she is unable to present 4 witnesses. No court of law can be in its right mind to award such a punishment."
|Wikinews has related news: Islamic groups protest Pakistani rape law reform|
- Qazi Hussain Ahmad
- Prof. Ghafoor Ahmed
- Khurshid Ahmad
- Abdul Latif Khalid Cheema
- Liaqat Baloch
- Women's Protection Bill
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- The Chief Executive of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (a) shall relinquish the office of Chief Executive on such day as he may determine in accordance with the judgement of the Supreme Court of Pakistan of the 12th May, 2000; and (b) having received the democratic mandate to serve the nation as President of Pakistan for a period of five years shall, on relinquishing the office of the Chief Executive, Notwithstanding anything contained in this Article or Article 43 or any other provision of the Constitution or any other law for the time being in force, assume the office of President of Pakistan forthwith and shall hold office for a term of five years under the Constitution, and Article 44 and other provisions of the Constitution shall apply accordingly."
- (a) for paragraphs (h), (i) and (j) the following shall be substituted, namely: (h) he has been convicted by a court of competent jurisdiction on a charge of corrupt practice, moral turpitude or misuse of power or authority under any law for the time being in force; or (i) he has been dismissed from the service of Pakistan or service of a corporation or office set up or controlled by the Federal Government, Provincial Government or a Local Government on the grounds of misconduct or moral turpitude; or (j) he has been removed or compulsorily retired from the service of Pakistan or service of a corporation or office set up or controlled by the Federal Government, Provincial Government or a Local Government on the grounds of misconduct or moral turpitude; or" (b) for paragraph (p) the following shall be substituted, namely: (p) he has been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for having absconded by a competent court under any law for the time being in force; or (q) he has obtained a loan for a an amount of two million rupees or more, from any bank, financial institution, cooperative society or cooperative body in his own name or in the name of his spouse or any of his dependents, which remains unpaid for more than one year from the due date, or has got such loan written off; or (r) he or his spouse or any of his dependents has defaulted in payment of government dues and utility expenses, including telephone, electricity, gas and water charges in excess of ten thousand rupees, for over six months, at the time of filing his nomination papers (s) he is for the time being disqualified from being electedor chosen as a member of the Majlis-e- Shoora (Parliament) or of a Provincial Assembly under any law from the timebeing in force”
- In Part V, in Chapter 3, before Article 153, the following new Article shall be inserted, namely: (1) There shall be a National Security Council to serve as a forum for consultation on strategic matters pertaining to the sovereignty, integrity and security of the State; and the matters relating to democracy, governance and inter-provincial harmony. (2) The President shall be the Chairman of the National Security Council and its other members shall be the Prime Minister, the Chairman of the Senate, the Speaker of the National Assembly, the Leader of the Opposition in the National Assembly, the Chief Ministers of the Provinces, the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, and the Chiefs of Staff of the Pakistan Army, Pakistan Navy and Pakistan Air Force. (3) Meetings of the National Security Council may be convened by the President either in his discretion, or on the advice of the Prime Minister, or when requested by any other of its members, within the time frame indicated by him regularly
- Idrees Bakhtiar, “Little Men,” Herald, January 2004, 47–49
- Idrees Bakhtiar, “Little Men,” Herald, January 2004, 47–49
- Staff, “MMA Holds Rally Against Govt, LFO,” Dawn, December 18, 2003
- Huma Aamir Malik, “Opposition Stages Islamabad Rally to Support Political Prisoners,” Al-Jazeera News, November 3, 2003
- Zaffar Abbas in his article “The Military-Mullah Alliance” proposes that the long-standing relationship between the MMA and Military may have contributed to such conciliation, as well as the government’s implicit assurance for the MMA to continue its Islamization reforms in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
- Amir Mir, “Unanswered Questions,” Herald, September 2004, 30–36
- Umer Farooq, “Reforms in Questions,” Herald, August 2007, 67
- Ilyas Khan “Cartoon Trouble,” Herald, March 2004, 62–73
- Intikhab Amir, “Courting the Centre,” Herald, December 2005, 39–41
- Pakistan People's Party. Accessed May 25, 2011. http://www.ppp.org.pk/manifestos/2002.html.
- Ali Ismail, “Pakistan: Military sponsored PML (Q) joins PPP-led coalition government,” WSWS, May 20, 2011
- Tim Mcgirk, Ghulam Hasnain, Syed Talat Hussain, “Pakistan The Sword of Islam,” Time, September 28, 1999
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- Intikhab Amir, “MMA Parties Jostle for Power,” Herald, Novermber 2004, 54
- Intikhab Amir, “Dissident rocks JI boat for the second time in Senate polls,” Herald, May 2005 42–43
- “MMA chief isolated as Durrani attends NSC session,” Herald
- Intikhab Amir, “Double Standards,” Herald, October 2005
- Ilyas Khan, “Taming the MMA,” Herald, November 2003, 36
- “Taming the MMA,” Herald 38
- Ilyas Khan, “MMA leaders remain mum as young girl is paraded naked,” Herald, September 2005, 43
- Intikhab Amir, “Paper leak puts entrance test under a cloud,” Herald, October 2005, 58–59
- Intikhab Amir, “Khyber Pakhtunkhwa CM and governor to purchase 105-million-rupee copters,” Herald, December 2005, 63
- The Reality of ‘Women Protection Bill’
- Islam Channel presenters Hassan and Habibah on the rape laws in Pakistan 
- Stop violence against women in Pakistan, Human Rights Watch
- mma.org.pk – Official web site
- Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan (A key member of MMA)
- Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA)