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When the French entered [[Nabatieh]] in 1918, they barred the local populace from carrying out political activity. As a response, Sadiq Hamzeh hoisted the [[Pan-Arab colors|Arab flag]] in several villages as a symbol of rejecting French occupation.<ref name="gharbieh"/> Tensions increased following the [[Syrian National Congress]] in July 2, 1919, when Shiites restated their support for Syrian unity, bringing them into direct conflict with the Maronites.<ref name=":1">{{Cite book|last=Weiss|first=Max|title=In the Shadow of Sectarianism: Law, Shi'ism, and the Making of Modern Lebanon|publisher=Harvard University Press|year=2010|isbn=978-0674052987|location=Cambridge, MA|pages=58–59}}</ref>
When the French entered [[Nabatieh]] in 1918, they barred the local populace from carrying out political activity. As a response, Sadiq Hamzeh hoisted the [[Pan-Arab colors|Arab flag]] in several villages as a symbol of rejecting French occupation.<ref name="gharbieh"/> Tensions increased following the [[Syrian National Congress]] in July 2, 1919, when Shiites restated their support for Syrian unity, bringing them into direct conflict with the Maronites.<ref name=":1">{{Cite book|last=Weiss|first=Max|title=In the Shadow of Sectarianism: Law, Shi'ism, and the Making of Modern Lebanon|publisher=Harvard University Press|year=2010|isbn=978-0674052987|location=Cambridge, MA|pages=58–59}}</ref>


Following the official declaration of the [[French Mandate (Lebanon)|French Mandate of Greater Lebanon]] (''Le Grand Liban'') in September 1920, anti-French riots broke out in the predominantly Shia areas of [[Jabal Amel]] and the [[Beqaa Valley]]. In between 1920 and 1921, rebels from these areas attacked French military bases and garrisons in [[South Lebanon|Southern Lebanon]] and the [[Beqaa Valley|Beqaa valley]]. During this period of chaos, also several predominantly Christian villages in the region were attacked due to French armed support and their perceived acceptance of French mandatory rule, namely [[Ain Ebel]]. As a consequence, the French sent to the south an expedition of 4,000–6,000 soldiers lead by Colonel Niger, devestating Shiite villages and completely crushing Shiite rebels by June 1920.<ref name="gharbieh"/> Resistance subsided following the campaign, except for Adham Khanjar's unsuccessful assassination attempt on French High Commissioner [[Henri Gouraud (general)|Henri Gouraud]], which led to Khanjar's execution in 1923.<ref name=":1" />
Following the official declaration of the [[French Mandate (Lebanon)|French Mandate of Greater Lebanon]] (''Le Grand Liban'') in September 1920, anti-French riots broke out in the predominantly Shia areas of [[Jabal Amel]] and the [[Beqaa Valley]]. In between 1920 and 1921, rebels from these areas attacked French military bases and garrisons in [[South Lebanon|Southern Lebanon]] and the [[Beqaa Valley|Beqaa valley]]. During this period of chaos, also several predominantly Christian villages in the region were attacked due to French armed support and their perceived acceptance of French mandatory rule, namely [[Ain Ebel]]. As a consequence, the French sent to the south an expedition of 4,000–6,000 soldiers lead by Colonel Niger, devastating Shiite villages and completely crushing Shiite rebels by June 1920.<ref name="gharbieh"/> Resistance subsided following the campaign, except for Adham Khanjar's unsuccessful assassination attempt on French High Commissioner [[Henri Gouraud (general)|Henri Gouraud]], which led to Khanjar's execution in 1923.<ref name=":1" />


Shia cleric [[Abd al-Husayn Sharaf al-Din al-Musawi|Abdul Husayn Sharafeddine]] had organized and lead the [[nonviolent resistance]] movement against the French since 1919, and demanded US support for [[Syria (region)|Syrian]] unity during the [[King–Crane Commission]] visit. This angered the French, who encouraged an unsuccessful assassination attempt against him. Sharafeddine understood that sectarian hostility only gave purpose for French military presence in the area, and thus called for the protection of the Christians in the conference of Wadi al-Hujayr on 24 April 1920.<blockquote>
Shia cleric [[Abd al-Husayn Sharaf al-Din al-Musawi|Abdul Husayn Sharafeddine]] had organized and lead the [[nonviolent resistance]] movement against the French since 1919, and demanded US support for [[Syria (region)|Syrian]] unity during the [[King–Crane Commission]] visit. This angered the French, who encouraged an unsuccessful assassination attempt against him. Sharafeddine understood that sectarian hostility only gave purpose for French military presence in the area, and thus called for the protection of the Christians in the conference of Wadi al-Hujayr on 24 April 1920.<blockquote>

Revision as of 09:59, 7 May 2023

"Mutawālī" redirects here. Not to be confused with mutawallī.
Lebanese Shia Muslims
المسلمون الشيعة اللبنانيين
Distribution of Shi'a Muslims in Lebanon
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Lebanese Shia Muslims (Arabic: المسلمون الشيعة اللبنانيين), historically known as matāwila (Arabic: متاولة, plural of متوال mutawālin[2] ([Lebanese pronounced as متوالي metouali[3]]) refers to Lebanese people who are adherents of the Shia branch of Islam in Lebanon, which plays a major role along Lebanon's main Sunni, Maronite and Druze sects. According to the CIA World Factbook, Shia Muslims constituted an estimated 31% of Lebanon's population in 2022.[1]

Most of its adherents live in the northern and western area of the Beqaa Valley, Southern Lebanon and Beirut. The great majority of Shia Muslims in Lebanon are Twelvers. However, a small minority of them are Alawites and Ismaili.

Under the terms of an unwritten agreement known as the National Pact between the various political and religious leaders of Lebanon, Shias are the only sect eligible for the post of Speaker of Parliament.[4][5][6][7]

History

Origins

The cultural and linguistic heritage of the Lebanese people is a blend of both indigenous elements and the foreign cultures that have come to rule the land and its people over the course of thousands of years. In a 2013 interview the lead investigator, Pierre Zalloua, pointed out that genetic variation preceded religious variation and divisions: "Lebanon already had well-differentiated communities with their own genetic peculiarities, but not significant differences, and religions came as layers of paint on top. There is no distinct pattern that shows that one community carries significantly more Phoenician than another."[8]

Lebanon throughout its history was home of many historic peoples who inhabited the region. The Lebanese coast was mainly inhabited by Phoenician Canaanites throughout the Bronze and Iron ages, who built the cities of Tyre, Sidon, Byblos and Tripoli, which was founded as a center of a confederation between Aradians, Sidonians, and Tyrians. Further east, the Bekaa valley was known as Amqu in the Bronze Age, and was part of Amorite kingdom of Qatna and later Amurru kingdom, and had local city-states such as Enišasi. During the Iron Age, the Bekaa was dominated by the Aramaeans, who formed kingdoms nearby in Damascus and Hamath, and established the kingdom of Aram-Zobah where Hazael might have been born, and was later also settled by Itureans, who were likely Arabs themselves. These Itureans inhabited the hills above Tyre in Southern Lebanon, historically known as Jabal Amel, since at least the times of Alexander the Great, who fought them after they blocked his army's access to wood supply.[9]

During Roman rule, Aramaic became the lingua franca of the entire Levant and Lebanon, replacing spoken Phoenician on the coast, while Greek was used as language of administration, education and trading. It is important to note that most villages and towns in Lebanon today have Aramaic names, reflecting this heritage. However, Beirut became the only fully Latin speaking city in the whole east. On the coast, Tyre prospered under the Romans and was allowed to keep much of its independence as a "civitas foederata".[10] On the other hand, Jabal Amel was inhabited by Banu Amilah, its namesake, who have particular importance for the Lebanese Shia for adopting and nurturing Shi'ism in the southern population. The Banu Amilah were part of the Nabataean Arab foederati of the Roman Empire, and they were connected to other pre-Islamic Arabs such as Judham and Balqayn, whose presence in the region likely dates back to Biblical times according to Irfan Shahîd.[11] As the Muslim conquest of the Levant reached Lebanon, these Arab tribes received the most power which encouraged the non-Arabic-speaking population to adopt Arabic as the main language.[12]

Early Islamic period

See also: Hamdanids
See also: Banu Ammar
See also: Tyre, Lebanon

The spread of Shia Islam in Lebanon and the Levant is considered to have been a complex, multi-layered process. According to Islamic historian Ja'far al-Muhajir, pro-Alid tribes such as Hamdan and Madh'hij likely settled in the region following the Hasan–Muawiya treaty in 661, facilitating Shi'ism among segments of the local populations in Jabal Amel, Galilee, Mount Lebanon and Beqaa valley.[13] Anti-Abbasid sentiment was common in these areas due to marginalization by the Abbasids.[14] According to Husayn Mroue, Shiism was one option among many for the communities of Jabal Amel, but a positive and inviting dialectical relationship between the theological construct of Imamism and its social milieu gave precedence to the Shiite possibility.[15] The transformation likely followed the demise of the Umayyads in 750, when the Emesene Shia poet Abd al-Salam al-Homsi (777–850) figures.[13] The rise of Isma'ili missionary activity and the Fatimid Caliphate in 909, and the Twelver Shiite Hamdanids in Syria in 930, all ultimately acted as catalysts for consolidating Shia Islam's presence in the region.[15][16][17]

Political map of the Levant (c. 1090), highlighting the territories of Tripoli and Tyre

According to Al-Maqdisi (c. 966–985) and Nasir Khusraw (c. 1045), Shiites were the majority in coastal cities of Tyre and Tripoli,[15] and the city of Tiberias adjacent to Jabal Amel. Tyre and Tripoli were uniquely surrounded by Shiite shrines in the outskirts indicative of their Shiite populations, while Tiberias was reportedly inhabited by the Shia tribe al-Ash'ari of Madh'hij before 894, who originally founded the Shia holy city of Qom in 703.[13][14] Further east in the Bekaa valley, sources are scarce and generally uninformative. However, it is presumed Shiism took hold in the area after centuries-long contact with the Shiite Banu Hamdan, Qarmatians, Hamdanids and Mirdasids.[13] Shiite presence in the cities implied a Twelver–Isma'ili fusion, with Tyre and Tripoli producing both Twelver scholars and Isma'ili missionaries.[13][12]

In the eleventh century, two independent Shiite emirates covered parts of Lebanon: the Banu Ammar in Tripoli and Banu Mirdas in the Bekaa valley.[18][19] Banu Ammar declared Tripoli's independence in 1070, and ruled a territory which stretched between Jableh and Jbeil in the south. They invested large sums in turning the city a famous center for learning, founding a "House of Knowledge" that attracted scholars, as well as a notable library of reportedly 100,000 volumes.[20]

Late period

Siege of Tyre by the Crusaders and the Venetian fleet in 1122-1124

With the arrival of the First Crusade, Tripoli and Tyre experienced a drastic upheaval with the crusader conquests. Many Shiites fled Tripoli's fall in 1109 and settled in Tyre and Keserwan, where a Shiite community may have already been established when Shia Islam was in the ascendant in the 10th century.[13][12] A similar thing followed in Jabal Amel after the crusader consolidated control over the Galilee and Tyre in 1099 and 1124 respectively, whereby the bulk of Shiite populations in Tiberias and Tyre re-settled the countryside, and the cities suffered significant depopulation.[21][22] Shias in the Bekaa valley remained under Muslim rule and were on good terms with Bahramshah (1182–1230), whose gesture of welcoming a prominent Shia scholar in Baalbek "gave morale to the Shiites in the district" according to al-Dhahabi.[13]

Most of Jabal Amel regained its autonomy under Husam ad-Din Bechara, a presumably local Shiite officer of Saladin who participated in the capture of Jabal Amel and became its lord from 1187 until 1200.[23] Between 1187 and 1291, the Shiites of Jabal Amel were divided between the newly autonomous hills and a coast still subject to the Franks.[12] Shias from the newly autonomous areas of Jabal Amel acted as a bulwark against Frankish raids inland. During Saladin's siege of Beaufort castle, military units from Jabal Amel replaced his forces as he marched to repel a crusader invasion of Acre. In 1195, Husam ad-Din and his forces also fought off a Frankish siege at Toron.[22] Again in 1217, an elite Hungarian contingent was virtually annihilated by local archers in Jezzine, a Shia locality at the time, and the prisoners were paraded in Damascus.[12]

Thirteenth-century historian al-Yunini reports that Baalbek was the scene of guerilla warfare after the Mongols seized the city in 1258-9. Najm ad-Din ibn Malli al-Baalbeki (b. 1221), one of Baalbek's few Shia scholars at the time, took the initiative and retreated to the slopes of Mount Lebanon, where he was joined by ten thousand guerillas.[13] Najm ad-Din and his guerillas reportedly kidnapped and ambushed Mongols at night, and Najm ad-Din came to be known by his pseudonym, "the bald king".[13]

Mamluk Period

See also: Mamluk Sultanate and Keserwan campaigns (1292–1305)

By the early 14th century, Jabal Amel was becoming the Twelver Shia center of the Levant. With Shiism losing ground in Aleppo due to previous Seljuq, Ayyubid and now Mamluk takeover, a stream of scholars shifted to Jabal Amel, and the area probably received migrants from there as it provided refuge from Sunni rigor.[12] Jezzine, Karak Nuh and Machghara replaced Aleppo, Tyre and Tripoli as centers of Shiite learning in the Levant.[12][24]

In muharram of 1305, the Mamluk army under the command of Aqqush al-Afram devastated the mountain-dwelling Shia community of Keserwan. The Mamluks had previously launched two failed campaigns in 1292 and 1297, both of which failed to subjugate the community. The last campaign came after a band of Keserwanis reportedly attacked the retreating Mamluk army after Battle of Wadi al-Khaznadar. Aqqush's army of 50,000 attacked Keserwan from four routes, in contrast to an estimated 4,000 infantrymen on the Shiites' behalf. The region fell after 11 days of brutal fighting, driving an influx of Shiites toward the Beqaa valley and Southern Lebanon, while a humbled minority stayed.[24][13][25] In 1384, the Mamluks also executed Muhammad Jamaluddin al-Makki al-Amili, the most prominent Shia scholar after falsely being charged as a ghulat.[26]

During this period multiple Shiite families rose into prominence. Much of Jabal Amel, Safed and occasionally Wadi al-Taym were ruled by the Shia Bechara family from 1385 until 1516. In the Bekaa, the illustrious Murtada family of Sayyid descent served as deputies of Baalbek throughout most of the period, and were named supervisors of the newly endowed Alid shrine of Sayyidah Zaynab near Damascus in 1366.[27] They seem to have been replaced by the Harfush dynasty as deputies of Baalbek by 1498 according to historians Ibn Homsi and Ibn Tulun.[27] In 1497, when battle ignited between Mamluk governors in Damascus, Ibn Bechara and Ibn Harfush reportedly fought on each other's side and were joined by many Shiites according to Ibn Tulun.[24] In Mount Lebanon, the Hamada family were among the earliest identified Shia families, reportedly serving as tax-collectors in the district of Mamluk Tripoli as early as 1471, in the region Dinniyeh.[24] Bilad Beirut were similarly under the jurisdiction of a Shia muqaddam prior to 1407.

Under Ottoman rule

Further information: Harfush dynasty
Further information: Nasif al-Nassar
Further information: El Assaad Family

The Levant fell to the Ottomans in 1516, bringing about a new period in the region. Under the Ottomans, Local Shias often came into conflict with Ottoman-assigned governors of Tripoli, Sidon and Damascus, who derogatorily referred to them as Qizilbash in their documents as a means to delegitimize them or justify punitive campaigns against them.[28] During most of the Ottoman period, the Shia largely maintained themselves as 'a state apart'. Unlike the Druze and Christians, the Shiite emirs were regularly denounced for their religious identity and persecuted as Qizilbash heretics per Ebussuud Efendi's definitions, and Shiites were not recognized by the Ottoman millet system.[27][29][30] Eighteenth century French orientalist comte de Volney who visited Lebanon toward the late 1780s, also went on to describe the Shiites as a "distinct society".[31][30]

As part of their efforts of relying on local intermediaries rather than forcibly imposing foreign ones, the Ottomans confirmed tax-collectorship iltizam to the local Shia families in Jabal Amel, Bekaa valley and northern Mount Lebanon.[27] These most notably included the Munkars, Ali al-Saghirs and Sa'abs in Jabal Amel, the Harfush dynasty of the Bekaa and Hamade family of northern Mount Lebanon.[27] These families played a significant role in regional affairs, and sometimes their territories stretched as far as the outskirts of Hama and Palmyra in the Syrian Desert.[27] They frequently came into conflict with the Ottoman governors of Sidon, Tripoli and Damascus, and were involved in bitter rivalries or oftentimes close alliances with other feudal families such as the Ma'ns, Shihabs and Zahir al-Umar; who utilized his Shiite ally Nassif's 6,000-strong cavalry army to counter Ottoman assaults and expand his domains of iltizam in Palestine and the Transjordan.[27]

At the time, Shiites also built particularly close ties with the Safavids of Iran, contributing significantly to Iran's conversion into Shia Islam. Chief among their clerics was Muhaqqiq al-Karaki from Karak Nuh, who achieved significant power in religion and governance during the reign of Shah Tahmasp I, so much so that the latter told him:“You are the real king and I am just one of your agents". These contacts greatly angered the Ottomans, who derogatorily referred to them as Qizilbash. Thus, Shia-Ottoman conflict in Lebanon was a marriage of politics and religion.[32]

Political crisis

Beaufort castle, where Shia chiefs made a last stand against al-Jazzar in 1781

The late eighteenth century constituted a period of significant decline for Shiites, both politically and physically. In the Bekaa valley, the Harfush had fallen out of the grace of the Ottomans and were gradually replaced by the Shihab dynasty, who built a significant fortune from trade. The Hamade's of Mount Lebanon had been left physically broken by the 20,000-strong Ottoman campaign of 1693, and a Shiite influx overran the Bekaa valley in 1771 after their defeat by the Shihabs.[27][33][24]

Similarly, much of Shiite autonomy in Jabal Amel was diminished by Jazzar Pasha (1776–1804) who in 1781 eliminated all leading Shiite chiefs and destroyed their religious libraries,[34] an effort commended by the Sublime Porte in a letter filled with rhapsodic praise and a promise to al-Jazzar of the empire's unyielding support to "clean the land of the filth of their existence", in reference to the Shia clans.[27]

Due to their setbacks and frequent revolts, Shiite territories greatly diminished,[34] and Shiite villages in Jezzine and Keserwan witnessed significant Christian migration.[35][24] Comte de Volney, who visited Lebanon between 1783 and 1785, gave his own account of what he'd witnessed:

"The Metoualis are almost annihilated due to their revolts; their name is soon to be extinct".[31]

As a result of Jazzar's policies, Shiites held a meeting at Chehour village to organise guerrilla attacks against him, which continued throughout his rule.[33] The insurgents managed to temporarily conquer the Tebnine citadel in 1783, and the period witnessed swift uprisings against his rule in Tyre and Chehour in 1784–1785. Insurgency continued until the end of al-Jazzar's rule in 1804, and famously involved Faris al-Nassif, Nassif al-Nassar's son.[33][24] After al-Jazzar's death he was succeeded by Sulayman Pasha al-Adil in 1805, who signed a treaty with the Shiites in order to end their attacks. The treaty was signed at Beit ed-Dine as a result of the mediation of Bashir Shihab II (1788-1840) between the two sides. The agreement restored their autonomy and granted a general amnesty for all Shia rebels previously active against al-Jazzar and his forces, as well as a compensation for their losses after the battle of Yaroun, and granted the community the right to solve their internal problems without interference from the Ottoman governor.[33]

French mandate period

Adham Khanjar and Sadiq Hamzeh, two prominent anti-French revolutionary figures

When the French entered Nabatieh in 1918, they barred the local populace from carrying out political activity. As a response, Sadiq Hamzeh hoisted the Arab flag in several villages as a symbol of rejecting French occupation.[33] Tensions increased following the Syrian National Congress in July 2, 1919, when Shiites restated their support for Syrian unity, bringing them into direct conflict with the Maronites.[36]

Following the official declaration of the French Mandate of Greater Lebanon (Le Grand Liban) in September 1920, anti-French riots broke out in the predominantly Shia areas of Jabal Amel and the Beqaa Valley. In between 1920 and 1921, rebels from these areas attacked French military bases and garrisons in Southern Lebanon and the Beqaa valley. During this period of chaos, also several predominantly Christian villages in the region were attacked due to French armed support and their perceived acceptance of French mandatory rule, namely Ain Ebel. As a consequence, the French sent to the south an expedition of 4,000–6,000 soldiers lead by Colonel Niger, devastating Shiite villages and completely crushing Shiite rebels by June 1920.[33] Resistance subsided following the campaign, except for Adham Khanjar's unsuccessful assassination attempt on French High Commissioner Henri Gouraud, which led to Khanjar's execution in 1923.[36]

Shia cleric Abdul Husayn Sharafeddine had organized and lead the nonviolent resistance movement against the French since 1919, and demanded US support for Syrian unity during the King–Crane Commission visit. This angered the French, who encouraged an unsuccessful assassination attempt against him. Sharafeddine understood that sectarian hostility only gave purpose for French military presence in the area, and thus called for the protection of the Christians in the conference of Wadi al-Hujayr on 24 April 1920.

The Christians (Nasara) are your brethren in the country and in destiny. Show to them the love you show to yourselves. Protect their lives and possessions as you do to your own. Only by this can you face the conspiracy and put an end to the civil strife.[33]

Later in 1921, this period of unrest ended with a political amnesty offered by the French mandate authorities for all Shiites who had joined the riots, with the intention to bind the Shia community in the South of Lebanon to the new Mandate state.[36] However, the French breakdown on Shiites left the latter resentful against them. The French had dispersed the Shiite leaders and thousands of peasants who feared reprisals, and the high fines imposed on them caused financial misery.[33] When the Great Syrian Revolt broke out in 1925, rebellion ensued but rather ineffectively. Many Southerners went to Syria to participate, and battle spread from the Bekaa valley to the Qalamoun Mountains and Akroum, where according to eye-witness accounts Shiites took more than 400 rifles and fifty horses as booty from the French.[37] Many Christians who fled their villages during the revolt were accommodated by Shia notables from Nabatieh and Bint Jbeil, an act that was appreciated by Christian clergies in letters.

... what the Shi'ites did for the Christians in the south will be cherished in our hearts for as long as Lebanon and the Christians remain. What happened should be written in gold. Long live Lebanon, Long live Lebanese unity and long live the Shiites.[33]

After the revolt, the region experienced a decade or so of relative political stability. The Shiites gradually grew more accepting of Greater Lebanon for various sectarian and non-sectarian reasons. The Shiite zu'ama also believed their fortune would best be achieved within the newly founded Lebanese state.[33]

During the 1936–1939 Arab revolt in Palestine, Southerners had a key role in providing ammunition and assistance to the Palestinian rebels, and the revolt was in fact co-administered from Bint Jbeil. In 1938 the French also requested RAF air support during their operations against insurgents in Bint Jbeil and South. In addition, Abdul-Husayn Sharafeddine expressed solidarity with the Palestinian strike and demand for independence.[33]

Education

In the 19th century, Lebanon saw dramatic changes when missionaries started establishing schools throughout the country. While the French and Russians mainly encouraged Maronite and Orthodox active learning respectively, along with American Protestant missions in Beirut, the British established educational institutions in Druze areas, and Sunnis mainly benefitted from Ottoman state institutions. However, Shiites were the only ones who did not benefit from such activities. This neglectance continued into the early days of the French mandate.[33]

During the 1920s and 1930s, educational institutions became places for different religious communities to construct nationalist and sectarian modes of identification.[38] Shia leaders and religious clergy supported educational reforms in order to improve the social and political marginalization of the Shia community and increase their involvement in the newly born nation-state of Lebanon.[39] This led to the establishment of several private Shia schools in Lebanon, among them The Charitable Islamic ʿĀmili Society (al-Jamʿiyya al-Khayriyya al-Islāmiyya al-ʿĀmiliyya) in Beirut and The Charitable Jaʿfari Society (al-Jamʿiyya al-Khayriyya al-Jaʿfariyya) in Tyre.[39] While several Shia educational institutions were established before and at the beginning of the mandate period, they often ran out of support and funding which resulted in their abolishment.[39]

The primary outlet for discussions concerning educational reforms among Shia scholars was the monthly Shiite journal al-'Irfan, founded in 1909. In order to bring their demands (muṭālabiyya) to the attention of the French authorities, petitions were signed and presented to the French High Commissioner and the Service de l'Instruction Publique.[40] This institution – since 1920 headquartered in Beirut- oversaw every educational policy regarding public and private school in the mandate territories.[41] According to historian Elizabeth Thompson, private schools were part of "constant negotiations" between citizen and the French authorities in Lebanon, specifically regarding the hierarchical distribution of social capital along religious communal lines.[42] During these negotiations, petitions were often used by different sects to demand support for reforms. For example, the middle-class of predominantly urban Sunni areas expressed their demands for educational reforms through petitions directed towards the French High Commissioner and the League of Nations.[43]

Sayyid Abdul-Husayn Sharafeddine believed that the only way to ward off foreign political influence was to establish modern schools while maintaining Islamic teachings. In 1938, he built two schools, one for girls and another for boys, at his own expense. However, the girls' school did not last long due to financial difficulties and traditional views, prompting Sayyid Sharafeddine to transfer the girls and teach them in his own home. The boys' school was known as al-Ja'fariyya, and was able to continue despite financial difficulties.[33]

Ja'fari shar'ia courts

In January 1926, the French High Commissioner officially recognized the Shia community as an "independent religious community," which was permitted to judge matters of personal status "according to the principles of the rite known by the name of Ja'fari."[44] This meant that the Shiite Ja'fari jurisprudence or madhhab was legally recognized as an official madhhab, and held judicial and political power on multiple levels.[45] The institutionalization of Shia Islam during this period provoked discussions between Shiite scholars and clergy about how Shiite orthodoxy should be defined. For example, discussions about the mourning of the martyrdom of Imam Husain during Ashura, which was a clandestine affair before the 1920s and 1930s, led to its transformation into a public ceremony.[46]

On the other hand, the official recognition of legal and religious Shiite institutions by the French authorities strengthened a sectarian awareness within the Shia community. Historian Max Weiss underlines how "sectarian claims were increasingly bound up with the institutionalization of Shi'i difference."[47] With the Ja'fari shar'ia courts in practice, the Shia community was deliberately encouraged to "practice sectarianism" on a daily basis.

Sub-groups

Shia Twelvers (Metouali)

Shia Twelver (Metawali) woman in the Bekaa Valley in traditional clothes, 1950s
See also: Shia villages in Palestine

Shia Twelvers in Lebanon refers to the Shia Muslim Twelver community with a significant presence all over Lebanon including the Mount Lebanon (Keserwan, Byblos), the North (Batroun), the South, the Beqaa, Baabda District coastal areas and Beirut.

The jurisdiction of the Ottoman Empire was merely nominal in the Lebanon. Baalbek in the 18th century was really under the control of the Metawali, which also refers to the Shia Twelvers.[citation needed] Metawali, Metouali, or Mutawili, is an archaic term used to specifically refer to Lebanese Twelver Shias in the past. Although it can be considered offensive nowadays, it was a way to distinguish the uniqueness and unity of the community. The term 'mutawili' is also the name of a trustee in Islamic waqf-system.

Seven Shia Twelver (Mutawili) villages that were reassigned from French Greater Lebanon to the British Mandate of Palestine in a 1924 border-redrawing agreement were depopulated during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War and repopulated with Jews.[48] The seven villages are Qadas, Nabi Yusha, al-Malikiyya, Hunin, Tarbikha, Abil al-Qamh, and Saliha.[49]

In addition, the Shia Twelvers in Lebanon have close links to the Syrian Shia Twelvers.[50]

Alawites

Large mosque with tall minaret
Alawite El-Zahra Mosque in Jabal Mohsen, Lebanon

There are an estimated 100,000[51][52][53] Alawites in Lebanon, where they have lived since at least the 16th century.[54] They are recognized as one of the 18 official Lebanese sects, and due to the efforts of an Alawite leader Ali Eid, the Taif Agreement of 1989 gave them two reserved seats in the Parliament. Lebanese Alawites live mostly in the Jabal Mohsen neighbourhood of Tripoli, and in 10 villages in the Akkar region,[55][56][57] and are mainly represented by the Arab Democratic Party. Bab al-Tabbaneh, Jabal Mohsen clashes between pro-Syrian Alawites and anti-Syrian Sunnis have haunted Tripoli for decades.[58]

Isma'ilis

Isma'ilism, or "Sevener Shi'ism", is a branch of Shia Islam which emerged in 765 from a disagreement over the succession to Muhammad. Isma'ilis hold that Isma'il ibn Jafar was the true seventh imam, and not Musa al-Kadhim as the Twelvers believe. Isma'ili Shi'ism also differs doctrinally from Imami Shi'ism, having beliefs and practices that are more esoteric and maintaining seven pillars of faith rather than five pillars and ten ancillary precepts.

Though perhaps somewhat better established in neighbouring Syria, where the faith founded one of its first da'wah outposts in the city of Salamiyah (the supposed resting place of the Imam Isma'il) in the 8th century, it has been present in what is now Lebanon for centuries. Early Lebanese Isma'ilism showed perhaps an unusual propensity to foster radical movements within it, particularly in the areas of Wadi al-Taym, adjoining the Beqaa valley at the foot of Mount Hermon, and Jabal Shuf, in the highlands of Mount Lebanon.[59]

The syncretic beliefs of the Qarmatians, typically classed as an Isma'ili splinter sect with Zoroastrian influences, spread into the area of the Beqaa valley and possibly also Jabal Shuf starting in the 9th century. The group soon became widely vilified in the Islamic world for its armed campaigns across throughout the following decades, which included slaughtering Muslim pilgrims and sacking Mecca and Medina—and Salamiyah. Other Muslim rulers soon acted to crush this powerful heretical movement. In the Levant, the Qarmatians were ordered to be stamped out by the ruling Fatimid, themselves Isma'ilis and from whom the lineage of the modern Nizari Aga Khan is claimed to descend. The Qarmatian movement in the Levant was largely extinguished by the turn of the millennium.[59]

The semi-divine personality of the Fatimid caliph in Isma'ilism was elevated further in the doctrines of a secretive group which began to venerate the caliph Hakim as the embodiment of divine unity. Unsuccessful in the imperial capital of Cairo, they began discreetly proselytising around the year 1017 among certain Arab tribes in the Levant. The Isma'ilis of Wadi al-Taym and Jabal Shuf were among those who converted before the movement was permanently closed off a few decades later to guard against outside prying by mainstream Sunni and Shia Muslims, who often viewed their doctrines as heresy. This deeply esoteric group became known as the Druze, who in belief, practice, and history have long since become distinct from Isma'ilis proper. Druze constitute 5.2% of the modern population of Lebanon and still have a strong demographic presence in their traditional regions within the country to this day.[59]

Due to official persecution by the Sunni Zengid dynasty that stoked escalating sectarian clashes with Sunnis, many Isma'ilis in the regions of Damascus and Aleppo are said to have fled west during the 12th century. Some settled in the mountains of Lebanon, while others settled further north along the coastal ridges in Syria,[60] where the Alawites had earlier taken refuge—and where their brethren in the Assassins were cultivating a fearsome reputation as they staved off armies of Crusaders and Sunnis alike for many years.

Once far more numerous and widespread in many areas now part of Lebanon, the Isma'ili population has largely vanished over time. It has been suggested that Ottoman-era persecution might have spurred them to leave for elsewhere in the region, though there is no record or evidence of any kind of large exodus.[61]

Isma'ilis were originally included as one of five officially-defined Muslim sects in a 1936 edict issued by the French Mandate governing religious affairs in the territory of Greater Lebanon, alongside Sunnis, Twelver Shias, Alawites, and Druzes. However, Muslims collectively rejected being classified as divided, and so were left out of the law in the end. Ignored in a post-independence law passed in 1951 that defined only Judaism and Christian sects as official, Muslims continued under traditional Ottoman law, within the confines of which small communities like Isma'ilis and Alawites found it difficult to establish their own institutions.[62]

The Aga Khan IV made a brief stop in Beirut on 4 August 1957 while on a global tour of Nizari Isma'ili centres, drawing an estimated 600 Syrian and Lebanese followers of the religion to the Beirut Airport in order to welcome him.[63] In the mid-1980s, several hundred Isma'ilis were thought to still live in a few communities scattered across several parts of Lebanon.[64] Though they are nominally counted among the 18 officially-recognised sects under modern Lebanese law,[65] they currently have no representation in state functions[66] and continue to lack personal status laws for their sect, which has led to increased conversions to established sects to avoid the perpetual inconveniences this produces.[67]

War in the region has also caused pressures on Lebanese Isma'ilis. In the 2006 Lebanon War, Israeli warplanes bombed the factory of the Maliban Glass company in the Beqaa valley on 19 July. The factory was bought in the late 1960s by the Madhvani Group under the direction of Isma'ili entrepreneur Abdel-Hamid al-Fil after the Aga Khan personally brought the two into contact. It had expanded over the next few decades from an ailing relic to the largest glass manufacturer in the Levant, with 300 locally hired workers producing around 220,000 tons of glass per day. Al-Fil closed the plant down on 15 July just after the war broke out to safeguard against the deaths of workers in the event of such an attack, but the damage was estimated at a steep 55 million US dollars, with the reconstruction timeframe indefinite due to instability and government hesitation.[68]

Geographic distribution within Lebanon

Lebanese Shia Muslims are concentrated in south Beirut and its southern suburbs, northern and western area of the Beqaa Valley, as well as Southern Lebanon.[69]

Demographics

Lebanese Shia Muslims (CIA est.)[70][71][1]
Year Percent
1932
 
 19.6%
1975
 
 26.2%
1988
 
 32.8%
2022
 
 31.2%

Note that the following percentages are estimates only. However, in a country that had last census in 1932, it is difficult to have correct population estimates.

Lebanon religious groups distribution

Based on Ottoman tapu tahrir tax registers between 1519 and 1545, Shiite villages counted roughly 16,462 out of 42,791 total males in present-day Lebanon, or around 38.5% of the total population.[24][72]

The last census in Lebanon in 1932 put the numbers of Shias at 19.6% of the population (154,208 of 785,543).[71] A study done by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1985 put the numbers of Shias at 41% of the population (919,000 of 2,228,000).[71] A later study done by the French Institute for Demographic Studies – Paris in 2005 estimated Shias at about 34% of Lebanon's population.[73][70] More recently, the CIA World Factbook estimated that Shia Muslims constitute 31.2% of Lebanon's population in 2022.[1]

Between 1943 and 1990, Shiite population exploded and had the highest fertility rate (3.8) of all communities.[74] Starting in 1921 from a mere 17.2% (104,947 of 609,069), the population almost doubled to 32% by 1988 (1,325,000 of 4,044,784).[74]

Percentage growth of the Lebanese Shia Muslim population (other sources est.)[75][70][1][33][76][73][77]
Year Shiite Population Total Lebanese Population Percentage
1921 104,947 609,069 17.2%
1932 154,208 785,543 19.6%
1956 250,605 1,407,868 17.8%
1975 668,500 2,550,000 26.2%
1977 800,000 3,110,000 25.7%
1984 1,100,000 3,757,000 30.8%
1988 1,325,000 4,044,784 32.8%
2005 1,650,723 4,855,067 34%
2022 1,652,600 5,296,814 31.2%

Genetics

Further information: Lebanese people § Genetics
See also: Lebanese Sunni Muslims § Genetics

In a 2020 study published in the American Journal of Human Genetics, authors showed that there is substantial genetic continuity in Lebanon and the Levant since the Bronze Age (3300–1200 BC) interrupted by three significant admixture events during the Iron Age, Hellenistic, and Ottoman period, each contributing 3%–11% of non-local ancestry to the admixed population. The admixtures were tied to the Sea Peoples of the Late Bronze Age collapse, Central/South Asians and Ottoman Turks respectively.[78] Genetic studies have shown that there are no significant genetic differences between Lebanese Muslims and non-Muslims.[79]

Haplogroup J2 is also a significant marker throughout Lebanon (29%). This marker found in many inhabitants of Lebanon, regardless of religion, signals pre-Arab descendants, although not exclusively. Genealogical DNA testing has shown that 21.3% of Lebanese Muslims (non-Druze) belong to the Y-DNA haplogroup J1 compared with non-Muslims at 17%.[80] Although Haplogroup J1 is most common in Arabian peninsula, studies have shown that it has been present in the Levant since the Bronze Age[81] and does not necessarily indicate Arabian descent.[82] Other haplogroups present among Lebanese Shia include E1b1b (17%), G-M201 (10%), R1b, and T-L206 occurring at smaller, but significant rates.[80]

Notable Lebanese Shia Muslims

Religious Figures

Political Figures

Academics

Artists, Singers and Journalists

Athletes

See also

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