Iraq War

For other uses, see Iraq war (disambiguation).

Iraq War
Part of the U.S. "War on Terrorism"
U.S. soldiers drive by burning oil fields while convoying to Al Jawala, Iraq, during an operation.
Date March 20, 2003 to Present Location Iraq Result Conflict ongoing Overthrow of Saddam Hussein government and capture of Saddam Hussein. Occupation of Iraq by coalition forces. Emergence of Iraqi insurgency and Sectarian violence in Iraq. Massive civilian casualties Widespread damage to Iraqi infrastructure Privatisation of Iraqi services in ongoing attempt to reconstruct Iraq Election of a new government
Belligerents
Resistance Forces: Ba'athist Iraq File:White flag icon.jpg Ba'ath Loyalists Al-Qaeda in Iraq Mahdi Army Other insurgent groups and militias	Coalition Forces: United States United Kingdom South Korea Australia New Iraqi Army Kurdish forces Multinational forces in Iraq SCIRI others
Commanders and leaders
Saddam Hussein Abu Musab al-Zarqawi† Moqtada al-Sadr Abu Ayyub al-Masri Mujahideen Shura Council others	George W. Bush Tommy Franks George Casey Brian Burridge Peter Wall others
Strength
375,000+ initial (figure only includes regular Iraqi forces)	263,000 coalition, 50,000 Kurdish fighters (peak)
Casualties and losses
Iraqi military dead (Saddam-era): 4,900-6,375 Insurgents dead: estimated at 45,000-60,000 (no verifiable tally)	Coalition dead (inc. 2,813 US, 120 UK, 119 other, 647 contractors): 3,699 Iraqi Security Forces dead (post-Saddam era): 6,392 Coalition Wounded in action (inc. 20,687 U.S., 891+ UK, 3,963+ contractors): 25,541
Two of the eight independent estimates of Iraqi deaths Total deaths of Iraqis (civilians and non-civilians) due to war. Includes all excess deaths due to increased lawlessness, degraded infrastructure, poor healthcare, etc.. (Johns Hopkins University): 655,000 (392,979 to 942,636--95% Confidence interval) Civilian deaths attributable to insurgent or military action in Iraq, and to increased criminal violence. As recorded from English-language media reports. Iraq Body Count project stats: 43,850-48,693. During wars such passive methods typically report 5% to 20% of all deaths, so this passive count indicates 250,000 to 1,000,000 actual civilian deaths. See also: Casualties of the conflict in Iraq since 2003

The Iraq War (2003 to the present), also known as the Second Gulf War (and by the U.S. military as Operation Iraqi Freedom and the UK military as Operation TELIC), started with the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Subsequent occupation of Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist Iraq by a U.S.-led coalition has resulted in ongoing asymmetric warfare between resistance forces and coalition forces. Both resistance and coalition forces include fighters from several countries. The New Iraqi Army was created to replace the old one that was disbanded after the US led invasion. In the midst of fighting between resistance, coalition, and Iraqi forces, sectarian war between the majority Shia and minority Sunni populations continues today. The causes and consequences of the war remain controversial.

War rationale

Main article: Rationale for the Iraq War

Stated reasons for the invasion and occupation are controversial, and have varied over time. The first calls for invasion of Iraq came from the Project for the New American Century (PNAC), and the American Enterprise Institute, with arguments based largely on the threat that they believed Saddam posed to American interests in the region, and the project of American influence into the next century.

Events following the 1991 Gulf War

After the 1991 Gulf War, then-United States Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney reported that "Saddam Hussein's offensive military capability, his capacity to threaten his neighbors, has been virtually eliminated." Yet there was still much concern over Iraq's weapons programs, so United Nations Resolutions were passed to impose sanctions on the regime of Saddam Hussein until it was verified that its weapons of mass destruction were destroyed.

From April 1991 and the formation of UNSCOM, Iraq had been under ongoing pressure by the United Nations to declare and destroy its biological and chemical weapons. In total the UN had passed 13 resolutions calling for complete access of UNSCOM and IAEA officials to locate and destroy all weapons of mass destruction.

Starting in the aftermath of the war and continuing until 1998, UNSCOM inspected Iraq, locating and destroying large quantities of chemical agents, nuclear-related equipment and other prohibited materials. Conflict between Iraq and the UN developed during 1998, however, which led to the withdrawal of the UN and the authorization of a bombing campaign by the Clinton administration to "degrade Saddam's capacity to develop and deliver weapons of mass destruction, and to degrade his ability to threaten his neighbors".

Furthermore, in November 1998, at the urging of President Bill Clinton, the U.S. House of Representatives and the US Senate passed the "Iraq Liberation Act of 1998," which "declare[d] that it should be the policy of the United States to remove the Saddam Hussein regime from power in Iraq and to replace it with a democratic government." President Clinton signed this bill into law. It also stated that "nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize or otherwise speak to the use of United States Armed Forces," instead calling for support of Iraqi opposition groups.

Events following September 11, 2001

After the September 11, 2001 attacks the Bush administration policy toward Iraq became that of regime change. Although Saddam had not been involved in the attacks, he and the Iraqi media praised them and compared the destruction inflicted on the U.S. to U.S. actions world-wide.

Beginning in September, 2002, an Iraq disarmament crisis emerged due to assertions that "Saddam Hussein's regime is a grave and gathering danger" and that Iraq possessed and was developing weapons of mass destruction. weapons of mass destruction in violation of UN sanctions.

Beginning with a speech to the United Nations General Assembly on September 12, 2002 President George W. Bush began a public campaign to convince the world that Saddam Hussein was violating both the commitments he had made at the end of the First Gulf War and which prior UN resolutions dealt with: weapons of mass destruction, human rights, Kuwaiti prisoners of war, terrorism, long range SCUD missiles, the U.N. Oil-for-Food Programme and allowing UN inspectors to return to Iraq after their removal in 1998.

Some members of the Bush administration implied a link between the Hussein government to the September 11, 2001 attacks, partly on the basis of an alleged meeting in Prague in April 2001 involving an Iraqi intelligence agent and other evidence.. Both a Senate Select Committee and the 9/11 Commission failed to uncover convincing evidence of such a link, and specifically found no evidence of an Atta meeting in Prague. (See also Atta in Prague and Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda).

On October 10, 2002 the 107th Congress of the United States passed HJ Res 114 titled "Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002." Among the reasons noted in the Congressional resolution authorizing force were Iraq's non-compliance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441, aid to terrorists (PALF), a 1993 assassination attempt on former President George H. W. Bush (George W. Bush's father) and the Emir of Kuwait, in addition to violations of the no-fly zones.

Iraq agreed to allow inspectors back into the country on September 17, 2002. In November, 2002, UN Security Council Resolution 1441 was passed unanimously demanding that Iraq comply with its disarmament obligations in a verifiable manner as well as previous resolutions on human rights, terrorism and prisoners of war. UNMOVIC began inspections on November 18, 2002, replacing UNSCOM which had previously been in charge of monitoring Iraq since April 3, 1991.

In his January 27, 2003 report to the U.N., chief inspector Hans Blix, while noting Iraqi cooperation with regards to prompt access to inspection sites, stated "...Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament which was demanded of it and which it needs to carry out to win the confidence of the world and to live in peace." The reasons for this include a failure to account for the weaponization of VX nerve agent, the whereabouts of 1,000 tons of chemical agent and anthrax, and also the inability of the U.N. to interview Iraqi scientists outside the country. As late as June 2003, Hans Blix stated that although his team had found no evidence of WMD, "I don't exclude that they can find things. ... I don't think I'd be surprised if they found it." Later, however, Hans Blix was sceptical of the motivation for the invasion of Iraq.

Colin Powell holding a model vial of anthrax while giving a presentation to the United Nations Security Council. He later referred to this speech as "painful," saying it was a "blot" on his record.

On February 5, 2003 Colin Powell attempted to convince the UN Security Council that Saddam Hussein's regime posed a significant and timely threat to international security. The Bush administration also claimed that Iraq was allied with al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations, including the Palestinian Arab Liberation Front (PALF) and Hamas. Bush administration officials also claimed that Iraq was developing nuclear weapons. Powell later expressed regret that the evidence for his claims, while they "reflected the collective judgment, the sound judgment of the intelligence community" the sourcing was "inaccurate and wrong and in some cases, deliberately misleading."

On March 7, 2003, chief inspector Hans Blix made his last presentation to the U.N. describing Iraq's cooperation in resolving outstanding issues as "active or even proactive," although "these initiatives three to four months into the new resolution cannot be said to constitute immediate cooperation."

After failed attempts to get a United Nations Security Council resolution supporting military action against Iraq, the United States delivered an ultimatum on March 17, 2003, demanding that Saddam Hussein leave Iraq within 48 hours. On March 18, 2003 the U.S. announced the formation of the "Coalition of the willing". On March 20, 2003 the 2003 Invasion of Iraq began, led by the United States and the United Kingdom, and the "Coalition of the Willing".

Criticisms of the rationale for the Iraq war

See also: Opposition to the Iraq War, Legitimacy of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Protests against the Iraq war, and Views on the 2003 invasion of Iraq

Despite these efforts to sway public opinion, the invasion of Iraq was seen by some including Kofi Annan, United Nations Secretary-General, Lord Goldsmith, British Attorney General, and Human Rights Watch as a violation of international law, breaking the UN Charter (see Legitimacy of the 2003 invasion of Iraq), especially since the U.S. failed to secure U.N. support for an invasion of Iraq. In 41 countries the majority of the populace did not support an invasion of Iraq without U.N. sanction and half said an invasion should not occur under any circumstances. In the U.S., 73 percent of Americans supported an invasion. To build international support the United States formed a "Coalition of the Willing" with the United Kingdom, Italy, Australia and several other countries despite a majority of citizens in these countries opposing the invasion. Massive protests of the war have occurred in the U.S. and elsewhere. At the time of the invasion UNMOVIC inspectors were ordered out by the United Nations. The inspectors requested more time because "disarmament, and at any rate verification, cannot be instant."

Following the invasion, no stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction were found, although about 500 abandoned chemical munitions, mostly degraded, remaining from Iraq's Iran-Iraq war, were collected from around the country. The Kelly Affair highlighted a possible attempt by the British government to cover-up fabrications in British intelligence, the exposure of which would have undermined the Prime Minister's original rationale for involvement in the war. The U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence found no substantial evidence for reputed links between Iraq and al-Qaeda. President George W. Bush has since admitted that "much of the intelligence turned out to be wrong". Although evidence of WMD was searched for by the Iraq Survey Group, their final report of September 2004 stated, "While a small number of old, abandoned chemical munitions have been discovered, ISG judges that Iraq unilaterally destroyed its undeclared chemical weapons stockpile in 1991. There are no credible indications that Baghdad resumed production of chemical munitions thereafter, a policy ISG attributes to Baghdad’s desire to see sanctions lifted, or rendered ineffectual, or its fear of force against it should WMD be discovered." In the March 2005 Addendum to the Report, the Special Advisor furthermore went on to state that "ISG assesses that Iraq and Coalition Forces will continue to discover small numbers of degraded chemical weapons, which the former Regime mislaid or improperly destroyed prior to 1991. ISG believes the bulk of these weapons were likely abandoned, forgotten and lost during the Iran-Iraq war because tens of thousands of CW munitions were forward deployed along frequently and rapidly shifting battlefronts." (For comparison, the U.S. Department of Defense itself was famously unable in 1998 to report the whereabouts of "56 airplanes, 32 tanks and 36 Javelin command launch units".) ISG also believed that Saddam did not want to verifiably disarm Iraq of WMD, as required by U.N. resolutions, for fear of looking weak to his enemies. [1]

Claire Short claims that in July 2002, UK government ministers were warned that Britain was committed to participating in a U.S. invasion of Iraq, and a further allegation was that “the decision by Blair’s government to participate in the U.S. invasion of Iraq bypassed proper government procedures and ignored opposition to the war from Britain’s intelligence quarters.“. Tony Blair had agreed to back military action to oust Saddam Hussein with an assessment regarding WMD, at a summit at President George W. Bush's Texas ranch. Also present at the meeting, were Geoff Hoon, then-British defence secretary, Jack Straw, then-British foreign secretary, and Sir Richard Dearlove, then-chief of MI6.

In Europe the peace movement was very strong, especially in Germany, where three quarters of the population were opposed to the war. Ten NATO member countries did not join the coalition with the U.S., and their leaders made public statements in opposition to the invasion of Iraq. These leaders included Gerhard Schroeder of Germany, Jacques Chirac of France, Guy Verhofstadt of Belgium, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Turkey. Public perceptions of the U.S. changed dramatically as a consequence of the invasion.

Other possible U.S. objectives, denied by the U.S. government but acknowledged by retired U.S. General Jay Garner, included the establishment of permanent U.S. military bases in Iraq as a way of projecting power (creating a credible threat of U.S. military intervention) to the oil-rich Gulf region and the Middle East generally. Jay Garner, who was in charge of planning and administering post-war reconstruction in Iraq, explained that the U.S. occupation of Iraq was comparable to the Philippine model: "Look back on the Philippines around the turn of the 20th century: they were a coaling station for the navy, and that allowed us to keep a great presence in the Pacific. That's what Iraq is for the next few decades: our coaling station that gives us great presence in the Middle East"; (see also Philippine-American War). Garner was replaced by Paul Bremer after reports came out of his position in SY Coleman, a division of defense contractor L-3 Communications specializing in missile-defense systems. It was believed his role in the company was in contention with his role in Iraq. The House Appropriations Committee said the report accompanying the emergency spending legislation was "of a magnitude normally associated with permanent bases." However, the U.S. House of Representatives voted in 2006 to not fund any permanent bases in Iraq.

Criticism of military strategy

In addition to the criticism of the war itself, there is also a large amount of criticism from people that support the war, but who criticize the current military strategy, believing that the current strategy causes unnecessary deaths and injuries of coalition and iraqi troops, as well as civilian contractors, and does not kill enough insurgents. Included within this is the criticism that, if the military strategy were much more effective, then there would be much more support for the war among the people of the coalition countries, especially the U.S. , except in the case of the strict pacifists and isolationists, who are always opposed to foreign wars regardless of the efficacy of the strategy.

Many specific strategic criticisms have been made by various individuals and publications. Some major criticisms include:

• Prisoners in Iraq detained by U.S. troops are treated badly, and it is estimated that about 1/4th of them are innocent, and many prisoners are subsequently released. The bad treatment of those prisoners makes more enemies of the U.S. . Therefore the prisoners should be treated humanely. (this criticism was made on Nightline , among other places)

• There is a very large number of explosion-induced injuries to soldiers' arms, legs, and faces, including many loses of limbs. Such injuries can be greatly reduced if the soldiers wore light-weight, ventilated, heat-resistant polymer (such as aramid) over their arms and legs, and transparent polycarbonate face masks, which are not strong enough to stop an AK-47 bullet (as that would require them to be too heavy), but can prevent much of the damage from the hot particles of explosives. This goes doubly for the iraqi police, who are severely under-equipped , and who suffer far more deaths and injuries than coalition troops , despite the fact that they are the permanent stabilizing force that, when strong enough, will allow the coalition troops to withdraw. (this criticism was made in discover magazine , among other places)

• Most injuries and deaths to coalition troops and iraqi police are due to covertly-placed roadside bombs (often called IEDs) and car bombs. In any case, the casualties of coalition troops and iraqi police depend on the fact that such troops are clearly marked by their uniforms. That not only provides the insurgents with targets, but it also shows them who to avoid when conducting covert activities such as bomb placement. If the coalition troops and iraqi police used more covert tactics, including the use of plain-clothes iraqi police posing as militia men (it would not work for coalition members, due to the conspicuousness of both their race and their language), the use of hidden cameras with nightvision capability, and constant aerial surveillance of roads (such as by predator drones), then coalition and iraqi forces would be able to kill many insurgents while in the act of planting bombs. It is only by watching such insurgents when they think that they are not being watched, that they can be seen and killed. Covert surveillance and plainclothes iraqi troops in a perimeter around overt coalition and iraqi troop positions would also be effective in sniper attacks and gun battles.

• Many civilian contractors in Iraq, who are involved in rebuilding Iraq, are killed by insurgents , and the improvements that they build are often destroyed soon after they are made. Such contractors and their projects are often not protected. Protecting the contractors and their projects, especially with plainclothes iraqi troops, would both reduce contractor deaths and injuries, and kill insurgents. Another option is to pull out the contractors except for those that are working on military and security projects, until most of the insurgents are dead and it is much safer.

• The pentagon has refused to tabulate the number of insurgents killed . That gives the impression to many people that no progress is being made, which in turn reduces support for the war. It also gives both the government and the people much less to go on when determining the efficacy of their strategy, such that they can not determine the all-important kill ratio, and what that kill ratio is in different situations and different areas of Iraq, such that they can not adjust their strategy accordingly, nor can the public pressure them to do so.

It is notable that Geraldo Rivera is one of the major critics of the military strategy in Iraq. Geraldo advised, among other things, that U.S. troops should only use roads that are monitored 24-7, so as to avoid roadside bombs, and that civilian contractors, except for those working on military and security projects, should pull out until most insurgents are dead and it is safe to build .

War on terrorism

The war in Iraq was originally justified as part of the U.S.-led war on terrorism. Specifically, the Bush Administration argued that Saddam Hussein had ties to al-Qaeda, and that his overthrow would lead to democratization in the Middle East, decreasing terrorism overall. The alleged ties between Saddam and al-Qaeda were never confirmed, however, and numerous reports of intelligence agencies investigating the matter -- including several reports of the CIA, the U.S. State Department, the FBI, and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, as well as the investigations of foreign intelligence agencies -- concluded that no evidence had been found supporting an operational connection between Saddam and al-Qaeda. The New York Times commented in September 2006 on the conclusions of the bipartisan Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, "there is no evidence that Saddam Hussein had prewar ties to Al Qaeda and one of the terror organization’s most notorious members, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi."[2][3] (See main article: Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda).

However, al-Qaeda leaders have seen the Iraq war as a boon to their recruiting and operational efforts, providing both evidence to jihadists worldwide that America is at war with Islam, and the training ground for a new generation of jihadists to practice attacks on American forces. In October 2003, Osama bin Laden announced: "Be glad of the good news: America is mired in the swamps of the Tigris and Euphrates. Bush is, through Iraq and its oil, easy prey. Here is he now, thank God, in an embarrassing situation and here is America today being ruined before the eyes of the whole world."[4] Al-Qaeda commander Seif al-Adl gloated about the war in Iraq, indicating, "The Americans took the bait and fell into our trap."[5] A letter thought to be from al-Qaeda leader Atiyah Abd al-Rahman found in Iraq among the rubble where al-Zarqawi was killed and released by the U.S. military in October 2006, indicated that al-Qaeda perceived the war as beneficial to its goals: "The most important thing is that the jihad continues with steadfastness ... indeed, prolonging the war is in our interest."[6]

In the years since the war began, a consensus has developed among intelligence experts that the Iraq war has increased terrorism. Counterterrorism expert Rohan Gunaratna frequently referred to the invasion of Iraq as a "fatal mistake" that had greatly increased terrorism in the Middle East. London's conservative International Institute for Strategic Studies concluded in 2004 that the occupation of Iraq had become "a potent global recruitment pretext" for jihadists and that the invasion "galvanized" al-Qaeda and "perversely inspired insurgent violence" there.[7] The U.S. National Intelligence Council concluded in a January 2005 report that the war in Iraq had become a breeding ground for a new generation of terrorists; David B. Low, the national intelligence officer for transnational threats, indicated that the report concluded that the war in Iraq provided terrorists with "a training ground, a recruitment ground, the opportunity for enhancing technical skills... There is even, under the best scenario, over time, the likelihood that some of the jihadists who are not killed there will, in a sense, go home, wherever home is, and will therefore disperse to various other countries." The Council's Chairman Robert L. Hutchings said, "At the moment, Iraq is a magnet for international terrorist activity."[8] And the 2006 National Intelligence Estimate, which outlined the considered judgment of all 16 U.S. intelligence agencies, held that "The Iraq conflict has become the 'cause celebre' for jihadists, breeding a deep resentment of US involvement in the Muslim world and cultivating supporters for the global jihadist movement."[9]

Timeline of the War

Prior to invasion

No-fly zone detail

Prior to invasion, the United States and other coalition forces involved in the 1991 Persian Gulf War had been engaged in a low-level conflict with Iraq, by enforcing the two Iraqi no-fly zones in the north and the south of the country. Iraqi air-defense installations repeatedly targeted American and British air patrols and were often engaged by the coalition aircraft shortly afterwards. In mid-2002, the U.S. initiated Operation Southern Focus as a change to its response strategy, by increasing the overall number of missions and selecting targets throughout the no-fly zones in order to disrupt the military command structure in Iraq.

The weight of bombs dropped increased from none in March 2002 and 0.3 in April 2002 to between 8 and 14 tons per month in May-August, reaching a pre-war peak of 54.6 tons in September - prior to Congress' 11 October authorization of the invasion. In retaliation for the Iraqi's now-daily air defense attacks on coalition aircraft, the September attacks included a 5 September 100-aircraft attack on the main air defence site in western Iraq. According to an editorial by Michael Smith for the The New Statesman, this was "Located at the furthest extreme of the southern no-fly zone, far away from the areas that needed to be patrolled to prevent attacks on the Shias; it was destroyed not because it was a threat to the patrols, but to allow allied special forces operating from Jordan to enter Iraq undetected." US military personnel stationed at Southern Watch headquarters during this time, recall that this attack, on this particular Iraqi air defense unit, was taken solely in reaction to Iraq's continued attack on coalition aircraft operating in compliance with the UN-mandated overflights of the Iraq "no-fly" zone.

Further information: [[:Governments' pre-war positions on invasion of Iraq, Public relations preparations for 2003 invasion of Iraq, The UN Security Council and the Iraq war, and American government position on invasion of Iraq]]

2003: Invasion

Main article: 2003 invasion of Iraq

The 2003 invasion of Iraq, the second Gulf war was termed "Operation Iraqi Liberation" by the US administration, and began on March 19, later the invasion was changed to "Operation Iraqi Freedom" by the Bush administration. They cooperated with Kurdish forces in the north which numbered upwards of 50,000. Other nations also participated in part of a coalition force to help with the operation by providing equipment, services and security as well special forces. The 2003 Iraq invasion marked the beginning of what is commonly referred to as the Iraq War.

Post-invasion, early and mid 2003

Map of the Sunni Triangle

Main article: Post-invasion Iraq, 2003–2006

On May 1, 2003, President Bush made a dramatic visit to the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln while the ship was a few miles west of San Diego. The Lincoln was on its way home to Everett, Washington from a long deployment which had included service in the Persian Gulf. The visit climaxed at sunset with his now-legendary "Mission Accomplished" speech. This nationally-televised speech was delivered before the sailors and airmen on the flight deck. Bush essentially declared victory at this time (even though, admittedly, Saddam Hussein was still at large and significant pockets of resistance remained plus more resistance would form for years to come.)

In May of 2003, after the defeat of Iraq's conventional forces, the coalition military noticed a gradually increasing flurry of attacks on the multinational troops in various regions, such as the "Sunni Triangle". In the initial chaos after the fall of the Iraqi government, there was massive looting of infrastructure, including government buildings, official residences, museums, banks, and military depots. According to The Pentagon, 250,000 tons (of 650,000 tons total) of ordnance was looted, providing a significant source of ammunition for the Iraqi insurgency. The hundreds of weapons caches already created by the conventional Iraqi army and Republican Guard further strengthened these looted supplies for the insurgents.

At first the resistance stemmed from fedayeen and loyalists of Saddam Hussein or the Ba'ath Party, but soon religious radicals and Iraqis angered by the occupation contributed to the insurgency. In late 2004, foreign fighters from around the Middle East as well as Al-Qaeda in Iraq (a group that is separate from al-Qaeda but which changed its name for propaganda purposes), led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi would help to drive the insurgency. The insurgents are generally known to the Coalition forces as "Anti-Iraqi Forces."

The initial insurgency in Iraq was concentrated in, but not limited to, an area referred to by Western media and the occupying forces as the Sunni triangle. This location includes Baghdad. The three provinces that had the highest number of attacks were Baghdad, Anbar, and Salah Ad Din--these provinces account for 35% of the population. This resistance has been described as a type of guerrilla warfare. Insurgent tactics include mortars, suicide bombers, improvised explosive devices, roadside bombs, small arms fire, and RPGs, as well as sabotage against the oil, water, and electrical infrastructure.

American soldier and an Iraqi child

The post-invasion environment began after the Hussein regime had been overthrown. It centers on Coalition and U.N. efforts to establish a stable democratic state capable of defending itself and holding itself together and overcoming insurgent attacks and internal divisions.

Coalition military forces launched several operations around Tigris River peninsula and in the Sunni Triangle. A series of similar operations were launched throughout the summer in the Sunni Triangle. Toward the end of 2003, the intensity and pace of insurgent attacks began to increase. A sharp surge in guerrilla attacks ushered in an insurgent effort that was termed the "Ramadan Offensive", as it coincided with the beginning of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. Coalition forces brought to bear the use of air power for the first time since the end of the invasion.

Suspected ambush sites and mortar launching positions struck from the air and with artillery fire. Surveillance of major routes, patrols, and raids on suspected insurgents were stepped up. In addition, two villages, including Saddam’s birthplace of al-Auja and the small town of Abu Hishma were wrapped in barbed wire and carefully monitored. On July 22, 2003, during a raid by the U.S. 101st Airborne Division and soldiers from Task Force 20, Saddam Hussein's sons (Uday and Qusay) and one of his grandsons were killed.

In the wave of intelligence information fueling the raids on remaining Ba'ath Party members connected to insurgency, Saddam Hussein himself was captured on December 13 2003 on a farm near Tikrit in Operation Red Dawn. The operation was conducted by the U.S. Army's 4th Infantry Division and members of Task Force 121.

see also: Military operations of the Iraq War for a list of all Coalition operations for this period

Late 2003

With the capture of Saddam and a drop in the number of insurgent attacks (an average of 18 a day), some concluded the multinational forces were prevailing in the fight against the insurgency. With the weather growing cooler, Coalition forces were able to operate in full armor which reduced their casualty rate. The provisional government began training a security force intended to defend critical infrastructure, and the United States promised over $20 billion in reconstruction money in the form of credit against Iraq's future oil revenues. Of this, less than half a billion dollars had been spent in 10 months after it had been promised. Oil revenues were also used for rebuilding schools and for work on the electrical and refining infrastructure.

However, the failure to restore basic services to above pre-war levels, where over a decade of sanctions, bombing, corruption, and decaying infrastructure had left major cities functioning at much-reduced levels, also contributed to local anger at the IPA government headed by an executive council. On July 2 2003, President Bush declared that American troops would remain in Iraq in spite of the attacks, challenging the insurgents with "My answer is, bring 'em on," a line the President later expressed misgivings about having used. In the summer of 2003, the multinational forces focused on hunting down the remaining leaders of the former regime, culminating in the shooting deaths of Saddam's two sons in July. In all, over 300 top leaders of the former regime were killed or captured, as well as numerous lesser functionaries and military personnel.

Shortly after the capture of Saddam, elements left out of the Coalition Provisional Authority began to agitate for elections and the formation of an Iraqi Interim Government. Most prominent among these was the Shia cleric Ali al-Sistani. More insurgents stepped up their activities. The two most turbulent centers were the area around Fallujah and the poor Shia sections of cities from Baghdad to Basra in the south.

see also: Military operations of the Iraq War for a list of all Coalition operations for this period

2004: Increased insurgent activity and the First Battle of Fallujah

US Army (USA) Soldiers assigned to 2-7 Cavalry, 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 1st Cavalry Division, rush a wounded Soldier from Apache Troop to a waiting US Marine Corps (USMC) CH-46E Sea Knight helicopter during operation in Fallujah, Iraq. Date Shot: 12 Nov 2004.

The start of 2004 was marked by a relative lull in violence. Insurgent forces reorganized during this time, studying the multinational forces' tactics and planning a renewed offensive. Guerrilla attacks were less intense.

Insurgent activity soon increased, however, as hundreds of Iraqi civilians and police were killed over the next few months in a series of massive bombings. One hypothesis for these increased bombings is that the relevance of Saddam Hussein and his followers was diminishing in direct proportion to the influence of radical Islamists, both foreign and Iraqi. An organized Sunni insurgency, with deep roots and both nationalist and Islamist motivations, was becoming more powerful throughout Iraq. The Mahdi Army also began launching attacks on coalition targets in an attempt to seize control from Iraqi security forces. The southern and central portions of Iraq were beginning to erupt in urban guerrilla combat as multinational forces attempted to keep control and prepared for a counteroffensive.

The coalition and the Coalition Provisional Authority decided to face the growing insurgency with a pair of assaults: one on Fallujah, the center of the "Mohammed's Army of Al-Ansar", and another on Najaf, home of an important mosque that had become the focal point for the Mahdi Army and its activities. Just before the attack on Fallujah, four private military contractors, working for Blackwater USA, were ambushed and their corpses mutilated by a large crowd, receiving a great deal of media attention. The attention elicited a violent reaction from Donald Rumsfeld who then ordered Lt. General Conway to attack Fallujah at the earliest opportunity.

After this incident, the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force began plans to re-establish a coalition presence in Fallujah. On April 4, the multinational forces began assaults to clear Fallujah of insurgents. On April 9, the multinational force allowed more than 70,000 women, children and elderly residents to leave the besieged city, reportedly also allowing males of military age to leave. Meanwhile, insurgents were taking advantage of the lull in combat to prepare defenses for a second assault. On April 10, the military declared a unilateral truce to allow for humanitarian supplies to enter Fallujah. Troops pulled back to the outskirts of the city; local leaders reciprocated the ceasefire, although lower-level intense fighting on both sides continued.

The usage by the U.S. of white phosphorus in Fallujah attracted controversy. In the documentary "Fallujah: The Hidden Massacre", aired on the Italian state television network RAI, a former soldier testified "I saw the burned bodies of women and children. The phosphorus explodes and forms a plume. Who ever is within a 150 metre radius has no hope." The US State department first dismissed such claims, but was later corrected in other reports. Lt Col Barry Venable stated to the BBC, "it is an incendiary weapon and may be used against enemy combatants." According to Protocol III of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, white phosphorus can be used, but only against enemy combatants and not civilians. The Independent later reported that "there remain widespread reports of civilians suffering extensive burn injuries. While US commanders insist they always strive to avoid civilian casualties, the story of the battle of Fallujah highlights the intrinsic difficulty of such an endeavour."

When the Iraqi Governing Council protested against the US assault to retake Fallujah, the US military halted its efforts. In the April battle for Fallujah, Coalition troops killed about 600 insurgents and a number of civilians, while 40 Americans died and hundreds were wounded in a fierce battle. The Marines were ordered to stand-down and cordon off the city, maintaining a perimeter around Fallujah. A compromise was reached in order to ensure security within Fallujah itself by creating the local "Fallujah Brigade". While the Marines attacking had a clear advantage in ground firepower and air support, LtGen Conway decided to accept a truce and a deal which put a former Baathist general in complete charge of the town's security. The Fallujah Brigade's responsibility was to secure Fallujah and put a stop to insurgent mortar attacks on the nearby U.S. Marine bases. This compromise soon fell apart and insurgent attacks returned, causing Marine commanders to begin preparations for a second attack in the coming fall. By the end of the spring uprising, the cities of Fallujah, Samarra, Baquba, and Ramadi had been left under guerrilla control with coalition patrols in the cities at a minimum.

see also: Military operations of the Iraq War for a list of all Coalition operations for this period

Early-mid 2004 – the Shi'ite south

Meanwhile, the fighting continued in the Shiite south, and Italian and Polish forces were having increasing difficulties retaining control over Nasiriya and Najaf. United States Marines were then shifted there to put down the overt rebellion and proceeded to rout Muqtada al-Sadr's Shiite militia. In all, April, May and early June saw more fighting. Over the next three months, the multinational forces took back the southern cities. Also, various insurgent leaders entered into negotiations with the provisional government to lay down arms and enter the political process.

see also: Military operations of the Iraq War for a list of all Coalition operations for this period

June 2004: The new Iraqi government

Main article: Iraqi coalition counter-insurgency operations

Toward the end of June 2004, the Coalition Provisional Authority transferred the "sovereignty" of Iraq to a caretaker government, whose first act was to begin the trial of Saddam Hussein. However, fighting continued in the form of the Iraqi insurgency. The new government began the process of moving towards open elections, though the insurgency and the lack of cohesion within the government itself, has led to delays. Militia leader Muqtada al-Sadr took control of Najaf and, after negotiations broke down, the government asked the United States for help dislodging him.

Through the months of July and August, a series of skirmishes in and around Najaf culminated with the Imam Ali Mosque itself under siege, only to have a peace deal brokered by Grand Ayatollah Sistani in late August. The new Iraq Grain Board has started to import wheat from Australia Wheat Board which had been long banned by Saddam Hussein.

November 2004: The Second Battle of Fallujah

see: Operation Phantom Fury

The abortive US operation to recapture control of the city, Operation Vigilant Resolve, led to Operation Phantom Fury in November 2004 which resulted in the reputed death of over 5,000 insurgent fighters and the loss of 92 American Marines and over 500 wounded. According to local sources, hundreds of civilians were among those killed.

2005: Iraqi elections and aftermath

Main article: Iraqi legislative election, 2005

File:Iraqwarimage.jpg

An Iraqi Army unit prepares to board a Task Force Baghdad UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter for a counterinsurgency mission in Baghdad.

On January 31, an election for a government to draft a permanent constitution took place. Although some violence and lack of widespread Sunni Arab participation marred the event, most of the eligible Kurd and Shia populace participated. On February 4, Paul Wolfowitz announced that 15,000 U.S. troops whose tours of duty had been extended in order to provide election security would be pulled out of Iraq by the next month. February, March and April proved to be relatively peaceful months compared to the carnage of November and January, with insurgent attacks averaging 30 a day from the prior average of 70.

Hopes for a quick end to an insurgency and a withdrawal of U.S. troops were dashed at the advent of May, Iraq's bloodiest month since the invasion by U.S. forces in March and April of 2003. Suicide bombers, believed to be mainly disheartened Iraqi Sunni Arabs, Syrians and Saudis, tore through Iraq. Their targets were often Shia gatherings or civilian concentrations mainly of Shias. As a result, over 700 Iraqi civilians died in that month, as well as 79 U.S. soldiers.

During early and mid-May, the U.S. also launched Operation Matador, an assault by around 1,000 Marines in the ungoverned region of western Iraq. Its goal was the closing of suspected insurgent supply routes of volunteers and material from Syria, and with the fight they received their assumption proved correct. Fighters armed with flak jackets (unseen in the insurgency before this time) and using sophisticated tactics met the Marines, eventually inflicting 30 U.S. casualties by the operation's end, and suffering 125 casualties themselves. The Marines succeeded, recapturing the whole region and even fighting insurgents all the way to the Syrian border, where they were forced to stop (Syrian residents living near the border heard the American bombs very clearly during the operation). The vast majority of these armed and trained insurgents quickly dispersed before the U.S. could bring the full force of its firepower on them, as it did in Fallujah.

August 2005: Announcements and renewed fighting

On August 14, 2005 the Washington Post quoted one anonymous U.S. senior official expressing that "the United States no longer expects to see a model new democracy, a self-supporting oil industry or a society in which the majority of people are free from serious security or economic challenges... 'What we expected to achieve was never realistic given the timetable or what unfolded on the ground'". On September 22, 2005, Prince Saud al-Faisal, the Saudi foreign minister, said that he had warned the Bush administration in recent days that Iraq was hurtling toward disintegration, and that the election planned for December was unlikely to make any difference. U. S. officials immediately made statements rejecting this view .

2006: Growing sectarian violence

The beginning of 2006 was marked by government creation talks, growing sectarian violence, and continuous anti-coalition attacks.

February 2006: Al-Askari shrine bombing and Sunni-Shia fighting

See Al Askari Mosque bombing

File:CSA-2006-10-20-101059.jpg

A U.S. soldier on patrol in Diwaniyah.

On February 22 2006, at 6:55 a.m. local time (0355 UTC) two bombs were set off by five to seven men dressed as personnel of the Iraqi Special forces who entered the Al Askari Mosque during the morning. Explosions occurred at the mosque, effectively destroying its golden dome and severely damaging the mosque. Several men, one wearing a military uniform, had earlier entered the mosque, tied up the guards there and set explosives, resulting in the blast.

Shiites across Iraq expressed their anger by destroying Sunni mosques and killing dozens. Religious leaders of both sides called for calm amid fears this could erupt into a long-feared Sunni-Shia civil war in Iraq.

On March 2 the director of the Baghdad morgue fled Iraq explaining, "7,000 people have been killed by death squads in recent months." [10] The Boston Globe reported that around eight times the number of Iraqis killed by terrorist bombings during March 2006 were killed by sectarian death squads during the same period. A total of 1,313 were killed by sectarian militias while 173 were killed by suicide bombings.[11] The LA Times later reported that about 3,800 Iraqis were killed by sectarian violence in Baghdad alone during the first three months of 2006.[12] During April 2006, morgue numbers showed that 1,091 Baghdad residents were killed by sectarian executions.[13] Insurgencies, frequent terrorist attacks and sectarian violence led to harsh criticism of US Iraq policy and fears of a failing state and civil war. The concerns were expressed by several US think tanks [14] [15] [16] [17] as well as the US ambassador to Iraq, Zalmay Khalilzad. [18]

In early 2006, a handful of high-ranking retired generals began to demand United States Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's resignation due in part to the aforementioned chaos that resulted from his management of the war.

In September 2006, The Washington Post reported that the commander of the Marine forces in Iraq filed "an unusual secret report" concluding that the prospects for securing the Anbar province are dim, and that there is almost nothing the U.S. military can do to improve the political and social situation there.

Iraq was listed fourth on the 2006 Failed States Index compiled by the American Foreign Policy magazine and the Fund for Peace think-tank. The list was topped by Sudan.

As of October 20 the U.S military announced that operation Together Forward had failed to stem the tide of violence in Baghdad, and Shiite Militants Under al-Sadr Seized several southern Iraq Cities [19]

Iraqi insurgency

Main article: Iraqi insurgency

Attacks against Iraqi National and Coalition forces as of July 2006 (Data from Government Accountability Office report product no. GAO-06-1094t)

Attacks against Iraqi National and Coalition forces as of July 2006 (Data from Government Accountability Office report product no. GAO-06-1094t)

When the ruling Ba'ath party organization disintegrated after the fall of the Iraqi government, elements of the secret police and Republican Guard formed guerrilla units, since some had simply gone home rather than openly fight the multinational forces. Many of these smaller units formed the center of the initial anti-coalition insurgency, based primarily around the cities of Mosul, Tikrit and Fallujah.

The militants and guerrilla units favored attacking unarmored vehicles and avoiding major battles. The early Iraqi insurgency was concentrated in, but not limited to, an area referred to by the Western media and the occupying forces as the Sunni triangle which includes Baghdad.

By the fall of 2003, these insurgent groups began using typical guerrilla tactics such as ambushes, bombings, kidnappings, and improvised explosive devices. Other tactics included mortars, suicide bombers, roadside bombs, small arms fire, and RPGs, as well as sabotage against the oil, water, and electrical infrastructure. Multi-national Force-Iraq statistics (see detailed BBC graphic) show that the insurgents primarily targeted coalition forces, Iraqi security forces and infrastructure, and lastly civilians and government officials. The civilian death log reveals that a large majority of the deaths were by car bombs, booby traps, throat slitting, beheading and other techniques that are known to be associated with insurgents. These irregular forces favored attacking unarmored or lightly armored Humvee vehicles, the U.S. military's primary transport vehicle. In November 2003, some of these forces successfully attacked U.S. rotary aircraft with SAM-7 missiles bought on the global black market. Insurgent groups such as the al-Abud Network have even attempted to constitute their own chemical weapons programs, attempting to weaponize traditional mortar rounds with ricin and mustard toxin.

As Coalition Forces respond to a car bombing in South Baghdad, Iraq (IRQ), a second car bomb is detonated, targeting those responding to the initial incident. Date Shot: 14 Apr 2005

There is evidence that some guerrilla groups are organized, perhaps by the fedayeen and other Saddam Hussein or Ba'ath loyalists, religious radicals, Iraqis angered by the occupation, and foreign fighters. On February 23, 2005 Al-Iraqiya TV (Iraq) aired transcripts of confessions by Syrian intelligence officer Anas Ahmad Al-Issa and Iraqi insurgent Shihab Al-Sab'awi concerning their booby-trap operations, explosions, kidnappings, assassinations, and details of beheading training in Syria. The insurgents are known by the Coalition military (especially in the United States armed forces) as Anti-Iraqi Forces (AIF).

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was killed on June 7 2006 in the town of Baquba, north of Baghdad, when U.S. warplanes dropped two 500-pound bombs on his isolated safe house. President George W. Bush said the killing was "a severe blow to al-Qaida and it is a significant victory in the war on terror" but cautioned: "We have tough days ahead of us in Iraq that will require the continuing patience of the American people." His death corresponded with no decrease in the level of violence.

Al-Qaeda in Iraq vowed to continue its "holy war," according to a statement posted on a Web site announcing: "We want to give you the joyous news of the martyrdom of the mujahed sheik Abu Musab al-Zarqawi." With over 1,600 Iraqi deaths in the month of June, the highest monthly total since the Al Askari Mosque bombing, the death of Zarqawi appears to have had little impact on the violence in Iraq.

A violent break between Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army and the rival Badr Organization of Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, as seen in the fighting in the town of Amarah [[20]] on October 20, 2006, would severely complicate the efforts of Iraqi and American officials to quell the soaring violence in Iraq.

see also: History of Iraqi insurgency, Sectarian violence in Iraq, Private militias in Iraq

US media coverage of Iraq

Main article: News media (United States)

Concerns have been raised of insufficiently critical coverage of the activities of US forces in Iraq. However, the argument has also been made that coverage has been unfair to US forces, and has failed to send a message adequately supportive of US forces.

Criticisms of U.S. media coverage

Some critics suggest that the US news media is extremely reluctant to criticise the conduct of American soldiers, for fear of upsetting their viewers and thus losing profits. This could hypothetically keep certain concerns over soldiers' conduct off the US political agenda.

Thus it has been often reported in European media, including countries involved in operations in Iraq, that a large minority of American soldiers and marines in Iraq have been able to behave irresponsibly in Iraq, causing unnecessary deaths of civilians. At the same time, many believe that US forces have come under little US media scrutiny, except in the most extreme cases.

Even in the most extreme cases, such as the Haditha massacre, US media coverage has been considerably less than in European countries such as the United Kingdom. This is especially the case during the early stage when the massacre was a rumour. At this early point, the rumour was rejected by the US media.

The killing of Nicola Calipari by an American soldier, which Italian prosecutors are now classifying murder, received US media coverage because the victim was an Italian Major-General. However the killing fits a pattern of widespread unprovoked fatal incidents which has been suggested by most of the mainstream European media for some time (e.g. among many others, in the British Guardian newspaper and French Le Monde newspaper).

Another example of such a killing is the killing of British reporter Terry Lloyd, who was (according to the report of the British coroner hearing the inquest into his death) unlawfully killed by US marines in Iraq. The Independent on Sunday (15th October 2006) suggested that this death was the result of US soldiers' hostility to his decision to report independently rather than being "embedded "with coalition forces.

Criticisms of Cable News Network (CNN)

In October 2006, CNN broadcast tapes of American soldiers being shot at by Iraqi militants. The US government said in response, "your network has shown pictures of snipers hitting Americans, which was used as a propaganda tool, so the fact is that -- it shows real sophistication on the part of these guys, because it creates the impression that Americans are sitting ducks, and that these guys are capable, when, in fact, while you have a capable enemy, they're dying in much greater numbers and suffering much greater damage." The Pentagon has been asked to remove embedded CNN reporters: "C-N-N has now served as the publicist for an enemy propaganda film featuring the killing of an American soldier."

Human rights abuses

Spc. Charles Graner poses over Manadel al-Jamadi's corpse.

Main article: Human rights in post-Saddam Iraq

Throughout the entire Iraq war there have been numerous human rights abuses on all sides of the conflict.

U.S. Armed Forces

WARNING: These links have graphic content depicting a decapitation; some of the most publicized abuses include:

• Abu Ghraib torture and prisoner abuse
• Haditha killings - alleged murder of 24 civilians, including women and children (Under investigation)
• Ishaqi incident - alleged murder of 11 civilians, including five children (Under investigation)
• Hamadiya incident - alleged kidnapping and murder of one civilian (Under investigation)
• Mahmudiyah incident - alleged gang-rape and murder of a 14 year old girl and the murder of her parents and 7 year old sister, all civilians. (Under investigation)
• Mukaradeeb - alleged bombing and shooting of at least 42 civilians (Under investigation)

Insurgent forces

A 2005 Human Rights Watch report analysed the insurgency in Iraq and highlighted, "The groups that are most responsible for the abuse, namely al-Qaeda in Iraq, Ansar al-Sunna and the Islamic Army in Iraq, have all targeted civilians for abductions and executions. The first two groups have repeatedly boasted about massive car bombs and suicide bombs in mosques, markets, bus stations and other civilian areas. Such acts are war crimes and in some cases may constitute crimes against humanity, which are defined as serious crimes committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population."

The regular Iraqi insurgents and other groups such as the Sunni Islamic militant groups Al-Qaeda in Iraq and Ansar al-Islam are responsible for numerous abuses and killings, including:

• Killing over 12,000 Iraqis over the period of January 2005 - June 2006, according to Iraqi Interior Minister Bayan Jabr, giving the first official count for the largest category of victims of bombings, ambushes and other increasingly deadly attacks. The insurgents have also conducted numerous suicide attacks on the Iraqi civilian population, mostly targeting the majority Shia community, such as the Attack on the Shia district of Sadr City, Baghdad, on 02/07/2006 which claimed at least 66 lives. An October 2005 report from Human Rights Watch examines the range of civilian attacks and their purported justification.
• The bombing of the U.N. headquarters in Baghdad in August 2003 which killed the top U.N. representative in Iraq and 21 other UN staff members.
• The February 2006 bombing of the al-Askari Mosque, destroying one of the holiest Shiite shrines, killing over 165 worshipers and igniting sectarian strife and reprisal killings.
• Beheading several diplomats: two Algerian diplomatic envoys Ali Belaroussi and Azzedine Belkadi, Egyptian diplomatic envoy al-Sherif, and four Russian diplomats.
• The publicized murders of several non-military persons including; construction contractor Eugene Armstrong, supply contractor Jack Hensley, translator Kim Sun-il, supply contractor Kenneth Bigley, Bulgarian truck drivers Ivaylo Kepov and Georgi Lazov, Shosei Koda, Italian Fabrizio Quattrocchi, charity worker Margaret Hassan, reconstruction engineer Nick Berg, Italian photographer, 52 year old Salvatore Santoro and Iraqi supply worker Seif Adnan Kanaan. Most of these civilians were subjected to brutal torture and/or beheading.
• Torture or murder of members of the New Iraqi Army, and assassination of civilians associated with the Coalition Provisional Authority, such as Fern Holland, or the Iraqi Governing Council, such as Aqila al-Hashimi and Ezzedine Salim, or other foreign civilians, such as those from Kenya.

Iraqi government

Other abuses have been blamed on the new Iraqi government, including:

• The widespread use of torture by Iraqi security forces.
• Shiite-run death squads run out of the Interior Ministry that are accused of committing numerous massacres of Sunni Arabs and the police collusion with militias in Iraq have compounded the problems.

Financial costs

Dollar figures

As of September 29, 2006, over $379 billion has been allocated by the US Congress for the Iraq war. The direct costs of the war and occupation have not been included in the regular defense spending request (with the exception of FY 2007); instead, President Bush has submitted emergency spending bills to Congress to cover those costs. The current rate of U.S. expenditure in Iraq is approximately $6.4 billion a month.

As of March 2006, approximately £4.5 billion had been spent by the United Kingdom in Iraq. All of this money has come from a government fund called the "Special Reserve" which has a current allocation of £6.44 billion.

It is not known how much more money has been spent by other members of the coalition; however, the US's share of the cost is by far the largest.

Joseph Stiglitz, former chief economist of the World Bank has suggested the total costs of the Iraq War on the US economy will be $1 trillion in a conservative scenario and could top $2 trillion in a moderate one. Additionally, the extended combat and equipment loss have placed a severe financial strain on the U.S Army, causing the elimination of non-essential expenses such as travel and civilian hiring. The CIA World Factbook lists a 2005 estimate of U.S. military expenditure as 4.06% of GDP (the 26th position in a listing of 167 countries). The Congressional Research Service recently estimated weekly spending at almost $2 billion per week, and that total expenditures have now topped $1 trillion. The Office of Management and Budget's pie chart shows that the discretionary defense spending is 20% of government outlays

U.S. equipment losses

In addition to the human casualties suffered in the war, the U.S. has also lost a number of pieces of military equipment. This total includes those vehicles lost in non-combat related accidents - numbers are an approximation. Recently, the Army has said that the cost of replacing its depleted equipment has tripled from that of 2005.

Combat losses: Land equipment

• 20 M1 Abrams tanks
• 55 Bradley fighting vehicles
• 20 Stryker wheeled combat vehicles
• 20 M113 armored personnel carriers
• 250 Humvees
• 500+ Fuchs wheeled recon. vehicles, mine clearing vehicles, heavy/medium trucks, and trailers
• 10 Amphibious Assault Vehicles

Combat losses: Air equipment

The UH-60 Black Hawk that crashed on September 21, 2004

• 27 Apache attack helicopters
• 21 Blackhawk utility helicopters
• 14 Chinook cargo helicopters
• 23 Kiowa surveillance helicopters
• 4 CH-46E Sea Knight cargo helicopters
• 1 A-10 Thunderbolt II ground attack aircraft
• 1 F-15E Strike Eagle fighter aircraft
• 2 UH-1N Huey utility helicopters
• 8 AH-1 Cobra attack helicopters
• 5 CH-53E Super Stallion or MH-53 Pave Low helicopters
• 2 H-3 Sea King helicopters
• 25+ RQ-1 Predator unmanned aerial vehicles
• 3 F/A-18 Hornet fighter aircraft

See also: List of Coalition aircraft crashes in Iraq

See also

Years in Iraq

• 2003 in Iraq
• 2004 in Iraq
• 2005 in Iraq
• 2006 in Iraq
• Post-invasion Iraq, 2003–2006
• Human rights in post-Saddam Iraq
• Reconstruction of Iraq

General

• List of wars 2003–current
• List of people associated with the 2003 invasion of Iraq
• US media coverage of the Iraq conflict
• Weapons of the 2003 invasion

Multinational forces

• Military operations of the Iraq War -List of Coalition Operations 2003-Present
• Iraq Orbat - List of U.S. and coalition units in Iraq
• Australian contribution to the 2003 invasion of Iraq
• Deployment of Japanese troops to Iraq
• Polish contribution to the 2003 invasion of Iraq

Casualties

• Casualties of the conflict in Iraq since 2003
• Lancet surveys of mortality before and after the 2003 invasion of Iraq
• Suicide bombings in Iraq since 2003
• List of Coalition aircraft crashes in Iraq

Related legal concepts

• Jus ad bellum
• Jus in bello

Other related articles and concepts

• Foreign hostages in Iraq
• United States and weapons of mass destruction
• British Mandate of Iraq
• Dover test
• Military rule
• 2004 energy crisis
• Opposition to the Iraq War
• Sectarian violence in Iraq
• Withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq
• Zarqawi PSYOP program

Iraq War literature

• Night Draws Near (2005) by Anthony Shadid

Previous U.S. occupations

• Occupied Japan The post World War II U.S. occupation of Japan 1945 - 1952
• Morgenthau Plan The post World War II U.S. occupation of part of Germany 1945 - 1955 (Germany was not fully sovereign until 1991)
• History of Germany since 1945
• Eisenhower and German POWs
• GARIOA Government And Relief in Occupied Areas. Contains some comparisons on expenditures Germany/Japan and Iraq.

External articles

Overview

• The Brookings Institution Iraq Index
• ProCon's Extensive Iraq War Examination

Road to War

• White House Meeting Memo; Details of 31 January 2003 private meeting between George W. Bush and Tony Blair where they discussed using U.S. spyplanes in UN colours to lure Saddam Hussein into war.
• UK Attorney-General leak; Legal advice given to the British Prime Minister Tony Blair weeks before the 2003 invasion.
• Presidential address given by George W. Bush on the evening of March 19, 2003, announcing war.

Iraqi sources

• The Ground Truth Project -- A series of exclusive, in-depth interviews with Iraqis, aid workers, military personnel and others who have spent significant time on-the-ground in Iraq.
• What Iraqis Think -- A compilation of the latest polls and blogs coming out of Iraq.
• Iraq documents on Weapons of Mass Destruction This is a U.S. military site containing approximately 1 million files captured from the Iraqi military in the aftermath of the invasion.

Opinions and polls

• Sean Rayment, "Secret MoD poll: Iraqis support attacks on British troops"; a poll conducted among Iraqis reveals strong opposition toward Allied presence in Iraq. The Daily Telegraph, 23 October 2005.
• Extraordinary renditions: the playwright and the president; Jeff Sommers, Khaled Diab and Charles Woolfson explore the dynamics between playwright and president as America's 'war on terror' stands in the dock. January 2006, published in Al Ahram Weekly
• Caspar Henderson, "Three polls: attitudes across frontiers". 12 December 2002.
• Karl Zinsmeister, "What Iraqis Really Think". Wall Street Journal, September 10, 2003.
• "1st Major Survey of Iraq". Zogby International, September 10, 2003.
• Carl Conetta, "What do Iraqis want? Iraqi attitudes on occupation, U.S. withdrawal, governments, and quality of life". Project on Defense Alternatives, 01 February 2005.
• "Iraq". Polling Report.com. (ed. Chronological polls of Americans 18 & older)

Casualties

• Carl Conetta, "The Wages of War; Iraqi Combatant and Noncombatant Fatalities in the 2003 Conflict". Project on Defense Alternatives Research Monograph #8, 20 October 2003.
• Hamit Dardagan, et. al., "Iraq Body Count". (ed. reportedly comprehensive tally of deaths resulting from the war and occupation based on media reports compiled by various antiwar activists.)
• "The Civilian Casualty Fable; Analysis of Civilian Casualties in the first two years of the Iraq War". Logic Times, 26 October 2005.
• "In Tribute - U.S. troops who have died while serving in Afghanistan or Iraq" Biographies of selected war casualties published June 19, 2006.
• "[21]; Iraqi Civilian Deaths Increase Dramatically After Invasion" Johns Hopkins School of Public Health, October 28, 2004.
• Military Casualties and non-military deaths.
• "Civilians reported killed by military intervention in Iraq"

Combat operations related

• "Aerial Propaganda Leaflet Database". Psywar.org, 06 November 2005. (ed. Iraq War PSYOP leaflets and posters)

News

• News from Iraq Aggregated news on the war, including politics and economics.
• The Struggle for Iraq: BBC Best Link: All the latest news, analysis and images from Iraq.
• War in Iraq: CNN Special Report: This page was archived in May 2003 when President Bush declared an end to major combat. However, the coalition casualties' list continues to be updated.
• Iraq: Transition of Power: CNN Special Report: Three years later, debate rages.

Anti-war activists and war critics

• David Shuster, "Road to war; How the Bush administration sold the Iraq War to American people". MSNBC, Nov. 8, 2005
• Antiwar news and viewpoints [22]
• Charlie and Katrina, "Mourning the Vote". (ed. Students (Boston University and Oglethorpe University) site presenting their opinion about the Iraq War)
• OnlyOneWorld.NET Contains information, news, and opinion on the Iraq War.
• What Barry Says Written by Barry McNamara in 2003, Winner of the Best Animation award at the Brooklyn International Film Festival and Portobello Film Festival in 2004.
• [23] Dahr Jamail's Iraq Dispatches. Independent journalist in Iraq. Many despatches, reports and photos.
• [24] Tales of Iraq War. Anti-war webcomics by cartoonist Latuff.
• The U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq Socialist Worker Online’s ongoing coverage and analysis
• FixIraq.com 15 minute updated news, Discussion, Auto-Updating US Deaths counter that can be shown on any website.
• "Unlike Vietnam, There is No End in Sight" iShotTheDeputy.com article criticising comparisons with Vietnam.
• Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield, The Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy or Division?, 2004, Palgrave Macmillian ISBN 1-4039-6354-1
• Juan Cole, [Iraq] Three-State Solution? The Nation review, March 29, 2004

Independent analysis

• "The Road Ahead: Lessons in Nation Building from Japan, Germany, and Afghanistan for Postwar Iraq" by Ray Salvatore Jennings May 2003 Peceworks No. 49 United States Institute of Peace
• "A New American Century? - Iraq and the Hidden Euro-Dollar wars " by William Engdahl
• Oil and Empire - the backstory to the invasion of Iraq
• The Neocons, Peak Oil and the Invasion of Iraq
• "An ethical blank cheque" British and US mythology about the second world war ignores our own crimes and legitimises Anglo-American war making, Richard Drayton, Tuesday May 10, 2005 The Guardian

War supporters and operation proponents

• Victor Davis Hanson, "An American 'Debacle'? More unjustified negativity on the war in Iraq." National Review Online, October 14, 2005.
• An interesting analogy presented by Jessica Well where she shows a Life magazine article from 1946 discussing the failures of Denazification entitled Americans are Losing the Victory in Europe

Economics

• Scott Wallsten and Katrina Kosec, "The Economic Costs of the War in Iraq". AEI-Brookings Joint Center Working Paper 05-19. September 2005.
• Online cost estimator allows users to change assumptions for predicting expected future cost of the Iraq war.
• "Dollar cost of war". (ed. Reportedly actual total of the U.S. taxpayer cost of the Iraq War.)
• "Iraq war costs could top $2 trillion". Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 10, 2006 based on "The Economic Costs of the Iraq War" by Linda Bilmes, Harvard University, and Joseph E. Stiglitz, laureate of the Nobel Prize of Economics in 2001.
• "The Dollar System and U.S. Economic Reality post-Iraq War" by William Engdahl

Exit Strategy

• Iraq Exit Strategy Watch

Media Echo

• Eliot Weinberger: What I Heard About Iraq in 2005, and What I Heard about Iraq (a collage of various statements concerning the war) dead link; these links active as of Oct 01 2006 [link1] and [link2]

• Tatham, Steve (2006), 'Losing Arab Hearts & Minds: The Coalition, Al-Jazeera & Muslim Public Opinion' Hurst & Co (London) Published 1 Jan 06