Talk:World War II

Incorrect infobox image

Infobox [ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:NRAWanjialing1.jpg top left image] pertains to the Sino-Japanese War which preceded WWII and hence needs to be changed. AshLin (talk) 19:04, 19 March 2011 (UTC)

• I agree, most scholars and the general public disagree with the idea that the Second World War began in 1937. The fall of Hong Kong would be better. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Hawjam (talk • contribs) 20:07, 8 April 2011 (UTC)

Wrong Information

Hello, whoever created the WWII page,

I just wanted to add,respectfully,that an error found its way into you article. In the second paragraph, it says that Germany and Slovakia invaded Poland; In actuality, Germany and the former Soviet Union invaded Poland.

Sincerely,

A concerned citizen — Preceding unsigned comment added by Obruton (talk • contribs) 22:58, 23 March 2011 (UTC)

Ah - er - yeah. Oops.

I'm trying to figure out who put that in. 8-( Fixing it now. Georgewilliamherbert (talk) 23:17, 23 March 2011 (UTC)

this was hard. it is like call-ofduty games. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 68.34.217.62 (talk) 03:14, 24 March 2011 (UTC)

Information is correct. Germany and Slovakia invaded Poland on Sept 1st, and the USSR on Sept 17th. I do not see what should be fixed.--Paul Siebert (talk) 03:19, 24 March 2011 (UTC)

Paul's correct. The para also gives the correct date for the Soviet invasion, so no changes seem necessary Nick-D (talk) 06:15, 24 March 2011 (UTC)

It's factually accurate that puppet Slovakia invaded Poland with Germany, it's not a mistake. However in this second para, I don't see any mention of the Soviet invasion of Poland on Sept 17th 1939 (Nick, it appears you may have been referring to the Nazi invasion of the USSR in June 1941 as a correct date, rather than the Soviet invasion of Poland on Sept 17th 1939 as a correct date). The perception that Slovakia is a mistake is because the less notable Slovak invasion of Poland is mentioned but the more notable Soviet invasion of Poland is not. The Soviet invasion of Poland on Sept 17th 1939 should be added to the line per Obruton's and Georgewilliamherbert's comments. -Chumchum7 (talk) 17:13, 25 March 2011 (UTC)

The article currently states:

"On 1 September 1939, Germany and Slovakia—a client state in 1939—attacked Poland. On 3 September 1939 France and Britain, followed by the countries of the Commonwealth, declared war on Germany but provided little support to Poland other than a small French attack into the Saarland. On 17 September 1939, after signing a nonaggression pact with Japan, the Soviets also invaded Poland."

Therefore, I simply do not understand your point.--Paul Siebert (talk) 18:38, 25 March 2011 (UTC)

Obruton opened this discussion about the second paragraph of the article, i.e. the lede, where the less notable 1939 Slovak invasion of Poland is mentioned, but the more notable 1939 Soviet invasion of Poland is not. This caused two editors to think there's a mistake. The solution to stop this happening is to as briefly as possible mention the 1939 Soviet invasion of Poland in the lede. -Chumchum7 (talk) 19:03, 25 March 2011 (UTC)

You are right. Removed.--Paul Siebert (talk) 19:12, 25 March 2011 (UTC)

Regarding your "The solution to stop this happening is to as briefly as possible mention the 1939 Soviet invasion of Poland in the lede", I object. The reason is simple: this invasion was just an ordinary, medium scale military operation, that hadn't lead to any new war declaratons, alliances, etc. Therefore, I simply do not understand why this invasion should be mentioned explicitly (by contrast to other military operations, such as Battle of France, invasion of Yugoslavia, etc).--Paul Siebert (talk) 19:18, 25 March 2011 (UTC)

It depends which way one measures it. While there were only about 10,000 combat dead in the 1939 Soviet invasion of Poland, there were at least 700,000 troops involved. Diplomatically, it did have huge ramifications for the situation later on in the war including the Big Three conferences, and is noted in analysis of the Origins of the Cold War. Territorially, as a matter of fact, the 1939 Soviet invasion of Poland took more land than did the 1939 Nazi invasion of Poland. The Soviet invasion was also a direct cause of the eventual creation of notable Polish armies in Siberia after 1941: the Soviet-backed 'Berling Army' that took part in the Battle of Berlin, and the British-backed 'Anders Army' that took part in the Battle Monte Cassino. For these reasons it is worth the briefest of mentions in the lede. Besides, for Obruton and Georgewilliamherbert, its absence may still look like an omission. They ought to chime in here. -Chumchum7 (talk) 20:03, 25 March 2011 (UTC)

Despite a huge amount of troops, the hostilities were minimal (and even the war had not been declared on the USSR: it remained formally neutral). The troops were needed to take this large territory under strict control and as a balance for the Wehrmacht (no one could know real Hitler's intentions).

I see no serious diplomatic consequences: both British and American attitude towards the USSR was deeply negative even before Soviet invasion of Poland.

The territorial expansion of the USSR has already been mentioned in the lede.

I do not think the Berling army was so notable to mention it in the lede.

Re Obruton and Georgewilliamherbert, let them express their opinion by themselves.

In summary, by mentioning the Soviet invasion of Poland, which didn't start any new war, brought no new belligerents to the WWII, and was not too impressive by the scale of hostilities (which were minimal), we will open a Pandora box, and the lede, which is too big even without that, will start to inflate due to addition of the Battle of France, Battle of Britain, Japanese operation in China, Battle of Moscow, Battle of Dnieper, Bagration, siege of Leningrad, Ardenne offensive, etc. A large number of battles that by their scale and political implication dwarf the Soviet invasion of Poland, and I do not see why the latter is so exceptional that we need to add it.--Paul Siebert (talk) 23:09, 25 March 2011 (UTC)

Japan and USSR

"These clashes convinced the Japanese government that they should focus on conciliating the Soviet government to avoid interference in the war against China and instead turn their military attention southward, towards the US and European holdings in the Pacific."

This is so much mentioned, but in fact it was only one of the reaons that turned Japan's attention to the south. And also, the Emperor was very angry by the Nomonhan Incident. Not because at least part of an Army was defeated, but because the Kwantung Army iniciated this clash by it's own. Please, let's check and put here the informations from the Japanese side as well, such as the declaration of the Matsuoka's secretary in The World at War. I'm tired of see this "logic conclusion" by Soviet/Russian historiography that the Japanese feard the Soviets because the defeat in Khalkhin Gol (which wasn't even so badly as so mentioned, due to the conditions the IJA operated there and it's surprise defeat). They never feared them. The Pacific War was just a mean of obtain resources the Impire needed by the Western embargo, blockate and finnish China and confrontate with the Soviets in the future.

Amnon Sella (Khalkhin-Gol: The Forgotten War. Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 18, No. 4, Military History (Oct., 1983), pp. 651-687 ) characterises the consequences of this battle as follows:

"The outcome of the battle had far-reaching consequences. It entered into the calculations of the Soviet diplomats as they negotiated with Germany and with the Anglo-French delegation in August 1939. As for Japan, the defeat of the Kwantung Army caused her to reassess her future policies towards the USSR and Germany."

The journal is being published by SAGE Publications, and by no means the article reflects the position of Soviet/Russian historiography.

Another quote:

"After Khalkhin-Gol ... the aggressive Kwantung Army position had been deflated, and the political weight of more moderate naval interests, favouring the southern strategy, was correspondingly increased. The Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact of 13 April 1941 effectively removed the danger of a two-front war for both Soviet and Japanese policy makers."(Robert F. Miller. The Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 71, No. 3 (Jul., 1993), pp. 561-562. Published by: the Modern Humanities Research Association and University College London, School of Slavonic and East European Studies).--Paul Siebert (talk) 18:49, 25 March 2011 (UTC)

"The Imperial Conference July 2, 1941 At the Imperial Conference held on July 2, 1941, the following policies were decided upon:

1. Do not intervene in the Russo-German War;
2. Proceed with prudent diplomatic negotiations while consolidating secret preparations against the U.S.S.R.;
3. If the Russo-German War turned out favorably for Japan, settle the Northern Problem by force and maintain stability in the north. Because of these decisions, which resulted from the outbreak of the Russo-German War, the Chungking operation had to be suspended.

The Army High Command had traditionally strong tendencies of watchfulness toward the Soviet Union. There thus arose criticism that the settlement of the China Incident by force had been incomplete because Japan was nailed down by Russia. At the root of the High Command's attitude toward the U.S.S.R. lay the following considerations: conflict between Japan and Russia was just a matter of time. It was taboo for Japan to demonstrate weakness toward the Soviet Union. Armaments were therefore the only means of stabilizing matters with Russia.

Mention has already been made that the Japanese Army had originally utilized the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact to contemplate the launching of an offensive against Chungking, by diverting part of the Kwantung Army from Manchuria to China. These plans had had to be abandoned, and the Kwantung Army Special Maneuvers (KANTOKUEN) were instead instituted, with a view toward awaiting a good chance of participating in the war against the Soviet Union."

My source, at momment, for this and the other informations I'm providing here is this Wikbin article: http://wikibin.org/articles/japanese-planned-republic-of-the-far-east.html

Their key points can be all confirmed by Japanese sources, but if someone could confirm them by providing sources of it's contents such as the Imperial Conference mentioned above, it would be very welcome.

And more this part:

"The "Special Maneuvers" consisted of preparations for the use of force against the Soviet Union, based upon the outlook that the Russo-German War might take a rapidly favorable turn for Germany. KANTOKUEN, indeed, can be compared to running toward a bus stop in order not to miss the bus. In the event that force was used against the U.S.S.R., the operational plan of 1939 was scheduled to go into effect, whereby simultaneous offensives were to be mounted toward the north and the east from Manchuria."

This metaphor of "not miss the bus", again, can be confirmed by a Japanese politician in The World at War.

Please, I ask to read the the rest of the article for more details about the Japanese intentions and plans. Therefore I will insist: the vision of "fear" is wrong. There were several reasons for the attack in the Pacific. Khalkhin Gol can be one of them, but it wasn't the only, and not the decisive factor. Everything was placed in the balance and then the history happened.

The above post was made by an IP 187.52.36.244, 20:04, 25 March 2011 (Paul Siebert).

Firstly, could you please sign your posts by adding four "~"? Thank you in advance.

Secondly, I am perfectly aware of Japanese plans of invasion of the USSR in 1941 and 1942. However, I see no contradiction here. You probably know that the necessary prerequisite for Japanese invasion was either major and devastating Soviet defeat in the Eastern Europe (fall of Moscow in 1941 or fall of Stalingrad in 1942), or massive revolt in Siberia. That was a direct result of the Nomonhan lesson: do not attack the USSR unless the situation of the latter is not absolutely desperate. In other words, whereas Japan decided she was in position to attack the USA, which were not at war at all, and whose strategic positions and industeial potential were quite good, she did not dare to attack the USSR, whose position was almost desperate in late 1941 and late 1942.

Thirdly, please, try to use more reliable sources: the source you refer to is hardly reliable. Try to read this for the beginning.--Paul Siebert (talk) 23:25, 25 March 2011 (UTC)

An independent action of the Kwantung Army. Tokyo didn't wanted war with the USSR even in 1939, and already let this very clear when forbidden air strikes in the Soviet airfields at starting of the Nomomhan Incident. The Soviet Union was always considerated a threat for Japan. They were not yet read for a war with them in 1941, but were already preparing to do so, as the much growing numbers of the Kwantung Army showed. And of course, in case of a certain defeat to the Germans, the plans probably would be different. This is not my opinion, it's what the own Japanese planned. They did take the Nomonhan lesson seriously, but were very willing to come back (Stalin itself knew this). If you denied this, and keep beliving they feard the Soviets, then you are clearly showing you don't know how the Japanese military saw the Communists, and the hatred they have from them because Nomonhan. And again: the war in the Pacific was a mean of obtain the needed resouces by the weakned European nations, finnish the Allied support to China, finnish China (that was taking most of the Impire's resources), and then prepare military and economically to a war with the USSR.

Check my affirmations in any source that covers the Japanese perspective. I want to see you refute them.

Thanks for your attention,

Marcelo Jenisch —Preceding unsigned comment added by 189.30.216.253 (talk) 14:37, 26 March 2011 (UTC)

Firstly, it is incorrect to say that the Kwantung Army acted independently from the government of Japan, because it was de facto a part of Japanese government. The military were one of three political groups that determined Japanese policy, and the most influential one. The defeat of the Kwantung army had weakened the positions of the army and, accordingly, strengthened the positions of the navy, hence the Japanese decision to start a naval war against the US.

Secondly, I didn't write that Japan abandoned her plans to attack the USSR, she just changed priorities, preferring to attack the US/UK first. That does not contradict to what the article says.

Thirdly, regarding your "Check my affirmations in any source that covers the Japanese perspective", please, keep in mind that the burden of proof is your, not on me: if you want some changes to be made, please, provide serious rationale and reliable sources supporting it.--Paul Siebert (talk) 14:53, 26 March 2011 (UTC)

"Firstly, it is incorrect to say that the Kwantung Army acted independently from the government of Japan, because it was de facto a part of Japanese government."

Ok, now you gonna tell me that was Tokyo's order to iniciate the border war? this argument has an end here.

"The defeat of the Kwantung army had weakened the positions of the army and, accordingly, strengthened the positions of the navy, hence the Japanese decision to start a naval war against the US."

This was much more truth because the "maverick policy of the Kwantung Army. The Emperor was furious with the Army because this. Other factors such as the fear that the US, now allied of the Soviets, attacked Japan while she attacked the USSR, and the embargo of oil(remember the plans of the attack in the Pacific were to cancelled if the diplomacy managed to finnish the embargo), the need of a retirement of China due to the lack of oil and the same lack of oil for launch a war against the Soviets, as well as maintein the Japanese economy, all contributed to the clearly emergencial "South Policy" to be implemented.

"Secondly, I didn't write that Japan abandoned her plans to attack the USSR, she just changed priorities, preferring to attack the US/UK first. That does not contradict to what the article says."

I just think the article should let clear something like: "Despite it's wish to confrontate with the Soviets, the Japanese provisionally decided to launch a war in the Pacific."

"Thirdly, regarding your "Check my affirmations in any source that covers the Japanese perspective", please, keep in mind that the burden of proof is your, not on me: if you want some changes to be made, please, provide serious rationale and reliable sources supporting it."

Surely. And I will provide sources. The only thing I want let clear here, is the Japanese never abandoned their plans of agressivity towards the USSR. It was a lot of factors, such as distrust in Germany by the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact being signed together with Zhukov's offensive, the non warning of the Barbarossa to the Japanese, the oil embargo, the other factors I mentioned and probably others. The Japanese decision wasn't simply by what happened in Mongolia, in 1939. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 189.30.216.253 (talk) 16:48, 26 March 2011 (UTC)

(I believe you do not mind me to format your post making it more readable for others.)

As for the Tokyo orders, they were as follows:

"Soviet intelligence reports indicated as early as January 1939 that the Japanese Army had embarked on a series of provocative strikes in the Nomonhan district. In the months which followed, as diplomatic wrangles at either end of the globe intensified by the day, the Kwantung Army, the commanders of which apparently had influential backing in Tokyo in the shape of certain generals in the War Ministry, struggled to gain a free hand to deal with any emergency arising on the border with the USSR. Until after the armistice was signed, on 16 September 1939, nobody was prepared to assume responsibility for issuing a definite order, such as 'go ahead' or 'stop', where border incidents were concerned. So the orders issued were ambiguous. In April .... the Kwantung Army command put out a new operational order, 'Guidelines for the settlement of Soviet-Manchurian border disputes'. This order enjoined on the one hand: 'Do not attack even if attacked by the enemy', which represented a middle-of-the-road approach and conformed with the Imperial wish; but on the other, it stated that 'the frequency and escalation of incidents can only be prevented by the resolute application of just punishment, the basic principle being neither to invade nor to permit invasion . . . in areas where the lines of demarcation are unclear, the officer responsible for defending the border shall himself determine the demarcation line'. That was the root of all the trouble: the borders were not precisely delineated, and the order gave commanders at local level carte blanche to decide whether or not to provoke an international crisis." (Sella, op.cit.)

In other words, whereas there was no unambiguous order from Tokyo to attack, the opposite order had also not been given, so it is incorrect to say that Kwantung army opposed to the Tokyo's will, because the will was not articulated clearly.

Regarding your point about Japanese plans towards the USSR, that is hardly relevant to this concrete section. They abandoned the plans of immediate attack moving them to a very remote future. That is in agreement with what the article says.--Paul Siebert (talk) 21:24, 26 March 2011 (UTC)

":::(I believe you do not mind me to format your post making it more readable for others.)"

It wasn't. Try to put me down in the discussion with this is a very coward way, Siebert. Don't try loose your time with this again, it won't work.

About the Tokyo's orders, pratically a war such as Khalkhin Gol, was never Tokyo's wish. They really not liked from what the Kwantung Army did. So much that the Kwantung Army operated by it's own, and with a lot of restrictions, such as in the air operations I already mentioned. They were in the scout role trying to provoke a full scale war.

And about the plans for the USSR, the Kwantung Army was promissed it would resume hostilities against the USSR after the war in the Pacific was over. Or if the Germans obtained a certain sucess in the West.

Still, as my Wikbin articles mentions, and as the Japanese politicians of the time in the World at War as well, the war with the Soviets was just a matter of time, as the Kwantung would take the iniciative regardless of Tokyo's intentions, as this article shows: http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/timeline/411021amie.html

Tokyo made the Pacific war with a objetive and one of the main objectives was obtain resources to confront the Soviets. Not mention this, is the same as not mention the oil they wanted in the Dutch Indies and the rubber. The people need to be informed the "Zhukov's trauma" wasn't in the way it is so promoted (this, if it really had some impact at all). The Japanese wanted a showdown with the USSR, and very probably it would have happened, no mather the consequences. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 189.30.216.253 (talk) 17:48, 27 March 2011 (UTC)

You Wikibin web site is a self-published source, which, by the way, relies on the works of such fringe theorists as Victor Suvorov. Please, try to read more serious literature before continuing this dispute.--Paul Siebert (talk) 21:07, 27 March 2011 (UTC)

Anyone that knows Imperial Japan knows it couldn't tolerate the USSR. The Army never gived up of it's expansionism ideas in the USSR. The Pacific war tried to be avoided in the same way a total war against the USSR was in 1939, when the Japanese proposed the cease fire approved by Stalin due to the playground created by the Kwantung Army. That not happening, general mobilization for a full scale war was already underway, as well as a counter offensive by General Komatsubara.

The emergencial nature of the Pacific War can be very well see by the non intention of an attack in the Pacific by the Japanese if they could solve the problem diplomatically.

And I'm not making nothing like Suvorov. On the contrary; there's plenty of sources the Japanese wanted to attack the Soviet Union. Today's historiography tends to denied this because the name Zhukov but people who see the Japanese perspective of History know the things were different. I really don't have much literally refferences of this subject, but in the book: Rising Sun Victorius at pages 13 and 14 the author puts a historic view supporting my idea. In other pages as well. I'm just with not with my book now and could see only a part at google books. The testimonials of the Japanese politicians in The World at War were already mentioned as well.

And about my Wikbin source, simple: I want that you prof me if there's anything wrong with it.

Don't take me bad Siebert, I just want to show the Japanese never feared the Soviets. You know this is truth, don't try lie to youself. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 189.30.216.253 (talk) 22:03, 27 March 2011 (UTC)

You failed to show that. You just state it. "

"The witness' testimony is a primary source. Please, come up with some concrete text (with sources), put it here, and let's discuss."

"When the time from an integration against the North parted, the Army naturally joined with the Navy".

- Matsuoka's secretary in The World at War.

I will provide you sources. Don't worry.

"However, let me point out that your idea that Japan never feared the USSR is not consistent with the fact that in Dec 1941, when the USSR was on the brink of catastrophe, Japan, which didn't fear it, preferred to attack the USA, not the USSR."

Matsuoka's secretary mentioned the "time" that parted as the oil. When the war started in the USSR, Japan preffered to observe the Germans performance. When she realised that an intervention was possible, the Japanese wanted to help their German allies, but they simply didn't have oil to do so. And they didn't put all their luck in an attack in the Soviet Union that could last much more and result in a colapse of the nation. This could have been by Khalkhin Gol, but again, I don't see fear, I see an carefully action about the Nomonhan lesson: do not understimate your enemy. So it wasn't only Nomonhan, it was Nomonhan, the oil embargo and many others factors that made the Japanese take the provisionally decision to strike in the South.

I will back with sources next time. Enough of discuss with you.

--Paul Siebert (talk) 22:40, 27 March 2011 (UTC)

The IP in this discussion, our new colleague from Brazil, is a newcomer. Wikipedia policy dictates that they are to be welcomed in a friendly manner and provided with clear, considerate and non-condescending guidance when necessary. They may have an important and valuable contribution to make, and should be encouraged to do so in the most courteous and least combative way possible. I propose that our new colleague from Brazil refrains from debating what are the nuances of Soviet/Russian POV versus Japanese POV here, and instead quotes an excerpt of the book, below. Ordem e Progresso. -Chumchum7 (talk) 09:05, 28 March 2011 (UTC)

Yes, I'm Brazilian, but don't treat me with shame due to the stereotype of we as a primitive people. I'm not worst or better than anyone in the world that can be wrong or correct. I refuse any "special tretament" courtesy and found this very offensive. There was any needed to mention my nacionality.

And again I repeat: I will come back with sources suppoting my idea to a more impartial view of this subject.

Thanks for your attention,

Marcelo

Your "but" is by no means justified. No one assumes that Brasilians are more primitive then, e.g. the US citizens. Re Chumchum7's attempt to reveal the origin of the anonymous editor, that is hardly in accordance with the WP policy, which explicitly prohibits to disclose the personal information about a user without his will. I believe, Chumchum7 will not repeat this mistake in future, otherwise this may inflict sanctions on him. By saying that, I didn't question Chumchum7's good faith, because I believe his actual intentions were quite good. I agree with the remaining part of his post.--Paul Siebert (talk) 17:37, 28 March 2011 (UTC)

PS "special treatment" refers to new users, not to Brazilians. That is required by WP policy and the guidelines. New users are usually not sanctioned for actions that are not allowed for more experienced editors. However, that does not mean that this situation will last long. For instance, I advised to use the ":" symbol properly, and you refused to do so. By doing that you go against common politeness rules, and after looking at formatting of your post one can assume that they have been made by a rude person. Usually the talk page threads look like:

Initial post <signature>

Responce 1<signature>

Responce on the responce 1<signature>

Responce on the responce on the responce 1<signature>

Responce 2<signature>

etc. Please, try to follow this way.--Paul Siebert (talk) 17:45, 28 March 2011 (UTC)

Paul, Wikipedia specifically provides a "Geolocate" link at the bottom of every IP User contribution page - by choosing to be an IP user, the person has given that information. If they don't want to do that, they can create an account.

Marcelo - I believe you are taking offence where none was intended. Perhaps we could all get back to discussing ways to improve the article. (Hohum ^@) 23:14, 28 March 2011 (UTC)

Hohum, WP:OUTING says: "Posting another person's personal information is harassment, unless that person voluntarily had posted his or her own information, or links to such information, on Wikipedia." If a person disn't post a link to the information voluntarily, it is hardly appropriate to publish it, even if it is easily available.--Paul Siebert (talk) 01:51, 29 March 2011 (UTC)

By posting as an IP, he has voluntarily given his IP information, which is presumably why wikipedia itself publishes the geolocation link on every IP user page. It seems very unlikely to be classed as WP:OUTING. (Hohum ^@) 20:54, 1 April 2011 (UTC)

This link is added automatically, independently of the IP's will. Anyway, although I see no problem in this particular case, it theoretically may result in unneeded complaints and, in my opinion, should be avoided.--Paul Siebert (talk) 21:26, 1 April 2011 (UTC)

Australians at War

This article has one very glaring mistake.

Australia joined the European theatre of war in 1939 in support of England not as part of the English forces but as allied Australian Forces.

Also from this article you would think that the Americans won the Pacific theatre on their own but this is not true. The Royal Australian Army Forces, the Royal Australian Navy and Airforce fought to protect the soverienty of the Australian Nation against the Japanese who, with the occupation of Australia in their sites, crossed the Owen Stanley Ranges in 1940. It was the bravery of the Australian soldiers of the Kokoda Track that saved Australia from invasion. They were and will forever be in our hearts and minds as our saviours. They fought in the most miserable conditions and against the most alarming odds being out numbered, in the begining six to one and yet they pushed the Japanese back and then for the next five years our brave Australian Soldiers kept them at bay. Australian support for America meant that the American Forces had the time to regroup and prepare for war in the Pacific after their horrific losses at Pearl Harbour in 1942.

Australian troops thanks to Winston Churchill were captured in Singapore and Burma and held by the Japanese in Prisoner of War Camps that defiled the conventions of war. Thousands died of malnutritian, dysentry, malaria and typhoid. Many of those who survived Japanese brutality, returned home never able to work again because of the physical and mental damage caused by the abuse levied at them by Japanese mistreatment.

Australian troops were not only stationed in New Guinea but throughout the Pacific and supported the American troops with their courage and exceptional skills. The Battle of the Coral Sea was fought by an Allied American and Australian Naval contigent and it was this battle that was the turning point of the Pacific theatre.

Every Australian today holds the bravery of the Australian Defence Forces of World War 2 close to their heart and also thanks the support of the American Forces for their help.RbandLm (talk) 01:32, 27 March 2011 (UTC)

What specific changes to the article do you suggest? I'm afraid that your comments contain some mistakes (for instance, there's never been a 'Royal Australian Army', the Japanese never intended to invade Australia (see Proposed Japanese invasion of Australia during World War II and you're exaggerating the importance of the Australian military in the Pacific War). You may find the Military history of Australia during World War II article of interest. Nick-D (talk) 01:42, 27 March 2011 (UTC)

Edit request from 70.53.121.209, 2 April 2011

the flags of canada and china are incorrect (canada is showing the flag of ontario, china is showing the flag of Taiwan. The link to china also directs the reader to the wikipedia page of taiwan and not china.

70.53.121.209 (talk) 15:09, 2 April 2011 (UTC)

The flags are correct for the timeframe. Canada did not adopt its current flag until twenty years after the end of WWII and it wasn't until 1949 that the PRC won the Chinese Civil War. During the war, China was still known as the Republic of China, hence the link to the correct article. --PlasmaTwa2 22:12, 2 April 2011 (UTC)

I believe those flags are from the period of the war.  Hazard-SJ  ±  03:18, 3 April 2011 (UTC)

Edit request from 24.107.130.252, 2 April 2011

The fourth paragraph is absolutely incorrect. The Imperial Japanese forces DID NOT surrender in August 1945. They AGREED TO surrender after the two atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. At that point, substantive hostilities between the U.S. and Japan ceased. Note - not all hostilities ceased at this point in the Pacific Theatre, for example, in China, and the Soviet occupation of Manchuria, etc. continued unabated.

Japan surrendered on 2 September 1945, VJ Day, aboard the battleship USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay. This marks the official end point of the Second World War. 24.107.130.252 (talk) 15:31, 2 April 2011 (UTC)

Do you have a source? Adabow (talk · contribs) 05:17, 5 April 2011 (UTC)

 Not done: please provide reliable sources that support the change you want to be made.My understanding is that Aug 15 is VJ Day. Nevertheless, I looked in Google and on the NY Times web site to find when NY had a ticker-tape parade. While certainly not scientific, it's a reasonable indicator.

The parade was listed as "Aug. 14-15, 1945; Victory in Japan (V-J) Day, marking end of World War II; 5,438 tons" of ticker tape. Dunno if that means the parade lasted two days or what, but that's a helluva lot of paper.

Can you cite a Reliable Source for your assertion? If so, please change the "answered=yes" to "answered=no" in the template above and we'll revisit your request. Thanks! — UncleBubba ^{( T @ C )} 20:56, 5 April 2011 (UTC)

This is actually a reasonable edit request. Japan agreed to surrender on 15 August and most of the fighting ceased that day, but the formal surrender came into effect on 2 September. The Surrender of Japan article does a rather good job of explaining this, and includes lots of supporting references (its actually a FA). I've just tweaked the wording in question. Nick-D (talk) 08:42, 8 April 2011 (UTC)

Contradictions

Hi, I'm not sure how Wikipedia generally deals with this, but there seems to be a contradiction between the main WWII page and one of the linked articles "The Holocaust". It says under Concentration camps and slave work for the WWII article that "The Nazis were responsible for The Holocaust,...killing...as part of a programme of deliberate extermination.". The Holocaust article, however, cites that even the figure of 5 million Jewish deaths includes counts of death by "ghettoization and general privation". To call privation "deliberate extermination" surely requires qualification, otherwise both sides in WWI could be described as deliberately exterminating their own soldiers, as a synonymous term for attrition. Not to make any apologies for anyone, but gross neglect causing death is not "deliberate extermination" is it? This wording seems to imply that all of these deaths were as a result of official execution by means such as death camps and firing squad, implying that an unspecified additional number of people must have died as a result of war and attrition, when in fact the numbers of at least the latter are already included. Is there generally consistency of wording used among linked Wikipedia articles, or how is this sort of thing usually handled? User talk:efAston

'Privation' seems like a rather weak way to describe deliberetly packing people into squalid conditions and then providing them with starvation rations as part of a program of murdering as many of them as possible. However, that's a discussion for the other article; this one's wording seems OK, particularly as it's only providing a brief mention of the Holocaust. Nick-D (talk) 08:34, 8 April 2011 (UTC)

OK, so you think the wording is good, I'll accept that, but what's Wikipedia's general approach to contradiction? I've seen a couple of articles where a specific article seemed to contradict a general one, even if there is a link to the afore in the text of the latter. Usually it's quite easy to fix just by using slightly more specific language, but in an instance like this, there's a question of what's actually being described, as you pointed out. There's, oddly, no mention of contradiction in any of the Wikipedia guidelines, as a phenomenon of related articles. Are all articles considered independent of one another and only dependent on their references, or is encyclopædic reference expected to create coherent explanations?

User talk:efAston

PS My WWI attrition analogy still works given your description of privation as an understatement, but I'll concede that's not the only way to view the sentence :P. "Though the death rate in the concentration camps was high with a mortality rate of 50%, they were not designed as, or meant to be, killing centres." -Holocaust article