Phronesis

Phronēsis (Greek: φρόνησις) is an Ancient Greek word for wisdom or intelligence which is a common topic of discussion in philosophy. In Aristotelian Ethics, for example in the Nicomachean Ethics it is distinguished from other words for wisdom and intellectual virtues – such as and techne – as the virtue of practical thought, and is usually translated "practical wisdom", sometimes (more traditionally) as "prudence", from Latin prudentia. Phronesis is also sometimes spelled Fronesis.

Aristotle defines phronesis in the following manner:

"We may grasp the nature of prudence [phronesis] if we consider what sort of people we call prudent. Well, it is thought to be the mark of a prudent man to be able to deliberate rightly about what is good and advantageous . . . But nobody deliberates about things that are invariable . . . So . . . prudence cannot be science [episteme] or art [techne]; not science because what can be done is a variable (it may be done in different ways, or not done at all), and not art because action and production are generically different. For production aims at an end other than itself; but this is impossible in the case of action, because the end is merely doing well. What remains, then, is that it is a true state, reasoned, and capable of action with regard to things that are good or bad for man . . . We consider that this quality belongs to those who understand the management of households or states.

Thus for Aristotle episteme concerns theoretical know why, techne denotes technical know how, and phronesis is practical wisdom. Those possessing practical wisdom (phronimos) know how to behave in specific situations that cannot be reduced to a knowledge of general truths.

Related concepts

Intellectual

In Book 6 of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle distinguishes between two intellectual virtues which are sometimes translated as "wisdom": sophia and phronesis. Sophia (sometimes translated as "theoretical wisdom") is a combination of nous, the ability to discern reality, and epistēmē, a type of knowledge which is logically built up, and teachable, and which is sometimes equated with science. Sophia, in other words, involves reasoning concerning universal truths. Phronesis also combines a capability of rational thinking, with a type of knowledge. On the one hand it requires the capability to rationally consider actions which can deliver desired effects. Aristotle says that phronesis is not simply a skill (technē), however, as it involves not only the ability to decide how to achieve a certain end, but also the ability to reflect upon and determine good ends consistent with the aim of living well overall. Aristotle points out that although sophia is higher and more serious than phronesis, the highest pursuit of wisdom and happiness requires both, because phronesis facilitates sophia. He also associates phronesis with political ability.

Ethical

According to Aristotle' theory on rhetoric phronesis is one of the three types of appeal to character (ethos). The other two are respectively appeals to arete (virtue) and eunoia (goodwill).

Gaining phronesis requires maturation, in Aristotle's thought:

Whereas young people become accomplished in geometry and mathematics, and wise within these limits, prudent young people do not seem to be found. The reason is that prudence is concerned with particulars as well as universals, and particulars become known from experience, but a young person lacks experience, since some length of time is needed to produce it (Nicomachean Ethics 1142 a).

Phronesis is concerned with particulars, because it is concerned with how to act in particular situations. One can learn the principles of action, but applying them in the real world, in situations one could not have foreseen, requires experience of the world. For example, if one knows that one should be honest, one might act in certain situations in ways that cause pain and offense; knowing how to apply honesty in balance with other considerations and in specific contexts requires experience.

Aristotle holds that having phronesis is both necessary and sufficient for being virtuous; because phronesis is practical, it is impossible to be both phronetic and akratic; i.e., prudent persons cannot act against their "better judgement."

Influence

Aristotle's importance to mediæval European thought led phronesis to be included as one of the four cardinal virtues.

Bent Flyvbjerg has argued that instead of trying to emulate the natural sciences, the social sciences should be practiced as phronesis. This would unlock the real potential of the social sciences and move them beyond their role as perennial losers in the Science Wars, according to Flyvbjerg.

In After Virtue, Alasdair MacIntyre makes a similar call for a phronetic social science, combined with weighty criticism of attempts by social scientists to emulate natural science. He points out that for every prediction made by a social scientific theory there are usually counter-examples. These derive from the unpredictability of human beings, and the fact that one unpredictable human being can have a world-changing impact. Following Pascal, he argues that the shape of Cleopatra's nose changed the course of history, for if her profile had not been beautiful it is unlikely (according to this argument) that Mark Anthony would have pursued her, with significant consequences for Roman political history.

In light of his fundamental ontology, Martin Heidegger interprets Aristotle in such a way that phronesis (and practical philosophy as such) is the original form of knowledge and thus primary to sophia (and theoretical philosophy).

See also

• Aristotle
• Casuistry
• Dianoia
• Noesis
• Phronesis in social science
• Rhetorical reason
• What is phronetic social science?

Sources and further reading

• Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, dual text, with translation by H. Rackham (Harvard University Press, 1934) ISBN 0-674-99081-1 [1]
• Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics trans. Terence Irwin (2nd edition; Hackett, 1999) ISBN 0-87220-464-2
• Robert Bernasconi, “Heidegger’s Destruction of Phronesis,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 28 supp. (1989): 127–47.
• Flyvbjerg, Bent, 2001, Making Social Science Matter: Why Social Inquiry Fails and How It Can Succeed Again (Cambridge University Press).
• Flyvbjerg, Bent, Todd Landman, and Sanford Schram, Real Social Science: Applied Phronesis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012)
• Clifford Geertz, "Empowering Aristotle." Science, vol. 293, July 6, 2001, p. 53. [2]
• Martin Heidegger, Plato's Sophist (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997).
• Gerard J. Hughes, Aristotle on Ethics (Routledge, 2001) ISBN 0-415-22187-0
• Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Duckworth, 1985)ISBN 0-7156-1663-3
• William McNeill, The Glance of the Eye: Heidegger, Aristotle, and the Ends of Theory (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999).
• Ikujiro Nonaka, Managing Flow: A Process Theory of the Knowledge-Based Firm (Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2008).
• Amélie Oksenberg Rorty [ed.], Essays on Aristotle's Ethics (University of California Press, 1980) ISBN 0-520-04041-4
• Richard Sorabji, "Aristotle on the Role of Intellect in Virtue" (Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74, 1973–1974; pp 107–129. Reprinted in Rorty)
• David Wiggins, "Deliberation and Practical Reason" (Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76, 1975–1976; pp 29–51. Reprinted in Rorty)

External links

• What is phronetic social science?
• Resources for phronetic social science