United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine

UN 1947 partition plan for Palestine

The United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine was a resolution adopted on 29 November 1947 by the General Assembly of the United Nations. Its title was United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 (II) Future Government of Palestine.

The resolution recommended the termination of the British Mandate for Palestine and the partition of the territory into two states, one Jewish and one Arab, with the Jerusalem-Bethlehem area being under special international protection, administered by the United Nations. The resolution also contained a plan for an economic union between the proposed states, and a plan for the protection of religious and minority rights. The resolution sought to address the conflicting objectives and claims to the Mandate territory of two competing nationalist movements, Zionism (Jewish nationalism) and Arab nationalism, as well as to resolve the plight of Jews displaced as a result of the Holocaust. The resolution called for the withdrawal of British forces and termination of the Mandate by 1 August 1948, and establishment of the new independent states by 1 October 1948. A transitional period under United Nations auspices was to begin with the adoption of the resolution, and lasting until the establishment of the two states. However, war broke out and the partition plan was never implemented by the Security Council.

The proposed plan was accepted by the leaders of the Jewish community in Palestine, through the Jewish Agency. However, the plan was rejected by leaders of the Arab community (the Palestine Arab Higher Committee etc.), who were supported in their rejection by the states of the Arab League. In a communication to the United Nations Palestine Commission dated 19 January 1948, the Arab Higher Committee for Palestine stated that it was "determined [to] persist in rejection [to the] partition and in refusal [to] recognize UNO resolution [with] this respect and anything deriving therefrom". Two minor exceptions to this rejectionist line were the National Liberation League in Palestine, an Arab-Palestinian Communist faction which supported the Partition Plan (since it followed all Soviet policies), and Emir Abdullah of Transjordan, who in strictly private discussions was in favor of the partition plan — under the assumption that the Arab state under the plan would be annexed to Transjordan — yet never publicly accepted the plan (he later suggested that Transjordan should annex the whole mandate territory and establish a Jewish autonomous entity, to be eventually aligned with the rest of the Arab countries).

The passing of the UN resolution marked the start of the 1947–1948 Civil War in Mandatory Palestine.

With no plan for a smooth transition of authority to a new administration, the United Kingdom announced its intention to unilaterally withdraw from Palestine starting by 15 May 1948. During their withdrawal, the British refused to hand over territory or authority to any successor. On the day before the United Kingdom was to complete its withdrawal, (i.e. 14 May 1948) the Jewish community in Palestine published a Declaration of Independence as the State of Israel, and five Arab armies crossed into the former Mandate as the start of the 1948 Arab–Israeli War.

Background

Both the League of Nations, as well as the terms of the various League of Nations Mandates, had their origin at the Paris Peace Conference, 1919 and were drafted within the councils of the victorious Allies of World War I. The League of Nations could not alter the terms of a mandate in any substantial way. It was the original intention that the mandatory regime would lead toward the mandates' eventual independence. However, in the case of Palestine, the United Kingdom had inserted in the Mandate for Palestine an objective for the establishment of a Jewish national home in accordance with the 1917 Balfour Declaration. The preamble of the mandate declared:

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have also agreed that the Mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 2nd, 1917, by the Government of His Britannic Majesty, and adopted by the said Powers, in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.

However, the contradictions of the two (or three) objectives contained in the preamble to the Mandate, as well as in the Balfour Declaration, was soon evident.

In 1937, members of the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations had privately informed the leadership of the Jewish Agency that the Palestine Mandate could not be implemented according to the Agency's wishes. Faced with the prospect of remaining a minority in greater Palestine, the Jewish Agency Executive decided that partition was the only way out of the impasse. The principle of partition was placed on the agenda of the Twentieth Zionist Congress. During the Congress, Ben Gurion supported the proposal to partition Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab state. At the same time, he delivered speeches in which he said that no Jew is entitled to give up the right of the Jewish nation to the land.

In the White Paper of 1939, the British Government had determined that it was under no legal obligation to facilitate the further development of the Jewish National Home, by immigration, without respecting the wishes of the Arab population. The 1939 Zionist Congress denied the moral and legal validity of the White Paper. The opinion of the Permanent Mandates Commission, which had the duty "to advise" the Council of the League of Nations "on all matters relating to the observance of the Mandates" was divided. Four members felt the White Paper violated the terms of the mandate, while three members did not.

The Zionist Congress continued to publicly propose that Palestine be established as a Jewish Commonwealth according to the Biltmore proposals, while they were willing to accept a partition plan in principle.

When the Jewish and Arab leadership could not agree on a course of administration that would lead to a unified independent state, the government of the United Kingdom requested that the Question of Palestine be placed on the Agenda of the United Nations General Assembly. They asked that the Assembly make recommendations, under Article 10 of the Charter, concerning the future government of Palestine. The British proposal recommended that a special committee be established to perform a preliminary study designed to assist the General Assembly in developing recommendations. The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) was an advisory committee to the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestine Question. Membership on the Ad Hoc Committee was open to all the members of the United Nations. The General Assembly resolution called for the establishment of a United Nations Palestine Commission with a mandate to implement the plan of partition. The United Kingdom recognized the United Nations Palestine Commission as the successor government of Palestine. But the United Nations had not agreed to automatically fall heir to all of the responsibilities either of the League of Nations or of the Mandatory Power in respect to the Palestine Mandate. It had merely agreed to facilitate the transfer of sovereignty from the Mandatory to the provisional governments and to administer and govern a small trusteeship.

During the debate on partition in November 1947, Mr Husseini (of the Arab Higher Committee) referred to Ben Gurion's previous contention that no Zionist could forego the smallest portion of the land of Israel, and suggested that the Revisionists were being more honest about their territorial aspirations than the representatives of the Jewish Agency.

British Mandate of Palestine

Main articles: McMahon–Hussein Correspondence, Sykes–Picot Agreement, Balfour Declaration of 1917, and British Mandate of Palestine

In July 1915, during the First World War, the British promised the Arabs independence in the areas of the Ottoman Empire in exchange for revolting against the the Ottomans. This agreement was stipulated in the McMahon–Hussein Correspondence.

In November 1917, as General Allenby was preparing to invade Palestine, the British Foreign office issued the Balfour Declaration of 1917 which expressed British support for a Jewish national home in Palestine.

After the First World War and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the victorious Allied Supreme Council met at the San Remo Conference in April 1920 to confirm the allocation of Ottoman lands under the proposed new System of Mandates. Palestine was placed under the British mandate. The final juridical date on which the mandates for the Middle East became a part of a fixed and authoritative law of nations was delayed due to difficulties surrounding the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, the Treaty of Sèvres, and the Treaty of Lausanne. The League of Nations British Mandate of Palestine attempted to make the national home for the Jewish people an article of the Law of Nations, by incorporating the wording of the Balfour Declaration. The mandates were supported by President Woodrow Wilson, but the Senate refused to ratify the Covenant of the League of Nations or the mandates. Senator Borah explained his objections to the mandates:

When this league, this combination, is formed four great powers representing the dominant people will rule one-half of the inhabitants of the globe as subject peoples – rule by force, and we shall be a party to the rule of force. There is no other way by which you can keep people in subjection. You must either give them independence, recognize their rights as nations to live their own life and to set up their own form of government, or you must deny them these things by force.

The British Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, together with the Italian and French governments rejected early drafts of the mandate because it had contained a passage which read:

'Recognizing, moreover, the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and the claim which this gives them to reconstitute it their national home...'

The Palestine Committee set up by the Foreign Office recommended that the reference to 'the claim' be omitted. The Allies had already noted the historical connection in the Treaty of Sèvres, but they had recognized no legal claim. They felt that whatever might be done for the Jewish people was based entirely on sentimental grounds. Further, they felt that all that was necessary was to make room for Zionists in Palestine, not that they should turn 'it', that is the whole country, into their home. Lord Balfour suggested an alternative which was accepted:

'Whereas recognition has thereby [i.e. by the Treaty of Sèvres] been given to the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine, and to the [sentimental] grounds for reconstituting their National Home in that country ...'

The Vatican, the Italian, and the French governments continued to press their own legal claims on the basis of the former Protectorate of the Holy See and the French Protectorate of Jerusalem. The idea of an International Commission to resolve claims on the Holy Places had been formalized in Article 95 of the Treaty of Sèvres, and taken up again in article 14 of the Palestinian Mandate. Negotiations concerning the formation and the role of the commission were partly responsible for the delay in ratifying the mandate. The United Kingdom assumed responsibility for the Holy Places under Article 13 of the mandate. However, it never created the Commission on Holy Places to resolve the other claims.

Jewish immigration to Palestine in the initial period following World War I was sparse, owing to difficult conditions in Palestine and lack of sufficient commitment to Zionism to face the rigors of pioneering life, as well as lack of funds for development.

Comparison between the boundaries in the November 29, 1947 United Nations General Assembly partition plan (Resolution 181) for the British Mandate Territory of Palestine and the eventual armistice boundaries of 1949-1950. *Blue = area assigned to a Jewish state in the original UN partition plan, and within the 1949 Israel armistice lines. *Green = area assigned to an Arab state in the original UN partition plan, and controlled by Egypt or Jordan from 1949-1967. *Light red = area assigned to an Arab state in the original UN partition plan, but within the 1949 Israel armistice lines. *Magenta = area assigned to the "Corpus Separatum" of Jerusalem/Bethlehem (neither Jewish nor Arab) by the plan, but controlled by Jordan from 1949-1967. *Greyish = area assigned to the "Corpus Separatum" of Jerusalem/Bethlehem (neither Jewish nor Arab) by the plan, but within the 1949 Israel armistice lines.

On 24 July 1922, in London, the terms of the British Mandate over Palestine and Transjordan were approved by the Council of the League of Nations. Under the Anglo-French Declaration, and the McMahon-Hussein Agreements, certain areas had been reserved to be Arab and independent in the future. No fixed borders for the Palestine Mandate had been established in the zone controlled by the British Military, or the Occupied Enemy Territories Administration (OETA). The OETA was in effective control under the Hague Conventions (1899 and 1907) at the time of the Faisal-Weizmann Agreement. The conventions required that the status quo be maintained until a peace treaty was negotiated. Accordingly, the Faisal-Weizmann Agreement had called for the borders to be established after the Peace Conference. The Zionist Organization submitted a proposed map at the Peace Conference, which excluded the independent Arab area east of the Hedjaz Railway. In drafting the Mandate, the British elected to use the Jordan River as a natural boundary instead of the railway line. Article 25 stated:

In the territories lying between the Jordan and the eastern boundary of Palestine as ultimately determined, the Mandatory shall be entitled, with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations, to postpone or withhold application of such provisions of this mandate as he may consider inapplicable to the existing local conditions, and to make such provision for the administration of the territories as he may consider suitable to those conditions, provided that no action shall be taken which is inconsistent with the provisions of Articles 15, 16 and 18.

Accordingly, on 16 September 1922 the League of Nations formally approved a memorandum from Lord Balfour confirming the exemption of Transjordan from the clauses of the mandate concerning the creation of a Jewish national home, and from the mandate's responsibility to facilitate Jewish immigration and land settlement in that portion of the former occupied territories.

In the 1930s, with increased anti-Semitism and the rise of Adolf Hitler in Germany, the Fifth Aliya brought substantial numbers of European Jews to Palestine.

The Arab uprising of 1936-9 was triggered by increased Jewish immigration in conjunction with rising Arab nationalist sentiment. Following the revolt, the British Peel Commission proposed a Palestine divided between a small Jewish state (about 15%), a much bigger Arab state and an international zone. The Arab leadership rejected the plan. The Jewish Agency also rejected the borders in the British plan, but established their own committees on borders and population transfer so that they could offer an alternative plan of their own. Both of the proposals contained provisions for the relocation of the Arab population to areas outside the borders of the new Jewish state. The plans were developed along the lines of the Greco-Turkish transfer. After these proposals were rejected by the Arab side, the British changed their position and sought to eliminate Jewish immigration to Palestine. This was seen as a contradiction of the terms of the mandate, and an anti-humanitarian catastrophe, in light of the increasing persecution in Europe. In the prewar period it led to organization of illegal immigration. While the small Lehi group attacked the British, the Jewish Agency, which represented the mainstream Zionist leadership, still hoped to persuade the British to restore Jewish immigration rights and cooperated with the British in the war against Fascism.

When the British insisted on preventing immigration of Jewish Holocaust survivors to Palestine following World War II, the Jewish community began to wage an uprising and guerrilla war. This warfare and United States pressure to end the anti-immigration policy led to the establishment of The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry in 1946. It was a joint British and American attempt to agree on a policy regarding the admission of Jews to Palestine. In April, the Committee reported that its members had arrived at a unanimous decision. The Committee approved the American condition of the immediate acceptance of 100,000 Jewish refugees from Europe into Palestine. It also recommended that there be no Arab, and no Jewish State. The report explained that in order to dispose, once and for all, of the exclusive claims of Jews and Arabs to Palestine, we regard it as essential that a clear statement of principle should be made that Jew shall not dominate Arab and Arab shall not dominate Jew in Palestine. U.S. President Harry S.Truman angered the British Labour Party by issuing a statement supporting the 100,000 refugees but refusing to acknowledge the rest of the committee's findings. The British government had asked for US assistance in implementing the recommendations. The US War Department had issued an earlier report which stated that an open-ended U.S. troop commitment of 300,000 personnel would be necessary to assist the British government in maintaining order against an Arab revolt.

These events were the decisive factors that forced the British to announce their desire to terminate the Palestine Mandate and place the Question of Palestine before the United Nations.

The United Nations, the successor to the League of Nations, attempted to resolve the dispute between the Jews and Arabs in Palestine. On May 15, 1947 the UN appointed a committee, the UNSCOP, composed of representatives from eleven states. To make the committee more neutral, none of the Great Powers were represented. After spending three months conducting hearings and general survey of the situation in Palestine, UNSCOP officially released its report on August 31. The only unanimous recommendation was that the United Kingdom terminate their mandate for Palestine and grant it independence at the earliest possible date. A majority of nations (Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay) recommended the creation of independent Arab and Jewish states, with Jerusalem to be placed under international administration. A minority (India, Iran, Yugoslavia) plan supported the creation of a federal union based upon the US Constitutional model. It would have established both a Jewish State and an Arab state.

Status of Transjordan

When the United Kingdom announced plans for the independence of Transjordan, the Jewish Agency and many legal scholars raised objections. Duncan Hall said that each mandate was in the nature of a treaty, and that being treaties, the mandates could not be amended unilaterally. The Jewish Agency spokesmen said that Transjordan was an integral part of Palestine, and that according to Article 80 of the UN Charter, the Jewish people still had a secured interest in its territory.

After the dissolution of the League of Nations the Anglo-American Palestine Mandate Convention remained in effect. The United States adopted the policy that formal termination of the mandate for Transjordan would follow the earlier precedent established by the French Mandate for Syria and the Lebanon. Termination would generally be recognized upon the admission of Transjordan into the United Nations as a fully independent country.

In 1946 Transjordan applied for membership in the United Nations. The President of the Security Council, speaking in his capacity as the representative of Poland, said that Transjordan was part of a joint Mandate. He denied that the Mandate had been legally terminated and asserted the rights and obligations of the United Nations. He mentioned that US Secretary of State Byrnes had spoken out against premature recognition of Transjordan, and he added that the application should not be considered until the question of Palestine as a whole was addressed. The application for membership was not approved. At the 1947 Pentagon Conference, the US advised the UK it was withholding recognition of Transjordan pending a decision on the Palestine question by the United Nations.

During the General Assembly deliberations on Palestine, there were proposals to incorporate part of the territory of Transjordan into the Jewish state. A few days before the November 29, 1947 decision on partition, U.S. Secretary of State Marshall noted frequent references had been made by the other members of the Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine regarding the desirability of the Jewish State having both the Negev and the Port of Aqaba.

Preliminary legal questions

From the outset, there were important preliminary legal questions regarding the validity of the Balfour Declaration of 1917, the Anglo-French Declaration, the League of Nations British Mandate of Palestine, and the competence of the United Nations or its members to enforce a solution against the wishes of the majority of the existing population. The United States Senate had not ratified the Treaty of Versailles, partly because of reservations about the legitimacy of the League of Nations System of Mandates. The US government subsequently entered into individual treaties to secure legal rights for its citizens, and to protect property rights and businesses interests in the mandates. In the case of the Palestine Mandate Convention, it recited the terms of the League of Nations mandate, and subjected them to eight amendments. One of those precluded any unilateral changes to the terms of the mandate. The United States insisted that the convention say that it 'consents' rather than 'concurs' with the terms of the mandate and declined to mention the Balfour Declaration in the preamble of its portion of the agreement. It did not agree to mutual defense, to provisionally recognize a Jewish State, or to pledge itself to maintain the territorial integrity of the mandate.

There were also suggestions that the Mandate should have been placed under the UN trusteeship program in accordance with the guiding principles contained in Chapter 11 and Chapter 12 of the UN Charter. All members were required to recognize the 'fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion' when dealing with non-self governing peoples. In that respect the UN system was portrayed as 'a real advance over the League of Nations Covenant and the mandate system established under it.'. All of these issues were more or less brushed aside by routine procedural decisions according to the delegate from Colombia. His observations and comments were addressed to the Ad Hoc Committee on 25 November 1947.

Article 26 of the Palestine Mandate provided that:

'The Mandatory agrees that, if any dispute whatever should arise between the Mandatory and another member of the League of Nations relating to the interpretation or the application of the provisions of the mandate, such dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice...'

The Jewish Agency claimed that the Mandate created a binding legal obligation to establish a sovereign Jewish State. The UNSCOP report to the General Assembly said the conclusion seemed inescapable that the undefined term "National Home" had been used, instead of the term "State", to place a restrictive construction on the scheme from its very inception.

The UN never reached a unanimous conclusion. Nothing in the terms of the Mandate precluded the establishment of a Jewish State in all of Palestine. However, a minority felt that nothing in the terms of the post-war treaties and the mandate precluded the establishment in Palestine of a Jewish state denominated along the lines of a 'domestic dependent nation'.

In an earlier dispute involving the grant of the Rutenberg Concessions, the Permanent Court of Justice had ruled it had jurisdiction over every dispute involving the Palestine Mandate:

'The Court is of opinion that, in cases of doubt, jurisdiction based on an international agreement embraces all disputes referred to it [the Court] after its establishment. In the present case, this interpretation appears to be indicated by the terms of Article 26 itself where it is laid down that "any dispute whatsoever .... which may arise" shall be submitted to the Court.'

On 25 November 1947 the Colombian delegate, Fernandez, announced that he favored the first draft resolution of the minority sub-committee, which called for an advisory opinion under Article 96 of the UN Charter and Chapter IV of the Statute of the Court. He stated that 'The delegation of Colombia, faithful to the principles of law, asked that a request should be made for an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice.' The opinion of the remaining colonial powers was summed-up in the response of the French delegation that the inherent rights of the indigenous population of Palestine were a political or philosophical question, but not a legal matter for the Court to decide. The Colombian resolution requesting an advisory opinion was defeated.

One further legal issue remained. The mandatory Power had the required legal and administrative authority to implement a partition plan. The U.N. could recommend a partition solution but, "does not seem to have any legal ground to impose a solution unless the mandate is in due order transmitted into a trusteeship with the U.N. as administering authority". The only other source of legal authority was if a threat to the peace existed. Four days later the plan of partition was approved with the provision that it be imposed by force: 'The Security Council [shall] determine as a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, in accordance with Article 39 (CHAPTER VII) of the Charter, any attempt to alter by force the settlement envisaged by this resolution.'

Plan for the future government of Palestine

The Palestine Mandate contained dispositive clauses that required the establishment of a perpetual system of safeguards for the religious rights and immunities which had been under international guarantee during the mandate period. Those provisions would become operative in the event that a decision was taken to terminate the mandate. Although the Palestine question had only been submitted for a recommendation under article 10 of the Charter, the UNSCOP committee had proposed the termination of the mandate and the establishment of a Corpus separatum under UN trusteeship. Questions relating to the operation of the trusteeship system fall under the provisions of Article 18 of the Charter. That article stipulates that the determinations are 'decisions', not recommendations, and requires a two-thirds majority of the members present. In several cases involving the powers of the General Assembly with regard to trusteeships and mandates, the International Court has held that those decisions can have legal effects which are binding or dispositive.

The United Nations also enacted a formal minority rights protection system as an integral part of the Partition Plan for Palestine, and placed those rights under UN guarantee. A complete list of the various legal instruments still in force, including UN GAR 181(II), was compiled by the UN Secretariat in 1950. The Chairman-Rapporteur of a UN Working Group on Minorities subsequently advised that no competent UN organ had made any decision which would extinguish the obligations under those instruments. The legal instrument was a unilateral Declaration to be made by the government of the new states. This was another established procedure. In the Minority Schools in Albania Case, the Permanent Court of International Justice held that Declarations made before the League Council were tantamount to a treaty.

Like the earlier treaties, the Declarations conferred basic rights on all the inhabitants of the Jewish and Arab states without distinction of sex, nationality, language, race or religion and protected the rights and property of all nationals of the country who differed in race, religion, or language from the majority of the inhabitants of the country. The country concerned had to acknowledge the clauses of the treaty: as fundamental laws of State and no law, regulation or official action could conflict or interfere with their stipulations, nor could any law, regulation or official action prevail over them. The States also had to acknowledge these rights as obligations of international concern placed under the guarantee of the United Nations. Compromissory clauses were included granting the International Court jurisdiction.

Abba Eban subsequently declared that the rights stipulated in section C. Declaration, chapters 1 and 2 of UN resolution 181(II) had been constitutionally embodied as the fundamental law of the state of Israel as required by that resolution and assured the committee that Israel would not invoke Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter, regarding its domestic jurisdiction. The instruments that he cited during the hearings were the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, and various cables and letters of confirmation addressed to the Secretary General. Mr. Eban's explanations and Israel's undertakings were noted in the text of A/RES/273 (III), 11 May 1949. A similar Declaration of the State of Palestine, supplied by the Palestine National Council, was accepted as being in line with the General Assembly resolution in A/RES/43/177, 15 December 1988.

Both States were also required to adopt democratic constitutions which were to embody the same rights guaranteed in the Declarations. Four days after UNSCOP held its first public hearings the Jewish Agency had signed a letter that came to be known as The Status-Quo Agreement. It was addressed to the Ultra-Orthodox World Agudat Israel organization. It explained that the establishment of the State required the approval of the United Nations, and that this would not be possible unless the State guaranteed freedom of conscience for all of its citizens and made it clear there was no intention of establishing a theocratic State. The letter also provided that the state would honor the Sabbath, and that only kosher food would be served in state institutions.

Proposed division

See also: Land ownership of the British Mandate of Palestine

The Jewish population was concentrated in settlement areas in 1947. The borders were drawn to encompass them, placing most of the Jewish population in the Jewish state. (Map reflects Jewish owned land not the size and number of settlements. It does not imply that only Jews lived here or that all other land was owned or exclusively populated by Arabs.)

The Jewish Agency contended that the Arab and Jewish portions of the plan were not integral. The Chairman of the Palestine Commission contended that they were integral. The US delegation had implied that the setting up of one state was not made conditional on the setting up of the other state.

The details of the land division were never finalized. On 25 November 1947 an amendment to the plan was passed that would have allowed the boundaries to be adjusted on the spot in Palestine by the Border Commission. The amendment was introduced by the delegation from the Netherlands due to last minute revisions of the demographic data by the mandatory administration. The proposed borders would have cut-off 54 Arab villages from their farm land. The discussion before the vote indicated that the inclusion of those villages in the Jewish state would have added 108,000 more Arabs to the population, or required in the alternative that an additional 2 million dunams of cereal farm land be included in the Arab state. The final text of the resolution read:

On its arrival in Palestine the Commission shall proceed to carry out measures for the establishment of the frontiers of the Arab and Jewish States and the City of Jerusalem in accordance with the general lines of the recommendations of the General Assembly on the partition of Palestine. Nevertheless, the boundaries as described in Part II of this Plan are to be modified in such a way that village areas as a rule will not be divided by state boundaries unless pressing reasons make that necessary.

Palestine's land surface was approximately 26,320,505 dunums (26,320 km²), of which about one third was cultivable. By comparison, the size of modern day Israel (as of 2006) is 20,770,000 dunums (20,770 km²) (Geography of Israel). The land in Jewish possession had risen from 456,000 dunums (456 km²) in 1920 to 1,393,000 dunums (1,393 km²) in 1945 and 1,850,000 dunums (1,850 km²) by 1947 (Avneri p. 224). No reliable figures of private land ownership by Arabs were available, due to the lack of centralized records under the Ottoman Land Code. The 1939 White Paper had imposed prohibitions and restrictions on land transfers to the Jewish citizenry. The Zionist Organization had established a similar system under the Jewish National Fund, or JNF, which held its land purchases in trust 'for the Jewish people as a whole'. The Fund's charter specified that the purpose of the JNF was to purchase land for the settlement of Jews. This was usually interpreted to mean that the JNF should not lease land to non-Jews.

The UN General Assembly made a non-binding recommendation for a three-way partition of Palestine into a Jewish State, an Arab State and a small internationally administered zone including the religiously significant towns Jerusalem and Bethlehem. The General Assembly recommended that the City of Jerusalem be placed under a special international regime, a corpus separatum, administered by the United Nations and outside both states; this was to preserve peace, given the unique spiritual and religious interests in the city among the world's three great monotheistic religions.

The two states envisioned in the plan were each composed of three major sections, linked by extraterritorial crossroads. The Jewish state would receive the Coastal Plain, stretching from Haifa to Rehovot, the Eastern Galilee (surrounding the Sea of Galilee and including the Galilee panhandle) and the Negev, including the southern outpost of Umm Rashrash (now Eilat). The Arab state would receive the Western Galilee, with the town of Acre, the Samarian highlands and the Judean highlands, and the southern coast stretching from north of Isdud (now Ashdod) and encompassing what is now the Gaza Strip, with a section of desert along the Egyptian border.

The partition defined by the General Assembly resolution differed somewhat from the UNSCOP report partition. Most notably, Jaffa was constituted as an enclave of the Arab State and the boundaries were modified to include Beersheba and a large section of the Negev desert within the Arab State and a section of the Dead Sea shore within the Jewish State.

The land allocated to the Arab state (about 43% of Mandatory Palestine) consisted of all of the highlands, except for Jerusalem, plus one third of the coastline. The highlands contain the major aquifers of Palestine, which supplied water to the coastal cities of central Palestine, including Tel Aviv. The Jewish state was to receive 56% of Mandatory Palestine, a slightly larger area to accommodate the increasing numbers of Jews who would immigrate there. The state included three fertile lowland plains — the Sharon on the coast, the Jezreel Valley and the upper Jordan Valley.

The bulk of the proposed Jewish State's territory, however, consisted of the Negev Desert. The desert was not suitable for agriculture, nor for urban development at that time. The Jewish state was also given sole access to the Red Sea.

The plan called for the new states to honor the existing international commitments and submit any disputes to the International Court of Justice. Under the Anglo-French Accords of 1922, 1923 and 1926 Syria and Lebanon had been granted the same rights of access to Lake Tiberias (aka Sea of Galilee and Lake Kinneret) as the Jewish and Arab Palestinians in the British Mandate territory. Under the 1923 Agreement:

"...Any existing rights over the use of waters of the Jordan by the inhabitants of Syria shall be maintained unimpaired.... ... The inhabitants of Syria and of the Lebanon shall have the same fishing and navigation rights on Lakes Huleh and Tiberias and on the River Jordan between the said lakes as the inhabitants of Palestine, but the Government of Palestine shall be responsible for the policing of the lakes.

The 1926 Accord stipulated that

"All the inhabitants, whether settled or semi-nomadic, of both territories who, at the date of the signature of this agreement enjoy grazing, watering or cultivation rights, or own land on the one or the other side of the frontier shall continue to exercise their rights as in the past."

Apart from the Negev, the land allocated to the Jewish state was largely made up of areas in which there was a significant Jewish population. The land allocated to the Arab state was populated almost solely by Arabs.

The plan tried its best to accommodate as many Jews as possible into the Jewish state. In many specific cases, this meant including areas of Arab majority (but with a significant Jewish minority) in the Jewish state. Thus the Jewish State would have an overall large Arab minority. Areas that were sparsely populated (like the Negev), were also included in the Jewish state to create room for immigration in order to relieve the "Jewish Problem". According to the resolution, Jews and Arabs living in the Jewish state would become citizens of the Jewish state and Jews and Arabs living in the Arab state would become citizens of the Arab state.

The UNSCOP plan would have had the following demographics (data based on 1945). This data does not reflect the actual land ownership by Jews, local Arabs, Ottomans and other land owners. This data also excludes the land designated to Arabs in trans-Jordan (country of Jordan, west of the river Jordan).

Territory	Arab and other population	% Arab and other	Jewish population	% Jewish	Total population
Arab State	725,000	99%	10,000	1%	735,000
Jewish State	407,000	45%	498,000	55%	905,000
International	105,000	51%	100,000	49%	205,000
Total	1,237,000	67%	608,000	33%	1,845,000
Data from the Report of UNSCOP — 1947

The UNSCOP Report also noted that "in addition there will be in the Jewish State about 90,000 Bedouins, cultivators and stock owners who seek grazing further afield in dry seasons."

Last minute corrections

The Bedouin settlement and population figures were revised in a report submitted by a representative of the government of the United Kingdom on 1 November 1947. It was included in an Ad Hoc Committee report, A/AC.14/32, dated 11 November 1947. The Palestine Administration conducted an investigation and used the Royal Air Force to perform an aerial survey of the Beersheba District. They reported that the Bedouins had the greater part of two million dunams under cereal grain production. The administration counted 3,389 Bedouin houses together with 8,722 tents. The report explained that:

"It should be noted that the term Beersheba Bedouin has a meaning more definite than one would expect in the case of a nomad population. These tribes, wherever they are found in Palestine, will always describe themselves as Beersheba tribes. Their attachment to the area arises from their land rights there and their historic association with it."

On the basis of that investigation, the Palestine Administration estimated the Bedouin population at approximately 127,000. The report noted that the earlier population "estimates must, however, be corrected in the light of the information furnished to the Sub-Committee by the representative of the United Kingdom regarding the Bedouin population. According to the statement, 22,000 Bedouins may be taken as normally residing in the areas allocated to the Arab State under the UNSCOP's majority plan, and the balance of 105,000 as resident in the proposed Jewish State. "It will thus be seen that the proposed Jewish State will contain a total population of 1,008,800, consisting of 509,780 Arabs and 499,020 Jews. In other words, at the outset, the Arabs will have a majority in the proposed Jewish State." The partition plan was revised and the Beersheba region was assigned to the Arab State, while some further parts of the Judean Desert were given to the Jewish State.

Reactions to the plan

Jewish reaction

The Jewish Agency criticized the UNSCOP majority proposal concerning Jerusalem, saying that the Jewish section of modern Jerusalem (outside the Walled City) should be included in the Jewish State. During his testimony Ben Gurion indicated that he accepted the principle of partition, but stipulated: "To partition," according to the Oxford dictionary, means to divide a thing into two parts. Palestine is divided into three parts, and only in a small part are the Jews allowed to live. We are against that."

The majority of the Jewish groups, and the Jewish Agency subsequently announced their acceptance of the proposed Jewish State, and by implication the proposed international zone, and Arab State. However, it had been stipulated that the implementation of the plan did not make the establishment of one state or territory dependent on the establishment of the others.

A minority of extreme nationalist Jewish groups like Menachem Begin's Irgun Tsvai Leumi and the Lehi (known as the Stern Gang), which had been fighting the British, rejected the plan. Begin warned that the partition would not bring peace because the Arabs would also attack the small state and that "in the war ahead we'll have to stand on our own, it will be a war on our existence and future".

Numerous records indicate the joy of Palestine's Jewish inhabitants as they attended to the U.N. session voting for the division proposal. Up to this day, Israeli history books mention November 29 (the date of this session) as the most important date in Israel's acquisition of independence, and many Israeli cities commemorate the date in their streets' names. However, Jews did criticize the lack of territorial continuity for the Jewish state.

Mehran Kamrava says Israeli sources often cite Jewish acceptance and Arab rejection of the U.N. partition plan as an example of the Zionists' desire for peaceful diplomacy and the Arabs' determination to wage war on the Jews. But he notes that more recent documentary analysis and interpretation of events leading up to and following the creation of the state of Israel fundamentally challenged many of the "myths" of what had actually happened in 1947 and 1948." Simha Flapan wrote that it was a myth that Zionists accepted the UN partition and planned for peace, and that it was also a myth that Arabs rejected partition and launched a war.

Chaim Weizmann commented on outside Arab interference with earlier partition proposals. He noted that Arab states, like Egypt and Iraq, had no legal standing in Palestinian affairs. During the 1947 General Assembly Special Session on Palestine "The Egyptian representative explained, in reply to various statements, that the Arab States did not represent the Palestinian Arab population." Avi Plascov says that the Arab countries had no intention of permitting the Palestinians a decisive role in the war or establishing a Palestinian state. He notes that the Arab Higher Committee (AHC) could not carry out its decisions and could not count on local Palestinian support.

Arab reaction

The Arab leadership (in and out of Palestine) opposed the plan. The Arabs argued that it violated the rights of the majority of the people in Palestine, which at the time was 67% non-Jewish (1,237,000) and 33% Jewish (608,000).

Arab leaders threatened the Jewish population of Palestine, speaking of "driving the Jews into the sea" and ridding Palestine "of the Zionist Plague". On the eve of the Arab armies invasion, Azzam Pasha, the General Secretary of the Arab League, "describing the fate of the Jews" is said to have declared: "This will be a war of extermination and a momentous massacre which will be spoken of like the Mongolian massacres and the Crusades". However, Joffe and Romirowsky report that this "cannot be confirmed from cited sources". Six days later, Azzam told reporters "We are fighting for an Arab Palestine. Whatever the outcome the Arabs will stick to their offer of equal citizenship for Jews in Arab Palestine and let them be as Jewish as they like. In areas where they predominate they will have complete autonomy."

John Wolffe says that while Zionists tend to attributed Palestinian rejection of the plan to a mere intransigence, Arabs have always reiterated that it was rejected because it was unfair: it gave the majority of the land (56 percent) to the Jews, who at that stage legally owned only 7 percent of it, and remained a minority of the population. Mehran Kamrava also notes the disproportionate allocation under the plan, and adds that the area under Jewish control contained 45 percent of the Palestinian population. The proposed Arab state was only given 45 percent of the land, much of which was unfit for agriculture. Jaffa, though geographically separated, was to be part of the Arab state. Eugene Bovis says that the Jewish leadership had rejected an earlier partition proposal because they felt it didn't allocate enough territory to the proposed Jewish state.

Ian Bickerton says that few Palestinians joined the Arab Liberation Army because they suspected that the other Arab States did not plan on an independent Palestinian state. Bickerton says for that reason many Palestinians favored partition and indicated a willingness to live alongside a Jewish state. He also mentions that the Nashashibi family backed King Abdullah and union with Transjordan. Abdullah appointed Ibrahim Hashem Pasha as the Governor of the Arab areas occupied by troops of the Arab League. He was a former Prime Minister of Transjordan who supported partition of Palestine as proposed by the Peel Commission and the United Nations. Fakhri Nashashibi and Ragheb Bey Nashashibi were leaders of the movement that opposed the Mufti during the mandate period. Both men accepted partition. Bey was the mayor of Jerusalem. He resigned from the Arab Higher Committee because he accepted the United Nations partition proposal. Fu’ad Nasar, the Secretary of Arab Workers Congress, also accepted partition. The United States declined to recognize the All-Palestine government in Gaza by explaining that it had accepted the UN Mediator's proposal. The Mediator had recommended that Palestine, as defined in the original Mandate including Transjordan, might form a union. Bernadotte's diary said the Mufti had lost credibility on account of his unrealistic predictions regarding the defeat of the Jewish militias. Bernadotte noted "It would seem as though in existing circumstances most of the Palestinian Arabs would be quite content to be incorporated in Transjordan.".

British reaction

The United Kingdom refused to implement the plan by force, arguing it was unacceptable to both sides. It refused to share the administration of Palestine with the UN Palestine Commission during the transitional period and announced its intention to unilaterally withdraw from Palestine starting on 15 May 1948. During their withdrawal, the British refused to hand over territory or authority to any successor.

Continuing relevance of the resolution

The Palestine Liberation Organization said that its 1988 Declaration of Statehood was a direct consequence of resolution 181(II) which continues to provide international legitimacy for the right of the Palestinian people to sovereignty and national independence.

John Quigley said that Palestine under the Mandate was a state and that the 1988 unilateral declaration of statehood, with its references to the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Partition plan, reaffirmed an existing Palestinian statehood.

James Crawford, Vera Gowlland-Debbas, Quigley and others have described how the General Assembly acknowledged and legitimized the proclamation of the State of Palestine, unlike the cases of Rhodesia and Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The General Assembly said Palestine's declaration was "in line with General Assembly resolution 181 (II) and in exercise of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people". Crawford noted that UN General Assembly Resolution 48/158D, 20 December 1993, called for the permanent status negotiations to guarantee 'arrangements for peace and security of all States in the region, including those named in resolution 181(II) of 29 November 1947, within secure and internationally recognized boundaries'.

The General Assembly request for an advisory opinion, Resolution ES-10/14 (2004), specifically cited resolution 181(II) as a "relevant resolution", and asked the International Court of Justice (ICJ) what are the legal consequences of the relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions? Judge Koroma explained the majority opinion: "The Court has also held that the right of self-determination as an established and recognized right under international law applies to the territory and to the Palestinian people. Accordingly, the exercise of such right entitles the Palestinian people to a State of their own as originally envisaged in resolution 181 (II) and subsequently confirmed."

Prof. Paul De Waart said that the Court put the legality of the 1922 League of Nations Palestine Mandate and the 1947 UN Plan of Partition beyond doubt once and for all.

The vote

  In favour

  Switched to in favour

  Abstained

  Against

  Absent

  Not UNO member

On 29 November 1947, the United Nations General Assembly voted 33 to 13, with 10 abstentions, in favour of the Partition Plan, while making some adjustments to the boundaries between the two states proposed by it. The partition was to take effect on the date of British withdrawal from the Mandate Territory of Palestine.

Passage of the resolution required a two-thirds majority of valid votes (i.e. not counting abstaining and absent members). Prior to the final vote, when countries indicated their voting intentions, it was evident that the required majority was not available. The vote would have been: for 30, against 16, abstaining 10 - one short of a two-thirds majority. Both sides put pressure on member countries to vote for or against the partition. President Truman later noted, "The facts were that not only were there pressure movements around the United Nations unlike anything that had been seen there before, but that the White House, too, was subjected to a constant barrage. I do not think I ever had as much pressure and propaganda aimed at the White House as I had in this instance. The persistence of a few of the extreme Zionist leaders — actuated by political motives and engaging in political threats — disturbed and annoyed me." Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru spoke with anger and contempt for the way the UN vote had been lined up. He said the Zionists had tried to bribe India with millions and at the same time his sister, Vijayalalshmi Pandit, had received daily warnings that her life was in danger unless "she voted right". Three countries — Haiti, Liberia, the Philippines — were persuaded to change their positions, which enabled the required majority to be reached. Liberia's Ambassador to the United States complained that the US delegation threatened aid cuts to several countries.

Of the permanent members of the Security Council, France, the United States, and the Soviet Union voted for the resolution while the Republic of China and the United Kingdom abstained. The final vote was as follows:

In favor, (33 countries, 59%):

• 30 countries (54%) initially in favour:
  • Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Belorussian SSR, Canada, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, Guatemala, Iceland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Sweden, South Africa, Ukrainian SSR, United States of America, Soviet Union, Uruguay, Venezuela.

• An additional 3 (5%) switched to in favor:
  • Haiti, Liberia, Philippines.

Against, (13 countries, 23%):

• Afghanistan, Cuba, Egypt, Greece, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, Yemen.

Abstentions, (10 countries, 18%):

• Argentina, Chile, Republic of China, Colombia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Honduras, Mexico, United Kingdom, Yugoslavia.

Absent, (1 country, 0%):

• Thailand

See also

• 1949 Armistice Agreements
• Balfour Declaration of 1917
• Churchill White Paper, 1922
• Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, May 14, 1948
• Faisal-Weizmann Agreement
• Hussein-McMahon Correspondence
• Israeli-Palestinian conflict
• Minority Treaties
• Proposals for a Palestinian state
• Sykes-Picot Agreement
• British Mandate of Palestine
• Lausanne Conference, 1949

Bibliography

• Bregman, Ahron (2002). Israel's Wars: A History Since 1947. London: Routledge. ISBN
• Arieh L. Avneri (1984). The Claim of Dispossession: Jewish Land Settlement and the Arabs, 1878–1948. Transaction Publishers. ISBN
• Fischbach, Michael R. (2003). Records of Dispossession: Palestinian Refugee Property and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Columbia University Press. ISBN
• Gelber, Yoav (1997). Jewish-Transjordanian Relations: Alliance of Bars Sinister. London: Routledge. ISBN-X
• Khalaf, Issa (1991). Politics in Palestine: Arab Factionalism and Social Disintegration,. University at Albany, SUNY. ISBN
• Louis, Wm. Roger (1986). The British Empire in the Middle East,: Arab Nationalism, the United States, and Postwar Imperialism. Oxford University Press. ISBN
• "Palestine". Encyclopædia Britannica Online School Edition, 15 May 2006.
• Sicker, Martin (1999). Reshaping Palestine: From Muhammad Ali to the British Mandate, 1831–1922. Praeger/Greenwood. ISBN

External links

• Text of the resolution
• Legal Status of West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem
• Maps of Palestine
• Ivan Rand and the UNSCOP Papers
• Official Map prepared by UNSCOP
• November 29th Quiz
• Firsthand testimonies from the men and women who helped found the State of Israel