Impeachment of Dilma Rousseff
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The impeachment of Dilma Rousseff, the 36th President of Brazil, began in late 2015 and continued through 2016. An impeachment request against Rousseff was accepted by Eduardo Cunha, then president of the Chamber of Deputies, on 2 December 2015. Rousseff was more than 12 months into her second four-year term at the time. She was charged with criminal responsibility in the execution of her duties, including administrative misconduct and disregarding the federal budget in violation of article 85, items V and VI of the Brazilian Constitution and the Fiscal Responsibility Law, article 36.
The impeachment request also accused Rousseff of failing to act on irregularities concerning the Brazilian petroleum company Petrobras where she, as President of Brazil and presented with serious allegations uncovered by the Operation Car Wash investigation, failed to distance herself from the suspects. According to the report, this lack of action was aggravated by Rousseff's being president of the board of directors of the company during the time frame covered by the investigation, when Petrobras controversially acquired Pasadena Refining System. According to the request, her inaction indicated criminal responsibility. However, these charges were not included in the impeachment, due to a legal obstacle that prevents investigating a president for acts prior to their presidential mandate.
On 31 August 2016, the Senate removed President Rousseff from office by a vote of 61–20, finding her guilty of breaking budgetary laws. Her vice-president Michel Temer replaced her and became the 37th President of Brazil.
- 1 Background
- 2 Request for impeachment
- 3 Process in Congress
- 4 Acting president
- 5 Impeachment trial
- 5.1 Rousseff's defence
- 5.2 Committee meetings
- 5.3 Voting on the final report in Senate
- 5.4 Decisive voting in Senate
- 6 After impeachment
- 7 See also
- 8 References
- 9 External links
Tax evasion and wrongdoing at Petrobras, "fiscal pedalling"
Graft was alleged to have occurred when President Rousseff was on the board of directors of the state-owned energy company Petrobras from 2003 to 2010. In February 2014, an investigation by Brazilian Federal Police called Operation Car Wash placed Petrobras at the center of "what may be the largest corruption scandal in Brazil's history". On 14 November 2014, police raids across six Brazilian states netted prominent Brazilian politicians and businessmen, including some Petrobras directors, who were placed under investigation in connection with "suspicious" contracts worth $22 billion. Further investigation found various offshore accounts and art collections held by those involved in the controversy.
No evidence that Rousseff herself was involved in the scheme was found and she denied any prior knowledge of the graft. One million Brazilians protested in the streets in March 2015 calling for Rousseff's impeachment.
Under Rousseff, the government of Brazil was also accused of carrying out "fiscal pedalling" — an accounting manoeuvre through which the government gives the false impression that it received more money than it spent. The government failed to provide funds to public and private banks that make payments for a number of public expense programs, including social assistance programs like Bolsa Família, forcing the banks to finance programs themselves without government compensation. The government's apparent motive was to improve its fiscal outcomes for the years 2012 to 2014. The Tribunal de Contas da União (TCU), unanimously declared this maneuver a violation of fiscal responsibility. TCU, an auxiliary of the legislative body, has no legal power; but their decision put the National Congress under pressure to begin impeachment proceedings.
Rousseff won the 2014 general election, with 51.64% of the votes. It was one of the most contentious presidential elections in the country's history. Sworn in on 1 January 2015, Rousseff began her second term weakened by corruption allegations and the 2014–2016 Brazilian economic recession. On 15 March 2015, protests began, gathering hundreds of thousands of Brazilians across the country to demand among other things Rousseff's resignation or her impeachment. By June 2015 she had a disapproval rating of 68%, the highest for a Brazilian president since the country's redemocratization, and by August 2015 had a disapproval rating of 71%.
Beyond the violations of the budget law, Rousseff and her government were increasingly tainted by corruption allegations. The President of the Chamber of Deputies, Eduardo Cunha, was investigated in Operation Car Wash for allegedly receiving bribes and keeping secret Swiss bank accounts. The Council of Ethics and Parliamentary Decorum of the House of Deputies of Brazil filed a lawsuit against him, putting Cunha at risk of losing his seat in the Chamber of Deputies. The Council is responsible for judging and applying penalties to deputies in cases of non-compliance with norms regarding parliamentary decorum. Rumors emerged about attempts to reach an agreement between the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (Cunha's party) and the Workers' Party (Rousseff's party) to archive the lawsuit against Cunha if Cunha would refuse to accept the impeachment request against Rousseff. Cunha strongly denied this agreement existed. When the Workers' Party announced to the Council of Ethics its support for the lawsuit against Cunha, he accepted the impeachment request, allegedly in retaliation.
In his defense, Cunha said: "The receipt of the complaint has clearly defined reasons when it talks about direct participation in the conduct that was described in what were then budget decrees. I haven't issued and I will not issue any judgment on the accusation against the President of the Republic, even more if it's a personal matter. I'm just sticking to facts exemplified (in the law)". He stated that the opening of the impeachment process was his constitutional duty as the chamber's president, and the decision was based only on facts related to the disregarding of the Budget Laws. He reiterated that he had no personal reason or retaliation against the Workers' Party. He also stressed that Rousseff signed six decrees with additional credits, which increased the 2015 federal spending in non-compliance with the annual budget law and without approval of the Congress.
|“||Inconsistent and unfounded are the reasons for this request. There is no illegal act committed by me [...] I would never accept any kind of bargain, much less those that threaten the free functioning of democratic institutions in this country.||”|
|— Dilma Rousseff, News conference and pronouncement on national television – 2 December 2015.|
In turn, Rousseff also denied any attempted deal to save Cunha in return for stopping her impeachment, and also denied agreements to interfere with the Council of Ethics in exchange for approval of the re-introduction of the CPMF tax (Provisional Tax on Financial Transactions), which was another great need of the government. At a news conference on 2 December 2015, she said that she would never accept or agree to any kind of bargain.
|“||She lied on national television network and this is very serious. If she had not participated directly I would not speak.||”|
|— Eduardo Cunha, News conference – 3 December 2015.|
After this pronouncement by the president, Cunha said Rousseff had lied to the nation when she said she would not participate in any deal and that the government had much to explain to the country. Cunha claimed he was not aware of negotiations and that he had not met Jaques Wagner, the supposed intermediary in supposed negotiations with Rousseff. Declaring himself against the Workers' Party, he said he would rather not have the three votes from the party in the Council of Ethics.
Comments by specialists and public opinion
Professor Leonardo Avritzer of Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais told Agência Brasil in December 2015 that the political crisis was tied to Rousseff's inability to negotiate with Congress, and noted Brazil's fragmented political system, and many political parties, causing an ungovernable government. Also, the opposition confronted Rousseff after the elections of 2014, calling for a recount. Her campaign accounts were also disputed, and the impeachment process destabilized the government. However, some of the comments said, the process benefit Rousseff, who would then be freed from blackmail and could potentially reorganize her government. Political scientists believed Cunha could lose his mandate and that the opposition would try to push the process in Congress for 2016 in order to mitigate the "electoral ecstasy" and "act of revenge" that were said to be the cause of the impeachment attempt.
In CNT/MDA polls performed in March 2015, only 10.8% of Brazilians approved of Rousseff's government and 59.7% wanted her impeached. In July 2015, this number had risen to 62.8%. By April 2016, in polls performed by Datafolha Institute, 61% of Brazilians believed that Rousseff should be impeached.
Request for impeachment
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Since 2012, a total of 37 requests for impeachment of president Dilma Rousseff were presented to the Chamber of Deputies, of which 23 were archived and did not proceed. The remaining 14 proceeded, but only one was accepted by then president of the Chamber Eduardo Cunha. This request was submitted by former congressman and attorney Hélio Bicudo and attorneys Miguel Reale Júnior and Janaina Paschoal. It was based on allegations of omission concerning irregularities at Petrobras, fiscal responsibility crimes, and budgetary mismanagement.
In the course of Operation Car Wash, many illegal and suspicious transactions were investigated, including Brazil's purchase of Pasadena Refinery by Petrobras, a business deal that cost the Brazilian company a financial loss of R$792 million (US$362 million). Rousseff was president of the board of directors of Petrobras and gave as a defence that a mistake had been made concerning a contractual clause. She stated that "her decision was based on a technically and legally flawed summary" of the purchase document drawn up by Nestor Cerveró, who was then the financial director on Petrobras Distribuidora, fuel distribution and trading subsidiary of Petrobras. According to the report, the president insisted on a theory that the allegations were a kind of coup and merely an attempt to weaken Petrobras. Always emphasizing its expertise in the economy and energy sectors, the president also emphasized the company's financial health. She stepped down from the Petrobras board only in February 2015, when the situation was already untenable.
The report also denounced a corrupt scheme involving alleged shady deals by former President Lula, who intermediated business of the Brazilian construction company Norberto Odebrecht in Cuba and Angola, which Rousseff had allegedly known was for the purpose of money laundering corrupt income through Petrobras. Some international companies were chosen to be encouraged and, thereafter, participating in unrealistic bids, to drain the state-owned company, giving back much of the values through seemingly licit donations. It was alleged that, according to statements taken from the accused in Operation Car Wash, Lula and Rousseff knew of the bribery scheme in Petrobras.
Fiscal responsibility crimes
Rousseff issued six unnumbered decrees in 2014 and 2015 that resulted in the provision of additional credit to social programs for political purposes, without authorization from Congress. These amounts totaled R$18.5 billion (US$6.9 billion) and were contracted in official financial institutions without the necessary legislative authorization, even with the targets set not complying with the Fiscal Responsibility Law and the Annual Budgetary Law. To obtain these additional credits, the target of 2014 was reduced by the end of 2014 by R$67 billion (US$25 billion) at the request of the president. The same conduct of the accused was committed in 2015. Rousseff, by means of decrees, authorized in the years 2014 and 2015, the opening credit, disregarding the Annual Budgetary Law and the Federal Constitution, precisely to allow the provision of additional resources when it was known that the primary superavit target in the Budget forecast was not being fulfilled, and would not be fulfilled.
Illegal practices of accounting disinformation and so-called "fiscal pedalling"
In 2011 and 2014, the Government has held illegal credit operations from no transfer of funds to the national financial system entities controlled by the State. That practice was taken from financial advances made by official financial institutions, such as Caixa Econômica Federal and Banco do Brasil for finance social programs of responsibility of the Federal Government. These transactions were reported in 2015 by Tribunal de Contas da União and, according to the report, aimed at election results.
The Government contracted Caixa Economica Federal and Banco do Brasil as operators by Federal Government social programs. For this purpose, the Government should pass along directly from the National Treasury Secretary account, the necessary resources for the realization of programs each month, more precisely, would be obliged to transfer to the financial institutions the equivalent values for the equalization of interest rates, expenditures and legal transfers. But the government had not done these refunds and the contracted financial system entities made payments to programs beneficiaries with own resources and hence promoted the credit constitution in his favor against the Government. This procedure is a form of mutual credit, or similar operation and in accordance with the Fiscal Responsibility Law, art. 36, is prohibited to carry out credit operations between a state financial institution and the member of the Federation that controls it, as the borrower. The total balance of these liabilities by the end of August 2014 was R$1.74 billion (US$740 million). Of an amount of R$7.8 billion (US$2.9 billion) spent on subsidies in the programs between 2009 and 2014, only R$1.6 billion (US$590 million) was transferred by the Government.
By the end of 2014, Rousseff sent to the National Congress the PLN Nr. 362014, to change the Budgetary Directives Law aimed at modifying the rules of the primary superavit. Thus, has demonstrated knowledge of the results of the public accounts and which has taken the necessary steps to regularize them. However, he did just to meet your interest, as sought avoid being accused of a crime committed for not meet the fiscal targets set out in law.
Both the Federal Constitution and Article 4 of Law 1079/50, establish that give rise the impediment of the President the fact that attempt against probity in administration and against the budget law. Are crimes of responsibility against the budget law, order or authorize the opening of credit in disagreement with the limits set by the Senate, not well-founded in budget law or in additional credit law or inobservance of legal prescription;(Law Nr. 10028, 2000) and fail to promote or to order the full settlement of credit operations in anticipation of budget revenue, including related interest and other charges, until the end of the fiscal period; (Law Nr. 10028, 2000).
Therefore, there is a political violation, which may lead to the impeachment, by Legislative trial, and there is a civil offense, which entails indemnities and mandate cassation by the Judiciary. When the author of conduct is the President, also commit crime of responsibility, pursuant to art. 10 of Law n. 1079/50, amended by Law Nr. 10028/2000.
Process in Congress
Acceptance of the request for impeachment
There were 37 requests for impeachment filed with the Chamber of Deputies by September 2015 against Dilma Rousseff, but the president's home only received the written request of Hélio Bicudo and the lawyers Miguel Reale Júnior and Janaina Paschoal. The social movement pro-impeachment (such as the Free Brazil Movement and Come to the Street Movement) decided to join Bicudo's request. It also had the support of parliamentarians and civil society, which organized a petition in support of the impeachment of the President of the Republic.
Lawyers, in the document presented to the House, tried to associate Dilma Rousseff with Operation Car Wash, cited failure in case of corruption, to investigate influence peddling allegations against former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and "fiscal pedalling". In addition, it contributed to support the request of six decrees signed by the president in the fiscal year of 2015 in disagreement with the law guidelining the budget, which were published without permission of the Congress.
Voting on the admissibility of the request by the Chamber of Deputies
After Cunha accepted the impeachment request on 2 December 2015, a special committee of the Chamber of Deputies decided on its admissibility. The impeachment process began with the testimony of the authors of the request, followed by a presentation of Rousseff's defense. Meanwhile, street protests for and against the impeachment occurred periodically throughout the country. The committee's report favored impeachment 38 to 27.
On 17 April 2016, the full lower house of the Brazilian Parliament voted 367 to 137 for an impeachment process, with seven deputies abstaining and two absent from the session. The internal rules of the house required 342 votes in favor from among the 513 sitting members. This resulted in Cunha referring the matter to the Senate, the Brazilian upper legislative house, which followed procedure and judged the case.
|Brazilian Democratic Movement Party||PMDB||59||7||1||67|
|Brazilian Labour Party||PTB||14||6||20|
|Brazilian Republican Party||PRB||22||22|
|Brazilian Social Democracy Party||PSDB||52||52|
|Brazilian Socialist Party||PSB||29||3||32|
|Communist Party of Brazil||PCdoB||10||10|
|Democratic Labour Party||PDT||6||12||1||19|
|Humanist Party of Solidarity||PHS||6||1||7|
|Labour Party of Brazil||PTdoB||2||1||3|
|National Ecologic Party||PEN||1||1||2|
|National Labour Party||PTN||8||4||12|
|Party of the Brazilian Woman||PMB||1||1|
|Party of the Republic||PR||26||10||3||1||40|
|Popular Socialist Party||PPS||8||8|
|Republican Party of the Social Order||PROS||4||2||6|
|Social Christian Party||PSC||10||10|
|Social Democratic Party||PSD||29||8||37|
|Social Liberal Party||PSL||2||2|
|Socialism and Liberty Party||PSOL||6||6|
Voting on the process proceeding to the Senate
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|Wikinews has related news: Brazilian Senate vote to suspend President Rousseff|
After the vote held in the Chamber on 17 April to allow the charges against the President to be presented to the Senate, the process was delivered by Cunha to the Senate and confirmed with a 55–22 vote on 12 May in a session that lasted more than 20 hours, resulting in the suspension of Rousseff's presidential powers and duties for up to 180 days. During the suspension and the judgement to decide whether she would be convicted and removed from office or acquitted with powers and duties restored, vice-president Michel Temer served as acting president.
On 5 May 2016, Teori Zavascki, judge of the Supreme Federal Court decided that Cunha must step down from the presidency of the Chamber of Deputies and suspend his mandate, because he was facing a corruption trial. The decision was later endorsed by all eleven judges of the Court and did not affect the process of impeachment against Rousseff.
On 12 September 2016, Cunha was ousted from the Chamber of Deputies with political rights suspended, accused of ethical misconduct by lying during testimony at the Committee of Investigation on the Operation Car Wash and after a lengthy Chamber internal process that lasted for eleven months. The following month, on 19 October 2016, Cunha was arrested on corruption and money laundering charges by kickbacks over Petrobras drillship.
|Brazilian Democratic Movement Party||PMDB||13||2||1||2||18|
|Brazilian Labour Party||PTB||1||2||3|
|Brazilian Republican Party||PRB||1||1|
|Brazilian Social Democracy Party||PSDB||11||11|
|Brazilian Socialist Party||PSB||5||2||7|
|Christian Labour Party||PTC||1||1|
|Communist Party of Brazil||PCdoB||1||1|
|Democratic Labour Party||PDT||2||1||3|
|Party of the Republic||PR||4||4|
|Popular Socialist Party||PPS||1||1|
|Social Christian Party||PSC||1||1||2|
|Social Democratic Party||PSD||3||1||4|
In the Brazilian political system, the President and Vice President form a single electoral coalition. However, their terms are constitutionally separate. Michel Temer was President of the Chamber of Deputies during the Fernando Henrique Cardoso presidential mandate, from 1995 to 2002. Mr. Temer is a member of PMDB, which declared moving to opposition to Dilma Rousseff government in March 2016. According to some newspapers such as The Guardian, "for those desperate for change, Temer represents salvation. Others, more concerned about the country's fragile democracy, believe he is the perpetrator of a coup." A separate proposal to impeach Michael Temer as Acting President and Vice President has been made.
Public opinion survey and economics
A CNT/MDA poll published on 8 June 2016, indicates that 11.3% of Brazilians approved and 28% censured the acting government of President Temer. For 30.2% of respondents, Temer's government is ordinary, while 30.5% gave no answer. The survey revealed that 46.6% of Brazilians believed that the corruption in Temer's government could be equal to that experienced in Rousseff's government. Also according to the poll, 28.3% believe that corruption could be lessened, while 18.6% estimated that it could be even greater. Regarding lawfulness in the process of impeachment, 61.5% agreed with the conduction of the process, 33.3% answered negatively and 5.2% didn't answer. According to the survey agency, the CNT/MDA polled 2,002 people in 137 municipalities in 25 federative units from 2 to 5 June. The margin of error was 2.2 percentage points, with 95% reliability.
An Ipsos poll in early July 2016 concluded that 16% of Brazilians preferred Temer in office, 20% that Rousseff should be acquitted and restored to office to conclude her four-year mandate; 52% that whoever assumes the command of the nation must call new elections for president. However, the anticipated elections can only occur with the approval of a large majority of Congress (three-fifths) or if Temer and Rousseff resign simultaneously, considered unlikely. Alternatively, both could be removed from their offices, depending on the outcome of a lawsuit filed in Superior Electoral Court by the PSDB, party of Aécio Neves, then defeated candidate in the presidential elections of 2014, claiming that there was electoral crime in the political campaign of the alliance Rousseff-Temer, with donations made by companies investigated in Operation Car Wash. In the poll, 12% were undecided or had not answered; sample size was 1,200 people in 72 Brazilian municipalities. The margin of error was 3 percentage points.
According to the National Confederation of Industry (CNI), the industry confidence index reached 47.3 points in July 2016, from 45.7 in June, 10.1 points higher than July 2015. In the CNI Industrial Thermometer, released on 2 September 2016, two indicators had positive performance: exports and industrial confidence index. Five others were negative: hours worked in production, employment, sales, investment intention and effective capacity utilization rate. Two indicators were steady: production and actual-planned stock indicator.
According to Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics, the National Index of Consumer Prices Broad in Brazil decreased from 0.78% in May 2016 to 0.35% in June 2016, the lowest index since August 2015.
With the completion of the assessment and admissibility stages of an impeachment process, subsequent procedure requires new citations, rulings on gathering of evidence, and witness testimony to support the decision. The Senate, in a plenary session, pronounce by a simple majority whether the charges are well-founded or are not adequately supported. The first task was Rousseff notification to allow a new defence. For this whole second phase of the process, the Committee was supported by the president of the Supreme Federal Court, Ricardo Lewandowski. The last phase of the trial, that decided by the conviction or acquittal of the suspended President, was chaired by Lewandowski, sitting as Supreme Court president. On this decisive voting, two-thirds of the votes (54 of the total of 81 senators) are needed to permanently remove a President.
The 20-day period in which suspended President Dilma Rousseff could present a preliminary written defence for the trial in the Senate expired on 1 June 2016. On that day, the document was personally registered in the Senate by Rousseff's lawyer, former Minister of Justice and former Attorney General José Eduardo Cardozo.
In the 370-page document, besides the reasons already claimed in the previous phase, that the president had not committed the alleged crimes of responsibility, it was stated that the "just cause or reason aimed at the need for consummation of Rousseff's impeachment was only and exclusively the aim at end up the Operation Car Wash". For this statement, Cardozo was supported by the transcripts of a recorded telephone conversation between Sérgio Machado (politician and businessman), former president of Transpetro (a Petrobras subsidiary), and the senator Romero Jucá, a politician with influential leadership in the Brazilian party PMDB. The recorded conversation, published by the newspaper Folha de S. Paulo, convinced Cardozo that the two were trying to prevent the investigation widening, due to the risk of both being caught up, and suggested that Rousseff's impeachment could have been part of an agreement aimed at preventing (and possibly later stopping) the Operation Car Wash investigations. Senator Jucá's lawyer said that his client never thought to interfere in Operation Car Wash and the dialogue did not suggest that. Jucá, who had been appointed Planning Minister by acting President Temer, also denied ever attempting to obstruct the investigation, and after speaking with Temer on 23 May, said that he had no intention of resigning. However, the next day Jucá resigned after eleven days in office.
Work plan and preliminary requests
On 25 May 2016, Senator Antônio Anastasia, rapporteur of the Special Committee of Impeachment 2016 (CEI 2016), presented a work plan for the trial. The next meeting was scheduled for 2 June, to analyse new deadlines.
The Committee, on 2 June 2016, assessed the report with new work plan deadlines presented by Anastasia and requests by senators in a session that lasted over nine hours. Anastasia proposed that the final arguments of the prosecution and the defence should be heard by 7 July. He rejected the introduction of the recording of the telephone conversation between Sérgio Machado and senator Romero Jucá, requested by Cardozo. He ruled that it would be irrelevant to the process, since the charges against Rousseff were fiscal responsibility crimes and the recording was only an informal conversation and nothing could be proved legally. Cardozo protested the decision, claiming that the facts cited in the record were a main object of the investigation, and announced on 3 June that he would appeal the decision to the president of the Supreme Court, Lewandowski.
The Committee approved the work plan and deadlines presented by the rapporteur Anastasia on 6 June.
On 7 June, Lewandowski denied the appeal filed by Cardozo to append the recording of Sérgio Machado, citing a precedent that evidence of that type is confidential until the beginning of a formal investigation. Machado was arrested and introduced the recording of the conversation during his interrogatory. Besides, the subject under appeal had been discussed in prior decisions of the Court. Lewandowski also denied an appeal by senator Aloysio Nunes, former member of the Committee, to reduce the number of witnesses. At the 2 June meeting, the Committee had established that eight witnesses would be heard for each of the six supplemental budget decrees against Rousseff, both for the prosecution and for the defence, i.e. a total of 48 witnesses for each side, with each decree considered separately. Nunes contended that the six decrees should be considered a single entity, to be added to the so-called "tax pedalling", so that the number of witnesses to be heard could be reduced to 16.
On 8 June, the Committee accepted a request by both defence and prosecution, reducing to four the number of supplemental budget decrees to be considered in the trial, as crime of responsibility by President Rousseff. Thus, the number of witnesses in the process was reduced to forty. Since each charge entitled eight witnesses, the defence of Rousseff could introduce up to 32 witnesses for the four decrees and eight for the "tax pedalling" charge. The prosecution would be entitled to the same number. The decision to reduce the charges was supported by a report produced at the course on the House of Representatives, that considered that two decrees signed by Rousseff without approval of Congress were neutral from a fiscal perspective, once the primary sources and financial expenses listed in these documents were equivalent.
Hearing of witnesses
The hearings began on 8 June 2016. Prosecutors were Janaína Paschoal and Miguel Reale Junior, and Rousseff was represented by her lawyer, Jose Eduardo Cardozo. Four prosecution witnesses were heard in this first session, which lasted more than 14 hours from 11:40 am on the 8th to 2:10 am on the 9th.
|“||Fraud is the will of, free and consciously, to practice the misconduct and get the result. And that's what the President did. She edited the decrees by a free and conscious mode to increase costs, that could not increased by a decree. She should send a bill.||”|
|— Julio Marcelo de Oliveira, procurator of the Federal Court of Accounts (TCU), Agência Brasil.|
Julio Marcelo de Oliveira, procurator of the Federal Court of Accounts (TCU), said that in April 2015, TCU identified the recidivist fiscal misconduct, so-called "tax pedalling", immediately rejected. There was not previous understanding to modified the rules and the consensus, every time that the TCU has ruled, was disapproved this conduct adopted illegally by Rousseff. He also reiterated that the President acted intentionally to borrow from public banks, that acted "coercively" in these operations. This, in his opinion, is serious, and forbidden by the Fiscal Responsibility Law. The practice, he said, lasted years, including throughout the year 2015.
Antonio Carlos Costa D'avila Carvalho, the auditor of TCU, said that the fiscal practices by Rousseff were unprecedented. He also reiterated that the misconducts committed caused serious outcomes. Adriano Pereira de Paula, Credit Operations manager of the National Treasury Secretary, and Otavio Ladeira de Medeiros, deputy secretary of the National Treasury, also testified during this session.
On 9 and 10 June there were no Committee sessions. From 13 to 17 June, there were five sessions, with hearings of sixteen witnesses, two by prosecution and fourteen by defence.
The prosecution witnesses Tiago Alves de Gouveia Lins Dutra and Leonardo Rodrigues Albernaz, both TCU auditors, were heard on 13 June. Tiago Dutra said that Rousseff held credit operations with public banks in 2015 that had already observed in 2014. A TCU report pointed to a delay of eleven months in the amount of R$2.6 billion, and five months in transfers of R$3 billion, related to the operations. For principal and interest, until December 2015, the government have been paid R$15 billion, of which R$2 billion were related to interest. According to Leonardo Albernaz, more than fifty auditors accomplished an analysis of Rousseff accounts and concluded unanimously that her administration has made "the most reckless management" of public finances since the Fiscal Responsibility Law was enacted in May 2000.
The Committee's President, Raimundo Lira, announced the decision of the President of the Supreme Court, Ricardo Lewandowski, authorizing an audit in the documents, requested by the defence. Lira designated a board consisting of three experts, granting to prosecution, defence and Senators 48 hours to formulate questions and indicate technical assistants, as well as 24 hours to refute the appointed experts, fixing also a ten days deadline for the completion of audit.
|“||I don't understand that it was a credit operation, but a rendering of services. At no time that the Union [Government] pays to bank was directly related to what the producers has received. The producers received from the bank itself. The Union participation doesn't characterize a credit operation between the Union and public banks.||”|
|— Gilson Bittencourt, former National Secretary of Planning and Strategic Investment, Agência Brasil.|
On 14 June, the first defence witnesses were heard: the former National Secretary of Planning and Strategic Investment, Gilson Bittencourt, and the former Secretary of Agricultural Policy of the Ministry of Agriculture, André Nassar. Bittencourt said that there was no credit operation between the Government and public banks and also denied that there was delay in the payment of interest to public banks in 2015. According to Bittencourt, the debit to be paid in 2016 came to be due only at the time of collection by the banks, that is done every six months. André Nassar said that the Bank of Brazil had an interest in "circulating money", by lending to producers, and even getting the transfers delayed by the government. He also said that, as Secretary of Agricultural Policy and from the point of view of the agricultural sector, this was the most important to avoid a discontinuity that, had it occurred, would have generated serious outcomes to the sector.
On 15 June, three defence witnesses were heard: the former Deputy Secretary of the Federal Budget Office, Cilair Rodrigues de Abreu, the former Secretary of Budget and Administration of the Ministry of Social Security, José Geraldo França Diniz and the Juridical Consultant of the Ministry of Planning, Budget, and Management, Walter Baere de Araújo Filho. Cilair Rodrigues said that the understanding of the TCU before 2015 was always that the future target could be used by Secretary of Budget in the publication of their reports. This understanding had changed, he said, only in 2015. França Diniz commented that, due the process complexity for supplemental budget decrees, the documents are reviewed by experts and the President could not accomplish a whole analysis of the documents. Rousseff signed, but it would be impossible to analyse in detail 200 pages of attachments, calculations and spreadsheets. Walter Baere said that the TCU never emitted formal advices concerning the illegality of the issue of supplemental budget decrees by the President. He said also that the TCU had the specific legal duty to alert when there is a possibility of not achieving the fiscal targets.
Four defence witnesses were heard on 16 June: the former Executive Secretary of the Ministry of Education, Luiz Cláudio Costa, the former Secretary Executive Assistant of the Ministry of Education, Wagner Vilas Boas, the Assistant Secretary of Planning and Budget of the Ministry of Education, Iara Ferreira Pinho and the Director of the Department of Economic Programs of the Secretary of Federal Budget, Clayton Luiz Montes. According to Luiz Claudio Costa, the supplemental budget decree for the Ministry of Education, was important for the management, enabling several sectors linked to the Ministry, such as universities, institutes and others, should adequate their budget to the instant needs. Vilas Boas explained that it was not granting of the Ministry of Education to evaluate the impact of the credit opening for obtaining the primary balance target. He said that the sectorial authority – in this case the agencies of the Ministry – make a request for supplemental budget, but are liable to policy guidance and technical supervision by the budget agency. Both, Wagner Vilas Boas and Iara Pinho, said they could not give an opinion on the compatibility of the signed supplementary decrees and the current fiscal target since their functions don't allow to accomplish analysis of the achievement of the target. Concerning these statements, the prosecution pointed out that the technicians were not able to explain specifically about the possible crime of responsibility. "The witnesses left shown that unaware the facts. Our claim is that the evidence shall excused", said prosecution lawyer, Janaina Paschoal, after the testimony of Iara Pinho.
Clayton Luiz Montes said that "the government has followed the new understanding of the TCU by October 2015. Since that time, were not sent any credit decrees". This, nevertheless, is conflicting with the statements of TCU auditors, that there was not previous understanding to modified the rules.
On 17 June, five defence witnesses were heard: the former Minister of Planning, Budget and Management, Nelson Barbosa, the former Minister of Education, José Henrique Paim, the Director of the Department of Infrastructure Programs of the Federal Budget Secretary, Zarak de Oliveira Ferreira, the Analyst of Planning and Budget of the Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management, Antonio José Chatack Carmelo, and the Planning and Budget Analyst of the Federal Budget Office, Georgimar Martiniano de Sousa.
Nelson Barbosa said that the additional credit decrees issued by President Rousseff from June to August 2015 not prevented the fulfilment of the fiscal target approved by Congress in early 2015 and, since is an supplemental credit that has no impact on the target, was not considered a target of primary balance, but to give more autonomy to the allocation of a value already available. Henrique Paim said that the decrees were essential to the functioning of various sectors of Education, including scientific research and operation of universities. Moreover, according to the former minister, the additional credits are often edited based on revenue generation, provided by "budget units", linked to the Ministry. Also the technicians Zarak de Oliveira, Chatack Carmelo and Georgimar Martiniano, have not seen incompatibility of supplemental decrees with the fiscal target.
From 20 to 24 June, there were five meetings, with hearings of fifteen witnesses, all called by the defence.
On 20 June, four witnesses were heard: the former Deputy Chief for Legal Affairs of Staff of the Presidency, Ivo da Motta Azevedo Correa, the former Minister of Education, Renato Janine Ribeiro, the Director of the Department of Social Programs of the Secretary of Federal Budget, Felipe Daruich Neto and the former Deputy Executive Secretary of the Staff of the Presidency, Bruno Moretti. Ivo Correa said that an alert of the TCU is not a decision of the Court, therefore, the government relied on previous jurisprudence to edit the decrees. Janine Ribeiro said that no alert was received from the TCU about irregularities in the supplemental budget decrees when Minister of Education. Daruich Neto saids that, at any time, as occurred any intentional misconduct and is impracticable to the President evaluate all decrees, before sign it.
Four witnesses were heard on 21 June: the former Minister of the Secretary of Human Rights, Pepe Vargas, the former Minister of Planning, Budget and Management and former President of Caixa Econômica Federal, Miriam Belchior, the Planning and Budget Analyst and former Deputy Secretary of Planning and Budget of the Ministry of Justice, Orlando Magalhães da Cunha and the Coordinator of Budget and Finance of the Ministry of Justice, Marcelo Minghelli. The former Minister Pepe Vargas asserted that the supplemental credit to Secretary of Human Rights was derived not just from Treasury resources, but of surplus resources of funds obtained through donations by individuals and corporations. Mirian Belchior said that the supplemental budget decrees, by which Rousseff is indicted were lawful and was impossible increase the resources contingency as made in 2015.
On 22 June, three witnesses were heard: the Planning and Budget Analyst and General Coordinator of Technology and Information of the Federal Budget Office, Robson Azevedo Rung, the Secretary of Institutional Organization of the Ministry of Defence, Luiz Antonio de Souza Cordeiro and the Representative of the Superior Labor Court, Luciano Carlos de Almeida. Azevedo Rung said that the Federal Budget Office received a new interpretation from TCU only in 2015, concerning to procedures that ever were well settled.
Also, at this session the Committee approved a new timetable for the trial. On 6 July, testimony of Rousseff, who can be represented by her lawyer, José Eduardo Cardozo. From 7 to 12 July, final arguments of the prosecution and from 13 to 27 July, final arguments of the defence. On 9 August, discussion and voting of the report in plenary and 22 August, the estimated date to decisive judgment.
Two witnesses were heard on 23 June, the Deputy Secretary of Planning, Budget and Administration of the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation, Anderson Lozi da Rocha and the former Secretary of Federal Budget, Esther Dweck. Dweck denied that the supplemental budget decrees in 2015 has contributed to the breach of the target for primary surplus for that year.
On 24 June, were heard two witnesses, the former Executive Secretary of the Ministry of Labor and Employment, Francisco José Pontes Ibiapina and the Director of Special Programs of the Secretary of Federal Budget, Marcos de Oliveira Ferreira. Pontes Ibiapina said that the supplemental budget decrees were published to aid programs as the transfer of resources to States and Municipalities, by the National Employment System and other programs.
From 27 to 29 June happened three meetings, with hearings of nine witnesses, all convened by defence.
Patrus Ananias, former Ministry of Agrarian Development, was heard on 27 June. Ananias said that he unknowledge the "tax pedalling" and the resources were transferred from the Bank of Brazil directly to producers with subsidized interest rates, due to the heed that agriculture deserves.
On 28 June, were heard Maria Fernanda Ramos Coelho, former Executive Secretary of the Ministry of Agrarian Development, Aldo Rebelo, former Ministry of Defence, Luís Inácio Adams, former General's Office attorney and Antônio Carlos Stangherlin Rebelo, technical responsible for analysis of supplemental credits on the National Justice Council. Maria Fernanda said that the delay in the payment of interest rate equalization of the Plan Safra (government's plan to support agriculture) for 2015, did not configure a credit operation, since the non-compliance was not subject to penalty payment in the contract term. According to former Secretary, the values were only monetarily adjusted. The prosecution lawyer Janaína Paschoal rejected the claims of Maria Fernanda and said that the remuneration per interest rate SELIC (a benchmark interest rate of the Brazilian economy) is a proof that there was a credit operation. The prosecution reiterates that this statement confirmed the infringement materiality, she concluded. Aldo Rebelo rejected the accusations that the government spent wantonly in 2015, and that year was characterized by fiscal adjustments and efforts to reduce the public spending.
On 29 June, were heard João Luiz Guadagnin, Director of the Department of Finance and Production Protection of the Ministry of Agrarian Development, Marcel Mascarenhas dos Santos, Prosecutor of the Central Bank, Fernando Rocha, Deputy Head of the Economic Department of the Central Bank, and Paulo José dos Reis Souza, Finance and Control Analyst and Fiscal Policy Secretary on the National Treasury Secretary.
The phase of witnesses hearings had concluded on 29 June. A total of 44 witnesses were heard, six convened by prosecution and 38 by defence.
At the end of the witnesses hearings phase, both the prosecution and the defence lawyers said they were confident about their theses. The prosecution lawyer, Janaina Paschoal, criticized the actions of Rousseff's defence because of the large number of witnesses called, with clear dilatory intention, and the most of witnesses unknows accurately the facts. The defence lawyer, José Eduardo Cardozo also expressed confidence, but said that the process has a political nature and this may interfere in the result. He also pointed out that some senators refused to discuss with the witnesses, because they were already a judgment before the completion of work.
Auditors and assistants hearings
The board of experts designated at the 13 June session by the Committee's President, Raimundo Lira, was heard on 5 July. This board had audited the documents, as requested by the defence and authorized by the President of the Supreme Court, Ricardo Lewandowski. The board, composed of auditors João Henrique Pederiva, Prandino Diego Alves and Fernando Alvaro Leão Rincon, submitted the audit report results. They found that the delays in the transfer of payments to the public banks constituted loans. However, they avoided considering whether there was intent by the President and said that this judgment would be up to senators. Also heard were the assistant to the prosecution, Selene Péres Nunes and the assistant to the defense, Ricardo Lodi Ribeiro. Selene Nunes pointed out that there was willful misconduct by the President, since the operations were hidden by accounting and, later, the government had issued a provisional measure allowing the payment of debts. Ribeiro said that the President had no responsibility for the issue of the supplemental budget decrees because they were submitted for her signature by the technical areas of the ministries, and her participation, as demonstrated in the report, was only the signing of the decrees.
Rousseff interrogatory and final arguments
Rousseff was scheduled to be questioned on 6 July, but she declined to attend the Committee and sent a letter, read in its entirety by Cardozo. Rousseff defended herself, claiming that she was a victim of a conspiracy, repeating the arguments that have been mentioned from the beginning of the process. The final prosecution and defence arguments were delivered to the Committee on 12 July and 28 July respectively, for preparation of the final report by rapporteur, Antonio Anastasia.
Final report: discussion and approval
Anastasia submitted the final report on 2 August, concluding that Rousseff was culpable. On 3 August, the document was discussed by the Committee. João Correia Serra, prosecution lawyer in lieu, praised Anastasia's report and stressed the known "centralizing temperament" of Rousseff, that emphasized the impossibility of Rousseff not being aware of or not directly commanding the acts for which she was accused. Countering, Cardozo said that he was sure that Anastasia's report did not evince that Rousseff had committed crimes, and accused the rapporteur, despite his aptitude and usual brilliance, of managing his actions within the opinion of his party. On 4 August, the report was voted on and approved by 14–5 votes, closing the work of the Committee, to be followed for voting on the Senate floor on 9 August, chaired by Ricardo Lewandowski, Supreme Federal Court president.
Voting on the final report in Senate
In a long session, starting at 9:40 am on 9 August and lasting over sixteen hours, the Senate floor approved Anastasia's final report in the early morning of 10 August. By 59–21 vote, the indictments against Dilma Rousseff were upheld, ending the penultimate phase of the process, called pronunciation and determining the final judgment in the Senate, beginning on 25 August. In this judgment, two-thirds of 81 senators were necessary to remove the President from office and make her ineligible for office, for eight years subsequent to 1 January 2019, when her second term would end.
Decisive voting in Senate
The last phase of the trial consisted of three steps:
- Cross-examination of witnesses, first by Lewandowski and then by the senators (eight witnesses, two called by the prosecution and six by the defence). Finally, cross-examination by prosecution and defence lawyers.
- Cross-examination of Rousseff by senators, and final arguments by prosecution and defence.
- Decisive voting by senators.
Cross-examination of witnesses
On 25 August, cross-examination of witnesses began, in a stirred section that lasted over fifteen hours. The prosecution called two witnesses, Julio Marcelo de Oliveira, procurator of the Federal Court of Accounts (TCU), author of the report recommending the rejection of 2014 accounts, and Antonio Carlos Costa D'avila Carvalho Júnior, the auditor of TCU. Oliveira was questioned as an informant and not as a witness, as ruled by Lewandowski, after Cardozo accused him that made its report based in a biased understanding. Oliveira refused, claiming that only fulfilled a recommendation to adopt a "less tolerant" rule came from TCU. Oliveira asserted that Rousseff broke budget laws in 2014 and also in 2015. In his status as informant, his complaints could not be considered as evidence, but as technical information. The next prosecution witness questioned, D'Avila Carvalho, asserted that Rousseff "disguised" the accounting and was responsible for delaying transfers to state banks. Cardozo tried to disqualify this witness, accusing him of biased conduct, because he helped the prosecutor Oliveira to draft the TCU report. Cardozo pleaded that was "a clearly an unethical situation that violates the principle of impartiality." However, Lewandowski denied the request.
Cross-examination continued on 26 and 27 August. Six witnesses were called by the defence: Luiz Gonzaga Belluzzo, economist, Geraldo Luiz Mascarenhas Prado, legal advisor, Luiz Cláudio Costa, former Secretary of Ministry of Education, Nelson Barbosa, former Minister of Planning, Budget and Management, Esther Dweck, former Secretary of Federal Budget and Ricardo Ribeiro Lodi, Law professor at the State University of Rio de Janeiro. Dweck was dismissed by Lewandowski on the grounds of a conflict of interest, since she was being contracted for the office of Gleisi Hoffmann, one of the senators opposed to impeachment. Gonzaga Belluzzo and Ribeiro Lodi were heard in the status of informant.
Belluzo said that interruption of a mandate achieved by universal suffrage is something that should require very special care. It could only be done in extreme situations, and that trial had not facing it.
For Mascarenhas Prado, when signing decrees the President acted in reliance on the advice of subordinates, which attested to the legality of acts. As for Cláudio Costa, the supplementary credit decrees were used in educational programs. Senator Cássio Cunha Lima refused, saying that crime is not the expansion of universities and technical schools, but the lack of Congress authorization for such decrees.
Nelson Barbosa said that decrees provide more leeway in the administration of funds, when the budget is limited, and are edited by experienced officials. Pro-impeachment senators insisted that those actions had aggravated the economic crisis that faced the country. Barbosa said that the crisis was due to various internal and external factors. At last, Ribeiro Lodi stated that the decrees issued by the President in July and August 2015 were not considered violations until then by TCU and at that moment, when the decrees were issued, this understanding did not exist.
Cross-examination of Rousseff by senators and final arguments by lawyers
|This section needs expansion. You can help by adding to it. (August 2016)|
|“||I know I will be judged, but my conscience is clear. I did not commit a crime.||”|
|— Dilma Rousseff, |
Rousseff defended herself in the Senate on 29 August. She spoke for 45 minutes and then proceeded to answer questions from senators in a session that lasted over twelve hours. She explained that she was obliged to make difficult choices about the budget, to address the decline in revenue and a refusal by opposition in Congress to work with her. She compared her situation with other Brazilian presidents pursued by their opponents, including João Goulart, a leftist ousted in a military coup in 1964, a historical event that inaugurated a 21 year dictatorship. She also compared the effort to impeach her with the suffering she endured in her youth, when dictatorship agents arrested her for militancy in a group of urban guerrillas. She was repeatedly tortured while imprisoned in the early 1970s. Rousseff said that the impeachment proceedings amounted to a new type of coup, evoking the breakdown of Brazilian democracy in the 1960s. Senator Ana Amélia Lemos, in reply to Rousseff's statement, expressed respect for her personal history; she said however that the senators were not there to judge her biography, but the actions taken by her government. She insisted that Rousseff had broken the law by budget manipulation to hide the economic problems.
|“||We are not dealing with a little accounting problem; we are dealing with fraud.||”|
|— Janaína Paschoal, |
The trial resumed on 30 August, shortly after 10 am and lasted about seventeen hours, with the final arguments of the prosecution and defence, and then the speeches of the senators. The speeches lasted twelve hours, ending about 02:30 am on the 31st.
Decisive voting and outcome
The Senate found President Dilma Rousseff guilty of responsibility crimes and administrative misconduct regarding the federal budget and removed her from office after a vote of 61–20 on 31 August 2016. In a separate vote on whether she should be barred from public office for eight years, senators voted 42-36. Two-thirds of the votes (54 of the total of 81 senators) were needed, therefore she is able to run for any public office again in the near future.
|Brazilian Democratic Movement Party||PMDB||17||2||19|
|Brazilian Labour Party||PTB||1||2||3|
|Brazilian Republican Party||PRB||1||1|
|Brazilian Social Democracy Party||PSDB||11||11|
|Brazilian Socialist Party||PSB||5||2||7|
|Christian Labour Party||PTC||1||1|
|Communist Party of Brazil||PCdoB||1||1|
|Democratic Labour Party||PDT||3||3|
|Party of the Republic||PR||4||4|
|Popular Socialist Party||PPS||1||1|
|Social Christian Party||PSC||2||2|
|Social Democratic Party||PSD||3||1||4|
|Brazilian Democratic Movement Party||PMDB||7||10||2||19|
|Brazilian Labour Party||PTB||1||2||3|
|Brazilian Republican Party||PRB||1||1|
|Brazilian Social Democracy Party||PSDB||11||11|
|Brazilian Socialist Party||PSB||3||4||7|
|Christian Labour Party||PTC||1||1|
|Communist Party of Brazil||PCdoB||1||1|
|Democratic Labour Party||PDT||1||2||3|
|Party of the Republic||PR||1||3||4|
|Popular Socialist Party||PPS||1||1|
|Social Christian Party||PSC||2||2|
|Social Democratic Party||PSD||3||1||4|
Lawsuits against the Senate's judgment
Ms. Rousseff's defence on 1 September 2016 filed a writ of mandamus at the Supreme Court against the Senate's decision to remove her from office, rejected on 8 September. On 30 September, Ms. Rousseff's defence has filed a last appeal, questioning the impeachment. A 493-page piece called for an annulment. "This petition is aimed at invalidating the decision-making legal act of the Senate that led to the conviction, on August 31 this year, for the crime of responsibility of Her Excellency President of the Republic, Dilma Rousseff", reads the text. The appeal, signed by José Eduardo Cardozo, was denied by Supreme Court on 20 October.
On the other hand, the parties PSDB, DEM and PPS also decided to file a mandamus at the Supreme Court, against the decision on the impeachment trial, to vote separately the loss of political rights, allowing the former President to run for public office, opposed to law that defines the crimes of responsibility and regulates the respective trial process (impeachment law), that determines a concommitance of penalties.
|This section needs expansion. You can help by adding to it. (September 2016)|
The South American states of Ecuador, Bolivia and Venezuela reacted to the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff by recalling their ambassadors. On the other hand, the government of Argentina stayed neutral, viewing it as Brazilian internal affairs; the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that Argentina "recognizes the institutional process" that took place in Brazil. Representatives from Bolivia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Venezuela left their seats during Temer's speech at the UN General Assembly on 20 September 2016. Temer defended the impeachment process, and said that it occurred with "absolute respect for the constitutional order".
On 22 August, about a week before the decisive vote, the Brazilian Senate submitted a letter to the Organization of American States (OAS), after complaints by the Workers' Party (the former President's party), that the impeachment process was an "institutional coup". OAS asked for information about this complaint and Brazilian Senate stated in letter that "the constitutional rules were strictly observed, objections raised, and appeals to the Supreme Court were accepted."
After the decision of the Senate to impeach Dilma Rousseff, protests organized by supporters of the former president took place in several Brazilian cities against the decision and calling for new elections.
Public opinion survey and economics
In an Ibope survey in September, after about a month of President Temer's administration, 39% of Brazilians rated his administration "bad or terrible", while 14% considered it "great or good". 2,002 people were heard between 20 and 25 September, and the margin of error was two percentage points.
- "Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988" [Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil 1988] (in Portuguese). Presidência da República do Brasil. 5 October 1988. Retrieved 12 August 2016. Art. 85: Are crimes of responsibility the acts of the President of the Republic which attempt on the Federal Constitution and, especially, against the probity in administration (item V) and the budget law (item VI)
- "Lei Complementar nº 101, de 4 de Maio de 2000" [Supplementary Law n.101 of 4 May 2000] (in Portuguese). Presidência da República do Brasil. 4 May 2000. Retrieved 12 August 2016. Art. 36: It is forbidden the credit operation between a State financial institution and the member of the Federation that control it, in quality of the loan beneficiary.
- Helio Bicudo, Miguel Reale Jr, Janaína Paschoal (lawyers) (15 October 2015). "Pedido de impeachment da presidente Dilma Rousseff" [Impeachment request of President Dilma Rousseff] (PDF) (in Portuguese). p. 11. Retrieved 13 May 2016.
- Felipe Amorim (2 December 2015). "Veja 8 razões a favor e contra o impeachment da presidente Dilma Rousseff" [See 8 reasons for and against the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff] (in Portuguese). UOL Notícias – Política. Retrieved 13 May 2016.
- "STF arquiva pedido de investigação contra Dilma na compra de Pasadena" [STF archives request for investigation against Dilma on the purchase of Pasadena] (in Portuguese). Portal iG. 4 May 2016. Retrieved 13 June 2016.
- André Richter (5 May 2016). "Supreme Court dismisses allegations implicating Rousseff over Pasadena deal". Agência Brasil. Retrieved 4 January 2017.
- CNN, Catherine E. Shoichet and Euan McKirdy. "Brazil's Senate ousts Rousseff in impeachment vote". CNN. Retrieved 31 August 2016.
- "Brazil impeachment: Key questions". BBC News. 31 August 2016. Retrieved 4 January 2017.
- Costas, Ruth (21 November 2014). "Petrobras scandal: Brazil's energy giant under pressure". BBC News. Sao Paulo. Retrieved 20 March 2015.
- Dwyer, Rob (March 2015). "Brazil: Petrobras will be shut out of bond markets until 2016". Euromoney. Retrieved 20 March 2015.
- Pugile, Frederic (13 March 2016). "Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva's dramatic downfall rattles Brazil". The Washington Times. Retrieved 14 March 2016.
- Darlington, Shasta (12 April 2015). "Protesters in Brazil push to impeach President Dilma Rousseff". CNN. Retrieved 13 April 2015.
- Magalhaes, Luciana; Kiernan, Paul (16 March 2015). "Brazilian President Faces More Heat After Protests; Prosecutors file more charges in widening graft scandal as public anger grows against government". Dow Jones & Company. The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 17 March 2015.
- "Em infográfico, entenda o que são as pedaladas fiscais do governo Dilma" [In infographic, understand the fiscal pedaling in Dilma's government] (in Portuguese). Zero Hour. 17 July 2015. Retrieved 6 December 2015.
- Carlos Garcia (8 October 2015). "O que é pedalada fiscal? Um manual para não-economistas" [What is fiscal pedaling? A manual for non-economists] (in Portuguese). mercadopopular.org. Retrieved 6 December 2015.
- "As 'pedaladas fiscais' do governo Dilma" [The 'fiscal pedaling' on government Dilma] (in Portuguese). O Estado de S. Paulo. Retrieved 19 March 2016.
- Alexander Martello; Fabio Amato (17 June 2015). "Entenda as 'pedaladas fiscais' e o que o TCU avalia nas contas do governo" [Understand 'tax pedaling' and the TCU assesses in government accounts] (in Portuguese). Rede Globo. Retrieved 5 December 2015.
- Ana Clara Costa (22 April 2015). ""O governo fez bancos do Estado pagarem as suas despesas – e isso não é pedalada"" [The government did state banks pay their expenses – and this is not pedaling] (in Portuguese). Veja. Retrieved 6 December 2015.
- Fernando Rego Barros (16 April 2015). "TCU conclui que o governo infringiu a Lei de Responsabilidade Fiscal" [TCU concludes that the government has violated the Fiscal Responsibility Law]. Rede Globo. Retrieved 20 December 2016.
- Bernard Caram (7 October 2015). "Em decisão unânime, TCU rejeita contas do governo Dilma em 2014" [In a unanimous decision, TCU rejects bills of government Dilma and 2014]. O Estado de S. Paulo. Retrieved 20 March 2016.
- "Lei Complementar No. 101 de 4 de Maio de 2000" [Supplementary Law No. 101 of 4 May 2000] (in Portuguese). Palácio do Planalto. 4 May 2000. Retrieved 19 March 2016.
- Deborah Cruz; Philip Matoso (7 October 2015). "TCU recomenda ao Congresso reprovar contas do governo de 2014" [TCU recommended to Congress disapprove government accounts 2014] (in Portuguese). Rede Globo. Retrieved 6 December 2015.
- "O TCU e o Controle Externo" [TCU and External Control] (in Portuguese). the Federal Audit Court. Retrieved 19 March 2016.
- Noelle Oliveira (27 October 2014). "Eleição presidencial de 2014 foi a mais acirrada após ditadura" [2014 presidential election was the most strifed after dictatorship] (in Portuguese). EBC. Retrieved 18 March 2016.
- "Dilma toma posse para segundo mandato" [Rousseff takes office for second term]. Correio. 1 January 2015. Retrieved 5 December 2015.
- "Todos os estados e o DF têm protestos contra o governo Dilma" [All states and the DF have protests against the government Dilma]. G1. 16 August 2015. Retrieved 5 December 2015.
- Filipe Matoso (1 July 2015). "Governo Dilma tem aprovação de 9%, aponta pesquisa Ibope" [Government Dilma has 9% approved, points Ibope survey]. G1. Archived from the original on 8 January 2017. Retrieved 5 December 2015.
- Alexandre Aragon (6 August 2015). "Reprovação de Dilma cresce e supera a de Collor em 1992" [Rousseff's disapproval grows and exceeds that of Collor in 1992]. Folha de S.Paulo. Archived from the original on 4 March 2016. Retrieved 5 December 2015.
- "Eduardo Cunha accepts charges filed for Rousseff's ouster". Agência Brazil. 2 December 2015. Retrieved 30 December 2016.
- Carolina Gonçalves (3 December 2015). "Lower House Speaker: Rousseff lied when denied political bargaining". Agência Brazil. Retrieved 30 December 2016.
- Carolina Gonçalves (3 December 2015). "Cunha says Dilma lied to the nation by denying political bargaining". Agência Brazil. Retrieved 6 December 2015.
- "Dilma diz estar "indignada" com pedido de impeachment" [Dilma says she is "outraged" with request for impeachment]. UOL. 2 December 2015. Retrieved 6 December 2015.
- Carolina Gonçalves (7 December 2015). "Dilma: "There is no wrongful act committed by me"". Red Portal. Retrieved 19 March 2016.
- "Dilma Rousseff: "There is no wrongful act committed by me"". Brasileiros. 2 December 2015. Retrieved 19 March 2016.
- "Lower House Speaker: Rousseff lied when denied political bargaining". Agencia Brasil. 3 December 2015. Retrieved 31 December 2016.
- Daniel Carvalho; Igor Gardelha (3 December 2015). "'Who did bargain was the government, not me', claims Cunha on impeachment". Estadão. Retrieved 6 December 2015.
- "Para especialistas, impeachment dependerá do futuro de Cunha" [For experts, impeachment depends on the future of Cunha] (in Portuguese). Terra Networks. 6 December 2015. Retrieved 2 July 2016.
De acordo com o professor da Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG) Leonardo Avritzer, desde a posse de Dilma, prevalece um cenário de “fragmentação política”, com demonstrada dificuldade do governo de obter apoio no Congresso Nacional. Ele atribui o problema à pouca habilidade da presidente em conquistar aliados e também a falhas no sistema político, que permite uma pulverização de partidos, tornando mais difícil a governabilidade.[...] A análise é semelhante à do vice-diretor do Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Políticos da Rio de Janeiro State University (Uerj), João Feres Júnior. [...} Feres Júnior lembra que, desde a posse da presidente, a oposição, liderada pelo PSDB, tenta revogar o resultado das urnas. “A primeira estratégia foi pedir a recontagem de votos, alegando fraude eleitoral, depois, reprovar as contas da campanha”, cita. “A oposição está mais interessada em desestabilizar o governo e tirar a presidente do que promover o bem público”, diz / Translated: According to Leonardo Avritzer, a professor at the Federal University of Minas Gerais (UFMG), since Dilma's inauguration, a scenario of "political fragmentation" prevails, with demonstrated difficulty for the government to obtain support in the Congress. He attributes the problem to the president's poor ability to win allies and also to fails in the political system, which allows for a spraying of parties, making governance more difficult. [...] "The analysis is similar to that of the deputy director of the Institute of Social and Political Studies of the State University of Rio de Janeiro (Uerj), João Feres Júnior." [...] Feres Júnior remember that since the president's inauguration, the opposition, led by the PSDB, had tried to revoke the result of the polls. "The first strategy was to ask for a recount, alleging electoral fraud, then, to reprove the accounts of the campaign, he cites. "The opposition is more interested in destabilizing the government and removing the president; than promoting the public wellness," he says.
- "Brazil poll: Rousseff popularity still falling, impeachment favored". Reuters. 21 July 2015. Retrieved 21 July 2015.
- CNT/MDA (March 2015). "Pesquisa CNT/MDA - Relatório Síntese - Rodada 127 - 16 a 19 de março de 2015" [Pools CNT/MDA - Syntesis Report - Round 127 - 16 to 19 March 2015] (PDF) (in Portuguese). Retrieved 25 December 2016.
- Romero, Simon (11 April 2016). "Effort to Impeach Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff Clears Congressional Panel". The New York Times. Retrieved 14 April 2016.
- "Conheça os autores dos 37 pedidos de impeachment contra Dilma" [Know the authors of the 37 requests for impeachment against Dilma] (in Portuguese). Gazeta do Povo. 16 September 2015. Archived from the original on 23 September 2015. Retrieved 20 June 2016.
- Sergio Spagnuolo (16 November 2015). "Brazil prosecutors say bribes paid in Petrobras Texas refinery deal". Reuters. Retrieved 26 December 2016.
- David Segal (7 August 2015). "Petrobras Oil Scandal Leaves Brazilians Lamenting a Lost Dream". The New York Times. Retrieved 26 December 2016.
- Stan Lehman (21 March 2014). "Scandal involving refinery hits Brazil's Petrobras". The Washington Times. Retrieved 20 June 2016.
- Request for impeachment, pg 3, 4 and 5
- Mihir Zaveri Susan Carroll and Ben Tavener (13 November 2015). "Brazilian scandal centers on purchase of Pasadena refinery". Houston Chronicle. Retrieved 20 June 2016.
- Request for impeachment, pg 7 and 8
- "Why Brazil's Lula faces fresh corruption investigation". BBC News. 4 May 2016. Retrieved 26 December 2016.
- Reuters (14 September 2016). "Brazil's ex-president Lula charged with corruption in oil kickback scandal". The Guardian. Retrieved 26 December 2016.
- "Lula e Dilma sabiam de corrupção na Petrobrás, diz revista" [Lula and Dilma knew of corruption in Petrobras, magazine says] (in Portuguese). O Estado de S. Paulo. 24 October 2014. Retrieved 26 December 2016.
- Request for impeachment, pg 13–21
- Request for impeachment, pg 22–38
- Request for impeachment, pg 25–27
- Request for impeachment, pg 45
- Request for impeachment, pg 32–34
- Request for impeachment, pg 34
- Rodrigo Capelo (4 December 2015). "What does the request for Bicudo for the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff". Season. Retrieved 19 March 2016.
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|Wikimedia Commons has media related to Impeachment of Dilma Rousseff.|
- Impeachment Special Committee (CEI2016) – Senate official site (Portuguese)
- Impeachment page – Senate official site (archived) (Portuguese)
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- Impeachment page in You Tube – Senate TV channel (Portuguese)
- Impeachment – O Julgamento da Presidente Dilma Rousseff (Impeachment - The Trial of President Dilma Rousseff Brazilian Senate, October 2016 - 668 pages (Portuguese)