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China–Laos relations

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China-Laotian relations
Map indicating locations of China and Laos

China
Laos

Chinese-Laotian relations (Lao: ສາຍພົວພັນ ລາວ-ຈີນ, simplified Chinese: 中老关系; traditional Chinese: 中寮關係) refers to the current and historical relationship between Lao People's Democratic Republic and the People's Republic of China.

History

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The Lao kingdom of Lan Xang and its successor states were tributaries of Ming and later Qing China. In the late 15th century, the Chinese backed Lan Xang against their common rival, the Vietnamese. Chinese traders operated in Lan Xang like any other Southeast Asian country, however, Lan Xang also proved to be important as a participant in the Tea-Horse Road trade. Relations between the two states were re-established in 1953 with the Republic of China (Nationalist China or Taiwan) as the sole legitimate government of China. On 25 April 1961, Laos switched recognition to the PRC government in Beijing.[1] However, on 16 May 1962, the royal government severed diplomatic relations with Red China and restored relations with the Taipei government, aligning with the anti-communist alliance in the Vietnam War until 1975 when the new Lao communist government re-established relations with the PRC.[2] Laos is represented by the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in Hanoi for ROC-related matters.

Economy

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Relations have consisted of trade and aid, largely focused on road construction in the northern provinces of Laos, without directly challenging the interests of Thailand or Vietnam in the central and southern regions. However, Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in December 1978 to unseat the Khmer Rouge regime provoked China into a limited invasion of Vietnam—approximately nineteen kilometers deep—to "teach Vietnam a lesson." Laos was caught in a dangerous bind, not wanting to further provoke China, but not able to oppose its special partner, Vietnam. The Laotian leadership survived the dilemma by making slightly delayed pronouncements in support of Vietnam after some intraparty debate and by sharply reducing diplomatic relations with China to the chargé d'affaires level—without a full break. The low point in China-Laotian relations came in 1979, with reports of Chinese assistance and training of Hmong resistance forces under General Vang Pao in China's Yunnan Province.[3] China remains Laos' largest creditor, accounting for approximately half of Laos' government debt as of 2023.[4]

The Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone is a significant point of economic contact between China and Laos.[5]: 103  The Chinese firm Kings Romans group was granted a 99-year lease to develop the SEZ into a gambling and tourist destination.[5]: 103 

Government

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This hostile relationship gradually softened, however, and in 1989 Prime Minister Kaysone Phomvihane paid a state visit to Beijing. In 1991 Kaysone chose to spend his vacation in China rather than make his customary visit to the Soviet Union. Diplomatic and party-to-party relations were normalized in 1989. Trade expanded from the local sale of consumer goods to the granting of eleven investment licenses in 1991—including an automotive assembly plant. Following the establishment of the Laotian-Chinese Joint Border Committee in 1991, meetings held during 1992 resulted in an agreement delineating their common border. China's commercial investments and trade with Laos expanded quietly, but not dramatically, in 1993 and 1994.[3]

CCP general secretary Xi Jinping held talks with LPRP general secretary Bounnhang Vorachit in 2016, seeking further coordination in international affairs.[6]

Belt and Road Initiative

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In 2015, Laos joined the People's Republic of China global infrastructure project the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).[citation needed]

During a 2017 visit to Vientiane by Xi, the two countries announced the Laos-China Economic Corridor.[7]: 129 

The most important BRI project in Laos is the Vientiane-Boten Railway which was completed in 2021.[8]: 212  It runs from the capital of Laos to the Chinese border.[8]: 212  It is part of the broader China-Laos Railway, which the two countries operate as a joint venture through the Laos-China Railway Company.[7]: 129 

Like China, Laos is a major supporter of the Pan-Asian Railway, given its desire to move from a land-locked economy to a land-linked economy.[9]: 50–51 

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Political cooperation

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The shared ideology of communism helps facilitate cooperation between Laos and China.[8]: 211 

In November 2010, Laos and China signed a security cooperation agreement.[10]: 159 

With ASEAN, Laos is often supportive of China, particularly in decreasing the possibility of an ASEAN consensus for taking a harsher stance against China on territorial disputes in the South China Sea.[8]: 211 

In June 2020, Laos was one of 53 countries that backed the Hong Kong national security law at the United Nations.[11]

See also

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Bibliography

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  • Cardenal, Juan Pablo; Araújo, Heriberto (2011). La silenciosa conquista china (in Spanish). Barcelona: Crítica. pp. 183–186, 230–232. ISBN 9788498922578.

References

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  1. ^ China (Taiwan), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of (1962-11-01). "Overseas Chinese". Taiwan Today. Retrieved 2021-04-23.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  2. ^ China (Taiwan), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of (1966-01-01). "The Month in Free China". Taiwan Today. Archived from the original on 2021-04-23. Retrieved 2021-04-23.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  3. ^ a b Brown, MacAlister and Joseph J. Zasloff. "Relations with China". Laos: a country study Archived 2015-07-21 at the Wayback Machine (Andrea Matles Savada, editor). Library of Congress Federal Research Division (July 1994). This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
  4. ^ "Laos is drowning in debt. China says it's 'doing its best' to help". South China Morning Post. Bloomberg News. 2024-07-03. Retrieved 2024-07-18.
  5. ^ a b Garlick, Jeremy (2024). Advantage China: Agent of Change in an Era of Global Disruption. Bloomsbury Academic. ISBN 978-1-350-25231-8.
  6. ^ "China's Xi holds talks with Lao leader to enhance ties". Xinhua. May 3, 2016. Archived from the original on May 6, 2016. Retrieved 4 May 2016.
  7. ^ a b Curtis, Simon; Klaus, Ian (2024). The Belt and Road City: Geopolitics, Urbanization, and China's Search for a New International Order. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. doi:10.2307/jj.11589102. ISBN 9780300266900. JSTOR jj.11589102.
  8. ^ a b c d Gerstl, Alfred (2023). "China in its Immediate Neighborhood". In Kironska, Kristina; Turscanyi, Richard Q. (eds.). Contemporary China: a New Superpower?. Routledge. pp. 205–217. doi:10.4324/9781003350064-21. ISBN 978-1-03-239508-1.
  9. ^ Han, Enze (2024). The Ripple Effect: China's Complex Presence in Southeast Asia. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780197696583.001.0001. ISBN 978-0-19-769659-0.
  10. ^ Loh, Dylan M.H. (2024). China's Rising Foreign Ministry: Practices and Representations of Assertive Diplomacy. Stanford University Press. doi:10.1515/9781503638679. ISBN 9781503638204.
  11. ^ Lawler, Dave (2 July 2020). "The 53 countries supporting China's crackdown on Hong Kong". Axios. Archived from the original on 4 July 2020. Retrieved 3 July 2020.
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