Attack on Pearl Harbor

This article is about the actual attack. For the arcade flying game of the same name, see Attack on Pearl Harbor (game).

Attack on Pearl Harbor
Part of the Pacific Theater of World War II
The attackers approached from two directions, and were detected by U.S. Army radar at 136 miles; the warning was discounted.
Date December 7, 1941 Location primarily Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, USA Result Decisive Japanese victory; United States declares war on the Empire of Japan and enters World War II on the side of Allies; Nazi Germany declares war on the United States.
Belligerents
United States	Empire of Japan
Commanders and leaders
Husband Kimmel Walter Short others	Chuichi Nagumo Tamon Yamaguchi Chuichi Hara Gunichi Mikawa Sentaro Omori Mitsumi Shimizu Mitsuo Fuchida Shigekazu Shimazaki others
Strength
8 battleships, 8 cruisers, 29 destroyers, 9 submarines, ~50 other ships, ~390 aircraft	6 aircraft carriers, 9 destroyers, 2 battleships, 2 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser, 8 tankers, 23 fleet submarines, 5 midget submarines, 414 aircraft
Casualties and losses
4 battleships sunk, 4 battleships damaged, 3 cruisers damaged, 3 destroyers sunk, 2 other ships sunk, 188 aircraft destroyed, 155 aircraft damaged, 2,333 military and 55 civilians killed, 1,139 military and 35 civilians wounded	4 midget submarines sunk, 1 midget submarine run aground, 29 aircraft destroyed, 55 airmen, 9 submariners killed and 1 captured

The attack on Pearl Harbor was a surprise military strike on the United States naval base at Pearl Harbor on Oahu, Hawaii on the morning of Sunday, 7 December, 1941. Aircraft launched from aircraft carriers of the Imperial Japanese Navy destroyed five U.S. Navy battleships, along with 188 aircraft, one minelayer, and three destroyers, killing 2,333 and wounding 1,139. Japanese losses were minimal at 29 aircraft and five midget submarines, with 65 Japanese servicemen killed or wounded.

The intent of the pre-emptive strike was to protect Imperial Japan's advance into Malaya and the Dutch East Indies — for their natural resources such as oil and rubber — by neutralizing the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Both the US and Japan, had long standing contingency plans for war in the Pacific focusing on the other's surface fleet. Actually attempting a surprise attack against the opposing fleet was a new element in US/Japanese strategic planning between the wars. The Japanese high command was (mistakenly) certain any attack on the United Kingdom's colonies would inevitably bring the U.S. into the war. President Franklin D. Roosevelt had moved the fleet to Hawaii, and ordered a buildup in the Philippines, to reduce Japanese aggression in China and deter operations against others, including European colonies in Asia.

The attack was one of the most important engagements of World War II. Occurring before a formal declaration of war, it shocked the U.S. out of isolationism. Roosevelt called December 7, 1941 "a date which will live in infamy".

Background to conflict

For more information, see Causes of World War II.

Throughout the beginning of the Showa era, (mid-1920s through 1930s), Japanese nationalists exerted more and more influence over government policy, promoting creation of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere as part of Japan's alleged "divine right" to unify Asia under emperor Showa's rule . Increasingly expansionist policies brought her into conflict with neighbors Russia and China. Japanese actions included the 1905 war with Russia, the invasion of Manchuria in 1931, and finally, the full-scale invasion of China, which began at the Marco Polo Bridge in July 1937.

In response to international condemnation of the 1931 conquest of Manchuria and the establishment of the Manchukuo puppet government, in 1933 Japan withdrew from the League of Nations. In 1935, Japan renounced the London Naval Conference which had limited the size of Japan's naval forces, in relation to other large navies (in particular, the U.S.). The 1937 Japanese attack against China was condemned by the League of Nations, the U.S., Britain, Australia, and the Netherlands. These states had economic interests, territorial interests, or formal colonies in Southeast Asia, and had become increasingly alarmed at Japan's military power and willingness to use it. In July 1939, the U.S. terminated the 1911 U.S.-Japan commercial treaty, which made clear its disapproval and, more concretely, allowed the U.S. to impose trade restrictions as additional pressure. These efforts failed to deter Japan from continuing the war in China nor from signing both the Anti-Comintern Pact with Nazi Germany and the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy.

The Tripartite Pact, war with China, and Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations led the U.S. eventually to embargo scrap metal and gasoline shipments to Japan and close the Panama Canal to Japanese shipping. In 1941, Japan moved into northern IndoChina. The U.S. responded by freezing Japan's assets in the U.S. embargoing oil. Oil was Japan's most crucial imported resource; more than 80 percent of Japan's oil imports at the time came from the United States To secure oil supplies, and other resources, Japanese planners had long been looking south, especially to the Dutch East Indies. The Navy was (mistakenly) certain any attempt to seize this region would bring the U.S. into the war. In August 1941, Japanese Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe proposed a summit with President Roosevelt to discuss differences. Roosevelt replied Japan must leave China before a summit meeting could be held.

War

Prime Minister of Japan Hideki Tojo

In July 1941, the Imperial Japanese Navy informed Emperor Showa its reserve bunker oil would be exhausted in two years if a new source was not acquired. On September 6, 1941, at the second Imperial Conference concerning attacks on Occidental colonies, Japanese leaders met to consider the attack plans prepared by Imperial General Headquarters, one day after the emperor had scolded General Sugiyama about the lack of success in China and the likely low chances of victory against the Occidental Powers. It was decided to commence hostilities against the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands if the Empire's requirements for access to resources were not resolved through diplomatic negotiations by October 10, 1941.

Emperor Shōwa

Prime Minister Konoe argued for more negotiations and possible concessions to avert war. Military leaders (e.g. Hideki Tojo, Sugiyama, and IJN Chief of Staff Fleet Admiral Osami Nagano) argued time had run out and additional negotiations would be pointless. Tojo argued yielding to the American demand to withdraw troops would wipe out all the fruits of the Second Sino-Japanese war, endanger Manchukuo and jeopardize control of Korea.

On October 16, 1941, Konoe resigned and proposed prince Naruhiko Higashikuni, who was also the choice of the Army and the Navy, as his successor. Hirohito choose Tojo instead, worried, as he told Konoe, about having the Imperial House being held responsible for a war against Western powers.

On November 3, 1941, Nagano presented a detailed plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor to Hirohito.. On 5 November, Hirohito approved the plan for a war against the United States, Great Britain and Holland, scheduled to start at the beginning of December if no significant changes were achieved through diplomacy.

On 30 November 1941, Prince Nobuhito Takamatsu warned his brother, Hirohito, the Navy felt the Empire could not fight more than two years against the United States and wished to avoid war. After consulting with Koichi Kido (who advised him to take his time until he was convinced) and Tojo, the Emperor then called Shimada and Nagano who reassured him that the war would be successful. On December 1, Hirohito finally sanctioned a "war against United States, Great Britain and Holland" in another Imperial Conference.

Prelude to battle

Intelligence

File:Yoshikawa.jpg

Ensign Takeo Yoshikawa, a spy in Pearl Harbor for Imperial Japan.

On February 3, 1940, Yamamoto briefed Captain Kanji Ogawa of Naval Intelligence on the potential attack plan, asking him to start intelligence gathering on Pearl Harbor. Ogawa already had spies in Hawaii, including Japanese Consular officials with an intelligence remit, and he arranged for help from a German (and perhaps from family members as well) already living in Hawaii who was an Abwehr agent. None had been providing much militarily useful information. He planned to add 29-year-old Ensign Takeo Yoshikawa. By the spring of 1941, Yamamoto officially requested additional Hawaiian intelligence, and Yoshikawa boarded the liner Nitta-maru at Yokohama. He had grown his hair longer than military length, and assumed the cover name Tadashi Morimura.

Yoshikawa began gathering intelligence in earnest by taking auto trips around the main islands, and toured Oahu in a small plane, posing as a tourist. He visited Pearl Harbor frequently, sketching the harbor and location of ships from the crest of a hill. Once, he gained access to Hickam Field in a taxi, memorizing the number of visible planes, pilots, hangars, barracks and soldiers. He was also able to discover that Sunday was the day of the week on which the largest number of ships were likely to be in harbor, that PBY patrol planes went out every morning and evening, and that there was an antisubmarine net in the mouth of the harbor. Information was returned to Japan in coded form in Consular communications, and by direct delivery to intelligence officers aboard Japanese ships calling at Hawaii by consulate staff.

Planning

Main articles: Imperial Japanese Navy and Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service

File:Isoroku Yamamoto.jpg

Fleet Admiral and commander-in-chief of the Combined Fleet Isoroku Yamamoto

Expecting war, and seeing an opportunity in the forward basing of the US Pacific Fleet at Hawaii, the Japanese began planning began in early 1941 for an attack on Pearl Harbor. For the next several months, planning, and organizing a simultaneous attack on Pearl and invasion of British and Dutch colonies to the South occupied much of the Japanese Navy's time and attention. Pearl Harbor attack planning was a part of the Japanese expectation the U.S. would be inevitably drawn into the war after a Japanese attack against Malaya and Singapore.

The intent of a preemptive strike on Pearl Harbor was to neutralize American naval power in the Pacific, allowing operations against American, British, and Dutch colonies. Attacks on colonies were judged to depend on successfully dealing with the American Pacific Fleet. Surprise attack posed a twofold difficulty. First, the Pacific Fleet was a formidable force, and would not be easy to defeat or to surprise. Second, for aerial attack, Pearl Harbor's shallow waters made using conventional air-dropped torpedoes ineffective. On the other hand, Hawaii's isolation meant a successful surprise attack could not be blocked or quickly countered by forces from the continental U.S.

Several Japanese naval officers had been impressed by the British Operation JUDGMENT, in which 20 obsolete Fairey Swordfish disabled half the Italian fleet. Admiral Yamamoto dispatched a delegation to Italy, which concluded a larger and better-supported version of Cunningham's strike could force the U.S. Pacific Fleet to retreat to bases in California, thus giving Japan the time necessary to erect a "barrier" defense to protect Japanese control of the Dutch East Indies. The delegation returned to Japan with information about the shallow-running torpedoes Cunningham's engineers had devised.

Japanese strategists were undoubtedly influenced by Heihachiro Togo's destruction of the Russian Baltic Fleet at Tsushima, and may have been influenced by U.S. Admiral Harry Yarnell's performance in the 1932 joint Army-Navy exercises, which simulated an invasion of Hawaii. Yarnell, as commander of the attacking force, placed his carriers northwest of Oahu and simulated an air attack. The exercise's umpires noted Yarnell's aircraft were able to inflict serious "damage" on the defenders, who for 24 hours after the attack were unable to locate his fleet.

Yamamoto's emphasis on destroying the American battleships was in keeping with the Mahanian doctrine shared by all major navies during this period, including the U.S. Navy and Royal Navy

Planner Commander Minoru Genda stressed surprise would be critical.

After some preliminary work, Yamamoto was authorized to create the Carrier Striking Task Force, and assigned Commander Minoru Genda to develop the actual attack plan. Genda's plan stressed that surprise would be essential, given the expected balance of forces. By April 1941, the Pearl Harbor plan became known as Operation Z, after the famous Z signal given by Admiral Tōgō at Tsushima.

Over the summer, pilots trained in earnest on the Japanese island of Kyūshū. Genda chose Kagoshima City for a training area because its geography and infrastructure presented most of the same problems bombers would face at Pearl Harbor. In training, each crew would fly over the 5000-foot (1500 m) mountain behind Kagoshima, dive down into the city, dodging buildings and smokestacks before dropping to an altitude of 25 feet (7 m) at the piers. Bombardiers would release a torpedo at a breakwater some 300 yards (270 m) away.

Yet even skimming the water would not solve the problem of torpedoes bottoming in the shallow waters of Pearl Harbor. Japan created and tested modifications allowing successful shallow water drops. The effort resulted in a heavily modified version of the Type 91 torpedo which inflicted most of the ship damage during the attack. Japanese weapons technicians also produced special armor-piercing bombs by fitting fins and release shackles to 14 and 16 inch (356 and 406 mm) naval shells. These were able to penetrate the armored decks of battleships and cruisers.

The strike force

Main articles: Carrier Striking Task Force and Attack on Pearl Harbor order of battle

Commander of the Kido Butai for the attack, Admiral Chuichi Nagumo (1st Carrier Division)

Rising Sun Flag is the ensign of the Imperial Japanese Navy forces

Fleet Admiral Osami Nagano

On November 26 1941, the day the Hull note was received from United States Secretary of State Cordell Hull, the Japanese strike force, assembling in the Kuriles, sortied under strict radio silence. The Combined Fleet's main carrier force, under the command of Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, included six aircraft carriers with 414 aircraft, nine destroyers, two battleships, two heavy cruisers, a light cruiser, 23 submarines, and 8 supporting tankers.

The six aircraft carriers (the most powerful carrier force with the greatest concentration of air power in the history of naval warfare to date), which embarked 359 airplanes, were Akagi (flag), Kaga, Sōryū, Hiryū, and the newest, Shōkaku and Zuikaku, with 135 Mitsubishi A6M Type 0 fighters (Allied codename "Zeke", commonly called "Zero"), 171 Nakajima B5N Type 97 torpedo bombers (Allied codename "Kate"), and 108 Aichi D3A Type 99 dive bombers (Allied codename "Val") aboard. Two fast battleships, two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, nine destroyers, and three fleet submarines provided escort and screening. In addition, the Advanced Expeditionary Force included 20 fleet and five two-man Ko-hyoteki-class midget submarines, which were to gather intelligence and sink U.S. vessels attempting to flee Pearl Harbor during or soon after the attack. It also had eight oilers for fueling.

• 
  Vice Admiral Tamon Yamaguchi (2nd Carrier Division)
• 
  Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa (3rd Battleship Division)
• 
  Dive bomber Aichi D3A Type 1 (1st Air Fleet)
• 
  Aircraft carrier Akagi (1st Carrier Division)
• 
  Kagero-class destroyer Isokaze (17th Destroyer Division - escort)
• 
  I-15-class submarine I-25 (2nd Submarine Division - screen)
• 
  Tone-class heavy cruiser Chikuma (8th Cruiser Division - escort)
• 
  Kongo-class battleship Hiei (3rd Battleship Division - escort)

Carrier Striking Task Force two-way route. Legend:

   Kido Butai

  USS Enterprise (CV-6)

  USS Lexington (CV-2)

On December 1, 1941, after the strike force was en route, Chief of Staff Nagano gave a verbal directive to commander of the Combined Fleet Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, informing him:

Japan has decided to open hostilities against the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands early in December...Should it appear certain that Japanese-American negotiations will reach an amicable settlement prior to the commencement of hostilities, it is understood that all elements of the Combined Fleet are to be assembled and returned to their bases in accordance with separate orders.

[The Kido Butai will] proceed to the Hawaiian Area with utmost secrecy and, at the outbreak of the war, will launch a resolute surprise attack on and deal a fatal blow to the enemy fleet in the Hawaiian Area. The initial air attack is scheduled at 0330 hours, X Day.

Upon completion, the force was to return to Japan, re-equip, and re-deploy for "Second Phase Operations".

Finally, Order number 9, issued on 1 December 1941 by Nagano, ordered Yamamoto to crush hostile naval and air forces in Asia, Pacific Ocean and Hawaii; promptly sieze the main U.S., British, and Dutch bases in East Asia; and "capture and secure the key areas of the southern regions."

On the home leg, the task force was instructed to counterattack should American forces locate and engage them, and re-routed south to the friendly base in the Marshall Islands.

United States' preparedness

Main article: Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge debate

Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Battleship Row presented an attractive concentration of targets

Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, commanding general of the Army post at Pearl Harbor

U.S. civil and military intelligence had, amongst them, good information suggesting additional Japanese aggression throughout the summer and fall before the attack. At the time, none specifically indicated an attack against Pearl Harbor, nor has any doing so been identified since. Public press reports during summer and fall, including Hawaiian newspapers, contained extensive reports on the growing tension in the Pacific. Late in November, all Pacific commands, including both the Navy and Army in Hawaii, were separately and explicitly warned war with Japan was expected in the very near future, probably with attacks in the Far East: the Philippines, Indochina, Thailand, or the Russian Far East. The warnings were not specific to any area, noting only war with Japan was expected in the immediate short term and all commands should act accordingly. Had any of these warnings produced an active alert status in Hawaii, the attack might have been resisted more effectively, and perhaps resulted in less death and damage. On the other hand, recall of men on shore leave to the ships in harbor might have led to still more being casualties from bombs and torpedoes, or trapped in capsized ships by shut watertight doors (as the attack alert status would have required), or killed (in their obsolescent and obsolete aircraft) by more experienced Japanese aviators. When the attack actually arrived, Pearl Harbor was effectively unprepared: anti-aircraft weapons not manned, most ammunition locked down, anti-submarine measures not implemented (e.g., no torpedo nets in the harbor), combat air patrol not flying, available scouting aircraft not in the air at first light, Air Corps aircraft parked wingtip to wingtip to reduce sabotage risks (not ready to fly at a moment's warning), and so on.

By 1941, U.S. signals intelligence, through the Army's Signal Intelligence Service and the Office of Naval Intelligence's OP-20-G, had intercepted and decrypted considerable Japanese diplomatic and naval cipher traffic, though nothing actually carrying significant information about Japanese military plans in 1940-41. Decryption and distribution of this intelligence, including such decrypts as were available, was capricious and sporadic, and can be blamed in part on lack of manpower. At best, the information was fragmentary, contradictory, or poorly distributed, and was almost entirely raw, without supporting analysis. It was also incompletely understood by decision makers. Nothing in it pointed directly to an attack at Pearl Harbor, and a lack of awareness of Imperial Navy capabilities led to a widespread underlying belief Pearl Harbor was safely out of harm's way. Only one message from the Hawaiian Japanese consulate (sent on 6 December), in a low level consular cipher, included mention of an attack at Pearl; it was not decrypted until 8 December.

In 1924, General William L. Mitchell produced a 324-page report warning future wars (including with Japan) would include a new role for aircraft, against existing ships and facilities. He even discussed the possibility of an air attack on Pearl Harbor but his warnings were ignored. Navy Secretary Knox had also appreciated the possibility of an attack at Pearl in a written analysis shortly after taking office. American commanders had been warned tests demonstrated shallow-water aerial torpedo attacks were possible, but no one in charge in Hawaii fully appreciated its import. A war game surprise attack against Pearl Harbor in 1932 had been judged a success and to have caused considerable damage.

Nevertheless, because it was believed Pearl Harbor had natural defenses against torpedo attack (e.g., the shallow water), the Navy did not deploy torpedo nets or baffles, which were judged to interfere with ordinary operations. And as a result of limited numbers of long-range aircraft (including Army Air Corps bombers, responsible for search by a prewar arrangement), reconnaissance patrols were not being made as often or as far out as required for adequate coverage against possible surprise attack; they improved considerably, with fewer planes, after the attack. The Navy had 33 PBYs in the islands, but only three on patrol at the time of the attack. Hawaii was low on the priority list for the B-17s finally becoming available for the Pacific, largely because General MacArthur in the Philippines was successfully demanding as many as could be made available to the Pacific (where they were intended as a deterrent); even the British, which had contracted for them, agreed to accept fewer to facilitate this buildup. At the time of the attack, Army and Navy were both on training status rather than operational alert. There was also confusion about the Army's readiness status as General Short had changed the alert level designations without clearly informing Washington. Most of the Army's mobile anti-aircraft guns were secured, with ammunition locked down in armories. To avoid upsetting property owners, and in keeping with Washington's admonition not to alarm civil populations (e.g., in the late November war warning messages from the Navy and War Departments), guns were not dispersed around Pearl Harbor (i.e., on private property). Additionally, aircraft were parked on airfields to lessen the risk of sabotage, not in anticipation of air attack, in keeping with Short's (uncontradicted) interpretation of the war warnings.

Breaking off negotiations

Part of the Japanese plan for the attack included breaking off negotiations with the United States 30 minutes before the attack began. Diplomats from the Japanese Embassy in Washington, including the Japanese Ambassador, Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura, and special representative Saburo Kurusu, had been conducting extended talks with the State Department regarding the U.S. reactions to the Japanese move into Việt Nam in the summer (see above).

In the days before the attack, a long 14-part message was sent to the Embassy from the Foreign Office in Tokyo (encrypted with the Type 97 cryptographic machine, in a cipher named PURPLE by U.S. cryptanalysts), with instructions to deliver it to Secretary of State Cordell Hull at 1 p.m. Washington time. The last part arrived late Saturday night (Washington time) but due to decryption and typing delays, and because Tokyo's failure to stress the crucial necessity of the timing, her Embassy personnel did not deliver the message breaking off negotiations to Secretary Hull until several hours after the attack.

The United States had decrypted the 14th part well before the Japanese Embassy managed to, and long before the Embassy managed a fair typed copy. The final part, with its instruction for the time of delivery, prompted General George Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, to send that morning's warning message to Hawaii. There were delays because General Marshall couldn't be found (he was out for a morning horseback ride), trouble with the Army's long distance communication system, a decision not to use the Navy's parallel facilities despite an offer to permit it, and various troubles during its travels over commercial cable facilities (somehow its "urgent" marking was misplaced, adding additional hours to its travel time). It was actually delivered to General Walter Short, by a young Japanese-American cycle messenger, several hours after the attack had ended.

Japanese records, admitted into evidence during Congressional hearings on the attack after the War, establish that the Japanese government had not even written a declaration of war until hearing news of the successful attack. The two-line declaration of war was finally delivered to U.S. Ambassador Grew in Tokyo about 10 hours after the attack was over. He was allowed to transmit it to the United States where it was received late Monday afternoon (Washington time).

Attack

Nakajima nicknamed "Kate" taking off from aircraft carrier Shokaku for Pearl Harbor on the morning while a crewman with hachimaki works

File:Japanesecrewmen.jpg

Crewmen aboard Shokaku waving to the planes taking off for Pearl Harbor.

Tactics

While during the operation, task force was ordered (Order Number 7) to attack the enemy fleet if encountered since war was officially declared from the Japanese government.. A commercial freighter had scouted the proposed route earlier in the year. Yamamoto and senior Navy staff intended there be three waves of attack, but Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo decided to break off after the second. There were also supporting submarines and midget submarines assigned to engage U.S. ships should they succeed in leaving the harbor. The location of the attack force remained unknown to the U.S. until after the Japanese ships were already returning to the Eastern Pacific; they were not located after the attack, in part because such searches as were organized were conducted south of Oahu despite aircraft and radar reports of the attacking force that morning. (This was partially due to direction finding mistakenly placing searchers on a reciprocal bearing.) The total number of planes involved in the attack was 350. 39 were engaged in protection of the Kido Butai during the attack.

The strike launched 200 nautical miles (370 km) north of Oahu, with orders to attack "a powerful enemy surface fleet" if one appeared.

Even before Nagumo began launching, at 03.42 Hawaiian Time, the minesweeper USS Condor spotted a midget submarine outside the harbor entrance and alerted destroyer USS Ward. Ward carried out an unsuccessful search. The first shots fired, and the first casualties in the attack, occurred when Ward eventually attacked and sank a midget submarine, possibly the same one, at 06:37.

File:Kazuo sakamaki.jpg

Kazuo Sakamaki, first POW for the United States in World War II.

Five midget submarines had been assigned to torpedo U.S. ships after the bombing started. None of these returned, and only four have since been found. Of the ten sailors aboard, nine died; the only survivor, Kazuo Sakamaki, was captured, becoming the first Japanese prisoner of war. Sakamaki's unexpected survival was despised by many Japanese, who referred to his dead companions as "The Nine Young Gods." United States Naval Institute analysis of photographs from the attack, conducted in 1999, indicates one of these mini-subs entered the harbor and successfully fired a torpedo into the USS West Virginia, what may have been the first shot by the attacking Japanese. Her final disposition is unknown.

On the morning of the attack, the Army's Opana Point station (a SCR-270 radar, located near the northern tip of Oahu, which had not entered official service, having been in training mode for months), detected the first wave of Japanese planes and called in a warning. Although the operators at Opana Point reported a target echo larger than anything they had ever seen, an untrained new officer at the new and only partially activated Intercept Center, Lieutenant Kermit A. Tyler, presumed the scheduled arrival of six B-17 bombers was the cause because of the direction from which the aircraft were coming (only a few degrees separated the two inbound courses); because he presumed the operators had never seen a formation as large as the U.S. bombers' on radar; and possibly because the operators had only seen the lead element of incoming attack.

Several U.S. aircraft were shot down as the first wave approached land; one at least radioed a somewhat incoherent warning. Other warnings were still being processed, or awaiting confirmation, when the planes began bombing and strafing. It is not clear any warnings would have had much effect even had they been interpreted correctly and much more promptly. For instance, the results the Japanese achieved in the Philippines were essentially the same as at Pearl Harbor, though MacArthur had almost nine hours warning the Japanese had attacked at Pearl (and specific orders to commence operations) before they actually struck his command.

Pre-attack reconnaissance

On December 5, Yoshikawa went on his final “sightseeing” flight over Pearl Harbor in a small Piper Cub. Via the Consulate, he cabled Tokyo that there were 8 battleships, 3 light cruisers, and 16 destroyers in the harbor. Also, two Aichi E12A Type 0 float scouts (Allied codename "Jake"), one each from Tone and Chikuma (Mikuma's Cruiser Division 8) secretly scouted the Lahaina Road anchorage and Pearl Harbor for the Pacific Fleet.

Initial air attack composition

The first wave of attack consisted of 49 B5Ns, 51 D3As, 40 B5Ns, and 43 A6Ms (a total of 183 aircraft), launched north of Oahu, commanded by Captain Mitsuo Fuchida. It was comprised of:

• 1st Group (Captain Mitsuo Fuchida)

File:M Fuchida.jpg

Captain Mitsuo Fuchida

Aichi D3A "Val" dive bombers preparing for take off for Pearl Harbor

• • 1st-4th Attack Units - (Cpt. Fuchida, Lt. Cmdr. Hashiguchi, Lt. Abe and Lt. Cmdr. Kusmi) - 50 Nakajima B5Ns armed with 800 kg (1760 lb) armor piercing bombs.
  • 1st-4th Torpedo Attack Units - (Lt. Cmdr. Murata, Lt. Kitajima, Nagai and Matsumaru) - 40 B5Ns armed with Type 91 torpedoes
• 2nd Group (Lt. Cmdr. Takahashi) - 55 Aichi D3As armed with 550lb general purpose bombs
  • 15th Attack Unit (27 D3A) - (Lt. Cmdr. Takahashi) - Hangars and aircraft on Ford Island
  • 16th Attack Unit (27 D3A) - (Lt. Sakamoto) - Hangars and aircraft on Wheeler Field
• 3rd Group (Lt. Cmdr. Itaya) - 45 A6Ms for air control and strafing
  • 1st and 2nd Fighter Combat Units (18 A6M) - (Lt. Cmdr. Itaya and Lt. Shiga) - Ford Island and Hickam Field
  • 3rd and 4th Fighter Combat Units (15 A6M) - (Lt. Suganami and Okajima) - Wheeler Field and Barbers Point
  • 5th and 6th Fighter Combat Units (12 A6M) - (Lt. Sato and Kaneko) - Kaneohe

The first attack wave divided into 3 groups. One unit went to Wheeler Field. Each of the aerial waves started with the bombers and ended with the fighters to deter pursuit. The air portion of the attack on Pearl Harbor began at 7:48 a.m. December 7 Hawaiian Time (3:18 a.m. December 8 Japanese Standard Time, as used by the Kido Butai), with the attack on Kaneohe. Japanese planes attacked in two waves; a total of 353 planes reached Oʻahu. Slow, vulnerable torpedo bombers led the first wave, exploiting the first moments of surprise to attack the most important ships present (the battleships), while dive bombers attacked U.S. air bases across Oʻahu, starting with Hickam Field, the largest, and Wheeler Field, the main AAC fighter base. The 170 planes in the second wave attacked the Air Corps' Bellows Field near Kaneohe on the windward side of the island, and Ford Island, a Marine and Naval air station in the middle of Pearl Harbor. The only significant air opposition came from a handful of P-36 Hawks and P-40 Warhawks that flew 25 sorties.

USS California sinking

Men aboard U.S. ships awoke to the sounds of bombs exploding and cries of "Away fire and rescue party" and "All hands on deck, we're being bombed" and other various calls to General Quarters. (The famous message, "Air raid Pearl Harbor. This is not drill." was originated by Commander Logan Ramsey from the headquarters of Admiral Patrick Bellinger, commander of Patrol Wing Two.) Despite the lack of preparation, which included locked ammunition lockers, aircraft parked wing to wing to prevent sabotage, and no heightened alert status, and on at least one battleship, all watertight doors open throughout the ship in preparation for an inspection, many American military personnel served with distinction during the battle. Rear Admiral Isaac C. Kidd, and Captain Franklin Van Valkenburgh, commander of USS Arizona, both rushed to the bridge to direct her defense, until both were killed by an explosion in the forward magazine from an armor piercing bomb hit next to turret two. Both were posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor. Ensign Joe Taussig got his ship, USS Nevada, under way from a dead cold start during the attack. One of the destroyers, USS Aylwin, got underway with only four officers aboard, all Ensigns, none with more than a year's sea duty. That ship operated at sea for four days before her commanding officer managed to get aboard. Captain Mervyn Bennion, commanding USS West Virginia (Kimmel's flagship), led his men until he was cut down by fragments from a bomb hit in USS Tennessee, moored alongside.

Second air attack composition

Fighter Combat Units (Mitsubishi A6M Zeros) preparing to take off from aircraft carrier Shokaku for Pearl Harbor

The second wave consisted of 54 B5Ns, 78 D3As, and 35 A6Ms (a total of 167), launched from much the same location, commanded by Lieutenant-Commander Shigekazu Shimazaki. This wave was comprised of:

• 1st Group (Lt. Cmdr. Shigekazu Shimazaki) - 54 B5Ns armed with 550 lb and 120 lb general purpose bombs
  • 5th Attack Unit (27 B5N) - (Lt. Ichihira) - Aircraft and hangars on Kaneohe, Ford Island and Barbers Point
  • 6th Attack Unit (27 B5N) - (Lt. Cmdr. Shimazaki) - Hangars and aircraft on Hickam Field
• 2nd Group (Lt. Cmdr. Egusa)
  • 11th-14th Attack Units - (Lt. Egusa, Kobayashi, Chihaya, and Makino) - 78 D3As armed with 550 lb general purpose bombs
• 3rd Group (Lt. Cmdr. Shindo) - 36 A6Ms for defense and strafing
  • 1st and 2nd Fighter Combat Units (18 A6M) - (Lt. Shindo and Nikaido) - Ford Island and Hickam Field
  • 3rd and 4th Fighter Combat Units (18 A6M) - (Lt. Iida and Kumano) - Wheeler Field and Kaneohe

The second wave was divided into three groups. One unit was tasked to attack the Kāneʻohe Naval Air Station, the rest sent against Pearl Harbor proper. The separate sections arrived at the attack point almost simultaneously, from several directions.

The earliest aircraft kill credit was assigned to submarine USS Tautog. Probably the most famous single defender is Doris "Dorie" Miller, an African-American cook aboard West Virginia, who went beyond his duty assignment and training when he took control of an unattended anti-aircraft gun, on which he had no training, and used it to fire on attacking planes, while bombs were hitting his ship. He was awarded the Navy Cross. In all, 14 sailors and officers were awarded Medals of Honor. A special military award, the Pearl Harbor Commemorative Medal, was later authorized for all military veterans of the attack.

Ninety minutes after it began, the attack was over. 2,386 Americans died (55 were civilians, most killed by unexploded American anti-aircraft shells landing in civilian areas), a further 1,139 wounded. Eighteen ships were sunk, including five battleships.

B-17 after the attack on Hickam Field.

USS Pennsylvania, behind the wreckage of the USS Downes and USS Cassin.

Nearly half of the 1102 American fatalities were caused by the explosion and sinking of USS Arizona, the result of her forward magazine exploding after it was hit by a bomb (a modified 40 cm {16in} shell).

Nevada attempted to exit the harbor, but was deliberately beached to avoid blocking the harbor entrance. Already damaged by a torpedo and on fire forward, Nevada was targeted by many Japanese bombers as she got underway, sustaining more hits from 250 lb (113 kg) bombs as she beached.

USS California was hit by two bombs and two torpedoes. The crew might have kept her afloat, but were ordered to abandon ship just as they were raising power for the pumps. Burning oil from Arizona and West Virginia drifted down on her, and probably made the situation look worse than it was. The disarmed target ship USS Utah was holed twice by torpedoes. USS West Virginia was hit by seven torpedoes, the seventh tearing away her rudder. USS Oklahoma was hit by four torpedoes, the last two above her belt armor, which caused her to capsize. USS Maryland was hit by two of the converted 40cm shells, but neither caused serious damage.

Although the Japanese concentrated on battleships (the largest vessels present), they did not ignore other targets. The light cruiser USS Helena was torpedoed, and the concussion from the blast capsized the neighboring minelayer USS Oglala. Two destroyers in dry dock were destroyed when bombs penetrated their fuel bunkers. The leaking fuel caught fire; flooding the dry dock in an effort to fight fire made the burning oil rise, and so the ships were burned out. The light cruiser USS Raleigh was holed by a torpedo. The light cruiser USS Honolulu was damaged but remained in service. The destroyer USS Cassin capsized, and destroyer USS Downes was heavily damaged. The repair vessel USS Vestal, moored alongside Arizona, was heavily damaged and beached. The seaplane tender USS Curtiss was also damaged. USS Shaw was badly damaged when two bombs penetrated her forward magazine.

Destroyer USS Shaw exploding after her forward magazine was detonated

Almost all of the 188 American aircraft in Hawaii were destroyed or damaged, and 155 of those were hit on the ground. Almost none were actually ready to take off to defend the base, having been parked wingtip to wingtip as a sabotage protection measure. Of 33 PBYs in Hawaii, 24 were destroyed, and six others damaged beyond repair. (The three on patrol returned undamaged.) Attacks on barracks killed additional personnel. Friendly fire brought down several U.S. planes, including at least one inbound from USS Enterprise.

Fifty-five Japanese airmen and nine submariners were killed in the action. Of Japan's 387 available planes (350 took part in the attack), 29 were lost during the battle (nine in the first attack wave, 20 in the second), with another 74 damaged by antiaircraft fire from the ground.

Possible third attack

Several junior Japanese officers and flight leaders including Fuchida and Genda urged Admiral Nagumo to carry out a third strike in order to destroy as much of Pearl Harbor's fuel storage depots, maintenance and dry dock facilities as possible. Some military historians have suggested the destruction of these oil tanks and repair facilities would have crippled the U.S. Pacific Fleet far more seriously than did loss of its battleships. If these vital facilities had been wiped out, "serious [American] operations in the Pacific would have been postponed for more than a year." Nagumo, however, decided to forgo a third attack in favor of withdrawal for several reasons:

• The American anti-aircraft performance had improved considerably during the second strike, and two-thirds of Japan's losses were incurred during the second wave (20 out of 29 lost planes). Nagumo felt if he launched a third strike, he would be risking three-quarters of the Japanese Combined Fleet's strength to wipe out the remaining targets (which included the port facilities) while suffering higher aircraft losses.
• The location of the American carriers remained unknown to Nagumo. In addition, the Admiral was concerned that the Japanese task force was now within range of American land-based bombers. Nagumo was uncertain if the U.S. has enough surviving planes remaining on Hawaii to launch an attack against Japan's carriers.
• A third wave attack would have required substantial preparation and turn-around time, and would have meant returning planes would have faced night landings. At the time, no Navy had developed night carrier techniques, so this was a substantial risk.
• The task force's fuel situation did not permit him to remain in waters north of Pearl Harbor much longer since they were at the very limits of their logistical support. To do so risked running unacceptably low on fuel, perhaps even having to abandon destroyers en route home.
• Nagumo believed the second strike had essentially satisfied the main objective of his mission--the neutralization of the Pacific Fleet--and did not wish to risk further losses.

At a conference aboard Yamato the following morning, Yamamoto initially supported Nagumo's decision to withdraw. In retrospect, however, Nagumo's decision to spare the vital dockyards, maintenance shops, and oil depots meant the U.S. could respond relatively quickly to Japanese activities in the Pacific. Yamamoto later regretted Nagumo's decision and categorically stated it had been a great mistake not to order a third strike.

Aftermath

American response

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President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the Declaration of War against Japan on the day following the attack

On December 8, 1941, Roosevelt addressed a joint session of Congress, calling 7 December 1941 "a date which will live in infamy". Amid outrage at the attack and the late delivery of the note breaking off relations, actions considered treacherous, Congress declared war on Japan with Jeannette Rankin (Republican of Montana) casting the only dissenting vote. Roosevelt signed the declaration the same day. Continuing to intensify its military mobilization, the U.S. government finished converting to a war economy, a process begun by provision of weapons to the Soviet Union and Great Britain.

The Pearl Harbor attack immediately galvanized a divided nation into action. Public opinion had been moving towards support for entering the war during 1941, but considerable opposition remained until the Pearl Harbor attack. Overnight, Americans united against Japan, and probably made possible the unconditional surrender position later taken by the Allied Powers. Some historians believe the attack on Pearl Harbor doomed Japan to defeat simply because it awakened the "sleeping beast", regardless of whether the fuel depots or machine shops had been destroyed or even if the carriers had been caught in port and sunk. U.S. industrial and military capacity, once mobilized, was able to pour overwhelming resources into both the Pacific and Atlantic theaters. Others believe Japanese trade protection was so incompetent, U.S. submarines could have strangled Japan into defeat alone.

Perceptions of treachery in the attack before a declaration of war sparked fears of sabotage or espionage by Japanese sympathizers residing in the U.S., including citizens of Japanese descent and was a factor in the subsequent Japanese internment in the western United States. Other factors included misrepresentations of intelligence information (none) suggesting sabotage, notably by General John DeWitt, commanding Coast Defense on the Pacific Coast, who had personal feelings against Japanese Americans. In February 1942, Roosevelt signed United States Executive Order 9066, requiring all Japanese Americans to submit themselves for an internment.

Germany declares war

Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy declared war on the United States on December 11, allowing the US to formally enter the war in Europe. Hitler and Mussolini were under no obligation to declare war under the mutual defense terms of the Tripartite Pact. However, relations between the European Axis Powers and the United States had deteriorated since 1937. Earlier in 1941, the Nazis learned of the U.S. military's contingency planning to get troops in Continental Europe by 1943; this was Rainbow Five, made public by sources unsympathetic to Roosevelt's New Deal, and published by the Chicago Tribune. Hitler decided war with the United States was unavoidable, and the Pearl Harbor attack, the publication of Rainbow Five, and Roosevelt's post-Pearl Harbor address, which focused on European affairs as well as the situation with Japan, probably contributed to the declaration. Hitler underestimated American military production capacity, the nation's ability to fight on two fronts, and the time his own Operation BARBAROSSA would require. Similarly, the Nazis may have hoped the declaration of war, a showing of solidarity with Japan, would result in closer collaboration with the Japanese in Eurasia, particularly against the Soviet Union. Regardless of Hitler's reasons, the decision was an enormous strategic blunder and allowing the United States to enter the European war in support of the United Kingdom and the Allies without much public opposition.

Hitler awarded Imperial Japanese ambassador to Nazi Germany Hiroshi Oshima the Grand Cross of the Order of the German Eagle in Gold (1st class) after the attack, praising Japan for striking hard and without first declaring war.}}

Logistical and strategic analysis

The attack on Pearl Harbor failed to destroy the three aircraft carriers assigned to the Pacific Fleet (Enterprise, Lexington, and Saratoga), which was an important goal of Genda's plan. Fortunately for the U.S. Navy, at the time of the Japanese attack, Saratoga was on America's west coast for refit, while Lexington and Enterprise were ferrying fighters to Wake and Midway. The attack resulted in the permanent loss of Arizona and Oklahoma, and removed several other battleships (including Nevada, West Virginia, and California) from the order of battle for months. However, all of these were older designs, too slow to serve as escorts for the carrier task forces which became central to the Pacific War, in any case. The most immediate consequences of the attack were the destruction of over 155 aircraft, and shock to American pride.

Genda's plan and Nagumo's execution left the shore installations at Pearl almost untouched. Cruisers, essential to carrier task forces later in the war, suffered little damage, and only three destroyers were lost: Shaw, Cassin, and Downes. (Even so, machinery from both of the latter, and even Arizona, was successfully salvaged.) The tank farms, containing 140 million gallons (530 million liters) of bunker oil, were unscathed. The Navy Yard, critical to ship maintenance, famously for Yorktown just prior to Midway, was undamaged. The engineering and repair shops, as well as the torpedo store, were intact. The power station, central to base functioning, continued to operate. The Submarine Base, critical to the initial phase of the War and to commerce raiding throughout, was unaffected. And the cryptanalysis unit, HYPO, located in the basement of the old Administration Building, was undamaged, and indeed benefited, gaining staff from unemployed ship's bands.

The Army Air Force loss of aircraft must be balanced against the fact its P-40s were obsolescent (already scheduled for replacement by the P-38) and P-36s obsolete. Japan might have achieved a good deal more with not much additional effort or loss.

Nagumo's hesitation, and failure to find and destroy the American carriers, may have been a product of his lack of faith in the attack plan, and of the fact he was a gunnery officer, not an aviator. In addition, Yamamoto's targeting priorities, placing battleships first in importance, reflected an out-of-date Mahanian doctrine, and an inability to extrapolate from history, given the damage German submarines did to British trade in World War I. In the end, Japan achieved surprisingly little for all her daring and apparent success.

The politics of a "Europe First" strategy, loss of air cover over Pearl Harbor, and subsequent loss of the Philippines, meant the U.S. Navy and Army Air Force were unable to play a significant role in the Pacific War for several months. Japan was temporarily free of worries about the rival Pacific naval power, which was at least part of what had been intended for the attack. Japan conquered Southeast Asia, the Southwest Pacific, and extended her reach far into the Indian Ocean, without interference.

In retrospect, the attack was a strategic disaster for Japan. It spurred the United States into a determination to fight to complete victory. The War resulted in the destruction of the Japanese armed forces, the Occupation of the Home Islands (a state never before achieved in Japan's history), and the loss of Okinawa and the Ryukyu Islands to the United States until 1972, while the Russian annexation of the Kurile islands has not been reversed to this day.

Investigations and blame

President Roosevelt appointed an investigating commission, headed by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Owen Roberts to report facts and findings with respect to the attack on Pearl Harbor. It was the first of many official investigations (nine in all). Both the Fleet commander, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, and the Army commander, Lieutenant General Walter Short (the Army had been responsible for air defense of Hawaii, including Pearl Harbor, and for general defense of the islands against hostile attack), were relieved of their commands shortly thereafter. They were accused of "dereliction of duty" by the Roberts Commission for not making reasonable defensive preparations. None of the investigations conducted during the War, nor the Congressional investigation afterward, provided enough reason to reverse those actions. The decisions of the Navy and War Departments to relieve both was controversial at the time and has remained so. However, neither was court-martialed as would normally have been the result of dereliction of duty. On May 25, 1999, the U.S. Senate voted to recommend both officers be exonerated on all charges, citing "denial to Hawaii commanders of vital intelligence available in Washington".

Japanese views

File:JapanPropaganda.jpg

Japanese propaganda caricature map from around 1941, depicting a U.S. blockade of Japan from the Philippines (then a U.S. possession)

File:9submariners.jpg

Japanese depiction of nine midget submarine crewmembers lost during the attack, excluding the POW, Kazuo Sakamaki.

Although the Imperial Japanese government had made some effort to prepare their population for war via anti-U.S. propaganda, it appears most Japanese were surprised, apprehensive, and dismayed by the news they were now at war with the U.S., a country many Japanese admired. Nevertheless, the people at home and overseas thereafter generally accepted their government's account of the attack and supported the war effort until their nation's surrender in 1945.

Japan's national leadership at the time appeared to have believed war between the U.S. and Japan had long been inevitable. In any case, Japanese-American relationships had already significantly deteriorated since Japan's invasion of China beginning in the early '30s, of which the United States strongly disapproved. In 1942, Saburo Kurusu, former Japanese ambassador to the United States, gave an address in which he talked about the "historical inevitability of the war of Greater East Asia." He said war had been a response to Washington's longstanding aggression toward Japan. For example, provocations against Japan included the San Francisco School incident, (the United States' racist policies on Japanese immigrants), Naval Limitations Treaty, other Unequal treaties, the Nine Power Pact, constant economic pressure against Japan, culminating in the "belligerent" scrap metal and oil embargo in 1941 by the United States and Allied countries to contain and/or reverse the actions of the Empire of Japan especially in IndoChina during her expansion of influence and interests throughout Asia. In light of Japan's dependence on imported oil, the trade embargoes were especially significant. These pressures directly influenced Japan to go into alliance with Germany and Italy through the Tripartite Pact. According to Kurusu, because of these reasons, the Allies had already provoked war with Japan long before the attack at Pearl Harbor, and the United States was already preparing for war with Japan. Kurusu also states the United States was also looking for world domination, beyond just Asia, with "sinister designs" . Some of this view seems to have been shared by Adolf Hitler, when he called it one of the reasons Germany declared war on the United States. He also had mentioned European imperialism toward Japan many years before. Therefore, according to Kurusu, Japan had no choice but to defend herself and so should rapidly continue to militarize, bring Germany and Italy closer as allies and militarily combat the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands.

Japan's leaders also saw herself as justified in her conduct, believing that they are building the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. They also explained Japan had done everything possible to alleviate tension between the two nations. The decision to attack, at least for public presentation, was reluctant and forced on Japan. Of the Pearl Harbor attack itself, Kurusu said it came in direct response to a virtual ultimatum from the U.S. government, the Hull note, and so the surprise attack was not treacherous. Since the Japanese-American relationship already had hit its lowest point, there was no alternative; in any case, had an acceptable settlement of differences been reached, the Carrier Striking Task Force could have been called back.

Perception of the attack today

File:Japanpilotdrawing.jpg

Drawing found in the wreckage of one of the Japanese planes. It reads, "Hear! The voice of the moment of death. Wake up, you fools!" and "You damned! Go to the devil!"

The USS Arizona burning after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor

Some Japanese today feel they were compelled to fight because of threats to their national interests and an embargo imposed by the United States, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. The most important embargo was on oil on which its Navy and much of the economy was dependent. For example, the Japan Times, an English-language newspaper owned by one of the major news organizations in Japan (Asahi Shimbun), ran numerous columns in the early 2000s echoing Kurusu's comments in reference to the Pearl Harbor attack.

In putting the Pearl Harbor attack into context, Japanese writers repeatedly contrast the thousands of U.S. servicemen killed there with the hundreds of thousands of Japanese civilians killed in U.S. air attacks later in the War, even without mentioning the 1945 atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the United States.

However, in spite of the perceived inevitability of the war by many Japanese, many also believe the Pearl Harbor attack, although a tactical victory, was actually part of a seriously flawed strategy for engaging in war with the U.S. As one columnist eulogizes, "The Pearl Harbor attack was a brilliant tactic, but part of a strategy based on the belief that a spirit as firm as iron and as beautiful as cherry blossoms could overcome the materially wealthy United States. That strategy was flawed, and Japan's total defeat would follow." In 1991, the Japanese Foreign Ministry released a statement saying Japan had intended to make a formal declaration of war to the United States at 1 p.m. Washington time, 25 minutes before the attack at Pearl Harbor was scheduled to begin. This officially acknowledged something which had been publicly known for years, diplomatic communications had been coordinated well in advance with the attack, but had failed delivery at the intended time. It appears the Japanese government was referring to the "14-part message", which did not actually break off negotiations, let alone declare war, but which did officially raise the possibility of a break in relations. However, because of various delays, the Japanese ambassador was unable to make the declaration until well after the attack had begun.

Imperial Japanese military leaders appear to have had mixed feelings about the attack. Fleet Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto was unhappy about the botched timing of the breaking off of negotiations. He is rumored to have said, "I fear all we have done is awakened a sleeping giant and filled him with terrible resolve". Even though this quote is unsubstantiated, the phrase seems to describe his feelings about the situation. He is on record as having said, in the previous year, that "I can run wild for six months ... after that, I have no expectation of success."

The first Prime Minister of Japan during World War II, Hideki Tojo later wrote, "When reflecting upon it today, that the Pearl Harbor attack should have succeeded in achieving surprise seems a blessing from Heaven."

Yamamoto had said, regarding the imminent war with the United States, "Should hostilities once break out between Japan and the United States, it is not enough that we take Guam and the Philippines, nor even Hawaii and San Francisco. We would have to march into Washington and sign the treaty in the White House. I wonder if our politicians (who speak so lightly of a Japanese-American war) have confidence as to the outcome and are prepared to make the necessary sacrifices?"

Impact

Posters like Allen Saalberg's iconic work strengthed American resolve against the Axis powers

A common view is that the Japanese fell victim to victory disease because of the perceived ease of their first victories. It has also been stated by the Japanese military commanders and politicians who visited and lived in the United States, that their leadership (mostly military personnel) took the war with the United States relatively lightly, compared to them. For instance, Yamamoto's quote and Battle of Iwo Jima commander Tadamichi Kuribayashi's opinions expressed the views and concerns about the greater industrial power of the United States in comparison to Japan.

Despite the perception of this battle as a devastating blow to America, only three ships were permanently lost to the U.S. Navy. These were the battleships Arizona, Oklahoma, and the old battleship Utah (then used as a target ship); nevertheless, much usable material was salvaged from them, including the two aft main turrets from Arizona. Heavy casualties resulted from Arizona’s magazine exploding and the Oklahoma capsizing. Four ships sunk during the attack were later raised and returned to duty, including the battleships California, West Virginia and Nevada. California and West Virginia had an effective torpedo-defense system which held up remarkably well, despite the weight of fire they had to endure, resulting in most of their crews being saved. Many of the surviving battleships were heavily refitted, including the replacement of their outdated secondary battery of anti-surface 5" (127 mm) guns with more useful turreted dual-purpose (antiaircraft and antiship) guns, allowing them to better cope with the new tactical reality. Addition of modern radar to the salavaged vessels would give them a marked qualitative advantage over those of the IJN, and the slow battleships (incapable of operating with carrier task forces, unlike the Iowas) would prove useful delivering pre-invasion bombardment for the island hopping offensive against the Japanese in the pacific. Destroyers Cassin and Downes were total losses as ships, but their machinery was salvaged and fitted into new hulls, retaining their original names, while Shaw was raised and returned to service.

Of the 22 Japanese ships that took part in the attack, only one survived the war. As of 2006, the only U.S. ships in Pearl Harbor during the attack still remaining afloat are the Coast Guard Cutter Taney and the yard tug USS Hoga. Both remained active over 50 years after the attack and have been designated museum ships.

In the long term, the attack on Pearl Harbor was a strategic blunder for Japan. Indeed, Admiral Yamamoto, who conceived it, predicted that even success here could not win a war with the United States, because American productive capacity was too large. One of the main Japanese objectives was to destroy the three American aircraft carriers stationed in the Pacific, but they were not present: Enterprise was returning from Wake, Lexington from Midway, and Saratoga was under refit at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard. Putting most of the U.S. battleships out of commission was regarded—in both navies and by most military observers worldwide—as a tremendous success for Japan.

Though the attack was notable for its large-scale destruction, the attack was not significant in terms of American fuel storage, maintenance and intelligence capabilities. Had Japan destroyed the American carriers, the U.S. would have sustained significant damage to the Pacific Fleet's ability to conduct offensive operations for a year or so (given no further diversions from the Atlantic Fleet). As it was, the elimination of the battleships left the U.S. Navy with no choice but to place its faith in aircraft carriers and submarines—the very weapons with which the U.S. Navy halted and eventually reversed the Japanese advance. A major flaw of Japanese strategic thinking was a belief the ultimate Pacific battle would be between battleships of both sides, in keeping with the doctrine of Captain Alfred Mahan. As a result, Yamamoto (and his successors) hoarded his battleships for a "decisive battle" that never happened.

Ultimately, targets not on Genda's list, such as the Submarine Base and the old Headquarters Building, were more important than any battleship. It was submarines that immobilized IJN's heavy ships and brought Japan's economy to a standstill by crippling transportation of oil and raw materials. And in the basement of the old Administration Building was the cryptanalytic unit, HYPO, which contributed significantly to the Midway ambush and the Submarine Force's success.

Historical significance

Arizona barbette, 2005.

The attack had history-altering consequences. Prime Minister Winston Churchill, on hearing of the attack, wrote, "Being saturated and satiated with emotion and sensation, I went to bed and slept the sleep of the saved and thankful." By opening the Pacific War, which ended in the unconditional surrender of Japan, it broke the power of an Asian check on Soviet expansion. The Allied victory in this war and subsequent U.S. emergence as a dominant world power, eclipsing Britain, have shaped international politics ever since.

Damage to the headquarters building at Hickam, still visible.

Pearl Harbor is generally regarded as an extraordinary event in American history, remembered as the first time since the War of 1812 America was attacked on its home soil by another country. While this assertion is technically erroneous, as Hawaii was not a state at the time, it was widely regarded as "home soil". It has become synonymous with "surprise attack" ever since in the U.S. Unfortunately, the mistakes of intelligence collection, sharing, and analysis leading to the Japanese success at Pearl Harbor did not, in the end, lead to lessons.

Rise of anti-Japanese sentiment

Main article: Anti-Japanese sentiment

WWII propaganda posters using racial stereotypes were common. Shown here Adolf Hitler and Hideki Tojo of the Axis alliance.

The attack on Pearl Harbor coupled with Japanese alliance with the Nazis and the ensuing war in the Pacific fueled anti-Japanese sentiment, racism, and xenophobia. Japanese, Japanese-Americans and Asians having a similar physical appearance were regarded with deep seated suspicion, distrust and hostility. The attack was viewed as having been conducted in an extremely underhanded way and also as a very "treacherous" or "sneaky attack."

See also

• Attacks on North America during World War II
• Day of Deceit: The Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbor
• List of United States Navy losses in World War II
• Pearl Harbor
• Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge debate
• Pearl Harbor Survivors Association
• USS Arizona Memorial

Further reading

• McCollum memo A 1940 memo from a Naval headquarters staff officer to his superiors outlining possible provocations to Japan, which might lead to war (declassified in 1994).
• Gordon W. Prange, At Dawn We Slept (McGraw-Hill, 1981), Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History (McGraw-Hill, 1986), and December 7, 1941: The Day the Japanese Attacked Pearl Harbor (McGraw-Hill, 1988). This monumental trilogy, written with collaborators Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon, is considered the authoritative work on the subject.
• Larry Kimmett and Margaret Regis, The Attack on Pearl Harbor: An Illustrated History (NavPublishing, 2004). Using maps, photos, unique illustrations, and an animated CD, this book provides a detailed overview of the surprise attack that brought the United States into World War II.
• Walter Lord, Day of Infamy (Henry Holt, 1957) is a very readable, and entirely anecdotal, re-telling of the day's events.
• W. J. Holmes, Double-Edged Secrets: U.S. Naval Intelligence Operations in the Pacific During World War II (Naval Institute, 1979) contains some important material, such as Holmes' argument that, had the U.S. Navy been warned of the attack and put to sea, it would have likely resulted in an even greater disaster.
• Michael V. Gannon, Pearl Harbor Betrayed (Henry Holt, 2001) is a recent examination of the issues surrounding the surprise of the attack.
• Frederick D. Parker, Pearl Harbor Revisited: United States Navy Communications Intelligence 1924–1941 (Center for Cryptologic History, 1994) contains a detailed description of what the Navy knew from intercepted and decrypted Japan's communications prior to Pearl.
• Henry C. Clausen and Bruce Lee, Pearl Harbor: Final Judgment, (HarperCollins, 2001), an account of the secret "Clausen Inquiry" undertaken late in the war by order of Congress to Secretary of War Stimson.
• Robert A. Theobald, Final Secret of Pearl Harbor (Devin-Adair Pub, 1954) ISBN 0-8159-5503-0 ISBN 0-317-65928-6 Foreword by Fleet Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr.
• Albert C. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports! (Henry Holt Co, 1958) ISBN 0-89275-011-1 ISBN 0-8159-7216-4
• Hamilton Fish, Tragic Deception: FDR and America's Involvement in World War II (Devin-Adair Pub, 1983) ISBN 0-8159-6917-1
• John Toland, Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath (Berkley Reissue edition, 1986 ISBN 0-425-09040-X) is an excellent account by a Pulitzer Prize winning author, though thought by some not to back up his claims as thoroughly as expected by academic conventions.
• Robert Stinnett, Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor (Free Press, 1999) A study of the Freedom of Information Act documents that led Congress to direct clearance of Kimmel and Short. ISBN 0-7432-0129-9
• Edward L. Beach, Scapegoats: A Defense of Kimmel and Short at Pearl HarborISBN 1-55750-059-2
• Andrew Krepinevich, Template:PDFlink (Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments) contains a passage regarding the Yarnell attack, as well as reference citations.
• Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision, (Stanford University Press: 1962). Regarded by many as the most important work in the attempt to understand the intelligence failure at Pearl Harbor. Her introduction and analysis of the concept of "noise" persists in understanding intelligence failures.
• John Hughes-Wilson, Military Intelligence Blunders and Cover-Ups. Robinson, 1999 (revised 2004). Contains a brief but insightful chapter on the particular intelligence failures, and broader overview of what causes them.
• Horn, Steve (2005). The Second Attack on Pearl Harbor: Operation K And Other Japanese Attempts to Bomb America in World War II. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-59114-388-8. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)

• Seki, Eiji (2007). Sinking of the SS Automedon And the Role of the Japanese Navy: A New Interpretation. University of Hawaii Press. ISBN 1905246285. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)

• Daniel Madsen, Resurrection-Salvaging the Battle Fleet at Pearl Harbor. U.S. Naval Institute Press. 2003. Highly readable and thoroughly researched account of the aftermath of the attack and the salvage efforts from December 8, 1941 through early 1944.

External links

Accounts

• Guarding The United States And Its Outposts Official U.S. Army history of Pearl Harbor
• War comes to Hawaii Honolulu Star-Bulletin, Monday, Sept. 13, 1999

Media

• Video of first Newsreel from December 23 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor
• Roosevelt's Day Of Infamy Speech Audio of speech given by President Roosevelt shortly after Pearl Harbor Attack
• U.S. Naval Historical Center "Pearl Harbor Raid: Overview and Special Image Selection"
• Library of Congress: The day after

Historic documents

• Second World War - USA Declaration of War on Japan.
• Collection of extensive Japanese preparation military documents
• Naval Institute Special Collections: Pearl Harbor — Articles, books, and pictures.
• Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings Detailed reports from various investigations.
• Pearl Harbor Attack at HyperWar
• Information and Photographs on the Attack on Pearl Harbor at WWII Archives

Miscellaneous

• "Pearl Harbor Attacked" Message Board — A website featuring personal recollections.
• Pearl Harbor at Curlie
• Pearl Harbor website (reference only)

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