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Russia’s political presence in Syria predates the creation of the modern Syrian state after [[World War II]].<ref name='Kreutz'>{{cite book | last1 = Kreutz | first1 = Andrej | title = Russia in the Middle East: friend or foe? | publisher = Greenwood Publishing Group | year = 2007 | location = Westport, Connecticut | accessdate = 2012-04-22}}</ref> As early as the 10th and 11th centuries, Russian soldiers served in the [[Byzantine army]]. The late 19th and early 20th centuries can be characterized by a series of events linking the two nations together. In 1893, a Russian [[consular office]] was established in [[Damascus]], further cementing the relationship. By 1905, the Imperial [[Russian Orthodox]] Society had opened 74 schools in Syria, but by 1910, the society was spending most of its income on Syrian education, even neglecting its principal obligation to the Russian pilgrims in the Holy Land.<ref name='Kreutz' /> The [[Bolshevik revolution]] essentially brought an end to Russian presence in Syria for a brief period. Although Russia did not play a large political role, it helped Syria establish the first [[Syrian Communist Party]] in 1925.<ref name='Kreutz' /> The relationship was restored when Moscow established diplomatic links with Syria in 1944 before Syria was formally recognized as an independent state on 17 April 1946. Over the years, Syria has received substantial military and economic aid from Russia.
Russia’s political presence in Syria predates the creation of the modern Syrian state after [[World War II]].<ref name='Kreutz'>{{cite book | last1 = Kreutz | first1 = Andrej | title = Russia in the Middle East: friend or foe? | publisher = Greenwood Publishing Group | year = 2007 | location = Westport, Connecticut | accessdate = 2012-04-22}}</ref> As early as the 10th and 11th centuries, Russian soldiers served in the [[Byzantine army]]. The late 19th and early 20th centuries can be characterized by a series of events linking the two nations together. In 1893, a Russian [[consular office]] was established in [[Damascus]], further cementing the relationship. By 1905, the Imperial [[Russian Orthodox]] Society had opened 74 schools in Syria, but by 1910, the society was spending most of its income on Syrian education, even neglecting its principal obligation to the Russian pilgrims in the Holy Land.<ref name='Kreutz' /> The [[Bolshevik revolution]] essentially brought an end to Russian presence in Syria for a brief period. Although Russia did not play a large political role, it helped Syria establish the first [[Syrian Communist Party]] in 1925.<ref name='Kreutz' /> The relationship was restored when Moscow established diplomatic links with Syria in 1944 before Syria was formally recognized as an independent state on 17 April 1946. Over the years, Syria has received substantial military and economic aid from Russia.


During the [[Cold War]], Damascus served as an ally to Moscow as they fought the imperial powers of the West, creating a stronger political bond.<ref name='foreign affairs'>{{cite news | first = Dmitri | last = Trenin | title = Russia's Line in the Sand on Syria: Why Moscow Wants To Halt the Arab Spring | date = 2012-02-05 | url = http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137078/dmitri-trenin/russias-line-in-the-sand-on-syria | work = Foreign Affairs.com | accessdate = 2012-03-15}}</ref> Between 1955 and 1958, Syria received about $294 million from Moscow for military and economic assistance,<ref name='Kreutz' /> a business relationship which continues today.
During the [[Cold War]], Damascus served as an ally to Moscow as they fought the imperial powers of the West, creating a stronger political bond.<ref name='foreign affairs'>{{cite news | first = Dmitri | last = Trenin | title = Russia's Line in the Sand on Syria: Why Moscow Wants To Halt the Arab Spring | date = 2012-02-05 | url = http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137078/dmitri-trenin/russias-line-in-the-sand-on-syria | work = Foreign Affairs.com | accessdate = 2012-03-15}}</ref> Between 1955 and 1958, Syria received about $294 million from Moscow for military and economic assistance,<ref name='Kreutz' /> a business relationship which continues today. Thousands of Syrian military officers and educated professionals, and such connections have resulted in many marriages and mixed families.<ref>{{cite web |last1= Peel |first1= Michael |last2= Clover |first2= Charles |date= 9 July 2012 |title= Syria and Russia's 'special relationship' |url= http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e64a3076-c9b2-11e1-a5e2-00144feabdc0.html |publisher= FT.com |accessdate= 11 July 2012 }}</ref>


The [[1966 Syrian coup d'état|Syrian Revolution]] of February 1966 allowed the [[Soviet Union]] the opportunity to further support Syria. This was due to the possibility of acquiring basing rights on the [[Mediterranean Sea]] in order to counter the [[U.S. Sixth Fleet]]. Had the Soviet Union and [[Egypt]] united against the United States and neighboring [[Israel]], this would have greatly increased Soviet influence in the region.<ref name='Breslauer'>{{cite book | last1 = Breslauer | first1 = George W. | title = Soviet Strategy in the Middle East | year = 1990 | location = Boston, Massachusetts | accessdate = 2012-04-22}}</ref> In April 1977, President [[Hafez al-Assad]] visited [[Moscow]], and met with Soviet leaders [[Leonid Brezhnev]] and [[Alexei Kosygin]] among others, as a sign of improved Syrian relations with the USSR. Three years later, in October 1980, Syria signed a twenty-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the [[Soviet Union]].<ref name='Middle East Chronology'>{{cite book | last1 = Lea | first1 = David | title = A Political Chronology of the Middle East | publisher = Europa Publications | year = 2001 | location = London, United Kingdom | accessdate = 2012-04-22}}</ref>
The [[1966 Syrian coup d'état|Syrian Revolution]] of February 1966 allowed the [[Soviet Union]] the opportunity to further support Syria. This was due to the possibility of acquiring basing rights on the [[Mediterranean Sea]] in order to counter the [[U.S. Sixth Fleet]]. Had the Soviet Union and [[Egypt]] united against the United States and neighboring [[Israel]], this would have greatly increased Soviet influence in the region.<ref name='Breslauer'>{{cite book | last1 = Breslauer | first1 = George W. | title = Soviet Strategy in the Middle East | year = 1990 | location = Boston, Massachusetts | accessdate = 2012-04-22}}</ref> In April 1977, President [[Hafez al-Assad]] visited [[Moscow]], and met with Soviet leaders [[Leonid Brezhnev]] and [[Alexei Kosygin]] among others, as a sign of improved Syrian relations with the USSR. Three years later, in October 1980, Syria signed a twenty-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the [[Soviet Union]].<ref name='Middle East Chronology'>{{cite book | last1 = Lea | first1 = David | title = A Political Chronology of the Middle East | publisher = Europa Publications | year = 2001 | location = London, United Kingdom | accessdate = 2012-04-22}}</ref>

Revision as of 14:47, 11 July 2012

Dmitry Medvedev in a joint press conference with the Syrian President following Russo-Syrian talks in May 2011
Russia and Syria

Since the Syrian uprising began in 2011 between President Bashar al-Assad's government and thousands of demonstrators, Russia has played a strategic role in the unfolding of the crisis on the world stage. In a historical context, the two countries have shared a close, though sometimes rocky, relationship, as Syria is Russia's closest Middle Eastern ally. In 1956 Syria followed Egypt in acquiring arms from the Soviet Union, and the Suez War accelerated a multiplication of ties between Syria and the Soviet Union - ties closely associated with the increase in power and influence of the Ba'ath Party.[1] The Russian government continues to support President Assad, despite international calls for condemnation amidst accusations that Assad’s government has killed over 9,000 of its own citizens in order to maintain control. Human rights groups insist the number is closer to 11,000.[2] There are several potential motivating factors behind Russia’s support of President Assad and his government. Although the international community favors a swift end to the bloodshed in Syria, the agreements have been stalled by political stalemates. Western countries favor stronger measures against President Assad, with countries such as the United States calling for his removal, while Russia and China remain staunch defenders of the regime.[3][4]

Rhetoric and actions at the UN

Russia has at various times used its UN Security Council position to block resolutions that would harm the Syrian government (often in concert with China), including [5] blocking the first[5] and second drafts of a Franco-British sponsored attempt to condemn the use of force by the Syrian government.[6] A council diplomat said, in the case of the first, that Russia objected to "the publication of the report as an official Security Council document", but another council diplomat stated that "It's obviously an attempt to protect (Syrian president) Bashar al-Assad".[5] The vetoed report in March had apparently contained material incriminating both the leadership of Iran and Syria in matters related to the transmission of arms to militant groups.[5] The first and second drafts of the resolution sponsored by France, the UK, Germany, the US and Portugal condemning the Syrian government were opposed by Moscow because it was feared they could lead to an interpretation by Western countries that could allow for interference in Syrian affairs.[6] An interview in the government-run media outlet Voice of Russia stated that "What arouses concern is that this resolution of Britain and France declares illegitimacy of the regime of Bashar Assad. That means that the approval of the resolution will make it possible for other countries to doubt the legitimacy of the regime on the base of this document."[6]

In response, the following Friday, loyalist diaspora Syrians in Lebanon rallied in front of the Russian and Chinese embassies in Lebanon to "express their gratitude for Russia and China's support of Damascus and [to reject] the conspiracies sought against Syria",[7] while, on the same Friday, protestors in Syria itself burned Russian flags and carried signs with anti-Russian slogans to show their anger at Russia's position, which they perceived as helping Assad.[8]

On 2 June, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said, "It is not in the interests of anyone to send messages to the opposition in Syria or elsewhere that if you reject all reasonable offers we will come and help you as we did in Libya ... It's a very dangerous position." [9] Lavrov said furthermore that Russia opposes United Nations involvement because "the situation doesn't present a threat to international peace and security ... Syria is a very important country in the Middle East and destabilizing Syria would have repercussions far beyond its borders", and asserted that Assad had made attempts at major reform.[9]

Later in June, both the US and other Western governments[10] as well as Syrian protesters[8] prevailed upon Moscow to change its position, and finally a Syrian anti-government delegation visited Moscow and met with Russian envoy Mikhail Margelov, who after the meeting noted that "leaders come and go" and called for "an end to any and all forms of violence", which some interpreted to be a shift away from Assad, once a major ally, in foreign policy.[11] A switch of positions by Russia was considered to be potentially hazardous for the Syrian regime, given the Syrian government's reliance on Russia for weapons, and diplomatic and economic support in the past.[11]

On 19 July, President Dmitri Medvedev said he was working with German Chancellor Angela Merkel to find consensus for a strategy to persuade the Syrian government to abandon violence and begin a constructive dialogue with protesters. He did not threaten to use Russia's veto at the United Nations Security Council to oppose a resolution critical of the Syrian government, as Moscow has previously said it could do. Medvedev also said it was imperative that Syria not slide into civil war the way Libya did.[12]

Amid the siege of Hama, the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a 1 August statement documenting deaths in Hama as well as condemning the violence, including the alleged killing of eight policemen by Assad's regime. The statement beseeched the pro-Assad forces as well as the violent protesters to "exercise maximum restraint".[13]

However, around the end of the summer of 2011, Russia reverted to its previous stance at the UN.

On 3 August, Russian ambassador Vitaly Churkin stated that Russia will not oppose a UN resolution condemning the violence in Syria as long as it does not include sanctions or other "pressures".[14] Al Jazeera reported that Russia had "softened the blow" to the Assad government by insisting successfully that the UN would make a statement rather than a resolution on the matter.[15] On 23 August, the Russian delegation to the UN, along with those of China and Cuba, took to the floor to denounce a UN inquiry into human rights violations by the Assad government.[16] Vitaly Churkin stated that "We hope to see progress, we hope to see dialogue established in Syria... We think we should continue to work within the scope of that unified position." [17]

On 26 August, Reuters reported that according to UN envoys, the effort by the US, France, the UK, Germany and Portugal to impose UN sanctions on Syria was meeting "fierce resistance" from Russia and China, with Vitaly Churkin threatening to use Russia's veto power.[18] According to Reuters, the arms embargo included in the sanctions would prevent Russian firms (the main source of Syrian weaponry) from selling to Syria.[18] Russia proposed a second "rival" resolution to be voted on, described as "toothless" by Western diplomats, which did not include sanctions or other punitive measures, but rather urged Syria to speed up the process of its reforms.[18]

On 4 October, Russia and China exercised a rare double veto against a Western-drafted Security Council resolution which would have threatened the Syrian government with targeted sanctions if it continued military actions against protesters.[19][20] However, in the days following their opposition on the Security Council to a 'Libyan intervention scenario', both Russia and China issued rare public admonishments of the Syrian government, separately expressing their desire for the government to reform and respect the will of the Syrian people.[21] This veto signaled to the international community that Russia would remain an ally of the Assad regime, while experts asserted that China wanted to send a message to its own dissidents in the wake of the Arab Spring.[19]

On 1 November, Sergei Lavrov said at a Russian-Gulf ministerial meeting that Russia would oppose the recent proposal for a no-fly zone in Syria as (in Russia's view) the no-fly zone in Libya had been used to "support one side in a civil war". Lavrov nonetheless argued, when asked if Russia was supporting the Assad government, that "we are not protecting any regime".[20]

On 15 December, Russia proposed a UN Security Council resolution condemning the violence "by all parties, including disproportionate use of force by Syrian authorities". The draft resolution also raised concern over "the illegal supply of weapons to the armed groups in Syria". Western diplomats initially referred to the proposed resolution as a basis for negotiations.[22] The proposal is an updated version of a Russian-Chinese draft resolution introduced to the Security Council a few months earlier.[22] By the end of January 2012, however, a competing resolution proposal had been drafted by Western and Arab powers which, in contrast to the Russian draft, did not condemn violence by both sides in the conflict and did not rule out military intervention. Russia indicated that it would not agree to the Western-Arab draft in its current form,[23] and that it would continue to promote its own resolution in the Security Council.[24]

On 4 February 2012, Russia and China vetoed another Security Council resolution, sponsored by Western and Arab countries, which urged Bashar al-Assad to adhere to a peace plan drafted by the Arab League.[25][26] On 7 February 2012, Sergei Lavrov, the Russian Foreign Minister, along with overseas intelligence chief Mikhail Fradkov, met with President Assad and reported to the world that President Assad was committed to reform of the constitution and electoral process. Additionally, the Russian delegation said that Syria alone held the power to change the fate of its people, without foreign intervention.[25] On 16 April Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov and other Russian diplomats met with members of the Syrian opposition and Hassan Abdul-Azim, head of the opposition National Coordination Body.[27] Although special U.N. enovy Kofi Annan developed a plan to end Syrian violence, Russia attempted to play a major role in the outcome of the plan by meeting with both the Assad government and opposition forces, while vetoing multiple plans during Security Council votes to accomplish the goals set forth by an international consensus.

On 20 April, the Security Council announced an agreement to expand the number of U.N. cease-fire observers in Syria from 30 to 300, as well as to allow Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to decide on the peacekeepers' deployment based on conditions on the ground.[28] Under the plan, Syrian violence would immediately stop and the Assad government would begin implementation of the Annan six-point peace plan.[28] The draft was the result of two texts proposed by Russia and European Council members.[28] When the texts were merged, the portion imposing sanctions on the Assad government for failure to comply with the peacekeeping plan was removed, as requested by Russia and China.[28] The Russian draft also did not contain language dictating that U.N. peacekeepers' presence in Syria was a condition of Assad's agreement to return troops and heavy weapons to their barracks.[28]

The United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) was passed by the U.N. Security Council on 21 April 2012, and deployed up to 300 unarmed observers to Syria for a period of up to 90 days. The plan also called for passage of the Annan peace plan, making unanimous passage of the resolution significant. After the peace plan was passed, Russian's U.N. ambassador Vitaly Churkin relayed Russia's support of the agreement to the media, while other nations expressed frustration with the process and lack of progress in ending the violence so far.[2]

In the aftermath of the Houla massacre, Russia made numerous pivots. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said at first that "The government bears the main responsibility for what is going on" and that "Any government in any country bears responsibility for the security of its citizens".[29] Russia's reaction was considered to be a condemnation of the Syrian government.[30] However, Lavrov also stated that the rebels shared the blame for the killings, noting that some victims had been killed at close range in a district controlled by the opposition fighters.[31] As talk of UN intervention intensified, a foreign affairs committtee chair in the Russian government, hardened Russia's stance, moving it further away from the earlier condemnation of Damascus, saying that "We have very strong doubts that those people who were shot at point-blank [range] and were stabbed, that this was the action of forces loyal to President Assad... The shelling was probably...the troops of Mr Assad, but the stabbing and point-blank firing was definitely from the other side."[32]

Although Russia has tried to retain the image of a peacemaker in this conflict, Russian diplomats have repeatedly criticized the potential condemnation of Assad by western nations. Russia has also accused the West and allied nations of sabotaging a cease-fire brokered by Russia between Syrian forces.[33]

Motivations

Historical relationship between Russia and Syria

File:Reported Deaths in Violence Across Syria April 2012.png
Reported deaths in violence across Syria, April 2012

Russia’s political presence in Syria predates the creation of the modern Syrian state after World War II.[34] As early as the 10th and 11th centuries, Russian soldiers served in the Byzantine army. The late 19th and early 20th centuries can be characterized by a series of events linking the two nations together. In 1893, a Russian consular office was established in Damascus, further cementing the relationship. By 1905, the Imperial Russian Orthodox Society had opened 74 schools in Syria, but by 1910, the society was spending most of its income on Syrian education, even neglecting its principal obligation to the Russian pilgrims in the Holy Land.[34] The Bolshevik revolution essentially brought an end to Russian presence in Syria for a brief period. Although Russia did not play a large political role, it helped Syria establish the first Syrian Communist Party in 1925.[34] The relationship was restored when Moscow established diplomatic links with Syria in 1944 before Syria was formally recognized as an independent state on 17 April 1946. Over the years, Syria has received substantial military and economic aid from Russia.

During the Cold War, Damascus served as an ally to Moscow as they fought the imperial powers of the West, creating a stronger political bond.[35] Between 1955 and 1958, Syria received about $294 million from Moscow for military and economic assistance,[34] a business relationship which continues today. Thousands of Syrian military officers and educated professionals, and such connections have resulted in many marriages and mixed families.[36]

The Syrian Revolution of February 1966 allowed the Soviet Union the opportunity to further support Syria. This was due to the possibility of acquiring basing rights on the Mediterranean Sea in order to counter the U.S. Sixth Fleet. Had the Soviet Union and Egypt united against the United States and neighboring Israel, this would have greatly increased Soviet influence in the region.[37] In April 1977, President Hafez al-Assad visited Moscow, and met with Soviet leaders Leonid Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin among others, as a sign of improved Syrian relations with the USSR. Three years later, in October 1980, Syria signed a twenty-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union.[38]

Economic importance and history of arms sales

Bashar al-Assad

Arms sales from the Soviet Union and Russia to Syria are well-documented. Reports released by the United States Congressional Research Service in 2008 note that Syria purchased several billions of dollars' worth of military equipment from the former Soviet Union, including SS-21 “Scarab” short-range missiles (range 70 km).[39] According to the report, Soviet military sales to Syria in the 1970s and 80's were so extensive, they accounted for 90% of all military arms imports for the Soviet Union, making the Soviet Union a main supplier of arms for Syria.[39] After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Syria found itself deprived of arms imports, but continued to seek them through Soviet satellite states.[39] Russia's establishment as a nation-state in 1992 saw the re-introduction of the patron-vendor relationship and the cancellation of almost 73% of Syria's debt.[39]

Today, Russia is the world's second largest arms exporter (behind the United States) and lost $4 billion in Libyan contracts due to a United Nations arms embargo in 2011.[40] According to reports, 2.4% of Russia's exports comes from defense-related sales, so the recent Arab Spring conflicts saw an uptick in sales to countries like Syria.[33]

Russia has been shipping large amounts of weapons to Bashar al-Assad, with one ship loaded with "dangerous cargo" notably having to stop in Cyprus due to stormy weather on 10 January 2012.[41] Russia's current contracts with Syria for arms are estimated to be worth 1.5 billion US dollars, comprising 10% of Russia's global arms sales.[41]

The recent Syrian conflict began in early 2011, and as word spread globally of the increasing death toll, Russia's arms sales sparked anger and criticism on the part of certain Western and Arab nations,[41] and global leaders encouraged Russia to end arms sales to Syria. Russian officials refused, however, noting the contractual obligations they were under with their customers,[33] and the Russian government defended its sales by pointing out that they did not violate any standing arms embargoes.[41]

As the conflict continued, Western anger over the arms sales grew. On 1 June, right after the Houla massacre, United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton singled Russia out, condemning Russia's alleged "continuous supply of arms to Syria" and that in her view, Russia's stance in the conflict was not neutral as it claimed it was.[42] In particular, there was ire over a report that Russia allegedly delivered arms to the Syrian port of Tartus in the same week as the infamous massacre. In response to this and to American criticism of Russia's policy on Syria, Russian President Vladimir Putin denied that Russia was shipping any arms to Syria "which can be used in a civilian conflict".[42] Later, the Russian foreign ministry also retaliated with a statement saying "The tragedy in Houla showed what can be the outcome of financial aid and smuggling of modern weapons to rebels, recruitment of foreign mercenaries and flirting with various sorts of extremists."[42]

Main article: Russian naval base in Tartus

Much attention has also been pointed at Tartus, Syria, which is home to Russia's only naval base in the Mediterranean region. Critics say the position of the naval base serves as a chief motivating factor for speaking out in favor of the Assad regime to maintain stability in the region.[43][44][45] The port at Tartus is the only Russian naval base outside of its own territories, making it of great importance tactically and economically to protect military investments.[46]

Press reports in March 2012 indicated that Russian special forces arrived at the port. When questioned by the press about supposed outright support of the Assad regime through these actions, Russian Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov said that Russia is obliged to provide training along with the arms it delivers to Syria under a legal, contractual obligation for the remainder of the year.[46] The officials also deny the presence of Russian ground forces meant to reinforce Assad's rule.[46]

It was also argued that Russian support was motivated "the recent experience of Libya, strong doubts concerning the Syrian opposition, and suspicions about the motives of the United State."[47]

Notoriety[vague]

Journalists and world leaders have voiced concerns that Russia is attempting to play a strategic role in the Syrian conflict in order to boost its world standing and legitimacy.[48] Former U.K. ambassador to Russia from 2004 to 2008, Tony Brenton, said in a recent interview that Russia is looking for its first opportunity since the Cold War to boost its brokering abilities.[33] Many critics now point to Russia's learned lesson of 2011 when it abstained from a U.N. vote concerning military intervention in Libya.[35] Because of this abstention, the resolution to establish a no fly-over zone in Libya passed. The war eventually led the country into chaos, replacing a regime which originally purchased Russian arms with a weak central government that was much less friendly to Russia.[35] Russia would like to maintain control of the Syrian conflict, critics assert, to avoid a situation similar to Libya.

In January 2012, Human Rights Watch criticised Russia for "repeating the mistakes of Western governments" in its "misguided" support of Assad.[49] The human rights group also accused Russia of selectively using one of its reports to support a one-sided position on Syria.[50] Before March 2012[51] Russia had shown constant and vocal support for the Assad government, which is now considered to be Moscow's last remaining ally in the Middle East.[52]

Russia has shipped arms during the uprising to Assads government for use against rebels.[53] One of Russia's major interests is access to the port of Tartus, home to its only remaining military base outside the former USSR and thus a key source of its influence in the eastern Mediterranean.[54][55]

In addition to providing the refurbished MI-25 gunships, nicknamed "flying tanks", the country has also transferred to Syria the Buk-M2 air defense system, the Bastion anti-ship missile system, and Yak-130 combat jets.[55] Russian shipments of fuel have also assisted Assad,[56] and an unspecified number of military advisers are teaching Syrians how to use Russian weapons.[57] The head of Russia's federal service for military-technical co-operation confirmed that the MI-25 attack helicopters were "ready to deliver on time" adding that "Syria is our friend, and we fulfill all our obligations to our friends".[58] Amnesty International, noting the Syrian government's headlong deployment of military helicopters, criticised Russia: "Anyone supplying attack helicopters—or maintaining, repairing or upgrading them—for the Syrian government displays a wanton disregard for humanity."[59] Human Rights Watch warned Russia's state-owned arms-trading company Rosoboronexport in a letter that, under international law, "providing weapons to Syria while crimes against humanity are being committed may translate into assisting in the commission of those crimes", and called on governments and companies around the world to stop signing new contracts and consider suspending current dealings with the Russian company.[60] Not long after, however, the US bought Mi-17 helicopters from Rosoboronexport worth hundreds of millions of dollars.[61]

Notable events concerning Russia in the Syrian uprising

  • December 2011–February 2012: The Arab League Monitoring Mission is deployed to Syria, unarmed. Violence between the Assad government and the opposition forces grows, and many opposed to the Assad government who do not wish to stage a violent coup flee the country. A second UN resolution is vetoed by China and Russia.[44]

References

  1. ^ A History of the Middle East, Peter Mansfield, Penguin 2010, 3rd edition, p.293 ISBN 978-0-718-19231-0
  2. ^ a b "UN Authorizes 300 unarmed Syria Monitors". CNN. 2012-04-21. Retrieved 2012-04-22.
  3. ^ http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/29376
  4. ^ http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/china-warns-against-foreign-arming-syrian-rebels
  5. ^ a b c d Mohammed Zargham, ed. (12 May 2011). "Envoys: Russia blocks UN report on Iran arms". MSNBC. Reuters. Retrieved 28 June 2011.
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  7. ^ "Pro-Assad Syrians rally near Russian, Chinese embassies in Lebanon". NOW Lebanon. 19 June 2011. Retrieved 28 June 2011.
  8. ^ a b Al Jazeera Syria Live Blog: Saturday, June 11, 2011 - 10:33. http://blogs.aljazeera.net/liveblog/syria-jun-11-2011-1133. Also at youtube: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gTmd5MFmhQc&feature=player_embedded
  9. ^ a b Meyer, Henry; Cook, Brad; Arkhipov, Ilya (2 June 2011). "Russia Warns U.S., NATO Against Military Aid to Syria Protests After Libya". Bloomberg. Retrieved 28 June 2011.
  10. ^ "US seeks Russia's cooperation over Syria resolution". Newsleaks.com. 18 June 2011.
  11. ^ a b "Russian envoy calls for end to violence in Syria". MSNBC. 28 June 2011.
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  15. ^ Al Jazeera Libya Live Blog. Thursday, August 4, 2011 - 07:32 entry
  16. ^ Khaled Yacoub Oweis (23 August 2011). "U.S. envoy visits Syria town, U.N. launches inquiry". Reuters. Retrieved 30 August 2011.
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  18. ^ a b c Louis Charbonneau (26 August 2011). "Russia, China resist U.N. Syria sanctions push: envoys". Reuters. Retrieved 30 August 2011.
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  20. ^ a b "Russia will not allow Libya-style military intervention in Syria". Middle East Online. 1 November 2011. Retrieved 4 November 2011.
  21. ^ "Syria opposition gains regional backers - CNN.com". CNN. 11 October 2011.
  22. ^ a b "Russia proposes U.N. resolution on Syria; U.S. hopes to work with Moscow on draft". Al Arabiya. 15 December 2011. Retrieved 1 February 2012.
  23. ^ "Russia says U.N. Syria draft unacceptable: Itar-Tass". Reuters. 27 January 2012. Retrieved 27 January 2012.
  24. ^ "Russia to promote its own Syria resolution at U.N." Reuters. 26 January 2012. Retrieved 27 January 2012.
  25. ^ a b "The Long Road to Damascus". The Economist. 402 (8771): 25–28. 2012-02-11. {{cite journal}}: |access-date= requires |url= (help)
  26. ^ Neil MacFarquhar (4 February 2012). "Russia and China Block U.N. Action on Crisis in Syria". The New York Times.
  27. ^ "Syrian opposition delegation holds talks iwth Russian diplomats in Moscow". The Washington Post. Associated Press. 2012-04-16. Retrieved 2012-04-19.
  28. ^ a b c d e "UN Security Council reaches tentative agreement on increasing monitors in Syria to 300". The Washington Post. Associated Press. 2012-04-20. Retrieved 2012-04-20.
  29. ^ Hubbard, Ben; Jordans, Robert (29 May 2012). "UN: Most of 108 killed in Syria were executed". CBS8. Associated Press. Archived from the original on 30 May 2012. Retrieved 29 May 2012. {{cite news}}: Unknown parameter |deadurl= ignored (|url-status= suggested) (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  30. ^ "Russia Condemns Syria Over Massacre". Time. 28 May 2012. Archived from the original on 30 May 2012. Retrieved 29 May 2012. {{cite news}}: Unknown parameter |deadurl= ignored (|url-status= suggested) (help)
  31. ^ "Syria massacre: Rebels share blame, says Russia's Lavrov". BBC News. 28 May 2012. Archived from the original on 31 May 2012. Retrieved 31 May 2012. {{cite news}}: Unknown parameter |deadurl= ignored (|url-status= suggested) (help)
  32. ^ "Houla: How a massacre unfolded". BBC News. 29 May 2012.
  33. ^ a b c d Meyer, Henry (2012-04-20). "Putin Pins Hope on Syria Cease-Fire to Combat U.S. Supremacy". Bloomberg Businessweek. Retrieved 2012-04-20.
  34. ^ a b c d Kreutz, Andrej (2007). Russia in the Middle East: friend or foe?. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Publishing Group. {{cite book}}: |access-date= requires |url= (help)
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