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Islam is the state religion of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The country is noted for being the location of the two holiest sites in Islam, for its largess towards Islamic causes funded by its oil exports, and for its conservative official interpretation of Islam, which has influence well beyond its borders.^[1] It is the location of the citieis of Mecca and Medina, where Muhammad, the messenger of the Islamic faith, lived and died, and which remains the center of the religion, attracting millions of pilgrims annually, and thousands of clerics and students who come from across the Muslim world to study. The official title of the King of Saudi Arabia is "Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques"—the two being Masjid al-Haram in Mecca and Al-Masjid al-Nabawi in Medina—considered the holiest in Islam.

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Saudi Arabia is the birthplace of Muhammad and of the Arabic language. It is unique among modern Muslim states in being the only one to have been created by jihad, the only one to claim the Koran as its constitution, and unique among Arab-Muslim countries in being the only one to have escaped European imperialism. ^[2]

In the 18th century a pact between Islamic preacher Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab and a regional emir, Muhammad bin Saud, brought a fiercely puritanical strain of Sunni Islam first to the Najd region and then to the Arabian peninsula. Referred to by supporters as "Salafism" and by others as "Wahhabism", this interpretation of Islam became the state religion and interpretation of Islam espoused by Muhammad bin Saud and his successors, (the Al Saud family), who eventually created the modern kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932. The Saudi government has spent tens of billions of dollars of its petroleum export revenue throughout the Islamic World and elsewhere on building mosques, publishing books, giving scholarships and fellowships,^[3] and hosting international Islamic organisations, and promote its form of Islam, sometimes referred to as "petro-Islam".^[4]

Not all Saudis are Salafis/Wahhabis. While most of the fifteen to twenty million Saudis are Sunni Muslims,^[5] the eastern regions are populated mostly by Twelver Shias, and the Southern regions of Saudi Arabia are largely populated by Zaydi Shias.^[6]

History

The Prophet of Islam, Muhammad, was born in Mecca in about 571. From the early 7th century, Muhammad united the various tribes of the peninsula and created a single Islamic religious polity. Following his death in 632, his followers rapidly expanded the territory under Muslim rule beyond Arabia, conquering huge swathes of territory. Although Arabia soon became a politically peripheral region as the focus shifted to the more developed conquered lands,^[7] Mecca and Medina remained the spiritually most important places in the Muslim world. The Qu'ran requires every able-bodied Muslim who can afford it, as one of the five pillars of Islam, to make a pilgrimage, or Hajj, to Mecca during the Islamic month of Dhu al-Hijjah at least once in his or her lifetime.^[8]

From the 9th century, a number of Shia sects developed particularly in the eastern part of Arabia. These included the Qarmatians, a millenarian Ismaili sect led by [[Abu-Tahir Al-Jannabi]] who attacked and sacked Mecca in 930.^[9]

Al Saud and ibn Abd al-Wahhab

In 1744, the desert region of Nejd, Muhammad bin Saud, founder of the Al Saud dynasty, joined forces with the religious leader Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab,^[10] founder of the Wahhabi movement, a strict puritanical form of Sunni Islam.^[11] This alliance formed in the 18th century provided the ideological impetus to Saudi expansion and remains the basis of Saudi Arabian dynastic rule today.^[12] The first "Saudi state" established in 1744 in the area around Riyadh, rapidly expanded and briefly controlled most of the present-day territory of Saudi Arabia,^[13] but was destroyed by 1818 by the Ottoman viceroy of Egypt, Mohammed Ali Pasha.^[14] In 1824, a much smaller second "Saudi state", located mainly in Nejd, was established in 1824, but by 1891 its Al Saud rulers were driven into exile in Kuwait.^[15]

At the beginning of the 20th century, Abdulaziz Ibn Saud gained the support of the Ikhwan, a tribal army inspired by Wahhabism and led by Sultan ibn Bijad and Faisal Al-Dawish, and which had grown quickly after its foundation in 1912.^[16] With the aid of the Ikhwan, Ibn Saud captured Hasa from the Ottoman Empire in 1913.

Ibn Saud defeated a rival ruling family and took the title Sultan of Nejd in 1921. By this time the Ottomans had been defeated in World War I, and Ottoman suzerainty and control in Arabia was no more.^[17] With the help of the Ikhwan, the Hejaz was conquered in 1924–25.^[15]^[18] Following this victory however the Ikhwan clashed with Ibn Saud. He opposed their raiding the British protectorates of Transjordan, Iraq and Kuwait, to expand of the Wahhabist realm, and they opposed his policies of allowing some modernization and some non-Muslim foreigners in the country. The Ikhwan were defeated and their leaders executed in 1930 after a two-year struggle.^[19] In 1932 the two kingdoms of the Hejaz and Nejd were united as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.^[15]

Era of oil exports

Oil was discovered in the Persian Gulf region of Saudi Arabia in 1938,^[20], and oil wells eventually revealing the largest source of crude oil in the world.^[21] For the king, oil revenues became a crucial source of wealth since he no longer had to rely on receipts from pilgrimages to Mecca. This discovery would alter Middle Eastern political relations forever.

Muslim Brotherhood

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The brotherhood first had an impact inside Saudi Arabia in 1954 when thousands of Egyptian brethren sought to escape president Gamal Abdel Nasser's clampdown, while (the largely illiterate) Saudi Arabia was looking for teachers -- who were also conservative pious Arab Muslims -- for its newly created public school system.^[22] MB members "obeyed orders of the ruling family and ulama to not attempt to proselytize or otherwise get involved in religious doctrinal matters within the Kingdom, but "methodically ... took control of Saudi Arabia’s intellectual life" by publishing books and participating in discussion circles and salons held by princes. ^[23] MB members became "entrenched both in Saudi society and in the Saudi state, taking a leading role in key governmental ministries".^[24] In particular, many established themselves in Saudi educational system. One expert on Saudi affairs (Stephane Lacroix) has stated: "The education system is so controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood, it will take 20 years to change -- if at all. Islamists see education as their base" in Saudi Arabia.^[25]

The Muslim Brotherhood had considerable impact on Islam in Saudi Arabia. Unlike Wahhabism it "dealt in change-promoting concepts like social justice, anticolonialism, and the equal distribution of wealth." It gave "a radical, but still apparently safe, religious twist" to the Wahhabi values Saudi students "had absorbed in childhood". The "hands-on, radical Islam" of jihad became a "practical possibility today", not just part of history.^[26]

The Muslim Brotherhood's brand of Islam and Islamic politics differs from the strict Salafi creed, Wahhabiyya, officially held by the state of Saudi Arabia, and the organization does not have "a formal organizational presence" in the Kingdom.^[27] This is not discrimination as the Saudi government doesn’t allow any political group or party to function openly.^[28]

The brotherhood introduced a politically driven agenda into the purists’ Saudi community, which encouraged the youth of the country to being inquiring about modern world events.^[29]

" .... The second sub-group [of Wahhabis in KSA], the politicos (or the rejectionist), claimed a greater understanding of modern issues and concerns in comparison to the purists, and are therefore, better suited to implement and apply the Salafi belief system in modern context. As Saudi Arabia avoided colonization, the priority for the purists (i.e., the Wahhabi ulama) was the purity of Islam and the politics were simply left to the rulers. It was not until the introduction of the Muslim Brotherhood in Saudi Arabia that the politicos were able to gain any influence or power. The brotherhood introduced a politically driven agenda into the purists’ Saudi community, which encouraged the youth of the county to being inquiring about modern world events. The politicos believed it was their duty to engage in political discussions and to be critical of un-Islamic rulers and policies to expand their realm of influence and pass strictly religious matters while still holding true to their Salafi belief system. The politicos believed that truly to protect the purity of Islam, it was necessary to address political issues; otherwise, their rulers could destroy Islam. [from http://www.cerium.ca/IMG/pdf/WIKTOROWICZ_2006_Anatomy_of_the_Salafi_Movement.pdf |Anatomy of the Salafi Movement |QUINTAN WIKTOROWICZ Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 29:207–239, 2006], quote in http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a509109.pdf WAHHABISM: IS IT A FACTOR IN THE SPREAD OF GLOBAL TERRORISM? by Michael R. Dillon]

Relations between the Saudi ruling family and the Brotherhood became strained with Saudi opposition to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the willingness of Saudi government to allow US troops to be based in the Kingdom to fight Iraq.^[24] The Brotherhood supported the Sahwah "Awakening" movement that pushed for political change in the Kingdom.^[30] The ruling family was also alarmed by the Arab Spring and the example set by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, with president Muhammad Morsi bringing an Islamist government to power by means of popular revolution and elections.^[31] The then Saudi Interior Minister Prince Nayef denounced the Brotherhood, saying it was guilty of "betrayal of pledges and ingratitude" and was "the source of all problems in the Islamic world".^[32] In March 2014, in a "significant departure from its past official stance" the Saudi government declared the Brotherhood a "terrorist organization".^[24]

Reforms

During the 1960 and 1970 religious authorities allowed some practices that had previously been forbidden (haram). At the urging of the government and after vigorous debate, religious authorities allowed the use of paper money in 1951, abolished slavery in 1962, permitted the education of females in 1964, and use of television in 1965.^[33]

1973 oil embargo crisis

The 1973 oil embargo crisis -- led in part by Saudi Arabia -- quadrupled the price of oil. By 1980, Saudi Arabia was earning every three days the income from oil it had taken a year to earn before the embargo.^[34]

By the 1970s, as a result of oil wealth and government modernization policies, economic and social development progressed at an extremely rapid rate, transforming the infrastructure and educational system of the country;^[15] in foreign policy, close ties with the US were developed.^[35]

By 1976 Saudi Arabia had become the largest oil producer in the world.^[36] The power of the ulema was in decline.^[37]

Conservative era

However in the 1980s and 1990s, this trend was reversed. In 1979, the modernizing, monarch of Iran, despite his oil revenues and apparently formidable security apparatus, was overthrown by an Islamic revolution.^[38] The new revolutionary Islamic Republic was across the Persian Gulf from Saudi oil fields and across from where most of Saudi Arabia's minority Shi'ites—co-religionists of Iran who also often worked in the oil industry—lived. There were several anti-government uprisings in the region in 1979 and 1980.

Also alarming to the government was the seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca by Islamist extremists.^[39] The militants involved were in part angered by what they considered to be the corruption and un-Islamic nature of the Saudi government, proclaimed the return of the Mahdi.^[40] The takeover and siege of the mosque lasted for nearly two weeks, during which the mosque was severely damaged and several hundred militants, soldiers, and hostages were killed.^[41]

In response the royal family enforced much stricter observances of traditional religious and social norms in the country and gave the Ulema a greater role in government.^[42] First photographs of women in newspapers were banned, then women on television. Cinemas and music shops were shut down. School curriculum was changed to provide many more hours of religious studies, eliminating classes on subjects like non-Islamic history.^[39] Gender segregation was extended "to the humblest coffee shop". The religious police became more assertive.^[42]^[26]

Greater emphasis was put on religion in the media (increased religious programming on television and radio, and an increase in articles about religion in newspapers), in individual behavior, in government policies, in mosque sermons. In 1986 King Fahd replaced his title "His Majesty" with "Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques".^[43]^[44] The ulema's powers and financial support were strengthened^[42] in particular, they were given greater control over the education system^[39] and allowed to enforce stricter observance of Wahhabi rules of moral and social behaviour.^[42] These policies did not succeed in dampening the growth and strength of religious conservatives dissatisfied with the royal family.^[45]^[46]

Saudi Islamism gained momentum following 1991 Gulf War.^[47] The presence of U.S troops on Saudi soil from 1991 onwards was deeply unpopular with conservative Saudis^[48] and one of the major issues that has led to an increase in Islamist terrorism by Saudis inside and out of Saudi Arabia, (the 9/11 attacks in New York being the most prominent example).^[49]

9/11 and 2003

[PUT SOMETHING ABOUT MANY CONNECTED SAUDI EDUCATION AND RELIGIOUSITY AND WAHHABISM TO 9/11 ATTACKS]

Islamist terrorist activity increased dramatically in 2003, with the Riyadh compound bombings and other attacks, which prompted the government to take much more stringent action against terrorism.^[50] The king (Abdullah) has also taken steps to rein back the powers of the ulema, for instance transferring their control over girls' education to the Ministry of Education.^[51] Some have complained that the king's dominance over the ulema has weakened the traditional Islamic legitimacy of Saudi throne.^[52]

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"In July that year [2002?] Laurent Murawiec, a French analyst with the RAND Corporation, had given a 24-slide presentaiton to the prestigious Defense Policy Board, an arm of the Pentagon, suggesting that the United States should consider `taking [the ]Saudi out of Arabia' by forcibly seizing control of the oil fields, giving the Hijaz back to the Hashemites, and delegating control fo the holy cities to a multinational committee of moderate, non-Wahhabi Musilms: the House of Saud should be sent home to Riyadh. `Saudi Arabia supports our enemies and attacks our allies,` argued Murawiec, a protege of Richard Perle's, the neocon advocate of war with Iraq who chaired the Policy Board. `The Saudis are active at every level of the terror chain, from planners to financiers, from cadre to foot soldier, from ideologist to cheerleaders.` They were `the kernel of evil, the prime mover, the most dangerous opponent` in the Middle East. (p.288-289)

^[26]

In the days after 9/11 in a series of televised gatherings Crown Prince Abdullah adressed the country's religious, tribal, business, and media leadership calling for a strategy to correct what has gone wrong. and in a couple of later articles by top Al Saud princes (Prince Turki Al-Faisal, Prince Talal bin Abdul Aziz) it was declared that it has always been the role of executive rulers in Islamic history to excercise power and the job of the religious scholars to advise, never to govern.

^[53]

Current position

Role in the state and society

The Qu'ran, declared by the country's Basic Law to be Saudi Arabia's constitution^[54]

Islam plays a central role in Saudi society. It has been said that Islam is more than a religion, it is a way of life in Saudi Arabia, and, as a result, the influence of the ulema, the religious establishment, is all-pervasive.^[55] Article one of the 1992 Saudi "Basic Law of Governance" states,

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a sovereign Arab Islamic State. Its religion is Islam. Its constitution is Almighty God's Book, The Holy Qur'an, and the Sunna (Traditions) of the Prophet (PBUH). Arabic is the language of the Kingdom.^[56]

As Custodian for the two holy places, the King of Saudi Arabia sees himself as more than another Muslim head of state. At the Saudi-sponsored November 2008 Interfaith Dialogue at the United Nations, the king's staff insisted that the protocol for the King's visit parallel that of Pope John Paul II's visit to the United Nations. (The chief of protocol, met the king at the airport, and the UN secretary general greeted him at the base of the escalator bearing him up to the General Assembly, "an honor given to no other head of state.")^[57] Unlike most Muslim countries, Saudi Arabia gives the ulema direct involvement in government, and fields a specifically "religious" police force, called the Haia or mutaween.^[58] (Iran gives the ulema much more influence and also has a religious police.^[59])

A Council of Senior Scholars, appointed and paid by the government advises the king on religious matters. The ulema have also been a key influence in major government decisions,^[60] have a significant role in the judicial and education systems^[61] and a monopoly of authority in the sphere of religious and social morals.^[62] Not only is the succession to the throne subject to the approval of the ulema,^[63] but so are all new laws (royal decrees).^[58]

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The Council of Senior Scholars]], are appointed and paid by the government^[60]

[Bin Baz] home was a little cluster of modern two-story buildings where he lived with his wives and children . This was royal territory. Talal bin Abdul Aziz and other princes had palaces nearby. In fact, the compound had been a gift to Bin Baz from the royal family. This did not make it a bribe. All senior Saudi clerics lived in homes that were gifts from rich benefactors and foundations. Still it was a reminder of the underlying reality of the royal-Wahhabi alliance. The Al-Saud needed the Wahhabi clerics for their legitimacy, but the clerics, for their part, depended equally upon the Al-Saud. In no other Muslim Arab country did senior religious figures enjoy such prestige and closeness to the government centers of power. There would be no more cars and plush houses for the sheikhs if Saddam Hussein marched into Riyadh."

^[64]

The religious police or Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice numbers 3,500-4,000. Members patrol the streets enforcing dress codes, strict separation of men and women, salat prayer by Muslims during prayer times, investigating reports of witchcraft, and other behavior it believes to be commanded or forbidden by Islam.

Daily life in Saudi Arabia is dominated by Islamic observance. Five times each day, Muslims are called to prayer from the minarets of mosques scattered throughout the country. Because Friday is the holiest day for Muslims, the weekend begins on Thursday.^[65]^[66] In accordance with Salafi doctrine, only two religious holidays are publicly recognized, Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha. Celebration of other Islamic holidays, such as the Prophet’s birthday and Ashura,^[67] are tolerated only when celebrated locally and on a small scale. Public observance of non-Islamic religious holidays is prohibited, with the exception of 23 September, which commemorates the unification of the kingdom.^[65] Conformity of behavior is highly valued as part of religion, apparent in sameness of dress. Almost all women wear a loose-fitting black abaya cloak covering all but their eyes and hands, almost all men wear a white thawb with a red and white checkered headdress.^[68]

Sharia, or Islamic law, is the basis of the legal system in Saudi Arabia. It is unique not only compared to Western systems, but also compared to other Muslim countries, as (according to its supporters) the Saudi model is closest to the form of law originally developed when Islam became established in the Arabian peninsula in the 7th century.^[69]

The Saudi courts impose a number of severe physical punishments.^[70] The death penalty can be imposed for a wide range of offences^[71] including murder, rape, armed robbery, repeated drug use, apostasy,^[72] adultery,^[47] witchcraft and sorcery^[73] and can be carried out by beheading with a sword,^[72] stoning or firing squad,^[47] followed by crucifixion.^[73]

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Approximately half of Saudi state television's airtime is devoted to religious issues, and about about half of the material taught in state schools is religious according to the estimate of one school teacher. In comparison, the number of pages devoted to teaching the history, literature, and cultures of the non-Muslim world in twelve years of Saudi schooling total just thirty-eight. ^[74] 90% of books published in the kingdom are on religious subjects, and most of the doctorates its universities awards are in Islamic studies. ^[75]

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The charge of sorcery as applied in modern Saudi Arabia is sometimes used as retaliation against foreign migrant workers in dispute with their employers. Humans Rights Watch believes that the conviction of a Syrian national, `Abd al-Karim Mara'I al-Naqshabandi -- executed in 1996 for undertaking `the practice of works of magic and spells and possession of a collection of polytheistic and superstitious books` -- was actually resulted from a dispute with his employer Prince Salman bin Sa'ud bin `Abd al`Aziz, a nephew of King Fahd. ^[76]^[77]

The continued unifying power of Islam for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been questioned in light of new developments and technology that have undermined the official wahhabi religious establishment.

The sharp shift in support of the Council of Senior Ulama from jihadis during the 1980s, to peaceful moderation after the 2003 terror attacks, opening the question of whether the inconsistency of the ulema indicated political expediency rather than scripture guided their doctrinal positions;
growing literacy -- which has given Saudis the ability to read the Quran for themselves -- and satellite television and the internet -- which has given them the ability to choose among a wide variety of interpretations of Islam -- has meant the loss of monopoly of the establishment in the interpretation of Islam.
the more technology and society changes the more challenges arise that the "Prophet Muhammad did not have to deal with and could not forsee", and that hadith do not deal with.

^[78]

While religion in KSA is strict exceptions are made. Foreign non-Muslim troops are forbidden except when the king needed them to confront Saddam Hussein in 1990; gender mixing of men and women is forbidden, and fraternization with non-Muslims is discouraged, but not at King Abdullah University of Science and Technology.^[79]

Wahhabism

Many of the strict and unique practices in Saudi Arabia mentioned above come from Wahhabism, the official and dominant form of Sunni Islam in Saudi Arabia, named after the preacher and scholar Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Proponents consider the name derogatory, preferring the term Salafiyya, after the early Muslims known as the Salaf.^[80] This interpretation is often described as 'puritanical', 'intolerant' or 'ultra-conservative', however proponents believe its teachings seek to purify the practise of Islam of any innovations or practices that deviate from the seventh-century teachings of the Islamic Prophet Muhammad and his companions.^[81] According to one anti-Wahhabi source (Stephen Schwartz), "no more than" 40% of Saudi nationals consider themselves Wahhabis.^[82]

The message of the school was the essential oneness of God (tawhid). The movement is therefore known by its adherents as ad dawa lil tawhid (the call to unity), and those who follow the call are known as ahl at tawhid (the people of unity) or muwahhidun. (unitarians).^[83]

The school puts an emphasis on following of the Athari school of thought only.^[84] Ibn Abd-al-Wahhab, was influenced by the writings of Ibn Taymiyya and questioned the philosophical interpretations of Islam within the Ash'ari and Maturidi schools, claiming to rely on the Qur'an and the Hadith without speculative philosophy so as to not transgress beyond the limits of the early Muslims known as the Salaf.^[84] Ibn Abd-al-Wahhab attacked a "perceived moral decline and political weakness" in the Arabian Peninsula and condemned what he perceived as idolatry, the popular cult of saints, and shrine and tomb visitation.^[84]

In the 1990s, Saudi leadership did not emphasize its identity as inheritor of the Wahhabi legacy as such, nor did the descendants of Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab, the Al ash Shaykh, continue to hold the highest posts in the religious bureaucracy. Wahhabi influence in Saudi Arabia, however, remained tangible in the physical conformity in dress, in public deportment, and in public prayer. Most significantly, the Wahhabi legacy was manifest in the social ethos that presumed government responsibility for the collective moral ordering of society, from the behavior of individuals, to institutions, to businesses, to the government itself.^[83]

Wahhabism originated in Nejd region, and its conservative practices have stronger support there than in regions in the kingdom to the east or west of it.^[85]

International influence

Osama bin Laden and 15 out of the 19 9/11 hijackers were Saudi nationals^[86] and former CIA director James Woolsey described Saudi Arabian Wahhabism as "the soil in which Al-Qaeda and its sister terrorist organizations are flourishing."^[87]

According to a 2009 U.S. State Department communication by Hillary Clinton, United States Secretary of State, (disclosed as part of the Wikileaks U.S. 'cables leaks' controversy in 2010) "donors in Saudi Arabia constitute the most significant source of funding to Sunni terrorist groups worldwide".^[88] Part of this funding arises through the zakat (or religious tax) required to be paid by all Saudis to charities, and amounting to at least 2.5 percent of their income. Although many charities are genuine, others, it is alleged, serve as fronts for money laundering and terrorist financing operations. While many Saudis contribute to those charities in good faith believing their money goes toward good causes, it has been alleged that others know full well the terrorist purposes for which their money will be used.^[87]^[89]

Saudi religious conservatives have been criticised for what some critics see as an ambivalent attitude towards attacks on civilians by Islamic extremists. grand mufti Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin Abdullah al As-shaikh, chairman of the Council of Senior Islamic Scholars, did not issue a fatwa condemning terrorism until seven years after the first attacks inside the kingdom, and when he did issue a fatwa, emphasised terrorism's damage to Islam's "leadership role in the world." ^[90] ^[91]

Shia Islam

Approximately 10-15 percent^[92]^[93] of citizens in Saudi Arabia are Shia Muslims, most of whom are adherents to Twelver Shia Islam. Twelvers are predominantly represented by the Baharna community living in the Eastern Province, with the largest concentrations in Qatif, Al-Hasa, and Dammam. In addition there is a small Twelver Shia minority in Medina (called the Nakhawila). Sizable Zaydi and Isma'ili communities also live in Najran along the border with Yemen.

Shia, human rights groups and other observers have complained of "systematic discrimination" of Shia in Saudi Arabia "in religion, education, justice, and employment".^[94] Unlike other countries with sizable Shia populations (such as Iraq and Lebanon), Saudi Arabia has no Shia cabinet ministers, mayors or police chiefs. Shia are kept out of "critical jobs" in the armed forces and the security services, and not one of the three hundred Shia girls’ schools in the Eastern Province has a Shia principal.^[95] ^[96] In the Eastern provinces of Saudi Arabia there are Shia courts who deal with cases such as marriage, divorce and inheritance.^[97] Shia demonstrations in Qatif have sometimes led to conflict with Sunni Saudi religious authorities who disapprove of Shia commemorations marking the martyrdom of Hussein ibn Ali by the Sunni Caliph Yazid I. There also Shias living in Southern Saudi Arabia, who are mostly from the Zaydi branch.^[6]

Islamic pilgrimage

Saudi Arabia, and specifically the Hejaz, as the cradle of Islam, has many of the most significant historic Muslim sites including the two holiest sites of Mecca and Medina.^[98] One of the King's titles is Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, the two mosques being Masjid al-Haram in Mecca, which contains Islam's most sacred place, the Kaaba, and Al-Masjid al-Nabawi in Medina which contains Muhammad's tomb.^[99]^[100]

The Masjid al-Haram (the Grand Mosque) in Mecca is the location of the Kaaba, Islam's holiest site, and the Masjid al-Nabawi (the Prophet's Mosque) in Medina is the location of Muhammad tomb; as a result, from the 7th century, Mecca and Medina became the pilgrimage destinations for large numbers of Muslims from across the Islamic world.^[101]

The hajj, or pilgrimage to Mecca, occurs annually between the first and tenth days of the last month of the Muslim year, Dhul Hajj. The hajj represents the culmination of the Muslim's spiritual life. For many, it is a lifelong ambition. From the time of embarking on the journey to make the hajj, pilgrims often experience a spirit of exaltation and excitement; the meeting of so many Muslims of all races, cultures, and stations in life in harmony and equality moves many people deeply. Certain rites of pilgrimage may be performed any time, and although meritorious, these constitute a lesser pilgrimage, known as umrah.

The Ministry of Pilgrimage Affairs and Religious Trusts handles the immense logistical and administrative problems generated by such a huge international gathering. The government issues special pilgrimage visas that permit the pilgrim to visit Mecca and to make the customary excursion to Medina to visit the Prophet's tomb. Care is taken to assure that pilgrims do not remain in the kingdom after the hajj to search for work.

An elaborate guild of specialists assists the hajjis. Guides (mutawwifs) who speak the pilgrim's language make the necessary arrangements in Mecca and instruct the pilgrim in the proper performance of rituals; assistants (wakils) provide subsidiary services. Separate groups of specialists take care of pilgrims in Medina and Jiddah. Water drawers (zamzamis) provide water drawn from the sacred well.

Since the late 1980s, the Saudis have been particularly energetic in catering to the needs of pilgrims. In 1988 a US$l5 billion traffic improvement scheme for the holy sites was launched. The improvement initiative resulted partly from Iranian charges that the Saudi government was incompetent to guard the holy sites after a 1987 clash between demonstrating Iranian pilgrims and Saudi police left 400 people dead. A further disaster occurred in 1990, when 1,426 pilgrims suffocated or were crushed to death in one of the new air-conditioned pedestrian tunnels built to shield pilgrims from the heat. The incident resulted from the panic that erupted in the overcrowded and inadequately ventilated tunnel, and further fueled Iranian claims that the Saudis did not deserve to be in sole charge of the holy places. In 1992, however, 114,000 Iranian pilgrims, close to the usual level, participated in the hajj.

Islam and politics

Islamic legitimacy

ADD: FOUR FACTORS WEAKING OFICIAL ISALM ADD: NEED TO CHANGE LAWS AND WEAKEN ULEMA AND EDUCATION TO IMPROVE ECONOMY, JOBS, STOP TERRORISM ADD: TEACIING OF HATRED AND SUPREMACY.

The religious establishment in Saudi Arabia, led by the Al ash-Sheikh, which influences almost every aspect of social life, is deeply involved in politics. It has long been fractured into at least two distinct groups, with the senior ulema closely tied to the political agenda of the House of Saud. A younger generation of ulema, who are less firmly established and more radical in tone, have openly criticized the senior ulema and the government in the past.^[102]

Fractures between the government and this younger generation deepened in May 2003, when Riyadh fired or suspended thousands of them.^[103] Many were to be "re-educated," while others were simply ousted from the religious establishment. The move did little to endear the government to an already frustrated and religiously radical cadre of clerics.

The Islamic Legitimacy of the modern Saudi sate has been questioned by many groups and individuals including Al-Qaeda.^[104]

Saudi Arabia's grand mufti, Sheikh Abdul Aziz Al Al-Sheikh, has defended the religious establishment's legitimacy in a public forum, while responding to mounting criticism of the religious leadership's close political alliance with the ruling House of Saud.^[102] During a question-and-answer session with members of the public and the media, Al Al-Sheikh denied that the government influenced fatwas (religious rulings) and said accusations to the contrary within the media were false

Both the criticism and the public response to it indicate a deepening level of dissent, not only within the kingdom's religious establishment, but also among the public. It is significant that the question was asked and answered in a public forum, and then reprinted in the media -- including the Arabic and English language newspapers. Similar questions of legitimacy will arise in coming months, with the kingdom's religious, political and perhaps military leaderships becoming the focal points for increasingly intense criticism. That Al Al-Sheikh answered the question about government influence over fatwas so openly is a clear indicator that the public has growing concerns about the legitimacy of religious leaders. Also, that the statements were reprinted in the press signals that the Saudi government -- which wields enormous influence over the local press -- is moving to respond to the charges of undue influence and corruption and illegitimacy.

References

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^ Lacey, Robert (2009). Inside the Kingdom. Penguin. pp. xx–xxi.
^ ^a ^b {{cite journal Review |title=Unloved in Arabia" |last=Rodenbeck |first=Max |journal=The New York Review of Books |url=http://www.nybooks.com/articles/17477 |Volume=51 |Number=16 |date=October 21, 2004 |quote=This is, after all, the birthplace of Muhammad and of the Arabic language, the locus of Muslim holy cities, the root of tribal Arab trees, and also, historically, a last redoubt against foreign incursions into Arab and Muslim lands. The kingdom is in many ways a unique experiment. It is the only modern Muslim state to have been created by jihad,[10] the only one to claim the Koran as its constitution, and [the only Arab-]Muslim countries to have escaped European imperialism.}}
^ Kepel, Gilles (2002). Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. trans. Anthony F. Roberts, p.72
^ Kepel 2002, pp. 69–75
^ Saudi Arabia, Islam in, The Oxford Dictionary of Islam
^ ^a ^b Saudi Arabia and the New Strategic Landscape - Page 30
^ Lindsay, James E. (2005). Daily life in the medieval Islamic world. p. 33. ISBN 0-313-32270-8.
^ Farah, Caesar (1994). Islam: Beliefs and Observances (5th ed.),pp.145–147 ISBN 978-0-8120-1853-0
^ "Mecca". Infoplease.com. Retrieved 2010-04-06.
^ Bowen, Wayne H. (2007). The history of Saudi Arabia. pp. 69–70. ISBN 978-0-313-34012-3.
^ Harris, Ian (1992). Contemporary Religions: A World Guide. p. 369. ISBN 978-0-582-08695-1. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
^ Faksh, Mahmud A. (1997). The Future of Islam in the Middle East. pp. 89–90. ISBN 978-0-275-95128-3.
^ "Reining in Riyadh" by D. Gold, 6 April 2003, NYpost (JCPA)
^ "The Saud Family and Wahhabi Islam". Library of Congress Country Studies.
^ ^a ^b ^c ^d "History of Arabia". Encyclopaedia Britannica Online. Retrieved 7 June 2011.
^ Dekmejian, R. Hrair (1994). Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World. p. 131. ISBN 978-0-8156-2635-0.
^ Hourani, Albert (2005). A History of the Arab Peoples. pp. 315–319. ISBN 978-0-571-22664-1.
^ Wynbrandt, James (2010). A Brief History of Saudi Arabia. p. 182. ISBN 978-0-8160-7876-9. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
^ Lacey, Robert (2009). Inside the Kingdom. pp. 15–16. ISBN 978-0-09-953905-6.
^ the first tanker of oil left as an export in 1939 Lacey, Robert (1981). p. photo after page 308. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |2= (help); Missing or empty |title= (help); Text "The Kingdom : Arabia and the House of Saud" ignored (help)
^ "80 Days That Changed The World". Time.
^ House, Karen Elliott (2012). On Saudi Arabia : Its People, past, Religion, Fault Lines and Future. Knopf. pp. 144, . In the 1960s, when Faisal became king, he championed the creation of public schools across the kingdom for boys -- and also girls. The largely illiterate nation had few qualified teachers, so the government dispatched emissaries abroad, mostly to Egypt and Jordan, to recruit teachers with substantive skills who also were devout Muslims. A hallmark of King Faisal's reign was an effort to create an Islamic alliance in the Middle East to counter the Arab nationalism of Egypt's president, Gamel Abdel Nasser. When Nasser, a nationalist strongman and sworn enemy of Saudi Arabia, turned on his country's conservative Muslim Brotherhood, King Faisal welcomed those religious conservatives into Saudi Arabia as scholars and teachers, reinforcing the fundamentalist hold on the young Ministry of Education, founded in 1954 under his predecessor and half-brother, King Saud.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: extra punctuation (link)
^ Kepel, Gilles (2006). The War for Muslim Minds : Islam and the West. Belknap Press. pp. 173–4.
^ ^a ^b ^c Lacroix, Stéphane. "Saudi Arabia's Muslim Brotherhood predicament". Washington Post. Retrieved 20 March 2014.
^ House, Karen Elliott (2012). On Saudi Arabia : Its People, past, Religion, Fault Lines and Future. Knopf. p. 156.
^ ^a ^b ^c Lacey, Robert (2009). Inside the Kingdom : Kings, Clerics, Modernists, Terrorists, and the Struggle for Saudi Arabia. Viking. p. 56,7. The ambitions of the Muslim Brotherhood were similar to those of the Salfis and also of the dawah wahhabiya (Wahhabi mission) -- to reestablish the order of Allah and to bring about the perfect Islamic states. But the rhetoric of the Brotherhood dealt in change-promoting concepts like social justice, anticolonialism, and the equal distribution of wealth. Politically they were prepared to challenge the estabishment in a style that was unthinkable to mainstream Wahhabis, who were reflexively defferential to their rulers, and enablers, the House of Saud. It was heady stuff for the young students of Jeddah, taking the Wahhabi values they had absorbed in childhood and giving them a radical, but still apparently safe, religious twist. They had learned of jihad at school as a instantly romantic concept -- part of history. Now they were hearing of its practical possiblity today, and they could even make personal contact with jihad in the barrel-chested shape of Abdullah Azzam, who gave lectures in both Jeddah and Mecca in the early 1980s. The Saudi government had welcomed ideologues like Azzam and Mohammed, the surviving Qutub, to the Kingdom as pious reinforcement against the atheistic, Marxist-tinged thinking of their Middle Eastern neighbohood. But in the process they were exposing young Saudi hearts and minds to a still more potent virus -- hands-on, radical Islam. Cite error: The named reference "lacey-" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
^ "The Muslim Brotherhood In Saudi Arabia (comments by Thomas Hegghammer)". GlobalMB.
^ Cite error: The named reference Dreyfuss was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
^ "Anatomy of the Salafi Movement" (PDF). 29. 2006: 207–239,. The second sub-group [of Wahhabis in KSA], the politicos (or the rejectionist), claimed a greater understanding of modern issues and concerns in comparison to the purists, and are therefore, better suited to implement and apply the Salafi belief system in modern context. As Saudi Arabia avoided colonization, the priority for the purists (i.e., the Wahhabi ulama) was the purity of Islam and the politics were simply left to the rulers. It was not until the introduction of the Muslim Brotherhood in Saudi Arabia that the politicos were able to gain any influence or power. The brotherhood introduced a politically driven agenda into the purists' Saudi community, which encouraged the youth of the country to being inquiring about modern world events. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help); Missing pipe in: |= (help); Text "QUINTAN WIKTOROWICZ" ignored (help)CS1 maint: extra punctuation (link)
^ McCants, William (March 17, 2014). "Islamist Outlaws". Foreign Affairs. Retrieved 19 April 2014.
^ Brian Katulis. "Qatar Saudi Arabia Diverge in Battle to Shape Changing Middle East". The Paths of the Arab Spring. World Politics Review.
^ Cite error: The named reference WashingtonPost-Diverse was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
^ Max Rodenbeck (October 21, 2004). "Unloved in Arabia". New York Review of Books. 51 (16).
^ Laceylfirst=Robert (1981). The Kingdom : Arabia and the House of Sa'ud. Harcourt Brace Javonovich. p. back cover.
^ Al-Rasheed, Madawi (2010). A History of Saudi Arabia. pp. 136–137. ISBN 978-0-521-74754-7.
^ Viola, Joy Winkie (1986). Human Resources Development in Saudi Arabia: Multinationals and Saudization. p. 37. ISBN 978-0-88746-070-8.
^ Abir, Mordechai (1987). Saudi Arabia in the oil era: regime and elites: conflict and collaboration. p. 30. ISBN 978-0-7099-5129-2.
^ Lacey, Robert (2009). Inside the Kingdom : Kings, Clerics, Modernists, Terrorists, and the Struggle for Saudi Arabia. Viking. p. 47. An apparently impregnable, westernizing autocrat, smiled on by America, with a huge army, an efficient secret police, and burgeoning oil revenues, had been brought down without a serious shot being fired -- all the Shah's modernization had proved helpless against the supposedly outmoded power of religion
^ ^a ^b ^c Abir, Mordechai (1993). Saudi Arabia: government, society, and the Gulf crisis. p. 21. ISBN 978-0-415-09325-5.
^ Jones, Toby Craig (2010). Desert Kingdom: How Oil and Water Forged Modern Saudi Arabia. pp. 218–219. ISBN 978-0-674-04985-7.
^ House, Karen Elliott (2012). On Saudi Arabia : Its People, past, Religion, Fault Lines and Future. Knopf. p. 20. This incident [Mecca Grand Mosque takeover which lasted] for nearly two weeks, severely damaging the mosque ... claimed at least 1000 lives.
^ ^a ^b ^c ^d Hegghammer, Thomas (2010). Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism Since 1979. p. 24. ISBN 978-0-521-73236-9. Cite error: The named reference "Hegghammer24" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
^ "Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz". Retrieved April 6, 2011.
^ Wood, Paul (August 1, 2005). "Life and legacy of King Fahd". BBC News. Retrieved April 6, 2011.
^ Cordesman, Anthony H. (2003). Saudi Arabia Enters the 21st Century. p. 174. ISBN 978-0-275-98091-7.
^ Rabasa, Angel (2005). The Muslim world after 9/11. p. 42. ISBN 978-0-8330-3712-1. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
^ ^a ^b ^c Federal Research Division (2004). Saudi Arabia A Country Study. pp. 122–123. ISBN 978-1-4191-4621-3. Cite error: The named reference "FRD306" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
^ Hegghammer, Thomas (2010). Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism Since 1979. p. 31. ISBN 978-0-521-73236-9.
^ Blanchard, Christopher (2009). Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations. United States Congressional Research Service. pp. 5–6.
^ Cordesman, Anthony H. (2009). Saudi Arabia: national security in a troubled region. pp. 50–52. ISBN 978-0-313-38076-1.
^ "Abdullah, King of Saudi Arabia". The New York Times. 29 November 2010. Retrieved 28 June 2011.
^ Okruhlik, Gwenn. "Empowering Civility Through Nationalism". In Robert W. Hefner (ed.). Remaking Muslim Politics: Pluralism, Contestation, Democratization. Princeton University Press. pp. 190, 193. al-Saud historically based their right to rule largely on Isolamic legitimacy. ...
Today, the `alliance` between the regime and official clergy is much contested by dissidents because the parties no longer serve as `checks` on each other. The official clergy are said to be dependent upon the al-Saud for their existence. They regularly issue fatwas ... that justify the policies of the al-Saud in Islamic volcabulary, even when such policies are deplored by the people.
^ Lacey, Robert (2009). Inside the Kingdom : Kings, Clerics, Modernists, Terrorists, and the Struggle for Saudi Arabia. Viking. p. 234,235. ....one of the religious sheikhs .... Dr. Adullah Turki, the learned member of the council of the ulema who had accompanied Prince Turki to Afghanistan .... fastened on Abdullah's use of the term wali al-amr. "Those who govern, he pointed out, included not only the king and the government, but also the senior ulema. ... A few days after Prince Turki Al-Faisal layed out his views in an article that was published a few days later. `... from the very first caliphs, the secular rulers have always been the executive rulers in Islamic history -- the ultimate boss. It as been their job to exercise the power, while the job of the religious men -- the shiekhs and the mufti -- has been to give them advice. Never to govern. That is where Khomeiniand the Iranian ayatollahs departed from true Islam. {{cite book}}: line feed character in |quote= at position 210 (help)
^ Robbers, Gerhard (2007). Encyclopedia of world constitutions, Volume 2. p. 791. ISBN 0-8160-6078-9.
^ Korany, Bahgat (2010). The Foreign Policies of Arab States: The Challenge of Globalization. p. 358. ISBN 978-977-416-360-9. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
^ "About Saudi Arabia. THE BASIC LAW OF GOVERNANCE". Decreed 1 March 1992. Embassy of Saudi Arabia. Retrieved 18 March 2014.
^ House, Karen Elliott (2012). On Saudi Arabia : Its People, Past, Religion, Fault Lines and Future. Knopf. p. 235. UN organizers who worked with the Saudi to arrange the king's visit -- the first ever by a Saudi king to the UN -- say his primary goal was to present himself as the `pope` of all Islam, thereby diminishing Iran's Shiite sect and pleasing the conservative clerics in Riyadh, for whom Shiites are heretics. For this reason, the king's staff insisted that protocol for his visit parallel that of Pope John Paul II's visit to the United Nations. The chief of protocol, the Saudis insisted, must meet the king at the airport, and the UN secretary general must greet him at the base of the escalator bearing him up to the General Assembly, an honor given to no other head of state.
^ ^a ^b Goldstein, Natalie (2010). Religion and the State. p. 118. ISBN 978-0-8160-8090-8. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
^ Federal Research Division (2004). Saudi Arabia A Country Study. pp. 232–233. ISBN 978-1-4191-4621-3. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
^ ^a ^b Nawaf E. Obaid (Sept. 1999). "The Power of Saudi Arabia's Islamic Leaders". Middle East Quarterly. VI (3): 51–58. Retrieved 23 June 2011. {{cite journal}}: Check date values in: |year= (help)CS1 maint: year (link)
^ Farsy, Fouad (1992). Modernity and tradition: the Saudi equation. p. 29. ISBN 978-1-874132-03-5. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
^ Hassner, Ron Eduard (2009). War on sacred grounds. p. 143. ISBN 978-0-8014-4806-5. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
^ Cavendish, Marshall (2007). World and Its Peoples: the Arabian Peninsula. p. 78. ISBN 978-0-7614-7571-2.
^ Lacey, Robert (2009). Inside the Kingdom : Kings, Clerics, Modernists, Terrorists, and the Struggle for Saudi Arabia. Viking. p. 131. [Bin Baz] home was a little cluster of modern two-story buildings where he lived with his wives and children . This was royal territory. Talal bin Abdul Aziz and other princes had palaces nearby. In fact, the compound had been a gift to Bin Baz from the royal family. This did not make it a bribe. All senior Saudi clerics lived in homes that were gifts from rich benefactors and foundations. Still it was a reminder of the underlying reality of the royal-Wahhabi alliance. The Al-Saud needed the Wahhabi clerics for their legitimacy, but the clerics, for their part, depended equally upon the Al-Saud. In no other Muslim Arab country did senior religious figures enjoy such prestige and closeness to the government centers of power. There would be no more cars and plush houses for the sheikhs if Saddam Hussein marched into Riyadh.
^ ^a ^b "Encyclopaedia Britannica Online: Saudi Arabia". Britannica.com. Retrieved 28 April 2011. no mention of holidays
^ Sulaiman, Tosin. Bahrain changes the weekend in efficiency drive, The Times, 2 August 2006. Retrieved 25 June 2008. Turkey has a weekend on Saturday and Sunday
^ which commemorates the martyrdom of Husayn ibn Ali and is one of the most important Shia holidays
^ Sharp, Arthur G. "What's a Wahhabi?". net places. Retrieved 20 March 2014. Wahhabis desire to see unity in issues of faith and conformity in areas of practice. In their view, outward appearances and expressions are directly connected to one's inward state. In other words, clothing styles, mannerisms, and specific actions prove whether or not one is a "true" Muslim.
One striking example of Wahhabism's outward influence on Saudi society is the widespread uniformity of men and women's apparel. In other parts of the Middle East, you will find a mix of traditional and modern clothing styles. You will also discover great variety among those who sport time-honored robes, headdresses, and veils. But in Wahhabist Saudi Arabia, nearly everyone dresses the same.
For women, a long black head covering (concealing all but the eyes) flows over a loose-fitting black outer garment that covers the entire body. This ensemble is usually accompanied by black gloves and sunglasses, covering any remaining skin. For men, a red-and-white checkered headdress (sometimes exchanged for an all-white head covering) is neatly creased at the front and held in place by two black camel-hair rings.
^ Otto, Jan Michiel (2010). Sharia Incorporated: A Comparative Overview of the Legal Systems of Twelve Muslim Countries in Past and Present. p. 172. ISBN 978-90-8728-057-4. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
^ Otto, Jan Michiel (2010). Sharia Incorporated: A Comparative Overview of the Legal Systems of Twelve Muslim Countries in Past and Present. p. 175. ISBN 978-90-8728-057-4. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
^ Whitaker, Brian (9 August 2003). "Saudi system condemned". The Guardian. London. Retrieved 27 July 2011.
^ ^a ^b "Saudi executioner tells all". BBC News. 5 June 2003. Retrieved 11 July 2011.
^ ^a ^b Miethe, Terance D. (2004). Punishment: a comparative historical perspective. p. 63. ISBN 978-0-521-60516-8. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
^ {{cite journal Review |title=Unloved in Arabia" |last=Rodenbeck |first=Max |journal=The New York Review of Books |url=http://www.nybooks.com/articles/17477 |Volume=51 |Number=16 |date=October 21, 2004 |quote=Almost half of Saudi state television's airtime is devoted to religious issues, as is about half the material taught in state schools" (source: By the estimate of an elementary schoolteacher in Riyadh, Islamic studies make up 30 percent of the actual curriculum. But another 20 percent creeps into textbooks on history, science, Arabic, and so forth. In contrast, by one unofficial count the entire syllabus for twelve years of Saudi schooling contains a total of just thirty-eight pages covering the history, literature, and cultures of the non-Muslim world.)}}
^ Rodenbeck, Max (October 21, 2004). "Unloved in Arabia (Book reviews)". The New York Review of Books. Nine out of ten titles published in the kingdom are on religious subjects, and most of the doctorates its universities awards are in Islamic studies.) {{cite journal}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |1= (help); Unknown parameter |Number= ignored (|number= suggested) (help); Unknown parameter |Volume= ignored (|volume= suggested) (help)
^ A Fury For God : the Islamist Attack on America by Malise Ruthven, 2002 p.178-9
^ "`Flawed Justice: the Execution of 'Abd al-Karim Maria'I al-Naqshbandi`,". Human Rights Watch,. October 1997 (E) v.9 n.9. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)CS1 maint: extra punctuation (link)
^ House, Karen Elliott (2012). On Saudi Arabia : Its People, past, Religion, Fault Lines and Future. Knopf. pp. 39–41.
^ House, Karen Elliott (2012). On Saudi Arabia : Its People, past, Religion, Fault Lines and Future. Knopf. p. 9.
^ The Daily Star Lamine Chikhi. 27 11 2010.
^ 'The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya', US Congressional Research Service Report, 2008, by Christopher M. Blanchard available from the Federation of American Scientists website.
^ Q&A with Stephen Schwartz on Wahhabism on National Review Online
^ ^a ^b "Saudi Arabia. Wahhabi Theology". December 1992. Library of Congress Country Studies. Retrieved 17 March 2014.
^ ^a ^b ^c Esposito 2003, p. 333
^ House, Karen Elliott (2012). On Saudi Arabia : Its People, Past, Religion, Fault Lines and Future. Knopf. p. 235. The Eastern Province (home to the oil reserves and to the perennially ill-used and unhappy Shiite minority) and the Hejaz (site of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina with their more open, international outlook) both resent the overwhelming dominance of religious conservatives from the Nejd, home of the Al Saud, at all levels of national governance.
^ Johnston, David (9 September 2003). "Two years later: 9/11 Tactics; Official Says Qaeda Recruited Saudi Hijackers to Strain Ties". The New York Times. Retrieved 19 May 2008.
^ ^a ^b 'Fueling Terror', Institute for the Analysis of Global Terror,
^ The Telegraph 6 December 2010 "Wikileaks: Saudis 'chief funders of al-Qaeda" http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/wikileaks/8182847/Wikileaks-Saudis-chief-funders-of-al-Qaeda.html
^ 'Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism since 1979' by Thomas Hegghammer, 2010, Cambridge Middle East Studies ISBN 978-0-521-73236-9
^ House, Karen Elliott (2012). On Saudi Arabia : Its People, Past, Religion, Fault Lines and Future. Knopf. p. 206. ... the regime's legitimacy rests on protecting and propagating puritanical Islam. Small wonder then that only in 2010, some seven years after bloody attacks by terrorist began inside the kingdom, did the grand mufti of Saudi Arabia issue a fatwa condeming terrorism and declaring `any act of terrorism, including providing financial support to terrorists, is a crime.` Even then his focus seemed as much on protecting the reputation of Islam as on protecting innocent victims from terrorism.
^ "Terrorism is criminal". Arab News. March 3, 2010,. Terrorism is criminal and spills the blood of innocents, [said Grand Mufti Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin Abdullah Al-Asheikh, chairman of the Council of Senior Islamic Scholars.] It attacks security, spreads terror among people and creates problems for society … Such acts are forbidden by Islamic law, ... It is necessary to fight the attempts of some to attach terrorism to Islam and Muslims with the goal of distorting the religion and assailing its leadership role in the world {{cite journal}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)CS1 maint: extra punctuation (link)
^ http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7959531.stm Saudi Arabia's Shia press for rights
^ Council on Foreign Relations
^ Saudi Arabia: Treat Shia Equally|hrw.org| 2009/09/02
^ Nasr, Vali, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future, W. W. Norton & Company; 2006, p.236
^ see also: (Lacey, Robert (2009). Inside the Kingdom : Kings, Clerics, Modernists, Terrorists, and the Struggle for Saudi Arabia. Viking. p. 43. ... the modern Saudi state had treated the members of its Shia community as second-cass citizens. Out on the oil rigs, Shia made up the drilling gangs, but usually worked to the orders of a Sunni foreman. There were at that time no Shia diplomats in the Saudi foreign service, no Shia pilots in the national airline -- and certainly none in the air force. They could not become head teachers or even deputy heads in local schools, where, if they did teach, they were expected to follow a syllabus that scornfully denigrated Shia history and beliefs. Local zoning rules even banned them from building dens or basement areas beneath their homes, for fear they might use them as secret husayniyas for subversive worship and for their alleged sexual congresses.)
^ Saudi Arabia, Precarious Justice: Volume 20 - Page 133, Human Rights Watch - 2008
^ Arabia: the Cradle of Islam, 1900, S.M.Zwemmer
^ Saudi Embassy (US) website – Islam Retrieved 20 January 2011
^ Saudi Embassy (US) website – Guardian of the Holy Places Retrieved 20 January 2011
^ Goldschmidt, Jr., Arthur; Lawrence Davidson (2005). A Concise History of the Middle East (8th ed.), p.48 ISBN 978-0-8133-4275-7
^ ^a ^b http://www.stratfor.com/saudi_arabia_grand_mufti_defends_legitimacy
^ http://www.stratfor.com/dissident_saudi_clerics_weaken_riyadh dead link
^ Video: As-Sahab media, "Knowledge is for acting upon"

External links

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[Lacey-presitge-1] Lacey, Robert (2009). Inside the Kingdom. Penguin. pp. xx–xxi.

[nyrob-only-2] {{cite journal Review |title=Unloved in Arabia" |last=Rodenbeck |first=Max |journal=The New York Review of Books |url=http://www.nybooks.com/articles/17477 |Volume=51 |Number=16 |date=October 21, 2004 |quote=This is, after all, the birthplace of Muhammad and of the Arabic language, the locus of Muslim holy cities, the root of tribal Arab trees, and also, historically, a last redoubt against foreign incursions into Arab and Muslim lands. The kingdom is in many ways a unique experiment. It is the only modern Muslim state to have been created by jihad,[10] the only one to claim the Koran as its constitution, and [the only Arab-]Muslim countries to have escaped European imperialism.}}

[3] Kepel, Gilles (2002). Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. trans. Anthony F. Roberts, p.72

[4] Kepel 2002, pp. 69–75

[5] Saudi Arabia, Islam in, The Oxford Dictionary of Islam

[shrefs-6] Saudi Arabia and the New Strategic Landscape - Page 30

[7] Lindsay, James E. (2005). Daily life in the medieval Islamic world. p. 33. ISBN 0-313-32270-8.

[8] Farah, Caesar (1994). Islam: Beliefs and Observances (5th ed.),pp.145–147 ISBN 978-0-8120-1853-0

[9] "Mecca". Infoplease.com. Retrieved 2010-04-06.

[10] Bowen, Wayne H. (2007). The history of Saudi Arabia. pp. 69–70. ISBN 978-0-313-34012-3.

[11] Harris, Ian (1992). Contemporary Religions: A World Guide. p. 369. ISBN 978-0-582-08695-1. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)

[12] Faksh, Mahmud A. (1997). The Future of Islam in the Middle East. pp. 89–90. ISBN 978-0-275-95128-3.

[13] "Reining in Riyadh" by D. Gold, 6 April 2003, NYpost (JCPA)

[14] "The Saud Family and Wahhabi Islam". Library of Congress Country Studies.

[Britannica_history-15] "History of Arabia". Encyclopaedia Britannica Online. Retrieved 7 June 2011.

[16] Dekmejian, R. Hrair (1994). Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World. p. 131. ISBN 978-0-8156-2635-0.

[17] Hourani, Albert (2005). A History of the Arab Peoples. pp. 315–319. ISBN 978-0-571-22664-1.

[18] Wynbrandt, James (2010). A Brief History of Saudi Arabia. p. 182. ISBN 978-0-8160-7876-9. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)

[19] Lacey, Robert (2009). Inside the Kingdom. pp. 15–16. ISBN 978-0-09-953905-6.

[20] the first tanker of oil left as an export in 1939 Lacey, Robert (1981). p. photo after page 308. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |2= (help); Missing or empty |title= (help); Text "The Kingdom : Arabia and the House of Saud" ignored (help)

[21] "80 Days That Changed The World". Time.

[22] House, Karen Elliott (2012). On Saudi Arabia : Its People, past, Religion, Fault Lines and Future. Knopf. pp. 144, . In the 1960s, when Faisal became king, he championed the creation of public schools across the kingdom for boys -- and also girls. The largely illiterate nation had few qualified teachers, so the government dispatched emissaries abroad, mostly to Egypt and Jordan, to recruit teachers with substantive skills who also were devout Muslims. A hallmark of King Faisal's reign was an effort to create an Islamic alliance in the Middle East to counter the Arab nationalism of Egypt's president, Gamel Abdel Nasser. When Nasser, a nationalist strongman and sworn enemy of Saudi Arabia, turned on his country's conservative Muslim Brotherhood, King Faisal welcomed those religious conservatives into Saudi Arabia as scholars and teachers, reinforcing the fundamentalist hold on the young Ministry of Education, founded in 1954 under his predecessor and half-brother, King Saud.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: extra punctuation (link)

[Kepel-war-23] Kepel, Gilles (2006). The War for Muslim Minds : Islam and the West. Belknap Press. pp. 173–4.

[Lacroix-24] Lacroix, Stéphane. "Saudi Arabia's Muslim Brotherhood predicament". Washington Post. Retrieved 20 March 2014.

[25] House, Karen Elliott (2012). On Saudi Arabia : Its People, past, Religion, Fault Lines and Future. Knopf. p. 156.

[lacey--26] Lacey, Robert (2009). Inside the Kingdom : Kings, Clerics, Modernists, Terrorists, and the Struggle for Saudi Arabia. Viking. p. 56,7. The ambitions of the Muslim Brotherhood were similar to those of the Salfis and also of the dawah wahhabiya (Wahhabi mission) -- to reestablish the order of Allah and to bring about the perfect Islamic states. But the rhetoric of the Brotherhood dealt in change-promoting concepts like social justice, anticolonialism, and the equal distribution of wealth. Politically they were prepared to challenge the estabishment in a style that was unthinkable to mainstream Wahhabis, who were reflexively defferential to their rulers, and enablers, the House of Saud. It was heady stuff for the young students of Jeddah, taking the Wahhabi values they had absorbed in childhood and giving them a radical, but still apparently safe, religious twist. They had learned of jihad at school as a instantly romantic concept -- part of history. Now they were hearing of its practical possiblity today, and they could even make personal contact with jihad in the barrel-chested shape of Abdullah Azzam, who gave lectures in both Jeddah and Mecca in the early 1980s. The Saudi government had welcomed ideologues like Azzam and Mohammed, the surviving Qutub, to the Kingdom as pious reinforcement against the atheistic, Marxist-tinged thinking of their Middle Eastern neighbohood. But in the process they were exposing young Saudi hearts and minds to a still more potent virus -- hands-on, radical Islam. Cite error: The named reference "lacey-" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).

[27] "The Muslim Brotherhood In Saudi Arabia (comments by Thomas Hegghammer)". GlobalMB.

[Dreyfuss-28] Cite error: The named reference Dreyfuss was invoked but never defined (see the help page).

[29] "Anatomy of the Salafi Movement" (PDF). 29. 2006: 207–239,. The second sub-group [of Wahhabis in KSA], the politicos (or the rejectionist), claimed a greater understanding of modern issues and concerns in comparison to the purists, and are therefore, better suited to implement and apply the Salafi belief system in modern context. As Saudi Arabia avoided colonization, the priority for the purists (i.e., the Wahhabi ulama) was the purity of Islam and the politics were simply left to the rulers. It was not until the introduction of the Muslim Brotherhood in Saudi Arabia that the politicos were able to gain any influence or power. The brotherhood introduced a politically driven agenda into the purists' Saudi community, which encouraged the youth of the country to being inquiring about modern world events. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help); Missing pipe in: |= (help); Text "QUINTAN WIKTOROWICZ" ignored (help)CS1 maint: extra punctuation (link)

[McCants-30] McCants, William (March 17, 2014). "Islamist Outlaws". Foreign Affairs. Retrieved 19 April 2014.

[Katulis-31] Brian Katulis. "Qatar Saudi Arabia Diverge in Battle to Shape Changing Middle East". The Paths of the Arab Spring. World Politics Review.

[WashingtonPost-Diverse-32] Cite error: The named reference WashingtonPost-Diverse was invoked but never defined (see the help page).

[rodenbeck-33] Max Rodenbeck (October 21, 2004). "Unloved in Arabia". New York Review of Books. 51 (16).

[34] Laceylfirst=Robert (1981). The Kingdom : Arabia and the House of Sa'ud. Harcourt Brace Javonovich. p. back cover.

[Al-Rasheed_136-137-35] Al-Rasheed, Madawi (2010). A History of Saudi Arabia. pp. 136–137. ISBN 978-0-521-74754-7.

[36] Viola, Joy Winkie (1986). Human Resources Development in Saudi Arabia: Multinationals and Saudization. p. 37. ISBN 978-0-88746-070-8.

[37] Abir, Mordechai (1987). Saudi Arabia in the oil era: regime and elites: conflict and collaboration. p. 30. ISBN 978-0-7099-5129-2.

[lacey-islamism-38] Lacey, Robert (2009). Inside the Kingdom : Kings, Clerics, Modernists, Terrorists, and the Struggle for Saudi Arabia. Viking. p. 47. An apparently impregnable, westernizing autocrat, smiled on by America, with a huge army, an efficient secret police, and burgeoning oil revenues, had been brought down without a serious shot being fired -- all the Shah's modernization had proved helpless against the supposedly outmoded power of religion

[Abir21-39] Abir, Mordechai (1993). Saudi Arabia: government, society, and the Gulf crisis. p. 21. ISBN 978-0-415-09325-5.

[40] Jones, Toby Craig (2010). Desert Kingdom: How Oil and Water Forged Modern Saudi Arabia. pp. 218–219. ISBN 978-0-674-04985-7.

[41] House, Karen Elliott (2012). On Saudi Arabia : Its People, past, Religion, Fault Lines and Future. Knopf. p. 20. This incident [Mecca Grand Mosque takeover which lasted] for nearly two weeks, severely damaging the mosque ... claimed at least 1000 lives.

[Hegghammer24-42] Hegghammer, Thomas (2010). Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism Since 1979. p. 24. ISBN 978-0-521-73236-9. Cite error: The named reference "Hegghammer24" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).

[emjap-43] "Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz". Retrieved April 6, 2011.

[bbc-44] Wood, Paul (August 1, 2005). "Life and legacy of King Fahd". BBC News. Retrieved April 6, 2011.

[45] Cordesman, Anthony H. (2003). Saudi Arabia Enters the 21st Century. p. 174. ISBN 978-0-275-98091-7.

[46] Rabasa, Angel (2005). The Muslim world after 9/11. p. 42. ISBN 978-0-8330-3712-1. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)

[FRD306-47] Federal Research Division (2004). Saudi Arabia A Country Study. pp. 122–123. ISBN 978-1-4191-4621-3. Cite error: The named reference "FRD306" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).

[48] Hegghammer, Thomas (2010). Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism Since 1979. p. 31. ISBN 978-0-521-73236-9.

[49] Blanchard, Christopher (2009). Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations. United States Congressional Research Service. pp. 5–6.

[Cordesman_2009-50] Cordesman, Anthony H. (2009). Saudi Arabia: national security in a troubled region. pp. 50–52. ISBN 978-0-313-38076-1.

[NYT_Abdullah-51] "Abdullah, King of Saudi Arabia". The New York Times. 29 November 2010. Retrieved 28 June 2011.

[Okruhlik-52] Okruhlik, Gwenn. "Empowering Civility Through Nationalism". In Robert W. Hefner (ed.). Remaking Muslim Politics: Pluralism, Contestation, Democratization. Princeton University Press. pp. 190, 193. al-Saud historically based their right to rule largely on Isolamic legitimacy. ...
Today, the `alliance` between the regime and official clergy is much contested by dissidents because the parties no longer serve as `checks` on each other. The official clergy are said to be dependent upon the al-Saud for their existence. They regularly issue fatwas ... that justify the policies of the al-Saud in Islamic volcabulary, even when such policies are deplored by the people.

[lacey-govern-53] Lacey, Robert (2009). Inside the Kingdom : Kings, Clerics, Modernists, Terrorists, and the Struggle for Saudi Arabia. Viking. p. 234,235. ....one of the religious sheikhs .... Dr. Adullah Turki, the learned member of the council of the ulema who had accompanied Prince Turki to Afghanistan .... fastened on Abdullah's use of the term wali al-amr. "Those who govern, he pointed out, included not only the king and the government, but also the senior ulema. ... A few days after Prince Turki Al-Faisal layed out his views in an article that was published a few days later. `... from the very first caliphs, the secular rulers have always been the executive rulers in Islamic history -- the ultimate boss. It as been their job to exercise the power, while the job of the religious men -- the shiekhs and the mufti -- has been to give them advice. Never to govern. That is where Khomeiniand the Iranian ayatollahs departed from true Islam. {{cite book}}: line feed character in |quote= at position 210 (help)

[Gerhard-54] Robbers, Gerhard (2007). Encyclopedia of world constitutions, Volume 2. p. 791. ISBN 0-8160-6078-9.

[55] Korany, Bahgat (2010). The Foreign Policies of Arab States: The Challenge of Globalization. p. 358. ISBN 978-977-416-360-9. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)

[56] "About Saudi Arabia. THE BASIC LAW OF GOVERNANCE". Decreed 1 March 1992. Embassy of Saudi Arabia. Retrieved 18 March 2014.

[57] House, Karen Elliott (2012). On Saudi Arabia : Its People, Past, Religion, Fault Lines and Future. Knopf. p. 235. UN organizers who worked with the Saudi to arrange the king's visit -- the first ever by a Saudi king to the UN -- say his primary goal was to present himself as the `pope` of all Islam, thereby diminishing Iran's Shiite sect and pleasing the conservative clerics in Riyadh, for whom Shiites are heretics. For this reason, the king's staff insisted that protocol for his visit parallel that of Pope John Paul II's visit to the United Nations. The chief of protocol, the Saudis insisted, must meet the king at the airport, and the UN secretary general must greet him at the base of the escalator bearing him up to the General Assembly, an honor given to no other head of state.

[Goldstein118-58] Goldstein, Natalie (2010). Religion and the State. p. 118. ISBN 978-0-8160-8090-8. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)

[FRD-59] Federal Research Division (2004). Saudi Arabia A Country Study. pp. 232–233. ISBN 978-1-4191-4621-3. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)

[meforum.org-60] Nawaf E. Obaid (Sept. 1999). "The Power of Saudi Arabia's Islamic Leaders". Middle East Quarterly. VI (3): 51–58. Retrieved 23 June 2011. {{cite journal}}: Check date values in: |year= (help)CS1 maint: year (link)

[61] Farsy, Fouad (1992). Modernity and tradition: the Saudi equation. p. 29. ISBN 978-1-874132-03-5. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)

[Hassner-62] Hassner, Ron Eduard (2009). War on sacred grounds. p. 143. ISBN 978-0-8014-4806-5. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)

[Cavendish78-63] Cavendish, Marshall (2007). World and Its Peoples: the Arabian Peninsula. p. 78. ISBN 978-0-7614-7571-2.

[lacey-clergy-comfort-64] Lacey, Robert (2009). Inside the Kingdom : Kings, Clerics, Modernists, Terrorists, and the Struggle for Saudi Arabia. Viking. p. 131. [Bin Baz] home was a little cluster of modern two-story buildings where he lived with his wives and children . This was royal territory. Talal bin Abdul Aziz and other princes had palaces nearby. In fact, the compound had been a gift to Bin Baz from the royal family. This did not make it a bribe. All senior Saudi clerics lived in homes that were gifts from rich benefactors and foundations. Still it was a reminder of the underlying reality of the royal-Wahhabi alliance. The Al-Saud needed the Wahhabi clerics for their legitimacy, but the clerics, for their part, depended equally upon the Al-Saud. In no other Muslim Arab country did senior religious figures enjoy such prestige and closeness to the government centers of power. There would be no more cars and plush houses for the sheikhs if Saddam Hussein marched into Riyadh.

[Britannica-65] "Encyclopaedia Britannica Online: Saudi Arabia". Britannica.com. Retrieved 28 April 2011. no mention of holidays

[66] Sulaiman, Tosin. Bahrain changes the weekend in efficiency drive, The Times, 2 August 2006. Retrieved 25 June 2008. Turkey has a weekend on Saturday and Sunday

[67] which commemorates the martyrdom of Husayn ibn Ali and is one of the most important Shia holidays

[net_places-68] Sharp, Arthur G. "What's a Wahhabi?". net places. Retrieved 20 March 2014. Wahhabis desire to see unity in issues of faith and conformity in areas of practice. In their view, outward appearances and expressions are directly connected to one's inward state. In other words, clothing styles, mannerisms, and specific actions prove whether or not one is a "true" Muslim.
One striking example of Wahhabism's outward influence on Saudi society is the widespread uniformity of men and women's apparel. In other parts of the Middle East, you will find a mix of traditional and modern clothing styles. You will also discover great variety among those who sport time-honored robes, headdresses, and veils. But in Wahhabist Saudi Arabia, nearly everyone dresses the same.
For women, a long black head covering (concealing all but the eyes) flows over a loose-fitting black outer garment that covers the entire body. This ensemble is usually accompanied by black gloves and sunglasses, covering any remaining skin. For men, a red-and-white checkered headdress (sometimes exchanged for an all-white head covering) is neatly creased at the front and held in place by two black camel-hair rings.

[69] Otto, Jan Michiel (2010). Sharia Incorporated: A Comparative Overview of the Legal Systems of Twelve Muslim Countries in Past and Present. p. 172. ISBN 978-90-8728-057-4. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)

[Sharia_Inc175-70] Otto, Jan Michiel (2010). Sharia Incorporated: A Comparative Overview of the Legal Systems of Twelve Muslim Countries in Past and Present. p. 175. ISBN 978-90-8728-057-4. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)

[71] Whitaker, Brian (9 August 2003). "Saudi system condemned". The Guardian. London. Retrieved 27 July 2011.

[BBCexecutioner-72] "Saudi executioner tells all". BBC News. 5 June 2003. Retrieved 11 July 2011.

[Miethe-73] Miethe, Terance D. (2004). Punishment: a comparative historical perspective. p. 63. ISBN 978-0-521-60516-8. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)

[nyrob-relig-educ-74] {{cite journal Review |title=Unloved in Arabia" |last=Rodenbeck |first=Max |journal=The New York Review of Books |url=http://www.nybooks.com/articles/17477 |Volume=51 |Number=16 |date=October 21, 2004 |quote=Almost half of Saudi state television's airtime is devoted to religious issues, as is about half the material taught in state schools" (source: By the estimate of an elementary schoolteacher in Riyadh, Islamic studies make up 30 percent of the actual curriculum. But another 20 percent creeps into textbooks on history, science, Arabic, and so forth. In contrast, by one unofficial count the entire syllabus for twelve years of Saudi schooling contains a total of just thirty-eight pages covering the history, literature, and cultures of the non-Muslim world.)}}

[nyrob-relig-books-75] Rodenbeck, Max (October 21, 2004). "Unloved in Arabia (Book reviews)". The New York Review of Books. Nine out of ten titles published in the kingdom are on religious subjects, and most of the doctorates its universities awards are in Islamic studies.) {{cite journal}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |1= (help); Unknown parameter |Number= ignored (|number= suggested) (help); Unknown parameter |Volume= ignored (|volume= suggested) (help)

[76] A Fury For God : the Islamist Attack on America by Malise Ruthven, 2002 p.178-9

[77] "`Flawed Justice: the Execution of 'Abd al-Karim Maria'I al-Naqshbandi`,". Human Rights Watch,. October 1997 (E) v.9 n.9. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)CS1 maint: extra punctuation (link)

[78] House, Karen Elliott (2012). On Saudi Arabia : Its People, past, Religion, Fault Lines and Future. Knopf. pp. 39–41.

[79] House, Karen Elliott (2012). On Saudi Arabia : Its People, past, Religion, Fault Lines and Future. Knopf. p. 9.

[80] The Daily Star Lamine Chikhi. 27 11 2010.

[81] 'The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya', US Congressional Research Service Report, 2008, by Christopher M. Blanchard available from the Federation of American Scientists website.

[82] Q&A with Stephen Schwartz on Wahhabism on National Review Online

[LofC-83] "Saudi Arabia. Wahhabi Theology". December 1992. Library of Congress Country Studies. Retrieved 17 March 2014.

[Esposito333-84] Esposito 2003, p. 333

[85] House, Karen Elliott (2012). On Saudi Arabia : Its People, Past, Religion, Fault Lines and Future. Knopf. p. 235. The Eastern Province (home to the oil reserves and to the perennially ill-used and unhappy Shiite minority) and the Hejaz (site of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina with their more open, international outlook) both resent the overwhelming dominance of religious conservatives from the Nejd, home of the Al Saud, at all levels of national governance.

[86] Johnston, David (9 September 2003). "Two years later: 9/11 Tactics; Official Says Qaeda Recruited Saudi Hijackers to Strain Ties". The New York Times. Retrieved 19 May 2008.

[iags.org-87] 'Fueling Terror', Institute for the Analysis of Global Terror,

[88] The Telegraph 6 December 2010 "Wikileaks: Saudis 'chief funders of al-Qaeda" http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/wikileaks/8182847/Wikileaks-Saudis-chief-funders-of-al-Qaeda.html

[Saudi_Arabia_2010-89] 'Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism since 1979' by Thomas Hegghammer, 2010, Cambridge Middle East Studies ISBN 978-0-521-73236-9

[90] House, Karen Elliott (2012). On Saudi Arabia : Its People, Past, Religion, Fault Lines and Future. Knopf. p. 206. ... the regime's legitimacy rests on protecting and propagating puritanical Islam. Small wonder then that only in 2010, some seven years after bloody attacks by terrorist began inside the kingdom, did the grand mufti of Saudi Arabia issue a fatwa condeming terrorism and declaring `any act of terrorism, including providing financial support to terrorists, is a crime.` Even then his focus seemed as much on protecting the reputation of Islam as on protecting innocent victims from terrorism.

[91] "Terrorism is criminal". Arab News. March 3, 2010,. Terrorism is criminal and spills the blood of innocents, [said Grand Mufti Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin Abdullah Al-Asheikh, chairman of the Council of Senior Islamic Scholars.] It attacks security, spreads terror among people and creates problems for society … Such acts are forbidden by Islamic law, ... It is necessary to fight the attempts of some to attach terrorism to Islam and Muslims with the goal of distorting the religion and assailing its leadership role in the world {{cite journal}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)CS1 maint: extra punctuation (link)

[92] ttp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7959531.stm Saudi Arabia's Shia press for rights

[93] Council on Foreign Relations

[94] Saudi Arabia: Treat Shia Equally|hrw.org| 2009/09/02

[Nasr2006_p._236-95] Nasr, Vali, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future, W. W. Norton & Company; 2006, p.236

[lacey-shia-96] see also: (Lacey, Robert (2009). Inside the Kingdom : Kings, Clerics, Modernists, Terrorists, and the Struggle for Saudi Arabia. Viking. p. 43. ... the modern Saudi state had treated the members of its Shia community as second-cass citizens. Out on the oil rigs, Shia made up the drilling gangs, but usually worked to the orders of a Sunni foreman. There were at that time no Shia diplomats in the Saudi foreign service, no Shia pilots in the national airline -- and certainly none in the air force. They could not become head teachers or even deputy heads in local schools, where, if they did teach, they were expected to follow a syllabus that scornfully denigrated Shia history and beliefs. Local zoning rules even banned them from building dens or basement areas beneath their homes, for fear they might use them as secret husayniyas for subversive worship and for their alleged sexual congresses.)

[97] Saudi Arabia, Precarious Justice: Volume 20 - Page 133, Human Rights Watch - 2008

[98] Arabia: the Cradle of Islam, 1900, S.M.Zwemmer

[99] Saudi Embassy (US) website – Islam Retrieved 20 January 2011

[100] Saudi Embassy (US) website – Guardian of the Holy Places Retrieved 20 January 2011

[101] Goldschmidt, Jr., Arthur; Lawrence Davidson (2005). A Concise History of the Middle East (8th ed.), p.48 ISBN 978-0-8133-4275-7

[stratfor.com-102] ttp://www.stratfor.com/saudi_arabia_grand_mufti_defends_legitimacy

[103] ttp://www.stratfor.com/dissident_saudi_clerics_weaken_riyadh dead link

[104] Video: As-Sahab media, "Knowledge is for acting upon"

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@@ Line 1: / Line 1: @@
-<!--
+<--
 {{Islam by country}}
 '''Islam''' is the state religion of the '''[[Kingdom of Saudi Arabia]]'''. The country is noted for being the location of the two holiest sites in Islam, for its largess towards Islamic causes funded by its oil exports, and for its conservative official interpretation of Islam, which has influence well beyond its borders.<ref name=Lacey-presitge>{{cite book|last=Lacey|first=Robert|title=Inside the Kingdom|year=2009|publisher=Penguin|pages=xx-xxi}}</ref>  It is the location of the citieis of [[Mecca]] and [[Medina]], where [[Muhammad]], the messenger of the Islamic faith, lived and died, and which remains the center of the religion, attracting millions of pilgrims annually, and thousands of clerics and students who come from across the [[Muslim world]] to study. The official title of the [[King of Saudi Arabia]] is "[[Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques]]"—the two being [[Masjid al-Haram]] in Mecca and [[Al-Masjid al-Nabawi]] in Medina—considered the holiest in Islam.
+TRIM AND INTEGRATE THIS
+Saudi Arabia is the birthplace of Muhammad and of the Arabic language. It is unique among modern Muslim states in being the only one to have been created by jihad, the only one to claim the Koran as its constitution, and unique among  Arab-Muslim countries in being the only one to have escaped European imperialism.
+<ref name=nyrob-only>{{cite journal
+Review
+|title=Unloved in Arabia"
+|last=Rodenbeck
+|first=Max
+|journal=The New York Review of Books
+|url=http://www.nybooks.com/articles/17477
+|Volume=51 |Number=16 |date=October 21, 2004
+|quote=This is, after all, the birthplace of Muhammad and of the Arabic language, the locus of Muslim holy cities, the root of tribal Arab trees, and also, historically, a last redoubt against foreign incursions into Arab and Muslim lands. The kingdom is in many ways a unique experiment. It is the only modern Muslim state to have been created by jihad,[10] the only one to claim the Koran as its constitution, and [the only Arab-]Muslim countries to have escaped European imperialism.}}</ref>
 Saudi Arabia is the birthplace of Muhammad and of the Arabic language. It is unique among modern Muslim states in being the only one to have been created by jihad, the only one to claim the Koran as its constitution, and unique among  Arab-Muslim countries in being the only one to have escaped European imperialism.
@@ Line 50: / Line 64: @@
 |pages=173-4}}</ref>
 MB members became "entrenched both in Saudi society and in the Saudi state, taking a leading role in key governmental ministries".<ref name=Lacroix/>  In particular, many established themselves in Saudi educational system. One expert on Saudi affairs (Stephane Lacroix) has stated: "The education system is so controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood, it will take 20 years to change -- if at all. Islamists see education as their base" in Saudi Arabia.<ref>{{cite book|author=House, Karen Elliott|title=On Saudi Arabia : Its People, past, Religion, Fault Lines and Future| publisher=Knopf|year=2012|page=156}}</ref>
+The Muslim Brotherhood had considerable impact on Islam in Saudi Arabia. Unlike Wahhabism it "dealt in change-promoting concepts like social justice, anticolonialism, and the equal distribution of wealth."  It gave "a radical, but still apparently safe, religious twist" to the Wahhabi values Saudi students "had absorbed in childhood". The "hands-on, radical Islam" of jihad became a "practical possibility today", not just part of history.<ref name=lacey-
+>{{cite book|last=Lacey|first=Robert|title=Inside the Kingdom : Kings, Clerics, Modernists, Terrorists, and the Struggle for Saudi Arabia|date=2009|publisher=Viking
+|page=56,7
+|quote=The ambitions of the Muslim Brotherhood were similar to those of the Salfis and also of the ''dawah wahhabiya'' (Wahhabi mission) -- to reestablish the order of Allah and to bring about the perfect Islamic states. But the rhetoric of the Brotherhood dealt in change-promoting concepts like social justice, anticolonialism, and the equal distribution of wealth. Politically they were prepared to challenge the estabishment in a style that was unthinkable to mainstream Wahhabis, who were reflexively defferential to their rulers, and enablers, the House of Saud. It was heady stuff for the young students of Jeddah, taking the Wahhabi values they had absorbed in childhood and giving them a radical, but still apparently safe, religious twist. They had learned of jihad at school as a instantly romantic concept -- part of history. Now they were hearing of its practical possiblity today, and they could even make personal contact with jihad in the barrel-chested shape of Abdullah Azzam, who gave lectures in both Jeddah and Mecca in the early 1980s. The Saudi government had welcomed ideologues like Azzam and Mohammed, the surviving Qutub, to the Kingdom as pious reinforcement against the atheistic, Marxist-tinged thinking of their Middle Eastern neighbohood. But in the process they were exposing young Saudi hearts and minds to a still more potent virus -- hands-on, radical Islam.
+}}</ref>
 The Muslim Brotherhood's brand of Islam and Islamic politics differs from the strict [[Salafism|Salafi]] creed, [[Wahhabi]]yya, officially held by the state of Saudi Arabia, and the organization does not have "a formal organizational presence" in the Kingdom.<ref>{{cite web|title=The Muslim Brotherhood In Saudi Arabia (comments by Thomas Hegghammer)|url=http://www.globalmbwatch.com/2008/07/08/the-muslim-brotherhood-in-saudi-arabia/|publisher=GlobalMB}}</ref> This is not discrimination as the Saudi government doesn’t allow any political group or party to function openly.<ref name=Dreyfuss/>
-Relations between the Saudi ruling family and the Brotherhood became strained with Saudi opposition to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the willingness of Saudi government to allow US troops to be based in the Kingdom to fight Iraq.<ref name=Lacroix/> The Brotherhood  supported the Sahwah "Awakening" movement that pushed for political change in the Kingdom.<ref name=McCants>{{cite journal|last=McCants|first=William|title=Islamist Outlaws|journal=Foreign Affairs|date=March 17, 2014|url=http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141038/william-mccants/islamist-outlaws|accessdate=19 April 2014}}</ref>
-The ruling family was also alarmed by the [[Arab Spring]] and the example set by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, with president [[Muhammad Morsi]] bringing an Islamist government to power by means of popular revolution and elections.<ref name=Katulis>{{cite book|title=The Paths of the Arab Spring|publisher=World Politics Review|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=jNp5-MTGDOMC&pg=PT70&lpg=PT70&dq=saudi+arab+spring+muslim+brotherhood+egypt+example&source=bl&ots=2jXH7DMbRd&sig=nQKYJqsZaDtQED9GkVH8WH15F4A&hl=en&sa=X&ei=3vNSU4SgGebgyQHtqYCQDw&ved=0CHUQ6AEwCA#v=onepage&q=saudi%20arab%20spring%20muslim%20brotherhood%20egypt%20example&f=false|author=Brian Katulis|chapter=Qatar Saudi Arabia Diverge in Battle to Shape Changing Middle East}}</ref>   The then Saudi Interior Minister [[Nayef bin Abdul-Aziz Al Saud|Prince Nayef]] denounced the Brotherhood, saying it was guilty of "betrayal of pledges and ingratitude" and was "the source of all problems in the Islamic world".<ref name="WashingtonPost-Diverse"/> In March 2014, in a "significant departure from its past official stance" the Saudi government declared the Brotherhood a "terrorist organization".<ref name=Lacroix>{{cite news|last=Lacroix|first=Stéphane|title=Saudi Arabia’s Muslim Brotherhood predicament|url=http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/03/20/saudi-arabias-muslim-brotherhood-predicament/|accessdate=20 March 2014|newspaper=Washington Post}}</ref>
+The brotherhood introduced a politically driven agenda into the purists’ Saudi community, which encouraged the youth of the country to being inquiring about modern world events.<ref>{{cite journal|url=http://www.cerium.ca/IMG/pdf/WIKTOROWICZ_2006_Anatomy_of_the_Salafi_Movement.pdf |title=Anatomy of the Salafi Movement |QUINTAN WIKTOROWICZ |=journal=Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, |volume=29|page=207–239, |year=2006|quote=The second sub-group [of Wahhabis in KSA], the politicos (or the rejectionist), claimed a greater understanding of modern issues and concerns in comparison to the purists, and are therefore, better suited to implement and apply the Salafi belief system in modern context. As Saudi Arabia avoided colonization, the priority for the purists (i.e., the Wahhabi ulama) was the purity of Islam and the politics were simply left to the rulers. It was not until the introduction of the Muslim Brotherhood in Saudi Arabia that the politicos were able to gain any influence or power. The brotherhood introduced a politically driven agenda into the purists’ Saudi community, which encouraged the youth of the country to being inquiring about modern world events.}}</ref>
+" .... The second sub-group [of Wahhabis in KSA], the politicos (or the rejectionist), claimed a greater understanding of modern issues and concerns in comparison to the purists, and are therefore, better suited to implement and apply the Salafi belief system in modern context. As Saudi Arabia avoided colonization, the priority for the purists (i.e., the Wahhabi ulama) was the purity of Islam and the politics were simply left to the rulers. It was not until the introduction of the Muslim Brotherhood in Saudi Arabia that the politicos were able to gain any influence or power. The brotherhood introduced a politically driven agenda into the purists’ Saudi community, which encouraged the youth of the county to being inquiring about modern world events. The politicos believed it was their duty to engage in political discussions and to be critical of un-Islamic rulers and policies to expand their realm of influence and pass strictly religious matters while still holding true
-"The ambitions of the Muslim Brotherhood were similar to those of the Salfis and also of the ''dawah wahhabiya'' (Wahhabi mission) -- to reestablish the order of Allah and to bring about the perfect Islamic states. But the rhetoric of the Brotherhood dealt in change-promoting concepts like social justice, anticolonialism, and the equal distribution of wealth. Politically they were prepared to challenge the estabishment in a style that was unthinkable to mainstream Wahhabis, who were reflexively defferential to their rulers, and enablers, the House of Saud." (p.56)
+to their Salafi belief system. The politicos believed that truly to protect the purity of Islam, it was necessary to address political issues; otherwise, their rulers could destroy Islam. [from http://www.cerium.ca/IMG/pdf/WIKTOROWICZ_2006_Anatomy_of_the_Salafi_Movement.pdf |Anatomy of the Salafi Movement |QUINTAN WIKTOROWICZ Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 29:207–239, 2006], quote in  http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a509109.pdf WAHHABISM: IS IT A FACTOR IN THE SPREAD OF GLOBAL TERRORISM? by Michael R. Dillon]
+Relations between the Saudi ruling family and the Brotherhood became strained with Saudi opposition to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the willingness of Saudi government to allow US troops to be based in the Kingdom to fight Iraq.<ref name=Lacroix/> The Brotherhood  supported the Sahwah "Awakening" movement that pushed for political change in the Kingdom.<ref name=McCants>{{cite journal|last=McCants|first=William|title=Islamist Outlaws|journal=Foreign Affairs|date=March 17, 2014|url=http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141038/william-mccants/islamist-outlaws|accessdate=19 April 2014}}</ref>
-"It was heady stuff for the young students of Jeddah, taking the Wahhabi values they had absorbed in childhood and giving them a radical, but still apparently safe, religious twist. They had learned of jihad at school as a instantly romantic concept -- part of history. Now they were hearing of its practical possiblity today, and they could even make personal contact with jihad in the barrel-chested shape of Abdullah Azzam, who gave lectures in both Jeddah and Mecca in the early 1980s.
+The ruling family was also alarmed by the [[Arab Spring]] and the example set by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, with president [[Muhammad Morsi]] bringing an Islamist government to power by means of popular revolution and elections.<ref name=Katulis>{{cite book|title=The Paths of the Arab Spring|publisher=World Politics Review|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=jNp5-MTGDOMC&pg=PT70&lpg=PT70&dq=saudi+arab+spring+muslim+brotherhood+egypt+example&source=bl&ots=2jXH7DMbRd&sig=nQKYJqsZaDtQED9GkVH8WH15F4A&hl=en&sa=X&ei=3vNSU4SgGebgyQHtqYCQDw&ved=0CHUQ6AEwCA#v=onepage&q=saudi%20arab%20spring%20muslim%20brotherhood%20egypt%20example&f=false|author=Brian Katulis|chapter=Qatar Saudi Arabia Diverge in Battle to Shape Changing Middle East}}</ref>   The then Saudi Interior Minister [[Nayef bin Abdul-Aziz Al Saud|Prince Nayef]] denounced the Brotherhood, saying it was guilty of "betrayal of pledges and ingratitude" and was "the source of all problems in the Islamic world".<ref name="WashingtonPost-Diverse"/> In March 2014, in a "significant departure from its past official stance" the Saudi government declared the Brotherhood a "terrorist organization".<ref name=Lacroix>{{cite news|last=Lacroix|first=Stéphane|title=Saudi Arabia’s Muslim Brotherhood predicament|url=http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/03/20/saudi-arabias-muslim-brotherhood-predicament/|accessdate=20 March 2014|newspaper=Washington Post}}</ref>
-"The Saudi government had welcomed ideologues like Azzam and Mohammed, the surviving Qutub, to the Kingdom as pious reinforcement against the atheistic, Marxist-tinged thinking of their Middle Eastern neighbohood. But in the process they were exposing young Saudi hearts and minds to a still more potent virus -- hands-on, radical Islam." (p.56-7)
-<ref name=lacey-
->{{cite book|last=Lacey|first=Robert|title=Inside the Kingdom : Kings, Clerics, Modernists, Terrorists, and the Struggle for Saudi Arabia|date=2009|publisher=Viking
-|page=56,7
-|quote=
-}}</ref>
@@ Line 99: / Line 113: @@
 Islamist terrorist activity increased dramatically in 2003, with the [[Riyadh compound bombings]] and [[List of militant incidents in Saudi Arabia|other attacks]], which prompted the government to take much more stringent action against terrorism.<ref name= "Cordesman 2009">{{cite book |title=Saudi Arabia: national security in a troubled region |last=Cordesman |first=Anthony H. |year=2009 |isbn=978-0-313-38076-1 |pages=50–52}}</ref>  The king ([[Abdullah of Saudi Arabia|Abdullah]]) has also taken steps to rein back the powers of the ulema, for instance transferring their control over girls' education to the Ministry of Education.<ref name="NYT Abdullah">{{cite news|title=Abdullah, King of Saudi Arabia |url=http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/people/a/abdullah_bin_abdul_aziz_alsaud/index.html |newspaper=The New York Times|date=29 November 2010|accessdate=28 June 2011}}</ref>
 Some have complained that the king's dominance over the ulema has weakened the traditional Islamic legitimacy of Saudi throne.<ref name=Okruhlik>{{cite book|last=Okruhlik|first=Gwenn|title=Remaking Muslim Politics: Pluralism, Contestation, Democratization|publisher=Princeton University Press|pages=190, 193|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=MmmVMCBej8oC&pg=PA193&dq=ibn+abd+al-Wahhab+fatwa+al-Saud&hl=en&sa=X&ei=tZwgU-T9A8egyAHCpIC4Ag&ved=0CDgQ6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=ibn%20abd%20al-Wahhab%20fatwa%20al-Saud&f=false|editor=Robert W. Hefner|chapter=Empowering Civility Through Nationalism|quote=al-Saud historically based their right to rule largely on Isolamic legitimacy. ...<BR>Today, the `alliance` between the regime and official clergy is much contested by dissidents because the parties no longer serve as `checks` on each other. The official clergy are said to be dependent upon the al-Saud for their existence. They regularly issue fatwas ... that justify the policies of the al-Saud in Islamic volcabulary, even when such policies are deplored by the people.}}</ref>
+TRIM AND INTEGRATE
+"In July that year [2002?] Laurent Murawiec, a French analyst with the RAND Corporation, had given a 24-slide presentaiton to the prestigious Defense Policy Board, an arm of the Pentagon, suggesting that the United States should consider `taking [the ]Saudi out of Arabia' by forcibly seizing control of the oil fields, giving the Hijaz back to the Hashemites, and delegating control fo the holy cities to a multinational committee of moderate, non-Wahhabi Musilms: the House of Saud should be sent home to Riyadh.
+`Saudi Arabia supports our enemies and attacks our allies,` argued Murawiec, a protege of Richard Perle's, the neocon advocate of war with Iraq who chaired the Policy Board. `The Saudis are active at every level of the terror chain, from planners to financiers, from cadre to foot soldier, from ideologist to cheerleaders.` They were `the kernel of evil, the prime mover, the most dangerous opponent` in the Middle East. (p.288-289)
+<ref name=lacey-
+>{{cite book|last=Lacey|first=Robert|title=Inside the Kingdom : Kings, Clerics, Modernists, Terrorists, and the Struggle for Saudi Arabia|date=2009|publisher=Viking
+|page=288-9
+|quote=
+"In July that year [2002?] Laurent Murawiec, a French analyst with the RAND Corporation, had given a 24-slide presentaiton to the prestigious Defense Policy Board, an arm of the Pentagon, suggesting that the United States should consider `taking [the ]Saudi out of Arabia' by forcibly seizing control of the oil fields, giving the Hijaz back to the Hashemites, and delegating control fo the holy cities to a multinational committee of moderate, non-Wahhabi Musilms: the House of Saud should be sent home to Riyadh.
+`Saudi Arabia supports our enemies and attacks our allies,` argued Murawiec, a protege of Richard Perle's, the neocon advocate of war with Iraq who chaired the Policy Board. `The Saudis are active at every level of the terror chain, from planners to financiers, from cadre to foot soldier, from ideologist to cheerleaders.` They were `the kernel of evil, the prime mover, the most dangerous opponent` in the Middle East.
+}}</ref>
+In the days after 9/11 in a series of televised gatherings Crown Prince Abdullah adressed the country's religious, tribal, business, and media leadership calling for a strategy to correct what has gone wrong. and in a couple of later articles by top Al Saud princes (Prince Turki Al-Faisal, Prince Talal bin Abdul Aziz) it was declared that it has always been the role of executive rulers in Islamic history to excercise power and the job of the religious scholars to advise, never to govern.
+<ref name=lacey-govern
+>{{cite book|last=Lacey|first=Robert|title=Inside the Kingdom : Kings, Clerics, Modernists, Terrorists, and the Struggle for Saudi Arabia|date=2009|publisher=Viking
+|page=234,235
+|quote=....one of the religious sheikhs .... Dr. Adullah Turki, the learned member of the council of the ulema who had accompanied Prince Turki to Afghanistan ....  fastened on Abdullah's use of the term wali al-amr.
+"Those who govern, he pointed out, included not only the king and the government, but also the senior ulema. ... A few days after Prince Turki Al-Faisal layed out his views in an article that was published a few days later. `... from the very first caliphs, the secular rulers have always been the executive rulers in Islamic history -- the ultimate boss. It as been their job to exercise the power, while the job of the religious men -- the shiekhs and the mufti -- has been to give them advice. Never to govern. That is where Khomeiniand the Iranian ayatollahs departed from true Islam.
+}}</ref>
 ==Current position==
@@ Line 117: / Line 156: @@
 A [[Council of Senior Scholars (Saudi Arabia)|Council of Senior Scholars]], appointed and paid by the government advises the king on religious matters.  The ulema have also been a key influence in major government decisions,<ref name="meforum.org">{{cite journal |author=Nawaf E. Obaid |year=Sept. 1999 |title=The Power of Saudi Arabia's Islamic Leaders |journal=Middle East Quarterly |volume=VI |issue=3 |pages=51–58 |url=http://www.meforum.org/482/the-power-of-saudi-arabias-islamic-leaders |accessdate=23 June 2011}}</ref> have a significant role in the judicial and education systems<ref>{{cite book |title=Modernity and tradition: the Saudi equation |last=Farsy |first=Fouad |coauthors= |year=1992 |isbn=978-1-874132-03-5 |page=29}}</ref> and a monopoly of authority in the sphere of religious and social morals.<ref name= Hassner>{{cite book |title=War on sacred grounds |last=Hassner |first=Ron Eduard |coauthors= |year=2009 |isbn=978-0-8014-4806-5 |page=143}}</ref>  Not only is the succession to the throne subject to the approval of the ulema,<ref name=Cavendish78>{{cite book |title=World and Its Peoples: the Arabian Peninsula |last=Cavendish |first=Marshall |year=2007 |isbn=978-0-7614-7571-2 |page=78}}</ref> but so are all new laws (royal decrees).<ref name= Goldstein118/>
+INTEGRATE
+The Council of Senior Scholars]], are appointed and paid by the government<ref name="meforum.org"/>
+[Bin Baz] home was a little cluster of modern two-story buildings where he lived with his wives and children . This was royal territory. Talal bin Abdul Aziz and other princes had palaces nearby. In fact, the compound had been a gift to Bin Baz from the royal family. This did not make it a bribe. All senior Saudi clerics lived in homes that were gifts from rich benefactors and foundations. Still it was a reminder of the underlying reality of the royal-Wahhabi alliance. The Al-Saud needed the Wahhabi clerics for their legitimacy, but the clerics, for their part, depended equally upon the Al-Saud. In no other Muslim Arab country did senior religious figures enjoy such prestige and closeness to the government centers of power. There would be no more cars and plush houses for the sheikhs if Saddam Hussein marched into Riyadh."
+<ref name=lacey-clergy-comfort
+>{{cite book|last=Lacey|first=Robert|title=Inside the Kingdom : Kings, Clerics, Modernists, Terrorists, and the Struggle for Saudi Arabia|date=2009|publisher=Viking
+|page=131
+|quote=[Bin Baz] home was a little cluster of modern two-story buildings where he lived with his wives and children . This was royal territory. Talal bin Abdul Aziz and other princes had palaces nearby. In fact, the compound had been a gift to Bin Baz from the royal family. This did not make it a bribe. All senior Saudi clerics lived in homes that were gifts from rich benefactors and foundations. Still it was a reminder of the underlying reality of the royal-Wahhabi alliance. The Al-Saud needed the Wahhabi clerics for their legitimacy, but the clerics, for their part, depended equally upon the Al-Saud. In no other Muslim Arab country did senior religious figures enjoy such prestige and closeness to the government centers of power. There would be no more cars and plush houses for the sheikhs if Saddam Hussein marched into Riyadh.}}</ref>
 The religious police or [[Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice (Saudi Arabia)|Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice]] numbers 3,500-4,000. Members patrol the streets enforcing dress codes, strict separation of men and women, [[salat]] prayer by Muslims during prayer times, investigating reports of witchcraft, and other behavior it believes to be commanded or forbidden by Islam.
@@ Line 125: / Line 177: @@
 The Saudi courts impose a number of severe physical punishments.<ref name= "Sharia Inc175">{{cite book |title=Sharia Incorporated: A Comparative Overview of the Legal Systems of Twelve Muslim Countries in Past and Present |last=Otto |first=Jan Michiel |coauthors= |year=2010 |isbn=978-90-8728-057-4 |page=175}}</ref> The death penalty can be imposed for a wide range of offences<ref>{{cite news |title=Saudi system condemned |url=http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/aug/09/saudiarabia.brianwhitaker |newspaper=The Guardian |date=9 August 2003 |accessdate=27 July 2011 |location=London |first=Brian |last=Whitaker}}</ref> including murder, rape, armed robbery, repeated drug use, [[apostasy]],<ref name= BBCexecutioner>{{cite news |url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/2966790.stm |title=Saudi executioner tells all |date=5 June 2003 |publisher=BBC News |accessdate=11 July 2011}}</ref> adultery,<ref name= FRD306>{{cite book |title=Saudi Arabia A Country Study |last=Federal Research Division |year=2004 |isbn=978-1-4191-4621-3 |page=304}}</ref> witchcraft and sorcery<ref name= Miethe>{{cite book |title=Punishment: a comparative historical perspective  |last=Miethe |first=Terance D. |coauthors=Lu, Hong |year=2004 |isbn=978-0-521-60516-8 |page=63}}</ref> and can be carried out by beheading with a sword,<ref name= BBCexecutioner/> [[stoning]] or firing squad,<ref name= FRD306/> followed by crucifixion.<ref name= Miethe/>
+INTEGRATE
+Approximately half of Saudi state television's airtime is devoted to religious issues, and about about half of the material taught in state schools is religious according to the estimate of one school teacher.  In comparison, the number of pages devoted to teaching the history, literature, and cultures of the non-Muslim world in twelve years of Saudi schooling total just thirty-eight.
+<ref name=nyrob-relig-educ>{{cite journal
+Review
+|title=Unloved in Arabia"
+|last=Rodenbeck
+|first=Max
+|journal=The New York Review of Books
+|url=http://www.nybooks.com/articles/17477
+|Volume=51 |Number=16 |date=October 21, 2004
+|quote=Almost half of Saudi state television's airtime is devoted to religious issues, as is about half the material taught in state schools"
+(source: By the estimate of an elementary schoolteacher in Riyadh, Islamic studies make up 30 percent of the actual curriculum. But another 20 percent creeps into textbooks on history, science, Arabic, and so forth. In contrast, by one unofficial count the entire syllabus for twelve years of Saudi schooling contains a total of just thirty-eight pages covering the history, literature, and cultures of the non-Muslim world.)}}</ref>
+% of books published in the kingdom are on religious subjects, and most of the doctorates its universities awards are in Islamic studies.
+<ref name=nyrob-relig-books>{{cite journal|
+|title=Unloved in Arabia (Book reviews)
+|last=Rodenbeck
+|first=Max
+|journal=The New York Review of Books
+|url=http://www.nybooks.com/articles/17477
+|Volume=51 |Number=16 |date=October 21, 2004
+|quote=Nine out of ten titles published in the kingdom are on religious subjects, and most of the doctorates its universities awards are in Islamic studies.)}}</ref>
+INTEGRATE OR DELETE?
+The charge of sorcery as applied in modern Saudi Arabia is sometimes used as retaliation against foreign migrant workers in dispute with their employers. Humans Rights Watch believes that the conviction of a Syrian national, `Abd al-Karim Mara'I al-Naqshabandi -- executed in 1996 for undertaking `the practice of works of magic and spells and possession of a collection of polytheistic and superstitious books` -- was actually resulted from a dispute with his employer Prince Salman bin Sa'ud bin `Abd al`Aziz, a nephew of King Fahd.
+<ref>''A Fury For God : the Islamist Attack on America'' by Malise Ruthven, 2002 p.178-9</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=`Flawed Justice: the Execution of 'Abd al-Karim Maria'I al-Naqshbandi`,
+|publisher=Human Rights Watch,
+|date=October 1997 (E) v.9 n.9
+|url=http://www.hrw.org/reports/1997/Saudi.}}</ref>
+The continued unifying power of Islam for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been questioned in light of new developments and technology that have undermined the official wahhabi religious establishment.
+* The sharp shift in support of the Council of Senior Ulama from jihadis during the 1980s, to peaceful moderation after the 2003 terror attacks, opening the question of whether the inconsistency of the ulema indicated political expediency  rather than scripture guided their doctrinal positions;
+* growing literacy  -- which has given Saudis the ability to read the Quran for themselves -- and satellite television and the internet -- which has given them the ability to choose among a wide variety of interpretations of Islam -- has meant the loss of monopoly of the establishment in the interpretation of Islam.
+* the more technology and society changes the more challenges arise that the "Prophet Muhammad did not have to deal with and could not forsee", and that hadith do not deal with.
+<ref>{{cite book|author=House, Karen Elliott|title=On Saudi Arabia : Its People, past, Religion, Fault Lines and Future| publisher=Knopf|year=2012|pages=39-41}}</ref>
+While religion in KSA is strict exceptions are made. Foreign non-Muslim troops are forbidden except when the king needed them to confront Saddam Hussein in 1990; gender mixing of men and women is forbidden, and fraternization with non-Muslims is discouraged, but not at King Abdullah University of Science and Technology.<ref>{{cite book|author=House, Karen Elliott|title=On Saudi Arabia : Its People, past, Religion, Fault Lines and Future| publisher=Knopf|year=2012|pages=9}}</ref>
 === Wahhabism ===

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