User:Сергей Олегович/sandbox

For the 2015 intervention, see Russian military intervention in the Syrian Civil War.

Russia and Syria

An ally of Syria since 1956, Russia has supported the Syrian government since the Syrian Civil War began in 2011, with military aid in the form of weaponry, training, and military advisors. In October 2011 and again February 2012, Russia blocked Western-backed resolutions in the United Nations Security Council because those resolutions left the possibility of sanctions, or even military intervention, against the Syrian Assad government open. In January and February 2012, Russian peace initiatives were dismissed by the oppositional Syrian National Council and by the Western powers.

The Russian government has stated that the Syrian Civil War was caused by the US and allies pushing for “a so-called democratic revolution” in Syria by arming and training “so-called moderate Syrian opposition” groups.”

In September 2015, the Russian Federation Council approved the use of Russian military in Syria to fight terrorist groups, ISIL or 'the Islamic State' in particular, at a request from the Syrian President Bashar Assad. Russian and Western officials stated that Russian strikes targeted not only ISIL, but other rebel groups in the Army of Conquest coalition including al-Nusra, al-Qaeda's Syrian branch.

As of 2015 Russia wants a united front against ISIL that includes the Assad government. Western powers however have stated that the Assad government shouldn't have a place in a coalition against ISIL.

History of ties between Syria and Russia

See also: Russia–Syria relations

In 1893, a consular office of the Russian Empire was established in Damascus. The Bolshevik revolution (1917), more or less the creation of the Soviet Union (1922-1991), essentially brought an end to Russian presence in Syria for a brief period. Although the Soviet Union did not play a large political role, it helped establish the first Syrian Communist Party in 1925. The relationship was restored with diplomatic links established with Syria in 1944, shortly before Syria was formally recognized as an independent state on 17 April 1946. Since then, Syria over the years received substantial military and economic aid from the Soviet Union and (since 1991) from Russia.

During the Cold War (1947-1991), Syria served as an ally to the Soviet Union in opposition to the western powers, and a stronger political bond grew. Between 1955 and 1958, Syria received about $294 million from the Soviet Union for military and economic assistance. The Suez War in 1956 accelerated a multiplication of ties between Syria and the Soviet Union, simultaneously with the increase in power and influence of the Ba'ath Party in Syria.

The Syrian Revolution of February 1966 allowed the Soviet Union the opportunity to further support Syria. In 1971, under an agreement with the Ba'athist Syrian government’s President Hafez al-Assad, the Soviet Union was allowed to open its naval military base in Tartus, giving the Soviet Union a stable presence in the Middle East. Thousands of Syrian military officers and educated professionals studied in Russia during President Hafez al-Assad's three-decade rule (1971-2000), and such connections have resulted in many marriages and mixed families.

In April 1977, President Hafez al-Assad visited Moscow, and met with Soviet leaders Leonid Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin among others, as a sign of improved Syrian relations with the USSR. Three years later, in October 1980, Syria signed a twenty-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union.

At the beginning of the Syrian Civil War (2011), Syria was one of Russia's closest Middle Eastern allies.

Political efforts and statements

Dmitry Medvedev in a joint press conference with the Syrian President following Russo-Syrian talks in May 2011

2011

At the end of May 2011, the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that Russia opposed United Nations' involvement in Syria because "the situation doesn't present a threat to international peace and security ... Syria is a very important country in the Middle East and destabilizing Syria would have repercussions far beyond its borders", and asserted that Assad had made attempts at major reform.

In June, both the US and other Western governments as well as Syrian protesters prevailed upon Russia to change its position, and finally a Syrian anti-government delegation visited Moscow and met with Russian envoy Mikhail Margelov, who after the meeting noted that "leaders come and go" and called for "an end to any and all forms of violence", which some interpreted to be a shift away from Assad, once a major ally, in foreign policy. “A harder line from Russia would be a blow to Syria which relies heavily on Russian military equipment and has long-standing ties to Moscow”, the American nbcnews.com wrote that day.

On 19 July, President Dmitri Medvedev said he was working with German Chancellor Angela Merkel to find consensus for a strategy to persuade the Syrian government to abandon violence and begin a constructive dialogue with protesters. He did not threaten to use Russia's veto at the United Nations Security Council to oppose a resolution critical of the Syrian government, as Russia has previously said it could do. Medvedev also said it was imperative that Syria not slide into civil war the way Libya did.

Amid the siege of Hama, the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a 1 August statement documenting deaths in Hama as well as condemning the violence, including the alleged killing of eight policemen by Assad's government. The statement beseeched the pro-Assad forces as well as the violent protesters to "exercise maximum restraint".

On 3 August, Russian UN ambassador Vitaly Churkin stated that Russia will not oppose a UN resolution condemning the violence in Syria as long as it does not include sanctions or other "pressures". Al Jazeera reported that Russia had "softened the blow" to the Assad government by insisting successfully that the UN would make a statement rather than a resolution on the matter. On 23 August, the Russian delegation to the UN, along with those of China and Cuba, took to the floor to denounce a UN inquiry into human rights violations by the Assad government. Vitaly Churkin stated that "We hope to see progress, we hope to see dialogue established in Syria.... We think we should continue to work within the scope of that unified position."

On 26 August, Reuters reported that according to UN envoys, the effort by the US, France, the UK, Germany and Portugal to impose UN sanctions on Syria was meeting "fierce resistance" from Russia and China, with Vitaly Churkin threatening to use Russia's veto power. According to Reuters, the arms embargo included in the sanctions would prevent Russian firms (the main source of Syrian weaponry) from selling to Syria. Russia proposed a second "rival" resolution to be voted on, described as "toothless" by Western diplomats, which did not include sanctions or other punitive measures, but rather urged Syria to speed up the process of its reforms.

On 4 October, Russia and China exercised a double veto against a Western-drafted Security Council resolution. The resolution demanded an end to all violence in Syria, accountability for those responsible for it, condemned “grave and systematic” human rights violations, called for a political process, encouraged the opposition to take part in that, and said the Security Council would review Syria’s compliance with the resolution in 30 days after which the Council would “consider options”, including unspecified “measures” under the United Nations Charter. The New York Times qualified that as “a weak reference to the possibility of sanctions against Damascus”, while Russia had said it would not accept a resolution that included even a hint of sanctions. Russia and the other BRICS nations (Brazil, India, China, South Africa) argued that a UNSC resolution on Libya had been twisted to justify the NATO 2011 military intervention in Libya leading into war against the Libyan government and were determined not to repeat that. After this veto, an analyst of the Center for the Analysis of Middle East Conflicts said to the BBC Russian service: Assad has a better chance to resist than the opposition does to win, therefore Moscow is now simply betting on Assad.

In the days following their rejecting the Security Council resolution, both Russia and China issued public admonishments of the Syrian government, separately expressing their desire for the government to reform and respect the will of the Syrian people. "If the Syrian leadership is unable to complete such reforms, it will have to go, but this decision should be made not by NATO and certain European countries, it should be made by the people of Syria and the government of Syria," Medvedev told the Russian Security Council.

On 1 November, Sergei Lavrov said at a Russian-Gulf ministerial meeting that Russia would oppose the recent proposal for a no-fly zone in Syria as (in Russia's view) the no-fly zone in Libya had been used to "support one side in a civil war". Lavrov nonetheless stated, when asked if Russia was supporting the Assad government, that "we are not protecting any regime".

On 15 December, Russia proposed a UN Security Council resolution condemning the violence "by all parties, including disproportionate use of force by Syrian authorities". The draft resolution also raised concern over "the illegal supply of weapons to the armed groups in Syria". Western diplomats initially referred to the proposed resolution as a basis for negotiations. The proposal was an updated version of a Russian-Chinese draft resolution introduced to the Security Council a few months earlier.

2012

By the end of January 2012, a resolution proposal, competing with the Russian 15 December draft (see above), had been drafted by Western and Arab powers, which, in contrast, did not condemn violence by both sides in the conflict and did not rule out military intervention. Russia indicated that it would not agree to the Western-Arab draft in its current form, and that it would continue to promote its own resolution in the Security Council. On 4 February 2012, Russia and China vetoed that Western and Arab sponsored Security Council resolution, which urged Bashar al-Assad to adhere to a peace plan drafted by the Arab League.

On 7 February 2012, Sergei Lavrov, the Russian Foreign Minister, along with foreign intelligence chief Mikhail Fradkov, met with President Assad and reported to the world that President Assad was committed to reform of the constitution and electoral process. Additionally, the Russian delegation said that Syria alone held the power to change the fate of its people, without foreign intervention. In March, Lavrov said in a televised interview that Syria’s leadership had ignored Russia’s warnings and made “very many mistakes” that helped drag the country to the brink of civil war.

On 16 April Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov and other Russian diplomats met with members of the Syrian opposition and Hassan Abdul-Azim, head of an opposition group, the National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change. When special U.N. envoy Kofi Annan developed a plan to end Syrian violence, Russia attempted to play a major role in the outcome of the plan by meeting with both the Assad government and opposition forces, while vetoing multiple plans during Security Council votes to accomplish the goals set forth by an international consensus.

On 20 April, the Security Council announced an agreement to expand the number of U.N. cease-fire observers in Syria from 30 to 300, as well as to allow Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to decide on the peacekeepers' deployment based on conditions on the ground. Under the plan, Syrian violence would immediately stop and the Assad government would begin implementation of the Annan six-point peace plan. The draft was the result of two texts proposed by Russia and European Council members. When the texts were merged, the portion imposing sanctions on the Assad government for failure to comply with the peacekeeping plan was removed, as requested by Russia and China. The Russian draft also did not contain language dictating that U.N. peacekeepers' presence in Syria was a condition of Assad's agreement to return troops and heavy weapons to their barracks.

The United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) was passed by the U.N. Security Council on 21 April 2012, and deployed up to 300 unarmed observers to Syria for a period of up to 90 days. The plan also called for passage of the Annan peace plan, making unanimous passage of the resolution significant. After the peace plan was passed, Russian's U.N. ambassador Vitaly Churkin relayed Russia's support of the agreement to the media, while other nations expressed frustration with the process and lack of progress in ending the violence so far.

A Bloomberg article (April 2012) said that although Russia has tried to retain the image of a peacemaker in this conflict, Russian diplomats have repeatedly criticized the potential condemnation of Assad by western nations. Russia has also accused the West and allied nations of sabotaging a cease-fire brokered by Russia between Syrian forces.

In the aftermath of the Houla massacre (May 2012), Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that "The government bears the main responsibility for what is going on" and that "Any government in any country bears responsibility for the security of its citizens". Russia's reaction was considered to be a condemnation of the Syrian government. However, Lavrov also stated that the rebels shared the blame for the killings, noting that some victims had been killed at close range in a district controlled by the opposition fighters. As talk of UN intervention intensified, a foreign affairs committee chair in the Russian government, hardened Russia's stance, moving it further away from the earlier condemnation of Damascus, saying that "We have very strong doubts that those people who were shot at point-blank [range] and were stabbed, that this was the action of forces loyal to President Assad.... The shelling was probably ... the troops of Mr Assad, but the stabbing and point-blank firing was definitely from the other side."

According to Steve Rosenberg of the BBC in June 2012, Russia accused the US of setting double standards: US selling weapons to Bahrain and at the same time criticizing Russia for supporting Syrian President Assad with weapons. Russia feels that the US is acting hypocritically by expecting them to discontinue selling weapons to the Syrian government, since the US supplies Syrian rebels with weapons via Turkey. From Russia's perspective, if US aids the Syrian opposition, they are indirectly, undermining Russia's national security. BBC commented that Russia expects only one of two outcomes to take place in the Syrian civil war: either Assad stays in power, ensuring their stronghold influence in the middle east region, or, radical Islamists take over, creating a terror threat for Russia.

2013

On 11 June 2013, President Vladimir Putin acknowledged that President Assad's position had led to the current situation in Syria. He stated on Russian state media that: "Syria as a country was rife for some kind of change. And the government of Syria should have felt that in due time and should have undertaken some reform. Had they done that, what we're seeing in Syria today would have never happened."

On 26 June 2013, the Deputy Russian Foreign Minister said that the small Russian naval base at Tartus has been evacuated. Mikhail Bogdanov stated that: "Presently, the Russian Defense Ministry has not a single person stationed in Syria. The base does not have any strategic military importance".

On 9 September 2013, responding to U.S. threats of strikes against Syria in response to use of chemical weapons in Syria, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov issued a proposal intended to avert a U.S. attack, with provisions including Syria's placing its chemical weapons under international control and their subsequent destruction.

On 12 September 2013, The New York Times published an op-ed by Vladimir Putin urging the United States to avoid unilateral military action and work with international cooperation in support of a negotiated solution to the Syrian conflict.

Russian view on cause of Syrian Civil War

Statement of Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation, at the 70th session of the United Nations General Assembly, 28 September 2015. Excerpts on the situation in Syria:

“(…) We all know that after the end of the Cold War, a single center of domination emerged in the world. And those who found themselves at the top of that pyramid were tempted to think that if we are so strong and exceptional then we know better than anyone what to do and why at all should we reckon with the UN, which instead of automatically authorizing and legitimizing necessary decisions often creates obstacles or, in other words, “stands in the way”. (…) Russia is ready to work together with all partners on the basis of broad consensus, but we consider the attempts to undermine the authority and legitimacy of the United Nations as extremely dangerous. They can lead to a collapse of the entire architecture of international relations. Then, indeed, we would be left with no other rules than the rule of force.

(…) We are all different. And we should respect that. No one has to conform to a single development model that someone has once and for all recognized as the only right one.

(…) Attempts to push for changes within other countries based on ideological preferences often led to tragic consequences and to degradation rather than progress. It seems however, that far from learning from others’ mistakes, everyone just keeps repeating them. And so the export of revolutions, this time of so-called “democratic” ones, continues. Suffice it to look at the situation in the Middle East and North Africa. (…) Instead of the triumph of democracy and progress we got violence, poverty and a social disaster. (…) It is now obvious that the power vacuum created in some countries of the Middle East and North Africa led to emergence of anarchy areas. Those immediately started to be filled with extremists and terrorists. Tens of thousands of militants are fighting under the banners of the so-called “Islamic State”. (…) And now the ranks of radicals are being joined by the members of the so-called “moderate” Syrian opposition supported by the Western countries. First, they are armed and trained, and then they defect to the Islamic State.

(…) Russia has always been firm and consistent in opposing terrorism in all its forms. Today, we provide military and technical assistance both to Iraq and Syria that are fighting terrorist groups. We think it is an enormous mistake to refuse to cooperate with the Syrian government and its Armed Forces (…) We should finally acknowledge that no one but President Assad’s Armed Forces and Kurd militia are truly fighting the Islamic State and other terrorist organizations in Syria. (…)”

Russia called for cooperation with the Syrian government as "no-one except for Assad and his militia is truly fighting Isis in Syria."

Russian peace initiatives

Main article: Syrian Civil War peace process

On 30 January 2012, the Russian foreign ministry suggested “informal” talks in Moscow between the Syrian regime and opposition, and said the Syrian authorities had already agreed to the Russian offer. Abdel Baset Seda, a member of the Syrian National Council’s executive committee, told Reuters that the SNC had not received any formal invitation for such talks, but would decline if one arrived: “Our position has not changed and it is that there is no dialogue with (President Bashar al-Assad)”.

According to Martti Ahtisaari who held discussions about Syria with the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council in February 2012, a Russian three-point plan, put forth by its ambassador, Vitaly Churkin included a proposal for Assad to cede power. The plan also required the Syrian government and the opposition to come to the negotiating table. It was ignored by the US, Britain and France, because at the time they thought that Assad's regime was about to fall.

7 November 2013, Russia again announced it was trying to broker talks in Moscow between the Syrian government and opposition, seeing that the U.S. and Russian negotiators failed to agree on whether or not Assad should be forced out of office. Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister Bogdanov said the Moscow talks could focus on humanitarian problems as well on some political issues.

Motivations

Economic importance and history of arms sales

Syrian president Bashar al-Assad

Arms sales from the Soviet Union and Russia to Syria are well-documented. Reports released by the United States Congressional Research Service in 2008 note that Syria purchased several billions of dollars' worth of military equipment from the former Soviet Union, including SS-21 "Scarab" short-range missiles (range 70 km). According to the report, Soviet military sales to Syria in the 1970s and 80's were so extensive, they accounted for 90% of all military arms exports from the Soviet Union, making the Soviet Union a main supplier of arms for Syria. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Syria found itself deprived of arms imports, but continued to seek them through Soviet satellite states. The establishment of Russian Federation in 1992 saw the re-introduction of the patron-vendor relationship and the cancellation of almost 73% of Syria's debt.

Russia has shipped arms during the uprising to Assad's government allegedly for use against rebels.

As of 2015, Russia is the world's second largest arms exporter (behind the United States) and lost $4 billion in Libyan contracts due to a United Nations arms embargo in 2011. According to reports, 2.4% of Russia's exports comes from defense-related sales, so the recent Arab Spring conflicts saw an uptick in sales to countries like Syria. Russia's backing of the Assad government has been seen as preventing the loss of a Russian ally that will purchase Russian weapons as happened in Libya..

Military facilities

Main articles: Russian naval facility in Tartus and Center C

Much attention has also been pointed at Tartus, Syria, which is home to Russia's only naval facility in the Mediterranean region.

In the opinion of some commentators one of Russia's major interests is access to the port of Tartus, home to its only remaining military facility outside the former USSR and a key source of its influence in the eastern Mediterranean.

Critics say the position of the naval facility serves as a chief motivating factor for speaking out in favor of the Assad government to maintain stability in the region.

The Deputy Russian Foreign Minister stated in June 2013 that the Russian naval base at Tartus had been evacuated. Mikhail Bogdanov stated that: "Presently, the Russian Defense Ministry has not a single person stationed in Syria. The base does not have any strategic military importance". However, on 1 October 2015, the Russian Defence Ministry said that it had deployed over 50 planes and helicopters to Syria: "The air group was deployed on very short notice. It was possible because we had most of the materiel and ammunition ready at our depot in Tartus. We only had to move our aircraft and deliver some extra equipment."

Russia also maintains an OSNAZ GRU electronic surveillance facilities in Latakia and Al-Harra (captured by the rebels in October 2014) and airbase facilities at Tadmur (Palmyra).

The Syrian government hosted the Russian GRU Center C listening station near the Syrian-Israeli border at Tel Al-Hara for an unknown number of years. The station was abandoned in late 2014 before it could be overrun by American-backed rebels. Syria is believed to host at least two other Russian intelligence bases.

Chechen and Caucasus jihadists in Syria

See also: Foreign rebel fighters in the Syrian Civil War

A number of Chechen and other North Caucasus volunteers travelled to fight in the Syrian Civil War against the government of Bashar al-Assad. The Washington Post reported that "Many may hope to pick up contacts for an eventual return to fighting in Russia, a possibility that clearly concerns Moscow." In December 2013, the Chechen-led Syrian jihadist group Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar (JMA) split away from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), emphasising that they wished to continue respecting the Oath of Allegiance they had made to the Caucasus Emirate's Dokka Umarov. In September 2015, JMA pledged allegiance to the Al-Qaeda affiliated Al-Nusra Front.

Approximately 2,500 Russian nationals and 7,000 citizens of other post-Soviet republics are fighting alongside the Islamic State. A veteran of the 2008 Russo-Georgian War and a former sergeant in the Georgian Army, Abu Omar al-Shishani, currently serves as a commander for the Islamic State in Syria.

Circassian diaspora

See also: Circassians in Syria § Post-independence

There is a small Circassian diaspora in Syria consisting of the descendants of the muhajirs who emigrated or were expelled from the Caucasus in the aftermath of the Caucasian War. During the civil war a few thousand applied for Russian visas and residency permits in order to resettle there, as a group of Kosovo Circassians did in 1998. About 400 have resettled in Kabardino-Balkaria, 220 in Adygea and 40 in Karachay-Cherkessia. Tastikin writes a total of 1,200 have left for Russia.

Military support for the Assad government

Bashar and Asma al-Assad during a visit to Moscow.

Russia shipped large amounts of weapons to Bashar al-Assad with Russia's contracts with Syria for arms are estimated to be worth 1.5 billion US dollars, comprising 10% of Russia's global arms sales as of 2012.

The Syrian conflict began in early 2011 and, as word spread globally of the increasing death toll, Russia's arms sales sparked anger and criticism on the part of certain Western and Arab nations, and global leaders encouraged Russia to end arms sales to Syria. Russian officials refused, however, noting the contractual obligations they were under with their customers, and the Russian government defended its sales by pointing out that they did not violate any standing arms embargoes.

As the conflict continued, Western anger over the arms sales grew. On 1 June, right after the Houla massacre, United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton singled Russia out, condemning Russia's "continuous supply of arms to Syria" and that in her view, Russia's stance in the conflict was not neutral as it claimed it was. In particular, there was ire over a report that Russia allegedly delivered arms to the Syrian port of Tartus in the same week of the infamous massacre. In response to this and to American criticism of Russia's policy on Syria, Russian President Vladimir Putin denied that Russia was shipping any arms "which can be used in a civilian conflict" to Syria. Later, the Russian foreign ministry also retaliated with a statement saying: "The tragedy in Houla showed what can be the outcome of financial aid and smuggling of modern weapons to rebels, recruitment of foreign mercenaries and flirting with various sorts of extremists."

In addition to reportedly providing the refurbished MI-25 helicopter gunships, Russia has also transferred to Syria the Buk-M2 air defense system, the Bastion coastal defence missile system, and Yak-130 combat jet trainer. Russian shipments of fuel have also assisted Assad, and an unspecified number of military advisers are teaching Syrians how to use Russian weapons. The head of Russia's federal service for military-technical co-operation confirmed that the repaired Syrian MI-25 attack helicopters were "ready to be delivered on time" adding that "Syria is our friend, and we fulfill all our obligations to our friends". Amnesty International, noting the Syrian government's headlong deployment of military helicopters, criticised Russia: "Anyone supplying attack helicopters — or maintaining, repairing or upgrading them — for the Syrian government displays a wanton disregard for humanity." Human Rights Watch warned Russia's state-owned arms-trading company Rosoboronexport in a letter that, under international law, "providing weapons to Syria while crimes against humanity are being committed may translate into assisting in the commission of those crimes", and called on governments and companies around the world to stop signing new contracts and consider suspending current dealings with the Russian company.

In May 2013, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu traveled to Moscow in a bid to convince Vladimir Putin not to sell S-300 surface-to-air missile batteries and 144 missiles to Assad's government. The long-range air defense system would be a leap for Syria's current air defense system, enabling them to down fighter planes and cruise missiles.

In October 2013 a group of Russian military contractors from Slavonic Corps (Славянский корпус) was deployed to As-Sukhnah and engaged in fire exchange and suffered losses. One of the contractors lost his ID, which was later published by Syrian and Russian media. Shortly after the group was retreated and the company disbanded.

The Assad government has used Russian-supplied MI-8 and Mi-17 helicopters to carry out barrel-bomb attacks in Homs. According to former senior American intelligence official Jeffrey White, Russia is most likely providing spare parts such as engines, transmissions and rotors.

In January 2014 a Russian company AR 514 (514 авиационный ремонтный завод) posted photos in their portfolio showing them performing repairs and upgrade on Su-24 identified to belong to Syrian fleet. In 2015 Assad confirmed in an interview that Russia has been supplying arms to Syria based on contracts signed before and after the beginning of the conflict.

During the war, Syrian officers and air defence personnel were trained in Russia.

2015 intervention and airstrikes

Main articles: Russian military intervention in the Syrian Civil War and 2015 Russian air raids in Syria

Barack Obama meets with Vladimir Putin to discuss Syria, 29 September 2015

As of September 2015, Russia has stepped up its military presence in Syria, deploying 12 Su-25 ground attack aircraft, 12 Su-24 interdictor aircraft, 6 Sukhoi Su-34 medium bombers and 4 Su-30 multirole combat aircraft and 15 helicopters (including Mi-24 attack helicopters) at the Bassel Al-Assad International Airport near Latakia. The planes are protected by at least two or possibly three SA-22 surface-to-air, antiaircraft systems, and unarmed MQ-1 Predator-like surveillance drones are being used to fly reconnaissance missions. In addition to air forces, ground forces include 6 T-90 tanks, 15 artillery pieces, 35 armored personnel carriers and 200 Marines (with housing facilities for 1,500 personnel) BM-30 multiple missile launchers have been spotted near Latakia.

On 30 September 2015, Russian President Vladimir Putin requested permission from Federation Council, the upper house of the Russian parliament, to deploy the country's military in Syria. On the same day, Federation Council approved the use of Russian military in Syria to fight terrorist groups, the Islamic State in particular. Permission was granted after a unanimous vote, however any combat operations will be limited to using the air force. Russian media reported that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad had asked for Russia to intervene by providing military assistance.

On 30 September 2015, Russia launched its first airstrikes against targets in Rastan, Talbiseh, and Zafaraniya in Homs province of Syria. Moscow gave the United States a one-hour advanced notice of its operations. The Homs area is crucial to President Bashar al-Assad’s control of western Syria. Insurgent control of the area would separate the coastal cities of Latakia (where Russian aircraft are based) and Tartous where Russia operates a naval facility from Damascus.

On 1 October, the Russian Defence Ministry stated it had deployed over 50 planes (including also Su-34) and helicopters to Syria: "The air group was deployed on very short notice. It was possible because we had most of the materiel and ammunition ready at our depot in Tartus. We only had to move our aircraft and deliver some extra equipment."

Reactions

Domestic

In May 2012 Patriarch Kirill I of the Russian Orthodox Church, as argument for supporting President Assad’s reign, warned that a wave of Islamic fundamentalism unleashed by the Arab Spring might sweep away Christians (10% of the Syrian population) in Syria. He illustrated that danger by pointing at the persecution of Christians during the Bolshevik revolution and ensuing Russian civil war (1917–1922) while Orthodox Christians make up 75% of the Russian population.

Foreign

In January 2012, Human Rights Watch criticised Russia for "repeating the mistakes of Western governments during the Arab Spring by continuing to support a longstanding authoritarian ally [Assad] whose people have clearly expressed the desire for democratic change". The human rights group also accused Russia of selectively using one of its reports to support a one-sided position on Syria.

Former UK ambassador to Russia from 2004 to 2008, Tony Brenton, said in April 2012 that Russia is looking – in Syria – for its first opportunity since the Cold War to boost its brokering abilities.

See also

• Foreign involvement in the Syrian Civil War
• Russia–Syria relations
• Syrian conflict peace proposals

Further reading

• Responsibility to protect... itself? Russia’s strategy towards the crisis in Syria, FIIA Briefing Paper 131 (2013), The Finnish Institute of International Affairs