SARS-CoV-2 Alpha variant

"B117" redirects here. For other uses, see B117 (disambiguation).

Countries with confirmed cases of lineage B.1.1.7. The map display the outdated data, as of 23 January 2021.
Legend:

  1000+ confirmed cases

  100–999 confirmed cases

  50–99 confirmed cases

  10–49 confirmed cases

  5–9 confirmed cases

  2–4 confirmed cases

  1 confirmed case

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  Suspected cases

  No confirmed cases, no population, or no data available

Lineage B.1.1.7, also known as 20I/501Y.V1, Variant of Concern 202012/01 (VOC-202012/01) or commonly as the UK variant, British variant or Kent variant (see § Names), is a variant of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19. One of several variants believed to be of particular importance, it is estimated to be 40%–80% (with most estimates lying around the middle to higher end of this range) more transmissible than wild-type SARS-CoV-2 and was detected in November 2020 from a sample taken in September, during the COVID-19 pandemic in the United Kingdom; it began to spread quickly by mid-December, and is correlated with a significant increase in SARS-CoV-2 infections in the country. This increase is thought to be at least partly because of one or more mutations in the virus's spike protein. The variant is also notable for having more mutations than normally seen.

As of January 2021, more than half of all genomic sequencing of SARS-CoV-2 was carried out in the UK. This has given rise to questions as to the variant's origins, and how many other important variants may be circulating around the world.

On 2 February 2021, Public Health England reported that they had detected "[a] limited number of B.1.1.7 VOC-202012/01 genomes with E484K mutations", which they dubbed Variant of Concern 202102/02 (VOC-202102/02). This mutation is also present in the South Africa and Brazil variants and may reduce vaccine effectiveness.

Names

The variant is known by several names. In British-government and media reports it may be referred to as UK COVID-19 variant, UK coronavirus variant, the new variant or, particularly outside the UK, as the UK variant or British variant or English variant. It is sometimes called the Kent variant after Kent, where the variant was found.

In scientific use, the variant had originally been named the first Variant Under Investigation in December 2020 (VUI – 202012/01) by Public Health England (PHE), but was reclassified to a Variant of Concern (Variant of Concern 202012/01, abbreviated VOC-202012/01) by Meera Chand and her colleagues in a report published by PHE on 21 December 2020. In a report written on behalf of COVID-19 Genomics UK (COG-UK) Consortium, Andrew Rambaut and his co-authors, using the Phylogenetic Assignment of Named Global Outbreak Lineages (pangolin) tool, dubbed it lineage B.1.1.7, while Nextstrain dubbed the variant 20I/501Y.V1.

The name VOC-202102/02 refers to the variant with the E484K mutation (see below).

Detection

False-colour transmission electron micrograph of a B.1.1.7 variant coronavirus. The variant's increased transmissibility is believed to be due to changes in structure of the spike proteins, shown here in green.

B.1.1.7 was first detected in early December 2020 by combining genome data with knowledge that the rates of infection in Kent were not falling despite national restrictions.

The two earliest genomes that belong to the B.1.1.7 lineage were collected on 20 September 2020 in Kent and another on 21 September 2020 in Greater London. These sequences were submitted to the GISAID sequence database (sequence accessions EPI_ISL_601443 and EPI_ISL_581117, respectively).

Backwards tracing using genetic evidence suggests B.1.1.7 emerged in September 2020 and then circulated at very low levels in the population until mid-November. The increase in cases linked to the variant first became apparent in late November when Public Health England (PHE) was investigating why infection rates in Kent were not falling despite national restrictions. PHE then discovered a cluster linked to this variant spreading rapidly into London and Essex.

Also important was the nature of the RT-PCR test used predominantly in the UK, Thermo Fisher's TaqPathCOVID-19. The test matches RNA in three locations, and stopped working for the spike gene due to the HV 69–70 deletion—a deletion of the amino acids histidine and valine in positions 69 and 70, respectively, of the spike protein—in B.1.1.7's spike protein. This made preliminary identification easier because it could be better suspected which cases were with B.1.1.7 through genome sequencing.

Although the variant was first detected in Kent, it may never be known where it originated. Discovery in the UK may merely reflect that the UK does more sequencing than many other countries. It has been suggested that the variant may have originated in a chronically infected immunocompromised person, giving the virus a long time to replicate and evolve.

Characteristics

Genetics

Defining mutations in VOC-202012/01

(change of amino acid only)

Gene	Nucleotide	Amino acid
ORF1ab	C3267T	T1001I
	C5388A	A1708D
	T6954C	I2230T
	11288–11296 deletion	SGF 3675–3677 deletion
Spike	21765–21770 deletion	HV 69–70 deletion
	21991–21993 deletion	Y144 deletion
	A23063T	N501Y
	C23271A	A570D
	C23604A	P681H
	C23709T	T716I
	T24506G	S982A
	G24914C	D1118H
ORF8	C27972T	Q27stop
	G28048T	R52I
	A28111G	Y73C
N	28280 GAT→CTA	D3L
	C28977T	S235F
Source: Chand et al., table 1 (p. 5)

Mutations in SARS-CoV-2 are common: over 4,000 mutations have been detected in its spike protein alone, according to the COVID-19 Genomics UK (COG-UK) Consortium.

VOC-202012/01 is defined by 23 mutations: 14 non-synonymous mutations, 3 deletions, and 6 synonymous mutations (i.e., there are 17 mutations that change proteins and six that do not).

E484K mutation

On 2 February 2021, Public Health England reported that they had detected "[a] limited number of B.1.1.7 VOC-202012/01 genomes with E484K mutations", which is also present in the South Africa and Brazil variants; this mutation may reduce vaccine effectiveness. On 9 February 2021, it became known that some 76 cases with the E484K mutation had been detected, principally in Bristol, but with a genomically distinct group in Liverpool also carrying the mutation. A week later a Research and analysis report from PHE gave a total of 77 confirmed and probable cases involving the E484K mutation across the UK, in two variants, VUI-202102/01 and VOC-202102/02, the latter described as 'B.1.1.7 with E484K'.

On 5 March 2021, it was reported that a B.1.1.7 lineage with the E484K mutation has been detected in two US patients (in Oregon and New York States). Researchers think that the Oregon variant has evolved independently.

Transmissibility

Estimates of VOC-202012/01's transmissibility have varied greatly across different studies: in a preprint, the Centre for the Mathematical Modelling of Infectious Diseases at the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine reported that the variant was 56% (50%–74%) more transmissible than other variants across three regions in England (East of England, South East of England, and London) in early December 2020, while a peer-reviewed article concluded that it was 75% (70%–80%) more transmissible in the UK between October and November 2020.

The Dutch Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport calculated, based on genome sequencing of positive cases, each week the transmissibility rate of the variant compared to the local wildtype, and found it to fluctuate between 28%-47% higher during the first six weeks of 2021. The Danish Statens Serum Institut in comparison calculated it to be 55% (48%–62%) more transmissible in Denmark based upon the observed development of its relative frequency from 4 January to 12 February 2021. The Institute of Social and Preventive Medicine (ISPM) under University of Bern, calculated the transmissibility of B.1.1.7 based on the weekly development of its observed fraction of all Covid-19 positives during the entire pandemic, and found for 95% confidence intervals under the assumption of a wildtype reproduction number Rw≈1 and an exponentially generation time of 5.2 days, that transmissibility was: 42%–57% higher when compared to the wildtype in Denmark and 48%-73% higher when compared to the wildtype in Switzerland.

On 18 December 2020—early on in the risk assessment of the variant—the UK scientific advisory body New and Emerging Respiratory Virus Threats Advisory Group (NERVTAG) concluded that they had moderate confidence that VOC-202012/01 was substantially more transmissible than other variants, but that there were insufficient data to reach any conclusion on underlying mechanism of increased transmissibility (e.g. increased viral load, tissue distribution of virus replication, serial interval etc.), the age distribution of cases, or disease severity. Data seen by NERVTAG indicated that the relative reproduction number ("multiplicative advantage") was determined to be 1.74—i.e., the variant is 74% more transmissible—assuming a 6.5-day generational interval. It was demonstrated that the variant grew fast exponentially with respect to the other variants. The variant out-competed the ancestral variant by a factor of $1.74^{14/6.5}=3.3$ every two weeks. Another group came to similar conclusions, generating a replicative advantage, independent of "protective measures", of 2.24 per generation of 6.73 days, out-competing the ancestral variant by $2.24^{14/6.73}=5.4$ every two weeks. Similarly, in Ireland, the variant—as indicated by the missing-S-gene detection (S-gene target failure [SGTF]), which historically was rare—went from 16.3% to 46.3% of cases in two weeks. This demonstrates, based on the statistics of 116 positive samples, that the variant had a relative higher growth by a factor of $46.3\%\cdot (100\%-16.3\%)/((100\%-46.3\%)\cdot 16.3\%)=4.4$, when compared to the average growth for all other variants by the end of this two week period. The variant became the dominant variant in London, East of England and the South East from low levels in one to two months. A surge of SARS-CoV-2 infections around the start of the new year is seen as being the result of the elevated transmissibility of the variant, while the other variants were in decline.

One of the most important changes in B.1.1.7 seems to be N501Y, a change from asparagine (N) to tyrosine (Y) in amino-acid position 501. This is because of its position inside the spike protein's receptor-binding domain (RBD)—more specifically inside the receptor-binding motif (RBM), a part of the RBD—which binds human ACE2. Mutations in the RBD can change antibody recognition and ACE2 binding specificity and lead to the virus becoming more infectious; indeed, Chand et al. concluded that "[i]t is highly likely that N501Y affects the receptor-binding affinity of the spike protein, and it is possible that this mutation alone or in combination with the deletion at 69/70 in the N-terminal domain (NTD) is enhancing the transmissibility of the virus". In early 2021 a peer-reviewed paper found that the mentioned HV 69–70 deletion in vitro "appeared to have two-fold higher infectivity over a single round of infection compared to [wild-type SARS-CoV-2]" in lentiviral SARS-CoV-2 pseudoviruses.

Virulence

NERVTAG concluded on 18 December 2020 that there were insufficient data to reach a conclusion regarding disease severity. At prime minister Boris Johnson's briefing the following day, officials said that there was "no evidence" as of that date that the variant caused higher mortality or was affected differently by vaccines and treatments; Vivek Murthy agreed with this. Susan Hopkins, the joint medical adviser for the NHS Test and Trace and Public Health England (PHE), declared in mid-December 2020: "There is currently no evidence that this strain causes more severe illness, although it is being detected in a wide geography, especially where there are increased cases being detected." Around a month later, however—on 22 January 2021—Johnson said that "there is some evidence that the new variant [VOC-202012/01] [...] may be associated with a higher degree of mortality", though Sir Patrick Vallance, the government's Chief Scientific Advisor, stressed that there is not yet enough evidence to be fully certain of this.

In a paper analysing twelve different studies on the B.1.1.7 death rate relative to non-B.1.1.7 lineages, it was found to have a higher death rate (71% according to LSHTM, 70% according to University of Exeter, 65% according to Public Health England, and 36% according to Imperial College London), and NERVTAG concluded that "it is likely that infection with VOC B.1.1.7 is associated with an increased risk of hospitalisation and death compared to infection with non-VOC viruses". Results of the death studies were associated with some high uncertainty and confidence intervals, because of a limited sample seize related to the fact that UK only analyzed the VOC status for 8% of all COVID-19 deaths.

A Danish study found people infected by the B.1.1.7 variant to be 64% (32%–104%) more likely to get admitted to hospitals compared with people infected by a non-B.1.1.7 SARS-CoV-2 lineage.

Genetic sequencing of VOC-202012/01 has shown a Q27stop mutation which "truncates the ORF8 protein or renders it inactive". An earlier study of SARS-CoV-2 variants which deleted the ORF8 gene noted that they "have been associated to milder symptoms and better disease outcome". The study also noted that "SARS-CoV-2 ORF8 is an immunoglobulin (Ig)–like protein that modulates pathogenesis", that "SARS-CoV-2 ORF8 mediates major histocompatibility complex I (MHC-I) degradation", and that "SARS-CoV-2 ORF8 suppresses type I interferon (IFN)–mediated antiviral response".

Referring to amino-acid position 501 inside the spike protein, Chand et al. concluded that "it is possible that variants at this position affect the efficacy of neutralisation of virus", but noted that "[t]here is currently no neutralisation data on N501Y available from polyclonal sera from natural infection". The HV 69–70 deletion has, however, been discovered "in viruses that eluded the immune response in some immunocompromised patients", and has also been found "in association with other RBD changes".

Rapid-antigen-test effectiveness

Several rapid antigen tests for SARS-CoV-2 are in widespread use globally for COVID-19 diagnostics. They are believed to be useful in stopping the chain of transmission of the virus by providing the means to rapidly identify large numbers of cases as part of a mass-testing program. Following the emergence of VOC-202012/01, there was initially concern that rapid tests might not detect it, but Public Health England determined that rapid tests evaluated and used in the United Kingdom detect the variant.

Vaccine effectiveness

As of late 2020, several COVID-19 vaccines were being deployed or under development.

However, as further mutations occur, concerns were raised as to whether vaccine development would need to be altered. SARS-CoV-2 does not mutate as quickly as, for example, influenza viruses, and the new vaccines that had proved effective by the end of 2020 are types that can be adjusted if necessary. As of the end of 2020, German, British, and American health authorities and experts believe that existing vaccines will be as effective against VOC-202012/01 as against previous variants.

On 18 December, NERVTAG determined "that there are currently insufficient data to draw any conclusion on… [a]ntigenic escape".

As of 20 December 2020, Public Health England confirmed there is "no evidence" to suggest that the new variant would be resistant to the Pfizer–BioNTech vaccine currently being used in the UK's vaccination programme, and that people should still be protected.

Preliminary results presented in biorxiv have shown Covaxin to be effective against neutralizing the strain.

Spread

Test determined growth curves on a logarithmic scale, for development of the VOC-202012/01 frequency (B.1.1.7 variant share) among all coronavirus positive samples in Denmark, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Portugal, Switzerland, and Ireland. The slopes noted in brackets, are the relative exponential growth rate per day (e.g. 7.6% per day for Denmark).

Test determined growth curves on a logarithmic scale, for development of the B.1.1.7 frequency (B.1.1.7 variant share) among all coronavirus positive samples in the United Kingdom, countries in the UK, and regions of England. The slopes noted in brackets, are the relative exponential growth rate per day (e.g. 8.6% per day for the UK).

Cases of B.1.1.7 are likely to be under-reported by most countries as the most commonly used tests do not distinguish between this variant and other SARS-CoV-2 variants, and as many SARS-CoV-2 infections are not detected at all. RNA sequencing is required for detection of this variant, although RT-PCR test for specific variants can be used as a proxy test for VOC-202012/01 — or as a supplementing first-screening test before conducting the whole-genome sequencing.

As of February 23, the variant had been detected in United Kingdom plus 101 additional countries (of which 45 had reported community transmission). As of February 28, it had become the dominant COVID-19 variant for 13 countries: United Kingdom (week 52), Ireland (week 2), Bulgaria (week 4), Slovakia (week 5), Israel (week 5), Luxembourg (week 5), Portugal (week 6), Denmark (week 7), Netherlands (week 7), Norway (week 7), Italy (week 7), Belgium (week 8) and France (week 8).

Spread in UK

The first case was likely in mid-September 2020 in London or Kent, United Kingdom. As of 13 December 2020, 1,108 cases with this variant had been identified in the UK in nearly 60 different local authorities. These cases were predominantly in the south east of England. The variant has also been identified in Wales and Scotland. By November, around a quarter of cases in the COVID-19 pandemic in London were being caused by the new variant, and by December, that was a third. In mid-December, it was estimated that almost 60 percent of cases in London involved B.1.1.7. By 25 January 2021, the number of confirmed and probable UK cases had grown to 28,122.

Spread in Europe

The variant became dominant for:

• South East England in week 48, the last week of November 2020.
• England in week 51 of 2020.
• United Kingdom in week 52 of 2020.
• Scotland and Northern Ireland in week 1 of 2021.
• Wales in week 2 of 2021.
• Ireland in week 2 of 2021.

In Bulgaria, genome sequencing found the variant to be dominant with 52.1% in week 4, followed by 73.4% in week 9.

Also in Slovakia, a RT-PCR Multiplex DX test capable of detecting the 2 deletions specific for B.1.1.7 (ΔH69/ΔV70 and ΔY144), found the variant nationwide in 74% of cases on February 3 and 72% of cases on February 15; the same test resulted earlier on 8 January in a finding of 36% in the Michalovce District and 29% in Nitra.

In Israel, the variant was first time detected by genome sequencing 23 December 2020. Leumit Health Care Services however analyzed with the proxy test RT-PCR (SGTF) and found the variant at a rate of 3‑4% on December 15. The national Ministry of Health estimated based on genome sequencing, that the prevalence of the variant became dominant (70%) on February 6 followed by 90% on February 16.

In Luxembourg, the variant became dominant with a share of 54.2% in week 5 according to a genome sequenced test (although no correction occurred from potential targetting bias from contact tracing, the airport and local clusters). In week 6 and 7, genome sequencing of a population representative randomized test pool (with no target bias) confirmed the dominant status of the variant at a rate of respectively 57.6% (76/132) and 56%.

In Denmark the variant grew from 0.3% (week 46 of 2020) to become dominant with 65.5% (week 7 of 2021), and grew further to 81.3% (week 9). The observed growth of the relative variant share, was in full accordance with the earlier modelled forecast, that had predicted dominance (over 50%) around mid-February and a prevalence of around 80% of the total circulating variants by early March.

In the Netherlands, a randomly conducted genome sequencing found that the variant grew from 1.3% of cases in week 49 to a dominant share of 64.3% in week 7. In the City Region of Amsterdam, the variant grew from 5.2% (week 52) to 54.5% (week 6).

In Norway, the variant was found by genome sequencing to grow from 5.7% (week 1) into dominance by a 58.4% (week 7) followed by 65.0% (week 8). Another large survey comprising results of both genome sequencing and PCR proxy tests, at the same time found that the variant grew from 34.9% (week 5) into dominance by 72.3% (week 7) followed by 90.1% (week 8). The variant regionally had its highest share in the county of Oslo and Viken, growing from 18% to 90% of analyzed samples in Oslo from 20 January to 23 February (although with the data-corrected estimate a bit lower at 50-70% on 23 February); while growing from 21% to 80% of analyzed samples in Viken from 25 January to 23 February (although with the data-corrected estimate a bit lower at 50% on 23 February).

In Portugal, the variant represented according to a national genome sequencing survey: 16.0% of the Covid-19 infections during 10–19 January (week 2), followed by a dominant 58.2% in week 6. A national RT-PCR proxy test based on SGTF and SGTL observations, found the variant at a rate of 33.5% in week 4, but observed afterwards a decelerating pace for the weekly rise of the variant share (reason unknown), and according to this study it only became dominant by 50.5% (91.8% of 55.0% SGTFL) in week 8.

In Italy, the variant accounted for 17.8% of cases nationwide on February 4-5 (week 5), followed by 54.0% on February 18 (week 7). The regional prevalence for week 7 ranged from 0% in Aosta Valley (although only one sample was tested) to 93.3% in Molise.

In Switzerland, the variant grew to 40.5% of cases in week 7, and was modelled to be dominant around mid-February.

In Belgium, genome sequencing of samples selected randomly after excluding all samples from active targetted testing related to local outbreaks or travels (creating a statistical representative national sample with a seize equal to 4.6% of all COVID-19 positive tests), found that the variant share grew from 7.1% in week 1 to 59.3% in week 8. The variant was first time detected by targeted genome sequencing in week 49, but due to a small sample seize (not being random, and less than 100 tests per week) then no reliable variant share data could be determined before week 1. The proxy test for the variant (RT-PCR SGTF) was also conducted for a sample seize equal to 3.3% of all COVID-19 positive tests, and found a 45.8% SGTF rate for week 8.

In France the variant grew from a share of 3.3% on January 7–8 (week 1) to 13.2% on January 27 (week 4), followed in week 8 by either: 49.5% according to genome sequencing which tested 0.9% of all the COVID-19 positive tests, or 59.5% according to a variant-specific RT-PCR survey testing 54% of all the COVID-19 positive tests. The spread of the variant differed regionally for the 96 departments located in Metropolitan France for week 8, with 57 departments over 50%, 29 departments with 30%-50% and 10 departments with 10%-30% (of which the Moselle department in particular was notable due to finding a dominant 54.4% rate of the competing South African variant). The variant was expected to become dominant nationwide around week 8–11 of 2021.

In Germany, the largest and probably most representative national survey published by the Robert Koch Institute (RKI-Testzahlerfassung), analyzed weekly more than 45,000 samples by genome sequencing or RT-PCR proxy tests with data collected on a voluntary basis from 82 university/research/clinical/outpatient laboratories spread evenly across the nation (although no weighted data or data selection criteria was applied to ensure existence of geographical representativity). According to the RKI-Testzahlerfassung survey, the variant grew from a share of 2.0% (week 2) to 40.0% (week 8).

In Sweden, the national authorities initially expected the variant would become dominant around week 12–14 under the assumption of 50% increased transmissibility compared to the original virus. In average, the variant share was found growing from 10.8% (week 3) to 36.9% (week 7) across five of its southern regions (Skåne, Västra Götaland, Västmanland, Gävleborg and Örebro). For week 7, the share of the variant was for the first time also calculated to 30.4% as the overall average for 19 out of 21 Swedish regions (ranging from 3.3% in Blekinge to 45% in Gävleborg). For week 8, the share of the variant was calculated to 41.5% as the overall average for the 19 regions (ranging from 6% in Kronoberg to 60% in Gävleborg). Although no geographical weights were applied to ensure geographical representativity for the calculated average for the 19 regions, the overall sample seize of 11,189 variant tests represented 42.2% of all COVID-19 positive tests for week 8, inferring that the result of the survey might be close to represent the actual true average for the nation as a whole.

In Spain, the variant share was estimated nationwide to be 5%-10% of cases on January 29 and 25%-30% of cases on February 22; while at the same time ranging from 0% to 76.5% for the 17 regions:

• 0% for week 3 in La Rioja.
• 4.0% for week 4 in Basque Country.
• 12.1% for week 8 in Aragon.
• 14.3% for week 53 in Castile and León.
• 29.4% for week 7 in Valencia.
• 31.8% for week 8 in Castilla–La Mancha.
• 38.0% for week 8 in Murcia.
• 42.7% for week 8 in Madrid.
• 51.1% for week 9 in Andalusia.
• 52.5% for week 8 in Navarre.
• 53.3% for week 4 in Galicia.
• 64.3% for week 6 in Asturias.
• 65.5% for week 8 in Balearic Islands.
• 76.1% for week 8 in Catalonia.
• 76.5% for week 7 in Cantabria.

In Poland, a national survey among infected teachers led to experts estimating that the variant share was between 5% to 10% nationwide as of February 11, while ECDC reported it to be 9% as of February 15.

In Finland, no statistical representative national survey had been conducted as of February 2021, as the national genome sequencing mainly targetted further analyzis of COVID-19 positive samples from travelers and local outbreak clusters. Helsinky University Hospital (HUS), operating in the Helsinki and Uusimaa Hospital District, found the variant in 10% of all samples collected randomly during a few days ahead of February 14 in the capitol region (also known as the Helsinky constituency and Uusimaa constituency). For the capitol region, the variant was modelled to become dominant (over 50%) in the second half of March (week 11-13).

In Malta, the variant accounted for 60% of cases nationwide on March 10, increasing from 8% in February.

Spread in North America

In the United States, the variant first appeared late November 2020, grew to 0.3% at the start of 2021, and was expected to become predominant in March 2021. The number of variant cases in the US confirmed by genome sequence, grew from 76 cases in 12 US states found by January 13, to 3283 cases in 49 US states found by March 9 (being most prevalent in Florida, Michigan and California). Based on the combined results of the RT-PCR (SGTF) proxy test and genome sequencing, the variant was expected to become dominant on March 8 for Florida, March 23 for United States, April 5 for California, while the remaining states could not be modelled due to lack of sufficient data. Data from the Helix Research Team, determined the share of the variant by multiplying each days "SGTF percentage of positive samples" with the "B.1.1.7 variant share of all sequenced SGTF positives", and found the variant at a rate of 37.4% in Florida, 18.6% in California and 26.2% in United States for week 9.

The relatively low sensitivity of the projected dominance dates to the current percentage of the variant is due to its fast relative exponential growth. It is presumed the variant will become dominant over the ancestral variant globally, although it may be taken over by other variants.

In Canada, the variant first appeared in Ontario late December 2020. By February 13, it had spread to all ten provinces.

Development of the B.1.1.7 lineage

Development of the B.1.1.7 lineage (share of analyzed SARS-CoV-2–positive tests in a given week)
Country	Test	Week 42	Week 43	Week 44	Week 45	Week 46	Week 47	Week 48	Week 49	Week 50	Week 51	Week 52	Week 53	Week 1	Week 2	Week 3	Week 4	Week 5	Week 6	Week 7	Week 8	Week 9
United Kingdom	Seq.	0.05%	0.35%	1.0%	2.7%	6.3%	10.2%	10.2%	13.9%	32.9%	45.7%	51.3%	70.6	74.1%	78.6%	86.0%	89.1%	–	–	–	–	–
England	SGTF*Seq.% Seq. SGTF rawdata SGTF model	0.07% (0.02%) (N/A) (N/A)	0.4% (0.5%) (N/A) (N/A)	1.0% (1.2%) (N/A) (N/A)	3.2% (1.5%) (N/A) (N/A)	5.7% (5.3%) (N/A) (N/A)	10.0% (7.8%) (15.2%) (m:13.3%)	19.7% (11.4%) (24.3%) (m:15.9%)	34.4% (22.1%) (36.8%) (m:22.0%)	54.4% (38.1%) (49.3%) (m:32.1%)	64.0% (61.8%) (60.7%) (m:57.2%)	73.4% (62.1%) (72.1%) (m:68.9%)	79.0% (78.4%) (75.0%) (m:74.0%)	82.7% (76.7%) (80.7%) (m:78.3%)	88.1% (79.7%) (83.3%) (m:82.1%)	91.0% (–) (88.2%) (m:86.0%)	94.2% (–) (87.7%) (m:89.5%)	95.9% (–) (93.4%) (m:92.8%)	– (–) (95.3%) (m:94.8%)	– (–) (97.0%) (m:95.1%)	– (–) (95.6%) (m:93.7%)	– (–) (–) (m:–)
Northern Ireland	SGTF rawdata SGTF model	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	17.9% (m:14.0%)	7.4% (m:14.9%)	37.5% (m:16.3%)	23.0% (m:18.5%)	50.0% (m:36.1%)	25.0% (m:42.1%)	58.8% (m:44.7%)	45.2% (m:52.7%)	71.4% (m:67.0%)	78.2% (m:74.0%)	72.4% (m:80.2%)	95.7% (m:86.7%)	88.9% (m:91.2%)	92.2% (m:93.0%)	100.0% (m:92.4%)	– (m:–)
Scotland	SGTF rawdata SGTF model	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	9.5% (m:5.8%)	9.7% (m:6.7%)	10.4% (m:7.7%)	11.7% (m:10.2%)	51.4% (m:26.2%)	40.0% (m:39.5%)	35.8% (m:43.9%)	64.1% (m:49.8%)	67.2% (m:64.2%)	63.3% (m:65.0%)	69.2% (m:70.4%)	70.6% (m:77.8%)	93.9% (m:84.5%)	82.0% (m:89.8%)	100.0% (m:90.6%)	– (m:–)
Wales	SGTF rawdata SGTF model	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	27.9% (m:18.1%)	8.3% (m:16.0%)	10.7% (m:13.3%)	26.3% (m:12.1%)	13.4% (m:15.0%)	15.9% (m:14.7%)	19.8% (m:20.4%)	54.4% (m:34.8%)	61.5% (m:59.6%)	69.0% (m:65.0%)	68.1% (m:68.4%)	77.0% (m:72.5%)	71.8% (m:76.5%)	75.8% (m:78.2%)	86.8% (m:76.4%)	– (m:–)
Ireland	SGTF rawdata	–	–	–	1.9% (few data)	0.0% (few data)	0.0% (few data)	6.1% (few data)	2.2% (few data)	1.6% (few data)	7.5%	16.3%	26.2%	46.3%	57.7%	69.5%	75.0%	90.1%	88.6%	90.8%	–	–
Bulgaria	Seq.	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	52.1%	–	70.8%	–	–	73.4%
Israel	SGTF w.51+1 Seq. after w.1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	3–4% (Dec.15)	–	–	10–20% (Jan.5)	10–20% (Jan.11)	30–40% (Jan.19)	40–50% (Jan.25)	~70% (Feb.2)	~80% (Feb.9)	~90% (Feb.16)	–	–
Luxembourg	Seq.	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.3%	0.9%	4.2%	8.8%	15.5%	17.0%	36.2%	54.2%	57.6%	~56%	–	–
Denmark	Seq.	–	–	–	–	0.3%	0.2%	0.4%	0.4%	0.4%	0.8%	1.8%	2.0%	3.7%	7.1%	12.8%	19.5%	29.7%	47.1%	65.8%	76.5%	81.3%
Netherlands	Seq.	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1.3%	0.8%	0.5%	2.1%	4.4%	9.6%	15.9%	23.5%	24.7%	31.0%	40.1%	64.3%	–	–
Norway	Seq. PCR proxy and Seq.	– (–)	– (–)	– (–)	– (–)	– (–)	– (–)	– (–)	0.0% (–)	0.0% (–)	7.2% (–)	2.9% (–)	1.3% (–)	5.7% (–)	11.6% (–)	9.3% (–)	20.1% (–)	30.3% (34.9%)	40.8% (46.1%)	58.4% (72.3%)	65.0% (90.1%)	–
Italy	Seq.%	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	17.8%	–	54.0%	–	–
France	SGTF*Seq.% or PCR proxy Seq.	– (–)	– (–)	– (–)	– (–)	– (–)	– (–)	– (–)	– (–)	– (–)	– (–)	– (–)	– (–)	3.3% (–)	– (–)	– (–)	13.2% (–)	– (–)	36.1% (–)	49.3% (39.5%)	59.5% (49.5%)	–
Belgium	Seq. SGTF	– (–)	– (–)	– (–)	– (–)	– (–)	– (–)	– (–)	0.0% (<5%)	0.0% (<5%)	0.0% (<5%)	13.6% (<5%)	0.0% (<5%)	7.1% (7.2%)	7.7% (6.9%)	13.4% (16.6%)	23.4% (19.5%)	39.7% (22.4%)	42.6% (27.9%)	49.1% (34.4%)	59.3% (45.8%)	–
Portugal	SGTFL*Seq.%	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1.7%	0.8%	1.2%	1.7%	2.9%	6.8%	12.3%	22.7%	33.5%	39.2%	40.9%	45.7%	50.5%	–
Switzerland	Seq.	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.04%	0.4%	0.8%	2.6%	4.9%	9.2%	16.5%	26.0%	32.4%	40.5%	–	–
Sweden	Seq. all N501Y+A570D pos. tests	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	10.8% (av. for 5 out of 21 regions)	15.1% (av. for 5 out of 21 regions)	27.3% (av. for 5 out of 21 regions)	30.4% (av. for 19 out of 21 regions)	41.5% (av. for 19 out of 21 regions)	–
Germany	PCR proxy and Seq. Seq.	– (–)	– (–)	– (–)	– (–)	– (–)	– (–)	– (–)	– (–)	– (–)	– (–)	– (–)	– (–)	– (2.5%)	2.0% (4.6%)	3.6% (4.7%)	4.7% (11.0%)	7.2% (18.3%)	17.6% (18.2%)	25.9% (22.5%)	40.0% (–)	–
United States	SGTF*Seq.%	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.05%	0.2%	0.4%	0.5%	1.0%	1.7%	2.9%	4.5%	7.8%	12.2%	19.0%	26.2%
California	SGTF*Seq.%	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.3%	0.3%	0.7%	1.1%	1.3%	1.9%	1.9%	3.1%	5.2%	12.8%	16.6%	18.5%
Florida	SGTF*Seq.%	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.2%	0.5%	0.9%	1.0%	2.3%	4.5%	8.1%	10.7%	14.3%	20.9%	28.2%	37.4%
Other countries without weekly data but with a variant share above 5%: 00 Slovakia (72%), Spain (25-30%), and Poland (9%).

The following additional countries did not report variant shares, but are likely to have a significant share present due to their finding of more than 50 cases confirmed by whole genome sequencing per 6 March 2021:

• Turkey (479 cases)
• Austria (271 cases)
• Finland (268 cases)
• Australia (128 cases)
• Canada (114 cases)
• Nigeria (102 cases)
• South Korea (90 cases)
• India (81 cases)
• Ghana (67 cases)
• Japan (65 cases)
• Slovenia (65 cases)
• Singapore (64 cases)
• Romania (63 cases)
• New Zealand (61 cases)
• Croatia (60 cases)

The GISAID database of all sequenced COVID-19 genomes, calculates for each country for the past four weeks an average "Relative Variant Genome Frequency" for submitted samples. Those observed frequencies are however subject to sampling and reporting biases, and do not represent exact variant share prevalence due to absence of statistical representativity.

Countries reporting a first case

December 2020

Cases of the variant began to be reported globally during December, being reported in Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands, Australia and Italy. Shortly after, several other countries confirmed their first cases, the first of whom were found in Iceland and Gibraltar, then Singapore, Israel and Northern Ireland on 23 December, Germany and Switzerland on 24 December, and the Republic of Ireland and Japan confirmed on 25 December.

The first cases in Canada, France, Lebanon, Spain and Sweden were reported on 26 December. Jordan, Norway, and Portugal reported their first case on 27 December, Finland and South Korea reported their first cases on 28 December, and Chile, India, Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates reported their first cases on 29 December. The first case of new variant in Malta and Taiwan are reported on 30 December. China and Brazil reported their first cases of the new variant on 31 December. The United Kingdom and Denmark are sequencing their SARS-CoV-2 cases at considerably higher rates than most others, and it was considered likely that additional countries would detect the variant later.

The United States reported a case in Colorado with no travel history on 29 December, the sample was taken on 24 December. On 6 January 2021, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention announced that it had found at least 52 confirmed cases in California, Florida, Colorado, Georgia, and New York. In the following days, more cases of the variant were reported in other states, leading former CDC director Tom Frieden to express his concerns that the U.S. will soon face "close to a worst-case scenario".

January 2021

Turkey detected its first cases in 15 people from England on 1 January 2021. It was reported on 1 January that Denmark had found a total of 86 cases of the variant, equalling an overall frequency of less than 1% of the sequenced cases in the period from its first detection in the country in mid-November to the end of December; this had increased to 1.6% of sequenced tests in the period from mid-November to week two of 2021, with 7% of sequenced tests in this week alone being of the B.1.1.7 lineage. Luxembourg and Vietnam reported their first case of this variant on 2 January 2021.

On 3 January 2021, Greece and Jamaica detected their first four cases of this variant and Cyprus announced that it had detected B.1.1.7 in 12 samples. At the same time, New Zealand and Thailand reported their first cases of this variant, where the former reported six cases made up of five from the United Kingdom and one from South Africa, and the latter reported the cases from a family of four who had arrived from Kent. Georgia reported its first case and Austria reported their first four cases of this variant, along with one case of 501.V2 variant, on 4 January.

On 5 January, Iran, Oman, and Slovakia reported their first cases of VOC-202012/01. On 8 January, Romania reported its first case of the variant, an adult woman from Giurgiu County who declared not having left the country recently. On 9 January, Peru confirmed its first case of the variant. Mexico and Russia reported their first case of this variant on 10 January, then Malaysia and Latvia on 11 January.

On 12 January, Ecuador confirmed its first case of this variant. The Philippines and Hungary both detected the presence of the variant on 13 January. The Gambia recorded first cases of the variant on 14 January with it being the first confirmation of the variant's presence in Africa. On 15 January, the Dominican Republic confirmed its first case of the new variant and Argentina confirmed its first case of the variant on 16 January. Czech Republic and Morocco reported their first cases on 18 January while Ghana and Kuwait confirmed their first cases on 19 January. Nigeria confirmed its first case on 25 January. On 28 January, Senegal detected its first case of the variant.

In early January, an outbreak linked to a primary school led to the detection of at least 30 cases of the new variant in the Bergschenhoek area of the Netherlands, signifying local transmission.

On 16 January, the Los Angeles County Department of Public Health confirmed the variant was detected in L.A. County, with public health officials believing that it is spreading in the community.

On 28 January, North Macedonia confirmed the variant was detected in a 46-year-old man, who had already recovered.

February 2021

On 4 February, health authorities in Uruguay announced the first case of the variant in the country. The case was detected in a person who entered the country on 20 December 2020 and has been in quarantine ever since. On 10 February, the Croatian Health Ministry confirmed that out of 61 sequenced samples since 20 January, the variant was detected in 3 samples: a male 50 year old and 3.5 year old from Zagreb, and a male 34-year-old from Brod-Posavina County. On 12 February, the variant was detected from four areas in Sri Lanka, and the Canadian province of Newfoundland and Labrador confirmed an outbreak of the variant.

March 2021

On 2 March, Indonesia reports its first cases of the variant in two migrant workers returning from Saudi Arabia. . On the same day, Tunisia reported their first cases of the variant.

N501Y mutation elsewhere

A variant with the same N501Y mutation (which may result in higher transmissibility), but with a separate lineage from the UK variant, was detected in South Africa, and named 501.V2. The N501Y mutation has also been detected elsewhere: in Australia since June–July, in the US since July, and in Brazil since April (of which the most notable wide-spread variant is Lineage P.1), and it is not yet clear if the N501Y mutation found in B.1.1.7 arose spontaneously in the UK or was imported.

Statistics

Graphics

Confirmed cases by countries

• Note: The graphs presented here are only viewable by computers and some phones. If you cannot view it on your cell phone, switch to desktop mode from your browser.
• Data provided by various sources, such as; governmental, press or officials are updated every week since their last publication.

Control

In the presence of an more transmissible variant, stronger physical distancing and lockdown measures were opted for to avoid overwhelming the population due to its tendency to grow exponentially.

All countries of the United Kingdom were affected by domestic travel restrictions in reaction to the increased spread of the virus—at least partly attributed to B.1.1.7—effective from 20 December 2020. During December 2020, an increasing number of countries around the world either announced temporary bans on, or were considering banning, passenger travel from the UK, and in several cases from other countries such as the Netherlands and Denmark. Some countries banned flights; others allowed only their nationals to enter, subject to a negative SARS-CoV-2 test. A WHO spokesperson said that, "[a]cross Europe, where transmission is intense and widespread, countries need to redouble their control and prevention approaches". Most bans by EU countries were for 48 hours, pending an integrated political crisis response meeting of EU representatives on 21 December to evaluate the threat from the new variant and coordinate a joint response.

Many countries around the world imposed restrictions on passenger travel from the United Kingdom; neighbouring France also restricted manned goods vehicles (imposing a total ban before devising a testing protocol and permitting their passage once more). Some also applied restrictions on travel from other countries. As of 21 December 2020, at least 42 countries had restricted flights from the UK, and Japan was restricting entry of all foreign nationals after cases of the new variant were detected in the country.

The usefulness of travel bans has been contested as limited in cases where the variant has likely already arrived, especially if the estimated growth rate per week of the virus is higher locally.

External links

• Corum, Jonathan; Zimmer, Carl (18 January 2021). "Inside the B.1.1.7 Coronavirus Variant". The New York Times.
• Public Health England: Variants: UK distribution – summary of 4 nations distribution
• PANGO lineages: New Variant Report - Report on global distribution of lineage B.1.1.7
• GISAID sequencing data base - Tracking of COVID-19 variants