Portuguese Colonial War

Portuguese Colonial War
	Part of Wars of Independence and Cold War
	; A Portuguese F-84 being loaded with ammunition in the 1960s, at Luanda Air Base
Date	1961–1974
Location	Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique
Result	The war prompted the Portuguese Carnation Revolution, which granted independence to all the colonies.
Belligerents
Portugal	Angola (1961-74):; MPLA, File:Ao-unita.gif UNITA, FNLA; Guinea-Bissau (1963-74):; PAIGC; Mozambique (1964-74):; FRELIMO ;
Strength
169,000; 70,000 in Angola; 42,000 in Guinea-Bissau; 57,000 in Mozambique	20,000; 6,500 in Angola; 7,000 in Guinea-Bissau; 6,500 in Mozambique
Casualties and losses
8,290 dead and hundreds of thousands displaced.	thousands dead, maimed and displaced.

Portuguese Air Force's helicopter operating in an African theatre during the war

The Portuguese Colonial War (Portuguese: Guerra Colonial), also known as Overseas War in Portugal (Portuguese: Guerra do Ultramar) or, in the former colonies as War of liberation (Portuguese: Guerra de Libertação), was fought between Portugal's military and the emerging nationalist movements in Portugal's African colonies between 1961 and 1974. Unlike other European nations, the Portuguese regimen did not leave its African colonies, or the overseas provinces (províncias ultramarinas), during the 1950s and 1960s. During the 1960s, various armed independence movements, most prominently led by communist parties who cooperated under the CONCP umbrella, became active in these areas, most notably in Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea. Popular discontent at mainland over the Portuguese government and the war against the African independentist guerrillas, led to the bloodless Carnation Revolution on 25 April, 1974 in Lisbon. In Portugal this soon lead to a democratic government and a collapse of the economy. It would take 20 years and membership of the European Union for the Portuguese economy to recover from the effects of the Carnation revolution. The end of the war resulted in the exodus of thousands of Portuguese citizens, including military personnel, of European, African and mixed ethnicity from the newly-independent African territories to Portugal, and devastating civil wars in the former Portuguese territories of Angola and Mozambique which would last several decades and claim millions of lives - ironically funded by the vast natural resources of the newly formed communist states.

Portugal had been the first European power to establish a colony in Africa when it captured Ceuta in 1415 and now it was one of the last to leave. The departure of the Portuguese from Angola and Mozambique increased the isolation of Rhodesia, where white minority rule ended in 1980. Portugal presided over the longest-lasting European colonies in Africa.

Political context

Following World War II the two great powers, the United States and the Soviet Union seeked to expand the sphere of influence and encouraged — both ideologically , financial and militarily — the formation of either pro Soviet Union or pro United States resistance groups. The United States supported the UPA in Angola. This funding and support of the UPA (terrorist group) which was based in the Congo would attack and massacre Portuguese settlers and local Africans living in Angola from bases in the Congo. The photos of these massacres which included photos of decapitated women and children (both of European and Angolan origin) would later be displayed in the UN. It is rumoured that the then US president J.F. Kennedy sent a message to Salazar to leave the colonies shortly after the massacre. Salazar after a pro US coup failed to depose him - consolidated power and immediately set to protect the oversee territories by sending reinforcements and so the war would begin in Angola (similar scenarios would play out in all other oversees Portuguese territories).

It is in this context that the Asian-African Conference was held in Bandung, Indonesia in 1955. The conference presented a forum for the colonies, most of them newly independent and facing the same problem - pressure to align with one or the other superpower in the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. At the conference the colonies were presented with an alternative. They could band together as the so-called Third World and work both to preserve the balance of power in Cold War relations and to use their new sense of independence for their own benefit by becoming an influence zone of their own. This would lessen the effect of the colonial and neo-colonial powers on the colonies, and increased their sense of unity and desire to support each other in their relationships with the other powers.

In the late 1950s, the Portuguese Armed Forces saw themselves confronted with the paradox generated by the dictatorial regime of Estado Novo that had been in power since 1926: on the one hand, the policy of Portuguese neutrality in World War II placed the Portuguese Armed Forces out of the way of a possible East-West conflict; on the other hand, the regime felt the increased responsibility of the keeping Portugal's vast overseas territories under control. There the postwar tension approached the level of the separatist fights in the colonies of Imperial Europe. With all this, the same leaders that declared Portugal neutral in the war for European liberation chose to have Portugal join the military structure of NATO, in a subtle desire to ally with the victors. This was to the detriment of military preparations against nationalist threats in Portugal's colonial territories that the political regime considered essential for the survival of the nation.

This integration of Portugal in the Atlantic Alliance would form a military élite that would become essential during the planning and implementation of the operations during the Overseas War. This "NATO generation" would ascend quickly to the highest political positions and military command without having to provide evidence of loyalty to the regime. The Colonial War would establish, in this way, a split between the military structure -- heavily influenced by the western powers with democratic governments -- and the political power of the regime. Some analysts see the "Botelho Moniz côup as the beginning of this rupture, the origin of a lapse on the part of the regime to keep up a unique command center, an armed force prepared for threats of conflict in the colonies. This situation would cause, as would be verified later, a lack of coordination between the three general staffs (Army, Air Force and Navy).

Armed conflict

The conflict began in Angola on 4 February, 1961, in an area called the Zona Sublevada do Norte (ZSN or the Rebel Zone of the North), consisting of the provinces of Zaire, Uíge and Cuanza Norte. The pro US UPA wanted national self-determination, while for the Portuguese, who had settled in Africa and ruled considerable territory since the 15th century, their belief in a multi-racial, assimilated overseas empire justified going to war to prevent its breakup. The UPA which was based in Zaire entered Angola and proceeded to massacre the civilian population (women and children included and of both European and angolan african decent) under the full knowledge of the US Goverment. JF Kennedy would later notify Salazar (via the US consulate in Portugal) to immediately abandon the colonies. A US backed coup was also attempted to overtrow the Estado Novo. It is due to this failed coup that Salazar was able to consolidate power and finally send a military response to the massacres occuring in Angola. As the war progressed, Portugal rapidly increased its mobilized forces. Under a right-wing dictatorship, a highly militarized population was maintained where all the males were obliged to serve three years in military service, and many of those called-up to active military duty were deployed to combat zones in Portugal's African overseas provinces. By the early 1970s, it had reached the limit of its military capacity but at this stage the war was already won. The Portuguese having been in Africa for much longer than the other colonia empires had developed strong relations with the local people and therefore was able to win them over. Without this support the US soon stopped backing the dissident groups in Angola.

The Soviet Union realising that a military solution it had so successfully employed in several other countries around the world was not bearing fruit, dramatically changed stradegy. It focused instead on Portugal. With the growing popular discontent over the casualities of the war and due to the large economic divide between the rich and poor the communists were able to manupilate junior officers of the military. The young officers were both idealistic and ignorant of the then world affairs, state of the economy or of the military progress in the colonies.. The communists would proceed to over throw the goverment with what was later called the Carnation Revolution on 25 April, 1974 in Lisbon, Portugal. This led to a period of economic collapse and politcal instability. Over the last 30 years the process has steady improved as the communists were soon ousted and a democratic goverment installed and later with Portugal entering the European Union economic stability has slowly been returning.

Angola

In Angola, the rebellion of the ZSN was taken up by the União das Populações de Angola (UPA), which changed its name to Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA) in 1962. On February 4 1961, the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola took credit for the attack on the prison of Luanda, where seven policemen were killed. On March 15, 1961, the UPA, in a tribal attack, started the massacre of white populations and black workers born in other regions of Angola. This region would be retaken by large military operations that, however, would not stop the spread of the guerrilla actions to other regions of Angola, such as Cabinda, the east, the southeast and the central plateaus.

Angola was the most successful campaign of the Colonial War (by 1974 it was clear that Portugal was winning the war in Angola), due to various factors. The country is large and the distance between the countries supporting the nationalist groups (the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia) and the populated areas were big (so big in fact that the east part of the country was called Terras do Fim do Mundo (Lands of the End of the World) by the Portuguese); the three nationalist groups (FNLA, MPLA and UNITA) spent as much time fighting each other as they did fighting the Portuguese and the strategy of General Costa Gomes that the war was to be fought not just by the military but also involving civilian organisations led to a successful hearts and minds campaign. South Africa gave a lot of support to the Portuguese war effort in Angola; the Portuguese even referred to their South African counterparts as primos (cousins).

Angola also saw the development of unique and successful units:

the Comandos were born out of the war in Angola and later used in Guinea and Mozambique
the Special Hunters (Caçadores Especiais) were already in Angola when the war began, in 1961
the Faithfuls (Fiéis): a force composed by Katanga exiles, black soldiers that opposed the rule of Mobutu
the Loyals (Leais): a force composed by exiles from Zambia, black soldiers that were against Kenneth Kaunda
the Special Groups (Grupos Especiais): units of volunteer black soldiers that had commando training; also used in Mozambique
the Special Troops (Tropas Especiais): the name of the Special Groups in Cabinda
the Flechas (Arrows): a very successful unit, controlled by the PIDE/DGS, composed by Bushmen, that specialized in tracking, reconnaissance and pseudo-terrorist operations. They were the basis for the Rhodesian Selous Scouts. The Flechas were also employed in Mozambique.
the 1st Cavalry Group (Grupo de Cavalaria Nº1): a horseback unit, armed with the Heckler & Koch G3, tasked with reconnaissance and patrolling. It was also known as "Angolan Dragoons" (Dragões de Angola). The Rhodesians would develop also this concept, forming the Grey's Scouts.
the 1927 Cavalry Battalion (Batalhão de Cavalaria 1927) - a tank unit, equipped with the M5A1 tank it was used for supporting infantry forces and as a rapid reaction force. Again the Rhodesians would copy this concept forming the Rhodesian Armoured Car Regiment.

Guinea-Bissau

File:Embpaigc.jpg

PAIGC emblem

File:Paigcsoldiers.jpeg

A PAIGC soldier with an AK-47

In Guinea-Bissau, the Marxist African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) started fighting in January 1963. Its guerrilla fighters attacked the Portuguese headquarters in Tite, located to the south of Bissau, the capital, near the Corubal river. Similar actions quickly spread across the entire colony, requiring a strong response from the Portuguese forces.

The war in Guinea placed face to face Amílcar Cabral, the leader of PAIGC, and António de Spínola, the Portuguese general responsible for the local military operations. In 1965 the war spread to the eastern part of the country and in that same year the PAIGC carried out attacks in the north of the country where at the time only the minor guerrilla movement, the Front for the Liberation and Independence of Guinea (FLING), was fighting. By that time, the PAIGC started receiving military support from the Socialist Bloc, mainly from Cuba, a support that would last until the end of the war.

In Guinea, the Portuguese troops mainly took a defensive position, limiting themselves to keeping the territories they already held. This kind of action was particularly devastating to the Portuguese troops who were constantly attacked by the forces of the PAIGC. They were also demoralized by the steady growth of the influence of the liberation supporters among the population that was being recruited in large numbers by the PAIGC.

With some strategic changes by António Spínola in the late 1960s, the Portuguese forces gained momentum and, taking the offensive, became a much more effective force. In 1970, Portugal attempted to overthrow Sekou Toure (with the support of Guinean exiles) in the Operation "Mar Verde" (Green Sea). The objectives were: perform a coup d'etat in Guinea-Conakry; destroy the PAIGC naval and air assets; capture Amilcar Cabral and free portuguese POWs held in Conakry. The operation was a failure, with only the POW rescue and the destruction of PAIGC ships being successful. Nigeria and Algeria offered support to Guinea-Conakry and the Soviet Union sent war ships to the area (known by NATO as the West Africa Patrol).

Between 1968 and 1972, the Portuguese forces took control of the situation and sometimes carried attacks against the PAIGC positions. At this time the Portuguese forces were also adopting subversive means to counter the insurgents, attacking the political structure of the nationalist movement. This strategy culminated in the assassination of Amílcar Cabral in January 1973. Nonetheless, the PAIGC continued to fight back and pushed the Portuguese forces to the limit. This became even more visible after PAIGC received anti-aircraft weapons provided by the Soviets, especially the SA-7 rocket launchers, thus undermining the Portuguese air superiority.

The war in Guinea is considered "Portugal's Vietnam". The PAIGC was well trained, led and equipped and the neighbouring countries (Senegal and specially Guinea-Conakry) were perfect bases for the guerrilla.

The war in Guinea also saw the use of two unique units:

African Commandos (Comandos Africanos): Commando units entirely composed by black soldiers, including the officers
African Special Marines (Fuzileiros Especiais Africanos): Marine units entirely composed by black soldiers

Mozambique

Mozambique was the last territory to start the war of liberation. Its nationalist movement was led by the Marxist-Leninist Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO), which carried out the first attack against Portuguese targets on September 24 1964, in Chai, Cabo Delgado Province. The fighting later spread to Niassa, Tete at the centre of the country. A report from Battalion No. 558 of the Portuguese army makes references to violent actions, also in Cabo Delgado, on August 21, 1964.

On November 16 of the same year, the Portuguese troops suffered their first losses fighting in the north of the country, in the region of Xilama. By this time, the size of the guerrilla movement had substantially increased; this, along with the low numbers of Portuguese troops and colonists, allowed a steady increase in FRELIMO's strength. It quickly started moving south in the direction of Meponda and Mandimba, linking to Tete with the aid of Malawi.

Until 1967 the FRELIMO showed less interest in Tete region, putting its efforts on the two northernmost districts of the country where the use of landmines became very common. In the region of Niassa, FRELIMO's intention was to create a free corridor to Zambézia. Until April 1970, the military activity of FRELIMO increased steadily, mainly due to the strategic work of Samora Machel in the region of Cabo Delgado.

The war in Mozambique saw a great involvement of Rhodesia, supporting the Portuguese troops in operations and even conducting operations independently. But by the 70s, Portugal was clearly losing the war. The Operation "Nó Górdio" (Gordian Knot) - conducted in 1970 - a conventional-style operation to destroy the guerrilla bases in the north of Mozambique, was a failure and even worsened the situation; the construction of the Cahora Bassa Dam tied up large numbers of Portuguese troops (near 50% of all the troops in Mozambique) and brought the FRELIMO to the Tete Province, closer to the cities and more populated areas in the south. Still, although the FRELIMO tried to halt and stop the construction of the dam, it was never able to do so. In 1974, the FRELIMO launched mortar attacks against Vila Pery (now Chimoio) an important city and the first (and only) heavy populated area to be hit by the FRELIMO.

In Mozambique unique units were also used:

the Special Groups (Grupos Especiais): units similar to the ones used in Angola
the Paratrooper Special Groups (Grupos Especiais Pára-Quedistas): units of volunteer black soldiers that had paratrooper training
the Combat Tracking Special Groups (Grupos Especiais de Pisteiros de Combate): special units trained in tracking
the Flechas: a unit similar to the one employed in Angola

Role of the Organisation of African Unity

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) was founded May 1963. Its basic principles were co-operation between African nations and solidarity between African peoples. Another important objective of the OAU was an end to all forms of colonialism in Africa. This became the major objective of the organization in its first years and soon OAU pressure led to the situation in the Portuguese colonies being brought up at the UN Security Council.

The OAU established a committee based in Dar es Salaam, with representatives from Ethiopia, Algeria, Uganda, Egypt, Tanzania, Zaire, Guinea, Senegal and Nigeria, to support African liberation movements. The support provided by the committee included military training and weapon supplies.

The OAU also took action in order to promote the international acknowledgment of the legitimacy of the Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile (GRAE), composed by the FNLA. This support was transferred to the MPLA and to its leader, Agostinho Neto in 1967. In November of 1972, both movements were recognized by the OAU in order to promote their merger. After 1964, the OAU recognized PAIGC as the legitimate representatives of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde and in 1965 recognised FRELIMO for Mozambique.

Armament and support

Portugal

When the war began, in 1961, the Portuguese forces were badly equipped to cope with the demands of a counter-insurgency conflict. It was standard procedure, up to that point, to send the oldest and obsolete material to the colonies. Thus, the first military operations were conducted using World War II radios and the old Mauser rifle. The Portuguese Army rapidly saw the need for a modern battle rifle and adopted the Heckler & Koch G3 as the standard rifle of the military (although several FN FAL rifles were also issued). The Paratroopers rarely used the G3, instead adopting the AR-10, until a collapsible stock version of the G3 rifle became available. For the machine-gun role, the MG42 was used until 1968, when the HK21 became available. Some submachine guns (specially the Uzi) were also used, mainly by reserve and Cavalry troops. Support weapons were also employed, ranging from the Bazooka to 60, 81, and later, 120 mm mortars and even howitzers. Several armored cars were also used: Panhard AML, Panhard EBR, Fox and (in the 70s) the Chaimite.

Unlike the Vietnam War, Portugal's low budget could not afford a general use of the helicopter. Only those troops involved in raids (also called golpe de mão (hand blow) in Portuguese) - mainly Commandos and Paratroopers - would deploy by helicopter. Most deployments were either on foot or in vehicles (Berliet and Unimog trucks). The helicopters were reserved for support (in a gunship role) or MEDEVAC. The Alouette III was the most widely used helicopter, although the Puma was also used with great success. Other aircraft were employed: for air support the T6 and the Fiat G.91 were used; for reconnaissance the Dornier Do 27 was employed. In the transport role, the Portuguese Air Force used mainly the Nord Noratlas and the C-47 (both were also used for the deployment of Paratroopers).

The Portuguese Navy (particularly the Marines) made extensive use of patrol boats, landing craft, and Zodiac boats. They were employed specially in Guinea, but also in the Congo River (and other smaller rivers) in Angola and in the Zambezi (and other rivers) in Mozambique. They even used small patrol crafts in the Lake Malawi. The Navy also used Portuguese civilian cruisers as troop transports, and drafted Portuguese Merchant Navy personnel to man ships carrying troops and material.

Most weaponry was purchased from France, West Germany and South Africa and, to a lesser extent, Belgium and Israel.

Guerrilla movements

The armament of the nationalist groups was mainly from the Eastern block and (specially in Mozambique) China, but they also used western armaments (such as the Thompson submachine gun, and British, French and German weapons). All guerrillas used roughly the same weaponry: the Mosin-Nagant bolt-action rifle, SKS and AK47 automatic rifles (the latter was only issued to the best guerilla units and even Portuguese soldiers used captured AK47s because they were considered superior to the G3), and the PPSh-41 submachine gun. The guerrilla movements also made extensive use of machine guns: the Degtyarev light machine gun was the most widely used, together with the DShK and the SG-43 Gorunov heavy machine guns. The support weapons used were the mortars, recoilless rifles, RPG-2 and specially the RPG-7 (again considered superior to the Portuguese counterpart, the bazooka).

Anti-aircraft weapons were also employed, specially by the PAIGC and the Frelimo. The ZPU-4 was the most widely used, but by far the most effective was the Strela 2, introduced in Guinea in 1973 and in Mozambique in 1974.

Mines were one of the most successful weapons of the guerrilla movements, and the most feared weapon by the Portuguese forces. All guerrillas used a variety of mines, combining anti-tank with anti-personnel mines with devastating results, successfully undermining the mobility of the Portuguese forces. Some mines that were used includes the PMN (Black Widow), TM-46, and POMZ. Even amphibious mines were used such as the PDM.

The PAIGC was the better armed, trained and led of all the guerrilla movements. By 1970 it had members in the Soviet Union learning how to fly MIGs and soviet-supplied amphibious assault crafts and APCs.

Opposition

The government presented as a general consensus that the colonies were a part of the national unity, closer to overseas provinces than to true colonies. The communists were the first party to oppose the official view, since they saw the Portuguese presence in the colonies as an act against the colonies' right to self determination. During its 5th Congress, in 1957, the illegal Portuguese Communist Party (Partido Comunista Português - PCP) was the first political organization to demand the immediate and total independence of the colonies. However, being the only truly organized opposition movement, the PCP had to play two roles. One role was that of a communist party with an anti-colonialist position; the other role was to be a cohesive force drawing together a broad spectrum of opposing parties. Therefore it had to accede to views that didn't reflect its true anticolonial position.

Several opposition figures outside the PCP also had anticolonial opinions, such as the candidates to the fraudulent presidential elections, like Norton de Matos (in 1949), Quintão Meireles (in 1951) and Humberto Delgado (in 1958). The communist candidates had, obviously, the same positions. Among them were Rui Luís Gomes and Arlindo Vicente, the first would not be allowed to participate in the election and the second would support Delgado in 1958.

After the electoral fraud of 1958, Humberto Delgado formed the Independent National Movement (Movimento Nacional Independente - MNI) that, in October of 1960, agreed that there was a need to prepare the people in the colonies, before giving them the right of self-determination. Despite this, no detailed policies for achieving this goal were set out.

In 1961, the nº8 of the Military Tribune had as its title "Let's end the war of Angola". The authors were linked to the Patriotic Action Councils (Juntas de Acção Patriótica - JAP), supporters of Humberto Delgado, and responsible for the attack on the barracks of Beja. The Portuguese Front of National Liberation (Frente Portuguesa de Libertação Nacional - FPLN), founded in December 1962, attacked the conciliatory positions. The official feeling of the Portuguese state, despite all this, was the same: Portugal had inalienable and legitimate rights over the colonies and this was what was transmitted through the media and through the state propaganda.

In April 1964, the Directory of Democratic-Social Action (Acção Democrato-Social - ADS) presented a political solution rather than a military one. In agreement with this initiative in 1966, Mário Soares suggested there should be a referendum on the overseas policy Portugal should follow, and that the referendum should be preceded by a national discussion to take place in the six months prior to the referendum.

The end of Salazar's rule in 1968, due to illness, did not prompt any change in the political panorama. The radicalization of the opposition movements started with the younger people who also felt victimized by the continuation of the war. The universities played a key role in the spread of this position. Several magazines and newspapers were created, such as Cadernos Circunstância, Cadernos Necessários, Tempo e Modo, and Polémica that supported this view. It was in this environment that the Armed Revolutionary Action (Acção Revolucionária Armada - ARA), the armed branch of the Portuguese Communist party created in the late 1960s, and the Revolutionary Brigades (Brigadas Revolucionárias - BR), a left-wing organization, became an important force of resistance against the war, carrying out multiple acts of sabotage and bombing against military targets. The ARA began its military actions in October of 1970, keeping them up until August of 1972. The major actions were the attack on the Tancos air base that destroyed several helicopters on March 8 1971, and the attack on the NATO headquarters at Oeiras in October of the same year. The BR, on its side, began armed actions on 7 November 1971, with the sabotage of the NATO base at Pinhal de Armeiro, the last action being carried out 9 April 1974, against the Niassa ship which was preparing to leave Lisboa with troops to be deployed in Guinea. The BR acted even in the colonies, placing a bomb in the Military Command of Bissau on 22 February 1974.

Furthermore, the alliance of the business and financial sectors, middle classes and workers' movements made an important mark on the policy of the regime in 1973. They now were supporting the independence of the colonies, a few months before the Carnation Revolution.

Economic consequences of the war

The Government budget increased significantly during the war years. The country's expenditure on the armed forces ballooned since the beginning of the war in 1961. The expenses were divided into ordinary and extraordinary ones; the latter were the main factor in the huge increase in the military budget. Since the rise of Marcelo Caetano, after Salazar's incapacitation, spending on military forces increased even further.

It is often stated that war in the colonies was having a severe impact but the accuracy of these statements have to be questioned. Especially in light of the vast natural resources of Angola. To put this in context prior to the Carnation Revolution - Angola was one of the largest oil produces in Africa. With the oil shock of the 1974 - oil alone could have easily paid for the war in all of the colonies. It also has large amounts of other natural resources like diamonds. This is the most logical reason for the powers of the day - the Soviet Union and United Stated interest in supporting dissedent groups. In fact both these primary resources would play a huge financial and funding role in the decades long civil war in Angola which would primarily benefit the US and Soviet Union.

The coup itself was led by junior officers - which implies that the better informed senior offices did not believe the war was lost or that the economy was in severe crises. A further illustration would be to compare the economic growth rates of Portugal in the war years 6%- to post war years 2-3%. This is substantially higher than the vast majority of other European nations (and much higher that Portugal has actually been able to achieve after the war). Other indicators like GDP as percentage of Western Europe would indicate that Portugal was rapidly catching up to its European neighbours. The Carnation revolution would actually have a more devastating economic impact than the Colonial War of the Estado Novo. It would take almost 30 years for Portugal reach the same level of GDP as a percentage of Western Europe GDP averages as it had during the war.

This articles does also not discuss the other economic impact of loss of the colonies on industry, finance, agricultural productivity (due to the loss of productivity of the colonies), mining, chemical and defence industry - all extremely negative. It is without a doubt that the end of the war and the abandonment of the colonies had a much more severe, devastating and lasting impact than the actual war to maintain control of the Portuguese provinces of Angola, Mozambique, Timor Leste, etc.

References

Bibliography

Becket, Ian et all., A Guerra no Mundo, Guerras e Guerrilhas desde 1945, Lisboa, Verbo, 1983
Marques, A. H. de Oliveira, História de Portugal, 6ª ed., Lisboa, Palas Editora, Vol. III, 1981
Mattoso, José, História Contemporânea de Portugal, Lisboa, Amigos do Livro, 1985, «Estado Novo», Vol. II e «25 de Abril», vol. único
Mattoso, José, História de Portugal, Lisboa, Ediclube, 1993, vols. XIII e XIV
Pakenham, Thomas, The Scramble for Africa, Abacus, 1991 ISBN 0-349-10449-2
Reis, António, Portugal Contemporâneo, Lisboa, Alfa, Vol. V, 1989;
Rosas, Fernando e Brito, J. M. Brandão, Dicionário de História do Estado Novo, Venda Nova, Bertrand Editora, 2 vols. 1996
Vários autores, Guerra Colonial, edição do Diário de Notícias
Jornal do Exército, Lisboa, Estado-Maior do Exército
Cann, John P, Counterinsurgency in Africa: The Portuguese Way of War, 1961-1974, Hailer Publishing, 2005

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