Barelvi movement
Barelvi (Hindi: बरेलवी, Urdu: بریلوی, /bəreːlviː/) is a movement of Sunni Islam originating in the Indian subcontinent. The Barelvi movement was started in 1880 to defend contemporary traditionalist Islamic beliefs and practices from the criticisms of reformist movements like the Deobandi or Ahl al-ḥadīth (people of hadith).[1] This included a defence of many traditional practices and rites associated with popular Sufism.[2] The movement in British India was shaped by the writings of Ahmed Raza Khan Barelvi (1856–1921).[3]
Etymology
To its followers the movement is known as Ahle Sunnat wal Jama'at ("People of the traditions of Muhammad and the broad community"), as a means to lay exclusive claim to be the legitimate form of Sunni Islam, in opposition to its reformist rivals like the Deobandi, Ahl al-ḥadīth and Darul-uloom Nadwatul Ulama movements.[4] This is a contested claim and outside of the movement it is commonly referred to as the Barelvi movement,[5] derived from Ahmad Raza's home city of Bareilly, Uttar Pradesh, India.[6]
Presence
India Today estimates that the vast majority of Muslims in India adhere to the Barelvi movement,[7] and The Times (UK) writes that a majority of (South Asian) Muslims in the United Kingdom adhere to the movement as well.[8] Similarly, the conservative think tank The Heritage Foundation gives such estimates for the vast majority of Sunni Muslims in Pakistan.[2]
Mosques
-
Largest Jama Masjid in England,Ghamkol Sharif -
The Manchester Central Mosque -
The dargah Masjid at Haji Ali ,Mumbai -
Agra Jama Masjid -
Na Khoda Masjid, Calcutta India
Beliefs and practices
Like other Muslims, Barelvis base their beliefs on the Qur'an and Sunnah, and believe in monotheism and the prophethood of Muhammad. Barelvis follow the Ash'ari and Maturidi schools of aqidah, the Hanafi school of fiqh, and the Qadri, Chishti, Naqshbandi or Suhrawardi Sufi orders.[9]
Beliefs regarding Muhammad
Barelvis have several beliefs regarding the nature of the Islamic prophet, Muhammad, which distinguish them from non-Barelvi Muslims in South Asia:
- He is noor ("light"), rather than bashar ("human"), an issue dividing the Barelvi and Deobandi belief systems. This conflicts with the Deobandi depiction of Muhammad the insaan-e-kamil, "complete person".[10].[11]
- He is hazir (present in many places at the same time).[12]
- He is nazir (witnessing all that goes on in the world).[12]
- He has ilm-e-ghaib (knowledge of the unseen/unknown).[13]
- He is mukhtaar kul (having the authority to do whatever he desired).[citation needed]
Practices
- Public celebration of the Mawlid (the birthday of Muhammad).[14][15]
- Asking awliyā' (Muslim saints) for intercession to God on behalf of the living.[citation needed]
- Visiting the mazar (tombs) of notable Muslims. Wahabbis may see this as shirk or bid‘ah.[why?]
Relations with other movements
The major opposition to the Barelvis in the Indian subcontinent comes from the Deobandi movement.
Ahmad Raza Khan, along with other religious figures, issued fatāwā of apostasy against the founders of the Deobandi, Wahhabism, Shi'i and "Qadiani" (Ahmadiyya) sects of Islam. Commenting on this, historian Usha Sanyal, in her research entitled Devotional Islam and Politics in British India: Ahmad Raza Khan Barelwi and His Movement, 1870-1920, stated:
Not only did Ahmad Raza Khan obtain confirmatory signatures from other scholars in the subcontinent, he managed to get agreement from a number of prominent ulama in Mecca. That occurred in the first years of the twentieth century--long before the Al-Saud and their Wahhabi allies got control of the Haramayn.[16] The feat was, nevertheless, stunning. The antipathy of the Deobandis toward the Ahl-i Sunnah on the emotional level becomes more comprehensible when Ahmad Riza's fatwa receives a full explication.
— Usha Sanyal, Devotional Islam and Politics in British India: Ahmad Raza Khan Barelwi and His Movement, 1870-1920[17]
Opposition to the Taliban
The Barelvi movement has taken a stance against Taliban movements in South Asia, organising rallies and protests in India and Pakistan, condemning what they perceive as unjustified sectarian violence.[18] The Sunni United Council (SUC), an amalgamation of eight Sunni organizations, launched the Save Pakistan Movement to stem the process of Talibanisation. Terming the Taliban a product of global anti-Islam conspiracies], the leaders of SUC charged it with playing into the hands of the United States to divide Muslims and bring a bad name to Islam.[19]
Supporting this movement, the Pakistan Minister of Foreign Affairs, Shah Mehmood Qureshi, said:
The Sunni Tehreek has decided to activate itself against Talibanisation in the country. A national consensus against terrorism is emerging across the country.
— Shah Mehmood Qureshi[20]
Sectarian violence
In the 1990s and 2000s, sporadic violence resulted from disputes over control of Pakistani mosques between Barelwi and Deobandi.[21] In May 2001, sectarian riots broke out after Sunni Tehreek leader Saleem Qadri was assassinated by the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, a Deoband-affiliated terrorist group.[22] In April 2006 in Karachi, a bomb attack on a Barelvi gathering to celebrate the mawlid (Muhammad's birthday) killed at least 57 people, including several central leaders of the Sunni Tehreek.[23][24] In April 2007, Sunni Tehreek activists attempted to forcibly gain control of a mosque in Karachi, opening fire on the mosque and those inside, resulting in one death and three injuries.[25] On February 27, 2010, Barelvis celebrating mawlid in Faisalabad and Dera Ismail Khan were attacked by militants believed to be affiliated with the Taliban and Sipah-e-Sahaba, again sparking tensions among the rival sects.[26]
Notable scholars
Early scholars
|
Present scholars
|
|
Notable organizations
In Pakistan, the prominent Barelvi religious and political organizations include[27]:
Other organizations include:
|
|
Main institutions
|
|
Notable individuals
|
See also
- Maulana, Andhe ki laathi, a book detailing theological debates between Barelvis and Deobandis
Notes
- ^ Jones 1989: 70
- ^ a b "Pakistan plays Sufi card against jihadis | World War 4 Report". Ww4report.com. Retrieved 2009-09-30.
- ^ Usha Sanyal. Generational Changes in the Leadership of the Ahl-e Sunnat Movement in North India during the Twentieth Century. Modern Asian Studies (1998), Cambridge University Press.
- ^ Geaves 2006: 148
- ^ Riaz 2008: 75
- ^ Sanyal 2005
- ^ Sandeep Unnithan and Uday Mahurkar (2008-07-31). "The radical sweep". India Today. Retrieved 2009-09-30.
- ^ Norfolk, Andrew (2007-09-07). "Hardline takeover of British mosques". The Times. London. Retrieved 2010-04-26.
- ^ Rama Sankar Yadav & B.N. Mandal. Global Encyclopaedia of Education. Global Vision Publishing Ho, 2007. ISBN 8182202272, 9788182202276
- ^ Akbar S. Ahmed. Islam today: a short introduction to the Muslim world. I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1999. ISBN 1860642578, 9781860642579
- ^ Pakistan perspectives, Volume 7. Pakistan Study Centre, University of Karachi, 2002snippet
- ^ a b N. C. Asthana & A.Nirmal. Urban Terrorism : Myths And Realities. Publisher Pointer Publishers, 2009 ISBN 817132598X, 9788171325986. pg. 67
- ^ Clinton Bennett. Muslims and modernity: an introduction to the issues and debates. Continuum International Publishing Group, 2005 ISBN 082645481X, 9780826454812. pg. 189
- ^ Sirriyeh 1999: 49
- ^ Sirriyeh 2004: 111
- ^ Haramayn refers to the Masjid al-Haram ("Sacred Mosque") in Mecca and the Al-Masjid al-Nabawi ("Mosque of the Prophet") in Medina. Dictionary of Islamic Architecture
- ^ Gregory C. Doxlowski. Devotional Islam and Politics in British India: Ahmad Riza Khan Barelwi and His Movement, 1870-1920. The Journal of the American Oriental Society, Oct-Dec, 1999
- ^ Indian Muslims protest against Talibani terrorism. TwoCircles.net 17 June 2009
- ^ Pakistan’s Sunnis unite against Talibanisation. Thaindian News. May 9, 2009
- ^ Clashing interpretations of Islam. Daily Times (Pakistan), May 5, 2009
- ^ " Serious threat to Pakistan's civil society" The Hindu, April 18, 2006
- ^ "Serious threat to Pakistan's civil society". The Hindu. Chennai, India. April 18, 2006.
- ^ Bomb carnage at Karachi prayers, BBC Online, 11 April 2006
- ^ Special Coverage of Nishtar Park bombing, Jang Group Online
- ^ "One dead as ST tries to take control of Ahle Hadith mosque" Daily Times (Pakistan), April 11, 2007
- ^ Sectarian clashes kill seven in Pakistan, Agence France-Presse via Sydney Morning Herald, February 28, 2010
- ^ The widening split, Express Tribune, April 26, 2010
References
- Riaz, Ali (2008). Faithful Education: Madrassahs in South Asia. Rutgers University Press.
- Geaves, Ron (2006). "Learning the lessons from the neo-revivalist and Wahhabi movements: the counterattack of the new Sufi movements in the UK". In Malik, Jamal; Hinnells, John R. (eds.). Sufism in the West. Routledge. pp. 142–157.
- Jones, Kenneth W. (1989). Socio-Religious Reform Movements in British India, Part 3. Vol. 1. Cambridge University Press.
- Malik, Jamal, ed. (2008). Madrasas in South Asia: Teaching terror?. Routledge.
- Sanyal, Usha (2008). "Ahl-i Sunnat Madrasas: the Madrasa Manzar-i Islam, Bareilly, and Jamia Ashrafiyya, Mubarakpur". In Malik, Jamal (ed.). Madrasas in South Asia: Teaching terror?. Routledge. pp. 23–44.
- Sanyal, Usha (2005). Ahmed Riza Khan Barelwi: In the Path of the Prophet. Makers of the Muslim World. Oxford: Oneworld.
- Sirriyeh, Elizabeth (1999). Sufis and Anti-Sufis: The Defense, Rethinking and Rejection of Sufism in the Modern World. Routledge. ISBN 0700710582.
- Sirriyeh, Elizabeth (2004). "Sufi Thought and its Reconstruction". In Taji-Farouki, Suha; Nafi, Basheer M. (eds.). Islamic Thought in the Twentieth Century. I.B. Tauris. pp. 104–127. ISBN 1850437513.