Iran–Iraq War

Iran-Iraq War
Iranian soldier with gas mask in the battlefield
Date 22 September 1980–20 August 1988 Location Persian Gulf, Iranian-Iraqi border Result Stalemate; Strategic Iraqi failure; United Nations-mandated cease-fire; status quo ante bellum; Iraq's condemnation by the UN. Iran holds onto the Shatt al-Arab.
Belligerents
Iran	Iraq
Commanders and leaders
Ruhollah Khomeini Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani Ali Shamkhani Mostafa Chamran †	Saddam Hussein Ali Hassan al-Majid
Strength
305,000 soldiers 500,000 Pasdaran and Basij militia 900 tanks 1,000 armored vehicles 3,000 artillery pieces 470 aircraft 750 helicopters	190,000 soldiers 5,000 tanks 4,000 armored vehicles 7,330 artillery pieces 500+ aircraft, 100+ helicopters
Casualties and losses
Est. 500,000+ soldiers/militia/civilians killed or wounded	Est. 375,000+ soldiers/militia/civilians killed or wounded

The Iran-Iraq War, also known as the Iraqi Imposed War (جنگ تحمیلی, Jang-e-tahmīlī), Holy Defense (دفاع مقدس, Defa-e-moghaddas) and Iranian Revolutionary War in Iran, and Saddām's Qādisiyyah (قادسيّة صدّام, Qādisiyyat Saddām) in Iraq, was a war between the armed forces of Iraq and Iran lasting from September 1980 to August 1988. It was commonly referred to as the Persian Gulf War until the Iraq-Kuwait conflict of (1990–91), and for a while thereafter as the First Persian Gulf War. The Iraq-Kuwait conflict, while originally known as the Second Persian Gulf War, later became known simply as the Persian Gulf War. Many have also considered it to be the Longest Conventional War of the 20th Century as there was a book written by historian Dilip Hiro with the same title, however this is strongly disputed among historians. It is also regarded in much of the West as one of the Forgotten Wars of the 20th Century.

The war began when Iraq invaded Iran on 22 September 1980 following a long history of border disputes and demands for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime. Although the Iraqis attacked without formal warning, they failed to make progress and were soon repelled by the Iranians. Despite several calls for a ceasefire by the United Nations Security Council, hostilities continued until 20 August 1988; the last prisoners of war were exchanged in 2003. The war altered regional and even global politics.

The war is also noted for being very similar to World War I. Tactics such as trench warfare, manned machine-gun posts, bayonet charges, use of barb-wire, human wave attacks and Iraq's extensive use of chemical weapons (such as mustard gas) against Iranian troops and civilians as well as Iraqi Kurds.

Background

Early history

Although the Iran-Iraq war from 1980–1988 was a war for dominance of the Persian Gulf region, the roots of the war go back many centuries. There has been rivalry between kingdoms of Mesopotamia (the Tigris-Euphrates valley, modern Iraq) and the rugged highlands to the East (modern Persia or Iran) since the beginning of recorded history in Sumer.

File:Jang2.jpg

Iranian soldiers landing from a CH-47 Chinook helicopter in the northern front of the war. The war (according to one estimate) resulted in US$350 billion in damages to Iran alone.

More precisely, the origins of the Iran-Iraq war of 1980–1988 go back to the question of sovereignty over the resource-rich province of Khuzestan. Before the Ottoman empire 1299-1922, Iraq was part of Persia. The rising power of the Ottomans put an end to this when Suleyman I annexed Arabian Iraq. The Turkish Sultan and general, Murad IV recaptured Baghdad from the Safavids of Persia in 1638 via the Treaty of Zuhab. The border disputes between Persia and the Ottomans never ended. Between 1555 and 1918, Persia and the Ottoman empire signed no fewer than 18 treaties delineating their disputed borders. But, today's border comes from the Treaty of Zuhab (Peace of Qasr-e-Shirin). Modern Iraq was created with British take over in the region and the final collapse of the Ottoman empire following the First World War, thereby inheriting all the disputes with Persia.

Post-colonial era

On 18 December 1959, the new leader of Iraq Abdul Karim Qassim, declared: "We do not wish to refer to the history of Arab tribes residing in Al-Ahwaz and Mohammareh [Khorramshahr]. The Ottomans handed over Mohammareh, which was part of Iraqi territory, to Iran." The Iraqi regime's dissatisfaction with Iran's possession of the oil-rich Khuzestan province was not limited to rhetorical statements; Iraq began supporting secessionist movements in Khuzestan, and even raised the issue of its territorial claims at the next meeting of the Arab League, without success. Iraq showed reluctance in fulfilling existing agreements with Iran—especially after the death of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser and the rise of the Ba'ath Party, when Iraq decided to take on the role of "leader of the Arab world".

In 1969, the deputy prime minister of Iraq stated: "Iraq's dispute with Iran is in connection with Arabistan (Khuzestan) which is part of Iraq's soil and was annexed to Iran during foreign rule." Soon Iraqi radio stations began exclusively broadcasting into "Arabistan", encouraging Arabs living in Iran and even Balūchīs to revolt against the Shah of Iran's government. Basra TV stations even began showing Iran's Khuzestan province as part of Iraq's new province called Nasiriyyah, renaming all Iranian cities with Arabic names.

In 1971, Iraq broke diplomatic relations with Iran after claiming sovereignty rights over the islands of Abu Musa, Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb in the Persian Gulf, following the withdrawal of the British. Iraq then expropriated the properties of 70,000 Iranians and expelled them from its territory, after complaining to the Arab League and the UN without success.

One of the factors contributing to hostility between the two powers was a dispute over full control of the Shatt al-Arab waterway at the head of the Persian Gulf, an important channel for the oil exports of both countries.

In addition to Iraq's fomenting of separatism in Iran's Khuzestan and Iranian Balochistan provinces, both countries encouraged separatist activities by Kurdish nationalists in the other country.

In 1974 Iraq attacked Iranian forces, with heavy casualties on both sides. In 1975, United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had sanctioned Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to attack Iraq over the waterway, then under Iraqi control; soon afterward, both nations signed the Algiers Accord, where Iraq made territorial concessions — including the waterway — in exchange for normalized relations.

The relationship between Iranian and Iraqi governments briefly improved in 1978, when Iranian agents in Iraq discovered a pro-Soviet coup d'etat against the Iraqi government. When informed of this plot, Saddam Hussein, who was Vice President at the time, ordered the execution of dozens of his army officers, and to return the favor, expelled Ruhollah Khomeini, an exiled leader of clerical opposition to the Shah, from Iraq.

After the Islamic Revolution

See also: Islamic Revolution and Iranian Embassy Siege

File:IslamicRevolutionStamp.jpg

1980 Iranian stamp commemorating the Revolution: "Blood defeats the sword!" The martyrdom operations will play a central role in the war.

Iran's embassy in London was subsequently attacked by Iraqi-sponsored terrorist forces a few months prior to the war in 1980, in what came to be known as the Iranian Embassy Siege.

Saddam Hussein was keenly interested in elevating Iraq to a strong regional power. A successful invasion of Iran would make Iraq the dominant power in the Persian Gulf region, and would strengthen its lucrative oil trade.

Saddam on numerous occasions alluded to the Islamic conquest of Iran in propagating his position against Iran. For example, on 2 April 1980, half a year before the outbreak of the war, in a visit by Saddam to al-Mustansiriyyah University in Baghdad, drawing parallels with the 7th century defeat of Persia in the Battle of al-Qādisiyyah, he announced:

In your name, brothers, and on behalf of the Iraqis and Arabs everywhere we tell those Persian cowards and dwarfs who try to avenge Al-Qadisiyah that the spirit of Al-Qadisiyah as well as the blood and honor of the people of Al-Qadisiyah who carried the message on their spearheads are greater than their attempts."

The aftermath of the Iranian Revolution of 1979 was central to the conflict. The Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini believed that the oppressed Shias in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait could follow the Iranian example and turn against their governments to join a united Islamic republic. Khomeini and Iran's Islamic revolutionaries despised Saddam's secularist, Arab nationalist Ba'athist regime in particular as un-Islamic and "a puppet of Satan," and called on Iraqis to overthrow Saddam and his regime. At the same time severe officer purges (including several executions ordered by Sadegh Khalkhali, the post-revolution sharia ruler), and spare parts shortages for Iran's American-made equipment, had crippled Iran's once mighty military. The bulk of the Iranian military was made up of poorly armed, though committed, militias. Iran had minimal defenses in the Shatt al-Arab river. This along with its alienation from the West made it a tempting target to Saddam Hussein's expansionism. In particular he felt that Iranian Sunni citizens would rather join a powerful Sunni-led Iraq than remain in the Shia-dominated Iran.

Iraq started the war believing that Sunnis of Iran would join the opposing forces, failing to fully appreciate the power of Iranian nationalism over historically clan-centered differences, and the power of Iranian government control of the press. Few of the ethnic Arabs of Khuzestan or Sunnis of Iran collaborated with Iraqis.

The UN Secretary General report dated 9 December 1991 (S/23273) explicitly cites "Iraq's aggression against Iran" in starting the war and breaching International security and peace.

Timeline

September 1980: Iraqi invasion

File:Iranian Resistance.jpg

An armed Iranian woman in front of a mosque during Iraqi invasion to Khorramshahr in September-October 1981.

The Shatt al-Arab on the Iran-Iraq border.

Iraq declared war with Saddam Hussein's statement on 17th September 1980, to the recently re-instated Iraqi parliament: "The frequent and blatant Iranian violations of Iraqi sovereignty...have rendered the 1975 Algiers Agreement null and void. This river...must have its Iraqi-Arab identity restored as it was throughout history in name and in reality with all the disposed rights emanating from full sovereignty over the river." The one thing that had kept the Iranians and Iraqis from going to war over the Shatt al-Arab waterway was the agreement.

The principal aim of the campaign was the capture of the Shatt al-Arab waterway by Iraq, with an additional goal of overthrowing the revolutionary regime in Tehran. To this end, he told his generals that they would make a move into Iran, capture the Iranian province of Khuzestan, and prepare significant defenses along the front-line. This was meant to demonstrate that the target was the Shatt al-Arab and not the whole of Iran. Saddam was hoping to show the world the limited nature of his invasion by communicating that he was only interested in the area of dispute.

As part of this plan, Saddam planned to launch a number of offensives across the length and breadth of the Iran-Iraqi border. On the eve of the invasion, the Iraqis had mobilized 10 divisions against the Iranians. Despite Iran knowing of the imminent invasion, only 8 regular army divisions and one brigade had been mobilized with only four of those deployed to the border. This strategy probably stems from the fact that Iran's newly instated Islamic regime had little trust in the regular army, believing that they were a threat to the revolutionary regime. Consequently, the Iranian government attempted to boost the capabilities of militia groups, chiefly the Pasdaran and the Basij.

The two nations severed diplomatic relations in June 1980, and sporadic border clashes increased. On September 18, Iraq declared the Shatt al-Arab to be part of its territory. Iraq launched a full-scale invasion of Iran on September 22 1980, claiming as a pretext an Iranian assassination attempt on Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz.

Objectives of Iraq's invasion of Iran were:

1. Control over the Shatt al-Arab waterway
2. Acquisition of the three islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs, on the behalf of the UAE.
3. Annexation of Khuzestan to Iraq
4. Overthrow of the revolutionary regime in Tehran

The surprise offensive advanced quickly against the still disorganized Iranian forces, advancing on a wide front into Iranian territory along the Mehran-Khorramabad axis in central Iran and towards Ahvaz in the oil-rich southern province of Khuzestan.

The invasion stalls

Iraq encountered unexpected resistance, however. A preemptive strike executed by the Iraqi Air Force on the first day of the war succeeded in destroying portions of Iranian airbase infrastructure, but critically failed to significantly deplete Iran's aircraft inventory. Also, rather than turning against the Ayatollah's government as exiles had promised, the people of Iran rallied around their country and mounted a stiff resistance. An estimated 200,000 additional troops arrived at the front by November, a large proportion of them volunteers. The Iraqis soon found the Iranian military was not nearly as depleted as they had thought.

By June 1982, an Iranian counter-offensive had recovered the areas lost to Iraq earlier in the war. An especially significant battle of this counter-offensive in the Khuzestan province was the liberation of Khorramshahr from the Iraqis on May 24 1982. Hussein also played a major role in the constant battle defeats of Iraq. Although he had no real military experience, he interfered with battle plans and lost the Iraqis many battles that otherwise would have been easily won.

Iraq retreats; Iran invades Iraq

Demoralized Iraqi soldiers taken PoW at Khorramshahr.

Saddam Hussein, realising that he had no realistic hope of remaining in Iran, ordered his troops to withdraw to the international border between Iran and Iraq. He believed that his battered army would only be able to fight knowing that it was fighting for the homeland, and that they could rely upon the static defenses which had been built.

He announced that, for humanitarian reasons, he was withdrawing his army from Iran in order to help Lebanon, which had been invaded by Israel on 6 June 1982. He asked the Iranians to consider the plight of the Lebanese, although Saddam would obviously have been more concerned about avoiding an Iranian attack than the threat faced by Lebanon, and to make peace.

However, not only did the Iranians refuse to make peace, but that also increased their demands. Aside from the removal of the Saddam Hussein regime, they demanded $150 billion in war reparations and the repatriation of 100,000 Shi'ites expelled from Iraq before the war.

It is unlikely that anyone in Iran seriously expected that Iraq would accept these terms; and only offered them as a way of getting Saddam to refuse peace, thus making him continue to look like the aggressor. In fact, many within the Iranian government were demanding that the war be expanded into Iraq. On 21 June, Khomeini hinted that the expulsion of Iraqi troops would not be followed by a cessation of Iranian attacks, but by an invasion of Iraq. The following day, the Iranian Chief-of-Staff Shirazi said that the war would continue "until Saddam Hussein is overthrown so that we can pray at [the Shi'ite holy city of] Karbala and Jerusalem."

This statement was not long in being fulfilled. On 13 July, the Iranians crossed the border, in force, aiming towards the city of Basra, the second most important city in Iraq.

Iranian offensive blunders, as Iraqi resolve hardens

However, in this offensive, the Iranians encountered an Iraqi enemy which had entrenched itself in formidable defences. Unlike the hastily improvised defences that the Iraqis had manned in Iran during the 1980-1981 occupation of the conquered territories. The border defences were, by necessity, well developed even before the war; and the Iraqis were able to utilise a highly-developed network of bunkers and artillery fire-bases. Saddam had also doubled the size of the Iraqi army from 1981, 200,000 soldiers (12 divisions and 3 independent brigades), to 500,000 in 1985 (23 divisions and nine brigades).

The efforts of Saddam bore fruit. Iran had been using combined-arms operations to great effect when it was attacking the Iraqi troops in its country, and had launched the iconic human-wave attacks with great support from artillery, aircraft, and tanks. However, the increasingly strained army-Pasdaran relations meant that the Iranians were now launching human-wave assaults, with no support from other branches of the military. The superior defences of the Iraqis meant that tens of thousands of Iranian soldiers were lost in most operations after 1982, and the Iraqi defences would continue to hold in most sectors.

In the Basra offensive, five human-wave attacks were met with withering fire from the Iraqis. The boy-soldiers of the Basij were particularly hard-hit, especially since they were ordered to run into minefields, in order to clear the way for the Pasdaran brigades behind them. The Iranians were also hard-hit by the employment of gas by the Iraqis.

1983-1985: Iraq battered, but not beaten

The red line shows the Iraqi's furthest ground gains. The yellow the Iranian's ones.

File:Khamenei in battlefield.jpg

Ali Khamenei current Supreme Leader of Iran in battlefield during the Iran-Iraq war.

After the failure of their 1982 summer offensives, Iran believed that a major effort along the entire breadth of the front line would yield the victory that the Iranians desired. Perhaps, if Iran had acted on its numerical superiority, it might have been able to have achieved a break-through if it had launched an attack across all parts of the front-line at the same time. However, the organisation for that type of conflict was still lacking. Although some degree of co-operation between the Pasdaran and the regular army had been reached - meaning the Iranian militias could now rely upon some support - it was not enough.

During the course of 1983, the Iranians would launch five major assaults along the front, none meeting with substantial success.

Saddam had hoped that the mounting casualties, and the lack of progress, would force the Iranians to accept peace. However, in early 1984, the Khomeini government again re-iterated their demands for the overthrow of the Ba'ath regime. Saddam realised that a more aggressive posture would be needed to entice the Iranians to the bargaining table. He declared that eleven Iranian cities would come under attack unless Iran halted their acts of aggression by 7 February 1984.

As a way of demonstrating their answer to this ultimatum, the Iranians launched an attack against Iraqi forces along the northern sector of the front line. Although this was a minor attack, Saddam stuck to his pledge, and ordered aerial and missile attacks against the eleven cities that he had designated. The bombardment ceased on 22 February. This attack was soon followed by retaliation by Iran against urban centres as well. These exchanges become known as the first 'war of the cities'. There would be five throughout the course of the war.

The attack on the Iranian cities did not destroy the resolve of the Iranian government to fight. On 15 February, the Iranians launched a major attack against the central section of the front line, where the Second Iraqi Army Corps was deployed. 250,000 Iranians were facing 250,000 Iraqis. Of the 250,000 Iranians committed, 190,000 of those were Pasdaran and Basij soldiers, with only 60,000 regular troops engaged in the operation. However, the offensive did fall under army control, and was planned by the regular military.

From 15 to 22 February, in Operation Dawn 5, and 22 to 24 February, in Operation Dawn 6, the Iranians attempted to capture the vital town of Kut al-Amara, and to move to cut the key highway linking Baghdad and Basra. If the road had been captured, the Iraqis ability to supply and co-ordinate the defenses would have been extremely difficult. However, the Iranian forces could only come within 15 miles of the highway.

However, Operation Khaibar met with much greater success. The operation involved a number of thrusts towards the key Iraqi city of Basra. The operation started on the 24th February, and lasted until the 19th March. The Iraqi defences, having been under continuous strain since 15 February, seemed close to being conclusively broken. The Iraqis were able to stabilise the front, but not before the Iranians captured part of the Majnun Islands. Despite a heavy counter-attack by the Iraqis, coupled with the use of mustard gas and sarin nerve gas, the Iranians held their gains and would continue to hold them almost until the end of the war.

January 1985 - February 1986: Abortive offensives by Iran and Iraq

Saddam, with his armed forces now benefiting from the influx of material and financial support from Western powers such as the United States of America and France, went on the offensive for the first time since late 1980, on 28 January 1985. However, the offensive did not produce any significant gains, and the Iranians responded in kind with their own offensive on 11 March 1985, directed against Basra, which was codenamed Operation Badr. By this time, the failure of the unsupported human-wave attacks during 1984 meant that Iran was trying to develop a better working relationship between the army and the Pasdaran. The Iranian government also worked on moulding the Pasdaran units into a much more conventional fighting force. The attack did succeed in capturing a part of the Baghdad-Basra highway, the highway which had proved elusive during Operation Dawn 5 and Operation Dawn 6. Saddam responded to this strategic emergency by launching chemical attacks against the Iranian positions along the highway, and by initiating the second 'war of the cities', with a massive air and missile campaign against twenty Iranian towns, including Tehran.

The Tanker War and direct U.S. support for Iraq

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The Iranian minelayer Iran Ajr was captured by the U.S. Navy.

Donald Rumsfeld meets Saddam Hussein on 19 December - 20 December 1983. Rumsfeld visited again on 24 March 1984, the day the UN reported that Iraq had used mustard gas and tabun nerve agent against Iranian troops. The NY Times reported from Baghdad on 29 March 1984, that "American diplomats pronounce themselves satisfied with Iraq and the U.S., and suggest that normal diplomatic ties have been established in all but name."

Main article: U.S. support for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war

Starting in 1981, Iran and Iraq attacked oil tankers and merchant ships, including those of neutral nations, in an effort to deprive each other of trade. After Iraqi attacks on Iran's main oil export facility on Khark Island, Iran attacked a Kuwaiti tanker near Bahrain on May 13 1984, and a Saudi tanker in Saudi waters on May 16. Attacks on ships of noncombatant nations in the Persian Gulf sharply increased thereafter. This phase of the conflict was dubbed the "Tanker War."

In 1982 with Iranian success on the battlefield, the U.S. made its backing of Iraq more pronounced, supplying it with intelligence, economic aid, normalizing relations with the government (broken during the 1967 Six-Day War), and also supplying weapons. President Ronald Reagan decided that the United States "could not afford to allow Iraq to lose the war to Iran", and that the United States "would do whatever was necessary and legal to prevent Iraq from losing the war with Iran." President Reagan formalized this policy by issuing a National Security Decision Directive ("NSDD") to this effect in June, 1982.

Lloyd's of London, a British insurance market, estimated that the Tanker War damaged 546 commercial vessels and killed about 430 civilian mariners. The largest portion of the attacks were directed by Iran against Kuwaiti vessels, and on November 1 1986, Kuwait formally petitioned foreign powers to protect its shipping. The Soviet Union agreed to charter tankers starting in 1987, and the United States offered to provide protection for tankers flying the U.S. flag on March 7 1987 (Operation Earnest Will and Operation Prime Chance). Under international law, an attack on such ships would be treated as an attack on the United States, allowing the U.S. Navy to retaliate. This support would protect ships headed to Iraqi ports, effectively guaranteeing Iraq's revenue stream for the duration of the war.

On May 17, an Iraqi plane attacked the USS Stark (FFG 31), a Perry class frigate, killing 37 and injuring 21. However, U.S. attention was focused on isolating Iran; it criticized Iran's mining of international waters, and sponsored UN Security Council Resolution 598, which passed unanimously on July 20, under which it skirmished with Iranian forces. During the Operation Nimble Archer in October 1987, the U.S. attacked Iranian oil platforms in retaliation for an Iranian attack on the U.S.-flagged Kuwaiti tanker Sea Isle City.

On April 14 1988, the frigate USS Samuel B. Roberts was badly damaged by an Iranian mine. U.S. forces responded with Operation Praying Mantis on April 18, the United States Navy's largest engagement of surface warships since World War II. Two Iranian ships were destroyed, and an American helicopter crashed killing the two pilots.

In the course of these escorts by the U.S. Navy, the cruiser USS Vincennes shot down Iran Air Flight 655 with the loss of all 290 passengers and crew on July 3 1988. The American government claimed that the airliner had been mistaken for an Iranian F-14 Tomcat, and that the Vincennes was operating in international waters at the time and feared that it was under attack. The Iranians, however, maintain that the Vincennes was in fact in Iranian territorial waters, and that the Iranian passenger jet was turning away and increasing altitude after take-off. U.S. Admiral William J. Crowe also admitted on Nightline that the Vincennes was inside Iranian territorial waters when it launched the missiles. . The U.S. eventually paid compensation for the incident ($131,800,000)), but never apologized.

According to an investigation conducted by ABC News' Nightline, decoys were set during the war by the US Navy inside the Persian Gulf to lure out the Iranian gunboats and destroy them, and at the time USS Vincennes shot down the Iranian airline, it was performing such an operation.

See also: Iran Air Flight 655

"War of the Cities"

Toward the end of the war, the land conflict regressed into stalemate largely because neither side had enough self-propelled artillery or airpower to support ground advances.

The relatively professional Iraqi armed forces could not make headway against the far more numerous Iranian infantry. The Iranians were outmatched in towed and self-propelled artillery, which left their tanks and troops vulnerable. What followed was the Iranians substituting infantry for artillery. Both sides turned to more brutal weapons and tactics.

Iraq's air force soon began strategic bombing against Iranian cities, chiefly Tehran, starting in 1985. In response, Iran began launching SS-1 "Scud" missiles against Baghdad. Iraq did not respond in kind against Tehran until early 1988, able to deploy only air raids against the Iranian capital up until that point. In October 1986, Iraqi aircraft attacked civilian passenger trains and aircraft, including an Iran Air Boeing 737 unloading passengers at Shiraz International Airport.

In retaliation for the punishing Iranian Operation Karbala-5, an early 1987 attempt to capture Basra, over 42 days Iraq attacked 65 cities in 226 sorties bombing civilian neighborhoods. Eight Iranian cities came under the attack from Iraqi missiles. Bombings killed 65 children in an elementary school in Borujerd alone.The Iranian also responded with the scud missiles attack on Baghdad which struck a primary school there. These events became known as "the war of the cities".

Towards a ceasefire

People's Mujahedin of Iran supported by Sadam started their ten day operation after the Iranian government accepted UN Resolution 598. Casualties ranged from 2,000 to 10,000.

1987 saw a renewed wave of Iranian offensives against targets in both the north and south of Iraq. Iranian troops were stopped cold by Iraqi prepared defenses in the south in a month-and-a-half long battle for Basra (Operation Karbala-5), but met with more success later in the year in the north as Operations Nasr 4 and Karbala-10 threatened to capture the oil-rich Iraqi city of Kirkuk and other northern oilfields. However, the Iranian forces were unable to consolidate their gains and continue their advance, and so 1987 saw little land change hands. On 20 July, the Security Council of the United Nations passed the US-sponsored Resolution 598, which called for an end to fighting and a return to pre-war boundaries. Iraq, which had lost important pieces of land over the course of the war, eagerly accepted the resolution. Iran, however, was loathe to surrender its gains when total victory seemed close at hand, and so the fighting continued.

By April 1988, however, the Iraqi forces had regrouped sufficiently to begin a new series of devastating attacks on the Iranians, and in quick succession recaptured the strategic al-Faw peninsula (lost in 1986 in Operation Dawn-8) and territory around Basra and also struck deep into the Iranian north, capturing much matériel. Following these major setbacks, Iran acceded to the terms of Resolution 598. However Iraq, which had seen major victories in the end of the war, thought it could invade Iran once more, Iraqi forces managed to make small gains in Khuzestan but were halted by the Iranians and so Iraq also accepted the peace and on 20 August 1988 peace broke out.

The People's Mujahedin of Iran started their ten day operation after the Iranian government accepted UN Resolution 598. While Iraqi forces attacked Khuzestan, the Mujahedin attacked western Iran and battled the Pasdaran for Kermanshah. Close air support from the Iraqis contributed to whatever gains the Mojahedin made. However, under heavy international pressure for ending the war, Saddam Hussein withdrew his fighter aircraft and the sky opened for the Iranian airborne forces to be deployed behind Mojahedin lines. The operation ended in a Bay of Pigs style disaster for Mojahedin. Casualties ranged from 2,000 to 10,000.

See also: Operation Mersad

List of major Iranian operations during the war

1. 27 September-29 September 1981: Operation Samen-ol-A'emeh; Iran retakes Abadan.
2. 29 November-mid-December 1981: Operation Tarigh ol-Qods; Iran retakes Abadan and area north of Susangerd.
3. 21 March-30 March 1982: Operation Fath-ol-Mobeen (Operation Undeniable Victory; Iran expels Iraqi troops from Dezful-Shush area.
4. 30 April-24 May 1982: Operation Beit-ol-Moqaddas; Iran retakes Khorramshahr and drives Iraqis back across the border.
5. 14 July-28 July 1982: Operation Ramadan; Failed Iranian offensive to capture Basra.
6. 9 April-17 April 1983: Operation Valfajr-1/Dawn(-1)); Failed Iranian offensive in Ein Khosh to capture Basra-Baghdad highway.
7. 19 October-mid November 1983: Operation Valfajr-4/Dawn 4; Iranian offensive in Iraq's Kurdistan near Panjwin makes small gains.
8. 22 February-16 March 1984: Operation Kheibar; Iranian offensive captures the Iraqi Majnoon Islands in the Haur al-Hawizeh marshes.
9. 10 March-20 March 1985: Operation Badr; Unsuccessful Iranian offensive to capture the Basra-Baghdad highway.
10. 9 February-25 February 1986: Operation Valfajr-8/Dawn 8; Three-pronged Iranian offensive leads to capture of al-Faw Peninsula.
11. 2 June 1986: Operation Karbala-1.
12. 1 September 1986: Operation Karbala-2; Iranian offensive in the Hajj Umran area of Iraqi Kurdistan.
13. 9 January-26 February 1987: Operation Karbala-5; Iranian offensive in southern Iraq to capture Basra.
14. 21 June 1987: Operation Nasr 4. Iranian Operation captures Kirkuk
15. 16 March 1988: Operation Valfajr-10/Dawn 10; Iranian offensive in Iraqi Kurdistan.
16. 27 July 1988: Operation Mersad.

List of major Iraqi operations during the war

1. 22 September-mid November 1980; Iraqi invasion of Iran
2. 9 March-10 March 1986; Unsuccessful Iraqi offensive to recapture Al-Faw Peninsula.
3. 17 May 1986; Iraqi offensive captures Mehran.
4. 16 April-18 April 1988; Iraqi offensive recaptures Al-Faw Peninsula. Use of chemical weapons
5. 23 May-25 May 1988; Iraqi offensive in northern and central sectors recaptures Shalamche using chemical weapons.
6. 19 June-22 June 1988; Iraqi offensive captures Mehran.
7. 25 June 1988; Iraqi offensive recaptures Majnoon Islands.
8. 12 July 1988; Iraqi offensive retakes all Iraqi territory in the Musian border region.
9. 22 July-29 July 1988; Iraqi offensive along the entire Iran border, captures some territory in the central and southern sectors with the help of Mojahedin-e-Khalq, but fails in the northern sector.

Order of Battle

Main article: Order of battle during the Iran-Irak War

Iran's armament and support

Military armaments/technology

See also: Iran-Contra Affair

During the early years of the war, Iran's arsenal was almost entirely American-made, left over from the Imperial Armed Forces of the dethroned Shah. Iran's foreign supporters gradually came to include Syria & Libya. It purchased weaponry from North Korea and the People's Republic of China, notably the Silkworm anti-ship missile. Iran acquired weapons and parts for its Shah-era U.S. systems through covert arms transactions from officials in the Reagan Administration, first indirectly through Israel and then directly. It was hoped Iran would, in exchange, persuade several radical groups to release Western hostages, though this did not result; proceeds from the sales were diverted to the Nicaraguan Contras in what became known as the Iran-Contra Affair.

According to the report of the U.S. Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair issued in November 1987, "the sale of U.S. arms to Iran through Israel began in the summer of 1985, after receiving the approval of President Reagan." These sales included "2,008 BGM-71 TOW anti-Tank missiles, and 235 parts kits for MIM-23 Hawk surface-to-air missiles had been sent to Iran via Israel." Further shipments of up to US$2 billion of American weapons from Israel to Iran, consisting of 18 F-4 fighter-bombers, 46 A-4 Skyhawk fighter-bombers, and nearly 4,000 missiles were foiled by the U.S. Department of Justice, and "unverified reports alleged that Israel agreed to sell Iran AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, radar equipment, mortar and machinegun ammunition, field telephones, M-60 tank engines and artillery shells, and spare parts for C-130 transport planes." The London Observer also estimated that Israel's arms sales to Iran during the war totalled US$ 500 million annually, and Time Magazine reported that throughout 1981 and 1982, "the Israelis reportedly set up Swiss bank accounts to handle the financial end of the deals." For more on Israeli Hawk missile sales to Iran see. "

Aircraft

Further information: Iranian Air Force in Iran-Iraq war

During the war, Iran operated U.S.-manufactured F-4 Phantom and F-5 fighters, as well as AH-1 Cobra light attack helicopters. It also operated a number of F-14 Tomcat fighters, which, according to a few sources, proved devastating to the Iraqis in the early phases of the war. However, due to the Iranian government's estrangement from the United States, spare parts were difficult to obtain. Despite this the Iranians managed to maintain a constant presence with their Tomcats during the entire conflict, mostly due to a combination of spare parts acquired on the black market and parts made in Iran. These were supported by KC-135s, a refueling tanker based on the Boeing 367-80.

Military tactics

Perhaps the most unique and much commented-on characteristic of the war was the use of human wave attacks and suicide brigades by Iran, including the use of thousands of teenage Basij volunteers who sacrificed their lives to clear the marshes of mines. Wearing white headbands and shouting 'Shaheed, shaheed!' ('Martyr, martyr!') as they were blown up, these youths ran over fields of landmines to clear the way for Iranian ground assault. Their devotion earned the reverence of pious Iranian revolutionaries but ultimately did not overcome Iraqi defenses. To this day, the use of estesh-hadiyun (martyrdom-seekers) remains part of Iranian military doctrine.

Iraq's armament and support

Further information: Arms sales to Iraq 1973-1990, U.S. support for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war, and Iraq-gate (Gulf War)

Military armaments/technology

Iraq's army was primarily equipped with weaponry it had purchased from the Soviet Union and its satellites in the preceding decade. During the war, it purchased billions of dollars worth of advanced equipment from the Soviet Union, France, as well as from the People's Republic of China, Brazil, Egypt, Germany, and other sources (including Europe and facilities for making and/or enhancing chemical weapons). Germany along with other Western countries (among them United Kingdom, France, Spain (Explosivos Alaveses), Canada, Italy and the United States) provided Iraq with biological and chemical weapons technology and the precursors to nuclear capabilities (see below).

The sources of Iraqi arms purchases between 1970 and 1990 (10% of the world market during this period) are estimated to be:

Suppliers	in Billions (1985 $US)	% of total
Soviet Union	19.2	61
France	5.5	18
People's Republic of China	1.7	5
Brazil	1.1	4
Egypt	1.1	4
Other countries	2.9	6
Total	31.5	98.0

The U.S. sold Iraq $200 million in helicopters, which were used by the Iraqi military in the war. These were the only direct U.S.-Iraqi military sales and were valued to be about 0.6% of Iraq's conventional weapons imports during the war.

Ted Koppel of ABC Nightline reported the following, however, on June 9, 1992: "It is becoming increasingly clear that George Bush Sr., operating largely behind the scenes throughout the 1980s, initiated and supported much of the financing, intelligence, and military help that built Saddam's Iraq into [an aggressive power]" and “Reagan/Bush administrations permitted — and frequently encouraged — the flow of money, agricultural credits, dual-use technology, chemicals, and weapons to Iraq.”

According to New Yorker, the Reagan Administration began to allow Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Egypt to transfer to Iraq American howitzers, helicopters, bombs and other weapons. Reagan personally asked Italy’s Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti to channel arms to Iraq.

The United States, United Kingdom, and Germany also provided "dual use" technology (computers, engines, etc.) that allowed Iraq to expand its missile program and radar defenses. The U.S. Commerce Department, in violation of procedure, gave out licenses to companies for $1.5 billion in dual-use items to be sent to Iraq. The State Department was not informed of this. Over 1 billion of these authorized items were trucks that were never delivered. The rest consisted of advanced technology. Iraq's Soviet-made Scuds had their ranges expanded as a result.

Yugoslavia sold weapons to both countries for the entire duration of the conflict. Portugal helped both countries: it was not unusual seeing Iranian- and Iraqi-flagged ships side-by-side in Sines (a town with a deep-sea port).

Aircraft

Iraq's air force used Soviet weapons and reflected Soviet training, although it expanded and upgraded its fleet considerably as the war progressed. It conducted strategic bombing using Tupolev Tu-16 Badgers. Its fighters included the Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-21, later supplemented by large purchases of Sukhoi Su-22s and French Dassault Mirage F1s. It also deployed the Anglo-French Aérospatiale Gazelle scout helicopter and the Exocet anti-ship missile.

Chemical weapons

According to Iraq's report to the UN, the know-how and material for developing chemical weapons were obtained from firms in such countries as: the United States, West Germany, the United Kingdom, France and the People's Republic of China.

In December 2002, Iraq's 1,200 page Weapons Declaration revealed a list of Eastern and Western corporations and countries, as well as individuals, that exported a total of 17,602 tons of chemical precursors to Iraq in the past two decades. By far, the largest suppliers of precursors for chemical weapons production were in Singapore (4,515 tons), the Netherlands (4,261 tons), Egypt (2,400 tons), India (2,343 tons), and Federal Republic of Germany (1,027 tons). One Indian company, Exomet Plastics (now part of EPC Industrie) sent 2,292 tons of precursor chemicals to Iraq. The Kim Al-Khaleej firm, located in Singapore and affiliated to United Arab Emirates, supplied more than 4,500 tons of VX, sarin, and mustard gas precursors and production equipment to Iraq.

According to Iraq's declarations, it had procured 340 pieces of equipment used for the production of chemical weapons. More than half came from Germany, the remainder mostly from France, Spain, and Austria. [4] In addition, Iraq declared that it imported more than 200,000 munitions made for delivering chemicals, 75,000 came from Italy, 57,500 from Spain, 45,000 from China, and 28,500 from Egypt. [5]

Declassified U.S. government documents indicate that the U.S. government had confirmed that Iraq was using chemical weapons "almost daily" during the Iran-Iraq conflict as early as 1983. U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld even met with Saddam Hussein the same day the UN released a report that Iraq had used mustard gas and tabun nerve agent against Iranian troops. The New York Times reported from Baghdad on 29 March 1984, that "American diplomats pronounce themselves satisfied with Iraq and the U.S., and suggest that normal diplomatic ties have been established in all but name." The chairman of the Senate committee, Don Riegle, said: “The executive branch of our government approved 771 different export licenses for sale of dual-use technology to Iraq. I think it’s a devastating record”. According to the Washington Post, the CIA began in 1984 secretly to give Iraq intelligence that Iraq used to "calibrate" its mustard gas attacks on Iranian troops. In August, the CIA establishes a direct Washington-Baghdad intelligence link, and for 18 months, starting in early 1985, the CIA provided Iraq with "data from sensitive U.S. satellite reconnaissance photography...to assist Iraqi bombing raids." The Post’s source said that this data was essential to Iraq’s war effort.

In May 2003, an extended list of international companies involvements in Iraq was provided by The Independent (UK). Official Howard Teicher and Radley Gayle, stated that 31 Bell helicopters that were given to Iraq by U.S. later were used to spray chemical weapons.

Iraq's chemical weapons program was mainly assisted by German companies such as Karl Kobe, which built a chemical weapons facility disguised as a pesticide plant. Iraq’s foreign contractors, including Karl Kolb with Massar for reinforcement, built five large research laboratories, an administrative building, eight large underground bunkers for the storage of chemical munitions, and the first production buildings. 150 tons of mustard were produced in 1983. About 60 tons of Tabun were produced in 1984. Pilot-scale production of Sarin began in 1984. Germany also supplied reactors, heat exchangers, condensors and vessels. France, Austria, Canada, and Spain provided similar equipment.

The Al Haddad trading company of Tennessee delivered 60 tons of DMMP, a chemical used to make sarin, a nerve gas implicated in so-called Gulf War Syndrome. The Al Haddad trading company appears to have been an Iraqi front company. The firm was owned by Sahib Abd al-Amir al-Haddad, an Iraqi-born, naturalized American citizen. Recent stories in The New York Times and The Tennessean reported that al-Haddad was arrested in Bulgaria in November 2002 while trying to arrange an arms sale to Iraq. Al-Haddad was charged with conspiring to purchase equipment for the manufacture of a giant Iraqi cannon, a design based on the Canadian HARP program. In 1984, U.S. Customs at New York's Kennedy Airport stopped an order addressed to the Iraqi State Enterprise for Pesticide Production for 74 drums of potassium fluoride, a chemical used in the production of Sarin. The order was placed by Al-Haddad Enterprises Incorporates, owned by an individual named Sahib al-Haddad. [6]

The U.S. firm Alcolac International supplied one mustard-gas precursor, thiodiglycol, to both Iraq and Iran in violation of U.S. export laws for which it was forced to pay a fine in 1989. Overall between 300-400 tons were sent to Iraq.[7] [8] [9][10]

Biological

Iraq did not use biological weapons in the war, but built up its capability during that time.

On 25 May 1994, The U.S. Senate Banking Committee released a report in which it was stated that pathogenic, toxicological, and other biological research materials were exported to Iraq, pursuant to application and licensing by the U.S. Department of Commerce. It added: "These exported biological materials were not attenuated or weakened and were capable of reproduction." The report then detailed 70 shipments (including Anthrax Bacillus) from the United States to Iraqi government agencies over three years, concluding that "these microorganisms exported by the United States were identical to those the UN inspectors found and recovered from the Iraqi biological warfare program."

A report by Berlin's Die Tageszeitung in 2002 reported that Iraq's 11,000-page report to the UN Security Council listed 150 foreign companies that supported Saddam Hussein's WMD program. Twenty-four U.S. firms were involved in exporting arms and materials to Baghdad Donald Riegle, Chairman of the Senate committee that made the report, said, "UN inspectors had identified many United States manufactured items that had been exported from the United States to Iraq under licenses issued by the Department of Commerce, and [established] that these items were used to further Iraq's chemical and nuclear weapons development and its missile delivery system development programs." He added, "the executive branch of our government approved 771 different export licenses for sale of dual-use technology to Iraq. I think that is a devastating record."

The U.S. Centers for Disease Control sent Iraq 14 agents "with biological warfare significance," including West Nile virus, according to Riegle's investigators.

Financial support

Iraq's main financial backers were the oil-rich Persian Gulf states, most notably Saudi Arabia ($30.9 billion), Kuwait ($8.2 billion) and the United Arab Emirates ($8 billion).

The Iraq-gate scandal revealed that an Atlanta branch of Italy's largest bank, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, relying partially on U.S. taxpayer-guaranteed loans, funneled $5 billion to Iraq from 1985 to 1989. In August 1989, when FBI agents finally raided the Atlanta branch of BNL, the branch manager, Christopher Drogoul, was charged with making unauthorized, clandestine, and illegal loans to Iraq — some of which, according to his indictment, were used to purchase arms and weapons technology.

Aside from the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, and ABC's Ted Koppel, the Iraq-gate story never picked up much steam, even though the U.S. Congress became involved with the scandal. This scandal is covered in Alan Friedman's book "The Spider's Web: The Secret History of How the White House Illegally Armed Iraq."

Beginning in September 1989, the Financial Times laid out the first charges that BNL, relying heavily on U.S. government-guaranteed loans, was funding Iraqi chemical and nuclear weapons work. For the next two and a half years, the Financial Times provided the only continuous newspaper reportage (over 300 articles) on the subject. Among the companies shipping militarily useful technology to Iraq under the eye of the U.S. government, according to the Financial Times, were Hewlett-Packard, Tektronix, and Matrix Churchill, through its Ohio branch

In all, Iraq received $35 billion in loans from the West and between $30 and $40 billion from the Gulf States during the 1980s. [11]

Comparison of Iraqi and Iranian military strength

Power of Iranian and Iraqi armies were unbalanced. The strength of Iraq and Iran is seen on the table by The Economist estimates:

Imbalance of Power (1980-1987)	Iraq	Iran
Tanks in 1980	2700	1740
Tanks in 1987	4500	1000
Fighter Aircraft in 1980	332	445
Fighter Aircraft in 1987	500+	65*
Helicopters in 1980	40	500
Helicopters in 1987	150	60
Artillery in 1980	1000	1000+
Artillery in 1987	4000+	1000+

Weapons of mass destruction

See also: Halabja poison gas attack

File:Chemical weapon2.jpg

Chemical weapons which were used by Saddam Hussein killed and injured numerous Iranians and Kurds.

With more than 100,000 Iranian victims of Iraq's chemical weapons during the eight-year war, Iran is one the countries most severely afflicted by weapons of mass destruction.

The Simon Wiesenthal Center, a Jewish organization dedicated to preserving the memory of the Holocaust, released a list of U.S. companies and their exports to Iraq.

The official estimate does not include the civilian population contaminated in bordering towns or the children and relatives of veterans, many of whom have developed blood, lung and skin complications, according to the Organization for Veterans of Iran. According to a 2002 article in the Star-Ledger:

"Nerve gas agents killed about 20,000 Iranian soldiers immediately, according to official reports. Of the 90,000 survivors, some 5,000 seek medical treatment regularly and about 1,000 are still hospitalized with severe, chronic conditions. Many others were hit by mustard gas..."

Iraq also used chemical weapons on Iranian civilians, killing many in villages and hospitals. Many civilians suffered severe burns and health problems, and still suffer from them. Furthermore, 308 Iraqi missiles were launched at population centers inside Iranian cities between 1980 and 1988 resulting in 12,931 casualties.

On 21 March 1986, the United Nations Security Council made a declaration stating that "members are profoundly concerned by the unanimous conclusion of the specialists that chemical weapons on many occasions have been used by Iraqi forces against Iranian troops and the members of the Council strongly condemn this continued use of chemical weapons in clear violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 which prohibits the use in war of chemical weapons." The United States was the only member who voted against the issuance of this statement.

According to retired Colonel Walter Lang, senior defense intelligence officer for the United States Defense Intelligence Agency at the time, "the use of gas on the battlefield by the Iraqis was not a matter of deep strategic concern" to Reagan and his aides, because they "were desperate to make sure that Iraq did not lose." He claimed that the Defense Intelligence Agency "would have never accepted the use of chemical weapons against civilians, but the use against military objectives was seen as inevitable in the Iraqi struggle for survival", however, despite this allegation, Reagan’s administration did not stop aiding Iraq after receiving reports affirming the use of poison gas on Kurdish civilians.

There is great resentment in Iran that the international community helped Iraq develop its chemical weapons arsenal and armed forces, and also that the world did nothing to punish Saddam's Ba'athist regime for its use of chemical weapons against Iran throughout the war — particularly since the US and other western powers soon felt obliged to oppose the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and eventually invade Iraq itself to remove Saddam Hussein.

The Defense Intelligence Agency also accused Iran of using chemical weapons. These allegations however, have been disputed. Joost Hiltermann, who was the principal researcher for Human Rights Watch between 1992-1994, conducted a two year study, including a field investigation in Iraq, capturing Iraqi government documents in the process.

According to Hiltermann, the literature on the Iran-Iraq war reflects a number of allegations of chemical weapons use by Iran, but these are "marred by a lack of specificity as to time and place, and the failure to provide any sort of evidence". Gary Sick and Lawrence Potter call the allegations against Iran "mere assertions" and state: "no persuasive evidence of the claim that Iran was the primary culprit [of using chemical weapons] was ever presented". Policy consultant and author Joseph Tragert also states: "Iran did not retaliate with Chemical weapons, probably because it did not possess any at the time".

At his trial in December 2006, Saddam Hussein said he would take responsibility "with honour" for any attacks on Iran using conventional or chemical weapons during the 1980-1988 war but he took issue with charges he ordered attacks on Iraqis.

• Further reading on surviving veterans of these weapons:

Aftermath

Cemetery for Iranian fallen during the war in Yazd.

The war was disastrous for both countries, stalling economic development and disrupting oil exports. It cost Iran an estimated 1 million casualties, and $350 billion. Iraq was left with serious debts to its former Arab backers, including US$14 billion loaned by Kuwait, a debt which contributed to Saddam's 1990 decision to invade.

Much of the oil industry in both countries was damaged in air raids. Iran's production capacity has yet to fully recover from the damages during the war.

The Iraqi government commemorated the war with various monuments, including the Hands of Victory and the Al-Shaheed Monument, both in Baghdad.

The war left the borders unchanged. Two years later, as war with the western powers loomed, Saddam recognized Iranian rights over the eastern half of the Shatt al-Arab, a reversion to the status quo ante bellum that he had repudiated a decade earlier.

The war was extremely costly, one of the deadliest wars since World War II (see list of wars and disasters by death toll). Prisoners taken by both sides were not released until up to 10 years after the conflict was over.

Declassified US intelligence available explores both the domestic and foreign implications of Iran's apparent (in 1982) victory over Iraq in their then two-year old war. Iran especially had the opportunity to cut off Iraq from the Persian Gulf at the Al-Faw Peninsula and win the war in the late stages of the conflict.

Final ruling

On 9 December 1991, the UN Secretary-General reported the following to the UN Security Council:

"That Iraq's explanations do not appear sufficient or acceptable to the international community is a fact. Accordingly, the outstanding event under the violations referred to is the attack of 22 September 1980, against Iran, which cannot be justified under the charter of the United Nations, any recognized rules and principles of international law or any principles of international morality and entails the responsibility for conflict."

"Even if before the outbreak of the conflict there had been some encroachment by Iran on Iraqi territory, such encroachment did not justify Iraq's aggression against Iran—which was followed by Iraq's continuous occupation of Iranian territory during the conflict—in violation of the prohibition of the use of force, which is regarded as one of the rules of jus cogens."

"On one occasion I had to note with deep regret the experts' conclusion that "chemical weapons had been used against Iranian civilians in an area adjacent to an urban centre lacking any protection against that kind of attack" (s/20134, annex). The Council expressed its dismay on the matter and its condemnation in resolution 620 (1988), adopted on 26 August 1988."

See also

• History of Iraq
• Military of Iraq
• Saddam's trial and Iran-Iraq War
• History of Iran
• Military of Iran
• Military history of Iran
• Battle of al-Qādisiyyah
• Frans Van Anraat
• Iran-Israel relations
• US-Iran relations
• Iran Ajr, the minelaying ship captured by the U.S.
• Iran-Contra Affair
• Hands of Victory
• Three Whom God Should Not Have Created: Persians, Jews, and Flies
• Algiers Agreement (1975)
• Morteza Avini, prominent photographer of the Iran-Iraq war

External links

• Documentary about the war
• List of US companies and countries that sold chemical weapons to Iraq
• More indepth reading, includes many links
• Video footage from the war
• Iraqi nerve agents
• Paul Reynolds. How Saddam could embarrass the West, BBC, December 16 2003. (regarding foreign powers which armed Iraq)
• Global map of countries who took sides in the Iran-Iraq war
• Kendal Nezan. When our 'friend' Saddam was gassing people, Le Monde Diplomatique, March 1998.
• Robert Fisk. Poison gas from Germany, The Independent, December 30 2000.
• Robert Fisk A dictator created then destroyed by America, The Independent, December 30 2006.
• Lev Lafayette. Who armed Saddam?, World History Archives, July 26 2002.
• Norm Dixon. How the U.S. armed Saddam with Chemical Weapons, Green Left Weekly, August 28 2002.
• Neil Mackay, F. Arbuthnot. How did Saddam get his Chemical Weapons?, Sunday Herald, September 8 2002.
• U.S. helped Saddam acquire Biological Weapons, Congressional Record, September 20 2002.
• Eric Margolis. British helped Saddam develop biological weapons, The American Conservative, October 7 2002.
• Robert Fisk. America wants us to forget about the sources of Saddam's WMD, The Independent, October 8 2002.
• Robert Fisk. Did Saddam's army test poison gas on missing 5000?, The Independent, December 13 2002.
• Elaine Sciolino. Iraq WMD condemned, but West once looked the other way, New York Times, February 13 2003.
• Paul Bond. British built Chemical Weapons plant in Iraq, World Socialist Web Site, March 13 2003.
• Tom Drury. How Iraq built its weapons programs: with help from the West, St. Petersburg Times, March 16, 2003.
• Iraqi scientist reports on German, other help for Iraq Chemical Weapons program, Al-Zaman, December 1 2003.
• Elaine Sciolino. Saddam's gas victims blame the West, New York Times, February 14 2003.
• Eddie Davers. Australia's support for Saddam in the 1980s, Overland, Autumn 2003.
• Alan Maass. When the U.S. supported Saddam: The crimes of a U.S. ally, Socialist Worker, January 2, 2004.
• Joseph Kay, A. Lefebvre. The diplomacy of imperialism: Washington-Saddam connection, World Socialist Web Site, March 19 2004.
• Alex Lefebvre. The diplomacy of imperialism: Reagan administration deepens ties with Saddam, World Socialist Web Site, March 24 2004.
• Alex Lefebvre. The diplomacy of imperialism: U.S. financial assistance for Saddam in the 1980s, World Socialist Web Site, March 26 2004.
• Joseph Kay. The diplomacy of imperialism: The end of the Iran-Iraq war, World Socialist Web Site, March 29 2004.
• Joseph Kay, A. Lefebvre. The diplomacy of imperialism: American policy after the Iran-Iraq war, World Socialist Web Site, April 2 2004.
• Robert Fisk. When I reported Saddam's use of mustard gas, British government told me to stop criticizing our ally, Saddam, The Independent, April 10 2004.
• Norm Dixon. How Reagan armed Saddam with Chemical Weapons, CounterPunch, June 17 2004.
• Jacob Hornberger. Reagan’s WMD connection to Saddam, Future of Freedom Foundation, June 18 2004.
• Aaron Glantz. The West should go on trial with Saddam, Inter Press Service, June 18 2004.
• 100,000 Iranians are victims of chemical weapons, supplied by the West, IRNA, June 30, 2004.
• Eric Margolis. Put Saddam's backers on trial, Foreign Correspondent, December 20 2004.
• Dutchman charged for selling chemicals to Saddam, BBC, March 18, 2005.
• Iranian survivors of nerve gas attack testify in Chemical Frans' trial, IRNA, December 1, 2005.
• Dutchman know the chemicals were for nerve agents, Agence France-Presse, December 3, 2005.
• Trial Watch: Frans Van Anraat
• Chemical Frans: Saddam's Dutch link, BBC, December 23, 2005.
• Jeff Moore. Saddam: Made in the USA, Bainbridge Neighbors for Peace.
• Shaking hands with Saddam: U.S. supports for Iraq in the 1980s, U.S. National Security Archive.
• A report on Iranian victims of Iraqi blister agents, Medical Management of Chemical Casualties
• Martsching, Brad. "Iran-Iraq War and Waterway Claims," American University Inventory of Conflict & Environment, May 1998.
• Center for Strategic and International Studies: The Lessons of Modern War: Volume Two - The Iran-Iraq Conflict, with Abraham R. Wagner, Westview, Boulder, 1990.
• Center for Strategic and International Studies: Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iran and Iraq , March 27 2000.
• GlobalSecurity.org: Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988)
• United States Marine Corps: FMFRP 3-203 - Lessons Learned: Iran-Iraq War, 10 December 1990.
• A timeline of U.S. support for Saddām against Iran
• The statement of Henry B. Gonzalez, Chairman, House Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs on Iraq-gate
• Center for Nonproliferation Studies: Foreign Suppliers to Iraq's Biological Weapons Program
• And more sources:

Iranian sources

• John King. Arming Iraq: A Chronology of U.S. Direct Involvement, Iran Chamber Society, March 2003
• Iran Veterans Affairs Organization
• Memoirs, photos, and essays about the war, Iranian.com.
• Isfahan's War Veterans Foundation.
  • Pictures from the foundation's war memorial museum: [12]
• Islamic Republic News Agency, Sacred Defense Epic
• sajed.ir The Official site of Holy Defiance - Iraq-Iran War 1980-88