Iraq War

This article is about a war beginning in 2003-Today, for other uses Iraq war (disambiguation).

Iraq War
Part of the U.S. "War on Terrorism"
U.S. troops pass by burning oil fields while convoying to Al Jawala, Iraq, during an operation.
Date March 18, 2003 to Present Location Iraq Result Conflict ongoing Overthrow of Ba'athist government and capture of Saddam Hussein. Occupation of Iraq by coalition forces. Emergence of Iraqi insurgency and possible outbreak of civil war in Iraq. Massive civilian casualties Widespread damage to Iraqi infrastructure Privatization of Iraqi services in ongoing attempt to reconstruct Iraq Election of a new government
Belligerents
Insurgent Forces: Ba'athist Iraq Ba'ath Loyalists Al-Qaeda in Iraq Mahdi Army Other insurgent groups and militias	Coalition Forces: United States United Kingdom Australia New Iraqi Army Kurdish forces Multinational forces in Iraq
Commanders and leaders
Saddam Hussein Abu Musab al-Zarqawi Abu Ayyub al-Masri Moqtada al-Sadr	Nouri al-Maliki George W. Bush Tommy Franks George Casey Tony Blair Brian Burridge Peter Wall
Strength
Iraqi 375,000+ regular forces Sunni Insurgents 60,000~ Mahdi Army 25,000 Badr Organization 4-10,000 al Qaeda/others 1,300+	Coalition 315,000 invasion 162,000 current Contractors ~48,000 Kurds 50,000 (peak) New Iraqi Army 129,760 Iraqi Police 79-140,000
Casualties and losses
Iraqi military dead (Saddam-era): 4,895-6,370 Insurgents dead: No verifiable tally.	Iraqi Security Forces dead (post-Saddam era): 6,694 (Media source, low estimate) Iraqi Security Forces wounded: unknown Coalition dead (inc. 2,948 US, 126 UK, 121 other, 647 contractors): 3,842 Coalition Missing or Captured (US 2): 2 Coalition Wounded (inc. 22,032 U.S., 891+ UK, 3,963+ contractors): 26,886
*Total deaths (all Iraqis) Johns Hopkins: 392,979 - 942,636 War-related and criminal violence deaths (all Iraqis) Iraq Health Minister: 100,000-150,000 War-related and criminal violence deaths (civilians) Iraq Body Count-english language media only: 50,195-55,678
*Total deaths (all Iraqis) include all excess deaths due to increased lawlessness, degraded infrastructure, poor healthcare, etc. For more info, casualty estimates, and explanations for the wide variation in results, see: Casualties of the conflict in Iraq since 2003

The Iraq War (2003 to the present), also known as the Second Gulf War (and by the U.S. military as Operation Iraqi Freedom and the UK military as Operation TELIC), started with the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Subsequent occupation of Saddam Hussein-led Ba'athist Iraq by a United States-led coalition has resulted in ongoing asymmetric warfare between resistance forces and coalition forces. The New Iraqi Army was created to replace the old one that was disbanded after the U.S. led invasion. In the midst of fighting between resistance, coalition, and Iraqi forces, sectarian civil war between the majority Shia and minority Sunni populations continues today. The causes and consequences of the war remain controversial.

Timeline of the War

Prior to invasion

No-fly zone detail

Prior to invasion, the United States and other coalition forces involved in the 1991 Persian Gulf War had been engaged in a low-level conflict with Iraq, by enforcing the two Iraqi no-fly zones in the north and the south of the country. Iraqi air-defense installations repeatedly targeted American and British air patrols and were often engaged by the coalition aircraft shortly afterwards. Approximately nine months after the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. initiated Operation Southern Focus as a change to its response strategy, by increasing the overall number of missions and selecting targets throughout the no-fly zones in order to disrupt the military command structure in Iraq.

The weight of bombs dropped increased from none in March 2002 and 0.3 in April 2002 to between 8 and 14 tons per month in May-August, reaching a pre-war peak of 54.6 tons in September - prior to Congress' 11 October authorization of the invasion. In retaliation for the Iraqi's now-daily air defense attacks on coalition aircraft, the September attacks included a 5 September 100-aircraft attack on the main air defence site in western Iraq. According to an editorial by Michael Smith for the New Statesman, this was "Located at the furthest extreme of the southern no-fly zone, far away from the areas that needed to be patrolled to prevent attacks on the Shias; it was destroyed not because it was a threat to the patrols, but to allow allied special forces operating from Jordan to enter Iraq undetected." U.S. military personnel stationed at Southern Watch headquarters during this time, recall that this attack, on this particular Iraqi air defense unit, was taken solely in reaction to Iraq's continued attack on coalition aircraft operating in compliance with the UN-mandated overflights of the Iraq "no-fly" zone.

Further information:

• Governments' pre-war positions on invasion of Iraq
• Public relations preparations for 2003 invasion of Iraq
• The UN Security Council and the Iraq war
• American government position on invasion of Iraq
• Legitimacy of the 2003 invasion of Iraq

2003: Invasion

Main article: 2003 invasion of Iraq

see also: Military operations of the Iraq War for a list of all Coalition operations for this period, Iraq War order of battle

The 2003 invasion of Iraq began on March 19, under the U.S. codename "Operation Iraqi Freedom." The U.K. military's codename for their participation in the invasion was called Operation Telic. The coalition forces cooperated with Kurdish peshmerga forces in the north. Approximately forty other nations, in the U.S. dubbed "coalition of the willing", also participated by providing equipment, services and security as well as special forces. This March 19, 2003, invasion marked the beginning of what is commonly referred to as the Iraq War.

May 2003: "End of Major Combat"

Map of the Sunni Triangle

Main article: Post-invasion Iraq, 2003–2006

On May 1, 2003, President Bush staged a dramatic visit to the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln while the ship was a few miles west of San Diego. The Lincoln was on its way home to Everett, Washington from a long deployment which had included service in the Persian Gulf. The visit climaxed at sunset with his now well-known "Mission Accomplished" speech. This nationally-televised speech was delivered before the sailors and airmen on the flight deck. Bush essentially declared victory at this time due to the defeat of Iraq's conventional forces (even though Saddam Hussein was at large and significant pockets of resistance remained).

After Bush's speech in May of 2003, the coalition military noticed a gradually increasing flurry of attacks on their troops in various regions, especially the "Sunni Triangle". In the initial chaos after the fall of the Iraqi government, there was massive looting of infrastructure, including government buildings, official residences, museums, banks, and military depots. According to The Pentagon, 250,000 tons (of 650,000 tons total) of ordnance was looted, providing a significant source of ammunition for the Iraqi insurgency. The hundreds of weapons caches already created by the conventional Iraqi army and Republican Guard further strengthened these looted supplies for the insurgents.

At first the resistance stemmed from fedayeen and loyalists of Saddam Hussein or the Ba'ath Party, but soon religious radicals and Iraqis angered by the occupation contributed to the insurgency. The insurgents are generally known to the Coalition forces as "Anti-Iraqi Forces."

The initial insurgency in Iraq was concentrated in, but not limited to, an area referred to by Western media and the occupying forces as the Sunni triangle. This location includes Baghdad. The three provinces that had the highest number of attacks were Baghdad, Anbar, and Salah Ad Din. -Those 3 provinces account for 35% of the population, but are responsible for 73% of U.S. military deaths (as of December 5, 2006), and an even higher percentage of recent U.S. military deaths (about 80%) . This resistance has been described as a type of guerrilla warfare. Insurgent tactics include mortars, missiles, suicide bombers, snipers (cf. Juba, the Baghdad Sniper), improvised explosive devices (IEDs), roadside bombs, car bombs, small arms fire (usually with assault rifles), and RPGs (rocket-propelled grenades), as well as sabotage against the oil, water, and electrical infrastructure.

American soldier and an Iraqi child

The post-invasion environment began after the Hussein regime had been overthrown. It centers on Coalition and U.N. efforts to establish a stable democratic state capable of defending itself and holding itself together and overcoming insurgent attacks and internal divisions.

Coalition military forces launched several operations around Tigris River peninsula and in the Sunni Triangle. A series of similar operations were launched throughout the summer in the Sunni Triangle. Toward the end of 2003, the intensity and pace of insurgent attacks began to increase. A sharp surge in guerrilla attacks ushered in an insurgent effort that was termed the "Ramadan Offensive", as it coincided with the beginning of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. Coalition forces brought to bear the use of air power for the first time since the end of the invasion.

Suspected ambush sites and mortar launching positions struck from the air and with artillery fire. Surveillance of major routes, patrols, and raids on suspected insurgents were stepped up. In addition, two villages, including Saddam’s birthplace of al-Auja and the small town of Abu Hishma were wrapped in barbed wire and carefully monitored. On July 22, 2003, during a raid by the U.S. 101st Airborne Division and soldiers from Task Force 20, Saddam Hussein's sons (Uday and Qusay) and one of his grandsons were killed.

December 2003: Saddam captured

In the wave of intelligence information fueling the raids on remaining Ba'ath Party members connected to insurgency, Saddam Hussein himself was captured on December 13 2003 on a farm near Tikrit in Operation Red Dawn. The operation was conducted by the U.S. Army's 4th Infantry Division and members of Task Force 121.

With the capture of Saddam and a drop in the number of insurgent attacks (an average of 18 a day), some concluded the multinational forces were prevailing in the fight against the insurgency. With the weather growing cooler, Coalition forces were able to operate in full armor which reduced their casualty rate. The provisional government began training a security force intended to defend critical infrastructure, and the United States promised over $20 billion in reconstruction money in the form of credit against Iraq's future oil revenues. Of this, less than half a billion dollars had been spent in 10 months after it had been promised. Oil revenues were also used for rebuilding schools and for work on the electrical and refining infrastructure.

However, the failure to restore basic services to above pre-war levels, where over a decade of sanctions, bombing, corruption, and decaying infrastructure had left major cities functioning at much-reduced levels, also contributed to local anger at the IPA government headed by an executive council. On July 2 2003, President Bush declared that American troops would remain in Iraq in spite of the attacks, challenging the insurgents with "My answer is, bring 'em on", a line the President later expressed misgivings about having used. In the summer of 2003, the multinational forces focused on hunting down the remaining leaders of the former regime, culminating in the shooting deaths of Saddam's two sons in July. In all, over 300 top leaders of the former regime were killed or captured, as well as numerous lesser functionaries and military personnel.

Shortly after the capture of Saddam, elements left out of the Coalition Provisional Authority began to agitate for elections and the formation of an Iraqi Interim Government. Most prominent among these was the Shia cleric Ali al-Sistani. The United States and the Coalition Provisional Authority it helped install opposed allowing democratic elections at this time, preferring instead to eventually hand-over power to an unelected group of Iraqis. (The Guardian, January 19, 2004, free archived version at: http://www.commondreams.org/views04/0119-08.htm, last visited Nov. 21, 2006). More insurgents stepped up their activities. The two most turbulent centers were the area around Fallujah and the poor Shia sections of cities from Baghdad to Basra in the south.

2004: The Insurgency expands

see also: Military operations of the Iraq War for a list of all Coalition operations for this period

US Army (USA) Soldiers assigned to 2-7 Cavalry, 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 1st Cavalry Division, rush a wounded Soldier from Apache Troop to a waiting U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) CH-46E Sea Knight helicopter during operation in Fallujah, Iraq. Date Shot: 12 Nov 2004.

The start of 2004 was marked by a relative lull in violence. Insurgent forces reorganized during this time, studying the multinational forces' tactics and planning a renewed offensive. Guerrilla attacks were less intense. However, in late 2004 foreign fighters from around the Middle East as well as al-Qaeda in Iraq (an affiliated al-Qaeda group), led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi would help to drive the insurgency.

As the insurgent activity increased, there was a distinct change in targeting from the coalition forces towards the new Iraqi Security Forces, as hundreds of Iraqi civilians and police were killed over the next few months in a series of massive bombings. One hypothesis for these increased bombings is that the relevance of Saddam Hussein and his followers was diminishing in direct proportion to the influence of radical Islamists, both foreign and Iraqi. An organized Sunni insurgency, with deep roots and both nationalist and Islamist motivations, was becoming more powerful throughout Iraq. The Mahdi Army also began launching attacks on coalition targets in an attempt to seize control from Iraqi security forces. The southern and central portions of Iraq were beginning to erupt in urban guerrilla combat as multinational forces attempted to keep control and prepared for a counteroffensive.

The coalition and the Coalition Provisional Authority decided to face the growing insurgency with a pair of assaults: one on Fallujah, the center of the "Mohammed's Army of Al-Ansar", and another on Najaf, home of an important mosque that had become the focal point for the Mahdi Army and its activities. Just before the attack on Fallujah, four private military contractors, working for Blackwater USA, were ambushed, murdered and their corpses mutilated by a large crowd, receiving a great deal of media attention. The attention elicited a violent reaction from Donald Rumsfeld who then ordered Lt. General Conway to attack Fallujah at the earliest opportunity.

April 2004: The First Battle of Fallujah

After this incident, the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force began plans to re-establish a coalition presence in Fallujah. On April 4, the multinational forces began assaults to clear Fallujah of insurgents. On April 9, the multinational force allowed more than 70,000 women, children and elderly residents to leave the besieged city, reportedly also allowing males of military age to leave. Meanwhile, insurgents were taking advantage of the lull in combat to prepare defenses for a second assault. On April 10, the military declared a unilateral truce to allow for humanitarian supplies to enter Fallujah. Troops pulled back to the outskirts of the city; local leaders reciprocated the ceasefire, although lower-level intense fighting on both sides continued.

The usage by the U.S. of white phosphorus in Fallujah attracted controversy. In the documentary "Fallujah: The Hidden Massacre", aired on the Italian state television network RAI, a former soldier testified "I saw the burned bodies of women and children. The phosphorus explodes and forms a plume. Who ever is within a 150 metre radius has no hope." The U.S. State department first dismissed such claims, but was later corrected in other reports. Lt Col Barry Venable stated to the BBC, "it is an incendiary weapon and may be used against enemy combatants." According to Protocol III of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, white phosphorus can be used, but only against enemy combatants and not civilians. The Independent later reported that "there remain widespread reports of civilians suffering extensive burn injuries. While U.S. commanders insist they always strive to avoid civilian casualties, the story of the battle of Fallujah highlights the intrinsic difficulty of such an endeavour."

When the Iraqi Governing Council protested against the U.S. assault to retake Fallujah, the U.S. military halted its efforts. In the April battle for Fallujah, Coalition troops killed about 600 insurgents and a number of civilians, while 40 Americans died and hundreds were wounded in a fierce battle. The Marines were ordered to stand-down and cordon off the city, maintaining a perimeter around Fallujah. A compromise was reached in order to ensure security within Fallujah itself by creating the local "Fallujah Brigade". While the Marines attacking had a clear advantage in ground firepower and air support, LtGen Conway decided to accept a truce and a deal which put a former Ba'athist general in complete charge of the town's security. The Fallujah Brigade's responsibility was to secure Fallujah and put a stop to insurgent mortar attacks on the nearby U.S. Marine bases. This compromise soon fell apart and insurgent attacks returned, causing Marine commanders to begin preparations for a second attack in the coming fall. By the end of the spring uprising, the cities of Fallujah, Samarra, Baquba, and Ramadi had been left under guerrilla control with coalition patrols in the cities at a minimum.

Early-mid 2004 – the Shi'ite south

Meanwhile, the fighting continued in the Shiite south, and Italian and Polish forces were having increasing difficulties retaining control over Nasiriya and Najaf. United States Marines were then shifted there to put down the overt rebellion and proceeded to rout Muqtada al-Sadr's Shiite militia. In all, April, May and early June saw more fighting. Over the next three months, the multinational forces took back the southern cities. Also, various insurgent leaders entered into negotiations with the provisional government to lay down arms and enter the political process.

June 2004: Sovereignty transferred to Iraqi caretaker government

Toward the end of June 2004, the Coalition Provisional Authority transferred the "sovereignty" of Iraq to a caretaker government, whose first act was to begin the trial of Saddam Hussein. However, fighting continued in the form of the Iraqi insurgency. The new government began the process of moving towards open elections, though the insurgency and the lack of cohesion within the government itself, had led to delays. Militia leader Muqtada al-Sadr took control of Najaf and, after negotiations broke down, the government asked the United States for help dislodging him.

Through the months of July and August, a series of skirmishes in and around Najaf culminated with the Imam Ali Mosque itself under siege, only to have a peace deal brokered by Grand Ayatollah Sistani in late August. The new Iraq Grain Board has started to import wheat from Australia Wheat Board which had been long banned by Saddam Hussein.

November 2004: The Second Battle of Fallujah

The First Battle of Fallujah in April 2004 created an area of extreme instability and a de facto insurgent safe zone. After several months of this situation, in November 2004 coalition forces attacked and successfully captured Fallujah in the Second Battle of Fallujah. This battle resulted in the reputed death of over 5,000 insurgent fighters. The U.S. Marines (the main coalition force in combat) also took substantial casualties with 95 dead and around 500 wounded in action. According to local sources, hundreds of civilians were also killed and much of the city was destroyed in the battle.

2005: Iraqi elections and aftermath

Main article: Iraqi legislative election, 2005

File:Iraqwarimage.jpg

An Iraqi Army unit prepares to board a Task Force Baghdad UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter for a counterinsurgency mission in Baghdad.

On January 31, an election for a government to draft a permanent constitution took place. Although some violence and lack of widespread Sunni Arab participation marred the event, most of the eligible Kurd and Shia populace participated. On February 4, Paul Wolfowitz announced that 15,000 U.S. troops whose tours of duty had been extended in order to provide election security would be pulled out of Iraq by the next month. February, March and April proved to be relatively peaceful months compared to the carnage of November and January, with insurgent attacks averaging 30 a day from the prior average of 70.

Hopes for a quick end to an insurgency and a withdrawal of U.S. troops were dashed at the advent of May, Iraq's bloodiest month since the invasion by U.S. forces in March and April of 2003. Suicide bombers, believed to be mainly disheartened Iraqi Sunni Arabs, Syrians and Saudis, tore through Iraq. Their targets were often Shia gatherings or civilian concentrations mainly of Shias. As a result, over 700 Iraqi civilians died in that month, as well as 79 U.S. soldiers.

During early and mid-May, the U.S. also launched Operation Matador, an assault by around 1,000 Marines in the ungoverned region of western Iraq. Its goal was the closing of suspected insurgent supply routes of volunteers and material from Syria, and with the fight they received their assumption proved correct. Fighters armed with flak jackets (unseen in the insurgency before this time) and using sophisticated tactics met the Marines, eventually inflicting 31 U.S. casualties by the operation's end, and suffering 125 casualties themselves. The Marines were unable to recapture the region due to their limited numbers and the continual insurgent IED attacks and ambushes. The operation continued all the way to the Syrian border, where they were forced to stop (Syrian residents living near the border heard the American bombs very clearly during the operation). The vast majority of these armed and trained insurgents quickly dispersed before the U.S. could bring the full force of its firepower on them, as it did in Fallujah.

August 2005: Increasing instability and renewed fighting

On August 14, 2005 the Washington Post quoted one anonymous U.S. senior official expressing that "the United States no longer expects to see a model new democracy, a self-supporting oil industry or a society in which the majority of people are free from serious security or economic challenges... 'What we expected to achieve was never realistic given the timetable or what unfolded on the ground'". On September 22, 2005, Prince Saud al-Faisal, the Saudi foreign minister, said that he had warned the Bush administration in recent days that Iraq was hurtling toward disintegration, and that the election planned for December was unlikely to make any difference. U. S. officials immediately made statements rejecting this belief .

December 2005: Iraqi legislative election

Main article: Iraqi legislative election, December 2005

Following the ratification of the Constitution of Iraq on October 15 2005, a general election was held on 15 December to elect a permanent 275-member Iraqi National Assembly.

2006: Sectarian violence and possible outbreak of civil war

The beginning of 2006 was marked by government creation talks, growing sectarian violence, and continuous anti-coalition attacks. The United Nations has recently described the environment in Iraq as a "civil war-like situation." A 2006 study by the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health has estimated that more than 601,000 Iraqis have died in violence since the U.S. invasion and that fewer than one third of these deaths came at the hands of Coalition forces. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Iraqi government estimate that more than 365,000 Iraqis have been displaced since the bombing of the al-Askari Mosque, bringing the total number of Iraqi refugees to more than 1.6 million.

February 2006: Al-Askari shrine bombing and Sunni-Shia fighting

See Al Askari Mosque bombing

File:CSA-2006-10-20-101059.jpg

A U.S. soldier with M240 machine gun on patrol in Diwaniyah.

On February 22 2006, at 6:55 a.m. local time (0355 UTC) two bombs were set off by five to seven men dressed as personnel of the Iraqi Special forces who entered the Al Askari Mosque during the morning. Explosions occurred at the mosque, effectively destroying its golden dome and severely damaging the mosque. Several men, one wearing a military uniform, had earlier entered the mosque, tied up the guards there and set explosives, resulting in the blast.

Shiites across Iraq expressed their anger by destroying Sunni mosques and killing dozens. Religious leaders of both sides called for calm amid fears this could erupt into a long-feared Sunni-Shia civil war in Iraq.

On March 2 the director of the Baghdad morgue fled Iraq explaining, "7,000 people have been killed by death squads in recent months." [2] The Boston Globe reported that around eight times the number of Iraqis killed by terrorist bombings during March 2006 were killed by sectarian death squads during the same period. A total of 1,313 were killed by sectarian militias while 173 were killed by suicide bombings.[3] The LA Times later reported that about 3,800 Iraqis were killed by sectarian violence in Baghdad alone during the first three months of 2006.[4] During April 2006, morgue numbers showed that 1,091 Baghdad residents were killed by sectarian executions.[5] Insurgencies, frequent terrorist attacks and sectarian violence led to harsh criticism of U.S. Iraq policy and fears of a failing state and civil war. The concerns were expressed by several U.S. think tanks [6] [7] [8] [9] as well as the U.S. ambassador to Iraq, Zalmay Khalilzad. [10]

In early 2006, a handful of high-ranking retired generals began to demand United States Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's resignation due in part to the aforementioned chaos that resulted from his management of the war.

In September 2006, The Washington Post reported that the commander of the Marine forces in Iraq filed "an unusual secret report" concluding that the prospects for securing the Anbar province are dim, and that there is almost nothing the U.S. military can do to improve the political and social situation there.

Iraq was listed fourth on the 2006 Failed States Index compiled by the American Foreign Policy magazine and the Fund for Peace think-tank. The list was topped by Sudan.

As of October 20 the U.S military announced that operation Together Forward had failed to stem the tide of violence in Baghdad, and Shiite Militants Under al-Sadr seized several southern Iraq Cities [11].

On November 8, 2006, Donald Rumsfeld tendered his resignation as United States Secretary of Defense. President George W. Bush then appointed former CIA chief Robert Gates to replace him.

November 2006: Sadr City Bombing

See Sadr City bombings

On November 23, 2006 the deadliest attack since the beginning of the Iraq war occurred. According to The Associated Press, suspected Sunni-Arab militants used five suicide car bombs and two mortar rounds on the capital's Shiite Sadr City slum to kill at least 215 people and wound 257 on Thursday. Shiite mortar teams quickly retaliated, firing 10 shells at Sunni Islam's most important shrine in Baghdad, badly damaging the Abu Hanifa mosque and killing one person. Eight more rounds slammed down near the offices of the Association of Muslim Scholars, the top Sunni Muslim organization in Iraq, setting nearby houses on fire. Two other mortar barrages on Sunni neighborhoods in west Baghdad killed nine and wounded 21, police said late Thursday.

See also: Government of Iraq from 2006

Troop Deployment 2003 to Current

United Nations

The United Nations has also deployed a small contingent to Iraq.

United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI)

• Georgia: 550 blue-helmets
• Fiji: 168 blue-helmets
• Romania: 130 blue-helmets
• Denmark: 35 blue-helmets

see also: Multi-National Division (South-East) (Iraq), Multinational Force Iraq, Danish deployment, Japanese deployment, Polish deployment, Australian deployment, British deployment

Armed Iraqi Groups: Insurgents and Militias

Main articles: Iraqi insurgency and Private militias in Iraq

see also: History of Iraqi insurgency, Sectarian violence in Iraq

Background

When the ruling Ba'ath party organization disintegrated after the fall of the Iraqi government, elements of the secret police and Republican Guard formed guerrilla units, since some had simply gone home rather than openly fight the multinational forces. Many of these smaller units formed the center of the initial anti-coalition insurgency, based primarily around the cities of Mosul, Tikrit and Fallujah. These guerrilla units were the precursor to the eventual formation of what came to be known as the Iraqi insurgency, or those Iraqis and foreigners who attacked coalition or government forces.

More recently in late 2005 and 2006, due to increasing sectarian violence based on either tribal/ethnic distinctions or simply due to increased criminal violence, there has been the formation of various militias. Many of these militias have been formed in response to violent acts committed on the basis of the Shia/Sunni distinction, with whole neighborhoods and cities sometimes being protected or attacked by ethnic or neighborhood militias.

Attacks against Iraqi National and Coalition forces as of July 2006 (Data from Government Accountability Office report product no. GAO-06-1094t)

Attacks against Iraqi National and Coalition forces as of July 2006 (Data from Government Accountability Office report product no. GAO-06-1094t)

Insurgents

The insurgents and guerrilla units favored attacking unarmored vehicles and avoiding major battles. The early Iraqi insurgency was concentrated in, but not limited to, an area referred to by the Western media and the occupying forces as the Sunni triangle which includes Baghdad. The insurgents dead are numbered between 45-60,000.

By the fall of 2003, these insurgent groups began using typical guerrilla tactics such as ambushes, bombings, kidnappings, and improvised explosive devices. Other tactics included mortars, suicide bombers, roadside bombs, small arms fire, and RPGs, as well as sabotage against the oil, water, and electrical infrastructure. Multi-national Force-Iraq statistics (see detailed BBC graphic) show that the insurgents primarily targeted coalition forces, Iraqi security forces and infrastructure, and lastly civilians and government officials. The civilian death log reveals that a large majority of the deaths were by car bombs, booby traps, throat slitting, beheading and other techniques that are known to be associated with insurgents. These irregular forces favored attacking unarmored or lightly armored Humvee vehicles, the U.S. military's primary transport vehicle. In November 2003, some of these forces successfully attacked U.S. rotary aircraft with SAM-7 missiles bought on the global black market. Insurgent groups such as the al-Abud Network have even attempted to constitute their own chemical weapons programs, attempting to weaponize traditional mortar rounds with ricin and mustard toxin.

As Coalition Forces respond to a car bombing in South Baghdad, Iraq (IRQ), a second car bomb is detonated, targeting those responding to the initial incident. Date Shot: 14 Apr 2005

There is evidence that some guerrilla groups are organized, perhaps by the fedayeen and other Saddam Hussein or Ba'ath loyalists, religious radicals, Iraqis angered by the occupation, and foreign fighters. On February 23, 2005 Al-Iraqiya TV (Iraq) aired transcripts of confessions by Syrian intelligence officer Anas Ahmad Al-Issa and Iraqi insurgent Shihab Al-Sab'awi concerning their booby-trap operations, explosions, kidnappings, assassinations, and details of beheading training in Syria. The insurgents are known by the Coalition military (especially in the United States armed forces) as Anti-Iraqi Forces (AIF).

One insurgent, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, was killed on June 7 2006 in the town of Baquba, north of Baghdad, when U.S. warplanes dropped two 500-pound bombs on his isolated safe house. Zarqawi, a Jordanian, did not fit the usual profile of an Iraqi insurgent and had closer ties to the al Qaeda terrorist organization. Still, President George W. Bush said the killing was "a severe blow to al-Qaida and it is a significant victory in the war on terror" but cautioned: "We have tough days ahead of us in Iraq that will require the continuing patience of the American people."

Despite Zarqawi's death Al-Qaeda in Iraq vowed to continue its "holy war", according to a statement posted on a Web site announcing: "We want to give you the joyous news of the martyrdom of the mujahed sheik Abu Musab al-Zarqawi." Zarqawi's death may have had little impact on the violence since evidence of continued violence in Iraq could still be seen in the month of June with over 1,600 Iraqi deaths that month, the highest monthly total to date since the Al Askari Mosque bombing.

In addition to internal strife, Iran may be playing a role in the insurgency. U.S. Army Brig. Gen. Michael Barbero said, "Iran is definitely a destabilizing force in Iraq," Barbero said. "I think it's irrefutable that Iran is responsible for training, funding and equipping some of these Shia extremist groups."

The insurgent tactic that is responsible for the most U.S. deaths and injuries is the roadside IED. The U.S. military has taken measures to counter the IEDs, including armoring humvees (mostly on the bottom, where roadside bombs usually hit) and using radio frequency jammers (so as to prevent bomb detonation). The insurgents have adapted to those tactics by using larger explosives, shaped charges, alternative detonation methods (including electrical wires, mechanical strings, trip wires, and infrared beams), and placing bombs on telephone poles and the underside of bridges (so as to attack the top and sides of vehicles rather than the highly-armored bottom).

Militias

Two of the most powerful current militias are the Mahdi Army and the Badr Organization, with both militias having substantial political support as well in the current Iraqi government. Initially, both organizations were involved in the Iraqi insurgency, most clearly seen with the Mahdi Army at the Battle of Najaf. However in recent months, there has been a split between the two groups.

This violent break between Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army and the rival Badr Organization of Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, was seen in the fighting in the town of Amarah [12] on October 20, 2006, would severely complicate the efforts of Iraqi and American officials to quell the soaring violence in Iraq.

Terrorism

The war in Iraq was originally justified as part of the U.S.-led War on Terrorism. Specifically, the Bush Administration argued that Saddam Hussein had ties to al-Qaeda, and that his overthrow would lead to democratization in the Middle East, decreasing terrorism overall. The alleged ties between Saddam and al-Qaeda were never confirmed, however, and numerous reports of intelligence agencies investigating the matter -- including several reports of the CIA, the U.S. State Department, the FBI, and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, as well as the investigations of foreign intelligence agencies -- concluded that no evidence had been found supporting an operational connection between Saddam and al-Qaeda. The New York Times commented in September 2006 on the conclusions of the bipartisan Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, "there is no evidence that Saddam Hussein had prewar ties to Al Qaeda and one of the terror organization’s most notorious members, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi."[13][14] (See main article: Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda).

However, al-Qaeda leaders have seen the Iraq war as a boon to their recruiting and operational efforts, providing both evidence to jihadists worldwide that America is at war with Islam, and the training ground for a new generation of jihadists to practice attacks on American forces. In October 2003, Osama bin Laden announced: "Be glad of the good news: America is mired in the swamps of the Tigris and Euphrates. Bush is, through Iraq and its oil, easy prey. Here is he now, thank God, in an embarrassing situation and here is America today being ruined before the eyes of the whole world."[15] Al-Qaeda commander Seif al-Adl gloated about the war in Iraq, indicating, "The Americans took the bait and fell into our trap."[16] A letter thought to be from al-Qaeda leader Atiyah Abd al-Rahman found in Iraq among the rubble where al-Zarqawi was killed and released by the U.S. military in October 2006, indicated that al-Qaeda perceived the war as beneficial to its goals: "The most important thing is that the jihad continues with steadfastness ... indeed, prolonging the war is in our interest."[17]

In the years since the war began, a consensus has developed among intelligence experts that the Iraq war has increased terrorism. Counterterrorism expert Rohan Gunaratna frequently referred to the invasion of Iraq as a "fatal mistake" that had greatly increased terrorism in the Middle East. London's conservative International Institute for Strategic Studies concluded in 2004 that the occupation of Iraq had become "a potent global recruitment pretext" for jihadists and that the invasion "galvanized" al-Qaeda and "perversely inspired insurgent violence" there.[18] The U.S. National Intelligence Council concluded in a January 2005 report that the war in Iraq had become a breeding ground for a new generation of terrorists; David B. Low, the national intelligence officer for transnational threats, indicated that the report concluded that the war in Iraq provided terrorists with "a training ground, a recruitment ground, the opportunity for enhancing technical skills... There is even, under the best scenario, over time, the likelihood that some of the jihadists who are not killed there will, in a sense, go home, wherever home is, and will therefore disperse to various other countries." The Council's Chairman Robert L. Hutchings said, "At the moment, Iraq is a magnet for international terrorist activity."[19] And the 2006 National Intelligence Estimate, which outlined the considered judgment of all 16 U.S. intelligence agencies, held that "The Iraq conflict has become the 'cause celebre' for jihadists, breeding a deep resentment of US involvement in the Muslim world and cultivating supporters for the global jihadist movement."[20]

Casualties

Main article: Casualties of the conflict in Iraq since 2003

See also: Iraq Body Count project, Lancet surveys of mortality before and after the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and Suicide bombings in Iraq since 2003

Coffins of American soldiers in a C-17 Globemaster III at Dover Air Force Base.

See the above main article for much more info, and for casualty numbers for coalition nations, contractors, non-Iraqi civilians, journalists, media helpers, aid workers, wounded, etc.. Casualty figures, especially Iraqi ones, are highly disputed. This section gives a brief overview. "There are now at least 8 independent estimates of the number or rate of deaths induced by the invasion of Iraq."

Coalition

The icasualties.org website reports the death toll since the invasion in March 2003 as being 2,950 American lives (as of December 19, 2006). There have been a further 247 deaths among the troops of other coalition nations: Australia 2. Bulgaria 13. Denmark 6. El Salvador 5. Estonia 2. Hungary 1. Italy 33. Kazakhstan 1. Latvia 1. Netherlands 2. Poland 18. Romania 2. Slovakia 4. Spain 11. Thailand 2. Ukraine 18. United Kingdom 126.

Iraqi

Estimates of Iraqi deaths are highly disputed. In December 2005 President Bush said there were 30,000 Iraqi dead . A study in The Lancet estimates 654,965 Iraqi deaths (with a range of 392,979 to 942,636) from March 2003 to July 2006, based on national surveys of mortality . That total number of deaths (civilian and non-civilian) includes all excess deaths due to increased lawlessness, degraded infrastructure, poor healthcare, etc.. An October 19, 2006 Washington Post article says that the methodology of the Lancet study has been disputed, that "President Bush earlier this year put the number at 30,000 but gave no sources," and went on to say "Indices drawing only on the deaths reported by news organizations put the figure closer to 50,000." That figure is from the Iraq Body Count project (IBC). The IBC records civilian deaths due to insurgent/military action and increased criminal violence, as reported by English-language media. There is no verifiable tally of insurgent deaths .

The Lancet study states: "Aside from Bosnia, we can find no conflict situation where passive surveillance [used by the IBC] recorded more than 20% of the deaths measured by population-based methods [used in the Lancet studies]. In several outbreaks, disease and death recorded by facility-based methods underestimated events by a factor of ten or more when compared with population-based estimates. Between 1960 and 1990, newspaper accounts of political deaths in Guatemala correctly reported over 50% of deaths in years of low violence but less than 5% in years of highest violence."

Iraqi Healthcare deterioration

A November 11, 2006 Los Angeles Times article reports:

The [Iraq] nation's health has deteriorated to a level not seen since the 1950s, said Joseph Chamie, former director of the U.N. Population Division and an Iraq specialist. "They were at the forefront", he said, referring to healthcare just before the 1991 Persian Gulf War. "Now they're looking more and more like a country in sub-Saharan Africa."

Iraqi Refugees

As of November 4, 2006, the U.N. High Commissioner on Refugees estimated that 1.8 million Iraqis had been displaced to neighboring countries, and 1.6 million were displaced internally, with nearly 100,000 Iraqis fleeing to Syria and Jordan each month.

Financial costs

U.S. war costs

As of September 29 2006, over $379 billion has been allocated by the U.S. Congress for the Iraq war . Over $349 billion has been spent as of December 12, 2006 .

• FY2003 Supplemental: Operation Iraqi Freedom): Passed April 2003; Total $78.5 billion, $54.4 billion Iraq War
• FY2004 Supplemental: Iraq and Afghanistan Ongoing Operations/Reconstruction: Passed November 2003; Total $87.5 billion, $70.6 billion Iraq War
• DoD Budget Amendment: $25 Emergency Reserve Fund (Iraq Freedom Fund): Passed July 2004, Total $25 billion, $21.5 billion(estimation) Iraq War
• FY2005 Emergency Supplemental: Operations in the War on Terror; Activities in Afghanistan; Tsunami Relief: Passed April 2005, Total $82 billion, $58 billion(estimation) Iraq War
• Department of Defense appropriations for fiscal year 2006: Total $50 billion, $40 billion(estimation) Iraq War.
• FY2006 Emergency Supplemental: Operations in the Global War on Terror; Activities in Iraq & Afghanistan: Passed February 2006, Total $72.4 billion, $60 billion(estimation) Iraq War
• Department of Defense appropriations for fiscal year 2007: Total $70 billion, $59.5 billion(estimation) Iraq War

The current rate of U.S. expenditure in Iraq is approximately $6.4 billion a month.

Joseph Stiglitz, former chief economist of the World Bank and Nobel Prize in Economics, has suggested the total costs of the Iraq War on the US economy will be $1 trillion in a conservative scenario and could top $2 trillion in a moderate one. The Congressional Research Service recently estimated weekly spending at almost $2 billion per week, and that total expenditures have now topped half a trillion dollars. Additionally, the extended combat and equipment loss have placed a severe financial strain on the U.S Army, causing the elimination of non-essential expenses such as travel and civilian hiring.

Data from the Office of Management and Budget shows that the discretionary defense spending is 20% of government outlays, and the CIA World Factbook lists a 2005 estimate of U.S. military expenditure as 4.06% of GDP (the 26th position in a listing of 167 countries). Other figures, however, show that the total defense expenditures (Department of Defense, Homeland Security and War on Terror) amount to $563 billion, which represents 56% of the nation's discretionary budget and 47% of the world military spending.

U.K. war costs

As of March 2006, approximately £4.5 billion had been spent by the United Kingdom in Iraq. All of this money has come from a government fund called the "Special Reserve" which has a current allocation of £6.44 billion.

It is not known how much more money has been spent by other members of the coalition; however, the US's share of the cost is by far the largest.

U.S. equipment losses

File:Iraq IED.jpg

An IED hitting a US Humvee

In addition to the human casualties suffered in the war, the U.S. has also lost a number of pieces of military equipment. This total is approximate and includes those vehicles lost in non-combat-related accidents. Recently, the Army has said that the cost of replacing its depleted equipment has tripled from that of 2005. As of December 2006, according to government data reported by the Washington Post, On December 5 2006, the military stated that nearly 40% of the army’s total equipment has been lost in Iraq, with an estimated yearly replacement cost of $US 17 billion. Furthermore the military states that the replacement cost has increased by a factor of ten compared to that of the pre-war state.

Combat losses: Land equipment

• 20 M1 Abrams tanks
• 55 Bradley fighting vehicles
• 20 Stryker wheeled combat vehicles
• 20 M113 armored personnel carriers
• 250 Humvees
• 500+ Mine clearing vehicles, heavy/medium trucks, and trailers
• 10 Amphibious Assault Vehicles

Combat losses: Air equipment

The UH-60 Black Hawk that crashed on September 21, 2004

• 27 Apache attack helicopters
• 21 Blackhawk utility helicopters
• 14 Chinook cargo helicopters
• 23 Kiowa surveillance helicopters
• 4 CH-46E Sea Knight cargo helicopters
• 1 A-10 Thunderbolt II ground attack aircraft
• 1 F-15E Strike Eagle fighter aircraft
• 2 UH-1N Huey utility helicopters
• 8 AH-1 Cobra attack helicopters
• 5 CH-53E Super Stallion or MH-53 Pave Low helicopters
• 2 H-3 Sea King helicopters
• 25+ RQ-1 Predator unmanned aerial vehicles
• 3 F/A-18 Hornet fighter aircraft
• 2 C-130 Hercules aircraft
• 1 F-16 Fighting FalconCG (90-0776)

See also: List of Coalition aircraft crashes in Iraq

Criticism

Main article: Opposition to the Iraq War

Further information: Views on the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Rationale for the Iraq War, Withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq, Protests against the Iraq War, American popular opinion on invasion of Iraq, Opposition to the Iraq War, and Governments' positions pre-2003 invasion of Iraq

Criticism of military strategy

U.S. military strategy in Iraq has drawn criticism from a number of different circles. Military historian Martin van Creveld, a professor at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, has called the Iraq war "the most foolish war since Emperor Augustus in 9 BC sent his legions into Germany and lost them."[21]

Withdraw from Iraq

A growing number of citizens in coalition nations have urged their governments to withdraw from Iraq. Supporters of withdrawal argue that the Iraq war is unwinnable, that it has no purpose, or that it has become another Vietnam war. Those who oppose the war also argue that the huge financial cost, as well as the loss of innocent human life, will be ended by a withdrawal of troops. Another consideration is the destabilization to the Middle East region that may occur as a consequence of the sudden departure of the United States military. Given the strained relations between the United States and Iraq's neighbor, Iran, and considering the powerful influence of Iran among Iraq's Shi'a Muslim community, some people fear that Iraq is going to convert into a fundamentalist-lead client state of Iran. The civil strife between the Sunni and Shi'a communities, as well as Kurdish hopes of establishing an independent state of Kurdistan in northern Iraq, could lead to a full-scale civil war.

Stay in Iraq

In addition to the criticism of the war itself, there is also a large amount of criticism from people that support the war but criticize the current military strategy, believing that the current strategy causes unnecessary deaths and injuries of coalition and Iraqi troops, as well as civilian contractors, and does not adequately meet the insurgent threat. Included within this is the criticism that, if the military strategy were much more effective, then there would be much more support for the war among the people of the coalition countries, especially the United States, except in the case of the strict pacifists and isolationists, who are always opposed to foreign wars regardless of the efficacy of the strategy. In a classified memo to the current administration, former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld recently revealed that he believed the current stategy in Iraq was not working and was in need of change.

Many specific strategic criticisms have been made by various individuals and publications. Some major criticisms include:

• Prisoners in Iraq detained by U.S. troops are treated badly, and it is estimated that about 1/4th of them are innocent, and many prisoners are subsequently released. The bad treatment of those prisoners angers the civilian population and turns them against the United States. These critics say that prisoners should be treated humanely. (this criticism was made on Nightline , among other places)

• There is a very large number of explosion-induced injuries to soldiers' arms, legs, and faces, including many losses of limbs. Such injuries could be greatly reduced if the soldiers wore light-weight, ventilated, heat-resistant polymer (such as aramid) over their arms and legs, and transparent polycarbonate face masks, which not strong enough to stop a bullet, can prevent much of the damage from the hot particles of explosives. This also applies to the Iraqi police, who are severely under-equipped , and who suffer far more deaths and injuries than coalition troops , and are the permanent stabilizing force that, if strong enough, may allow the coalition troops to withdraw. (This criticism was made in Discover Magazine , among other places.)
• Most injuries and deaths to coalition troops and Iraqi police are due to covertly-placed roadside bombs (often calledIEDs (improvised explosive devices)) and car bombs. The casualties of coalition troops and Iraqi police depend on the fact that such troops are clearly marked by their uniforms. That not only provides the insurgents with targets, but it also shows them who to avoid when conducting covert activities such as bomb placement. If the coalition troops and Iraqi police used more covert tactics, including the use of plain-clothes Iraqi police posing as militia men (it would not work for coalition members, due to the conspicuousness of both their race and their language), the use of hidden cameras with nightvision capability, and constant aerial surveillance of roads (such as by predator drones), then coalition and Iraqi forces would be able to prevent insurgents planting bombs. It is only by watching such insurgents when they think that they are not being watched, that they can be seen and killed. Covert surveillance and plainclothes Iraqi troops in a perimeter around overt coalition and Iraqi troop positions would also be effective in sniper attacks and gun battles.
• Many civilian contractors in Iraq, who are involved in rebuilding Iraq, are killed by insurgents , and the improvements that they build are often destroyed soon after they are made. Such contractors and their projects are often not protected. Protecting the contractors and their projects, especially with plainclothes Iraqi troops, would both reduce contractor deaths and injuries, and kill insurgents. Another option is to pull out the contractors except for those that are working on military and security projects, until most of the insurgents are dead and it is much safer.
• The Pentagon has refused to tabulate the number of insurgents killed . That gives the impression to many people that no progress is being made, which in turn reduces support for the war. It also gives both the government and the people much less to go on when determining the efficacy of their strategy, such that they can not determine the all-important kill ratio, and what that kill ratio is in different situations and different areas of Iraq, such that they can not adjust their strategy accordingly, nor can the public pressure them to do so.
• Geraldo Rivera is one of the major critics of the military strategy in Iraq. Geraldo advised, among other things, that U.S. troops should only use roads that are monitored 24-7, so as to avoid roadside bombs, and that civilian contractors, except for those working on military and security projects, should pull out until most insurgents are dead and it is safe to build.

Criticisms of U.S. media coverage

Main article: News media (United States)

Concerns have been raised of insufficiently critical coverage of the activities of U.S. forces in Iraq. It has been suggested that the U.S. news media is reluctant to criticize the conduct of American soldiers, for fear of upsetting their viewers and losing market share. Concerns have also been raised that some U.S. media outlets are not supportive enough of the American military and have published articles or images harmful to the overall U.S. military effort.

Accusations of overly sympathetic coverage

It has been reported in European media, including countries involved in operations in Iraq, that a minority of American soldiers and marines in Iraq have behaved irresponsibly in Iraq, causing unnecessary deaths of civilians. At the same time, many believe that U.S. forces have come under little U.S. media scrutiny. Even in the most extreme cases, such as the Haditha massacre, U.S. media coverage has been considerably less than in European countries such as the United Kingdom.

The killing of Nicola Calipari by an American soldier, which Italian prosecutors are now classifying as murder, received U.S. media coverage because the victim was an Italian Major-General. This incident fits a pattern, suggested by most of the mainstream European media (especially in the British Guardian newspaper and the French Le Monde newspaper), of widespread unprovoked fatal incidents. Another cited example is the killing of British reporter Terry Lloyd, who was found by the coroner to have been unlawfully killed by U.S. marines in Iraq [22]. The Independent on Sunday (15 October 2006) suggested that this death was the result of U.S. soldiers' hostility to his decision to report independently rather than being "embedded "with coalition forces."

Accusations of overly unsympathetic coverage

File:Iraqi Sniper.jpg

A sniper loyal to Shiite cleric Moqtada al Sadr fires a Dragunov sniper rifle at U.S. positions in the cemetery in Najaf.[1]

However, the argument has also been made that coverage has been unfair to U.S. efforts to establish peace and stability in Iraq, due to extensive coverage of the ongoing violence with little attention on other aspects of the war such as rebuilding infrastructure. It is believed that this has the effect of enhancing the perception of chaos, emboldening the insurgents and terrorists, and undermining the morale of US and Iraqi troops.

Critics have long questioned the reliance of the major media outlets on Iraqi "stringers" with suspected ties to insurgent groups and terrorists as a source of information -- discounting the versions of events as explained by the coalition and the Iraqi government. For example, on November 24, 2006, the AP distributed a story from one of their stringers, sourced by an Iraqi Police officer named Jamil Hussein, of four mosques being burned to the ground along with the deaths of six Sunni worshipers who were doused in kerosene and burnt alive. Despite the source, there has been no confirmation of the story by the coalition and the Iraqi Police have stated they do not have a Jamil Hussein on their force. Currently, the AP stands by this story because they have used Jamil Hussein as a source for over two years. However, the AP reports filed by Jamil Hussein are invariably stories of atrocities committed by Shiites against Sunnis.

Human rights abuses

Spc. Charles Graner poses over Manadel al-Jamadi's corpse.

Main article: Human rights in post-Saddam Iraq

Throughout the entire Iraq war there have been numerous human rights abuses on all sides of the conflict.

U.S. Armed Forces

WARNING: These links have graphic content depicting a decapitation; some of the most publicized abuses include:

• Abu Ghraib torture and prisoner abuse
• Haditha killings - alleged murder of 24 civilians, including women and children (Under investigation)
• Ishaqi incident - alleged murder of 11 civilians, including five children (Under investigation)
• Hamadiya incident - alleged kidnapping and murder of an Iraqi man named Hashim Ibrahim Awad (Under investigation)
• Mahmudiyah incident - alleged gang-rape and murder of a 14 year old girl, the murder of her parents and 7 year old sister. (Under investigation)
• Mukaradeeb - alleged bombing and shooting of at least 42 civilians (Under investigation)
• White phosphorus use in Iraq

Private military contractors

There have been reported human rights abuses by some of the thousands of private military contractors working in Iraq. The most famous incident involving contractors was the Abu Ghraib incident.

Insurgent forces

A 2005 Human Rights Watch report analysed the insurgency in Iraq and highlighted, "The groups that are most responsible for the abuse, namely al-Qaeda in Iraq, Ansar al-Sunna and the Islamic Army in Iraq, have all targeted civilians for abductions and executions. The first two groups have repeatedly boasted about massive car bombs and suicide bombs in mosques, markets, bus stations and other civilian areas. Such acts are war crimes and in some cases may constitute crimes against humanity, which are defined as serious crimes committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population."

The regular Iraqi insurgents and other groups such as the Sunni Islamic militant groups Al-Qaeda in Iraq and Ansar al-Islam are responsible for numerous abuses and killings, including:

• Killing over 12,000 Iraqis over the period of January 2005 - June 2006, according to Iraqi Interior Minister Bayan Jabr, giving the first official count for the largest category of victims of bombings, ambushes and other increasingly deadly attacks. The insurgents have also conducted numerous suicide attacks on the Iraqi civilian population, mostly targeting the majority Shia community, such as the Attack on the Shia district of Sadr City, Baghdad, on 02/07/2006 which claimed at least 66 lives. An October 2005 report from Human Rights Watch examines the range of civilian attacks and their purported justification.
• The bombing of the U.N. headquarters in Baghdad in August 2003 which killed the top U.N. representative in Iraq and 21 other UN staff members.
• The February 2006 bombing of the al-Askari Mosque, destroying one of the holiest Shiite shrines, killing over 165 worshipers and igniting sectarian strife and reprisal killings.
• Beheading several diplomats: two Algerian diplomatic envoys Ali Belaroussi and Azzedine Belkadi, Egyptian diplomatic envoy al-Sherif, and four Russian diplomats.
• The publicized murders of several non-military persons including; construction contractor Eugene Armstrong, supply contractor Jack Hensley, translator Kim Sun-il, supply contractor Kenneth Bigley, Bulgarian truck drivers Ivaylo Kepov and Georgi Lazov , Shosei Koda, Italian Fabrizio Quattrocchi, charity worker Margaret Hassan, reconstruction engineer Nick Berg, Italian photographer, 52 year old Salvatore Santoro and Iraqi supply worker Seif Adnan Kanaan. Most of these civilians were subjected to brutal torture and/or beheading.
• Torture or murder of members of the New Iraqi Army, and assassination of civilians associated with the Coalition Provisional Authority, such as Fern Holland, or the Iraqi Governing Council, such as Aqila al-Hashimi and Ezzedine Salim, or other foreign civilians, such as those from Kenya.

Iraqi government

Other abuses have been blamed on the new Iraqi government, including:

• The widespread use of torture by Iraqi security forces.
• Shiite-run death squads run out of the Interior Ministry that are accused of committing numerous massacres of Sunni Arabs and the police collusion with militias in Iraq have compounded the problems.

Recent History

In late 2006, US officials attempted to pursue negotiations with insurgents in secret talks. These were reported by various news sources to have broken down, though there were no official statements.

External articles

Overview

• Journalists in Iraq: Video of Panel Discussion
• The Brookings Institution Iraq Index
• ProCon's Extensive Iraq War Examination

Maps of Iraq

• High resolution maps of iraq.

Road to War

• White House Meeting Memo; Details of 31 January 2003 private meeting between George W. Bush and Tony Blair where they discussed using U.S. spyplanes in UN colours to lure Saddam Hussein into war.
• UK Attorney-General leak; Legal advice given to the British Prime Minister Tony Blair weeks before the 2003 invasion.
• Presidential address given by George W. Bush on the evening of March 19 2003, announcing war.

Iraqi sources

• Iraq Diaries -- Iraqis writing about their experiences of war.
• The Ground Truth Project -- A series of exclusive, in-depth interviews with Iraqis, aid workers, military personnel and others who have spent significant time on-the-ground in Iraq.
• What Iraqis Think -- A compilation of the latest polls and blogs coming out of Iraq.
• Iraq documents on Weapons of Mass Destruction This is a U.S. military site containing approximately 1 million files captured from the Iraqi military in the aftermath of the invasion.

Opinions and polls

• Sean Rayment, "Secret MoD poll: Iraqis support attacks on British troops"; a poll conducted among Iraqis reveals strong opposition toward Allied presence in Iraq. The Daily Telegraph, 23 October 2005.
• Extraordinary renditions: the playwright and the president; Jeff Sommers, Khaled Diab and Charles Woolfson explore the dynamics between playwright and president as America's 'war on terror' stands in the dock. January 2006, published in Al Ahram Weekly
• Caspar Henderson, "Three polls: attitudes across frontiers". 12 December 2002.
• Karl Zinsmeister, "What Iraqis Really Think". Wall Street Journal, September 10 2003.
• "1st Major Survey of Iraq". Zogby International, September 10 2003.
• Carl Conetta, "What do Iraqis want? Iraqi attitudes on occupation, U.S. withdrawal, governments, and quality of life". Project on Defense Alternatives, 01 February 2005.
• "Iraq". Polling Report.com. (ed. Chronological polls of Americans 18 & older)

Casualties

(additional links not found in reference links section)

• "The Civilian Casualty Fable; Analysis of Civilian Casualties in the first two years of the Iraq War". Logic Times, 26 October 2005.
• "[23]; Iraqi Civilian Deaths Increase Dramatically After Invasion" Johns Hopkins School of Public Health, October 28 2004.
• Military Casualties and non-military deaths.
• "One-Day Toll in Iraq Combat Is Highest for U.S. in Months", Washington Post, October 19 2006.
• U.S. Military Personnel Wounded in Iraq & Afghanistan: A Running Log.

Combat operations related

• "Aerial Propaganda Leaflet Database". Psywar.org, 06 November 2005. (ed. Iraq War PSYOP leaflets and posters)

News

• Electronic Iraq: Daily news and analysis from Iraq with a special focus on the Iraqi experience of war.
• News from Iraq: Aggregated news on the war, including politics and economics.
• The Struggle for Iraq: BBC Best Link: All the latest news, analysis and images from Iraq.
• War in Iraq: CNN Special Report: This page was archived in May 2003 when President Bush declared an end to major combat. However, the coalition casualties' list continues to be updated.
• Iraq: Transition of Power: CNN Special Report: Three years later, debate rages.

Anti-war activists and war critics

• David Shuster, "Road to war; How the Bush administration sold the Iraq War to American people". MSNBC, 8 November 2005
• Antiwar news and viewpoints [24]
• Charlie and Katrina, "Mourning the Vote". (ed. Students (Boston University and Oglethorpe University) site presenting their opinion about the Iraq War)
• OnlyOneWorld.NET Contains information, news, and opinion on the Iraq War.
• What Barry Says Written by Barry McNamara in 2003, Winner of the Best Animation award at the Brooklyn International Film Festival and Portobello Film Festival in 2004.
• [25] Dahr Jamail's Iraq Dispatches. Independent journalist in Iraq. Many despatches, reports and photos.
• [26] Tales of Iraq War. Anti-war webcomics by cartoonist Latuff.
• The U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq Socialist Worker Online’s ongoing coverage and analysis
• FixIraq.com 15 minute updated news, Discussion, Auto-Updating U.S. Deaths counter that can be shown on any website.
• "Unlike Vietnam, There is No End in Sight" iShotTheDeputy.com article criticising comparisons with Vietnam.
• Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield, The Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy or Division?, 2004, Palgrave Macmillian ISBN 1-4039-6354-1
• Juan Cole, [Iraq] Three-State Solution? The Nation review, March 29 2004
• Iraq Exit Strategy Watch

Independent analysis

• "The Road Ahead: Lessons in Nation Building from Japan, Germany, and Afghanistan for Postwar Iraq" by Ray Salvatore Jennings May 2003 Peceworks No. 49 United States Institute of Peace
• "A New American Century? - Iraq and the Hidden Euro-Dollar wars " by William Engdahl
• Oil and Empire - the backstory to the invasion of Iraq
• The Neocons, Peak Oil and the Invasion of Iraq
• "An ethical blank cheque" British and U.S. mythology about the second world war ignores our own crimes and legitimises Anglo-American war making, Richard Drayton, Tuesday May 10 2005 The Guardian

War supporters and operation proponents

• Victor Davis Hanson, "An American 'Debacle'? More unjustified negativity on the war in Iraq." National Review Online, October 14 2005.
• An interesting analogy presented by Jessica Well where she shows a Life magazine article from 1946 discussing the failures of Denazification entitled Americans are Losing the Victory in Europe

Economics

• Scott Wallsten and Katrina Kosec, "The Economic Costs of the War in Iraq". AEI-Brookings Joint Center Working Paper 05-19. September 2005.
• Online cost estimator allows users to change assumptions for predicting expected future cost of the Iraq war.
• "Dollar cost of war". (ed. Reportedly actual total of the U.S. taxpayer cost of the Iraq War.)
• "Iraq war costs could top $2 trillion". Christian Science Monitor, 10 January 2006 based on "The Economic Costs of the Iraq War" by Linda Bilmes, Harvard University, and Joseph E. Stiglitz, laureate of the Nobel Prize of Economics in 2001.
• "The Dollar System and U.S. Economic Reality post-Iraq War" by William Engdahl

Photos

• 650+ pictures from a soldier posted to Iraq

Judiciary

• "Legal System in Iraq Staggers Beneath the Weight of War", New York Times December 17, 2006

Media Echo

• Eliot Weinberger: What I Heard About Iraq in 2005, and What I Heard about Iraq (a collage of various statements concerning the war) dead link; these links active as of Oct 01 2006 link1 and link2

• Tatham, Steve (2006), 'Losing Arab Hearts & Minds: The Coalition, Al-Jazeera & Muslim Public Opinion' Hurst & Co (London) Published 1 January2006