Talk:World War II

American policy during WWI

The apparition of a figure like Hitler on the world stage was the result of the American policy during WWI. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.115.96.75 (talk) 11:28, 24 April 2013 (UTC)

Why is there no single word about Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings in the "war crimes" paragraph? If extermination of 250 000+ civilians wasn't a war crime, so what it was? — Preceding unsigned comment added by Челдон (talk • contribs) 13:40, 15 May 2013 (UTC)

I think it is covered under civilian bombing, which is already mentioned. Mediatech492 (talk) 14:08, 15 May 2013 (UTC)

What about severed-headed and skinned japanese soldiers. What about knives made of human bones and skull-trading? It doesn't fit well into "civilian bombing", does it? Челдон (talk • contribs) 12:39, 20 May 2013‎ (UTC)

True enough. One remembers the words of Christopher Browning (p.160 Ordinary Men) regarding John Dower's War without Mercy: "Dower's account of entire American units in the Pacific openly boasting of a take no prisoners' policy and routinely collecting body parts of Japanese soldiers as battlefield souvenirs is chilling reading for anyone who smugly assumes that war atrocities were a monopoly of the Nazi regime." LudicrousTripe (talk) 11:58, 20 May 2013 (UTC)

Addable pictures showing German Reich before Adolf Hitler and before 2. WW & funny USA propaganda picture

German Reich 1871–1914

German Reich 1919–1937

A poster used to promote carpooling as a way to ration gasoline during World War II.

Can anybody add pictures mainly the german reich pictures showing that way changes through 2. WW ? Maps after 2. WW are known as actual maps but many people don`t know map before also before A.H. ! — Preceding unsigned comment added by 87.151.200.98 (talk) 14:23, 4 May 2013 (UTC)

Recent addition of material asserting the US forced Japan into war

I've just reverted the recent addition of material claiming that the US deliberetly made the Japanese dependent on them for oil, and the decision to attack Pearl Harbor was undertaken "to preserve some hope of future economic and military autonomy". As far as I'm aware, this viewpoint sits outside the consensus on why Japan went to war, and is advancing a viewpoint of Japan somehow being a victim of the US. The Japanese leadership didn't have to go to war with the US - the oil embargo was an end result of the attempts by the US to reign in their aggression in China, and would have been removed had Japan agreed to withdraw from China. Nick-D (talk) 04:52, 5 May 2013 (UTC)

Hi, Nick. Well, from this editor's point of view, you have made a series of claims and yet have not provided any sources to back them up. My sources are both from scholarly journals, and David S. Painter is the leading expert on US foreign policy as regards the issue of oil. I have two RS backing up what I am saying; you have none to support your contentions. I feel that the ball is in your court. LudicrousTripe (talk) 06:00, 5 May 2013 (UTC)

Here's another one from the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, where the Americans' use of the leverage stemming from Japan's 80% reliance on their oil is described as an "oil weapon" and that the "Pearl Harbor attack was [. . .] a countermeasure for the oil weapon. The episode suggests that if an importer's supply routes are vulnerable or if a single exporter can deny most supply, the oil weapon has power." LudicrousTripe (talk) 06:48, 5 May 2013 (UTC)

The US wanted to lean very hard on Japan to get them to quit beating on China. This is very, very different than trying to force Japan into war. FDR and Churchill were instead in perfect agreement that the European threat of Hitler was the paramount problem to solve. War with Japan would have (and did, in the event) taken a great deal of US materiel and manpower away from the European conflict. FDR was never interested in starting a war with Japan, even if newspaper photographer Robert Stinnett argued so in his much-maligned book Day of Deceit. Binksternet (talk) 07:00, 5 May 2013 (UTC)

OK, I feel that a misreading of what Painter says has crept in, so I'm going to deal with it. Here's Painter:

The United States cut off oil exports to Japan in the summer of 1941, forcing Japanese leaders to choose between going to war to seize the oil fields of the Netherlands East Indies or giving in to U.S. pressure. This situation thus led directly to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and other U.S. bases in December 1941.

Nothing within that quote is in contradiction with what Nick said—"the oil embargo was an end result of the attempts by the US to reign in their aggression in China, and would have been removed had Japan agreed to withdraw from China"—so I do not see the issue.

The business about the US deliberately fostering an overwhelming Japanese dependence on American oil—for the purposes of having an "oil weapon" to use as a threat (or actually use, if it ever came to it) whenever Japan thought about threatening (or actually threatened) US in the Far East—is, you will perhaps agree, also not relevant here, either. All we are interested in establishing is the direct connection between the American oil embargo and the decision to Japanese decision go to war. That's all. The issue over whether war in East Asia was avoidable is a separate issue, one that we aren't dealing with. Perhaps this confusion is down to me, and if so I obviously must take the blame.

With these clarifications in mind, I'm not really sure where the controversy lies. LudicrousTripe (talk) 08:05, 5 May 2013 (UTC)

Let's next take the Lehmann quote: all it does is assert the existence of an American "oil weapon" aimed at Japan:

The Japanese attacked the United States to preserve some hope of future economic and military autonomy in the face of their economic dependence on the United States, which was purposefully created by the United States and based primarily on oil from the middle 1920s forward. The United States had the luxury of holding the 'noose' of an economic embargo around its enemy's neck because it built a controlling position over both its friends Britain and the Netherlands and its dependent enemy Japan in the 1920s.

You could argue the the first bit—"The Japanese attacked the United States to preserve [...] hope of [...] autonomy"—is not in line with this still yet unsourced consensus, but there is no reason to deny readers the opportunity to at least acquaint themselves with differing views, else Wikipedia descends into the realm of Pravda. The remainder of the quote simply seeks to inform the reader of how and why the United States came about this "noose" or "oil weapon" in the first place. You might not like its description of US policy, but I'm still awaiting an RS source that points out that its wrong. Even if an RS is provided, I refer you to the previous comments about denying readers knowledge of a plurality of views. We can re-phrase if you like—"According to some scholars, the Americans deliberately cultivated Japan's dependence on their oil so they would have an "oil weapon" available, if they ever needed it"—but the threat of Pravda otherwise looms large. In truth, I really don't see what the big deal is. LudicrousTripe (talk) 08:37, 5 May 2013 (UTC)

Yes, Painter's article is pretty standard (and provides an good summary of the role of oil in geopolitics during this era) It's the quote from Lehmann which is a bit out-there given that he seems be be arguing that Japan had no choice but go to war with the US as a result of American policies. There's no question that the US attempted to use oil as a means of halting Japanese aggression in 1941, but Lehmann's view that this forced war on Japan is dubious. Most historians note that the US put the Japanese leadership in a difficult position in 1941, but this came at the end of a lot of other warnings and sanctions and that withdrawing from China, playing for time or striking for the NEI without attacking the US directly were also realistic options, and much better ones than attacking the US given how this worked out over the longer run. Nick-D (talk) 08:34, 5 May 2013 (UTC)

OK. So perhaps Painter can get an agreed tick. How do you feel about my way of trying to fit Lehmann into the article, add some caveats etc.? I guess I am happy to forgo Lehmann, since WWII article is perhaps not best place to mention the history of the American "oil weapon"? LudicrousTripe (talk) 08:39, 5 May 2013 (UTC)

Historically, the approach to developing this article has been to stick to consensus views of events given that it covers such a huge topic, and leave the historiographical debates for the more specialised articles. I'd suggest that this belongs in the Pacific War article (which needs a lot of work). Regards, Nick-D (talk) 08:49, 5 May 2013 (UTC)

OK, so it's been productive working with you, and thank you for keeping your responses to me polite and constructive. As for the reasoning behind adding Lehmann's article about the American "noose" it had placed around Japan's neck via oil dependency, I was motivated by the (already sourced) bit about how some Japanese commanders saw the embargo as an act of war. The "noose"/"oil weapon" was meant to lend some non-Japanese-military support to the commanders' take on the embargo. LudicrousTripe (talk) 08:54, 5 May 2013 (UTC)

It is well to remember that Japan would be losing 80% of its oil, not 100%. They figured that what they had left would allow them to continue on their major war footing in China for 18 more months. Which is quite a while, considering that most of Japan's oil use was going toward its Chinese war. The "oil weapon" wasn't going to make Japan starve or freeze, but simply give up its war of aggression, which it wasn't willing to do. The noose wasn't around Japan's neck but merely its weapons-- navy and airforce. [1].

It's well to remember that the US didn't just decide suddenly in mid-1941 to cut too Japan's oil to force it to withdraw from the 2/3rds of China it already held. The preciptating factor was France's fall to Germany in May 1940, leaving a power vacuum in French Indochina (today's Vietnam). Which Japan proceeded to fill, taking Saigon in 1941 and threatening Thailand, Philippines, Malaya, and Singapore. The US offered Japan (July 24, 1941) access to French Indochina's resources if Japan would simply stop taking over all of Southeast Asia, but Japan ignored the U.S. and of course bullied the powerless Vichy French. There was not much else to do but get Japan's attention by freezing their assets, which the Dutch and British were only too happy to help do. All Japan had to do was stop burning oil in continuing to taking over their part of the globe. The alternative to using an oil embargo was to allow Japan to continue to use that oil to take over China and Southeast Asia completely, including the remains of the Dutch and British colonies there. But from 1936 on, Japan was ruled by warlords and addicted to a war-and-pillage econonomy and wasn't going to switch to a trade economy. The die was really cast in 1937 when Japan embarked on that course, and wouldn't stop in 1941 in Indochina, despite all warnings. This article should probably point out some of that, and the cite above is a good place to get into the vast literature on the subject. SBHarris 04:44, 14 May 2013 (UTC)

The attack on Pearl Harbor was in direct response to the illegal US oil embargo. (JimRodgers1 (talk) 09:24, 14 May 2013 (UTC))

What are you-- today's troll? What is illegal about deciding you don't want to do business with somebody? Japan was fighting two wars of aggression in China and Indochina. Why don't you discuss the legality of that? SBHarris 15:32, 14 May 2013 (UTC)

How was that any different from the US annexing Cuba, the Philippines, Texas and New Mexico? (92.7.26.219 (talk) 18:12, 15 May 2013 (UTC))

This is a sockpuppet of banned editor HarveyCarter. Binksternet (talk) 14:52, 17 May 2013 (UTC)

Do you really have to ask? Texas fought a successful war of independence against Mexico and came into the US by treaty, already an independent nation. However, Mexico irrationally considered Texas theirs, notwithstanding that they had lost Texas the same way they had gained it previously, having taken it (like New Mexico) from Spain in 1821. They attacked the Texas border and killed US soldiers in 1845 and got themselves a war. After the US took Mexico City in that war, it certainly could have simply annexed all of Mexico. Instead it took New Mexico, paid Mexico for it, and returned most of Mexico to the Mexicans. Does that sound like Japan’s actions to you?

Cuba and the Philippines were long time Spanish colonies, both undergoing their own revolutions at the time of the Spanish-American war, which these rebellions precipitated. In both cases the US promised them, even before the war, eventual independence after revolution. This promise was kept almost immediately in Cuba. Had it not been, there would be no Castro there now, but it would instead be US territory like Puerto Rico. However, Cuba didn’t want that and the US allowed Cubans their democracy. It would have been better for Cuba if it had asked to be US territory. It’s now a stagnant and unfree place (have you been there? I have).

The Philippines are your best argument, but have you noticed they’ve been independent since 1946? Though promised independence from Spain from the beginning of the Spanish-American war, the US indeed stayed far too long there, and did some terrible things. Partly this stay was due to the fact that there was no infrastructure for self-rule at all after three centuries of Spanish rule (which had been fairly direct). To its discredit, the US committed atrocities in the Philippines after the Filipinos fought the US (committing atrocities also). Partly that early war was a communications failure. To Philippine discredit, it did not realize that if the US had left in 1900, the Philippines would immediately have been snapped up by the other colonial powers in the region, first Germany, and then (after The Great War) Japan (much like New Guinea and the Marianas and other parts of South Pacific). Indeed, Japan DID take the Philippines from the US in 1941. But had Japan never existed, the Philippines would have been granted full independence from the US in 1944. The war delayed that by two years. Again, although late for independence, this hardly sounds like Japanese-style colonialism.

The US is a strange “colonial” power, inasmuch as most of the territory conquered by the US outside its present contiguous borders, has long since been returned to independence, like the Philippines and Malaya. Guam is an exception only because just 4% of Guam voted for independence from the US in 1982 (half want to be a US territory, which they are, and a quarter want to be a US state). Even Iraq, which the US gratuitously attacked in a fit of paranoia in 2003, will never be a US territory and will eventually be completely independent. By contrast, if not confronted, Japan would still now still rule everything it had taken at the end of 1941. Japan never voluntarily returned any territory for independence in its entire history. Like Spain, Germany, and France, they had to be thrown out by force. The US has never been thrown out of anywhere, with the possible exception of South Vietnam. And that was hardly a colony. SBHarris 21:27, 15 May 2013 (UTC)

The US was thrown out of Canada during the War of 1812. (92.7.26.236 (talk) 09:25, 16 May 2013 (UTC))

This is a sockpuppet of banned editor HarveyCarter. Binksternet (talk) 14:52, 17 May 2013 (UTC)

Is the infobox too long? [was: Template:WW2InfoBox]:

Recent changes to Template:WW2InfoBox.... think this should be talked about before an editwar ensues.

• old version
• new version

So lets see what others have to say about all this...I personally would rather see the images removed long before the country content being removed....but thats just me.Moxy (talk) 16:23, 5 May 2013 (UTC)

I don't think that the images, which are part of hooking readers into the article, are the problem; it's the twenty-one countries that are in a list down the left side of the infobox. Ed ^{[talk] [majestic titan]} 15:39, 7 May 2013 (UTC)

Am I allowed to like all the pretty flags? ;D LudicrousTripe (talk) 16:02, 7 May 2013 (UTC)

Sure, the flags aren't extending the infobox any farther vertically. ;-) Ed ^{[talk] [majestic titan]} 16:29, 7 May 2013 (UTC)

It's great that this article is so perfect that there's nothing left to do but edit war over the infobox! I personally think that it needs a fair bit of work, which would pay off with an A class and FA assessment in due course. But that's just me. (comment motivated by the history of this infobox, rather than Ed's changes which I broadly endorse). Nick-D (talk) 12:04, 13 May 2013 (UTC)

Yeah, it would probably be much better off being merged back into this article; I think the extra scrutiny would lower the amount of conflicts when given a little time. But that's just me. Ed ^{[talk] [majestic titan]} 19:28, 14 May 2013 (UTC)

Recent additions of material

Given that this material was added to the article without discussion, or even the use of edit summaries, I thought that it would be good to discuss it. I think that the material added by CJK (talk · contribs) is a bit too British-centric, and is written from a British point of view (for instance, "The British scored a much-needed public morale boost in May 1941 by sinking the German flagship Bismarck" and "Perhaps most importantly, during the Battle of Britain the Royal Air Force had successfully resisted the Luftwaffe's assault, and the German bombing campaign largely ended in May 1941."). The addition of material claiming that Hitler was willing to consider peace with the USSR in November 1940 is simply wrong - he'd already decided to invade the USSR by this time (in his book Fateful Choices Ian Kershaw states that the initial decision to invade was made in July 1940, and the invasion was locked in as unchangeable policy early December that year - see pages 84-85). I also don't think that we need an entire paragraph on the handful of small skirmishes between German and US forces prior to December 1941, interesting though they are. Do other people have any thoughts on this? Nick-D (talk) 10:16, 14 May 2013 (UTC)

I agree with Mr Nick. And the article is fast becoming an ibiblio chronology of WWII. LudicrousTripe (talk) 12:20, 14 May 2013 (UTC)

Nick, you are not right. The directive No 21 ("Case Barbarossa") was signed in mid December, after Hitler-Molotov negotiations in Berlin failed, and most authors (Roberts, Koch, et al) directly connect its signing with the failure of the negotiations. The fact that Hitler was probably contemplating a possibility of the attack of the USSR before that date does not imply any real plans existed on that account. By the way, an indication that Hitler, sooner or later, would attack the USSR can be found even it his Mein Kampf, however, that is hardly relevant.--Paul Siebert (talk) 18:45, 19 May 2013 (UTC)

Um, I didn't add any of the British material you refer to, I merely relocated it from one part of the article to another.

The major flaws I'm trying to fix is the almost total neglect of political and diplomatic aspects of the war. I clearly stated that Hitler was already considering to eliminate the USSR. However, it is a fact that the actual directive was not issued until after the failed November 1940 negotiations. I presume that the Germans would not be making these propositions if they were already dead set on war anyway.

The small skirmishes you refer to are of note not because of their military significance but because they describe the political and diplomatic process in which Roosevelt was drawing the U.S. into the war.

It is not an "ibiblio" chronology, I am merely using sources posted on ibiblio for convenience. CJK (talk) 14:59, 14 May 2013 (UTC)

Thanks go out to Nick-D who is rightly keeping such material out of this article. Binksternet (talk) 16:16, 14 May 2013 (UTC)

War is politics by other means, and all that, and I had the some wonderings as CJK. I checked the 'See also' section, but see no articles listed there for dealing with diplomatic history, and this draws no suggestions. Even if there are disparate articles on each of the conferences, not having one that draws them together is a major gap. It is obvious, but if this article is confined to the military side of WWII, that precludes some extremely elementary questions about the non-military side from even being raised. Is it unreasonable to suggest the article be renamed as Military History of World War II, for that is what it is and appears set to remain. Military history is an extremely stunted discipline, even though shelves and shelves of schlock of it appear in every public library, and, by itself, can only capture one aspect of WWII. If there is, indeed, no article that discusses the diplomatic aspects of the war in a comprehensive way, Wikipedia has a glaring omission on a major topic. Nothing profound in what I am saying, all obvious enough, but I am just curious, as a relative newcomer to Wikipedia, how things work and are supposed to work. I presume there is nothing to stop CJK and I and whoever else starting a beginning-to-end effort of the diplomatic and strategic aspects of WWII? LudicrousTripe (talk) 22:22, 14 May 2013 (UTC)

There were quite a few discussions of the inclusion of diplomatic negotiations in the article a year or so ago, and the consensus was to exclude all but the major developments and summits as including the various negotiations would greatly expand the size of the article beyond readable levels, and that the military events were generally the best use of the available space. I certainly agree that a Diplomatic history of World War II article would be worthwhile, and there are many thousands of references which could be drawn upon in writing it! CJK, in regards to the November 1940 negotiations, you need to remember that the Nazis almost routinely negotiated in bad faith during diplomatic meetings (hence the appeasement saga of the 1930s where the British and French kept trying to strike a deal with Hitler, only for Hitler to violate the spirit and/or letter of the agreements). Nick-D (talk) 10:13, 16 May 2013 (UTC)

I see. Thanks for taking the time to explain things to me. Well, perhaps I will begin a diplomatic history, though it is such a major undertaking that I can't think about doing so just yet! Best wishes. LudicrousTripe (talk) 11:13, 16 May 2013 (UTC)

Even a stub or a B-class article would be better than the not-very-much we have now ;) But, yeah, it's a huge topic. Nick-D (talk) 11:27, 16 May 2013 (UTC)

I'm not including all diplomatic activity, far from it. I'm including only summaries of the most relevant aspects of the record, without which the war is difficult to understand. Your point about Hitler not being reliable is neither here nor there. Hitler was proposing a direct deal with the USSR and there is no reason for him to do this if he was planning to attack in 1941 either way. Whether or not he intended to maintain it in the long run is outside the scope of short-term strategy that I am talking about. The Munich agreement was fundamentally different because it promoted aggressive German expansionism at Czechoslovakia's expense, and only stopped short of a full takeover because Britain and France agreed to Hitler's public demands. Hitler's aggressive demands on Czechoslovakia in 1938 are in no way comparable to his 1940 proposals to the Soviets which did not threaten the Soviets by demanding territorial or economic concessions. CJK (talk) 18:26, 16 May 2013 (UTC)

I am not sure I fully understand you. You write that there is no reason to doubt that Hitler, who proposed a deal with the USSR, had no intentions to attack it, however, you admit that he probably didn't want to maintain peaceful relations with the USSR in the long run. However, that means that the deals Hitler was signing were dictated mostly by tactical, not strategic consideration. In other words, had Hitler been able to persuade the USSR to join the Axis as a junior partner (that was the essence of his 1940 proposals), he would probably not attach it in 1941. Does it mean he would not attack it at all? Who knows. Thus, Hitler did not attack Hungary, who, unlike the USSR, became a junior Axis member in 1940, however, he did attack it later. Your example does not refute the claim that Hitler was not reliable.

Regarding Munich vs 1940 deal, I am not sure it is correct. Firstly, whereas the Munich agreement was signed, the Soviet-German talks failed, so we can only speculate what the final text of this agreement would be. Secondly, in contrast to the Munich agreement, the prospective Soviet-German treaty would be a full scale military alliance (although, again, since it had never been signed, and even no draft had been prepared, because there was no agreement among the parties even about the basic principles, I see no reason to discuss it seriously). Therefore, I don't understand what concrete idea did you want to demonstrate by this comparison.--Paul Siebert (talk) 18:01, 19 May 2013 (UTC)

I also noticed the significant change of the "Course of the war" section has been made during last few days. In my opinion, that goes against the overall article's logic. The article's aim is to demonstrate a global character of the war, not to split it onto several sub-theatres. Since LudicrousTripe made many useful technical changes, it would be incorrect to fully revert all edits made without discussion. In connection to that, I propose LudicrousTripe to restore the article's structure he modified without discussion, otherwise I'll have to do that by myself, but in that case I cannot guarantee all recent technical edits will not be reverted too.--Paul Siebert (talk) 18:22, 19 May 2013 (UTC)

Just to clarify: All I've been doing is gradually (just doing a few each day) changing the footnoting to {{Harvnb}}. The only additions I've made were: to a footnote regarding the upswing in Germany atrocities in Italy; the smallest rewrite of the Bismarck going down (again, that was essentially to the relevant footnote); and, the most recent one, when I switched to Evans (2008) for the VE Day sourcing, which necessitated a minor rewording, plus I deleted some superfluous detail. In terms of structural revision and major additions, I have made none. These large-scale additions and revisions without discussion, the ones of which you speak, and the attendant mass introduction of ibiblio, have all been performed by CJK. LudicrousTripe (talk) 03:42, 20 May 2013 (UTC)

Understood. Sorry.--Paul Siebert (talk) 04:48, 21 May 2013 (UTC)

Hitler's "reliability" is neither here nor there, I am merely noting the thrust of his strategic thinking in 1940-41 with no implications as to whether he was "reliable" after 1941 or not. I split it into subsections because I thought it was less confusing and disjointed. Furthermore, I wanted to have the major strategic decisions of the Allies discussed separately. CJK (talk) 14:50, 20 May 2013 (UTC)

The need in this splitting is still not obvious to me. I need to think about that, and, if I'll find that it is not an improvement, I'll have to restore the old structure. The main idea of the "Course of the war" section was to show a deep interconnection between the events in different theatres, so your splitting hardly serves to this goal. We already have separate articles devoted to each major theatres, so if a reader who wants to learn about each theatre separately can easily do that.--Paul Siebert (talk) 04:48, 21 May 2013 (UTC)

They aren't interconnected to any great extent. That's why they are regarded as independent theaters. There is certainly no language in the article that would illustrate any impact of such large interconnectedness. The Western Allies and the Soviets planned their operations independently from each other and the Pacific and European theaters were, in all but name, completely separate wars. CJK (talk) 14:16, 21 May 2013 (UTC)

I'll agree with CJK. They were treated separately by the Allies: "The US deliberately chose to concentrate on winning the war against Germany before that against Japan, and to concentrate its resources accordingly. The calculation was correct. It took another three-and-a-half years to defeat Germany, after which Japan was brought to its knees in three months."
—The Age of Extremes, p. 41.

LudicrousTripe (talk) 16:15, 21 May 2013 (UTC)

First of all, it was not the US, but the USSR who concentrated on winning the war against Germany, and this decision was fully supported by other Allies, who correctly decided that the European theatre was more important. Thus, Churchill said: "Russian declaration of war on Japan would be greatly to our advantage, provided, but only provided, that Russians are confident that will not impair their Western Front".

Secondly, as you probably know, the US joined the was in Europe (I mean de facto participation in the hostilities, not formal war declaration) only after the most crucial battles (Battle of Moscow and Battle of Stalingrad) had been won by the Allies, and it became clear Germany could not win the war.

Thirdly, the US joined the European war as a result of Japanese attack of Perl Harbor. Japanese decision was a responce on the American oil embargo, which, in turn, was a responce on the Japanese activity in South East Asia, which was a result of weakening of European colonial powers (Britain, France, Belgium) due to German successes in Europe.

Fourthly, Japanese decision to expand to South East, not to Soviet Far East was a results of the Soviet victory in the European theatre (I mean the Battle of Moscow). Japan considered a possibility to attack the USSR seriously, and the Soviet defeat in the West would trigger Japanese invasion in the East. Clearly, there would be no Perl Harbor in that case.

All of that is a demonstration of the deep interconnection between different theatres of war in 1941.

Moreover, 1941 was the year when the two theatres, European and Pacific, merged together into a single world war. The stable article's version conveyed this idea quite clearly, and the splitting in hardly an improvement. I think I'll have to merge these sections back (I need to think how concretely that could be done).--Paul Siebert (talk) 17:22, 21 May 2013 (UTC)

Hello, Paul Siebert. I did not mean to give the impression—and I feel sure CJK would say the same—that I felt that there is no connection between the two theatres. If nothing else, a decision to focus on one theatre over another requires a comparison be made between the two, an event that instantly forges a connection between them.

I must next observe that you did not provide any sources for what you said. I provided a reliable source for asserting that the US chose to focus on Germany first, but your contradictory comment—"it was not the US, but the USSR who concentrated on winning the war against Germany"—was not supported with a reliable source.

In terms of the extent of the linkage between the two theatres—our topic for discussion—I am uncertain as to the relevance of your second point, since it only makes mention of the European theatre.

With regard to your third point—"the US joined the European war as a result of Japanese attack of Pearl Harbor"—you provide no source, and would you not agree that a key reason for the Americans joining Europe was Hitler's declaration of war, a few days after Pearl Harbor? And the American military build-up, though it accelerated after Pearl Harbor, began with Roosevelt's announcement in May 1940 (The Wages of Destruction, p. 405), well before the Japanese attack of December 1941.

The Age of Extremes, p. 39, ascribes the Japanese reluctance to attack the Soviets to the Imperial Army's being "badly mauled" by "the Red army in an unofficial but substantial war on the Siberian-Chinese border in 1939", not to the "the Soviet victory in the European theatre", as you suggest—and I must emphasise, again, that you did not cite a source for your suggestion.

I hope the tone of my remarks comes across in the way I intended them, just as polite discussion. And I will, unfortunately, be unsympathetic to CJK if his revisions do end up getting undone, since the article clearly states that editors should not undertake drastic revisions to the text without consultation. This he failed to do. LudicrousTripe (talk) 15:11, 22 May 2013 (UTC)

Firstly, I provide no sources because I refer to obvious facts. Of course, I can provide needed sources upon request, however I prefer to do that only when my opponent really doubt in what I am saying. Do you really believe what I am writing is not true? If yes, please, read such authors as David Glantz or Chris Bellamy.

Secondly, yes, the US leadership correctly concluded that Japanese domination in Pacific posed no real danger for continental US, so the defeat of Nazi Germany was more important task, so they joined the Anglo-Soviet anti-Hitler alliance (after the most decisive battles had been already won by the Allies), however, I am not sure how that fact proves your point (that the Pacific and European theaters should be considered separately). By the way, although I fully agree that European theatre was more important than Pacific one, I don't think that fact is clear from the article.

Thirdly, regarding my third point, yes, I provided no sources, simply because we are talking about universally accepted facts: the US joined the war against Germany because Hitler declared a war on the US - Hitler declared a war on the US because Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, and Germany, being Japan's ally had an obligation to do so - Japan attacked Pearl Harbor because it needed oil, which it could obtain either from the US or from South East Asia, but the US imposed an oil embargo on Japan, so the only thing Japan could do was to seize Indonesian oil and expel the US from East Asia - the US imposed an oil embargo because of increased military activity of Japan in East Asia - Japan's activisation was a consequence of weakening of the influence of European colonial powers there, as a result of German military successes in Europe. Tell me please, which of those facts is not universally accepted, and which of those facts needs a source?

--Paul Siebert (talk) 18:36, 22 May 2013 (UTC)

Perhaps it is just a mistaken impression—if so, do accept my apologises—but your tone is becoming slightly grouchy. I'd ask you to check that, since I do not want our discussion to degenerate into into a heated polemic, despite the fun the latter may provide to any audience we may have here.

My reason for repeated use of Eric Hobsbawm's book is that, firstly, as a major historian, he counts as a reliable source, and, secondly, I thought I detected in you a certain sympathy with the Soviet Union's actions during the war. As you will know, Hobsbawm held the USSR in tender regard, and so he is my attempt at gaining immediate traction with you, a way of avoiding dismissal of my sources with ad hominem attacks.

Let us take your first point: "I provide no sources because I refer to obvious facts." Well, regardless of how you feel about what you are saying—obvious facts or otherwise—one must still provide sources. I also regard my own position as built upon "obvious facts", yet had the humility to provide sources. I am simply asking for you to conduct yourself in a similarly humble fashion.

"I provide no sources because I refer to obvious facts … I provided no sources, simply because we are talking about universally accepted facts … Tell me please, which of those facts is not universally accepted, and which of those facts needs a source?" Following on from what I just said, I must insist that, the moment one enters into disagreement, however amicable, on some point or other, every statement requires a source.

"Do you really believe what I am writing is not true?" I mean to impugn neither your honesty nor your breadth and depth of knowledge. You obviously feel strongly about WWII, and that means you will have had, or developed, the motivation to read a considerable amount on it. Yet surely you must agree with me that something is not true because you or I say it is, but rather because that's what the experts tell us is so. Let us not get distracted with conjecture about my opinions and motives; let us stick to a fruitful exchange of sourced opinion. And the only properly sourced opinion so far is mine. Furnishing me with an imperative to go and read such-and-such a historian is not sufficient. I want the books and I want the page numbers. I am responsible for sourcing what I say; you are for what you say. Let us proceed in this fashion.

After saying that, "yes, the US leadership correctly concluded that Japanese domination in Pacific posed no real danger for continental US, so the defeat of Nazi Germany was more important task", you state "I am not sure how that fact proves your point (that the Pacific and European theaters should be considered separately)." Well, I will re-emphasise something I said before: "I did not mean to give the impression … that I felt that there is no connection between the two theatres." The only thing I am trying to defend in this engagement with you—and I am doing this partly by arguing that, after an initial assessment, the Allies treated the two theatres separately—is my original agreement with CJK that there is no real problem with his edits that have had the effect of downplaying the interconnectedness of the war in Asia with the war in Europe.

I agree with you regarding the US actions that precipitated the considerable expansion of Japanese aggression, and wanted to squeeze the background to this, and an emphasis of it, into the article, but I conceded defeat (see above). LudicrousTripe (talk) 22:00, 22 May 2013 (UTC)

Infobox the Battle of Wanjialing and Japan date of 1937

In the infobox there is an image of the Battle of Wanjialing from the Second Sino-Japanese War long before the time frame of WW2. This was mentioned over at Template talk:WW2InfoBox#China and Japan were the time frame for entry into WW2 for Japan is 1937 - and has lead to an edit war. What should be done is 1937 ok for the infobox for Japan and is the image from 1938 really about WW2? What do others think about this.Moxy (talk) 22:10, 22 May 2013 (UTC)

• Oppose - China and Japan had already been in total war starting in 1937, nearly two full years before the German invasion of Poland which widely agreed upon as the starting point of WW2. The point of the official start date isn't the rigorously limit active participation of nations by a rigid date, the point of the 1939 start date is to illustrate when total war erupt across the world's continent, and not to preclude the existence of total war in one region of the world, or another. esp. as the Second-Sino Japanese war is widley considered a major subset of the Pacific theatre of WW2. To suggest otherwise would set a dangerous precedent of characterizing history in grand black and white boundaries, which is the antithesis of how history usually unfolds.Phead128 (talk) 22:35, 22 May 2013 (UTC)

Question do you believe that we should change the dates of entry into the war for Russia (Soviet–Japanese border conflicts) or Italy (Second Italo-Ethiopian War) aswell?Moxy (talk) 22:50, 22 May 2013 (UTC)

Do you know why Soviet invasion of Manchuria is distinguishable from Soviet–Japanese border conflicts? One is full-scale declaration of total war, and the other is minor border skirmishes. Also, does Second Italo-Ethiopian War coincide with German invasion of Poland? How does Italian invasion of Ethiopia qualify as relevant to WW2 when it doesn't even overlap with WW2 dates?50.136.53.17 (talk) 03:23, 23 May 2013 (UTC)

So to be clear in your opinion WW2 started in 1937 with the Marco Polo Bridge Incident correct? Do we have any sources for this?Moxy (talk) 14:42, 23 May 2013 (UTC)

Red herring argument, as the issue at hand is whether to impose rigid dates of 1939 in a black and white boundary fashion at the expense of a major subset of WW2, not the official start of WW2 itself. As the Second Sino-Japanese war is a major subset of WW2 and overlaps with the entirety of 1939-145, you cannot exclude 1937-1939 just because China/Japan didn't initiate total war when Germany invaded Poland. Nobody reads history in such black and white boundary details, and it's a dangerous precedent to set such a standard now. 50.136.53.17 (talk) 16:03, 23 May 2013 (UTC)