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This RfC is designed to ascertain community consensus regarding certain aspects of the annual Arbitration Committee elections. A previous RfC (held a few months ago) indicated potential support for secret elections and the Schulze method. See Wikipedia:Requests for comment/ArbCom secret ballot. This new RfC should conclusively determine present opinions on these and other matters of importance.

Back in 2008, there was a strong consensus for a reduction in the duration of arbitrator terms. This can be seen in the 2008 RFC about the Arbitration Committee, where the opinion with the second highest support was SirFozzie's "reduce ArbCom terms" view. A lot of water has gone under the bridge since then, and term lengths were not changed for the 2008 election.

The question of the number of arbitrator seats, and the length of their terms, is again being raised in a variety of locations, including on Jimbo's talk page, and the 2009 election talk page. Traditionally Jimbo has made decisions about these matters after the election, however this year has seen a significant increase in the community wanting a say in these governance decisions. (e.g. User:Giano/The future followed by User:Giano/Findings of "The Future")

If the community is going to decide, or provide Jimbo with a loud signal, we need to do so now. We do not need to come up with a system that will be future proof. We can have another RFC next year to cater to the different needs of the next election.

This RfC began on this date: 14:09, 27 October 2009 (UTC).

Poll

This is a poll to gather consensus on how the community feels about the number of arbitrators, the length of their term, and the method by which they are chosen.

Please keep comments to a minimum in the poll sections. Long-form discussion should take place on the talk page, and exchanges which veer off the topic will also be transferred to the talk page.

Please place your views and proposals below the poll.

Sign multiple options if more than one is desirable to you.

Term lengths

6 months

I'm ru.wiki arbiter, and it's hard to keep high activity for a long time.·Carn !? 20:02, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Support this in spirit, but the election process does not make this practical.--Tznkai (talk) 22:04, 3 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

One year

Everyking (talk) 07:17, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Hipocrite (talk) 14:06, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Majorly talk 17:55, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Per my comments below. Offliner (talk) 22:29, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
– iridescent 22:42, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
MoreThings (talk) 00:42, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Less is more. -Atmoz (talk) 02:05, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
I understand the arguments that a year is too short, but I would nevertheless prefer to see a quick turnaround. SlimVirgin ^{talk|contribs} 20:45, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Sounds about right. They can stand for reelection, of course. But considering the fast changing environment of Wikipedia, longer then that is a "way too long". The community needs to make reassessment of such crucial appointments often. --_{Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus| talk} 00:47, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
YellowMonkey (bananabucket) 02:01, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
support in principle, similar to my comments about six months above.--Tznkai (talk) 22:05, 3 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Two year terms currently have much more support, but a shorter term might reduce burnout and encourage more good candidates who don't wish to take such a long engagement. Jonathunder (talk) 23:38, 4 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Two years too long. –Juliancolton | ^Talk 22:28, 5 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
It worked for the Romans, it should work for us. Ray^Talk 22:36, 11 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

18 months

John Vandenberg ^(chat) 09:15, 29 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Skomorokh, barbarian 10:15, 29 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
~ Amory (u • t • c) 16:39, 29 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Tactical voting because 2 years is two long and 1 year is optimal but 1 year is unlikey to have support. Hipocrite (talk) 14:14, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
I also think two years would be better than three, but 18 months allows us to continue to easily stagger 3 tranches of arbitrators with elections falling at the same time of year.--chaser (talk) 06:55, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
second choice (first choice is two years) Sssoul (talk) 09:25, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Many AC members burn out pretty damn fast, let's give them the opportunity to be reelected if they still want to be part of the community after 18 long months in wikijail :). -- Luk ^talk 10:31, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Enough time to get into the job but not enough to burn out. --rannṗáirtí anaiṫnid (coṁrá) 00:40, 4 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
This would be good.--Tznkai (talk) 05:40, 10 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
- Disclaimer. This is my personal view as a contributor and does not reflect the views of the Wikimedia Foundation, my employer. - Philippe 23:18, 11 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
One year is likely too short due to the nature of length of cases. I would suggest that once a case is started that those who were ArbCom members continue on without new members entering the case. There is also a real argument that one year may not be long enough to learn procedures. Ideally a two-year initial term with one year renewals would be my choice. Collect (talk) 11:42, 12 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Two years

John Vandenberg ^(chat) 09:15, 29 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Skomorokh, barbarian 10:15, 29 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
So Why 12:42, 29 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Mr.Z-man 14:47, 29 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
~ Amory (u • t • c) 16:39, 29 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Karanacs (talk) 16:52, 29 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Davewild (talk) 18:44, 29 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Manning (talk) 06:36, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
rspεεr (talk) 07:44, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Keegan Three years is too long, one year is getting your feet wet. This is particularly important because active cases may come up again in year's time. Keegan (talk) 07:46, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Moreschi (talk) 09:01, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Sjakkalle (Check!) 09:44, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Understanding that some sitting Arbs might consider running again for a second term, which should be encouraged (as long as they were effective previously). LessHeard vanU (talk) 14:04, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Sandstein 14:24, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
--Dirk Beetstra ^{T C} 15:19, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Three years has obviously been too long, and 18 months introduces too many issues relative to election cycles. Nathan^T 15:22, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
MBisanz ^talk 16:08, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
For clarity and stability. —Finn Casey * * * 17:06, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
JoshuaZ (talk) 17:36, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Two years seems like a good period of time. Basket of Puppies 17:37, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
NW (Talk) 17:43, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
(commented below with !vote) — Ched : ? 17:52, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
- Mjroots (talk) 18:38, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
--El on ka 18:47, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
—NMajdan•talk 19:31, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Durova³⁴⁹ 19:54, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Cirt (talk) 20:12, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
John Carter (talk) 20:38, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Jayron32 20:42, 30 October 2009 (UTC) Two is good for continuity. It should be noted that this more closely reflects current practice anyways; few arbitrators actually complete their 3 year term anyways.[reply]
Almost no-one wants to go on for three years, partly because it's a high stress position, mostly because it tends to take up all the time on wikipedia. However, 18 months is too short to get continuity and experience which the committee needs. Sam Blacketer (talk) 20:51, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Very few people have in practice served effectively for longer than two years. Continuity is good, but this is the longest length that is realistic. . DGG ( talk ) 21:11, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
— Jake Wartenberg 21:20, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Experience shows that three-year terms just don't work, for the reasons stated by Sam, DGG and others. Short Brigade Harvester Boris (talk) 22:14, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
One year is too short, three is too long, and I don't like the idea of having switchouts every half-year. Them From Space 22:20, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
M2Ys4U ^(talk) 22:42, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Even number. One and a half years would be harder to implement. Will Beback talk 23:27, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
the wub "?!" 00:45, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Second choice. I prefer staying with 3 year terms. But two year terms is acceptable too. - jc37 02:02, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
First choice. Three years is punishingly long for an arb. One year seems too short given the need for accumulated experience and overlapping terms on the Committee. Two years is idea, IMO. Tony (talk) 05:32, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
This is best, in my view. Arbs who can do the role for longer should be seeking re-election after two years in any case, ideally with a break of a year. By the third year, they may no longer have the same support they had two years previously. Carcharoth (talk) 07:15, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
This is the number I've been supporting publicly and privately. — Coren ^(talk) 12:45, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
I'd also consider 18 months reasonable. Heimstern Läufer (talk) 13:16, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
FloNight ♥♥♥♥ 14:14, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Two years seems to be a fair length to balance community power over ArbCom membership and the need for terms to be long enough for new ArbCom members to get momentum and experience. Three year terms are also simply too long for a voluntary but heavily demanding job like being on this committee with few members ever completing their full terms. Camaron · Christopher · talk 19:56, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Second choice. I would actually prefer one year; 18 months would be good too, but I can't see how that would fit with annual elections, and having elections more often than that would be a lot of extra work. SlimVirgin ^{talk|contribs} 20:45, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Ironholds (talk) 22:22, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
NellieBly (talk) 22:31, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Sensible length for arbs, and means that with resignations a majority of seats are up for election each year.--Scott Mac (Doc) 23:46, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Three years is just too long. Master&Expert (Talk) 03:38, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Few stick around the full three years, so shortening a bit is a wise idea.--chaser (talk) 06:55, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
--Cybercobra (talk) 08:40, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
first choice (18 months is second choice) Sssoul (talk) 09:23, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
--KrebMarkt 10:20, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
This would seem best; 3 years is definitely too long and generates burnout, but a year wouldn't be enough to get up momentum. Stifle (talk) 10:27, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Mailer Diablo 10:56, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
2 years is a really good number to serve on a board or a committee the 1st to get to know what you are doing and the 2nd to get things done. When there is a 3rd year the 3rd is sent thinking about how much fun you could be having doing something else... RP459 (talk) 13:24, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Acceptable, slightly prefer 3 years but not by much. Casliber (talk · contribs) 13:47, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Antandrus (talk) 14:37, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Please change to 2 years as soon as feasible. AGK 14:52, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Just right. --Joopercoopers (talk) 16:08, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Best option here. AtheWeatherman 17:10, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Wikipedia years are like dog years. Two is plenty. Greg L (talk) 18:14, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Two years are good, but I'd like to then see a two year break between terms. Who then was a gentleman? (talk) 19:19, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Amalthea 23:14, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
IMO 18 months is a bit too short and 2 years is just a tad too long, so I'm going to be conformist and go with this one. Terms need to be long enough so that decisions aren't made with a "view towards next election" but burn out is also a potential problem - balancing the two goals makes this seem like the right length.radek (talk) 06:25, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
— Kusma ^talk 10:21, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
--Cube lurker (talk) 14:02, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
-- PhantomSteve (Contact Me, My Contribs) 15:18, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Or longer is fine. -- EA Swyer ^Talk _{Contributions} 17:37, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Three years has proven too long for most to endure the hot seat. Just look at how many resign before their terms are up or do not stand for reelection! One year is hardly enough time to learn the ropes and gain enough experience. So by default, two might be the magic number.--R.D.H. (Ghost In The Machine) (talk) 20:02, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Burningview ✉ 00:50, 3 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Two seems long enough. GlassCobra 20:55, 3 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
-FASTILY_sock ^(TALK) 00:25, 4 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
iMatthew ^talk at 22:36, 4 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Rami R 11:29, 5 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
BrianY (talk) 01:25, 6 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Three years is too long, 18 months is too short. Cla68 (talk) 05:25, 10 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
If we must.--Tznkai (talk) 05:41, 10 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
My thoughts are similar to Keegan's above. Split the group, 2 years terms, 1/2 elected each year. — Ched : ? 15:51, 10 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
SirFozzie (talk) 21:51, 11 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
MZMcBride (talk) 22:06, 11 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
2 year terms but are staggered so half are elected each year. The veterans can teach the newbies the ropes and not be lame ducks when they're doing it. Valley2city^‽ 04:20, 12 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Three years

Note: This is the current maximum term length.

But if arbs want to retire earlier thats fine too. Christopher Parham (talk) 18:40, 29 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
I first proposed the two year term idea. Because we were seeing quite a bit of "arbitrator fatigue". However, After talking with others, including User:Jimbo Wales, I have changed my mind, and think that it should be three years. ALong with that, arbitrators should be free to resign whenever they wish. And short wikibreaks should also be freely allowed. I am wholly against 1 year terms. - jc37 13:39, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Arbs are of course welcome to resign earlier, but three years seems reasonable if they want to stick it out. The election process is a time-consuming and distracting one, arbs shouldn't be required to go through it more often than is necessary. It's better to keep their attention on other things (such as cases). --El on ka 18:46, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Arb elections are time-consuming, and it takes time for new arbs to come up to speed; I don't believe two-year terms will be helpful and in fact could penalize some of the more effective arbs. SandyGeorgia (Talk) 22:55, 30 October 2009 (UTC) A problem here, apparently my "vote" was lost in this edit; it's good thing I noticed, re-added, and I hope others are watching. SandyGeorgia (Talk) 01:04, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
A shorter term means more campaigning, less arbitrating. Chick Bowen 04:05, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
This is still acceptable, but two years is better. Carcharoth (talk) 07:15, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Either 2 or 3 year terms is reasonable. FloNight ♥♥♥♥ 14:17, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
It takes so long to get up to speed. Also, consider a 3 year term like a 2 year one with an option. Casliber (talk · contribs) 13:46, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Arbs should have time to learn the ropes and get up to speed on things. ---Irbisgreif-(talk | e-mail)-(contribs) 14:46, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
I think arbitrators should have the option of staying for three years, though I would like to see intermediate appointments if attrition rates reduce the number of arbitrators significantly -- Александр Дмитрий (Alexandr Dmitri) (talk) 20:42, 3 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Leave it adaptable to the current situation

As I remember after the last elections some arbitrators were appointed for 1 year terms, some for 2 years and remaining for 3 years. I think that the term length should remain flexible, so that User:Jimbo Wales can decide term lengths based upon the number of votes each candidate receives during elections and upon other circumstances. Ruslik_Zero 12:18, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

I should have mentioned above that I support flexibility in appointing people to shorter terms to even things up. Two years is currently the most popular option for a maximum term length. But this should be decided before the election, not based on support achieved during the election. Specifically, in this case, when the 10 arbitrators with terms continuing beyond this year consist of: 6 arbs on terms ending in December 2010, and 4 arbs with terms ending in December 2011; it makes little sense to appoint all 8 seats from these elections to two-year terms. As I've pointed out, that ends up with 6 seats up for election in December 2010, and 12 seats up for election in December 2011. The easiest way, IMO, to even it up, is to have the first 5 seats for 2-year terms and the next 3 seats for 1-year terms. That results in 9 seats for election in December 2010, and 9 seats for election in December 2011. With any resignations of arbs in their first year leading, as Scott MacDonald noted, to a slight majority of the committee being decided in an election (or half, if there are no resignations). Carcharoth (talk) 17:49, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Support - I don't think all arbitrators should necessarily serve the same length of time. There's some value in the current system, where the candidates who received most support serve longer terms, while those who received less support serve shorter ones (that's how Jimbo did it in the last election, anyway). Perhaps the current term lengths need to change - 3 years probably is too long - but we should remain flexible rather than trying to force all arbitrators into a rigid system. Robofish (talk) 02:47, 3 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Number of seats

12 seats

The Arbitration Committee had 12 seats from inception until the end of 2004.

Based on 10 arbitrators being appointed to serve into 2010, 12 seats would result in only 2 appointments in the upcoming election.

Arbs are not the Apostles and Jimbo is definitely not Jesus, but the more arbs there are, the easier it is for each arb to avoid taking responsibility as an individual. Deacon of Pndapetzim (Talk) 20:18, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Less is more. -Atmoz (talk) 02:05, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Twelve or thirteen arbitrators would probably be an optimal number if we could count on everyone being able to participate. Of course, that's not always a fair assumption given real-life commitments that come up, etc. If we make this choice, we need to elect more than 2 arbitrators in this election, though, so we might have to transition back over time rather than all at once. In any event, it looks like the consensus is to stick with the larger committee. Newyorkbrad (talk) 21:45, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Groups of more than about a dozen members, even ones which meet face to face, need to have more structure and devote more time to their own functioning (see The Mythical Man-Month and the rules for small assemblies in Robert's Rules of Order Newly Revised). Jonathunder (talk) 23:46, 4 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Smaller numbers reduces difficulty in the committee finding a quorum and minimizes the rate with which we collectively tap out our brain trust. The downside is that the individuals are more likley to burn out.--Tznkai (talk) 16:08, 5 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

15 seats

The Arbitration Committee had 15 seats between 2005 and the end of 2008.

Based on 10 arbitrators being appointed to serve into 2010, 15 seats would result in 5 appointments in the upcoming election.

Skomorokh, barbarian 10:15, 29 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Fifteen is a better number considering four to five arbitrators are inactive at any given time, and the council shouldn't be too large to convolute discussion and slow the process even more. Keegan (talk) 07:48, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Probably the best model between sharing workload efficiently and not being too unwieldy as to hamper progress. LessHeard vanU (talk) 14:00, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Preferable. MBisanz ^talk 17:44, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
See reasons on talk. Durova³⁴⁹ 19:57, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Larger numbers actually makes decision-making more difficult. Sam Blacketer (talk) 20:53, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
If we go to 2 years, 15 seats is enough, because fewer of the arbs will be inactive through burnout. But we might consider this one time having it 18 seats as a transition. DGG ( talk ) 21:13, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
— Jake Wartenberg 21:21, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
A good compromise. Larger numbers require reaching further down the list of candidates to those with less solid community support. Short Brigade Harvester Boris (talk) 22:12, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Anything more and each arb doesn't get much of an individual say in the matter. Also, per the above. Them From Space 22:19, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Keegan, Sam Blacketer, and SBHB have it right. Fifteen positions should be ample with 2 year terms. Risker (talk) 00:03, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Somewhere between 12 and 16 should be fine. And since this is between 12 and 16... Also, As a few others have said, I don't like the idea that arbitratorship is given out to those less-than-worthy simply to fill seats. - jc37 02:02, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Second option, if 18 seats results in dipping into lower Support percentages. SandyGeorgia (Talk) 02:22, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
This is equally acceptable to the eighteen seat option. —Finn Casey * * * 02:35, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Cirt (talk) 04:19, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Second option. Needs to be an even number if you have two-year terms, or you have alternate number of seats up for election each year (8, then 7, then 8, then 7, etc). Carcharoth (talk) 07:20, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Strongly prefer the Committee is scaled back to 12 to 15 people. A large part of the burn out comes from the difficulty in coordinating Committee work of more than a dozen people scattered all across the globe. Fewer is more in this situation. FloNight ♥♥♥♥ 13:31, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Per FloNight. Newyorkbrad (talk) 21:43, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Agree that 15 is about right, as (given holidays and the like) it would give around 12 arbitrators available. NellieBly (talk) 22:34, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Per the arbs commenting in this section, who must know best what it's like coordinating behind the scenes.--chaser (talk) 06:58, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
what chaser said. Sssoul (talk) 09:21, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Slightly prefer 18 as it allows leeway for breaks etc. I did feel that larger numbers did impair some quick decision making too as per others above. Casliber (talk · contribs) 13:50, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Second choice (first choice is 18). However, 15 is acceptable as well, since it's going to be somewhat dependent on whether there are sufficient quality candidates. ArbCom is a grueling job that not everyone is interested in. --El on ka 16:42, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Continuing with being a wishy-washy moderate, splitting the difference here as well. Too few arbitrators means under staffing. Too many means that ... honestly, it means some people who shouldn't be on there might wind up on there (looking at results from past elections).radek (talk) 06:28, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Shouldn't be too large. Reducing the term legnths should reduce burn-out, and hopefully allow for arbs to be active for more of their term. — Kusma ^talk 10:22, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
With 15 seats, even allowing for some being on wikibreaks, etc, there should always be 10-12 active at any one time - and if they are all active, then 15 isn't too unmanageable, I would have thought -- PhantomSteve (Contact Me, My Contribs) 15:21, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
-FASTILY_sock ^(TALK) 00:26, 4 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
- Based upon the number of arbs who are inactive at any given time. - Philippe 23:20, 11 November 2009 (UTC) Standard disclaimer: this is my personal opinion as a long time contributor, and not that of the Wikimedia Foundation, my employer. [reply]

18 seats

The Arbitration Committee was expanded to 18 seats after the 2008 election, however it only consisted of 16 arbitrators for the first six months, and there are only 13 bums on seats at the moment.

Based on 10 arbitrators being appointed to serve into 2010, 18 would result in 8 appointments in the upcoming election.

John Vandenberg ^(chat) 09:15, 29 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Skomorokh, barbarian 10:15, 29 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Considering the size of this community and the amount of necessary fluctuation that always happens with Arbitrators, a larger ArbCom is in the community's best interest (also to weaken "cabal!"-accusations and to allow to reflect on the diversity of users on this project). Regards So Why 12:45, 29 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
More is generally better, but I think there should be some minimum support required in the election (if there isn't already) in case there aren't many candidates. I'd rather have a couple fewer than have some with too little trust. Mr.Z-man 14:50, 29 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
~ Amory (u • t • c) 16:39, 29 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
with the same caveat as Mr. Z-Man. Karanacs (talk) 16:53, 29 October 2009 (UTC) Note: I think the minimum threshold should be 66% Karanacs (talk) 13:27, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Davewild (talk) 18:45, 29 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Manning (talk) 06:36, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Everyking (talk) 07:17, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
With Z-man's caveat. rspεεr (talk) 07:44, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Clearly the only sensible option with the Committe's current workload (which I believe is far too high, but). Moreschi (talk) 09:03, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Sjakkalle (Check!) 09:44, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
To allow for inacitvity, etc., and task delegation. Sandstein 14:26, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Allow for inactivity, recusals, could this be combined with a minimum number of active arbs (e.g. 9?), and that the active Arbs on a case are decided on before the case opens (no additions during the case, except with clear and transparent notice which and why an arb is being added when the number would drop below the minimum)? --Dirk Beetstra ^{T C} 15:23, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Because otherwise by the end of the first year we'd have no arbs. I've asked the committee on perhaps 5 or 6 separate occasions to follow through on Jimbo's request for the development of a procedure to replace inactive arbitrators. As the committee has never addressed this publicly in any way, we obviously cannot have a committee so small that attrition renders it completely ineffective between elections. Nathan^T 15:26, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Probably easiest. —Finn Casey * * * 17:07, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
With consideration of gauging consensus for reserving one or more seats for non-admin editors. Basket of Puppies 17:38, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
NW (Talk) 17:43, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Only 18 seats? I would have thought that number was on the low side. Mjroots (talk) 18:44, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
I'd support a larger Committee, but perhaps not require all of them to weigh in on every case. For example, a maximum of 9-10 active arbs reviewing any particular case would seem sufficient. --El on ka 18:50, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
SPLETTE :] ^{How's my driving?} 19:33, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
John Carter (talk) 20:40, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
--Jayron32 21:06, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Offliner (talk) 22:29, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Agree with Z-man; expand the committee only if that doesn't mean dipping too low into Support percentages. SandyGeorgia (Talk) 22:57, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
The comittee has so many responsibilities that more hands would be beneficial. It might also be worthwhile to create an "alternates" list made up of those who've gained sufficient support but aren't needed immediately to fill the committee. Will Beback talk 23:30, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
the wub "?!" 00:42, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
There are three compelling reasons to stick to Jimbo's intuition that 18, an historic increase in seats, is now appropriate: (1) Arb. burn-out is a concern, and we would do well to make it normal, unremarkable, for arbs to take scheduled refresher breaks. (2) The trend is towards greater delegation and arb involvement in specific roles such as serving on subcommittees. Giving the Committee the flexibility to temporarily re-allocate members to tasks other than formal hearings will serve the project well. (3) If we go to two-year terms, as seems likely, 18 maximises the overlap of terms, which is good for internal mentoring and the transfer of skills and knowledge. Tony (talk) 05:46, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
This option is best because it allows further streamlining and delegation, as John has pointed out. Carcharoth (talk) 07:20, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Having a little slack at the beginning of the year, while sometimes a little suboptimal, gives better odds that the committee can keep up with the workload all the way to the end of the year in case of inactivity or attrition. — Coren ^(talk) 12:46, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Given the heavy workload of the committee 18 members seems appropriate. A larger committee will also more accurately reflect the diversity of the community, plus absorb burnouts and resignations. It should also ideally be an even number if two year terms are implemented i.e. 12, 14, 16, or 18 members. Camaron · Christopher · talk 20:07, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
More Arbs is good from the workload point of view, but also because the larger the number, the greater diversity of views, and the less inward-looking. SlimVirgin ^{talk|contribs} 20:47, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
More arbs is good. The Law situation demonstrated that we don't even have enough arbs to handle casework and email, and some comments from Durova indicate that other mailing list comments have gone similarly unanswered for long periods of time. If I could, I'd up the number. Ironholds (talk) 22:23, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
ArbCom is obviously a stressful job that involves a great deal of work, reading through tons of emails and analyzing full pages of evidence; and often it seems as though very few appreciate all the Arbs are doing for us. Because it involves having numerous things to focus on at once, having more committee members will ideally allow them to go through things faster, and were one member to burn out, they could still continue on and compensate for whatever break he or she may go on. Master&Expert (Talk) 03:29, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Distributes the workload more and ensures quorum when several arbs need to recuse themselves. --Cybercobra (talk) 08:42, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Best option. --KrebMarkt 10:27, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Given that the number of active arbs is 10 at the moment, I tend towards this one. Stifle (talk) 10:28, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Needs more people to share the workload. Mailer Diablo 10:57, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Support we need more hands t share the load... RP459 (talk) 13:22, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
I found this number was easier to spread workload around. Casliber (talk · contribs) 13:51, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
For load-leveling, to allow for breaks, for general sanity. Antandrus (talk) 14:37, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Any more, and we have a "too many cooks" situation. Any less, and performance would be affected at those times where several arbitrators go on a wikibreak. AGK 14:53, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Accounts for the inevitable inactivity wastage. --Joopercoopers (talk) 16:12, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
As much as I despise the word “diversity” because of its overuse in PC situations, that’s what we need on ArbCom. Wikipedia is big, the issues varied, and Wikipedia will hopefully recruit more Admins and Arbs who spend a little more time off Wikipedia. Greg L (talk) 18:18, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Expand to allow more points of view. Who then was a gentleman? (talk) 19:20, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
This would (hopefully) prevent trainwrecks like the Mattisse clarification request, where only 6 arbitrators are ~~non-recused~~ listed as active, and only two are truly active. U A 23:15, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Amalthea 23:16, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
The more the merrier. I am not really happy with 18; it is obvious that this will not be enough either. Currently 10 arbs take ~2 months to solve a case, ~18 and guesstimate a month is still too long. --_{Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus| talk} 00:46, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
So they can adapt to members going inactive. -- Luk ^talk 10:32, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
They are volunteers and therefore you need spare capacity. Ϣere SpielChequers 12:30, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Not too much to comment on. It's been said before. ---Irbisgreif-(talk | e-mail)-(contribs) 14:44, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Caseload gets bigger as Wikipedia gets bigger -- EA Swyer ^Talk _{Contributions} 17:35, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Indeed...simply to maintain enough active arbs to work the caseload (and now subcommittee work and motions) requires 18.--R.D.H. (Ghost In The Machine) (talk) 20:06, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Burningview ✉ 00:51, 3 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Because of the demanding nature of the work, we loose some, so we need the larger number. Diderot's dreams (talk) 15:26, 3 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
The Arbitration Committee was set at 18 seats but with (i) attrition (ii) the fact that the planned intermediate election never happened and (iii) arbitrators understandably going inactive the numbers can get quite low. Currently only 8 arbitrators listed as active out of a theoretical 18. -- Александр Дмитрий (Alexandr Dmitri) (talk) 20:39, 3 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Because ArbCom is our only real deliberative body at the moment. GlassCobra 21:01, 3 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
More the better but we it should be kept below 20, beyond that people lose visibilty of each other. --rannṗáirtí anaiṫnid (coṁrá) 00:41, 4 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
I am in favour of a large(r) pool of arbitrators, but think that the actual number of arbitrators actively participating in any specific given case should be much less than 18 and be limited to maybe six members. Arbitrators should be able to recuse themselves without having to worry about the extra burden on the other arbitrators; also, cases should ideally be handled promptly and without delay, and arbitrators should also be able to refrain from participating in a case because of a (hopefully temporary) problem in giving it the required time and attention. (I'm also in favour of more flexibility if it increases the size of the pool of available arbitrators.) --Lambiam 18:32, 4 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
iMatthew ^talk at 22:37, 4 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
–Juliancolton | ^Talk 22:29, 5 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Because of how high the current workload is. Cla68 (talk) 05:24, 10 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
High workload, plenty of recusals, and high retirement rate. — Ched : ? 15:55, 10 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Leave it adaptable to the current situation

Personally, I think that there are situations that come up, such as last year's elections, in which there were several who were REALLY close in votes. I think User:Jimbo Wales should be able to expand or contract the number of seats, based upon current events of the election, and current resignations, and so on. - jc37 13:39, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]

This option does have merits. Flexibility is still present in the other options as well, though, mainly brought about by arbitrator resignation and departure. The question is who decides on the tweaks (Jimbo?) and when (before or after the election?). Carcharoth (talk) 07:20, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Per Carcharoth. Newyorkbrad (talk) 21:40, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
There is no need to have a fixed number of arbitrators. Any system with a fixed number will be too rigid and incapable of adaptation to changing circumstances. Ruslik_Zero 12:12, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Receptive to this - ultimately there is no "correct" number, and is good in situations of close votespread such as last years' election. Casliber (talk · contribs) 13:52, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Agree with Jc37 and Casilber here, gives good flexibility and judgement options. AtheWeatherman 17:14, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Rami R 11:32, 3 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Per closeness, also, size is generally irrelevant/doesn't correlate to results. YellowMonkey (bananabucket) (help the Invincibles Featured topic drive) 01:12, 4 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Discussion

New section for threaded discussion because I can't figure out a way to jam it in to the proper format yet. What is the goal the community has for the number of active arbitrators at any one time? The comments above suggest some commentors have the same goal number of active arbs, but have different ways to try to find that number with either a smaller, leaner committee (with shorter terms) or a larger committee where members can take breaks without issue.

Keep in mind the current subcommittee system, which I would qualify as a success if only measured by work output, has two 3 seat groups which could survive overlap, and a coordinator position. In addition there is room for a deputy coordinator, there has been suggestions for an eventual arb/clerk coordinator, and there is some noise (I don't know how the committee feels about it) about some sort of admin behavior subcommittee. Currently, all committeee members have voting responsibilities and I personally don't see that changing. I personally would aim for about 9 or 10 active Arbitrators at any one time. Thoughts?--Tznkai (talk) 16:23, 5 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Adding here (it seemed like the best section) my opinion that the number of seats available for election should be calculated before the election starts, and be chosen in such a way as to minimise variations from year-to-year and keep it as close to 9 as possible. A natural consequence of my proposal below is that if large numbers of arbs resign, then the committee naturally reduces in size, rather than automatically trying to fill up all the vacant seats in a "super-election". The schedules below assume no resignations of first-year arbs (with two-year terms, hopefully such resignations will be reduced), though the system can accommodate one or two such resignations. Once things have stabilised at nine seats for election each year, then if more than one first-year arb resigns in a given year, then seats have to be left empty to keep the number of seats elected each year about the same.
- Current probable schedule for seats available for election:
  - 8 seats for election - all 18 seats filled (December 2009)
  - 6 seats for election - all 18 seats filled (December 2010)
  - 12 seats for election - all 18 seats filled (December 2011)
  - 6 seats for election - all 18 seats filled (December 2012)
- Proposed schedule A for seats available for election:
  - 7 seats for election - only 17 of 18 seats filled (December 2009)
  - 7 seats for election - all 18 seats filled (December 2010)
  - 9 seats for election - only 16 of 18 seats filled (December 2011)
  - 9 seats for election - all 18 seats filled (December 2012)
- Proposed schedule B for seats available for election:
  - 8 seats for election - all 18 seats filled (December 2009)
  - 6 seats for election - all 18 seats filled (December 2010)
  - 9 seats for election - only 15 of 18 seats filled (December 2011)
  - 9 seats for election - all 18 seats filled (December 2012)
All the above are seats with 2-year terms. At the start of 2010, there will be 12 arbs with 2 years left, and 6 with 1 year left. Other variations are possible. The idea of the above is to damp down the imbalances in the numbers elected each year by carrying excess empty seats over to the following year. Carcharoth (talk) 19:05, 13 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Election method

For a list of options, see {{electoral systems}}.

Support/Oppose

The method used in the December 2008 elections, and in previous years, by which a voter may choose to support or oppose each candidacy, but is not required to enter a judgement about every candidacy (see example). Under the SecurePoll method, voters are required to enter judgements about every candidacy, but have the added option of being neutral (see example). The candidates are ranked by the ratio of supports to opposes.

SecurePoll plus Support/Oppose is the best option. It's simple and familiar. Roger Davies ^talk 13:10, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Karanacs (talk) 13:26, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
The method must be intuitive and non-complex, and must be designed to elect multiple candidates. The Schulze method is specifically designed to elect a single candidate, and is also very complex and counter-intuitive. Cumulative voting is also very complex (allocating portions of one's vote to various candidates) and its main use is in corporate elections where the number of votes each elector has can vary widely. Complicated systems have a tendency to disenfranchise voters who simply want to voice their opinion on individual candidates and not have to do complex calculations to figure out what weight their votes should get. Risker (talk) 14:55, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Simple = best. Also not at all sure that weighted voting methods promote the right sort of candidates for a consensus-driven community; specifically I mean that minority support, regardless of strength, should not cancel out broad opposition, while minority opposition, even if strong, should not cancel out broad support. Christopher Parham (talk) 15:30, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Manning (talk) 15:36, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Preferential voting requires that a voter research all candidates in detail. This makes it simpler, and also allows those with little time to research candidates to just vote for a few candidates. NW (Talk) 17:45, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
The support/oppose system works well. Though as I've indicated in another section of this RfC, I prefer that we stick with public voting, rather than moving to secret ballots. --El on ka 18:52, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Durova³⁴⁹ 20:12, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Cirt (talk) 20:13, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
KISS. Short Brigade Harvester Boris (talk) 20:14, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Oppose votes should have weight. Preferential voting is a bit scary, and it will only reward those who make an effort to become famous and loved in the run up to the election. Deacon of Pndapetzim (Talk) 20:21, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
John Carter (talk) 20:42, 30 October 2009 (UTC)\[reply]
Per Boris. Sam Blacketer (talk) 20:54, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Simple, clear, and understandable. DGG ( talk ) 21:15, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Offliner (talk) 22:30, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
I don't see the added benefit of the more complicated methods for our purposes. Sandstein 22:32, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
SandyGeorgia (Talk) 22:58, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Simple. -Atmoz (talk) 02:05, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Possibly other systems are better, but need to think about it more. Carcharoth (talk) 07:42, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
I admit to finding other systems exceedingly frustrating. This still works fine. Heimstern Läufer (talk) 13:18, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Keep it simple. SlimVirgin ^{talk|contribs} 20:48, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
This seems simpler, but it also seems to be better at giving opposition a say. NellieBly (talk) 22:36, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Because it works. Mailer Diablo 10:58, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Simplest. AGK 12:44, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Been okay so far. My main opposition to it is public opposes can spread ill-will, but this is negated by secret ballot. Casliber (talk · contribs) 13:54, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Per the KISS_principle. >Radiant< 14:25, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
In combination with secret ballot. Antandrus (talk) 14:38, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Simple and effective. AtheWeatherman 17:19, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Yes, it's important for people to be able to oppose candidates so that others can see the reasons for opposition. Who then was a gentleman? (talk) 19:20, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Although there are a lot of problems surrounding the ArbCom, I don't think the election method is one of them. Preferential voting would be interesting, but I think the old support/oppose method is fine too. Everyking (talk) 06:17, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
No perfect system of voting can exist [1] so simplicity is just that little extra something that makes this one slightly less imperfect then the others.radek (talk) 06:31, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
--Cube lurker (talk) 14:04, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
~~Using SecurePoll,~~ this is the easiest option -- PhantomSteve (Contact Me, My Contribs) 15:25, 2 November 2009 (UTC) (amended per my comments to be added in a moment in "public v secret" below)[reply]
KISS--R.D.H. (Ghost In The Machine) (talk) 20:09, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
First choice -- Александр Дмитрий (Alexandr Dmitri) (talk) 20:25, 3 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Per Boris. KISS. GlassCobra 21:03, 3 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
-FASTILY_sock ^(TALK) 00:29, 4 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
First choice. Approval voting (or our small variation on it that allows abstention) has worked fine for us, with the bonus that it allows a sanity check that makes sure each elected candidate has enough support. rspεεr (talk) 05:35, 4 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Support only with public voting. Still on the fence regarding which voting system w/ secret ballots. Rami R 11:58, 5 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Though I don't like SecurePolls. –Juliancolton | ^Talk 22:30, 5 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
The preferential voting systems have a lot of merits, but I'm not convinced they'll be able to accommodating the occasional need to improvise as needed, as was done when expanding the committee last year.--Tznkai (talk) 07:18, 10 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Simple, and doesn't require you to view all the candidates before you vote for/against some. עוד מישהו Od Mishehu 10:20, 10 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Сlickрор (talk) 03:50, 11 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Simple and doesn't require the voters to vote for or against candidates that they aren't familiar with. Vyvyan Basterd (talk) 04:47, 12 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

A point of contention

- Oppose the wording of this. The system used was not approval voting, due to the presence of 'oppose votes' which do not exist in an approval voting method. The existence of oppose votes actually produces something similar to the Borda count, which is much more complex and has significant downsides that have not been discussed. --Barberio (talk) 13:40, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  - Agree with Barberio. —SlamDiego_←T 17:37, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
    - Suggest pointing this out to whoever wrote the wording here. Was that Roger? Carcharoth (talk) 17:54, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  - That's not the Borda count in any way. The Borda count suffers because you have to give a different number of points to each person, leading to bizarre dominant strategies. This is 1/0/-1 range voting, which is very similar to approval. rspεεr (talk) 05:27, 4 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
    - The presence of a negative number is arbitrary. This is result identical to score allocation for being placed higher or lower than alternative candidates, except that the score for being below another candidate is allocated in negative numbers, which is in no way similar to approval voting. The closest formal model I see to it is Borda count, however the positioning of the candidates is not explicit or linear, but expressed by the oppose voting. --Barberio (talk) 15:47, 4 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
      - You are missing the point, and I think you should go brush up on some of our voting system articles. Negative numbers are indeed arbitrary, and they have nothing to do with it. In the Borda count, you must assign a different score, from an equally-spaced scale, to every candidate. This results in it being strategically very different from approval voting (and gives a strong incentive to not vote your true preferences). The formal model of our system is called range voting, and we have an article on it. The article mentions that it is strategically identical to approval voting (because a rational voter will simply use their vote to its full effect and not abstain on anyone). rspεεr (talk) 04:17, 11 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Cumulative voting

Cumulative voting is a multiple-winner voting system intended to promote proportional representation while also being simple to understand.

An ideal setup would be to give each voter one vote per seat, for them to distribute across the candidates as they see fit (in whole numbers; no fractions). It does not have oppose votes, and it is simple.

John Vandenberg ^(chat) 13:54, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Actually this method, while sounding more complicated, would reflect the community's will far better than a simple support/oppose system where one can only give equal preference to different candidates they want to support. Regards So Why 13:56, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
This is the method that people actually use in the real world - you know, where things have been demonstrated to work in practice as opposed to both fail in practice and in theory, like we have here. Hipocrite (talk) 14:11, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
No strong opinion on this issue. However, this method seems worth a try. —Finn Casey * * * 17:12, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
— Jake Wartenberg 21:21, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Might as well have a parliament. YellowMonkey (bananabucket) 02:02, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Sure, I can dig trying this out as an experiment. It may cut down on conflict and it does not violate the KISS principle.--R.D.H. (Ghost In The Machine) (talk) 20:12, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Approval AND Cumulative voting

Basically: Have Support/Neutral/Oppose, as in approval voting, but only can support a number of candidates up to the number of seats available, as in cumulative voting.

Preferential voting

Preferential voting is a method by which voters rank the candidates in order of preference, so that winners are selected based on the breadth and depth of support for their candidacies. An example of preferential voting is the Schulze method which was used in the 2008 and 2009 Wikimedia Foundation Board of Trustees elections.

Only if Support/Oppose is resoundingly rejected. This is over-complicated to start off with. Roger Davies ^talk 13:10, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Davewild (talk) 13:23, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Second preference (first is cumulative). Reagrds So Why 13:56, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Preferential systems are much better at representing the wishes of voters as a whole. They are easy to understand once one grasps the initial concept, as I think the WMF board vote (and their long-standing use in legislative elections) shows. Approval voting is a crude metric that allows the election of candidates which a sizeable minority of voters might strongly disapprove of, encourages tactical voting and cannot express any difference in strengths of support (If I vote for eight candidates, it treats this expressing equal support for all eight, which is likely to be highly distorting). It's time we matured. Skomorokh, barbarian 13:58, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Everyking (talk) 14:30, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
This system is as complicated as the voter wants it to, giving maximum freedom to the voter. Most of the complications are in the counting instead of the voting. If the voter prefers to make a simple "approval" vote, just put a "1" next to all you approve, and "2" next to those you disapprove, and if you want something more sophisticated feel free. I prefer this over cumulative voting because it allows people to support more candidates than there are seats (if they are mostly interested in preventing someone getting on ArbCom), and making 100% support behind a single candidate an attractive option is not so good if there are multiple seats. Sjakkalle (Check!) 15:54, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
--Jayron32 21:07, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Always. Any system of preferential voting is ideal (I personally like IRV) when compared to a system that is biased towards polarizing candidates. As Sjakkalle points out, this essentially includes Support/Oppose as an option within it. ~ Amory (u • t • c) 23:23, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
This system has many benefits. However there should be some mechanismm to prevent joke candidates from running. A problem with approval voting is that it gives disproportionate weight to opposition. If 80% is the threshold then 21% of the participants can veto any candidate. With a larger committee it's desirable to have a great range of views, even ones that might not be supported by a quarter of the community. Will Beback talk 23:36, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
I'm not sure why people think this is complicated. For voters, it's simply ranking candidates in order. I would actually say this is simpler than cumulative voting and on a par with approval. For counting, although Schulze method looks scary, there are established and trusted programs that will do all that for us. the wub "?!" 00:38, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
I'd prefer range voting (see the "Bayesian regret" analysis), but since it's not an option and I'm not so bold as to add it, this is the next best option. --Cybercobra (talk) 02:20, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
This is a much better expression of individual and community will and should be adopted more widely on WP (whether Schultze, here, or a simpler method for some RfCs). Voters don't have to be experts in operating the system it to cast their rankings. Voters are encouraged to weigh up their preference for candidates rather more carefully than under the clunky, ham-fisted Support/Oppose system (and I still couldn't work out how the final percentage was calculated lat December, and was too shy to ask). I presume Schultze for ArbCom would be "optional preferential", where voters don't have to rank all candidates, but choose how many they wish to rank; but it doesn't matter—it's still the best on offer. My second choice would be "Cumulative voting". Why couldn't we have listed these very alternatives here in terms of ranked preferences? (3,2,4,1 so simple) Tony (talk) 06:04, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Preferential voting will tend to favor the candidates you have widest support, even if that support is less massive in absolute numbers. This improves the odd that the selected candidates end up being "acceptable" to most of the electorate, even if some others would have been more strongly supported by specific groups (and thus also more polarizing; which is, IMO, an undesirable property). — Coren ^(talk) 12:49, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Simplest true proportional rep vote to implement. 'Oppose' voting has been primarily used tactically and not as a honest statement of preference in previous votes, in particular with some campaigning to ask for oppose votes against all other candidates in order to double their 'net vote'.--Barberio (talk) 13:09, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Will more accurately reflect the will of the community, and as others have said it really is as complicated as users want it to be, with it being up to voters on how many candidates they rank. Camaron · Christopher · talk 20:25, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Yes, being Irish I'd support PR-STV. Stifle (talk) 21:22, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Yes. I dislike the current system, as it tends to favour candidates who offend few, but may also be the only weakly preferred by any. I'd rather see some candidates who may represent strong minority interests have a chance.--Scott Mac (Doc) 23:50, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Markus Schulze 11:29, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
RP459 (talk) 13:25, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Support/Oppose voting is designed for cases where we don't have a limit on the number of seats. It would be a bad idea to choose one candidate over another just because the former got 78.5% of the vote and the latter got 78.4%. -- King of ♥ ♦ ♣ ♠ 18:08, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
I like this approach because it better reflects the grey areas inherent in making choices with sketchy information and conflicting virtues and shortcomings. Greg L (talk) 18:21, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Support/Oppose can be falsify: "Oppose" vote weight more than "Support". Schulze method most perfect·Carn !? 20:52, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Amalthea 23:13, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
— Jake Wartenberg 01:23, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
— Kusma ^talk 10:22, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Better than Support/Oppose voting. -- Luk ^talk 10:34, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Diversity is healthy, and a diverse arbcom could avoid a divide emerging between the arbs and the community Ϣere SpielChequers 12:32, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
I strongly support the Schulze method. ---Irbisgreif-(talk | e-mail)-(contribs) 14:47, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Burningview ✉ 00:52, 3 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Likely to produce a more accurate result than straight approval voting. Robofish (talk) 02:54, 3 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Preference system are better at producing results that reflect genuine opinion. --rannṗáirtí anaiṫnid (coṁrá) 00:44, 4 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Second choice behind approval. Preferential voting is often a good idea, but here it has the slight drawback that it loses us the ability to judge how much support each candidate has overall. rspεεr (talk) 05:37, 4 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Second choice behind cumulative voting. John Vandenberg ^(chat) 12:46, 4 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
--Joopercoopers (talk) 11:52, 11 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Public polling v. Secret ballot

Previous Request for Comment: ArbCom secret ballot

Discussion

Public voting

Votes are made and signed publicly; anyone can see how a user has voted. (this is the method that was used in elections from the last few years)

Go openly as we have always done without any real problems. Seriously, what is trying to be fixed by making everything a secret? We're meant to be open and honest. Arbcom is not a government.Majorly talk 17:40, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
I'm surprised you can claim there are no problems when elsewhere you say: "an election is basically an opportunity for the bullies ... to come out of their holes and dish their dirt"? Surely public voting simply gives bullies a platform, whereas secret polling doesn't? Roger Davies ^talk 08:51, 12 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Especially with something as important as ArbCom, which really depends on a perception of community trust, open and public voting is the way go. --El on ka 17:56, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
We definitely need to have everything out in the open. Arbcom already handles too many things in secret. Tex (talk) 19:39, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
I don't think there are significant problems with this method and there are advantages of transparency and openness. Christopher Parham (talk) 19:49, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Primarily to handle sophisticated Poetlister-like sockfarm voting schemes. A public and open vote is harder to game, and easier to remedy if fraud occurs. Durova³⁴⁹ 20:19, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Being more open also makes it, as Durova indicated, easier to check up on. John Carter (talk) 20:43, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
--Jayron32 21:08, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Second choice. The best reason against public voting, tactical voting, would be greatly reduced by preferential voting, and even without preferential voting, is overwhelmed by problems associated with secret voting. -kotra (talk) 21:49, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Most definitely, to preserve transparency and facilitate discussion. Open discourse is essential in the way we operate and is most necessary in the deciding of our upper-level officials. Them From Space 22:15, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Deacon of Pndapetzim (Talk) 22:34, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Previous rfc spoke of buying votes. Not quite sure what currency was intended, but I'm open to offers :) MoreThings (talk) 00:44, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Secret ballots are a terrible idea. A public vote enables us to see the cabals and cliques in action, and weight their views accordingly. A secret ballot opens the way to off-wiki canvassing and tactical voting on a massive scale, and we'd never know. Moreschi (talk) 01:54, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Open. User:Themfromspace said exactly what I was thinking. While I do like the convenience of secure poll, I like having a permanent record on the wiki, even more. That and, if secret ballots start happening, I think we'll have to raise the requirement for voting, since it will be less transparent. - jc37 02:02, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Open. -Atmoz (talk) 02:05, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
What I said here: it's helpful to both the community and candidates to see who voted for/against and why. Also, if some arbitrators are obviously using their position to "get back" at people who opposed them (though I can't think of a situation where this happened), they should be removed immediately. RfA/Bs aren't done in secret (and it's a good thing they're not), so neither should these. I'm disappointed that the secret voting method was pushed through in an RfC where less than 100 people participated, especially when hundreds of people vote in the ArbCom elections. Acalamari 02:14, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
I note that many respected community members present convincing arguments for a secret vote. However, Wikipedia is not an experiment in democracy. The same arguments regarding retribution and bloc voting could be made regarding RfA & RfB, but no one is seriously proposing a secret approval vote for administrator privileges. There is no compelling reason to exempt this election from the traditional open consensus model that has proved to be the foundation of Wikipedia. —Finn Casey * * * 02:33, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
I agree with Finn Casey. The public system has previously worked fine and it is much more useful to identify canvassing attempts than a secret voting system would be. Regards So Why 10:21, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Everyking (talk) 13:25, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
While I do understand the reasons for going over to a secret ballot, I haven't seen enough evidence of intimidation based on votes to consider it to be at the same threat level as possible unchecked meatpuppety and cabalism under a secret ballot. Heimstern Läufer (talk) 13:29, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
I'm sympathetic to some of the arguments for secret ballots. But in my years on Wikipedia I've seen arbcom correspondence published on Wikipedia Review, leaking of mailing lists, postings of detailed personal information, and many other things to make me extremely skeptical that "secret" balloting would be truly secret. Short Brigade Harvester Boris (talk) 19:46, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Secret ballots have their advantages, but the principal advantages don't really help us any and the disadvantages are particularly salient. Wikipedia does not have an (explicit) problem with voter intimidation. Wikipedia has a serious problem with the appearance of backstage dealings and private power struggles. A secret ballot works well if you trust the mechanism and you trust the reporter. Even in advanced democracies, there are legitimacy problems with the mechanism and the reporting. We should not pretend that technology obviates those problems for us (because they are mostly in the minds of critics). Obviously the argument will be made that WP is going to use some third party tech (probably hosted on some third party site), but how long will we go before we realize that candidate A has received an anomalous number of negative votes and have to 'correct' for this (in the sense that we might if they were public? What happens if we have to knock 100 votes off a tally? How do we explain this verifiably? Do we say "trust us, we would only remove truly illegitimate votes"? If we ignore non-technical disruption (i.e. we allow any account within some set parameters to vote and never molest the count), how do we deal with the obvious problems of ballot stuffing, double voting, etc? Protonk (talk) 08:50, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Small comment. I'm aware that the Secure-vote protocol allows that editors check who has voted (just not for whom), offering some measure of transparency. This is better than obscuring the vote entirely. I'm not certain it is enough to prevent problems or the appearance of problems WRT transparency. Protonk (talk) 19:10, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
I agree with Protonk. I also think that (very) marginal benefits of the secret ballot do not justify the extreme complexity of their organization in such an open editing environment as Wikipedia. Ruslik_Zero 12:05, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Public voting is always preferable, but I'd like us to use some variant of the SecurePoll interface that allows the public to see who voted, and for which candidates. This setup would remedy the problems pointed out by Durova, as would allowing the checkusers full access to the voting logs (as they would have for on-wiki voting). AGK 12:50, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Per Finn and Boris. Wikipedia has always been based on openness. We have already seen Arbitration moving from a mostly open, interactive process to something that mostly happens on the private mailing list - and that has not been an improvement. What's next, anonymous contributions to articles so that stalking becomes harder? Voting on Wikipedia is voluntary. Most actions are under public scrutiny, and should be. That's what protects us from the abuse of power - not increasing levels of obscurity and intransparency. --Stephan Schulz (talk) 13:13, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Essentially what Protonk said. Transparency is very important, and Wikipedia has repeatedly made the mistake of thinking that problems can be resolved by hiding information from the public. >Radiant< 14:26, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Per protonk, Durova and Finn. AtheWeatherman 19:19, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Secret voting would pretty well eliminate the oppose/support balloting method. Who then was a gentleman? (talk) 19:21, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Transparency is the key. I don't see how Wikipedia:Requests for comment/ArbCom secret ballot has a "result [that] was an overwhelming yes" as this RFC claims. Public voting, as AGK said, is the preferred way to go. As elections have shown, secret voting is much easier to game...and that is what will happen in future arbcom elections. Also, what is with this duopoly...allow for a discussion area outside this yes/no paradigm...Smallman12q (talk) 19:32, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Users see the situation and can change the criteria online. unlikely that open voting can end without electing enough people·Carn !? 20:54, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Amalthea 23:16, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
As expressed in RFC #1 --Cube lurker (talk) 14:05, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Transparency is the most important thing.M0RD00R (talk) 16:41, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Secrecy has caused enough problems on Wikipedia in the past. Secret polls are more subject to fraud and manipulation by the powers that be. We've had quite enough of that...it is time for WP's power structure to embrace open democracy, even while kicking and screaming if necessary. Besides, ghosts do it with transparency!--R.D.H. (Ghost In The Machine) (talk) 20:18, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Burningview ✉ 00:53, 3 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
(Reluctantly) A big problem with open voting is early trends leading later voters to just go along, IMO. But without open voting, transparency is lost. Since have no "paper trail" in Wikipedia elections, the public listing of votes serves as our check. And this is important, there have been several instances of abuse of power here at the encyclopedia. I favor open voting where the individual votes are not revealed until after "the polls close" and no running totals are kept during voting. Diderot's dreams (talk) 15:42, 3 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
I'm sorry, but your position confuses me. If you favor open voting, then it is not possible to not reveal votes until the polls close: the votes are, by definition, out in the open. Not revealing the individual votes and not running totals until the polls close is what secret ballots are. Did you mean to support the section below? — Coren ^(talk) 16:15, 3 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
It seems to be rather a third option where the votes are secret during the election, after which we would see whom everyone voted for. The current "secret voting" proposal, as I understand it, would never reveal individual votes. Evidently, there are a variety of middle grounds between "open" and "secret" voting not being considered here. Christopher Parham (talk) 16:55, 3 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
SecurePoll could easily be tweaked to release voting lists after the election had closed. Happy‑melon 22:16, 3 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
... or more *wink wink* --rannṗáirtí anaiṫnid (coṁrá) 22:27, 3 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
As the options were presented to us in this vote, I favor open voting over secret ballot as the best choice of those presented. This is because I think it is more important to have transparency than to get rid of the "go along with the early trend" phenomenon. (There are other considerations too, of course). What I really favor is the third option that Christopher deduced I wanted. And what Happy-melon said could be done by modifying the secret ballot option. Diderot's dreams (talk) 20:17, 4 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
If we move to a secret ballot then we will be placing a lot of trust in (effectively) strangers. Will need to trust that these strangers will conduct and count the election properly and announce the true result. While others may decry that these strangers would not "cheat" us in any way, it is unwise to place unquestionable trust in anyone we don't know. This isn't a statement of paranoia or cynicism, it simply a matter of not being so naive. ~~I would be willing to change to a method of secret balloting should there be more safe-guards to confidence, such as described in my proposal below. Without safeguards of this kind,~~ a change to a secret ballot is a definite 'no, no'. --rannṗáirtí anaiṫnid (coṁrá) 18:28, 3 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Per many above (transparency is important, etc). Although most voters simply sign their names, many do leave rationales that could influence the opinions of others voting; if we were to convert to a secret ballot, this would be lost. GlassCobra 20:04, 3 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Wikipedians have demonstrated time and again that they cannot be trusted to behave with integrity behind closed doors. Of course secret ballots are preferable in democracies, where there are also pollwatchers, and watchers of the watchers, and press, and etc., etc. It's not hard at all to imagine the audit subcommittee going into moral panic about some issue and deciding that it's time to lead, follow or get out of the way or some such pompous overblown panic rhetoric and thus conclude it's time to stage a coup for the sake of morality. Unfortunately, in a community as underdeveloped as ours a secret poll would be a step away from Democratic governance rather than toward it. --JayHenry (talk) 04:12, 4 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Bloc voting (particularly ethnic bloc voting) is my main concern. In a secret vote, there is no means of knowing of such votes before the results are finalized; Thus the community cannot counter-act unreasonable votes. See Wikipedia:Arbitration Committee Elections December 2008/Vote/Jayvdb where such a bloc vote did take place. Rami R 16:34, 4 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
iMatthew ^talk at 22:39, 4 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Outright votes should rarely be used, let alone hidden and secretive ones. –Juliancolton | ^Talk 22:31, 5 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
BrianY (talk) 01:26, 6 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Voting is evil to begin with, and the problem of multiple voting by sock operators is bad enough with the votes out in the open. Secret voting would make the election results completely untrustworthy. Also per GlassCobra, rationales are informative. 69.228.171.150 (talk) 12:32, 9 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Having read the various comments here, I am persuaded that a public ballot would be a better choice, as opposed to my previous 'secret' vote. The transparency of votes is required - and I have no objection with people seeing who I supported/opposed. If that pisses off someone at any RfA I might make, I'll take that chance - it might be that other editors at a hypothetical RfA might actually prefer that I show which mast I nail my colours to, rather than it being hidden - even if they disagree with me on my vote! -- PhantomSteve (Contact Me, My Contribs) 13:35, 9 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
This would allow for more transparency for the elections - while some of the issues are clearly computer-detectable objective criteria, others (such as sock-related issues) aren't. עוד מישהו Od Mishehu 10:16, 10 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
(moved to new option) Normally I'd prefer a more private method, but I see a lot of agenda driven things here that push me to prefer a more transparent view of the situation in this case. — Ched : ? 15:58, 10 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
I don't trust Jimbo Wales, especially to make his decisions when support and opposition are kept secret. Сlickрор (talk) 03:06, 11 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Transparency is the way of the Wiki, despite the flaws that it may have. bibliomaniac 1 5 05:33, 11 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Transparency is more important that having secret elections when the systems that would normally ensure a fair election aren't in place. I'm especially concerned about bloc voting and frankly I think there are bigger issues to be concerned about at the moment than asking people to make their opinions public. Vyvyan Basterd (talk) 04:56, 12 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
I was definitely split on this, which is why I have been watching the discussion go back and forth. Julian's comment below has swayed me enough to put myself here. What next, RfAs with secret voting and separate discussion areas? NW (Talk) 20:02, 12 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
I would like to see transparency on this... I don't like really secretive things on such an important issue as Arbcom elections... Until It Sleeps ^{Happy Thanksgiving} 21:51, 12 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
At the end of the day, if arbs are handling a lot of matters in secret, and their jobs are not easy, they need to be trusted in the eyes of the public, and all actions should be under public scrutiny. A number of arb resignations involved precisely this sort of thing, as well as cases lacking natural justice, leaking of mailing lists, postings of detailed personal information and private correspondance, and many other actions. For better or worse, this does include reputations too, past instances where candidates have exercised good/poor judgement, candidates actions who appear to repeatedly be guided by political agenda and manipulating others on and off wiki, candidates who are unlikely to be able to work with the community, etc - would such candidates benefit this project in an arb position, even by default? It is also voluntary voting; users need to be confident they can speak out against unfit candidates - there will be far less confidence by such users while the most important aspect of the elections is held in secrecy: voting. Rationales are important. Finally, the community should be trusted to see through users who are grinding an axe and users who are truly bringing quality perspective to the table, while any potential socking that occurs during the election period also needs to be identified. Ncmvocalist (talk) 02:50, 13 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Secret ballot (SecurePoll)

Votes are recorded and tallied by MediaWiki; the lists of "who voted" and "which candidates were voted for" are separated, so no one can see which way a user voted. A real time tally of who has voted is publicly-viewable (example from the current AUSC election).

As I supported on the previous request for comment on this issue. Davewild (talk) 18:06, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
SPLETTE :] ^{How's my driving?} 19:35, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Cirt (talk) 20:13, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
It is more likely that socks would be caught with SecurePoll as all IP information is available to the scrutineers. Having legitimate elections unbiased by social pressure is very important. It is also important to remember that the lists of who voted will be open to all. — Jake Wartenberg 21:22, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
As per the previous RFC. Voting without fear of retribution or harassment is more important than catching socks. That said, SecurePoll allows everyone to see who is voting, so it is still possible to look for accounts which appear to be socks. John Vandenberg ^(chat) 21:38, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Per Wikipedia:Requests_for_comment/ArbCom_secret_ballot, where this was generally supported. Please read for pros and cons. Why are we doing this again? Is this RfC advertised widely enough, or should we plan three more just in case? Nathan^T 21:56, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Vote secrecy is very important. Offliner (talk) 22:32, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
The current implementation seems to allow for adequate antisock safeguards, and secret votes are more likely to correctly represent community opinion, since the whole social networking aspect is filtered out. Sandstein 22:36, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
If the safeguards against fraud are in place then this is better system then open voting. Will Beback talk 23:38, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
It's not often I prefer secrecy to openness, but John Vandenberg said it best. the wub "?!" 23:59, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
As per Jake W, John V and Sandstein Manning (talk) 01:47, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Per John Vandenberg and Sandstein. ArbCom elections are explicitly not a "consensus" - they are a majority vote, as such we should treat it as one, and not as some sort of discussion-less discussion. Mr.Z-man 03:11, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Per this discussion, but we should re-evaluate next year in the event new problems surface as a result of secret balloting. SandyGeorgia (Talk) 03:38, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
(i) It makes an arbitrator's job more difficult, not easier, to know who supported or who opposed them (yes, people do bring this up). (ii) I'm cannot see why it's anyone else's business how I choose to cast my votes. (iii) Public voting disenfranchises those who are not confident about speaking up publicly and those who fear having their votes challenged by vociferous editors with an axe to grind. Roger Davies ^talk 04:03, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Exactly what Roger said. In addition, private voting is the obvious system to minimise the incentives for canvassing and, in a mirror image, for secretive influence before and after the election. Tony (talk) 06:11, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
The sensible thing to do, for all of the reasons outlined above. --Malleus Fatuorum 06:19, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
There should be no possibility of peer pressure on how you vote. Sjakkalle (Check!) 07:30, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
But only if there is vigorous and open public debate on the candidates and their election statements and answers to questions. That, coupled with open declarations of support where people prefer to do that, and analysis of the list of voters (which is available for all to see), should meet most concerns. But no-one should be forced to disclose who they voted for, unless they choose to do so. Carcharoth (talk) 07:52, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
It's no coincidence that absolutely every single true democratic system of the world uses secret ballots. The ability for voters to pick candidates without having to publicly justify their decision, or being able to "prove" they voted one way or another to a third party, and fundamental requirements of true democracy. Having public voting is an invitation to manipulation, coercion, and bribery. — Coren ^(talk) 12:54, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Strong preference for secure voting that lets people give there opinion publicly or not as they personally choose. Under this system people will be able to ask questions and make comments about their preferred candidates. But the voting will be outside the view of other people thus making people more likely to freely give their opinion. I see this as extremely important because of the nature of the work done by the Arbitration Committee. FloNight ♥♥♥♥ 14:28, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
I like the community have found myself divided on this, though I have ultimately come down in favour of secret voting. No matter if it is public or private this is going to be a democratic vote. The consensus model is good and works in many places, but not in something with hundreds of people participating. Unlike processes such as AfD it also is really down to personal opinion on who you support or oppose, not policy and guidelines, hence a secret vote is more appropriate. Public discussion about candidates will likely happen anyway, but on this model it is up to voters to decide on if to make their votes public or not, and privacy may in many cases improve honesty. I personally have already decided that I am to give feedback to candidates as I did last year, and I'm sure others will join in. I respect concerns over corruption e.t.c. with a secret vote but such issues should not be insurmountable if given proper attention. Finally, a secret vote allows a fairer election system to be used (per above). Camaron · Christopher · talk 20:39, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
We need a secret ballot for all the reasons democratic states use them; people are otherwise reluctant to express their views, and may support or oppose under peer pressure. SlimVirgin ^{talk|contribs} 20:51, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Any risk of socking is countered by the fact that the information still exists and, IP-wise, can be checked if needed. Ironholds (talk) 22:25, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Many people won't vote in a public ballot for fear their vote will be held against them. A secret ballot may be more representative for that reason, and as Ironholds says socks can still be ferreted out if necessary. --NellieBly (talk) 22:38, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Fairer and less open to manipulation.--Scott Mac (Doc) 23:51, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Per many above, particularly Coren. I agree with SandyGeorgia's point about revisiting this, as well.--chaser (talk) 07:06, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
A much better idea. Stifle (talk) 10:29, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
I like what I'm seeing in the AUSC elections. We could save ourselves a lot of drama on this. - Mailer Diablo 10:59, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Markus Schulze 11:29, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
RP459 (talk) 13:25, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Roger Davies summed it up succinctly - furthermore as an arb, as was aware of who supported me and who opposed me. This did cross my mind when people came up in arbitration and I had to judge their actions, although I did my best to ignore or negate any feelings I had. This more than anything pushes me to a secret ballot, as an open voting process can subtly impact on arb impartiality subsequently. Casliber (talk · contribs) 14:00, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
To counteract the insidious peer-pressure of our increasingly politicized social network. Antandrus (talk) 14:40, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
ArbCom members are people. It is asking too much for an Arb to be unbiased when he or she knows that an individual voted against them or has an Arb friend who had been voted against. Greg L (talk) 18:23, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Secret ballot is a democratic milestone, ensuring that those in power will not be able to punish those who disagree with them. As long as we use support/oppose votes, this is simply necessary to avoid intimidating editors and scaring them away from opposing. --_{Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus| talk} 00:49, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
This one seems obvious - avoids COI, boot lickin' votes and factionalism.radek (talk) 06:34, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Its time to face the facts: ArbCom elections is the the most wiki-political of acts on Wikipedia, except perhaps the position one takes on an ANI thread concerning a high profile user. We can't put the genie back in the bottle - elections are now and will continue to be a place where voters gain social credit with the wikipedian sub groups of their choice. Secret elections allow people to voice honestly what they think without fear of damaging their reputations or starting fights with their Wiki-pals. Additionally, we won't have to deal with the horse race problems that often skew results away from a genuine reflection of community will.--Tznkai (talk) 07:23, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
— Kusma ^talk 10:25, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
But in that case there's a need for someone to supervise the voting process. -- Luk ^talk 10:35, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
~~Who watches the watchmen? Hipocrite (talk) 19:28, 30 October 2009 (UTC)~~ Per Coren on talk - ability to oppose candidates who everyone thinks will pass may result in those candidates not passing outweighs watchman factor. Hipocrite (talk) 13:54, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Secret ballots are vital to fair elections. ---Irbisgreif-(talk | e-mail)-(contribs) 14:49, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
~~Secret votes would allow people to vote how they feel, rather than how they think they should be seen to vote. -- PhantomSteve (Contact Me, My Contribs) 15:30, 2 November 2009 (UTC)~~ Struck as I have changed my mind having read the various arguments presented -- PhantomSteve (Contact Me, My Contribs) 13:35, 9 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Voters should feel free to support or oppose without having to worry about it affecting their public reputation. This would make the ArbCom vote less 'political' (ironically enough), and hopefully reduce the level of drama around it. Robofish (talk) 02:58, 3 November 2009 (UTC) (I'm not against people publicly expressing their support or opposition for the candidates, of course, just so long as the actual votes themselves are secret.) Robofish (talk) 03:00, 3 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Privatemusings (talk) 08:16, 3 November 2009 (UTC)is this a vote, by the way? - hope so.[reply]
Avoids retribution for voting against certain candidates. OhanaUnited^{Talk page} 13:13, 3 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Too many good arguments in this section to vote otherwise. -- Александр Дмитрий (Alexandr Dmitri) (talk) 20:23, 3 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
-FASTILY_sock ^(TALK) 00:26, 4 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Under the current system, people who don't vote right away may be discouraged to vote later on (if the candidate(s) they support get little support) or may be influenced to change votes (candidate x seems popular, so I need to vote for him). Private polling should work if proper monitoring is done. Deserted Cities (talk) 17:25, 5 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
This really makes sense. MBisanz ^talk 13:52, 9 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
But there should be a section for people to publicly endorse (or attack) the candidacy. Ray^Talk 17:21, 10 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Absolutely agree, using the Comments section of the candidate's page, for example. It's an absolutely essential part of the husting/stump. Roger Davies ^talk 17:26, 10 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
"Only oppose if your concern is worth getting badgered about" makes some sense at RfA; we need lots of admins, and it's supposedly no big deal. This, however, is an actual election for a limited number of seats of some importance. The social pressure of public voting doesn't have an upside in this situation. --Chris Johnson (talk) 04:23, 11 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Yep - for all the reasons it's a good idea in general elections. Arise you silent majority! But concerned re. the checks and balances of counting.--Joopercoopers (talk) 11:54, 11 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Without fear or favour. Collect (talk) 11:51, 12 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Public voting can cause people to feel that they ought to votes for a certain candidate for the sake of others' opinions of them. Captain panda 17:55, 12 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Unlike some other processes, this is a vote. As in so many real-world elections, secret ballots are important to the integrity of the election. rspεεr (talk) 02:12, 13 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Obviously Awadewit (talk) 06:21, 13 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Proposed extension to SecurePoll

A large part of the opposition expressed during the last RFC to holding a secret ballot was concern over confidence in the result of a secret ballot (including my own opposition). This concern was maybe best expressed by Carn: "It does not matter who votes, it is important who counts". Secret ballots work in real life because of measures that ensure that the count cannot be manipulated in some way. How would we do this online?

Following on from the last RFC, I gave thought to a method in which SecurePoll could be extended to allow all users to have confidence that a secret ballot was not manipulated. The method I am proposing is explained here: Wikipedia:Secret ballot process. --rannṗáirtí anaiṫnid (coṁrá) 19:34, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

First choice. Not fool-proof against voter fraud, but makes it a prohibitively difficult headache for anyone trying to ballot-stuff behind the scenes. Keeps the benefits of secret voting with SecurePoll with fewer of its drawbacks. -kotra (talk) 20:47, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

New compromise solution

A third way is possible, which will satisfy many of the objections from both the "Public polling" and "Secret ballot" camps, with a specially modified version of SecurePoll using the usual Support/Oppose voting for the election itself. During the election, the ballot would be secret, thus eradicating pile-on voting and intimidation, and allowing voters to benefit from SecurePoll's inherent convenience and ease of use. Then, once the election closes, an overall tally is published, along with the individual tallies for each candidate, specifying which voters supported and opposed them, with say a week set aside for public scrutiny.

To clarify, does this mean the votes are essentially "open" (as in the old/current system), with all votes listed transparently, for a limited time (you say a week as an example) after the election closes? -kotra (talk) 19:42, 12 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

This would mean that the list of votes would be private during the election, appearing exactly the same as the AUSC election did. The process of eliminating socks would proceed initially as with a private election, based on voter details. Then the results would be released, and with them the public record of who voted for whom. So during the election and for a short time afterwards, the votes would be private; after that time they would be public, and would be public in perpetuity. Hope this clarifies. Happy‑melon 12:15, 13 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Question: User:Happy-melon, who has been involved in the implementation of SecurePoll, stated a few weeks ago that "SecurePoll ballots cannot be publicised. There is a public list of who has voted, and a list of what votes were recorded for each candidate, but there is no list, and no way to create a list, that combines both data. [2] Such a statement would seem to render this compromise proposal impossible. Has there been a change since that time? —Finn Casey * * * 22:37, 12 November 2009 (UTC) Answered at User talk:Happy-melon. —Finn Casey * * * 00:37, 13 November 2009 (UTC) [reply]

Support. Roger Davies ^talk 15:52, 6 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Support - If the proposal is understood to require complete public disclosure of all votes of every editor shortly following the election then it is an acceptable, though not preferable, alternative to public voting. —Finn Casey * * * 02:39, 7 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Support. Though the scrutiny time period needs to be longer, maybe just make it permanant. Diderot's dreams (talk) 06:19, 9 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Support. The above RFC seems very unlikely to deliver a clear consensus and this seems like the best possible compromise between the two camps. (I still prefer the Secret option however, and hopefully we will move towards that in the longer term)Manning (talk) 04:47, 11 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Support, unhappily, as transitional, hoping the 2010 vote will give full privacy. Tony (talk) 11:20, 11 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
I could live with it as very much a second choice to secret voting. Davewild (talk) 18:46, 11 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Acceptable as a second choice to fully-secret voting, but that would remain my first choice. Robofish (talk) 02:21, 12 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
I prefer actually secret balloting, since the issue of retaliation or bad feelings resulting from an oppose isn't alleviated in the compromise method, but I'd prefer this to the normal public vote. Nathan^T 20:42, 12 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
This would be very preferable. It would prevent comments from crowding in on voting (of course comments would still be available elsewhere) but it would also address the issue of transparency/legitimacy. It would combine the benefits of an automated vote, separated voting/commenting, eliminate "pile-on" voting and maintain the transparency/legitimacy of an open ballot. Excellent suggestion. My entire opposition to SecurePoll would vanish should the voting records be opened to scruity after. I would say however that these tallies should be available for always, not only for a limited period after the vote has closed. --rannṗáirtí anaiṫnid (coṁrá) 21:04, 12 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Support While everyone needs to feel secure in being able to cast their lot for those they feel strongly about without fear of retribution, I believe that everyone needs to be accountable for the weight they throw towards our scales. Too much "privacy" can lead to hidden agendas, too much transparency can lead to a lack of privacy. I think this is a good compromise. — Ched : ? 22:01, 12 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Still better than the current system, though I'd prefer fully secret voting as this only has a portion of the benefits. Mr.Z-man 00:07, 13 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Why not? It may not be perfect but this should be enough to make both camps happy enough. ~ Amory (u • t • c) 16:22, 13 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Tranches: keep or eliminate?

When we change the term lengths, will we keep the notion that the elected arbitrators are to fill "tranches" of specified sizes that determine when their term expires?

Keep tranches

The elected arbitrators will be placed into two "tranches" that determine when their term expires, so some arbitrators will be elected for one year instead of two. The tranches will be balanced so that at least half of the seats will be open at each election.

Eliminate tranches

All arbitrators elected from now on get 2-year terms. The number of seats to be filled at each election will be determined only by the number of retiring arbitrators and the number whose terms naturally expire.

As I've said elsewhere, this is our chance to simplify. rspεεr (talk) 08:11, 13 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Without mking any tranchant remarks, the utility of them was limited at best. I still prefer a 2 year term only for the first term, and one year renewals. Collect (talk) 11:13, 13 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Tranches are now a meaningless artifact. Arb terms have a start date and and end date. End of story. Tony (talk) 12:19, 13 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Retain balance from year to year

All arbitrators elected will get 2-year terms. The number of seats to be filled at each election will be determined by adding together the number of seats made available by terms that have ended normally, and the number of seats that have come up for election a year early. The number of seats available for election (presuming a committee of 18) shall not be more than 10 or less than 8 (i.e. half the number, plus or minus one). If more than ten seats are available for election, the extra seats shall be held empty until the next election to avoid the number of seats available in that future election dropping below eight.

This won't work for next year (which will see only 6 seats available for election, unless two of the four arbs on three-year terms resign a year early), but will work for subsequent years. The reasoning here is to avoid situations where 6 seats are available one year and 12 the next. That is too much of an imbalance. Presuming you get 20 candidates each year, and 9 of them are well-supported by the community and the other candidates are not, you lose out on three potentially good arbitrators in the year when only 6 seats are available, and you either elect 3 candidates with substantially less support in the year when 12 seats are available, or have to leave three seats empty. Either way, we shouldn't be drawing vastly differing amounts of arbitrators from elections in different years. Carcharoth (talk) 18:06, 13 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Views

View by John Vandenberg

Three years is a long time to be strapped to these chairs. It is a commitment that many sensible people are not able to make because they have a real life in addition to Wikipedia, or they don't know what the next three years holds for them. Reducing the term to two years will mean more candidates feel comfortable making the commitment, and feel capable of enduring to the end of their term. The argument that shorter terms result in loss of institutional knowledge don't sit well with me. After a shorter term, arbs can seek re-election or retire to be a functionary, where their knowledge can easily be tapped into.

One of the themes of the 2008 arbcom RFC was that arbitrators rarely ever make it to the end of their allocated term, and that the committee becomes unexpectedly short staffed when an arb resigns or retires. One way to alleviate this is to have extra non-voting members in the committee at the beginning of each year, and allocate them to work initially on the constant stream of ban appeals and other auxiliary tasks.

With a committee of 18 people next year, of which only 12 are voting members, six people can be working on the tasks which would otherwise divert arbitrator attention away from case work, and there is a pool of six people who are "in sync" with the committee and are able to rotate into a voting seat to account for inactivity, retirements or resignations.

The goal for 2010 could be to always have 12 voting members active on arbitration pages, while also ensuring that committee members take proper breaks to recharge their batteries.

View by rspεεr: tranches are obsolete

We have a tremendous opportunity to simplify the system here. Let's finish the job and do away with the obsolete notion of "tranches". Instead, we should give every elected arbitrator a term of the same length (which I'm assuming is two years).

Tranches were a system of staggering the expiration dates of the arb seats, even if this meant giving different term lengths to different people elected in the same election. They were devised based on the assumption that most arbitrators would finish their terms. This assumption turns out not to be true, so tranches serve no purpose.

I think many people are assuming this will happen anyway, because there has been no discussion about how to convert the three-year tranches into two-year tranches if we adopt two-year terms, but we might as well make this explicit to avoid confusion. Here's my specific proposal:

An arbitrator who is elected in a yearly election gets to keep their seat until the end of the election two years later.
An arbitrator who is appointed mid-year by some other process (should this situation arise) gets to keep their seat until the end of the next election.
An arbitrator who was elected before tranches were abolished keeps the same expiration date they already had in their tranche.

rspεεr (talk) 08:09, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]

View by SoWhy: Defending cumulative voting

Risker has outlined above that they think cumulative voting is too complex to be used in ArbCom elections and I think some people considering how to opine in this RFC will share such doubts. I think they are misplaced though. Cumulative voting can be both simple and complex, allowing both simply support/oppose votes and more complex preferences to be cast.
Let me elaborate with an example:

Let's assume the election will be held to fill 8 seats. As a result, each voter will get 8 votes. They can now choose the simple or the complex voting system. If they choose the simple one, they can support as many candidates as they wish but don't have to. Their votes will automatically be distributed equally amongst those candidates. For example, if they support 4 candidates, each one will receive 2 votes while the voter's only thing to do was to choose the candidates to support. The rest is done by the software. This means that the election is very simple for those who wish it to be.

For those who want to rank their candidates, cumulative voting would allow them to choose a different option when voting. They could give multiple votes (although I think there should be a limit per candidate, e.g. 3 votes maximum) to those candidates they prefer over others at the cost of not being able to support 8 candidates. For example, candidate A could receive 3 votes and candidates B and C 2 votes each with the last vote going to candidate Z.

All voters can decide only to use a certain number of their votes but are not forced to do so.

Cumulative voting has also the advantage that there are no oppose votes which are frankly not needed. Since the system means that those with the highest amount of votes will be elected, we also get rid of the need for having to set a bar, i.e. requiring a certain % of support. As such, I think this system would satisfy both the need for simplicity for the majority of users as well as the request for preferential voting that many experienced users probably have. Regards So Why 15:26, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]

We have an article on cumulative voting which is quite up-front about its fatal flaw: "Tactical voting is the rational response to this system." In cumulative voting, if you don't bullet vote for your favorite candidate, you're voluntarily weakening your vote. And this flaw is easily avoided in a system very similar to cumulative voting -- that system being range voting, which is what we use now.

Yes, range voting has a different way of voluntarily weakening your vote, which is to abstain, but if everyone takes this into account and votes up or down on all candidates you get the perfectly fine system of approval voting.

I can see the argument from those who want to change to a preferential system, but there is absolutely no reason to change from range voting to cumulative voting. rspεεr (talk) 03:43, 11 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

View by Finn Casey

A simplification of the present tri-tranche system is desirable. A two-year staggered term length system would give the process both clarity and stability. Electing half the arbitrators each year to a two-year term will be much simpler than the present arrangement. Such a process will also tend to reduce the endemic drop-out problem.
Wikipedia has traditionally operated in an open atmosphere. There is no compelling reason to switch to an atmosphere of secrecy to indulge the theoretical fears of certain editors. We are not, and do not wish to be, a real-life political system. Wikipedia is at its best when it is free of the partisanship that is evident in real-life secret elections.

View by Majorly

Seriously, why change what worked perfectly well (with regards to how we vote)? Majorly talk 17:43, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]

View by Jayron32

The Oppose/Support system works well for proposals and many other things at Wikipedia, but for elections where people are being chosen to fill an office, such things become bogged down in discussion, which often spirals out of control. A simple vote works much better in these cases, the "support/oppose" system is too open to hijacking by a few dedicated "haters". Lets instead keep discussion on discussion pages, and let the voting be unsullied by such events. Furthermore, not voting support in an election like this is equal to oppose anyways. --Jayron32 21:16, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]

God forbid an ArbCom election be mired in loathsome discussion. Best to tuck that sort of stuff away on the dark recesses of a Talk page nobody reads. Badger Drink (talk) 18:33, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

View by Offliner

Arbitrators should have one year terms only. Two years is very long time in Wikipedia. Personally, I'm extremely disappointed with the low efficiency of the previous and current ArbComs, and I think the community should have reasonably quick way of getting rid of bad arbitrators who cannot organize their work properly. Anything longer than a year is way too long — it allows the arbitrators to become confident that no matter how sloppy they are, they will still be allowed to continue for what is basically an eternity in WP. Cases dragging on for months is simply ridiculous, as is the extreme uncommunicativity of the committee members (it often takes weeks for ArbCom to answer even simple yes-or-no questions.) I'm 100% certain that the job can be done much better than that. We need to keep changing the Arbs in a quick fashion to try to find a constitution that works. I'd also like to note that, in contrast to real life, organizing elections doesn't cost anything in WP, so I really do not see any reason why we couldn't organize an election every year. Offliner (talk) 22:56, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]

View by Durova

If the problem is herding cats, one doesn't solve that problem by making the herd larger. ArbCom's core mission is to evaluate evidence in relation to policies. The larger the Committee gets, the harder it becomes to discuss matters and achieve quorum. Delays make problems worse because disruptive editors deliberately clog case pages.[3]

Moreover, what Wikipedia needs right now is better checks and balances. The principal check and balance upon ArbCom is Jimbo, but he's been under considerable pressure to refrain from intervention. That leaves a vacuum which would be healthier to replace with new bodies that serve separate functions and that answer directly to the community. A larger Committee is not the solution: that way leads to oligarchy. Durova³⁴⁹ 04:26, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]

View by Carcharoth

Copied from earlier post elsewhere.

In the interests of transparency, I'm going to post my views here. I'm speaking here as a community member, with current experience of the arbitration committee, and as someone who thinks that ultimately the community should decide issues such as the size of the committee, and the term lengths, and the voting method.

Term lengths - I think two years is a good term length. It is long enough to effect changes and to get up to speed in the first six months. Three years is too long, and two sets of two-year services (ideally with a break in-between) is better than two lots of three-year services. The problems arise with turnover and the need to keep the committee stable (having more than half its members change each year is not good). If you have elections to fill all vacant seats with 2-year terms, then the number of seats up for election depends on the number of resignations, and the number of departing arbs whose term has ended (though they can, of course, run for re-election). Ideally, you would have staggered terms (i.e. tranches), as this avoids situations where you have (say) eight seats up for election one year, six seats up for election the next year, and twelve the year after that (this is the current situation given the number of arbs on 1-, 2-, and 3-year terms, if all eight seats this year were appointed to 2-year terms). [...] The advantage of a three-tranche system is that you don't replace half the committee each year (that can also be a disadvantage), but the disadvantage is that if you have annual elections, you need three-year terms, which are too long for some. The advantage of a two-tranche system is that you only need 2-year terms, but the disadvantage is that you replace half the committee each year and if arbitrators resign the year they were elected, then the following election results in more than half the committee being replaced (i.e. less stability). It's not an easy thing to weigh in the balance.
Size of committee - I think 18 is a workable size (though at the upper limit). 15 would also be workable (though if you have 2-year terms, you either need an even number of seats, or the theoretical number of seats available for election goes up and down by one each year). I think anything below 12 becomes unworkable when you have arbitrators either resigned, recused, or inactive/burnt out, as you can end up with as few as 5 arbitrators voting on an issue towards the end of the year, which is not good. So anything between 18 and 12 is workable, in my view, with a preference for a number between 15 and 18 to allow for resignations and inactivity/burnout.
Voting method - I have reservations about secret ballots, but some of the arguments for this have swayed me. My primary concern is that the discussions and "endorsement" pages that will inevitably spring up will get out of hand. There should be vigorous discussions about the candidates, but it should be kept under control. I do think more discussion about the practicalities of a secret ballot are needed (the RfC endorsed the concept, but little was said about how it would work in practice). I would urge those following these discussions to follow the AUSC elections and help point out and correct any bugs or problems that arise.

So overall, 2-year term lengths, 18 arbs on the committee, and secret ballot (for this year at least). With the caveat that three of the eight seats this year need to be for 1-year terms to avoid a pile-up of 12 seats for re-election in December 2011. And repeating here that this is my personal view, and that these issues are, ultimately, for the community to decide. Carcharoth (talk) 07:10, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]

View by jc37

(To whoever assesses the RFC for consensus, please include these comments as part of determining my position on the issues.)

As may be seen by my "votes" above, I'm a bit torn beyween 2 year terms and 3 year terms. So to clarify:

If it's to be 3 years with 3 tranches, then it should be 15 members. With 3 tranches of 5.

If it's to be 2 years with 2 tranches, then it should be 16 members. With 2 tranches of 8

1 year is too short, and 18 members is just too many. (We're just creeping too close to 20.)

I'd like to see the Support/Neutral/Oppose method, but modified so that each voter must vote in support of a number of candidates equal to the number of seats. No less and no more. (I've commented more about this on the talk page.)

I don't like any method which does not allow for someone to oppose a candidate.

And while I am sympathetic to concerns, secret ballots are simply anti-wiki.

And whatever is decided here should be loosely configured, so that User:Jimbo Wales can modify as the situation may merit. - jc37 09:47, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]

View by Vecrumba

It typically takes someone six months to learn the basics of a job, a year to become proficient in it. I would suggest two year terms for first time individuals, with their having the option to re-up for one more to three. Prior members can serve again for as little as one year, with an option to re-up to a total of three. I have not seen any persuasive argument that more members translate to an improvement in throughput or efficiency.

Equally importantly, work needs to be done on improving due process, if you will, where "appeal to Jimbo" or lobbying until one finds a "receptive" admin are discouraged. That is completely independent of how many or for how long. Issues of efficacy and efficiency relate to proper organization and enforcement of workflow, not to the number of hands on deck. We should take care not to conflate the two. PЄTЄRS VЄСRUМВА ►talk 23:06, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]

On secrecy, either it's fully transparent or fully secret. The only thing worse than knowing who voted for whom (that is, confirming opinions of editors, pro or con, and creating "blocs" in one's perceptions) is assuming who voted for whom (that is, confirming one's own opinion absent of fact). Not to mention invisible peer pressure to vote certain positions because votes are in the open. Or sucking up to potential future admins in one's comments and vote. We may not be electing world leaders, but there is a reason that even the most innocuous of ballots are secret to assure people can vote their conscience, not their stated public position.

Per some of the concerns expressed elsewhere, there would need to be some auditing of users voting, that is, username and IP, to insure issues such as ballot stuffing, double voting, et al. are caught. All this said, open voting has worked well in the past—until there is some persuasive evidence that it has failed in some significant fashion, there's likely no impetus to change it. I would support some fashion of limited preferential voting. PЄTЄRS VЄСRUМВА ►talk 23:16, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

View by Smallman12q Opposing Secret Ballots

I find the following statement of this RFC to be an utter falsity.

The result was an overwhelming yes, with support also being expressed for implementing a Schulze method of electing arbitrators.

The result was not an overwhelming yes as you deceptively assert...it was anything but. If you take the time to read the statements left at Wikipedia:Requests for comment/ArbCom secret ballot you will see that a number of editors have shown concern as to exactly why a secret ballot is necessary.

I still do not understand the reason behind having a secret vote...and this sudden need for secrecy. As we have all seen before...secrecy and a lack of transparency corrupts(federal reserve anyone)...now while that may not happen on Wikipedia, a public vote would be much more assuring than a private one.Smallman12q (talk) 19:12, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Agree. There was not "an overwhelming yes". --rannṗáirtí anaiṫnid (coṁrá) 19:25, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

View by Mr.Z-man: Transparency of secret voting

One of the main reasons for opposing secret voting seems to be a lack of transparency. But what transparency are we actually losing?

We know who the candidates are
We know who voted
We know who the election admins are

The only thing we no longer know is who voted for who. Why do we need to know this? If someone is eligible to vote, how is it our business to know how they voted? If they don't tell us why they voted, then its mostly useless information for any beneficial purposes. If knowing how they voted would create any more or any less of a reason to look at them with suspicion, then that's just another positive aspect of secret voting. Mr.Z-man 23:58, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Talk moved to the, well, talk page. Thattaway. — Coren ^(talk) 00:27, 3 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

View by MZMcBride

Tranche is a stupid and archaic word and we would do well to stop using it. --MZMcBride (talk) 23:58, 10 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Given that I already posted that in more words several sections up, I agree. rspεεr (talk) 03:57, 11 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Brevity is the soul of wit. (Also, I hadn't read most of this page; far too lazy. If anyone wishes to merge this section elsewhere or dissolve it completely, feel free.) --MZMcBride (talk) 03:50, 12 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

I read this as a proposal/plea to stop using the word, not necessarily the process. A rose by any other name would smell as sweet, but calling a rose a tranche wouldn't be nearly as romantic. ~ Amory (u • t • c) 16:27, 13 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

View by Juliancolton

Please don't use SecurePoll for the upcoming Arbitration Committee election. Judging by the above poll, roughly half of the editors endorse the use of SecurePoll and half are against it. This is hardly sufficient consensus to justify implementing such a major change to the voting method. I'd assume that barring adequate support to utilize SecurePoll in the election, the default is to continue public voting.

SecurePoll undermines several fundamental Wikipedia policies and concepts, notably the fact that WP is not a democracy, is based on community consensus, and strives for transparency. With that said, I see no compelling reason whatsoever to hide such things as the ArbCom election from the community. I'd be far more comfortable with the use of SecurePoll if 1) the tallies are made publicly available, and 2) it is possible to post, as well as readily display, any and all comments relevant to one's vote. But if we do so the benefits of using a type of secret ballot become marginal.

Among the arguments I've heard for using SecurePoll is that it's more efficient than editing the candidates' subpages. My response to this is: what? This is a wiki; it is therefore based solely on the ability to edit pages, and I imagine that most contributors have hundreds, thousands, or even hundreds of thousands of edits. It does seem rather silly to suggest that we should be forced into using SecurePoll in order to avoid making a few odd edits.

I'm not necessarily concerned about vote manipulation, although I note that such issues don't become obsolete with the use of a secret ballot. In my eyes, SecurePoll is more vulnerable to a few standard problems (ie. canvassing).

Finally, we have relatively little information about who reviews the information and enacts upon the results. As I mentioned above, transparency is crucial to the project, and knowing so little about where my vote goes makes me uncomfortable. –Juliancolton | ^Talk 19:25, 12 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Agree. Well said. —Finn Casey * * * 19:42, 12 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Agree. Actually I strongly support the change to secret voting, so I disagree with the bulk of JC's comments. However I agree that there should be no change in voting procedure for this election. The Public/Private section of the RFC is guaranteed to be ruled "no consensus" (barring an unlikely change in voting patterns). IMO this RFC clearly indicates that there are still strong doubts in the community which must be overcome prior to implementing such a significant change. I still intend to campaign for secret voting, but it seems clear to me that the community is not yet sufficiently convinced. Manning (talk) 00:19, 13 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
nope - disagree - I rather suspect that there are some who have chosen to remain less than vocal about the merits of a secret ballot because they felt that it was rather straight forwardly a positive step. The polarity in the community (in this, as with other issues) is a problem, but it's one that is exacerbated by the 'anyone can pop their oar in' way we choose to run these discussions. Regardless of how others' feel (both the silent I refer to previously, and the less so above) - running a secret ballot was a progressive step many years ago - today it's a well established necessity for fair and smooth election processes. I hope we're sensible enough to do it :-) Privatemusings (talk) 00:31, 13 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Oh please. Using a secret ballot is undermining policies but having an open vote that still works purely by numbers and comments with votes aren't allowed is perfectly fine? The option here is not "vote or no vote", its "secret vote or public vote." I don't understand the "little information about who reviews the information" - for the AUSC elections, the stewards overseeing it signed off on the results, where is the lack of information? Mr.Z-man 00:43, 13 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Disagree. Secret ballots are useful. Also, this is an election, and we can't reasonably run it on the "this isn't a vote wink wink" model of RfA. rspεεr (talk) 02:09, 13 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

I don't disagree, but I'm not sure how that's relevant. I never said it shouldn't be a vote, just not a dubiously secret vote. –Juliancolton | ^Talk 02:29, 13 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

perhaps we should call it a 'private ballot' - wouldn't be the first time folk have confused these terms ;-) Privatemusings (talk) 02:35, 13 November 2009 (UTC)ps. I don't think describing secure poll as 'dubiously secret' is reasonable - try and tone down the language a little mebbe?[reply]

Right now, it is a dubious herd vote where everyone looks at each other for what to do - "pile on's" and "group think" are much more likely in a public vote. Awadewit (talk) 06:25, 13 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Agree with Awadewit. Julian, you're OK that I'll feel under pressure to vote differently if everyone can look over my shoulder as I do it? Tony (talk) 12:25, 13 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

It depends why you feel that pressure I think. Evidently if a specific individual is applying inappropriate pressure against you personally, e.g. by threatening you, then that's a serious issue but not one that the secret ballot necessarily solves. If you are talking about general social pressure, I'm not so worried about it - as a community operating by consensus, it is appropriate to make concessions to the opinions of our peers. This probably results in better success for broadly acceptable candidates (vs. narrowly-but-strongly acceptable candidates), as well as higher mandates for the winners, both of which I think are positive and help the arbitration committee perform its role within the project. Christopher Parham (talk) 14:15, 13 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Yes, exactly. At the risk of sounding a bit cold-hearted, if an editor submits themselves or their work for community consideration in any sort of election, they should expect criticism—both constructive and more blunt. This happens at FAC, RfA, functionary elections, et cetera. Awadewit: yes, true; but by using the standard public voting, we can determine for ourselves whether or not pile-ons were an issue. With SecurePoll, we risk off-wiki canvassing that has an even greater risk of going unnoticed. –Juliancolton | ^Talk 14:50, 13 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Interesting points all, Julian. May I start please by asking whether your view is based on a philosophical stance rather than on actual experience in ArbCom elections? Have you never seen pile-on? And the complete inability of the community to deal with it? Have you never ever perhaps even been swayed yourself, especially when dealing with an editor you've never interacted with?
I accept totally what you say about candidates needing thick skins but isn't this a red herring? After all, SecurePoll doesn't render the "Comments" section of the candidate's page obsolete and this is probably the best place to make remarks about the candidate's fitness or otherwise for office. The flaw with attaching comments to votes is that they are frequently highly polarised soundbytes, designed to publicly legitimise the voter's position. With secret balloting, the voter is under no pressure to justify himself and is thus much more likely to be even-handed in "Comments". Elections do not have to be gladiatorial contests, where the bullies and the besotted have a disproportionately weighty voice. And were half a dozen pile-ons appear before the candidate has had a chance to respond.
Turning now to the issue of block votes, with public voting, the manipulator can see exactly how many votes he needs to conjure to scupper/improve his favourite's chances. This gives him an incentive to try. In sharp contrast, with SecretPoll, the fraudster is working entirely in the dark, with no idea how many voices to bring to bear, and this is a great disincentive to misbehaviour. Additionally, SecurePoll offers the community a unified voting log - much easier than trawling through 30 candidate pages - with IP addresses and other technical tools available for the scrutineers. the inescapable conclusion is that the risking of gaming are greatly exaggerated.
There are other considerations too. Candidates may vote without fear of rebuke or retribution. Arbitrators and functionaries, who often have unique insights, may also vote for or against their colleagues, without fear or favour.
Quite apart from this, turnout for ArbCom elections has historically been ridiculously low. If the objective is to keep the selection of arbitrators effectively within the gift of a smallish elite group of about a thousand editors, public polling does the job well. If the intention, however, is genuinely to involve the community, SecurePoll surely does the job so much better? Roger Davies ^talk 17:26, 13 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Remember that we already had a perfectly valid RfC that endorsed use of SecurePoll for our elections. That's why it was used in the AUSC election, and we planned to use it in this election, too. That shouldn't be changed due to "no consensus" result here. This poll is also problematic as many voters seem to have cast "drive by" votes without informing themselves. The previous RfC was a much more informed discussion. We won't know for sure how things will go until we try. We should wait until after this election to evaluate what to do. — Jake Wartenberg 14:43, 13 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

I can respect your viewpoint. However, this RfC has clearly had relatively high participation and visibility. It has shown that there is not a consensus for secret voting. Perhaps there have been a few "drive-by" votes on each side of the issue. However, the general result is clearly a lack of agreement for such a dramatic change from traditional Wikipedia practice and principle. As a side point, the arguments regarding improved voter participation do not seem persuasive to me. Perhaps more people would contribute to the encyclopedia if we eliminated the notability requirements. Yet our goal is not simply to get more participants - in writing or voting - our goal is to encourage greater participation while staying true to the accepted principles, such as transparency. Our current Committee has overall done an admirable job - there is obviously no need to fix what isn't broken. —Finn Casey * * * 17:43, 13 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

And equally why should we assume that SecurePoll, which has been used for WMF elections for ages, is broken?

It's also worth mentioning that in addition to the previous RfC, there is also strong support for using SecurePoll has been expressed at the SecurePoll workshop. So, on balance, while consensus may not be clear here, there is clearly is community consensus to at least try SecurePoll. Roger Davies ^talk 17:52, 13 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

PS: An I alone in being surprised by the strong positions against SecurePoll taken by people appear never to have participated in ArbCom elections?

It is true that I (assuming you refer to me) did not participate in the previous Committee elections. I base my opinion on principle, not personal experience. Yet there are 50+ users listed above, most of whom did participate in the election, who also support tradition and transparency. Whatever course we end up taking, I believe this discussion has been valuable in hearing a variety of viewpoints. —Finn Casey * * * 18:55, 13 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

@@ Line 283: / Line 283: @@
 Keep in mind the current subcommittee system, which I would qualify as a success if only measured by work output, has two 3 seat groups which could survive overlap, and a coordinator position. In addition there is room for a deputy coordinator, there has been suggestions for an eventual arb/clerk coordinator, and there is some noise (I don't know how the committee feels about it) about some sort of admin behavior subcommittee. Currently, all committeee members have voting responsibilities and I personally don't see that changing. I personally would aim for about 9 or 10 active Arbitrators at any one time. Thoughts?--[[User:Tznkai|Tznkai]] ([[User talk:Tznkai|talk]]) 16:23, 5 November 2009 (UTC)
+*Adding here (it seemed like the best section) my opinion that the number of seats available for election should be calculated ''before'' the election starts, and be chosen in such a way as to minimise variations from year-to-year and keep it as close to 9 as possible. A natural consequence of [http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Wikipedia:Requests_for_comment/Arbitration_Committee_2&diff=325656624&oldid=325654472 my proposal below] is that if large numbers of arbs resign, then the committee naturally reduces in size, rather than automatically trying to fill up all the vacant seats in a "super-election". The schedules below assume no resignations of first-year arbs (with two-year terms, hopefully such resignations will be reduced), though the system can accommodate one or two such resignations. Once things have stabilised at nine seats for election each year, then if more than one first-year arb resigns in a given year, then seats have to be left empty to keep the number of seats elected each year about the same.
+**Current probable schedule for seats available for election:
+***8 seats for election - all 18 seats filled (December 2009)
+***6 seats for election - all 18 seats filled (December 2010)
+***12 seats for election - all 18 seats filled (December 2011)
+***6 seats for election - all 18 seats filled (December 2012)
+**Proposed schedule A for seats available for election:
+***7 seats for election - only 17 of 18 seats filled (December 2009)
+***7 seats for election - all 18 seats filled (December 2010)
+***9 seats for election - only 16 of 18 seats filled (December 2011)
+***9 seats for election - all 18 seats filled (December 2012)
+**Proposed schedule B for seats available for election:
+***8 seats for election - all 18 seats filled (December 2009)
+***6 seats for election - all 18 seats filled (December 2010)
+***9 seats for election - only 15 of 18 seats filled (December 2011)
+***9 seats for election - all 18 seats filled (December 2012)
+*All the above are seats with 2-year terms. At the start of 2010, there will be 12 arbs with 2 years left, and 6 with 1 year left. Other variations are possible. The idea of the above is to damp down the imbalances in the numbers elected each year by carrying excess empty seats over to the following year. [[User:Carcharoth|Carcharoth]] ([[User talk:Carcharoth|talk]]) 19:05, 13 November 2009 (UTC)
 ==Election method==