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Barelvi movement

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Barelvi (Template:Lang-ur, /bəreːlviː/) is a term used for a movement of Sunni Islam originating in South Asia. The name derives from the north Indian town of Bareilly where its main leader Ahmed Raza Khan (1856–1921) shaped the movement by his writings.[1] Although Barelvi is the commonly used term in the media and academia, the followers of the movement often prefer to be known by the title of Ahle Sunnat wal Jama'at, a reference to their perception as forming an international majority movement.[2] The movement is much influenced by Sufism and the traditional folk Islam practices of the Indian subcontinent.[3][4]

Etymology

To its followers, the movement is known as Ahle Sunnat wal Jama'at ("People of the traditions [of the Islamic Prophet Muhammad] and the community"). This terminology is used to lay exclusive claim to be the only legitimate form of Sunni Islam, in opposition to the Deobandi, Ahl al-Hadith, Salafi and Nadwatul Ulama movements.[2][3][5]

History

The Barelvi movement was founded by Ahmad Reza Khan[6][7][8][9] who, after two failed attempts at establishing Islamic schools, finally succeeded in 1904 with the Manzar-e-Islam.[3] Though very much linked to Pakistan today, the movement's foundation predated Pakistan's nationhood; the movement was, essentially, founded as a defense of traditional Islam as understood and practiced in India.[4] Defense of these beliefs sometimes brought the Barelvis into conflict with other movements and creeds. Unlike most other Muslim movements in the region, the Barelvis opposed the Indian independence movement due to its leadership under Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, who was not a Muslim.[10] On the other hand, Khan and his movement, being among the foremost campaigners for Sufism, were largely responsible for pulling Muslims into conflict with Hindus and were primary supporters of the Pakistan Movement.[10] The Barelvis were joined in this by all major Islamic movements in the Indian subcontinent - including Shi'ites, Ismailis and Ahmadiyya - except the Deobandis, the Barelvis main rivals.

Historically, relations between the movement and Britain have been better than those of other Islamic movements with the country.[2] The majority of Pakistani and Kashmiri immigrants to the United Kingdom are still descended from Barelvi-majority villages,[2] and the Barelvi movement in Pakistan has received funding from the country, in part as a reaction to rival movements also receiving funding from abroad.[11] Still, according to Western analysts the foreign funding the Barelvi movement receives from abroad is minor, thus being the likely reason why Barelvi jihadist groups have been unable to get involved in Islamist and sectarian politics.[12] Having been supportive of the creation of the republic of Pakistan,[2] the Barelvi movement has traditionally held a strong following in the country as well.

As a reaction to the anti-Islam film Innocence of Muslims, a conglomerate of forty Barelvi parties called for a boycott of Western goods, while at the same time condemning violence which had taken place in protest against the film.[13]

Presence

India Today estimates that the vast majority of Muslims in India adhere to the Barelvi movement,[14] and The Heritage Foundation gives a similar assessment for the vast majority of Muslims in Pakistan.[15] More than 35% of British mosques are administered by Barelvis as well.[16] Many of these mosques have been usurped by Saudi-funded radical organizations.[17] The switchover from Barelvi Islam to Deobandi Islam has resulted in the conversion of some mystically-minded Kashmiri expatriates to hardline Muslims.[18]

Beliefs and practices

Like other Sunni Muslims, Barelvis base their beliefs on the Qur'an and Sunnah, and believe in monotheism and the prophethood of Muhammad. Barelvis follow the Ash'ari and Maturidi schools of aqidah, any one of the four school of fiqh, and the Qadri, Chishti, Naqshbandi or Suhrawardi Sufi orders.

Beliefs regarding Muhammad

Barelvis have several beliefs regarding Muhammad's nature, which distinguish them from Deobandi, Salafi and Shia groups in South Asia:

  • He is noori bashar: a human (bashar) made from God's light (noor).[19]
  • He is hazir (present in many places at the same time).[20]
  • He is nazir (witnessing all that goes on in the world).[20]
  • He has ilm-e-ghaib (knowledge of the unseen/unknown).[21]
  • He is mukhtaar kul (having the authority to do whatever he desires as granted to him by God).[22]

Practices

  • Asking auliyā' (Muslim saints) for intercession to God on behalf of the living. This consists of the intervention of an ascending, linked and unbroken chain of holy personages, pirs (Sufi saints) reaching ultimately to Muhammad, who intercede on their behalf with God.[25][26]
  • Ziyarat (visiting) the mazar (tombs) of Muhammad, his companions and of pious Muslims, an act the Barelvis claim is supported by the Quran, Sunnah and acts of the Companions by Barelvis, but which opponents call “shrine-worshipping” and “grave-worshiping” and consider to be un-Islamic.[27][28][29][30]

Mosques

Relations with other movements

Having formed as a reaction against the reformist Deobandi movement, relations between the two groups have often been strained. Ahmad Raza Khan, the founder of Barelvism, went as far as to declare not only all Deobandis infidels and apostates, but also any non-Deobandis who doubted the apostasy of Deobandis.[36]

Although conflict has occurred, relations with other Muslim movements in South Asia have not always been hostile. In mid-2012, leaders of both the Barelvi and Ahl al-Hadith movements in Kashmir Valley denied that there was any animosity between the two sects in the region.[37] In more recent times, the Barelvi movement as a whole has begun to mix with Shi'ites more often than before.[17]

Support

The Barelvi movement formed as a defense of the traditional mystic practices of South Asia, which it sought to prove and support.[3][4] The All India Ulema & Mashaikh Board, representing the movement as a whole, has demanded protection and reconstruction of shrines in Hijaz Mecca and Medina, destroyed in 1803 and 1804 by the Saudis, calls which have been echoed by most practitioners of Sufism in other parts of the Muslim world.

Opposition

The movement's founder, Ahmad Raza Khan, and other Barelvi religious figures have issued fatwās of apostasy against the founders of the Deobandi, Shia Islam and the Ahmadiyya Community. The conflict with the Deobandi movement, against which the Barelwi movement formed as a reaction, has been particularly heated and uncivil.[3][38] While both the Barelvi and Deobandi movements tend to prefer the Hanafi school of Islamic law and accept Sufism, their fundamental beliefs and way in practicing Sufism has kept them at odds.[2][3] Commenting on this, historian Usha Sanyal, in her research entitled Devotional Islam and Politics in British India: Ahmad Raza Khan Barelwi and His Movement, 1870-1920, stated:

Not only did Ahmad Raza Khan obtain confirmatory signatures from other scholars in the subcontinent, he managed to get agreement from a number of prominent ulama in Mecca. That occurred in the first years of the twentieth century—long before the Al-Saud and their Wahhabi allies got control of the Haramayn.[39] The feat was, nevertheless, stunning. The antipathy of the Deobandis toward the Ahl-i Sunnah on the emotional level becomes more comprehensible when Ahmad Riza's fatwa receives a full explication.[40]

Although the Nadwatul Ulema council was founded in 1893 to reconcile the Indian Subcontinent's Muslim sectarian differences, the Barelwis eventually withdrew their support of the council and criticized its efforts.[3]

Opposition to the Taliban

The Barelvi movement has taken a stance against Taliban movements in South Asia, organising rallies and protests in India and Pakistan, condemning what they perceive as unjustified sectarian violence.[41] The Sunni Ittehad Council (SIC), an amalgamation of eight Sunni organizations, launched the Save Pakistan Movement to stem the process of Talibanisation. Terming the Taliban a product of global anti-Islam conspiracies, the leaders of SUC charged the Taliban with playing into the hands of the United States to divide Muslims and bring a bad name to Islam.[42]

Supporting this movement, the Pakistan Minister of Foreign Affairs, Shah Mehmood Qureshi, said: "The Sunni Tehreek has decided to activate itself against Talibanisation in the country. A national consensus against terrorism is emerging across the country."[43]

Sectarian violence

Analysts have claimed that the Barelvi movement is as affected by intolerance and radicalism as other Islamic movements in the region,[44][10][45][46][47][48] despite contrary perceptions in intellectual circles.[49]

In the 1990s and 2000s, sporadic violence resulted from disputes over control of Pakistani mosques between the Barelvi and Deobandi movements,[50] with the conflict coming to a head in May 2001 when sectarian riots broke out after the assassination of Sunni Tehreek leader Saleem Qadri.[51] In April 2006 in Karachi, a bomb attack on a Barelvi gathering in celebration of Muhammad's birthday killed at least 57 people, including several central leaders of the Sunni Tehreek.[52][53] In April 2007, Sunni Tehreek activists attempted forcibly to gain control of a mosque in Karachi, opening fire on the mosque and those inside, killing one person and injuring three others.[54] On 27 February 2010, militants believed to be affiliated with the Taliban and Sipah-e-Sahaba attacked Barelvis celebrating mawlid in Faisalabad and Dera Ismail Khan, again sparking tensions among the rival sects.[55]

Reaction to Blasphemy Law

On January 4, 2011, former governor of Punjab Salmaan Taseer was assassinated by a member of the Barelvi group Dawat-e-Islami due to his opposition to the blasphemy law in Pakistan.[56][47] Over five-hundred scholars of the Barelvi movement voiced support for the crime and urged a boycott of Taseer's funeral.[45][10][46][48][57] According to Time, Sunni Tehreek rewarded the assassin's family[58][59] and threatened Taseer's family,[47][60] while another Barelvi group abducted Taseer's son.[61] Supporters attempted to prevent police from bringing the perpetrator to an anti-terrorism court, blocking the way and cheering on the assassin.[62] During the same period of time, a number of Barelvi scholars also condemned the assassination.[63][64]

Notable scholars

Early scholars

Present scholars

Notable organizations

In Pakistan, prominent Sunni Barelvi religious and political organizations include:

In the United Kingdom:

In India:

South Africa:

Main institutions

See also

Notes

  1. ^ Usha Sanyal. Generational Changes in the Leadership of the Ahl-e Sunnat Movement in North India during the Twentieth Century. Modern Asian Studies (1998), Cambridge University Press.
  2. ^ a b c d e f Understanding Islam: The First Ten Steps - C. T. R. Hewer - Google Books. Books.google.com.my. Retrieved 24 September 2012.
  3. ^ a b c d e f g Faithful Education: Madrassahs in South Asia - Ali Riaz - Google Books. Books.google.com. 11 September 2001. Retrieved 24 September 2012.
  4. ^ a b c The Columbia World Dictionary of Islamism - Olivier Roy, Antoine Sfeir - Google Books. Books.google.com.my. 26 September 2007. Retrieved 24 September 2012.
  5. ^ Geaves 2006: 148
  6. ^ Roshen Dalal, The Religions of India: A Concise Guide to Nine Major Faiths, pg. 51. Revised edition. City of Westminster: Penguin Books, 2010. ISBN 9780143415176
  7. ^ Barbara D. Metcalf, Islam in South Asia in Practice, pg. 342. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009.
  8. ^ The Columbia World Dictionary of Islamism, pg. 92. Eds. Oliver Roy and Antoine Sfeir, trns. John King. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007.
  9. ^ Gregory C. Doxlowski. Devotional Islam and Politics in British India: Ahmad Riza Khan Barelwi and His Movement, 1870-1920. Journal of the American Oriental Society, Oct-Dec 1999.
  10. ^ a b c d R. Upadhyay, Barelvis and Deobandhis: “Birds of the Same Feather”. Eurasia Review, courtesy of the South Asia Analysis Group. January 28, 2011.
  11. ^ Karamat Bhatty, Religious groups find lucrative sources abroad. The Express Tribune, September 7, 2011.
  12. ^ Sushant Sareen, The Jihad Factory: Pakistan's Islamic Revolution in the Making, pg. 282. New Delhi: Har Anand Publications, 2005.
  13. ^ Anti-Islam movie: Barelvi parties call for Western boycott. The Express Tribune, October 5, 2012.
  14. ^ Sandeep Unnithan and Uday Mahurkar (31 July 2008). "The radical sweep". India Today. Retrieved 30 September 2009.
  15. ^ "Pakistan plays Sufi card against jihadis | World War 4 Report". Ww4report.com. Retrieved 30 September 2009.
  16. ^ Deobandi - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
  17. ^ a b Daily Times - Leading News Resource of Pakistan
  18. ^ Daily Times (Pakistan), 28 March 2006
  19. ^ Ahmed Raza. "Noor o Bashar ::Islamic Books, Books Library". Faizaneraza.org. Retrieved 24 September 2012.
  20. ^ a b N. C. Asthana & A.Nirmal. Urban Terrorism : Myths And Realities. Publisher Pointer Publishers, 2009 ISBN 81-7132-598-X, 9788171325986. pg. 67
  21. ^ Clinton Bennett. Muslims and modernity: an introduction to the issues and debates. Continuum International Publishing Group, 2005 ISBN 0-8264-5481-X, 9780826454812. pg. 189
  22. ^ Muḥammad Yūsūf Ludhiyānvī (1999). Differences in the Ummah and the straight path. Zam Zam Publishers. pp. 35–38. Retrieved 20 April 2011.
  23. ^ Sirriyeh 1999: 49
  24. ^ Sirriyeh 2004: 111
  25. ^ Barelvi Islam
  26. ^ Martin Parsons (1 January 2006). Unveiling God: Contextualizing Christology for Islamic Culture. William Carey Library. pp. 149–. ISBN 978-0-87808-454-8. Retrieved 20 April 2011.
  27. ^ Urban Terrorism: Myths and Realities - N. C. Asthana & A.Nirmal - Google Books. Books.google.com.my. Retrieved 24 September 2012.
  28. ^ Urban Terrorism: Myths and Realities - N. C. Asthana & A.Nirmal - Google Books. Books.google.com.my. Retrieved 24 September 2012.
  29. ^ "outlookindia.com". M.outlookindia.com. Retrieved 24 September 2012.
  30. ^ Curriculum in Today's World: Configuring Knowledge, Identities, Work and ... - Lyn Yates, Madeleine Grumet - Google Books. Books.google.com.my. 25 February 2011. Retrieved 24 September 2012.
  31. ^ The Columbia World Dictionary of Islamism - Olivier Roy, Antoine Sfeir - Google Books. Books.google.com.my. 26 September 2007. Retrieved 24 September 2012.
  32. ^ Tremors of Violence: Muslim Survivors of Ethnic Strife in Western India - Rowena Robinson - Google Books. Books.google.com.my. Retrieved 24 September 2012.
  33. ^ Urban Terrorism: Myths and Realities - N. C. Asthana & A.Nirmal - Google Books. Books.google.com.my. Retrieved 24 September 2012.
  34. ^ Indian Defence Review: April - June 2007 - Bharat Verma - Google Books. Books.google.com.my. 19 February 2008. Retrieved 24 September 2012.
  35. ^ Akhter, Shamim (2009). Faith & Philosophy of Islam. Gyan Publishing House. Retrieved 18 February 2013.
  36. ^ Shourie, pg. 646.
  37. ^ Sheikh Qayoom, Kashmir’s Barelvi, Ahle Hadith leaders deny sectarian tension. Thaindian, courtesy of Indo-Asian News Service: Saturday, April 28, 2012.
  38. ^ Ashok K. Behuria, Sects Within Sect: The Case of Deobandi–Barelvi Encounter in Pakistan. Strategic Analysis, vol. 32, no. 1. Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, January 2008.
  39. ^ Haramayn refers to the Masjid al-Haram ("Sacred Mosque") in Mecca and the Al-Masjid al-Nabawi ("Mosque of the Prophet") in Medina. Dictionary of Islamic Architecture
  40. ^ Gregory C. Doxlowski. Devotional Islam and Politics in British India: Ahmad Riza Khan Barelwi and His Movement, 1870-1920. The Journal of the American Oriental Society, Oct-Dec, 1999
  41. ^ Indian Muslims protest against Talibani terrorism. TwoCircles.net 17 June 2009
  42. ^ Pakistan’s Sunnis unite against Talibanisation. Thaindian News. 9 May 2009
  43. ^ Clashing interpretations of Islam. Daily Times (Pakistan), 5 May 2009
  44. ^ Syed Hamad Ali, Why are Pakistan's 'moderate' clerics defending Salman Taseer's murderer? The Guardian, Wednesday 12 October 2011.
  45. ^ a b Karin Brulliard, In Pakistan, even anti-violence Islamic sect lauds assassination of liberal governor. The Washington Post, Saturday, January 29, 2011; 9:55 PM.
  46. ^ a b The Jamestown Foundation, Sufi Militants Struggle with Deobandi Jihadists in Pakistan, 24 February 2011. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 9 Issue: 8. Accessed 11 March 2013.
  47. ^ a b c Omar Waraich, Why Pakistan's Taliban Target the Muslim Majority. Time, Thursday, Apr. 07, 2011.
  48. ^ a b Pervez Hoodbhoy, A long, sad year after Salman Taseer's killing. The Hindu, January 4, 2012.
  49. ^ See:
  50. ^ Rana Tanveer, Rites and wrongs: Mosque sealed after Barelvi-Deobandi clash. The Express Tribune, September 20, 2011.
  51. ^ "Serious threat to Pakistan's civil society". The Hindu. Chennai, India. 18 April 2006.
  52. ^ Bomb carnage at Karachi prayers, BBC Online, 11 April 2006
  53. ^ Special Coverage of Nishtar Park bombing, Jang Group Online
  54. ^ "One dead as ST tries to take control of Ahle Hadith mosque" Daily Times (Pakistan), 11 April 2007
  55. ^ Sectarian clashes kill seven in Pakistan, Agence France-Presse via Sydney Morning Herald, 28 February 2010
  56. ^ "Assassin linked with Dawat-i-Islami". Dawn (newspaper). 4 January 2011.
  57. ^ See also:
  58. ^ ST offers Rs200m blood money for Qadris release. The Nation, October 08, 2011.
  59. ^ PPI, Sunni Tehreek rejects capital punishment to Mumtaz Qadri. Dawn, 1st October, 2011.
  60. ^ Taseer's daughter warned to back off, The Sydney Morning Herald, January 14, 2011.
  61. ^ Rana Tanveer, Shahbaz Taseer abduction splits Barelvi group. The Express Tribute, September 4, 2011.
  62. ^ "Demonstrators Prevent Court Appearance of Alleged Pakistani Assassin". Voice of America. 6 January 2011.
  63. ^ The Assertion of Barelvi Extremism. Current Trends.
  64. ^ Taseer no blasphmer, claim Barelvi ulema. The Nation, October 14, 2011.

References

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