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Syrian Salvation Government

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Not to be confused with the Syrian transitional government.

Syrian Salvation Government
حكومة الإنقاذ السورية
Ḥukūmat al-ʾInqādh al-Sūriyya
2017–2024
Coat of arms of Syrian Salvation Government
Coat of arms
Areas under control of various opposition groups prior to November 2024:      Syrian Salvation Government (Tahrir al-Sham)      Interim Government (National Army)      al-Tanf (Revolutionary Commando Army)
Areas under control of various opposition groups prior to November 2024:
     Syrian Salvation Government (Tahrir al-Sham)
     Interim Government (National Army)
     al-Tanf (Revolutionary Commando Army)
StatusUnrecognized quasi-state
CapitalIdlib (de facto)
Damascus (de jure)
Largest cityDamascus
Official languagesArabic
Religion
Islam
GovernmentUnitary provisional government under a technocratic Islamic state
Emir of Tahrir al-Sham 
• 2017–present
Abu Mohammad al-Julani
Prime Minister 
• 2017–2018
Mohammed al-Sheikh (first)
• 2024
Mohammed al-Bashir (last)
President[a] 
• 2017–2020
Bassam al-Sahyouni
• 2020–2024
Mustafa al-Mousa
LegislatureGeneral Shura Council
History 
• Establishment
2 November 2017
• Reorganized into the Syrian transitional government
10 December 2024
Population
• Estimate
4,000,000 (2023)
CurrencyTurkish lira[4][5] (TRY)
Website
https://syriansg.org
 Succeeded by
Syrian transitional government

The Syrian Salvation Government (SSG; Arabic: حكومة الإنقاذ السورية, romanized: Ḥukūmat al-ʾInqādh al-Sūriyya) was a de facto unrecognized quasi-state in Syria formed in November 2017 by Hayʼat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and other Syrian opposition groups during the Syrian civil war.[6] It controlled much of northwest Syria, and had an estimated population of over 4,000,000 in 2023.[7] Its de facto capital was Idlib.

After the December 2024 Fall of Damascus,[8] the final prime minister of Ba'athist Syria, Mohammad Ghazi al-Jalali, transferred power in Syria to SSG Prime Minister Mohammed al-Bashir, with all ministers from the Syrian Salvation Government transferring to the same posts in the new transitional government of Syria.[9]

The SSG was governed as an authoritarian[10]: 34  technocratic[11][12][13] Islamic state with two branches: the legislative General Shura Council, headed by a president, and the executive branch, headed by a prime minister.

Although HTS declared its independence from the SSG, the SSG was widely regarded as its civilian administration,[14][13] although it maintained a degree of operational autonomy from the group.[11][10]: 31  It has been described as the state-building project of HTS leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa.[13][15]

Background

Prior to the formation of the SSG in 2017, Idlib Governorate was governed by a patchwork of armed opposition groups, co-operatively-run local councils and independent organizations nominally under the authority of the opposition Syrian Interim Government (SIG).[11][16] As Syrian government offensives encroached on the territory, civil initiatives to create a unified governing body were increasingly undertaken but failed due to a lack of trust and differences of opinion between stakeholders.[11]

HTS and its predecessor organizations, the al-Qaeda franchise al-Nusra Front and Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, have long maintained a presence in Idlib. The al-Nusra Front was not particularly interested in the minutiae of governance, leaving local councils to govern themselves.[16] However, in 2013, Ahmed al-Sharaa (Abu Mohammed al-Julani) — then the emir of al-Nusra — expressed his belief that the popular support required to establish an Islamic emirate could only be obtained through provision of public goods and services, laying the theoretical groundwork for increased involvement in governance.[12]

Initially, HTS shared its governing responsibilities with other armed groups, but this became increasingly unilateral as al-Sharaa sought to impose his group's hegemony over the province.[12] HTS engaged in fighting against rival armed groups in the region, such as Ahrar al-Sham, the Syrian National Army and the local affiliate of the Islamic State, Liwa al-Aqsa. During major offensives in January–March 2017 and July 2017, HTS expelled or subjugated these groups, leaving it as the pre-eminent military power in the province.[11]

History

The General Syrian Conference, held in Idlib in September 2017, was a continuation of the Civil Administration Initiative in opposition-controlled areas, held at the end of August 2017 in Idlib.[17] At its conclusion on 11 September 2017, the Conference formed a constituent body named the General Shura Council, headed by president Bassam al-Sahyouni,[18] and appointed a prime minister. The Syrian Interim Government and the Syrian Democratic Forces in Qamishli and Afrin rejected the results of the conference.[17] Conference participants agreed upon "Islamic law as the only source of legislation", "the need to preserve the identity of the Syrian Muslim people", "the overthrow of the illegal regime with all its symbols and pillars and holding it accountable for its committed crimes, as well as liberating the Syrian territory from all the occupying forces, extending security and spreading justice in the liberated areas".[17]

The move was seen as part of an attempt by HTS to impose its control on the region.[17] Riad al-Asaad's attendance at the conference was controversial. Riad al-Asaad said that "HTS has previously declared that it will be dissolve itself, which is an external and internal demand", and that HTS "did not attend the conference and we did not communicate with them after it ended, either".[17] However, the Hawar Kilis Operations Room, part of the Syrian National Army, condemned Riad al-Asaad and accused him of conspiring with al-Qaeda.[19]

In early November 2017, the General Conference formed the SSG.[6] There followed weeks of conflict between the new government and the Syrian Interim Government (SIG), with reports of HTS unilaterally disbanding several SIG-supported local councils across northwestern Syria.[6] Mohammed al-Sheikh was initially appointed as prime minister, with Riad al-Asaad serving as deputy prime minister for military affairs alongside eleven other ministers.[20] Al-Sheikh announced the formation of four commissions: Inspection Authority, Prisoners and Missing Persons Affairs, Planning and Statistics Authority, and the Commission of Trade Unions.[citation needed]

Students of the Free Aleppo University in al-Dana protest against the closure of several faculties by the Syrian Salvation Government

On 12 December 2017, the SSG issued a warning that called for the SIG to evacuate their offices from opposition-controlled areas in 72 hours.[21][6] There were reports that some SIG-run local councils had already been closed and replaced by SSG-loyal alternatives, but others said they would not vacate their offices.[6] On 6 January 2018, the SSG seized control of the SIG-run Free Aleppo University and closed several faculties in al-Dana and Sarmada, north of Idlib, where almost 4,000 students studied. This resulted in protests by students and lecturers of the university against the group.[22][23]

Politics of Syrian opposition
Symbols
Constitution
Executive
Legislature
Administrative divisions
Political parties
Foreign relations

On 15 August 2018, the SSG's Founding Body accepted the resignation of Mohammed al-Sheikh after the kidnapping of a prominent health director. Although the director was ransomed for US$100,000, al-Sheikh had promised to resign if the Ministry of Interior failed to apprehend the captors within 24 hours.[24] On 18 August 2018, the Founding Body instructed Fawaz Hilal to form a new government with the deputy prime minister, Mohammed Jamal Shahoud, leading in the interim.[25]

The SSG's Constitution Drafting Assembly appointed Fawaz Hilal as prime minister, alongside nine cabinet ministers, on 10 December 2018. Hilal and much of his cabinet maintained close ties with HTS.[26][27] During his term, the Ministry of Economy was merged with the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Housing and Reconstruction was merged with the Ministry of Local Administration and Services.[27] During a government offensive on Idlib in May 2019, Hilal called upon Turkey to support the opposition.[28]

Tax increases, rising commodity prices and accusations that the SSG was establishing monopolies on key goods such as fuel led to protests between October and November 2019, with demonstrators chanting slogans against the SSG and Ahmed al-Sharaa.[29][30] After residents of Kafr Takharim refused to pay a new tax on olive oil and expelled SSG officials, HTS besieged and bombed the town, killing 5.[31] Hilal and his cabinet resigned shortly afterwards, leading to the Shura Council asking Ali Keda, Deputy Minister of the Interior for Administrative Affairs and Public Relations, to form a new government.[32] On 18 November 2019, Keda was elected prime minister by the council, winning 65% of the vote.[33] However, some activists said the reshuffle was merely "changing faces".[34]

On 23 March 2020, the SSG created an emergency committee to coordinate its response to the COVID-19 pandemic in Syria. Measures taken by the SSG to prevent the spread of COVID-19 included suspending Friday prayers, shutting down schools and markets and opening quarantine centres in Jisr al-Shughur, Sarmada and Kafr Karmin. However, these efforts were undermined by hardliners from HTS and al-Qaeda's Syrian branch, Hurras al-Din, that continued to pray and hold sermons in mosques without social distancing. The SSG possessed limited resources to deal with a large outbreak of COVID-19, with only 107 ventilators and 243 intensive care unit beds at its disposal.[35]

On 7 April 2020, Bassam al-Sahyouni, president of the General Shura Council, resigned.[36] Sources told Enab Baladi that his resignation was in response to attempts by HTS to interfere in the council's activities. On 24 April 2020, the Council elected Mustafa al-Mousa, a pharmacist who previously headed its health committee, as his successor.[18]

In May 2020, rapid depreciation of the Syrian pound triggered by the US Government's Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act prompted the SSG to replace it with the Turkish lira in its administered territories.[37]

On 1 December 2020, Ali Keda was re-elected as prime minister for another term by the General Shura Council, receiving 81% of the vote. The appointment was criticized by opposition activists, who likened it to elections in territories controlled by the Ba'athist regime.[38] In May 2023, Rojava and SSG announced separate proposals to host millions of Syrian refugees stranded across the neighboring countries, following Arab League's readmission of the Assad government.[39]

In his speech during the Eid al-Adha celebrations in July 2022, Ahmed al-Sharaa described the SSG as "an important stage in the history of the Syrian revolution. It is a transition from the chaotic situation in which the liberated areas were toward organization."[40]

After formal diplomatic talks in July 2023, the SSG concluded an agreement with AANES to begin trading fuel supplies between Rojava and Idlib. The meetings had been conducted amid growing tensions between Turkey and SDF, and SDF's intention to deploy HTS as a check on the growing Turkish influence in northern Syria. For their part, the SSG proposed joint counter-terrorism efforts alongside SDF. The talks also involved negotiations on political arrangements, such as the prospects for a joint SSG-Rojava civil administration in the event of potential expulsion of SNA forces from northern Syria.[41]

In July 2023, the SSG launched "Syria Phone", the first communication and internet services company in Idlib. The state-owned company announced that it would provide "cellular calls, SMS, 4G and video calls."[42]

On January 13, 2024, the Shura Council elected Minister of Development and Humanitarian Affairs Mohammed al-Bashir as prime minister, succeeding Ali Keda.[43] His election platform focused on e-government and government automation.[44]

In March 2024, the Ministry of Interior said it would form a three-judge panel 'security court' for the families of detainees following demonstrations in Idlib due to the death of military personnel in prison and dissatisfaction at HTS influence. The Ministry of Interior also announced an amnesty for detainees "under certain conditions and exceptions" and established a 'General Security Administration' under its purview.[45]

In November 2024, HTS-led rebel groups launched the Syrian opposition offensives, capturing Aleppo city and bringing it under the control of the SSG. The SSG reactivated its inter-ministerial emergency response committee to coordinate its expansion into the new territories. The committee prepared tents for new IDPs displaced by bombing, coordinated the transfer of 100,000 loaves of bread from Idlib's bakeries to Aleppo city, and dispatched rubble removal and street cleaning teams.[13] By December 3, the SSG had opened several government institutions in Aleppo city, began garbage collection, and restarted water and electricity services,[46] it had also resumed traffic control duties and according to Reuters, "internet coverage has improved as a rebel-linked telecoms network (Syria Phone) has expanded its reach". Although the Syrian Pound has continued to devalue from 15,000 to ~22,000 per USD.[47] HTS Emir al-Julani said that governance duties would be transferred to a "transitional body" in the city rather than the Salvation Government and would withdraw fighters. Dareen Khalifa of the International Crisis Group in contract with Ahmed al-Sharaa said this was to avoid restrictions on international aid coming into the city due to HTS' terrorist designation.[47]

During the offensive, drones dropped SSG leaflets on government positions which exhorted troops to desert or defect and contained contact details for the SSG's "Center for Safety and Defection".[13] The SSG offered amnesty to all surrendering government forces who remained in Aleppo after its capture.[46]

Following the overthrow of the Assad regime and the establishment of a new, nationwide transitional government, incumbent ministers in the SSG assumed posts in the new transitional government.[48]

Government and politics

The SSG has been described as technocratic and "non-ideological" in nature.[11] Many of its positions are occupied by members of the educated urban elite attempting to regain influence after the end of direct governance by armed opposition groups, particularly businessmen and conservative revolutionary activists.[11]

Legislature

The General Shura Council is the legislative body of the SSG. It is responsible for electing a prime minister and approving ministerial appointments, drafting laws and presenting them for implementation to the executive branch, and ratifying the executive's plans.[20] The council is charged with forming specialized committees which oversee and scrutinize the work of the executive.[20][49]

The council is comprised from representatives of the various "segments" of society;[20] each elects 15 members to the council. These segments include trade unions, tribes, internally displaced people and local residents.[49] Candidates for Council elections are pre-selected and women are not permitted to vote.[10]: 34  In April 2024, the council announced the selection of an eight-member Higher Election Committee[b] to determine a new electoral process and delineate electoral districts for future elections.[49][50] The committee is reportedly considering giving representation to women, local councils, minorities and the military.[49]

Executive

The prime minister is elected by the Shura Council. Candidates for prime minister are nominated by council members; a minimum of 10 members must support a nomination for it to advance to the voting stage. In the event only one candidate continues to the voting stage, they must obtain two-thirds of Council's vote to be elected; otherwise, the candidate with the most votes wins.[49] Once elected, the prime minister must present his cabinet to the council for approval within 30 days. Prime ministers are elected for one year terms: the first term is a "trial year", after which the Council may elect them for second and third terms.[49]

Prospective prime ministerial candidates must be Syrian, hold a university degree, be married to a Syrian, not be convicted of a crime, have a "good reputation" and possess a "revolutionary history".[49] Women hold few positions in the SSG's government, being confined to the Women's Office. As of July 2024, female leadership was absent from 10 of the SSG's 11 ministries, and no woman had ever been granted a ministerial portfolio.[51]

List of prime ministers

No. Name Took office Left office
1 Mohammed al-Sheikh 2 November 2017[52] 18 August 2018[24]
2 Mohammed Jamal Shahoud (acting) 18 August 2018[25] 10 December 2018
3 Fawwaz Hilal 10 December 2018[26][27] 18 November 2019
4 Ali Abdulrahman Keda 18 November 2019 13 January 2024
5 Mohammed al-Bashir 13 January 2024[53] 10 December 2024[48]
Mohammed al-BashirAli KedaFawaz HilalMohammed Jamal ShahoudMohammed al-Sheikh

Ministries

The SSG consists of eleven ministries,[49] under each of which numerous departments and directorates operate.[7] The SSG originally comprised ten ministries, with the eleventh, the Ministry of Information, being formed in 2023.[54] Five institutions operate independently of a ministry and report directly to the prime minister.[7]

Ministerial nominees are evaluated based on several criteria, including age and academic qualifications. The nomination process involves discussions with the Shura Council's committees, elites and relevant community and professional bodies.[49]

Seventh cabinet (2024)
Incumbent Office Since Until Ref
Mohammed al-Bashir Prime Minister 13 January 2024[53] 10 December 2024 [55][48]
Fadi al-Qassem Ministry of Development 28 February 2024 10 December 2024
Mohammad Abdul Rahman Ministry of Interior 28 February 2024 10 December 2024
Shadi al-Waisi Ministry of Justice 28 February 2024 10 December 2024
Hussam Haj Hussein Ministry of Awqaf 28 February 2024 10 December 2024
Abdel Moneim Abdel Hafez Ministry of Higher Education 28 February 2024 10 December 2024
Nazir al-Qadri Ministry of Education 28 February 2024 10 December 2024
Mazen Dukhan Ministry of Health 28 February 2024 10 December 2024
Basil Abdul Aziz Ministry of Economy 28 February 2024 10 December 2024
Mohammad Al-Omar Ministry of Information 28 February 2024 10 December 2024
Mohammad Al-Ahmad Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation 28 February 2024 10 December 2024
Mohamed Muslim Ministry of Local Administration 28 February 2024 10 December 2024

Administrative divisions

The SSG's local municipal councils are organized as the Administration of the Liberated Areas (ALA).[13] The ALA is administratively divided into eight regions: Central, Northern, Sarmada, Harem, Jisr ash-Shughur, Ariha, Atme and Idlib.[49][7]

Foreign relations

While no country recognizes the SSG as a sovereign state or a legitimate government of Syria, its Department of Political Affairs (DPA) conducts diplomatic outreach. On 29 November 2024, the DPA issued a statement that called on Russia to end its support for the Syrian government and stated that the DPA sought to "build positive relations based on mutual respect and common interests with all countries of the world, including Russia." It issued a similar statement directed to Iraq, amid rumours that Iraqi militias were planning to enter Syria to fight alongside government forces.[13]

Economy

The territories controlled by the SSG in Idlib Governorate were primarily rural. The poor level of infrastructure in the region was further degraded by the civil war, which destroyed oil production facilities, power plants and agricultural silos.[56]

In a 2022 speech, Ahmed al-Sharaa stated his desire to see the SSG's "rate of exports [become] greater than [its] rate of imports" and to encourage industrial development by simplifying planning laws.[15] Through its Local Product Protection Department, the SSG's Ministry of Industry has adopted a protectionist policy of imposing tariffs on imports that compete with domestically produced goods. However, tariffs on imported raw materials and high energy costs mean that domestic production is unable to compete with imports in practice.[57] Weak domestic demand has also limited industrial development, although some pharmaceutical factories have been established.[57]

The currency of the SSG is the Turkish lira, which officially replaced the Syrian pound in June 2020 after it sharply depreciated in value. Usage of the Syrian pound has been criminalized.[58] The Turkish lira crisis raised the cost of imports, leading to increased unemployment, inflation and commodity prices,[59] and severely affecting economic activity.[60] The SSG operates a "General Monetary Agency for Cash Management and Consumer Protection" which regulates foreign exchange rates, hawala services and currency exchange firms.[58] It also operates Sham Bank, a financial institution that is the primary supplier of the lira in its territories.[58]

Sanctions prevent the population of the SSG from accessing international banking services.[61] Access to finance is generally limited to international grants, investments made by opposition groups and remittances from the Syrian diaspora.[56] To circumvent these restrictions, both opposition groups and civilians have turned to exchanging cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin and Tether. Cryptocurrency stores operate in Idlib and Sarmada. HTS has encouraged their usage, declaring cryptocurrencies as shariah-compliant and describing Bitcoin as the "Currency of the Future Economy".[62]

The SSG's General Authority of Zakat manages the collection of zakat, the Islamic alms-tax, from Muslims living under its administration. Failing to pay the zakat is illegal and can lead to arrest and imprisonment.[63]

Agriculture

Agriculture in the SSG's territories is not mechanized. Olive harvesting is the main source of employment for day laborers in Idlib Governorate, and in 2020 agriculture was the primary income source for 36% of households.[64] Both drought and groundwater depletion, exacerbated by illegal drilling and an influx of internally displaced persons into the region, have led to increasing production costs.[64]

The SSG's Ministry of Agriculture manages agricultural affairs and encourages the cultivation of strategic crops, such as wheat and potatoes.[65] It maintains seed testing laboratories and produces seeds that are distributed to farmers.[64] In 2023, the ministry produced and distributed 4,600 kilograms of cottonseed to farmers in an attempt to restart cotton cultivation in the region, which fell into decline after the reduction of government subsidies in 2007, and increase female employment.[64]

The Ministry of Economy imposes price controls on wheat.[66] In search of higher profits, farmers increasingly plant crops not traditionally cultivated in the region, including saffron, strawberries, bananas, broccoli and Damask roses, but such enterprises remain small and experimental.[65]

Energy

Most electricity in the SSG's territories is supplied from Turkey by the Green Energy Company,[67] the local franchise of a Turkish firm of the same name.[68] Electricity distribution is managed by the SSG's General Electricity Corporation. In May 2021, the Green Energy Company completed the construction of electrical substations capable of receiving 66kV from Turkey.[67] Transmission lines connect the substations in Reyhanlı in Turkey and Harem in Idlib.[69] By May 2023, over 70% of areas under the SSG's administration were connected to the electrical grid. Areas not connected to the grid rely on diesel generators and solar panels.[69] The Green Energy Company maintains an effective monopoly on the supply of electricity and has been accused by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights of unduly raising prices.[70]

Military and law enforcement

While the SSG does not have a defense ministry, HTS effectively functions as such. Despite this, the SSG opened a military college in December 2021, whose purpose was described by Ahmed al-Sharaa as to "[increase] the experience of the mujahidin in military science and martial arts."[13] Over 400 officers graduated from its first course in 2022.[71]

The SSG operates a police force under the Ministry of Interior. A police academy was opened in September 2023 and produced its first batch of graduates in August 2024.[72][73]

In 2024, the interior ministry absorbed two security agencies of HTS after a prisoner abuse scandal led to a protest movement,[74] and Ahmed al-Sharaa admitting that HTS had used torture to extract false confessions from prisoners.[75] HTS' General Security Service was transferred to the interior ministry in April 2024,[76] followed by its Public Security Service in June.[77]

Religion

HTS has faced internal opposition from hardline Salafi jihadis, who view the moderation of its views as "un-Islamic".[11] The SSG has institutionalised religious structures and has reasserted the role of the Shafi'i madhhab of Islamic jurisprudence, the predominant legal school followed in Idlib, in an effort to marginalise Salafi-jihadi hardliners.[78][11][10]: 9  Idlibi clerics characterise the SSG's policies concerning mosques as being "highly centralised and authoritarian".[78] The Ministry of Awqaf has the power to appoint and dismiss clerics; for example, in 2020, clerics affiliated with al-Qaeda affiliate Hurras al-Din in the village of Arab Sa'id were replaced by loyalists. "Mosque officers" appointed by the Ministry of Awqaf monitor mosque activities. Independent khatibs can be substituted for SSG-loyal preachers during politically sensitive events, such as bouts of rebel infighting; those who refuse substitution risk dismissal.[78]

Although HTS is Salafi in aqidah, the SSG has refrained from imposing a particular strand of Sunni Islam on the populace and predominately Sufi local ulama.[78][11] It allows politically neutral traditional religious institutes which teach the competing Ash'ari school of aqidah to operate,[11] including those run by the Muslim Brotherhood and Tablighi Jamaat.[78] It has gradually accommodated a larger diversity of religious views among preachers, an evolution driven partly by a lack of manpower.[11]

Public opposition halted early attempts at imposing religious laws such as women being required to travel with a mahram.[11] Schools are segregated by gender, but mixing between genders at restaurants and shopping centres is not prevented.[79] The SSG encourages women to "dress modestly" and wear the hijab,[79][10]: 38–39  but does not force them to wear the niqāb.[79] The sharia's hudud punishments, such as stoning and flogging, are not imposed.[79][11] In 2020, Ahmed al-Sharaa told HTS fighters that "some people limit the issue of implementing the rule of the sharia to just imposing some of the hudoud punishments, chopping off hands, stoning whomever, whipping someone who drinks alcohol [...] but this is a very basic part of the very big concept of implementing the rule of the sharia".[10]: 27 

In December 2024, the SSG's Department for Political Affairs issued a communique addressed to Syria's Alawites, stating that the Assad government had exploited the sect for its survival and had consequently caused "deep societal wounds". It further stated that the "Syrian revolution is a call for freedom, dignity and justice for all under the roof of Syria", and that while it may be "challenging", "wise individuals" from the Alawite sect could lead it to a "just and inclusive future".[80]

Education

The SSG's Ministry of Education supervises the formal schooling system in Idlib, with more than 550,000 students, 1,800 schools and 12 universities as of 2022. These include approximately 950 schools directly operated by the ministry and employing nearly 12,500 staff members, in addition to the private education system authorized by the SSG. The curriculum is a continuation of the pre-2011 Syrian syllabus developed in partnership with UNICEF, with the exception of texts related to the Assad regime or deemed as contradicting the Sharia as per its education ministry guidelines. Educational institutions follow gender segregation norms.[14][81]

Education has been severely disrupted by airstrikes on educational facilities and a lack of funding.[82] In 2022, Ahmed al-Sharaa stated that 200,000 people in the SSG's territories had dropped out of school, warning this could lead to "illiteracy that leads to ignorance, which is a precursor to crime, unemployment, begging, and many other things."[83]

In September 2024, the White Helmets reported that 170 schools had been bombed since 2019. In October 2023, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimated that at least 1 million of the 2.2 million school-aged children in the region were not in education. In 2024, OCHA stated that a decline in international funding had deprived 700 schools of resources, affecting 110,000 students and 6,500 teachers.[82]

See also

References

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