Sandinista National Liberation Front

Sandinista National Liberation Front
Leader	Daniel Ortega
Founded	1961
Headquarters	Managua, Nicaragua
Ideology	Socialism
International affiliation	Socialist International
Website
www.fsln-nicaragua.com

"Sandinista" redirects here. For the similarly titled album by The Clash, see Sandinista!

The Sandinista National Liberation Front (Spanish: Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional) is a Nicaraguan political party founded on the broad leftist principles of the popular front. It led a revolution that in 1979 overthrew the Somoza political dynasty. Following their seizure of power, the Sandinistas ruled Nicaragua for roughly 11 years from 1979 to 1990, during which time they established democratic elections and a national constitution, among other sweeping reforms. Their organization is generally referred to by the initials FSLN and its members are called, in both English and Spanish, Sandinistas. Opposition to the Somoza government was inspired by what Sandinistas termed the anti-imperialist struggle of Augusto C. Sandino during the thirties, decades prior to the "Nicaraguan Revolution".

Today the FSLN remains one of Nicaragua's two leading parties, representing some 40% or more of the Nicaraguan electorate. The FSLN often polls in opposition to the Constitutional Liberal Party, or PLC, which represents a roughly similar portion (though perhaps slightly larger) of the Nicaraguan population. Although the FSLN was voted out of power in 1990, its revolution affected many facets of Nicaraguan society and its legacy has left a lasting impression in the country. In the Nicaraguan general election, 2006 former President Daniel Ortega was re-elected President of Nicaragua and the voters brought in the country's second Sandinista government. Ortega was elected President with 38.7% of the vote compared to 29% for his leading rival Eduardo Montealegre of the Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance.

History 1961–1970

The Sandinistas took their name from Augusto César Sandino (1895–1934), the charismatic and historical leader of the country's nationalist rebellion against the U.S. occupation of Nicaragua during the early 20th century, c. 1922 - 1934. Sandino was assassinated in 1934 by the National Guard ([Guardia Nacional] Error: {{Lang}}: text has italic markup (help)), a police force trained and equipped by the United States military which was established to permit Anastasio Somoza García to consolidate his control of the country.

The Somoza family ruled the country from 1936 until they were overthrown by the Sandinistas in 1979.

The Sandinistas were initially organized as a group of student activists at the National Autonomous University of Nicaragua (UNAN) in Managua. Outraged by the martial excesses and economic and social injustices of the ruling government, their aim was to overthrow the Somoza regime.

The FSLN was founded in 1961 by Carlos Fonseca Amador, Silvio Mayorga, Tomás Borge Martínez and others as The National Liberation Front (FLN). The FSLN official website names the following as founders: Santos Lopez (former Sandino fighter), Carlos Fonseca Amador, Silvio Mayorga, Tomás Borge Martínez, German Pomares Ordonez, Jorge Navarro, Julio Buitrago, Faustino Ruiz, Rigoberto Cruz and Jose Benito Escobar Perez. Only Tomás Borge Martínez lived long enough to see the Sandinista victory in 1979. The term "Sandinista" was added two years later, establishing continuity with Sandino's movement, and using his legacy in order to develop the newer movement's ideology and strategy.

History 1970 - 1979

The rise of the FSLN

By the early 1970s, the FSLN had gained enough support from peasants and student groups to launch limited military initiatives. On December 23, 1972, a powerful earthquake levelled the capital city, Managua. The earthquake killed 10,000 of the city's 400,000 residents and left another 250,000 homeless. About 80 percent of Managua's commercial buildings were destroyed. Anastasio Somoza Debayle's National Guard embezzled much of the international aid that flowed into the country to assist in reconstruction, and several parts of downtown Managua were never rebuilt. The president's ability to take advantage of the people's suffering proved enormous. By some estimates, his personal wealth soared to US$400 million in 1974. This overt corruption caused even people who had previously supported the regime, such as business leaders, to turn against Somoza and call for his overthrow.

In December 1974, a guerrilla group seized government hostages at a party in the house of Minister of Agriculture in the Managua suburb Los Robles, among them several leading Nicaraguan officials and Somoza relatives. The siege was postponed specifically until the departure of the American ambassador from the gathering. At 10:50 PM, a group of 15 young guerrillas and their commanders, Pomares and Contreras, entered the house. They killed the Minister, who tried to defend himself, during the takeover. The guerrillas received US$1 million ransom, and had their official communiqué read over the radio and printed in the newspaper La Prensa.

The guerillas also succeeded in getting fourteen Sandinista prisoners released from jail, and with them, were flown to Cuba. One of the released prisoners was Daniel Ortega Saavedra, who would later become the president of Nicaragua (1985-1990) and is the current President of Nicaragua (elected November 2006). The group also lobbied for an increase in wages for National Guard soldiers to 500 córdobas ($71 at the time).

The Somoza government responded with further censorship, intimidation, torture, and murder.

In 1975, Anastasio Somoza Debayle imposed a state of siege, censoring the press, and threatening all opponents with detention and torture. Somoza's National Guard also increased its violence against individuals and communities suspected of collaborating with the Sandinistas. Many of the FSLN guerrillas were killed, including its leader and founder Carlos Fonseca Amador in 1976. Fonseca had returned to Nicaragua in 1975 from his exile in Cuba to try to reunite fractures that existed in the FSLN. He and his group were betrayed by a peasant who informed the National Guard that they were in the area. The guerrilla group was ambushed, and Fonseca was wounded in the process. The next morning Fonseca was shot by the National Guard.

The split of the FSLN

In the aftermath of the Pancasán guerrilla movement, one of FSLN's historical military defeats back in 1967, the organization adopted the "Prolonged Popular War" theory (Guerra Popular Prolongada––GPP) as the FSLN's strategic doctrine. The GPP was based on the "accumulation of forces in silence", while the urban organization recruited on the university campuses and collected funds through bank holdups, the main cadres were to go permanently to the north central mountain zone. There they would build a grassroots peasant support base in preparation for renewed rural guerrilla warfare.

As a direct consequence of the repressive campaign of the National Guard in 1975 a group within the FSLN's urban mobilization arm began to question the viability of the GPP. In the view of the young orthodox Marxist intellectuals, such as Jaime Wheelock, economic development had turned Nicaragua into a nation of factory workers and wage-earning farm laborers. The rural guerrilla strategy was rejected in favor of self-defense and urban commando actions by armed union members. Wheelock and his followers were purged by the GPP-dominated National Directorate in October 1975. Wheelock's faction was known as the "Proletarian Tendency".

Shortly after, a third faction arose within the FSLN. The "Insurrectional Tendency," also known as the "Third Way" or Terceristas, led by Daniel Ortega Saavedra and his brother Humberto Ortega Saavedra, was more pragmatic and called for tactical, temporary alliances with non-communists, including the right-wing opposition, in a popular front against the Somoza regime. By attacking the Guard directly, the Terceristas would demonstrate the weakness of the regime and encourage others to take up arms.

In October 1977 "El Grupo de los Doce", known as the "Twelve", a group of prominent Nicaraguan professionals, business leaders, and clergymen allied to the Terceristas, was formed in Costa Rica. The main idea was to organize a provisional government from Costa Rica. The new strategy of the Terceristas also included unarmed strikes and rioting by labor and student groups coordinated by the FSLN's "United People's Movement" (Movimiento Pueblo Unido - MPU).

On 10 January 1978, Pedro Joaquín Chamorro Cardenal, the popular editor of the opposition newspaper La Prensa and leader of the "Democratic Union of Liberation" (Unión Democrática de Liberación - UDEL), the bourgeois opposition, was assassinated. Although his assassins were not identified at the time, evidence implicated President Somoza's son and other members of the National Guard. Spontaneous riots followed in several cities, while the business community organized a general strike demanding Somoza's resignation.

The Terceristas joined the turmoil in early February with attacks in several Nicaraguan cities. The National Guard responded by further increasing repression and using force to contain and intimidate all government opposition. The nationwide strike that paralyzed the country for ten days weakened the private enterprises and most of them decided to suspend their participation in less than two weeks. Meanwhile, Somoza asserted his intention to stay in power until the end of his presidential term in 1981. The United States government replied with the suspension of all military assistance to the regime. Despite this, the U.S. Congress continued to approve economic assistance to the country for humanitarian reasons.

In August, the Terceristas took the initiative by staging a spectacular hostage-taking. Twenty-three Tercerista commandos led by Edén Pastora seized the entire Nicaraguan congress and took nearly 1,000 hostages including Somoza's nephew José Somoza Abrego and cousin Luis Paillais Debayle. Somoza gave in to their demands and paid a $500,000 ransom, released 59 political prisoners (including GPP chief Tomás Borge), and broadcasted a communiqué with FSLN's call for general insurrection. The guerrillas were flown to exile in Panama.

A few days later six Nicaraguan cities rose in revolt. Armed youths took over the highland city of Matagalpa. Tercerista cadres attacked Guard posts in Managua, Masaya, León, Chinandega and Estelí. Large numbers of semiarmed civilians joined the revolt and put the Guard garrisons of the latter four cities under siege. The September Insurrection of 1978 was subdued at the cost of several thousand, mostly civilian, casualties. Members of all three tendencies fought in these uprisings, which began to blur the distinctions between the factions and prepare the way for unified action.

The reunification of the FSLN

In early 1979, President Jimmy Carter and the United States no longer supported the Somoza regime, but did not want a revolutionary government to take power in Nicaragua. The moderate "Broad Opposition Front" (Frente Amplio Opositor - FAO) which opposed Somoza was made up of a conglomeration of dissidents within the government as well as the "Democratic Union of Liberation" (UDEL) and the "Twelve", representatives of the terceristas. The FAO and Carter came up with a plan that would remove Somoza from office but left no part in government power for the FSLN. The "Twelve" abandoned the coalition in protest and formed the "National Patriotic Front" (Frente Patriotico Nacional - FPN) together with the "United People's Movement" (MPU).

With this action the FAO lost its legitimacy in front of the people that didn't want a "Somocismo sin Somoza" (Somocism without Somoza). This strengthened the revolutionary organizations as tens of thousands of youths joined the FSLN and the fight against Somoza. A direct consequence of the massification of the armed struggle in Nicaragua was the official reunification of the FSLN that took place on 7 March 1979. Nine men, three from each tendency, formed the National Directorate which would lead the reunited FSLN. They were: Daniel Ortega Saavedra, Humberto Ortega Saavedra and Víctor Tirado (Terceristas); Tomás Borge, Bayardo Arce, and Henry Ruiz (GPP faction); and Jaime Wheelock, Luis Carrión and Carlos Núñez (Proletarian faction).

The final insurrection

The FSLN evolved from one of many opposition groups to a leadership role in the overthrow of the Somoza regime. By mid-April 1979, five guerilla fronts opened under the joint command of the FSLN, including an internal front in the capital city Managua. Young guerrilla cadres and the National Guardsmen were clashing almost daily in cities throughout the country.

The strategic goal of the Final Offensive was the division of the enemy's forces. Urban insurrection was the crucial element because the FSLN could never hope to achieve simple superiority in men and firepower over the National Guard.

On June 4, a general strike was called by the FSLN to last until Somoza fell and an uprising was launched in Managua. On June 16, the formation of a provisional Nicaraguan government in exile, consisting of a five-member Junta of National Reconstruction, was announced and organized in Costa Rica. The members of the new junta were Daniel Ortega Saavedra (FSLN), Moisés Hassan Morales (FPN), Sergio Ramírez Mercado (the "Twelve"), Alfonso Robelo Callejas (MDN) and Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, the widow of La Prensa's editor Pedro Joaquín Chamorro Cardenal. By the end of that month, with the exception of the capital, most of Nicaragua was under FSLN control, including León and Matagalpa, the two largest cities in Nicaragua after Managua.

The provisional government in exile released a government program on July 9 in which it pledged to organize an effective democratic regime, promote political pluralism and universal suffrage, and ban ideological discrimination--except for those promoting the "return of Somoza's rule". Anastasio Somoza Debayle resigned on July 17 1979, handed over power to Francisco Urcuyo Maliaños, and fled to Miami. It was meant that Urcuyo would in turn transfer the government to the revolutionary junta. This agreement was ignored by Urcuyo, who intended to remain in power until the end of Somoza's presidential term in 1981. Two days later Urcuyo left power and fled to Guatemala.

On July 19, the FSLN army entered Managua, culminating the Nicaraguan revolution. The insurrection left approximately 50,000 dead and 150,000 Nicaraguans in exile. The five-member junta entered the Nicaraguan capital the next day and assumed power, reiterating its pledge to work for political pluralism, a mixed economic system, and a nonaligned foreign policy.

Ideologies

Main article: Sandinista Ideologies

Through the media and the works of FSLN leaders such as Carlos Fonseca, the life and times of Augusto César Sandino became the unique symbol of this revolutionary force in Nicaragua. The ideology of Sandinismo gained momentum in 1974, when a Sandinista initiated hostage situation resulted in the Somoza government adhering to FSLN demands and publicly printing and airing work on Sandino in well known newspapers and media outlets.

During the long struggle against Anastasio Somoza Debayle, the FSLN leaders' internal disagreements over strategy and tactics were reflected in three main factions:

• The [guerra popular prolongada] Error: {{Lang}}: text has italic markup (help) (GPP, "prolonged popular war") faction was rural-based and sought long-term "silent accumulation of forces" within the country's large peasant population, which it saw as the main social base for the revolution.
• The [tendencia proletaria] Error: {{Lang}}: text has italic markup (help) (TP, "proletarian tendency"), led by Jaime Wheelock, reflected an orthodox Marxist approach that sought to organize urban workers.
• The tercerista/insurrecctionista (TI, "third way/insurrectionist") faction, led by Humberto and Daniel Ortega Saavedra, was ideologically eclectic, favoring a more rapid insurrectional strategy in alliance with diverse sectors of the country, including business owners, churches, students, the middle class, unemployed youth and the inhabitants of shantytowns. The [terceristas] Error: {{Lang}}: text has italic markup (help) also helped attract popular and international support by organizing a group of prominent Nicaraguan professionals, business leaders, and clergymen (known as "the Twelve"), who called for Somoza's removal and sought to organize a provisional government from Costa Rica.

Nevertheless, while ideologies varied between FSLN leaders, all leaders essentially agreed that Sandino provided a path for the Nicaragua masses to take charge, and the FSLN would act as the legitimate vanguard. The extreme end of the ideology links Sandino to Roman Catholicism and portrays him as descending from the mountains in Nicaragua knowing he would be betrayed and killed. Generally however, most Sandinistas associated Sandino on a more practical level, as a heroic and honest person who tried to combat the evil forces of imperialist national and international governments that existed in Nicaragua’s history.

Nicaraguan relations with the US

US involvement with Nicaragua dates back to the mid 19th century when it became a transit point for travelers heading from the US East Coast to California as part of the gold rush. At one point, US citizen William Walker (1824–1860) declared himself president of Nicaragua in 1856, making English the national language and protecting the interests of the slave system. Walker was eventually forced from Nicaragua by forces from the rest of Central America. Nicaragua's geographic position led to heightened US interests. Nicaragua was the leading candidate for a transoceanic canal until a Congress vote granted the canal to the newborn country of Panama. The US still maintained a strategic interest in Nicaragua and kept close tabs on local politics. This continued interest lead to the presence of Marines in Nicaragua on several occasions in the early 20th century.

Eventually, the US created a Nicaraguan national military force known as the National Guard ([Guardia Nacional] Error: {{Lang}}: text has italic markup (help)) under the leadership of Anastasio Somoza. Somoza and the National Guard were a powerful entity in Nicaragua during Juan Bautista Sacasa’s reign. It is believed that these two powerful creations of the USA were instrumental in the assassination of Sandino and the overthrow of Sacasa which allowed Somoza to begin his dictatorship.

For the next four and a half decades the Somoza family ruled Nicaragua. During this period, the US-Nicaragua relation became even stronger. Such a relationship between the two parties only increased US interest in protecting the rapidly increasing American investments. In return, the US aided and gave loans to the country on a regular basis and such help went towards humanitarian issues, notably after the 1972 Managua Earthquake. However, even during the Somoza dynasty, the US-Nicaraguan relationship started to deteriorate due to the fact that the youngest of the three imposed leaders, Anastasio Somoza Debayle, was losing support from both his people and the National Guard. Some believe that funds given to the National Guard in order to reconstruct the country after the earthquake were instead funneled into accounts owned by the Somoza family. Others say that the Somozas were known for pocketing money given for direct investments into the country. In 1977, when President Jimmy Carter entered the White House, he pressured the last of the Somozas to change his image and order the National Guard to stop their violence so that the leader could gain popularity amongst his people (?). Due to Anastasio Somoza Debayle's violation of human rights towards his own people, Carter gave him and his National Guard the option to stop or lose US support.

Cuban assistance

Beginning in 1967 the Cuban General Intelligence Directorate, or DGI, had begun to establish ties with various Nicaraguan revolutionary organizations. By 1970 the DGI had managed to train hundreds of Sandinista guerrilla leaders and had vast influence over the organization. In 1969 the DGI had financed and organized an operation to free the jailed Sandinista leader Carlos Fonseca from his prison in Costa Rica. Fonseca was re-captured shortly after the jail break, but after a plane carrying executives from the United Fruit Company was hijacked by the FSLN, he was freed and allowed to travel to Cuba.

DGI chief Manuel "Redbeard" Piñeiro commented that "of all the countries in Latin America, the most active work being carried out by us is in Nicaragua." However, one should keep in mind that there were many other Cuban operations throughout the world.

The DGI, with Fidel Castro's personal blessing, also collaborated with the FSLN on the botched assassination attempt of Turner Shelton, the U.S. ambassador in Managua and a close friend to the Somoza family. The FSLN managed to secure several hostages exchanging them for safe passage to Cuba and a one million dollar ransom.

After the successful ouster of Somoza, DGI involvement in the new Sandinista government expanded rapidly. An early indication of the central role that the DGI would play in the Cuban-Nicaraguan relationship is a meeting in Havana on July 27, 1979, at which diplomatic ties between the two countries were re-established after more than 25 years. Julián López Díaz, a prominent DGI agent, was named Ambassador to Nicaragua.

Cuban military and DGI advisors initially brought in during the Sandinista insurgency, would swell to over 2,500 and operated at all levels of the new Nicaraguan government. Sandinista defector Álvaro Baldizón alleged that Cuban influence in Nicaragua's Interior Ministry (MINT) was more extensive than was widely believed at the time and Cuban "advice" and "observations" were treated as though they were orders.

While the Cubans would like to have helped more in the development of Nicaragua towards socialism, they realized that they were no match for the United States' pressure on Latin America. Following the invasion of Grenada, countries previously looking for support from Cuba saw that they had little power to fight the United States when it chose to take action. [Banana Republic, Roy Gutman, 1988]

Cuban assistance after the revolution

The early years of the Nicaraguan revolution had strong ties to Cuba. The Sandinista leaders acknowledged that the FSLN owed a great debt to Cuba. The relationship was made possible because of Cuba’s commitment to the strategy of revolutionary guerrilla warfare. Once the Sandinistas assumed power, Cuba not only gave Nicaragua military advice but also gave assistance and aid to the impoverished Nicaraguan economy. Cuban aid came in the form of educational assistance, health care, vocational training and industry building. Once the Sandinistas assumed power, Cuba’s restraint on aid was lifted and it became an essential component of Nicaraguan development strategy. Cuban aid became important because it came in the form of grants and unconditional loans. (Roberto Perez, 1987) Nicaragua during the Somoza period had been nearly 90% dependent on the United States for assistance. In 1980 Cuban-Nicaraguan aid relations became formalized with the formation of the Mixed Commission for Scientific, Economic and Technical Cooperation. This commission is represented on the Cuban side by the State of Committee for Economic Cooperation and on the Nicaraguan side by the Ministry of Economic Cooperation. New aids agreements are negotiated every year within the framework of the commission. In this context the commission provides a vehicle for Nicaragua to present its various needs and for the Cubans to evaluate which ones they can fulfill (Gary Prevost, 126). The commission has overseen approximately 300 million dollars (U.S) between the years 1979 and 1987 in assistance to Nicaragua and according to Prevost it does not include military aid or the cost for schooling Nicaraguans in Cuba.

Educational assistance

Cuba was instrumental in the Nicaraguan Literacy Campaign. Nicaragua was a country with a very high rate of illiteracy, but the campaign succeeded in lowering the rate from 50% to 12%. This was a huge campaign to take on but it succeeded with the help of Cuba. Cuba not only served as a model for Nicaragua but also provided technical assistance and advice to Nicaragua. The Nicaraguan Literacy Campaign was one of the success stories of the Sandinistas' reign and Cuba played an important part in this; Cuba provided teachers on yearly basis after the revolution. Prevost states that “Teachers were not the only ones studying in Cuba, about 2,000 primary and secondary students were studying on the Isle of Youth and the cost was covered by the host country (Cuba)” (Prevost, 126).

Health care

Health care was another area where the Sandinistas made incredible gains and are widely recognized for this accomplishment. In this area Cuba also played a role by again offering expertise and know-how to Nicaragua. According to Prevost, over 1,500 Cuban doctors worked in Nicaragua and provided more than five million consultations. Also Cuban personnel have been essential in the elimination of polio, decrease in measles and lowering the infant mortality rate. Prevost also states that Cuban personnel have made it possible for Nicaragua to have a truly national health care system reaching a majority of its citizens. (Prevost 127)

Vocational assistance

Cuba has participated in the training of Nicaraguan workers in the use of new machinery imported to Nicaragua. The Nicaraguan revolution put the country’s government on the United States' black book; therefore the Sandinistas would not receive any aid from the United States or even other Western countries. There was also a trade embargo imposed by the United States in May of 1985 which made it impossible for Nicaragua to receive spare parts for American-made machines, so this led Nicaragua to look to other socialist countries for help. Cuba was the best choice because of the language and proximity and also it had imported such machinery over the years. Nicaraguans would come to Cuba for short periods of 3 to 6 months and this training closely involved close to 3,000 workers (Prevost, 128).

Industry building

Cuba helped Nicaragua in huge projects such as building roads, power plants and sugar mills. Cuba tried to help Nicaragua build the first overland route linking Nicaragua’s Atlantic and Pacific coasts in order to expedite the flow of the $1 Billion in Soviet military aid used to enable the FSLN administration. The road crossed 260 miles of jungle although full completion of the road and usage was hindered by the Contra war. The road was never completed.

Another significant feat was the building of the Tipitapa-Malacatoya sugar mill. It was completed and inaugurated during a visit by Fidel Castro in January of 1985. The plant used the newest technology available and was built by workers trained in Cuba. Also during this visit Castro announced that all debts incurred on this project were absolved (Prevost, 127). Cuba also provided numerous technicians to aid in the sugar harvest and assist in the rejuvenation of several old sugar mills. Cubans also assisted in building schools and other projects that would ensure the survival of the Nicaraguan revolutionary government.

Sandinista rule (1979–1990)

The Sandinistas inherited a country in ruins with a debt of 1.6 billion dollars (US), an estimated 50,000 war dead, 600,000 homeless, and a devastated economic infrastructure. To begin the task of establishing a new government, they created a Council (or [junta] Error: {{Lang}}: text has italic markup (help)) of National Reconstruction, made up of five members – Sandinista militants Daniel Ortega and Moises Hassan, novelist Sergio Ramírez Mercado (a member of Los Doce "the Twelve"), businessman Alfonso Robelo Callejas, and Violeta Barrios de Chamorro (the widow of Pedro Joaquín Chamorro). The preponderance of power, however, remained with the Sandinistas and their mass organizations, including the Sandinista Workers' Federation ([Central Sandinista de Trabajadores] Error: {{Lang}}: text has italic markup (help)), the Luisa Amanda Espinoza Nicaraguan Women's Association ([Asociación de Mujeres Nicaragüenses Luisa Amanda Espinoza] Error: {{Lang}}: text has italic markup (help)), and the National Union of Farmers and Ranchers ([Unión Nacional de Agricultores y Ganaderos] Error: {{Lang}}: text has italic markup (help)).

The dominant rebel leaders who controlled the FSLN such as Daniel Ortega were strongly Marxist. However, the new junta initially contained a broad spectrum of ideologies. Upon assuming power, its political platform included the following:

• Nationalization of property owned by the Somozas and their collaborators.
• Land reform.
• Improved rural and urban working conditions.
• Free unionization for all workers, both urban and rural.
• Control of living costs, especially basic necessities (food, clothing, and medicine).
• Improved public services, housing conditions, education (mandatory, free through high school; schools available to the whole national population; national literacy campaign).
• Nationalization and protection of natural resources, including mines.
• Abolition of torture, political assassination and the death penalty.
• Protection of democratic liberties (freedom of expression, political organization and association, and religion; return of political exiles).
• Equality for women.
• Free, non-aligned foreign policy and relations.
• Formation of a new, democratic, and popular army under the leadership of the FSLN.
• Pesticide controls
• Rain forest conservation
• Wildlife conservation
• Alternative energy programs

One example of the early FSLN's post-revolution successes was the literacy campaign, which saw teachers flood the countryside. Within six months, half a million people had been taught rudimentary reading, bringing the national illiteracy rate down from over 50% to just under 12%. Over 100,000 Nicaraguans participated as literacy teachers. One of the stated aims of the literacy campaign was to create a literate electorate which would be able to make informed choices at the promised elections. The great success of the literacy campaign was recognized by UNESCO with the award of a Nadezhda Krupskaya International Prize.

The FSLN also created neighborhood groups similar to the Cuban Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, called Sandinista Defense Committees ([Comités de Defensa Sandinista] Error: {{Lang}}: text has italic markup (help) or CDS). Especially in the early days following the overthrow of Somoza, the CDS's served as de facto units of local governance. Their obligations included the distribution of food rations, organization of neighborhood/regional cleanup and recreational activities, and policing to control looting, and the apprehension of remnants of the National Guard. Later, during the subsequent U.S./Contra/Nicaragua conflict, the CDS's also organized civilian defense efforts against Contra attacks and a network of intelligence systems in order to apprehend supporters. These activities led critics of the Sandinistas to argue that the CDS was a system of local spy networks for the government used to stifle political dissent, and it is true that the CDS did hold limited powers -- such as the ability to suspend privileges such as driver licenses and passports -- if locals refused to cooperate with the new government. After the initiation of full-scale U.S. military involvement in the Nicaraguan conflict the CDS was empowered to enforce wartime bans on political assembly and association with other political parties (i.e. -- parties associated with the "Contras").

By 1980, conflicts began to emerge between the Sandinista and non-Sandinista members of the governing junta. Violeta Chamorro and Alfonso Robelo resigned from the governing junta in 1980, and rumours began that members of the Ortega junta would consolidate power amongst themselves. These allegations spread, and rumors intensified that it was Ortega's goal to turn Nicaragua into a state modeled after Cuban Communism. In 1979 and 1980, former Somoza supporters and ex-members of the widely discredited and despised National Guard formed irregular military forces, while the original core of the FSLN began to splinter. Armed opposition to the Sandinista Government eventually divided into two main groups: The Fuerza Democratica Nicaraguense (FDN), a U.S. proxy army formed in 1981 by the CIA, U.S. State Department, and former members of the widely condemned Somoza-era Nicaraguan National Guard; and the Alianza Revolucionaria Democratica (ARDE), a group that had existed since before the FSLN and was led by Sandinista founder and former FSLN supreme commander, Eden Pastora, a.k.a. "Commander Zero". Although independent and often at conflict with each other, these guerrilla bands -- along with a few others -- all became generally known as "Contras" (short for "contrarrevolucionarios", en. "counter-revolutionaries"). Despite the common name, the two primary groups, ARDE and FDN, rarely cooperated with each other and (in no small part because of the FDN's brutal and vicious terrorist tactics and status as U.S. puppets) largely despised one another.

The opposition militias were initially organized and largely remained segregated according to regional affiliation and political backgrounds. They conducted attacks on economic, military, and civilian targets. During the Contra war, the Sandinistas arrested suspected members of the Contra militias and censored publications they accused of collaborating with the enemy (i.e. the U.S., the FDN, and ARDE, among others).

In contrast to the Cuban revolution, the Sandinista government practiced political pluralism. A broad range of new political parties emerged that had not been allowed under Somoza, ranging in political orientation from far-left to far-right. Following promulgation of a new populist constitution, Nicaragua held national elections in 1984. Independent electoral observers from around the world -- including groups from the UN as well as many observers from Western Europe and independent human rights organizations -- found that the elections had been fair. Two groups, however, disputed this: the Contra group "FDN", which was largely comprised of former Somozan-era National Guardsmen, landowners and businessmen, and their patron, the U.S. government as represented by a junta comprised of ultra-conservative elements from within the secret police agencies and espionage bureaucrats of the Reagan administration. Although initially willing to stand in the '84 elections, the FDN declined participation in the elections at the behest of President Ronald Reagan's State Department as part of a political ploy to portray the FSLN as a Marxist dictatorship. The U.S. subsequently objected to political restrictions placed on the opposition by the government (e.g. -- censorship of the press and the curtailing of free assembly), although notably these concerns were not validated by any of the UN, western European, or independent human rights organizations which sent observers.

Despite the wide selection of political parties and candidates, Daniel Ortega and Sergio Ramírez were elected president and vice-president, and the FSLN won an overwhelming 61 out of 90 seats in the new National Assembly, having taken 63% of the vote on a turnout of 74%. Despite international validation of the elections by multiple political and independent observers (virtually all from among U.S. allies), the United States refused to recognize the elections, with President Ronald Reagan denouncing the elections as a sham

Women in revolutionary Nicaragua

Main articles: Role of women in Nicaraguan Revolution and Women and the Armed Struggle in Nicaragua

The women of Nicaragua prior to, during and after the revolution played a prominent role within the nation’s society as they have commonly been recognized, throughout history and across all Latin American states, as its backbone. Nicaraguan women were therefore directly affected by all of the positive and negative events that took place during this revolutionary period. The victory of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) in 1976 brought about major changes, which in turn reduced the great burdens that the women of Nicaragua were faced with prior to the revolution.

Supporters of the Sandinistas see their era as characterized by the creation and implementation of successful social programs which were free and made widely available to the entire nation. Some of the more successful programs for women that were implemented by the Sandinistas were in the areas of Education Nicaraguan Literacy Campaign, Health, and Housing. Providing subsidies for basic foodstuffs and the introduction of mass employment were also memorable contributions of the FSLN. The Sandinistas were particularly advantageous for the women of Nicaraguan as they promoted progressive views on gender as early as 1969 claiming that the revolution would “abolish the detestable discrimination that women have suffered with regard to men and establish economic, political and cultural equality between men and women.” This was evident as the FSLN began integrating women into their ranks by 1967, unlike other left-wing guerilla groups in the region. Considering the Feminist Ideology During the Sandinista Revolution however, demonstrates that this goal was not fully reached because the roots of gender inequality were not explicitly challenged or deconstructed. Women's participation within the public sphere was also substantial, as many took part in the armed struggle as part of the FSLN or as part of counter-revolutionary forces.

Nicaraguan women also organized independently in support of the revolution and their cause. Some of those organizations were the Socialist Party (1963), Federación Democrática (which support the FSLN in rural areas), and Luisa Amanda Espinoza Association of Nicaraguan Women ([Asociacion de Mujeres Nicaraguenses Luisa Amanda Espinosa] Error: {{Lang}}: text has italic markup (help), AMNLAE). However, since Daniel Ortega, was defeated in the 1990 election by the United Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO) coalition headed by Violeta Chamorro, the situation for women in Nicaragua was seriously altered. In terms of women and the labor market, by the end of 1991 AMNLAE reported that almost 16,000 working women- 9,000 agricultural laborers, 3,000 industrial workers, and 3,800 civil servants, including 2,000 in health, 800 in education, and 1,000 in administration- had lost their jobs. The change in government also resulted in the drastic reduction or suspension of all Nicaraguan social programs, which brought back the burdens characteristic of pre-revolutionary Nicaragua. The women were forced to maintain and supplement community social services on their own without economic aid or technical and human resource.

1980 literacy campaign

Main article: Nicaraguan Literacy Campaign

Literacy Campaign Propaganda Poster

One of the major contributions to Nicaraguan society during the Sandinista rule was the 1980 Literacy Campaign, which was the most prominent event with regards to the new education system. Illiteracy was significantly reduced from 50.3% to 12.9%, which resulted in a major impact on the youth and development of the country. One of the government’s major concerns was the previous education system under the Somoza regime which did not see education as a major factor on the development of the country. As mentioned in the Historical Program of the FSLN of 1969, education was seen as a right and the pressure to stay committed to the promises made in the program was even stronger. 1980 was declared the “Year of Literacy” and the major goals of the campaign that started only 8 months after the FSLN took over. This included the eradication of illiteracy, the integration of different classes, races, gender and age, more political awareness and the strengthening of political and economic participation of the Nicaraguan people.

Sandinistas vs. Contras

Main articles: Contras and Iran-Contra affair

Upon assuming office in 1981, U.S. President Ronald Reagan condemned the FSLN for joining with Cuba in supporting Marxist revolutionary movements in other Latin American countries such as El Salvador. His administration authorized the CIA to begin financing, arming and training rebels, some of whom were the remnants of Somoza's National Guard, as anti-Sandinista guerrillas that were branded "counter-revolutionary" by leftists ([contrarrevolucionarios] Error: {{Lang}}: text has italic markup (help) in Spanish). This was shortened to Contras, a label the anti-Communist forces chose to embrace. Eden Pastora and many of the indigenous guerrilla forces, who were not associated with the "Somozistas," also resisted the Sandinistas.

The Contras operated out of camps in the neighboring countries of Honduras to the north and Costa Rica (see Eden Pastora cited below) to the south. As was typical in guerrilla warfare, they were engaged in a campaign of economic sabotage in an attempt to combat the Sandinista government and disrupted shipping by planting underwater mines in Nicaragua's Corinto harbour, an action condemned by the World Court as illegal. The U.S. also sought to place economic pressure on the Sandinistas, and the Reagan administration imposed a full trade embargo.

The armed resistance to the Sandinistas in Costa Rica initially called itself the Nicaraguan Revolutionary Democratic Alliance (ADREN) and was known as the 15th of September Legion. It later formed an alliance, called the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN), which comprised other groups including MISURASATA and the Nicaraguan Democratic Union. Together, the members of these groups were generally called Contras. The Sandinistas condemned them as terrorists, and human rights organizations expressed serious concerns over reports of Contra attacks on civilians. In 1982, under pressure from Congress, the U.S. State Department declared Contra activities terrorism. The Congressional intelligence committee confirmed reports of Contra atrocities such as rape, torture, summary executions, and indiscriminate killings.

After the U.S. Congress prohibited federal funding of the Contras in 1983, the Reagan administration continued to back the Contras by covertly selling arms to Iran and channelling the proceeds to the Contras (The Iran-Contra Affair.) When this scheme was revealed, Reagan admitted that he knew about the Iranian "arms for hostages" dealings but professed ignorance about the proceeds funding the Contras; for this, National Security Council aide Lt. Col. Oliver North took much of the blame.

Senator John Kerry's 1988 U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations report on Contra-drug links concluded that "senior U.S. policy makers were not immune to the idea that drug money was a perfect solution to the Contras' funding problems."[2] According to the National Security Archive, Oliver North had been in contact with Manuel Noriega, Panama's drug-lord.

The Reagan administration's support for the Contras continued to stir controversy well into the 1990s. In August 1996, San Jose Mercury News reporter Gary Webb published a series titled Dark Alliance, linking the origins of crack cocaine in California to the contras. Freedom of Information Act inquiries by the National Security Archive and other investigators unearthed a number of documents showing that White House officials, including Oliver North, knew about and supported using money raised via drug trafficking to fund the contras. Sen. John Kerry's report in 1988 led to the same conclusions, however, major media outlets and the Justice Department denied the allegations.

The Contra war unfolded differently in the northern and southern zones of Nicaragua. Contras based in Costa Rica operated in Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast, which is sparsely populated by indigenous groups including the Miskito, Sumo, Rama, Garifuno, and Mestizo. Unlike Spanish-speaking western Nicaragua, the Atlantic Coast is predominantly English-speaking and was largely ignored by the Somoza regime. The costeños did not participate in the uprising against Somoza and viewed Sandinismo with suspicion from the outset.

Relationship with the Catholic Church

Main article: The Catholic Church and the Nicaraguan Revolution

The Roman Catholic Church’s relationship with the Sandinistas was extremely complex. Initially, the Church was committed to supporting the Somoza regime. The Somoza dynasty was willing to secure the Church a prominent place in society as long as it did not attempt to subvert the authority of the regime. Under the constitution of 1950 the Roman Catholic Church was recognized as the official religion and church-run schools flourished. It was not until the late 1970s that the Church began to speak out against the corruption and human rights abuses that characterized the Somoza regime.

The Catholic hierarchy initially disapproved of the Sandinistas' revolutionary struggle against the Somoza dynasty. In fact, the revolutionaries were perceived as proponents of “godless communism” that posed a threat to the traditionally privileged place that the Church occupied within Nicaraguan society. Nevertheless, the increasing corruption and repression characterizing the Somoza rule and the likelihood that the Sandinistas would emerge victorious ultimately influenced Archbishop Miguel Obando y Bravo to declare formal support for the Sandinista’s armed struggle. Throughout the revolutionary struggle, the Sandinistas enjoyed the grassroots support of clergy who were influenced by the reforming zeal of Vatican II and dedicated to a “preferential option for the poor” (for comparison, see liberation theology). Numerous Christian base communities (CEBs) were created in which lower level clergy and laity took part in consciousness raising initiatives to educate the peasants about the institutionalized violence they were suffering from. Some priests took a more active role in supporting the revolutionary struggle. For example, Father Gaspar Garcia Laviana took up arms and became a member of FSLN.

Soon after the Sandinistas assumed power, the hierarchy began to oppose the Sandinistas government. The Archbishop was a vocal source of domestic opposition. The hierarchy was alleged to be motivated by fear of the emergence of the 'popular church' which challenged their centralized authority. The hierarchy also opposed social reforms implemented by the Sandinistas to aid the poor, allegedly because they saw it as a threat to their traditionally privileged position within society.

In response to this perceived opposition, the Sandinistas shut down the church run Radio Catolica radio station on multiple occasions.

The Sandinistas' relationship with the Roman Catholic Church deteriorated as the Contra War dragged on. The hierarchy refused to speak out against the counterrevolutionary activities of the contras and failed to denounce American military aid. State media accused the Catholic Church of being reactionary and supporting the Contras. According to former President Ortega, "The conflict with the church was strong, and it costs us, but I don't think it was our fault… …There were so many people being wounded every day, so many people dying, and it was hard for us to understand the position of the church hierarchy in refusing to condemn the contras." The hierarchy-state tensions were brought to the forefront with Pope John Paul II 1983 visit to Nicaragua. Hostility to the Catholic Church became so great that at one point, "…FSLN militants shouted down Pope John Paul II as he tried to say Mass."[3] Therefore, while the activities of the 'popular church' contributed to the success of the Sandinista revolution, the hierarchy’s opposition was a major factor in the downfall of the revolutionary government.

Allegations of human rights violations committed by the Sandinistas

The issue of human rights during the 1980s in Nicaragua should be treated with great care. It is impossible to deal with the issue without taking account of the circumstances and context in which events took place. It is very important to consider that a counter-revolutionary war was being fought against the government in this period (by the US-backed Contras) and that part of the government response to the situation of conflict was to enact a state of emergency, which included the derogation of certain human rights.

TIME magazine in 1983 published allegations of human rights violations in an article which stated that "According to Nicaragua's Permanent Commission on Human Rights, the regime detains several hundred people a month; about half of them are eventually released, but the rest simply disappear." TIME also interviewed a former deputy chief of Nicaraguan military counterintelligence, who stated that he had fled Nicaragua after being ordered to eliminate 800 Miskito prisoners and make it look like as if they had died in combat.

Also using the Permanent Commission on Human Rights as one of its sources, the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think thank, in a 1983 report alleged various human rights violations, including censorship, creating a neighborhood system which encouraged spying and reporting by neighbors, torture by state security forces, thousands of political prisoners, assassinations both inside and outside Nicaragua, and that a former Sandinista Intelligence officer has stated that 5,000 were killed in the early months of Sandinsta rule.

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in a 1981 report found evidence for mass executions in the period following the revolution. It stated "In the Commission’s view, while the government of Nicaragua clearly intended to respect the lives of all those defeated in the civil war. During the weeks immediately subsequent to the Revolutionary triumph, when the government was not in effective control, illegal executions took place which violated the right to life, and these acts have not been investigated and the persons responsible have not been punished." The Commission also stated that: "The Commission is of the view that the new regime did not have, and does not now have, a policy of violating the right to life of political enemies, including among the latter the former guardsmen of the Government of General Somoza, whom a large sector of the population of Nicaragua held responsible for serious human rights violations during the former regime; proof of the foregoing is the abolition of the death penalty and the high number of former guardsmen who were prisoners and brought to trial for crimes that constituted violations of human rights."

A 1983 report from the same source documented allegations of human rights violations against the Miskito indians, which were alleged to have taken place after opposition forces (the Contras) infiltrated a Miskito village in order to launch attacks against government soldiers, and as part of a subsequent forced relocation program. Allegations included arbitrary imprisonment without trial, "disapperances" of such prisoners, forced relocations, and destruction of property.

In its 1991 annual report the same source stated that "In September 1990, the Commission was informed of the discovery of common graves in Nicaragua, especially in areas where fighting had occurred. The information was provided by the Nicaraguan Pro Human Rights Association, which had received its first complaint in June 1990. By December 1991, that Association had received reports of 60 common graves and had investigated 15 of them. While most of the graves seem to be the result of summary executions by members of the Sandinista People's Army or the State Security, some contain the bodies of individuals executed by the Nicaraguan Resistance."[4]

In a 1992 annual report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights there are details of mass graves and investigations which suggest that mass executions had been carried out. One such grave contained 75 corpses of peasants who were believed to have been executed in 1984 by government security forces pretending to be members of the contras. Another grave was also found in the town of Quininowas which contianed six corpses, believed to be an entire family killed by government forces when the town was invaded. A further 72 graves were reported as being found, containing bodies of people, the majority of whom were believed to have been executed by agents of the state and some also by the contras. However, the report does not state that these executions were part of government policy.[5]

Politicization of human rights

The issue of human rights also became highly politicised at this time as human rights is claimed to be a key component of propaganda created by the Reagan administration to help legitimise its policies in the region. The Inter-Church Committee on Human Rights in Latin America (ICCHRLA) in its Newsletter stated in 1985 that: "The hostility with which the Nicaraguan government is viewed by the Reagan administration is an unfortunate development. Even more unfortunate is the expression of that hostility in the destabilization campaign developed by the US administration ... An important aspect of this campaign is misinformation and frequent allegations of serious human rights violations by the Nicaraguan authorities."

Among the accusations in the Heritage report are lengthy references to alleged policies of religious persecution. The ICCHRLA stated that: "From time to time the current U.S. administration, and private organizations sympathetic to it, have made serious and extensive allegations of religious persecution in Nicaragua. Colleague churches in the United States undertook onsite investigation of these charges in 1984. In their report, the delegation organized by the Division of Overseas Ministries of the National Council of Churches of Christ in the United States concluded that there is 'no basis for the charge of systematic religious persecution'. The delegation 'considers this issue to be a device being used to justify aggressive opposition to the present Nicaraguan government.'"

Human Rights Watch also stated in its 1989 report on Nicaragua that: "Under the Reagan administration, U.S. policy toward Nicaragua's Sandinista government was marked by constant hostility. This hostility yielded, among other things, an inordinate amount of publicity about human rights issues. Almost invariably, U.S. pronouncements on human rights exaggerated and distorted the real human rights violations of the Sandinista regime, and exculpated those of the U.S.-supported insurgents, known as the contras."

The 1987 report published by UK based NGO Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR, now known as Progressio), "Right to Survive - Human Rights in Nicaragua", also discussed in 1987 the politicisation of the human rights issue: "The Reagan administration, with scant regard for the truth, has made a concerted effort to paint as evil a picture as possible of Nicaragua, describing it as a 'totalitarian dungeon'. Supporters of the Sandinistas ... have argued that Nicaragua has a good record of human rights compared with other Central American countries and have compared Nicaragua with other countries at war." The CIIR report refers to estimates made by the NGO Americas Watch which count the number of non-battle related deaths and disappearances for which the government was responsible up to the year 1986 as "close to 300".

According to the CIIR report, Amnesty International and Americas Watch stated that there is no evidence that the use of torture was sanctioned by the Nicaraguan authorities, although prisoners reported the use of conditions of detention and interrogation techniques that could be described as psychological torture. The Red Cross made repeated requests to be given access to prisoners held in state security detention centers, but were refused. The CIIR was critical of the Permanent Commission on Human Rights, claiming that the organisation had a tendency to immediately publish accusations againt the government without first establishing a factual basis for the allegations. The CIIR report also questioned the independence of the Permanent Commission on Human Rights, pointing out that it received funds from the National Endowment for Democracy, an organization funded by the US government, and that these funds were administrated by Prodemca, a US-based organization which later published full-page adverisments in the Washington Post and New York Times supporting military aid to the Contras.

On the other hand, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights states "During its on-site observation in 1978 under the Government of General Somoza, the Permanent Commission on Human Rights in Nicaragua, (CPDH) gave the Commission notable assistance, which certainly helped it to prepare its report promptly and correctly." and in 1980 "It cannot be denied that the CPDH continues to play an important role in the protection of human rights, and that a good number of people who consider that their human rights have been ignored by the Government are constantly coming to it."[6] The IACHR also continued to meet with representatives of the Permanent Comission and report their assessments in later years such.[7][8]

The Heritage Foundation report appears to play-down human rights abuses committed by the US backed Somoza regime, stating that: "While elements of the Somoza National Guard tortured political opponents, they did not employ psychological torture." The International Commission of Jurists stated that under the Somoza regime cruel physical torture was regularly used in the interrogation of political prisoners.

"Democide"

R. J. Rummel in his book Statistics of Democide lists many sources and estimates regarding how many were killed during the Sandinista government. Rummel's own estimate, based on those sources, is the the Sandinistas were responsible for 5,000 democide deaths. More than 1/3 of Rummel's sources for his estimates on democide under the Sandinista government use the Permanent Commission on Human Rights and reports produced by the US State Department during the 1980s.

Relationship with East Block Intelligence Agencies

Pre-Revolution

According to Cambridge University historian Christopher Andrew, who undertook the task of processing the Mitrokhin Archive, Carlos Fonseca Amador, one of the original three founding members of the FSLN had been recruited by the KGB in 1959 while on a trip to Moscow. This was one part of Aleksandr Shelepin’s 'grand strategy' of using national liberation movements as a spearhead of the Soviet Union’s foreign policy in the Third World, and in 1960 the KGB organized funding and training for twelve individuals that Fonseca handpicked. These individuals were to be the core of the new Sandinista organization. In the following several years, the FSLN tried with little success to organize guerrilla warfare against the government of Luis Somoza Debayle. After several failed attempts to attack government strongholds and little initial support from the local population, the National Guard nearly annihilated the Sandinistas in a series of attacks in 1963. Disappointed with the performance of Shelepin’s new Latin American “revolutionary vanguard”, the KGB reconstituted its core of the Sandinista leadership into the ISKRA group and used them for other activities in Latin America.

According to Andrew, Mitrokhin says during the following three years the KGB handpicked several dozen Sandinistas for intelligence and sabotage operations in the United States. Andrew and Mitrokhin say that in 1966, this KGB-controlled Sandinista sabotage and intelligence group was sent to the U.S.-Mexican border. Their primary targets were southern NORAD facilities the oil pipeline running from El Paso, Texas to Costa Mesa, California. A support group, codenamed SATURN, passed as migrant farm workers to conceal themselves and smuggle in arms caches. In 1967, the reconstituted Sandinista forces suffered another major defeat during a National Guard offensive. One of the original Sandinista founders, Rigoberto Cruz Arguello, was killed in this attack.

As noted by [[UCLA historian J. Arch Getty, the source of these allegations is Mitrokhin's collection of handwritten notes, allegedly copied, transcribed, and translated from KGB archives. No other sources have been produced to verify these allegations.

Cooperation with foreign intelligence agencies during the 1980s

Other researchers have documented the contribution made from other Warsaw Pact Intelligence agencies to the fledgling Sandinista government including the East Germany secret police, the Stasi, by using recently declassified documents from Berlin as well as from former Stasi spymaster Markus Wolf who described the Stasi’s orchestration of the creation of a secret police force modeled after East Germany’s

Opposition (1990 - 2006)

In 1987, due to a stalemate with the Contras, the Esquipulas II treaty was brokered by Costa Rican President Óscar Arias Sánchez. The treaty's provisions included a call for a cease-fire, freedom of expression, and national elections. After the February 26, 1990 elections, the Sandinistas lost and peacefully passed power to the National Opposition Union, an alliance of 14 opposition parties ranging from the conservative business organization COSEP to Nicaraguan communists. UNO's candidate, Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, replaced Daniel Ortega as president of Nicaragua.

Reasons for the Sandinista loss in 1990 are disputed. Defenders of the defeated government assert that Nicaraguans voted for the opposition due to the continuing U.S. economic embargo and potential Contra threat. Opponents claim that Contra warfare had largely died down, and that the Sandinistas had grown increasingly unpopular, particularly due to forced conscription and crackdowns on political freedoms. An important reason, regardless of perspective, was that after a decade of the U.S. backed war and embargo, Nicaragua's economy and infrastructure were badly damaged and the United States promised aid only if the Sandinistas lost. The U.S. also helped keep the rightist factions united so there would not be two strong rightist candidates.

At the personal level, most Nicaraguans voted against the Sandinistas to end a bloody war, food shortages, the governments mishandling of the economy, and because they were tired of the FSLN.

After their loss, most of the Sandinista leaders held most of the private property and businesses that had been confiscated and nationalized by the FSLN government. This process became known as the piñata and was tolerated by the new Chamorro government. Ortega also claimed to "rule from below" through groups he controls such as labor unions and student groups. Prominent Sandinistas also created a number of nongovernmental organizations to promote their ideas and social goals.

Daniel Ortega remained the head of the FSLN, but his brother Humberto resigned from the party and remained at the head of the Sandinista Army, becoming a close confidante and supporter of Chamorro. The party also experienced a number of internal divisions, with prominent Sandinistas such as Ernesto Cardenal and Sergio Ramírez resigning to protest what they described as heavy-handed domination of the party by Daniel Ortega. Ramírez also founded a separate political party, the Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS); his faction came to be known as the [renovistas] Error: {{Lang}}: text has italic markup (help), who favor a more social democratic approach than the orthodoxos, or hardliners. In the 1996 Nicaraguan election, Ortega and Ramírez both campaigned unsuccessfully as presidential candidates on behalf of their respective parties, with Ortega receiving 43% of the vote while Arnoldo Alemán of the Constitutional Liberal Party received 51%. The Sandinistas won second place in the congressional elections, with 36 of 93 seats.

Daniel Ortega was re-elected as leader of the Sandinistas in 1998. Municipal elections in November 2000 saw a strong Sandinista vote, especially in urban areas, and former Tourism Minister Herty Lewites was elected mayor of Managua. This significant result led to expectations of a close race in the presidential elections scheduled for November 2001. Daniel Ortega and Enrique Bolaños of the Constitutional Liberal Party (PLC) ran neck and neck in the polls for much of the campaign, but in the end the PLC won a clear victory. At these elections, 4 November 2001, the party won 42.1% of the popular vote and 43 out of 90 seats in the national assembly. The same day, Ortega was defeated by Enrique Bolaños Geyer of the Constitutional Liberal Party, winning 42.3%.

Daniel Ortega was once again re-elected as leader of the Sandinistas in March 2002 and re-elected as president of Nicaragua in November 2006. Ortega has been roundly criticized by former supporters for not allowing a transparent election process within the FSLN.

2006, back in government

In 2006, Daniel Ortega was elected president with a clear lead of 9 points over his nearest opponent. See Nicaraguan general election, 2006. This occurred despite the fact that the Sandinista Renovation Movement continued to oppose the FSLN, running former Sandinista Herty Lewites as its candidate for president. Lewites died several months before the election, however.

The FSLN also won 38 seats in the congressional elections. Though this is a loss of 5 seats compared to the 2001 elections, the split in the Constitutionalist Liberal Party helped to allow the FSLN to become the largest party in Congress.

"Zero Hunger project"

The "Zero Hunger Program," which aims to reduce poverty in the rural areas over a five year period, was inaugurated by President Daniel Ortega and other members of his administration in the northern department of Jinotega. The program was designed to achieve the first objective of the United Nations' Millennium Development Goals, "to eradicate extreme poverty and reduce hunger to zero."

"Zero Hunger" with its budget of US$150 million plans to deliver a US$2,000 bond or voucher to 75,000 rural families between 2007 and 2012. The voucher will consist of the delivery of a pregnant cow and a pregnant sow, five chickens and a rooster, seeds, fruit- bearing plants and plants for reforestation. The project's short-term objective is to have each rural family capable of producing enough milk, meat, eggs, fruits, vegetables and cereals to cover its basic needs while its medium range objective is to establish local markets and export certain products.

The families that benefit from the project will be required to pay back 20 percent of the amount that they receive in order to create a rural fund that will guarantee the continuity of the program. NGOs and representatives from each community will be in charge of managing the project.

Symbols

US Marines with the captured flag of Augusto César Sandino in Nicaragua in 1932

The flag of the FSLN consists of an upper half in red, a lower half in black, and the letters F S L N in white.

The actual Sandinista flag is a modified version of the flag Sandino used in the 30's, during the war against the U.S. Occupation of Nicaragua. The flag consisted of two vertical stripes, equally in size, one red and the other black with a skull (like the traditional Jolly Roger flag).

The inspiration of the flag colors came from the Mexican anarchist movements that Sandino got involved with during his stay in Mexico in the early 1920s. [9]

In recent times, there has been a dispute between the FSLN and the dissident Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS) about the use of the red and black flag in public activities. Despite the fact that the MRS has it's own flag (orange with a silhouet of Sandino's hat in black), they also use the red and black flag in honor to Sandino's heritage. They state that the red and black flag is a symbol of Sandinismo as a whole, not only of the FSLN party.

Popular culture

Since the conflict with Nicaragua in the 1980s', variations of the term "Sandinista" are now sometimes used in the United States to refer to fanatical supporters of a certain cause. In the Spanish language, the suffix "-ista" is used to indicate a predilection towards the root. For example "fashionistas" for those excessively obsessed with fashion. Also, Bill and Hillary Clinton supporters, or people in the Clintons' political circle, are sometimes referred to as "Clintonistas" by their opponents. Another example would be "Somocistas", supporters of former dictator Anastasio Somoza.

In 1980, as a show of support for the movement and as a reaction to an anti-Sandinista statement by British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, punk rock group The Clash titled their triple album Sandinista!. The album also contains the song "Washington Bullets" which references the Sandinistas and other events and groups involved in Latin American history starting in 1959.

In 2007, the popular Reggaeton/Rap band Calle 13 mentioned the Sandinista movement in their song Llegale a mi guarida. The mentioned lyrics claimed: "Respeto a Nicaragua y a la lucha sandinista".("I respect Nicaragua and the sandinista struggle")

Prominent Sandinistas

• Bayardo Arce, hard-line National Directorate member in the 1980s
• Patrick Arguello, a Sandinista involved with the Dawson's Field hijackings
• Nora Astorga, Sandinista UN ambassador
• Monica Baltodano
• Gioconda Belli, novelist and poet, handled media relations for the FSLN government
• Tomás Borge, one of the FSLN's founders, leader of the Prolonged People's War tendency in the 1970s, Minister of Interior in the 1980s
• Omar Cabezas
• Ernesto Cardenal poet and Jesuit priest, Minister of Culture in the 1980s
• Fernando Cardenal, Jesuit priest and brother of Ernesto, directed the literacy campaign as Minister of Education.
• Luis Carrión, National Directorate member in the 1980s
• Rigoberto Cruz (Pablo Ubeda), early FSLN member
• Joaquín Cuadra. internal front leader, later chief of staff of the army
• Miguel D'Escoto, a Maryknoll Roman Catholic priest, served as Nicaragua's foreign minister
• Carlos Fonseca, one of the FSLN's principal founders and leading ideologist in the 1960s
• Herty Lewites, former mayor of Managua, opponent of Daniel Ortega in 2005
• Silvio Mayorga, FSLN co-founder
• Vilma Núñez
• Daniel Ortega, post-revolution junta head, then President from 1985, lost presidential elections in 1990, 1996, and 2001, but continues to control the FSLN party
• Humberto Ortega, leader of the FSLN Insurrectional Tendency (Tercerista) in the 1970s, chief strategist of the anti-Somoza urban insurrection, Minister of Defense in the 1980s during the Contra war
• Edén Pastora, "Comandante Cero," social democratic guerrilla leader who joined the Terceristas during the anti-Somoza insurrection, broke with FSLN to lead center-left ARDE contra group based in Costa Rica during the early 1980s
• Germán Pomares, "Comandante Danto," early Sandinista, killed shortly before the 1979 victory
• Sergio Ramirez, novelist and civilian Sandinista, architect of alliance with moderates in 1970s, Vice President in 1980s, opponent of Daniel Ortega in 1990s
• Henry Ruíz, "Comandante Modesto," FSLN rural guerrilla commander in the 1970s, member of the National Directorate in the 1980s
• Arlen Siu, is considered to be one of the first female martyrs of the Sandinista revolution
• Dora María Téllez
• Oscar Turcios
• Jaime Wheelock, leader of the FSLN Proletarian Tendency, Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development

See also

• Iran-Contra Affair
• Nicaragua Betrayed
• Nicaragua vs. United States
• Nicaraguan Sign Language, language that was born as a result of Sandinistas bringing deaf children together in schools for the deaf
• Carlos Mejía Godoy
• List of Films and Books about Nicaragua

References

• Andrew, Christopher; Mitrokhin, Vasili. The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World. Basic Books (2005)
• Andrew, Christopher; Mitrokhin, Vasili. The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB. Basic Books (2001)
• Arias, Pilar. [Nicaragua: Revolución. Relatos de combatientes del Frente Sandinista] Error: {{Lang}}: text has italic markup (help). Mexico: Siglo XXI Editores, 1980.
• Belli, Humberto. Breaking Faith: The Sandinista Revolution and Its Impact on Freedom and Christian Faith in Nicaragua. Crossway Books/The Puebla Institute, 1985.
• Christian, Shirley. Nicaragua, Revolution In the Family. New York: Vintage Books, 1986.
• Cox, Jack. Requiem in the Tropics: Inside Central America. UCA Books, 1987.
• Gilbert, Dennis. Sandinistas: The Party And The Revolution. Blackwell Publishers, 1988.
• Hodges, Donald C. Intellectual Foundations of the Nicaraguan Revolution. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986.
• Kinzer, Stephen. Blood of Brothers: Life and War in Nicaragua, Putnam Pub Group, ISBN 0-399-13594-4, 1991.
• Kirkpatrick, Jean. Dictatorships and Double Standards. Touchstone, 1982.
• Miranda, Roger, and William Ratliff. The Civil War in Nicaragua: Inside the Sandinistas. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1993.
• Moore, John Norton, The Secret War in Central America: Sandinista Assault on World Order. university Publications of America, 1987.
• Nolan, David. The Ideology of the Sandinistas and the Nicaraguan Revolution. Coral Gables, Fla.: University of Miami Press, 1984.
• Prevost, Gary. “Cuba and Nicaragua: A special Relationship?”. The Sandinista Legacy: The Construction of Democracy, Latin American Perspectives.17.3 (1990)
• Smith, Hazel. Nicaragua: Self-determination and Survival. Pluto Press, 1991. ISBN 0-7453-0475-3
• Sirias, Silvio. Bernardo and the Virgin: A Novel. Northwestern University Press, 2005.
• Zimmermann, Matilde. Sandinista: Carlos Fonseca and the Nicaraguan Revolution. Duke University Press, 2001.

External links

• La Voz del Sandinismo - News of the FSLN, Nicaragua and the World
• Template:Es icon www.fsln-nicaragua.com — Official Sandinista web page
• 25th Anniversary Celebration of the Sandinista Revolution at NicaNet
• Art, Truth & Politics — Harold Pinter delivers Nobel Prize in Literature lecture in which he explains the Sandinista conflict and condemns the U.S.
• Sandinista Revolution
• Template:Es iconMRS homepage
• Revista Envio - Nicaraguan magazine, "critically supportive" of the Sandinistas, with archive documenting events throughout the 80s