Anbar campaign (2003–2011)

Anbar Province
Part of the Iraq War
Marines from the 3rd Battalion 3rd Marine Regiment patrolling through the town of Haqlaniyah in Al Anbar Province, 2006.
Date March 20, 2003 – December 7, 2011 Location Al Anbar Governorate, Iraq Result Coalition victory, Al Anbar handed to Iraqi Government
Belligerents
United States Multi-National Forces West Republic of Iraq New Iraqi Army Iraqi Police Sahawa Al Anbar	Iraqi Insurgency Mujahideen Shura al-Qaeda in Iraq Ba'ath Party Loyalists 1920 Revolution Brigade File:Ansar al-sunnah.jpg Jamaat Ansar al-Sunna
Commanders and leaders
United States List Chuck Swannack James T. Conway John F. Sattler Stephen T. Johnson Richard C. Zilmer Walter Gaskin John F. Kelly Richard Tryon Terry Wolff Bernard Champoux Republic of Iraq List Abd al-Karim Barjas Raja Nawaf Farhan al-Mahalawi (KIA) Maamoon Sami Rasheed al-Alwani Qasim Abid Muhammad Hammadi al-Fahadawi Abdul Sattar Abu Risha (KIA)	Iraqi Insurgency List Al Qaeda in Iraq Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (KIA) Abu Ayyub al-Masri (KIA) Abdullah Abu Azzam al-Iraqi (KIA) Khalid Mahal (KIA) Abu Suleiman al-Naser (KIA) Abu Dua Abu Abdullah al-Rashid al-Baghdadi (KIA) Sunni Nationalists Khamis Sirhan al-Muhammad  (POW) Nasser al-Fahadawi (KIA) Mohammed Mahmoud Latif (KIA) Abdullah al-Janabi Harith al-Dhari
Strength
Multi National Force – West 37,000 (Peak in February 2008) Republic of Iraq 47,000 Army and Police (September 2008)	Iraqi Insurgency Unknown
Casualties and losses
United States 1,335 killed, 8,205+ wounded (USMC wounded only) Republic of Iraq Unknown United Kingdom 3 killed	Iraqi Insurgency 1,702+ killed, 405+ wounded, 10,578+ detained (February 2005 – February 2006)
Iraqi civilians Unknown Total Iraqis (All Sides) 6,236 killed (November 2008)

The Iraq War in Anbar Province, also known as the Al Anbar campaign, was a counterinsurgency campaign waged in the western Iraqi province of Al Anbar between the United States military and American-appointed Iraqi allies against Sunni insurgents. The campaign lasted from 2003 until 2008, although the majority of the fighting took place between April 2004 and September 2007. The Iraq War in Anbar Province initially saw heavy fighting primarily between Iraqi insurgents and United States Marines, although in the later years insurgents focused on ambushing Marines with mines, known as Improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Both commited multiple human rights violations, the majority by anti-government Iraqis but some, like the Haditha killings, perpetrated by American soldiers and Iraqi government forces. 1,335 U.S. servicemen died in Anbar Province during the Iraq War, many in and around the cities of Fallujah and Ramadi, part of an area known as the Sunni Triangle.

The province of Al Anbar, the only Sunni–dominated province in Iraq, saw little fighting in the initial 2003 invasion of Iraq. Following the fall of Baghdad it was occupied by the U.S. Army's 82nd Airborne Division. Violence began on April 28, 2003 when 17 Iraqis were killed in Fallujah by U.S. soldiers during an anti-American demonstration. In early 2004 the United States Army relinquished command of the province to the U.S. Marine Corps under coalition command Multi-National Force West. By the spring of 2004 the province was in full-scale revolt against the Americans, and savage fighting occurred in both Fallujah and Ramadi by the end of 2004, including the Second Battle of Fallujah. Violence escalated throughout 2005 and 2006 as U.S. and Iraqi forces struggled to secure the Western Euphrates River Valley. During this time, Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) became the main Sunni insurgent group in the province and turned the provincial capital of Ramadi into its stronghold. The Marine Corps issued an intelligence report in late 2006 declaring that the province had been lost to insurgents.

In the fall of 2006, several Iraqi tribes located near Ramadi and led by Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha revolted against Al Qaeda in Iraq. The tribes formed the Anbar Awakening and helped turn the tide of revolt in favor of the U.S. military. U.S. and Iraqi tribal forces regained control of Ramadi in early 2007, as well as other cities such as Hit, Haditha, Rutbah, and Al Qaim. During the summer of 2007 the U.S. turned its attention to eastern Anbar Province and secured the cities of Fallujah and Al-Karmah. The majority of the fighting was over by September 2007, although U.S. forces maintained a stability and advisory role for over two more years. Celebrating the victory, President George W. Bush flew to Anbar in September 2007 to congratulate Sheik Sattar and other leading tribal figures. Sattar was assassinated days later by AQI. In September 2008, political control of Anbar Province was transferred to Iraq. Military control was also transferred in June 2009, following the withdrawal of American combat forces from cities in Anbar Province. The Marine Corps officially withdrew all its forces and was replaced by the US Army in January 2010. The Army withdrew its combat units in Anbar by August 2010, leaving only advisory and support units. The last U.S. forces withdrew on December 7, 2011.

Background

Al Anbar province in Iraq in 2004, with its subdivisions by the US military.

Main article: Al Anbar Governorate

Al Anbar is the western-most province in Iraq. The province is the largest in Iraq (32% of the total country's landmass), nearly 53,208 square miles (137,810 km²), and is the size of North Carolina. Geographically, it is isolated from most of Iraq, but is easy to access from Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Syria. The Euphrates River, Lake Habbaniyah, and the artificially-created Lake Qadisiyah are the most significant geographical features in the province. The terrain outside of the Euphrates area is overwhelmingly desert. Temperatures ranged from highs of 115°F (46°C) during the summer to below 50°F (10°C) during the winter. The province lacks significant natural resources and many inhabitants benefited from the government's patronage system, funded by oil revenues from elsewhere in the country.

Statistics from the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) estimated the population in 2003 at 1,230,169, with more than two-thirds of the population in the cities of Fallujah and Ramadi. 95% of the population are Sunni, many from the Dulaimi Tribe, making it the only province in Iraq without a significant Shia or Kurdish population. 95% of the population lives within 5 miles (8.0 km) of the Euphrates River. Culturally, Fallujah was known as a religious enclave hostile towards outsiders, while Ramadi, the provincial capital, was thought to be more secular. Outside the cities, the ancient tribal system run by Sheikhs still held considerable influence.

Aerial photograph of the urban areas around Ramadi and the Euphrates River, where a majority of the Anbar Province people lived.

Unlike in other parts of Iraq, conditions in Anbar were extremely favorable towards an insurgency. The province was overwhelmingly Sunni, the one religious group that would lose power and influence in a post-Saddam Iraq. Fallujah contained an estimated 40,000 Ba'athist operatives, intelligence officials, and military officers. Many of them did not take part in the defense of Iraq during the invasion and may not have felt defeated. Military service was compulsory in Iraq under Saddam, and following the U.S. invasion many civilians and insurgents looted local armories and weapons stockpiles. While only a small minority of Sunnis were initially insurgents, many either supported or tolerated the insurgent movements. Sympathetic Ba'athists and former Saddam officials hiding in Syria provided money, sanctuary, and foreign fighters to the insurgent groups. Future AQI leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi spent most of summer 2002 in central Iraq, including Anbar Province, preparing the groundwork for future resistance against the United States. There were also ready sources of arms and ammunition: at least 96 known munitions sites were identified by the US Army, and the Amiriyah area contained a sizeable portion of Iraq's arms industry. Within several months of the invasion the province had become a sanctuary for anti-occupation resistance fighters.

Anbar During the Invasion (March 2003 – April 2003)

An Iraqi position near the Haditha Dam under attack by US Army Rangers in March 2003.

Main article: 2003 invasion of Iraq

During the initial invasion of Iraq, Anbar Province experienced relatively little fighting, as the main U.S. offensive was directed through the anti-Saddam Shia areas of southeastern Iraq, from Kuwait to Baghdad. An additional infantry division had been earmarked in 2002 to secure Anbar during the invasion. However, The Pentagon decided to treat the province as "an economy of force" in early 2003. The first Coalition Forces to enter Al Anbar were American and Australian special forces, who seized vital targets such as Al Asad Airbase and Haditha Dam and prevented the launch of Scud missiles at Israel. There was little combat, and the most significant engagement occurred when elements of the American 3rd Battalion 75th Ranger Regiment seized the Haditha Dam on March 31, 2003. Surrounded by a larger Iraqi force, the Rangers held the Dam for eight days until relieved. During the siege, they destroyed twenty-nine Iraqi tanks and killed an estimated 300 to 400 Iraqi soldiers. Four Rangers were awarded the Silver Star for the action. Four Rangers were killed during the fighting when their checkpoint near Haditha was attacked by a suicide bomber.

At the end of the invasion, the pro-Saddam forces in Anbar – the Ba'ath Party, the Republican Guard, the Fedayeen Saddam, and the Iraqi Intelligence Service – remained intact. Saddam Hussein himself hid in Ramadi and Hit in early April. Other pro-Saddam forces in Anbar Province were able to relocate to Syria with money and weapons, where they set up headquarters. The nucleus of the insurgency in its first few months was formed from the pro-Saddam forces in Anbar Province and Syria. In contrast to the looting throughout Baghdad and other parts of the country, Ba'athist headquarters and homes of high-ranking Sunni leaders remained relatively intact. The head of Iraqi ground forces in the province, General Mohammed Jarawi, formally surrendered to elements of the 3rd Infantry Division at Ramadi on April 15, 2003.

The Insurgency Begins (April 2003 – February 2004)

Immediate causes of the insurgency

Members of the Coalition Provisional Authority and U.S. military swear in the Interim Governorate Council of Anbar, July 2003.

Main articles: Fallujah killings of April 2003 and Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 2

Shortly after the Fall of Baghdad, the US Army turned Anbar Province over to a single regiment, the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR). With only several thousand soldiers, the 3rd ACR had little hope of effectively controlling Anbar. On the evening of April 28, 2003, Saddam Hussein's birthday, a crowd of about one hundred men, women, and children staged several anti-American protests in Fallujah outside several U.S. military outposts. The Iraqis claimed to be unarmed, while the American military said that some individuals in the crowd were carrying and firing AK-47s. The soldiers manning one of the outposts fired on the crowd, killing over a dozen Iraqis and wounding dozens more. Dubbed a "massacre" by many Iraqis and foreign journalists, the killings were the immediate catalyst for violent activity in the Fallujah area. The Americans never apologized for the killings or paid any type of compensation. In the weeks afterwards, the pro-US mayor of the town urged the Americans to leave. On May 16, 2003, the CPA issued Order Number 1 which abolished the Ba'ath Party and began a process of "de-Ba'athification", and on May 23, 2003 issued Order Number 2, which disbanded the Iraqi Army and other security services. Many Sunnis took great pride in the Iraqi Army and viewed its disbanding as an act of contempt towards the Iraqi people. The dissolution put hundreds of thousands of Anbaris out of work as many members of the Army were Sunnis.

The insurgency begins

American soldiers conducting a search near Fallujah in June 2003. At this stage of the war, many American soldiers still used unarmored Humvees. Also note the casual posture many have, especially with their weapons.

We are not fighting for Saddam. We are fighting for our country, for our honor, for Islam. We are not doing this for Saddam.

— Religious student in Fallujah

Following the disbanding of the Iraqi Army, insurgent activity increased during the summer of 2003, especially in the city of Fallujah. Initially, armed resistance groups could be divided into two major groups: Sunni nationalists who wanted to bring back the Ba'ath Party with Saddam Hussein, and otthers who did not want Saddam. The first major leader of the insurgency in Anbar was Khamis Sirhan al-Muhammad, the Ba'ath party regional chairman for the Karbala Governorate, who was originally #54 on the U.S. list of most-wanted Iraqis. According to the US military, Khamis received his funding and orders directly from Saddam Hussein, then still a fugitive. On May 26, three days after CPA Order #2, Major Matthew Schram became the first American killed in Anbar Province since the invasion when his convoy came under rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) attack near Haditha. In June, American forces conducted Operation Desert Scorpion, a mostly unsuccessful attempt to root out the burgeoning insurgency. An isolated success occurred near Rawah, where American soldiers cornered and killed up to 70 Iraqi and foreign fighters on June 12 and captured a large weapons cache. In general, though, American forces had a difficult time distinguishing between Iraqi civilians and insurgents, and the civilian casualties incurred during the sweep only increased support for the Sunni insurgency. On July 5, a bomb ripped through a graduation ceremony for the first American-trained police cadets in Ramadi, killing seven. On July 16, Mohammed Nayil Jurayfi, the pro-government mayor of Haditha, and his youngest son were assassinated. On November 2, during the insurgency's Ramadan Offensive, a military Chinook transport helicopter carrying 32 soldiers was shot down with an SA-7 missile near Fallujah. Thirteen were killed and the rest wounded.

What we have done over the last six months in Al Anbar has been a recipe for instability.

— CPA Diplomat Keith Mines, November 2003

American soldiers searching Iraqis at a vehicle checkpoint in Fallujah in July 2003.

As the violence escalated, the Americans responded with what many Iraqis called the "senseless use of firepower" and "midnight raids on innocent men". Human rights organizations also accused the Army of "over-aggressive tactics, indiscriminate shooting in residential areas and a quick reliance on lethal force," as well as using "disproportionate force." When Iraqi insurgents set off a mine, the Americans would drop bombs on houses with arms caches; when insurgents fired a mortar round at American positions, the Americans would respond with heavy artillery. American forces would conduct "hard knocks" on local residents, kicking in doors and roughing up individuals, only to discover they had the wrong man. In an incident on September 11, soldiers manning a checkpoint near Fallujah shot up both an Iraqi police truck and a nearby hospital, killing seven. Soldiers also beat and abused Iraqi detainees. There was a constant rotation of units throughout the province, which sowed confusion among the American troops: Fallujah had five different battalions rotate through the city in five months. Summing up the initial American approach to Al Anbar, the CPA diplomat in Anbar Province, Keith Mines, wrote:

"What we have done over the last six months in Al Anbar has been a recipe for instability. Through aggressive de-Ba'athification, the demobilization of the army, and the closing of factories the coalition has left tens of thousands of individuals outside the political and economic life of this country."

The Valentine's Day Massacre

American soldiers about to conduct a raid in Fallujah in January 2004.

Following the helicopter shootdown in November, Fallujah was quiet for a few months. On November 5, 2003, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced that the Marines would be returning to Iraq early the next year and would be taking over Anbar Province. As the Marines prepared to move into the province, there was a growing consensus that the 82nd Airborne had lost control, although so far the only real problem area was Fallujah. Some Marine commanders, like Major General James Mattis and Lt Col Carl Mundy, criticized the Army's tactics as "hard-nosed" and "humiliating the Sunni population", promising that the Marines would act differently. Following the capture of Saddam Hussein in December there were riots in Fallujah and Ramadi. The capture of Saddam Hussein was the worst of both worlds in Anbar Province: many Anbaris were outraged over what they saw as the degrading treatment Saddam Hussein received. This allowed the insurgency to recruit new members who had previously opposed the Americans but been relatively passive out of hatred for Saddam. As Saddam loyalists were killed or captured, leadership positions went to AQI-affiliated hardliners like Abdullah Abu Azzam al-Iraqi, who was directly responsible for murdering government officials in the region in 2004. While the Ba'ath Party would still play a major role in the insurgency in the future, the balance of power had shifted to various religious leaders who were advocating a jihad, or holy war, against American forces.

I'm discounting a very serious insurgency ongoing here [in Anbar] right now.

— Major General Chuck Swannack, March 2004

At the beginning of 2004 General Ricardo Sanchez, head of Multinational Force Iraq, said that the U.S. had "made significant progress in Anbar Province." However, CPA funds for the province were inadequate. By February, insurgent attacks were rapidly increasing in number. On February 12, United States Central Command (CENTCOM) commander General John P. Abizaid and Major General Chuck Swannack were attacked while driving through Fallujah. Two days later (February 14), in an incident dubbed the "Valentine's Day Massacre", insurgents overran a police station in downtown Fallujah, killed 23 to 25 policemen, and freed 75 prisoners. The next day, the Americans fired Fallujah's police chief for refusing to wear his uniform and arrested the mayor.

In March, Keith Mines wrote "there is not a single properly trained and equipped Iraqi security officer in the entire Al Anbar province." He added that security was entirely dependent on American soldiers, yet those same soldiers inflamed Sunni nationalists. That same month the 82nd Airborne's commanding officer gave a briefing on Anbar where he boasted about improved security, declared the insurgency there was all but finished, and concluded "the future for Al Anbar in Iraq remains very bright."

The Uprising and Fallujah (March 2004 – December 2004)

The Marines take over and the Blackwater killings

The transfer of authority ceremony at Camp Fallujah from the 82nd Airborne Division to the I Marine Expeditionary Force.

On March 24, the 82nd Airborne handed control of Anbar Province over to the I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF), also known as Multi-National Forces West. I MEF's commander, General James T. Conway, planned on gradually reestablishing control over Anbar Province using a methodical counterinsurgency program, showing respect for the population and training the Iraqi Army and Police using Military transition teams (based on the Combined Action Program used by the Marines during the Vietnam War). During the transition of authority between I MEF and the 82nd Airborne it became obvious that Anbar Province was more problematic than the Marines' previous deployment to southern Iraq.

On March 15, 3rd Battalion 7th Marines operating near Al Qaim got into a firefight with Syrian border guards. Then, on March 24, several Marines and paratroopers were wounded in Fallujah when insurgents attacked the transfer of authority ceremony. On March 31, just one week after I MEF had taken over Anbar, insurgents in Fallujah ambushed a convoy containing four American contractors from Blackwater USA, killing all of them. An angry mob then set the contractors' bodies ablaze and dragged their corpses through the streets before hanging them over a bridge crossing the Euphrates. American media compared the attack on the contractors to the 1993 Battle of Mogadishu, where images of American soldiers being dragged through the streets of Somalia persuaded the United States to withdraw its troops. That same day five soldiers were killed in nearby Habbaniyah when their M113 armored personnel carrier was hit by an mine. According to General Conway, it was the largest mine that had been used in Anbar at the time; all that was recovered were a tailgate and a boot.

First Battle of Fallujah

Al Jazeera kicked our ass.

— General James T. Conway on the First Battle of Fallujah

Marines from 1st Battalion 5th Marines during the First Battle of Fallujah.

Main article: First Battle of Fallujah

In response to the killings, the Marines were ordered to attack Fallujah by Combined Joint Task Force 7 commander Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, himself likely under direct orders from President George W. Bush or Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. General Conway and his staff initially urged caution, pointing out that I MEF already had a more nuanced long-term plan to reestablish control over Fallujah and that going in with overwhelming force would probably destabilize Fallujah even more. They also said that the insurgents in Fallujah were specifically trying to "bait us into overreaction." They were told to have a sustained Marine presence in the city within 72 hours. On April 5 the Marines began their attack, codenamed Operation Vigilant Resolve. The overall ground commander in Anbar, 1st Marine Division commander General James Mattis, initially planned to throw in his only available units, 1st Battalion 5th Marines and 2nd Battalion 1st Marines. They would push in from the east and west of Fallujah and methodically contain the insurgents. By April 9 they were pushing into the city when Sanchez ordered the attack prematurely halted. The main reason for the halt was the coverage by Arab media stations Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya. The two stations, who had exclusive coverage in Fallujah because no western media organization had access to the city, repeatedly propagated the theme that the Marines were using excessive force and collective punishment and their footage of dead babies in hospitals inflamed both Iraqi and world opinion. When the 2nd Iraqi Battalion was ordered to go to Fallujah, 30% of its soldiers refused or deserted and within days over 80% of the police and Iraqi National Guards in Anbar had also deserted. After two members of the Iraqi Governing Council resigned over the attack and five more threatened to do so, CPA Leader Paul Bremer and CENTCOM commander General John Abizaid were worried that Fallujah might bring down the Iraqi government and ordered a unilateral cease-fire.

Marines from 2nd Battalion 1st Marines passing the body of an alleged Iraqi insurgent in Fallujah.

Following the unilateral cease fire outside of Fallujah, the Marines settled into a siege mentality, holding their positions and bringing in additional units, waiting for what they assumed would be the resumption of their attack. During this time the Mattis launched Operation Ripper Sweep, pushing the 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion (LAR) and 2nd Battalion 7th Marines into the farmlands around Fallujah and neutralizing many armed gangs operating along the local highways. The 3rd Battalion 4th Marines also conducted a spoiling attack into nearby insurgent-held Karmah, which turned into another major engagement that lasted the rest of the month. The Marines were able to keep their supply lines open, but were eventually forced to withdraw from Fallujah for political reasons. President Bush had very publicly committed the United States' prestige to taking Fallujah and could not be seen to back down, but was caught in a bind because of Iraqi and world opposition to the attack. In late April, however, General Conway came up with what he said was a workable compromise: the Fallujah Brigade. Led by former Iraqi Sunni generals and made up largely of insurgents who had been fighting the Marines, the brigade was supposed to maintain order in the city while allowing the U.S. to withdraw and save face. On May 10, General Mattis formally turned the city over to the Fallujah Brigade and withdrew his battalions the following day. The First Battle for Fallujah had cost 51 U.S. servicemen killed and 476 wounded. Iraqi losses were much higher. Both the Marines and independent groups estimated that about 800 Iraqis were killed during the battle. They differed on how many were civilians: the Marines claimed that 300 of the dead were civilians, whereas the independent organization Iraq Body Count argued that twice as many, 600 civilians, were killed. Four Marines and soldiers were awarded either the Navy Cross or Distinguished Service Cross for the battle.

Expansion of fighting

If we don't hold [Ramadi], the rest of the province goes to hell in a handbasket.

— General James Mattis, July 2004

During the fighting in Fallujah there was also a major insurgent attack in Ramadi on April 6, 2004, which began when a force of 300 insurgents attacked Marine patrols throughout the city in an attempt to relieve pressure on Fallujah. In heavy street fighting over four days 16 U.S. Marines and an estimated 250 insurgents were killed. One squad from 2nd Battalion 4th Marines was virtually annihilated when it drove into an ambush in unarmored Humvees. Immediately following the Battle of Ramadi there was another insurgent attack on Husaybah on the Syrian border on April 17, 2004. As in Ramadi, insurgents attacked the Marine garrison and were repelled; five Marines and 150 insurgents were killed. Shortly before this attack, a squad led by Corporal Jason Dunham was operating near Husaybah when, while searching a group of Iraqis, one of them threw a grenade at the squad. Dunham immediately threw himself on the grenade, dying in the blast but saving his Marines. He later became the first Marine since the Vietnam War to be awarded the Medal of Honor. These attacks were part of a larger "jihad wave" that swept across Anbar Province in mid-April as gangs of armed youths took to the streets, setting up impromptu roadblocks and threatening most of the supply routes in eastern Anbar and around Baghdad. At one point General Mattis feared a general uprising by the Sunni community, similar to the 1978 Tehran protests.

The Iraqi people view Fallujah as the symbol of their steadfastness, resistance and pride.

— Sheikh Harith al-Dhari, Fall 2004

Attempting to emulate the perceived success in Fallujah, U.S. commanders in Ramadi followed the June 28 transfer of sovereignty by pulling most U.S. forces back to several camps outside of the city, and focused on securing a highway that ran through the center of the city. However, fighting continued to escalate throughout Anbar province throughout the summer and fall. On June 21 a four-man Scout Sniper team operating with 2nd Battalion 4th Marines in Ramadi was taken by surprise and executed by a group of insurgents who had infiltrated their observation post. On August 5, Anbar Provincial Governor Abd al-Karim Barjas resigned following the kidnapping of his two sons by Zarqawi. Barjas also went on television and publicly apologized for "cooperation with the infidel". He was replaced by an interim governor until January 2005. The head of the Ramadi police force was subsequently arrested for complicity with the kidnappings. That same month an Iraqi battalion commander was captured by insurgents in Fallujah and beaten to death. After his death, two Iraqi National Guard battalions near Fallujah promptly deserted, leaving all their weapons and equipment to the insurgents. Counterinsurgency expert John Nagl, serving in nearby Khaldiyah, said that his unit knew the local police chief was supporting the insurgency, "but assessed that he had to do so to stay alive." On September 6, seven Marines from 2nd Battalion 1st Marines were killed by a suicide bomber; another bomber killed 11 Iraqi police near Baghdadi on October 23, then a week later another suicide bomber killed eight Marines from the newly-arrived 1st Battalion 3rd Marines. In total, over 100 Americans were killed in Anbar from May to October 2004. Throughout the summer Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Allawi invited representatives from Ramadi and Fallujah to attempt a negotiated end to the fighting, similar to deals he had cut with Shia leader Moqtada al-Sadr. In September, with the blessings of the Americans, Allawi disbanded the discredited Fallujah Brigade and privately gave the Marines permission to begin planning an offensive to retake Fallujah. In early October he stepped up his efforts, demanding that the representatives of Fallujah hand over Zarqawi or face a renewed assault. They refused.

The insurgency and Al-Zarqawi

American hostage Nick Berg about to be executed by Al Qaeda in Iraq fighters in Fallujah.

Despite the return of sovereignty to the Iraqi Interim Government on June 28, the insurgency was still viewed as legitimate and the Iraqi government as agents of the United States. In late 2004 a CIA officer said that insurgents in Ramadi were receiving financing via Syria "to the tune of $1.2 million a month". The insurgency continued to enjoy broad-based support throughout Iraqi society, showing little of the sectarian divisions which would become pronounced following the 2006 al-Askari Mosque bombing. Shia Iraqis attacked Iraqi military units moving towards Fallujah, Shia leaders called on their supporters to donate blood to Iraqi insurgents in Fallujah, and Muqtada al-Sadr referred to the insurgents in Fallujah as "holy warriors". Some Shia men even attempted to join the fighting in Fallujah before being turned back by the U.S. military.

Starting in the early summer, the terrorist organization Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and its leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi began releasing what would become an infamous series of videos of Al Qaeda militants executing hostages, starting with American citizen Nick Berg on May 11. Many of these hostages, such as Kim Sun-il, Eugene Armstrong, Jack Hensley, and Kenneth Bigley, would be taken to Zarqawi's base in Fallujah where their execution would be videotaped. Zarqawi was also believed to be behind a series of car bombings throughout Iraq in the summer of 2004 that the military argued could be traced back to Fallujah. Following the initial attack into Fallujah, the U.S. military argued that it had uncovered enough munitions and contraband to conclude that many "bombs and car bombs detonated elsewhere in Iraq may have been manufactured in Fallujah." They also pointed out that during the siege of Fallujah there were no large car bombings in Baghdad. By contrast, in the two months following the creation of the Fallujah Brigade there were 30. Because of the prominence of the hostage videos and suicide bombings, Zarqawi became the public face of the Iraqi insurgency in 2004, even though his leadership was disputed by many Sunni nationalist commanders. By late 2004 the U.S. government's bounty on his head matched Osama bin Laden's. However, in December 2004 a senior U.S. military intelligence official described the core of the insurgency as still "the old Sunni oligarchy using religious nationalism as a motivating force."

Second Battle of Fallujah

In this series of photographs from the Second Battle of Fallujah, a Marine and Corpsman from 1st Battalion 8th Marines attempt to recover a Marine wounded by a sniper; the sniper then shoots the would-be rescuer.

Main article: Second Battle of Fallujah

On November 6, 2004, just four days after George W. Bush was reelected as president, Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Allawi authorized American forces to attack Fallujah. For the attack, 1st Marine Division commander General Richard F. Natonski had assembled an ad-hoc division of six Marine battalions, three Army battalions, three Iraqi battalions, and the British Black Watch Regiment. The insurgents, loosely led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Abdullah al-Janabi, and Zarqawi's lieutenant Hadid, had replaced their losses and now had 3,000–4,000 men in the city. They planned to hinder the Marine advance with roadblocks, berms, and mines, while also conducting attacks outside the city to tie down Marine units. The attack began the following day when Natonski had the 3rd LAR and 36th Iraqi battalions seize the city's hospital on a peninsula just west of the city. On the night of November 8 the main attack began, with the Coalition Forces attacking from the north of the city, catching the insurgents off-guard and achieving complete tactical surprise. The insurgents responded by attacking the Marines in small groups, often armed with RPGs. They fought hard, in many cases to the death. According to General Natonski, many of them had seen pictures of the Abu Ghraib scandal and were determined not to be taken alive. By November 20 Marines had reached the southern boundary of the city, but pockets of insurgents still remained. The assault battalions then each took a part of the city and crossed and recrossed their assigned areas trying to find them. Four days later Zarqawi released an audiotape condemning Sunni Muslim clerics for their lack of support, claiming "hundreds of thousands of the nation's sons are being slaughtered." The fighting slowly died down and by December 16 the U.S. had begun to reopen the city and allow the residents to return.

An M1 Abrams tank firing into a building during the Second Battle of Fallujah.

The battle was later described by the U.S. military as "the heaviest urban combat Marines have been involved in since the battle of Hue City in Vietnam." The official Marine Corps history of the war said that 78 Marines, sailors, and soldiers died and another 651 were wounded retaking Fallujah (although 394 were able to return to duty). One-third of all the dead and wounded came from a single battalion: 3rd Battalion 1st Marines. Five Marines were awarded the Navy Cross, the U.S. military's second-highest award for valor, three of them posthumously. One of them, Sergeant Rafael Peralta, was also unsuccessfully nominated for the Medal of Honor. U.S. and Iraqi officials estimated they had killed between 1,000–1,600 insurgents and detained another 1,000, out of an estimated 1,500–3,000 insurgents who they believed were in the city. Aircraft dropped 318 precision bombs, 391 rockets and missiles, and fired 93,000 machine gun or cannon rounds on the city. Artillery units fired 5,685 155mm shells on Fallujah during the battle. The Red Cross estimated that 250,000 out of 300,000 residents had either fled or been driven from the city as a result of the fighting. A Baghdad Red Cross official also unofficially estimated that up to 800 civilians were killed.

The Battle of Fallujah was not a defeat—but we cannot afford many more victories like it.

— United States Naval Institute's Proceedings, January 2005

The Second Battle of Fallujah was unique in the Anbar campaign in that it was the only time the U.S. military and the insurgents waged a division-level conventional engagement. For the rest of the Anbar campaign, the insurgents never conveniently massed before the overwhelming firepower of the US. Five years later, the official Marine Corps history claimed that the battle was not decisive, since most of the insurgent leadership and non-local insurgents had managed to flee before the battle. Summing up the U.S. view, the United States Naval Institute's official magazine Proceedings said, "The Battle of Fallujah was not a defeat—but we cannot afford many more victories like it."

The River Campaign (January 2005 – December 2005)

Parliamentary Elections

Anbaris lining up to vote in Fallujah, January 2005.

At the beginning of 2005 the Marines were faced with three main tasks: providing humanitarian assistance to the hundreds of thousands of refugees returning to Fallujah; retaking the numerous towns and cities they had abandoned along the Euphrates, after withdrawing forces for the Second Battle of Fallujah; and providing security for the January 30 Iraqi parliamentary elections. The elections, according to top US and Marine officials, were designed to help enfranchise the Iraqi government by giving its citizens a voice in it. Due to a Sunni boycott of the elections turnout was incredibly low in Anbar, with only 3,775 voters, or 2% of the eligible population, casting ballots. The elections for the provincial council, held simultaneously, were won by the Iraqi Islamic Party, which would dominate the Anbar legislature until 2009, but which persistently suffered from a perceived lack of legitimacy. During the run-up to the elections, a CH-53E helicopter crashed near Al-Rutbah on January 26, killing all thirty-one Marines and sailors, most of whom were members of 1st Battalion 3rd Marines and had survived the Second Battle of Fallujah. This remains the single deadliest incident for US troops in the Iraq War.

Battles along the Western Euphrates

A roadside bombing outside of Haditha which killed fourteen Marines from 3rd Battalion 25th Marines.

In May and June, the Marines began a series of simultaneous assaults in western Anbar in hopes of pacifying the area. On May 8, the 2nd Marine Regiment began clearing insurgent safe-havens along the western parts of the Euphrates River. The first major attack was Operation Matador, against the town of Ubaydi, which the US Central Command claimed was an insurgent staging area for attacks in more populated cities. In most cases the insurgents vanished, leaving behind booby traps and mines. At least nine Marines were killed and 40 wounded in the operation, but insurgents apparently returned to the town afterward. Also on May 8, the insurgent group Jamaat Ansar al-Sunna ambushed and killed a dozen mercenaries near Hīt, including Akihiko Saito. In August the 3rd Battalion 25th Marines conducted Operation Quick Strike, a cordon and search operation in the Haditha Triad. In two days they lost 20 Marines: six snipers were ambushed and killed by Jamaat Ansar al-Sunna on August 1, then two days later fourteen Marines were killed when their Amphibious Assault Vehicle was hit by a mine outside of Haditha. On November 5, the 2nd Marine Regiment launched Operation Steel Curtain against the border town of Husaybah. The Marines said ten Marines and 139 insurgents died in the offensive. Medical workers in Husaybah also claimed 97 civilians were killed.

The Rise and Fall of AQI (January 2006 – December 2006)

Haditha killings

Main article: Haditha killings

A picture taken at the scene of the Haditha killings shows several dead Iraqis who were allegedly executed by Marines.

In May 2006 the Marine Corps was rocked by allegations that a squad from 3rd Battalion 1st Marines "went on a rampage" the previous November, killing 24 unarmed Iraqi men, women and children in the city of Haditha. The incident occurred on November 19, 2005 following an mine attack on a convoy that killed Lance Corporal Miguel Terrazas. A squad of Marines led by Staff Sergeant Frank Wuterich had been riding in the convoy and immediately assumed control of the scene. Following the mine attack, the Marines stopped a white Opel sedan carrying five Iraqi men and shot them because they were considered a threat. After the five men were killed, the platoon commander arrived and took charge. At this point, the Marines say they received gunshots from a nearby house, and Wuterich's men were ordered "to take the house". Both Iraqi and Marine eyewitnesses later agreed that Wutterich's squad cleared the house (and several nearby ones) by throwing in grenades, then entering the houses and shooting individuals who they encountered. They differed over whether the killings had been permitted under the rules of engagement. The Marines claimed that the houses had been 'declared hostile' and that training dictated "that all individuals in a hostile house are to be shot." The Iraqis claimed the Marines had deliberately targeted civilians. In addition to the five Iraqi men killed by the sedan, nineteen other men, women, and children were killed by Wutterich's squad as they cleared the houses.

[E]xamples of many civilians being killed at a given time were [a] precedent for that. It happened all the time... [I] felt that was just the cost of doing business on that particular engagement.

— Major General Stephen T. Johnson

An internal investigation had been started by Multi-National Force – Iraq in February, one by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service which examined the actual killings and one by Major General Eldon Bargewell which examined the Marines' response to the killings. A news article which alleged a massacre had occurred was published in March. However, it was comments by anti-war Congressman (and former Marine) John P. Murtha in mid-May that made Haditha a national story. Murtha falsely claimed the number of civilians killed was much higher than reported and also said that the Marines had "killed innocent civilians in cold blood." Murtha's charges were exacerbated by news of another unlawful killing in Hamdania, near Abu Ghraib, where a squad of Marines executed an Iraqi man and then planted an AK-47 near his body, as well as the controversial internet video Hadji Girl, where a Marine was seen joking about killing members of an Iraqi family. In June the military's internal investigation was concluded. Though Bargewell found no evidence of a cover-up his report seriously criticized the Marine Corps for what he described as "inattention and negligence" as well as "an unwillingness, bordering on denial" by officers, especially senior officers, to investigate civilian deaths. On December 21, 2006, the U.S. military charged eight Marines in connection with the Haditha incident. Four of the eight, including Wuterich, were accused of unpremeditated murder. On October 3, 2007, the Article 32 hearing investigating officer recommended that charges of murder be dropped and that Wuterich be tried for negligent homicide instead. As of 2011, six defendants have had their cases dropped and one was found not guilty. Wuterich, the only one still on trial, has had his trial date postponed indefinitely. At least three officers including battalion commander Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey Chessani were officially reprimanded for failing to properly initially report and investigate the killings.

Second Battle of Ramadi

US soldiers take up positions on a street corner during a foot patrol in Ramadi, August 2006.

Main article: Battle of Ramadi (2006)

Since the fall of Fallujah in 2004, Ramadi had been the center of the insurgency in Iraq. The Islamic State of Iraq, a front group for Al-Qaida in Iraq, had declared the city to be its capital. The city of 400,000, located 110 kilometres west of Baghdad, had been under the control of the insurgency except for a few places where the Marines had set up remote outposts, that were virtually under siege. Law and order had broken down, and street battles were common. An offensive was planned in mid-2006 to take the city. Preparations for the attack had been under way for weeks. The objective of the operation was to cut off resupply and reinforcements to the insurgents in Ramadi by gaining control of the key entry points into the city. U.S. forces also planned to establish new combat outposts and patrol bases throughout the city, moving off their forward operating bases in order to engage the population and establish relationships with local leaders.

Al Anbar is going to be one of the last provinces to be stabilized.

— Lieutenant General John F. Sattler, June 2006

The attack on Ramadi started on June 18, 2006. The Marines and soldiers cleared some sections of the city and set up a base at the Ramadi Government Center and some other outposts. The operation had some initial success but the effect that the Americans wanted to achieve did not happen. Very soon the American forces were bogged down in heavy street fighting throughout the city. Insurgents launched hit and run attacks on the newly established outposts, which were sometimes assaulted by as many as 100 insurgents at a time.

By mid-November, the offensive had stalled with both sides at a stalemate. U.S. forces managed to take some parts of the city but the majority was still in insurgent hands. The fighting in Ramadi was so intense that some Marines compared it to the Battle of Stalingrad of World War Two. As a result of the offensive at least 75 U.S. troops and 750 insurgents were dead.

A report by the U.S. Marine corps described the battle in Al Anbar as a losing one with Al Qaeda and other insurgent groups on the rise and U.S. forces had no military means to stop them. The report said that not only were military operations facing a stalemate, unable to extend and sustain security beyond the perimeters of their bases, but also local governments in the province had collapsed and the weak central government had almost no presence. See Operation Murfreesboro for information.

Formation of the Anbar Awakening Council

Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha.

On August 21, 2006, insurgents killed Abu Ali Jassim, a Sunni sheik who had encouraged many of his tribesmen to join the Iraqi Police. The insurgents hid the body in a field rather than returning it for a proper burial, violating Islamic law and angering Jassim's tribesmen. Following this, 40 sheiks from 20 tribes from across Al Anbar organised a movement called the Sahwa Al Anbar (Anbar Awakening). On September 9, Sheik Sittar organised a tribal council attended by over fifty sheiks and Col. MacFarland. During this council, Sittar officially declared the Anbar Awakening underway.

Shortly after the council, the tribes began attacking al-Qaeda in Iraq insurgents in the Ramadi and the rest of Al Anbar. By December, attacks had dropped 50% in Ramadi according to the U.S. military.

Selected slide from Captain Travis Patriquin's brief "How to Win in Anbar".

Colonel MacFarland asked Captain Patriquin to prepare a brief for I MEF's staff, journalists, and the Iraqi government, all of whom remained skeptical about arming Sunni tribes who might someday fight the Shia-led government. Patriquin's brief, called "How to Win in Al Anbar", used stick figures and simple language to convey the message that recruiting tribal militias into the police force was a more effective strategy than using the US military. Tom Ricks referred to the briefing as "perhaps the most informal one given by the U.S. military in Iraq and the most important one." It later went viral on the Internet and is still used as a training aid.

The Devlin Report

A map of Al Qaeda in Iraq and Sunni insurgent strongholds in December 2006 (left) and March 2008 (right).

MNF and ISF are no longer capable of militarily defeating the insurgency in al-Anbar.

— Colonel Peter Devlin, State of the Insurgency in al-Anbar, August 2006

Even as the Awakening progressed, Anbar continued to be viewed as a lost cause. In mid-August, Colonel Peter Devlin, chief of intelligence for the Marine Corps in Iraq, had given a particularly blunt briefing on the situation in Anbar Province to General Peter Pace, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Devlin told Pace that the US could not militarily defeat Al Qaeda in Iraq in Anbar Province, since "AQI has become an integral part of the social fabric of western Iraq." He added that Al Qaeda in Iraq had "eliminated, subsumed, marginalized, or co-opted" all other Sunni insurgents, tribes, or government institutions in the province. Devlin believed that the only way to reestablish control over the province was by deploying an additional division to Anbar, coupled with billions of dollars of aid, or by creating a "sizeable and legally approved paramilitary force". He summed up by saying that all the Marines had accomplished was preventing things from being "far worse".

A month later, in early September, Colonel Devlin's report was leaked to the Washington Post. I MEF commander Major General Richard Zilmer was forced to respond to the press over accusations that Anbar was lost. Zilmer said that he agreed with the assessment, but added that he viewed his mission as only to train the Iraqi security forces, and that "the metrics change" were he to be asked to achieve a wider objective. He added that sending more Americans to Anbar would not pacify the province, and that the only path to victory was for the Sunnis to accept the Government of Iraq.

On December 6, the Iraq Study Group Report, while acknowledging the Awakening movement as having "started to take action", concluded "Sunni Arabs have not made the strategic decision to abandon violent insurgency in favor of the political process" and referred to the overall situation in Anbar as "deteriorating". That same day Captain Patriquin was killed by a roadside bomb in Ramadi, along with Major Megan McClung, the first female Marine officer to die in Iraq. On December 30, following the execution of Saddam Hussein, an unknown number of loyalists near Ramadi staged a march with Saddam pictures and waved Iraqi flags.

The Surge and Victory (January 2007 – August 2007)

The Surge and Al Majid

File:Iraq shooting down.gif

Iraqi insurgents shoot down an American CH-46E helicopter on February 7, 2007, near Al-Karmah.

On January 23, 2007, during his State of the Union Address, President Bush announced plans to deploy more than 20,000 additional soldiers and Marines to Iraq in what became known as The Surge. 4,000 of them were specifically earmarked for Anbar Province, which Bush acknowledged had both become an Al Qaeda in Iraq haven but also a center of resistance against Al Qaeda in Iraq. Instead of deploying new units, the Marine Corps chose to extend the deployments of several units already in Anbar: 1st Battalion 6th Marines, 3rd Battalion 4th Marines, and the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) The 15th MEU would later be replaced by the 13th MEU as the last surge unit.

Some of the first offensive operations outside of Ramadi had already begun in late 2006, with the construction of 8-foot high dirt berms around several Iraqi cities in western Anbar: Haditha, Haqlaniyah, and Barwanah. (The towns of Rutbah, and Anah had already been bermed several months earlier) Called Operation Al Majid‎, the berming was part of a US operation to finally clear and hold more than 30,000 square miles in western Anbar. Prior to Al Majid, a previous battalion commander had observed that his unit lacked the manpower to control both the main roads and towns of the "Haditha Triad", that the Iraqi Army was as blind as they were, and that the insurgents were killing anyone who spoke to Coalition Forces. The 2nd Battalion 3rd Marines had lost over 23 Marines in just two months trying to hold the area. In addition to the berms, and the help of a local Sunni strongman known as Colonel Faruq, the Marines in these towns also set up a series of checkpoints in key locations to regulate who was coming in and out of the cities, effectively turning the towns into police states. By early January, attacks in the Triad had dropped from 10–13 per day to one every few days.

Al Qaeda in Iraq also had its own offensives planned for 2007. In the first two months of 2007, it shot down eight helicopters throughout Iraq, two of them in Anbar. One of them was brought down by a sophisticated SA-14 or SA-16 shoulder-fired missile near Karmah on February 7 (see picture), killing five Marines and two sailors. Al Qaeda in Iraq also began a series of chlorine bombings near Ramadi and Fallujah. While the first attack was on October 21, 2006, when a car bomb carrying 12 120 mm mortar shells and two 100-pound chlorine tanks was detonated in Ramadi, the campaign began in-strength in January 2007. For five months Al Qaeda in Iraq would carry out a series of suicide bombings in Anbar using conventional vehicle-borne explosive devices mixed with chlorine gas. The attacks in general were poorly executed, burning the chemical agent rather than dispersing it.

The MRAPs

An MRAP that was hit in Al Anbar in 2007 by a 300–500 lbs mine. All crew members survived the blast.

Main article: MRAP (armored vehicle)

As the campaign in Al Anbar entered its fourth year the Marine Corps scored another major victory when it finally achieved the decisive technological breakthrough needed to beat the mines: the MRAP. The MRAP (Mine Resistant Ambush Protected) was an armored vehicle specifically designed to survive mine attacks. As early as 2004 the Marine Corps had recognized that it needed a replacement for its up-armored Humvees and contracted a small team at Force Protection Inc to design one. The MRAP they would design, the Cougar, was initially fielded in small numbers but yielded impressive results. The Marines reported in 2004 that no troops had died in more than 300 mine attacks on Cougars. In 2007, General Conway, now Commandant of the Marine Corps, estimated that the widespread use of the MRAP could reduce mine casualties in Anbar by as much as 80 percent. In April, the Deputy Commander for MNF-W said that of the 300 attacks on MRAPs in Anbar since January 2006, no Marines had been killed. General Conway now asked for an additional 3,000 MRAPs for Anbar and told the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he wanted to require every Marine traveling outside bases to ride in one. On 8 May 2007, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated that the acquisition of MRAPs was the highest priority of the Department of Defense, and earmarked US$1.1 billion for them. The Marine Corps began massive purchases of MRAPs throughout 2007 and began fielding the vehicle in large numbers that same year. Deaths from mine attacks plummeted and in June 2008, USA Today reported that roadside bomb attacks and fatalities in Iraq had dropped almost 99% partially due to MRAPs.

Endgame in Ramadi

Ramadi sheiks and policemen celebrating in Ramadi, July 2007.

Main article: Battle of Donkey Island

In January 2007, the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, on its third tour to Iraq, arrived in Ramadi and assumed responsibility from Macfarland's brigade on February 18 at a transfer ceremony at Camp Ramadi. During the ceremony, which was attended by Sheikh Sattar, MacFarland said that his brigade had lost 86 soldiers, sailors and Marines during the 8 month campaign.

At this point, Ramadi was averaging around 35 attacks a day. Following heavy fighting over an 8-week campaign by the brigade, also known as Task Force Raider, attacks in the brigade's area of operations dropped to one a day. At one point in August 2007, Ramadi had gone 80 consecutive days without a single attack and the brigade commander, Col. John Charlton, stated that "al-Qaida had been defeated in Al Anbar". However, insurgents continued to launch attacks on Ramadi. On June 30, a group of between 50 and 60 insurgents trying to enter the city were intercepted and destroyed, following a tipoff from Iraqi Police. By March 2008, Ramadi had gone 300 days without an attack.

Operation "Alljah"

Screening prospective Iraqi security forces in Fallujah during Operation Alljah, June 2007.

Main article: Operation Alljah

In the summer of 2007, the Marine Corps launched Operation Alljah, an attempt to secure Fallujah, Karma, Zaidon, and the Thar Thar regions of eastern Anbar. These fell under the umbrella of Operation Phantom Thunder, an overall offensive throughout Iraq with multiple U.S. and Iraqi divisions engaged on multiple fronts in an attempt to clear the areas surrounding Baghdad. In late 2006 the 1st Battalion 25th Marines had turned Fallujah over to the Iraqi Army and Police, who preferred to stay in defensive checkpoints and not patrol the city. Colonel Richard Simcock, whose 6th Marine Regiment would retake the city, later admitted that the US had pulled out too soon. In June he launched the 2nd Battalion 6th Marines into the city, dividing it up into ten precincts and swarming each one with Marines and Iraqi Police in a duplication of 1st Battalion 6th Marines' operations in Ramadi.

A US Military chart of Iraqi insurgent attacks in Anbar Province from October 2006 to August 2007.

In May General Gaskin began planning to retake the city of Karmah, which sat astride a main supply route between Fallujah and Baghdad. Karmah had become an important insurgent stronghold due its proximity both Baghdad and Fallujah. Unlike other cities, Karmah had no definable perimeter to hold, making it easy for outsiders to access. In addition, as insurgents were pushed out of Baghdad by other offensives they found it easy to flee to Karmah. First Gaskin sent one of his aides to Jordan to meet with Sheik Mishan, head of the Karmah's Jumayli tribe, the largest in the area. Sheik Mishan had fled to Jordan in 2005 after receiving threats from Al Qaeda in Iraq. Gaskin's aide was able to persuade the sheik to return in June and was partnered up with 2nd Battalion 5th Marines. By October kinetic activity dropped to almost nothing.

Also in May the 13th MEU had moved into Thar Thar, a 2,500 square kilometer area that was Al Qaeda's last refuge in Anbar, with the goal of cutting off insurgent travel between Anbar and Salahuddin Provinces into Baghdad and uncovering insurgent weapons caches. Resistance was light, and the insurgents more often than not fled. They had however lain over 400 mines to slow the Marines down. In one single operation, Marines found 18 tons of homemade explosives and 48,000 pounds of ammonium nitrate fertilizer. In addition, they uncovered several mass graves left behind by Al Qaeda in Iraq with over 100 victims. By August Thar Thar had been cleared. Alljah was one of the last significant offensive of the US military in Anbar province. By late October the US military was regularly going weeks without casualties.

Transitioning to Iraqi Control (September 2007 – September 2008)

President Bush Declares Victory

President George W. Bush at Al Asad Airbase declaring victory in Anbar Province, September 2007.

When you stand on the ground here in Anbar...you can see what the future of Iraq can look like.

— President George W. Bush, September 3, 2007

On September 3, 2007, President George W. Bush flew to Al Asad Airbase in western Anbar to help showcase what he referred to as one of the main success stories of the US' new military strategy. While there he met with top U.S. and Iraqi leadership and held a "war council". Frederick Kagan referred to the visit as "the Gettysburg of this war" and observed that Bush thought Anbar was "safe enough for the war cabinet of the United States of America to meet there with the senior leadership of the government of Iraq to discuss strategy."

A week after Bush's visit, General David Petraeus gave his Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq. He specifically singled out Anbar Province as a major improvement, referring to the tribal uprisings there as "the most significant development of the past 8 months". He also mentioned the dramatic improvements in security, showing how enemy attacks in Anbar had decreased from a high of 1,350 in October 2006 to about 200 in August 2007. Ambassador Ryan Crocker also referred to Anbar in his Congressional testimony. He was careful to credit the victory to Al Qaeda in Iraq "overplay[ing] its hand" and that the tribal uprising was directed primarily against the "excesses" of Al Qaeda. He also referred to the Iraqis as having "21,000 Anbaris on police roles", a delicately chosen phrase since many of them were undoubtedly tribal militia.

Drawdown and Handover

Iraqi Soldiers in Anbar, February 2008.

Starting in 2008, US forces began the process of turning political and military control of Anbar back over to the Iraqis. On February 14, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines withdrew outside the city limits of Hīt, turning it over to Iraqi security forces. Two days later on February 16 American and Iraqi forces conducted a joint-heliborne operation in Anbar that was used to show off the Iraqi security forces. More significantly, in late March both Iraqi Army divisions in Anbar, the 1st Division and 7th Division, were pulled out and sent south to participate in the Battle of Basra. Their participation helped win the battle for the government forces and showcased the major improvements to the Iraqi Army since 2004.

On April 19, the leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, Ayyub al-Masri, called for a month-long offensive against U.S. and Iraqi forces. In Anbar that offensive may have begun four days earlier on April 15, when 18 people (including five Iraqi police) were killed in two suicide bombings near Ramadi. On April 22 a suicide bomber attempted to drive his vehicle into an entry-control point in Ramadi manned by over 50 Marines and Iraqi police. Two Marines on guard engaged the driver who detonated his bomb early, killing the guards and wounding 26 Iraqis. Both Marines were posthumously awarded the Navy Cross. On May 2, a group of insurgents infiltrated across the Syrian border near Al Qaim, rounded up 11 policemen, and beheaded them. That same day, four Marines were killed in a roadside blast in Lahib, a farming village just east of Karmah. Two weeks later, on May 16, a suicide car bomber attacked a Fallujah police station, killing four and wounding nine.

Maj. General John F. Kelly and Governor Maamoon Sami Rasheed al-Alwani sign provincial Iraqi control documents on Sep. 1, 2008.

In June 2008, it was announced that Anbar would be the tenth province to transfer to Provincial Iraqi Control, the first Sunni Arab region to be handed back. This handover was delayed due to bad weather, as well as a suicide bombing in Karmah at a meeting between Sunni Sheikhs and U.S. Marines which killed at least 23, including three Marines on June 26. In July, US President candidate Barack Obama visited Ramadi and met with Governor Rasheed, Sheik Abu Rish, as well as 30 other sheiks and other senior U.S. and Iraqi military personnel. In the meeting Obama promised them that "The United States will not abandon Iraq". On August 26 Iraqi leaders signed the Command and Control Memorandum of Understanding in a ceremony at the Anbar Governance Center in the Al Anbar Province, a step towards taking full control and responsibility for security from Coalition forces. Less than a week later, on September 1, Iraqi security forces assumed responsibility for security of Al Anbar Province, becoming the 11th of Iraq’s 18 provinces to come under provincial Iraqi control.

Aftermath (October 2008 – December 2011)

When you leave Ramadi, or Anbar all together, what will your legacy be? It's total destruction. People will say you just came in, destroyed, and left.

— Iraqi Professor at Al-Anbar University, February 2009

The last major US military action in Anbar Province occurred on October 26, 2008, when a group of US Special Forces conducted a raid into Syria to kill Abu Ghadiya, the leader of a network of foreign fighters who were traveling through Syria to join the Iraqi insurgency. Anbar Province continued to play a large role in the Iraqi insurgency. That same month Al Qaeda in Iraq announced the formation of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), an umbrella group led by Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, a cleric from Anbar. After both Abu Omar and Al-Masri were killed in Tikrit in April 2010, leadership of the ISI briefly passed to Abu Suleiman al-Naser, who in turn was killed in Hīt the following year by Iraqi soldiers. By October 2011, the US believed the leader of AQI/ISI was Abu Dua al-Badri, the former Emir of Rawa who was married to a woman from Fallujah.

Marines turning over an outpost in northern Karmah over to Iraqi Security Forces in April 2009.

In late 2008 U.S. forces began accelerating their move out of cities across Iraq, turning over the task of maintaining security to the Iraqi Army, police, and their paramilitary allies. In November and December 2008 the Marines pulled out of both Fallujah and Haditha Dam, handing both over to the government of Iraq. On July 19, 2009 Lance Corporal Brandon Lara from 3rd Battalion 4th Marines became the last American service member killed in Anbar. In early August, a unit of Marines operating in Anbar located and recovered the body of Navy Captain Scott Speicher, who had been missing in action since the 1991 Gulf War. In late September 2009 the last two Marine Regiments in Anbar cased their colors and left, ending the presence of American combat units. Experts and many Iraqis worried that in the absence of U.S. soldiers, Al Qaeda in Iraq might resurface and attempt mass-casualty attacks to destabilize the country. There was indeed a spike in the number of suicide attacks, and through mid and late 2009, al-Qaeda in Iraq rebounded in strength and appeared to be launching a concerted effort to cripple the Iraqi government.

Following the US withdrawal from Iraqi cities on June 30 there were a number of car bombings in Ramadi, Haditha and Al Qaim. Throughout the fall there were additional attacks, mainly assassinations, around Fallujah and Abu Ghraib. In October twin bombings killed 26 people and wounded 65 at a reconciliation meeting in Ramadi. In December 2009 a coordinated double suicide bombing outside Ramadi's government compound killed 25 people and severely wounded Governor Qassim Fahdawi, who lost an arm. During the last months of 2011 there was additional violence: in September 2011 a bus carrying Shia pilgrims from neighboring Karbala Governorate was stopped by gunmen outside of Ramadi; 22 Shia were executed, prompting threats from Karbala to annex parts of southern Anbar, including the city of Nukhayb. In November, the provincial council in Anbar announced that it was considering whether to form a semi-autonomous region with other Sunni provinces in the Sunni areas of Iraq. As the Americans withdrew, many Iraqis and Americans questioned both the ability of the Iraqi security forces in Anbar, especially the police, to protect the province. Others expressed skepticism over whether or not Iran would dominate Iraq or whether the Iraqi government would be able to provide security for Anbar.

Anbar was where instability began in Iraq. It was where stability returned. And it is where instability could start again.

— Iraqi Journalist in Fallujah, December 2011

In late 2009 and early 2010 came a series of reorganizations among the United States military in Anbar. The last non-American foreign forces left Iraq on July 31, 2009 and Multi-National Forces West became United States Force West. On January 23, 2010 the Marines formally left both Anbar Province and Iraq, transferring American military commitments over to the United States Army's 1st Armored Division. The Army promptly merged United States Division West with United States Division-Baghdad, creating United States Division-Center to advise Iraqi forces in both Anbar and Baghdad. In December 2010, the 25th Infantry Division assumed responsibility for Anbar Province from the 1st Armored Division. On December 7, the United States transferred its last base in Anbar, Al Asad, to the Government of Iraq. One week later, hundreds of Fallujah residents celebrated the pullout by burning American flags in the city.

Human Rights abuses

[Y]ou would get civilian casualties. I mean, whether it’s a result of our action or other action, you know, discovering 20 bodies, throats slit, 20 bodies, you know, beheaded, 20 bodies here, 20 bodies there.

— Colonel Thomas Cariker

Main article: Human rights in post-invasion Iraq

Both sides committed human rights abuses in Anbar Province and civilians were often caught between the two sides. During Operation Steel Curtain, insurgents forced their way into peoples' houses and held them hostage while engaging in gun battles with American forces, who often destroyed the homes. One Sunni Iraqi family described how in 2006 they fled the sectarian violence in Baghdad to Hīt. During their yearlong stay in Hīt, they watched Al Qaeda in Iraq fighters kidnap a man for talking back to them; they later dumped the man's body on his doorstep. The family also watched an American patrol hit a mine in front of their house, and worried that the Americans would conduct reprisal killings on the family.

United States and Republic of Iraq

A building in Fallujah destroyed by air strike during the Second Battle of Fallujah.

For the United States, abuses were typically either a disproportionate use of firepower (Fallujah 2003) or individuals or small units committing extrajudicial killings (Haditha 2005). Many accusations of human rights violations against the United States were connected with the First and Second Battles of Fallujah. Following the assault, the United States military admitted it had employed white phosphorus artillery rounds, the use of which is not permitted in civilian areas. Several Marines, all of them from the hard-hit 3rd Battalion 1st Marines, were later charged (but not convicted) with executing Iraqi prisoners. Some British advisers also complained that the Marines had little regard for civilian casualties and had used munitions containing uranium that were causing major birth defects for years after the battle. American forces also killed civilians through aerial bombing. On May 19 2004, 42 Iraqis were killed near Al Qaim when U.S. planes mistakenly bombed a wedding party. Six months later 59 civilians were killed when the U.S. bombed Fallujah's Central Health Center. Some accusations, such as that Marines had bombed a mosque in Fallujah in April 2004, killing 40, were later proven to be exaggerated or false. Other violations involved detainee abuse. In late November former Iraqi general Abed Hamed Mowhoush died at a detention facility near Al Qaim after U.S. Army interrogators stuffed him inside a sleeping bag and beat him to death. In 2005, several members of the 82nd Airborne described how in 2003 they beat and abused prisoners at Camp Mercury, a forward operating base near Fallujah. Iraqi security forces also committed abuses. In 2007, a Marine commander near Thar Thar uncovered several instances of Iraqi soldiers raping civilians and Iraqi police torturing prisoners.

Iraqi insurgents

The various insurgent groups regularly executed and tortured suspected Iraqi collaborators and Westerners whom they captured, as well as Iraqis who they considered insufficiently religious. One Iraqi Christian told Human Rights Watch how he was stopped by insurgents in Anbar and ordered to convert to Islam or they would kill him. Another Iraqi Shia related how insurgents from other Arab countries, referred to by the US military as foreign fighters, had expelled many Kurds and Shia from cities like Fallujah and executed others. After the Second Battle of Fallujah, American forces uncovered Al Qaeda torture and execution chambers, which had been used on Iraqis suspected of working with the United States, other Westerners or the Government of Iraq. Some of the chambers still contained victims. Others, like Nicholas Berg and Kim Sun-il, had been video-taped by their executioners. Some Fallujah residents also complained that during the battle Al Qaeda had shot anyone trying to leave. In nearby Haditha, after the Marines were withdrawn to go fight in Fallujah, insurgents rounded up dozens of local police officers and publicly executed them in a soccer stadium. When the Marines were withdrawn a second time later in 2004 there were similar massacres of local police. An Iraqi woman from Ramadi said Al Qaeda enforced strict Islamic laws on the city, banning women from driving or walking alone by themselves. Women, pretending to be seamstresses, were drafted to reconnoiter houses and report on the presence of Iraqi policemen in hiding. They also murdered countless Iraqis: doctors, mullahs, college graduates, even women and children; anyone they thought might be connected to the Americans, no matter how remotely. In 2007, American Marines found several mass graves near Lake Tharthar with over 100 victims.

In popular culture

The Iraq War in Anbar Province is referred to in the Dropkick Murphys song "Last Letter Home", which references a series of letters written by Marine Sergeant Andrew K. Farrar Jr. who died in Anbar on January 28, 2005. Part of the movie The Men Who Stare at Goats is set in Al Anbar, and includes an incident when two rival groups of American contractors engage in a gunfight against each other in Ramadi. Another movie, Battle for Haditha, is set in the city of the same name and tries to see the Iraq War through the viewpoint of US Marines, Iraqi insurgents, and Iraqi civilians while exploring the Haditha killings. In 2008, a Marine near Haditha was filmed throwing a puppy off a cliff in a viral video that was circulated around YouTube and the Internet and resulted in the Marine being discharged from the military. In 2009 Konami announced plans to release a tactical shooter computer game Six Days in Fallujah, based on the Second Battle of Fallujah from the perspective of a squad from 3rd Battalion 1st Marines.

See also

• List of decorated Americans from the Iraq War in Anbar Province
• Diyala campaign
• Ninawa campaign

Notes

Bibliography

• Devlin, Peter. "State of the Insurgency in al-Anbar" (PDF). United States Marine Corps. Retrieved 2 December 2011.
• Estes, Kenneth (2011). "U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2004–2005: Into the Fray" (PDF). History Division, United States Marine Corps: 200. Retrieved 2011-11-18. {{cite journal}}: Cite has empty unknown parameters: |coauthors= and |month= (help)
• Michaels, Jim (2010). A Chance in Hell: The Men Who Triumphed Over Iraq's Deadliest City and Turned the Tide of War. St. Martin's Press. p. 272. ISBN 978-0312587468.
• McWilliams, Chief Warrant Officer-4 Timothy S. (2009). Al-Anbar Awakening: U.S. Marines and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004–2009 (PDF). Vol. Volume 1: American Perspectives (1st ed.). Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press. p. 307. {{cite book}}: |volume= has extra text (help); Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link)
• McWilliams, Chief Warrant Officer-4 Timothy S. (2009). Al-Anbar Awakening: U.S. Marines and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004–2009 (PDF). Vol. Volume 2: Iraqi Perspectives (1st ed.). Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press. p. 320. {{cite book}}: |volume= has extra text (help); Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link)
• Patriquin, Travis (2006). "How to Win the War in Al Anbar by CPT Trav" (PDF). Ramadi, Iraq: United States Army. Retrieved 2 December 2011.
• Ricks, Thomas (2006). Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq. Penguin. ISBN 0-14-303891-5.
• Ricks, Thomas (February 10, 2009). The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006–2008. Penguin Press. ISBN 1-59420-197-8.
• Schlosser, Dr. Nicholas J. (2010). U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2004–2008: Anthology and Annotated Bibliography. US Marine Corps. p. 295.
• Smith, Niel (2008). "Anbar Awakens: The Tipping Point" (PDF). Military Review. 72 (2): 622. doi:10.1353/jmh.2008.0120. Retrieved 2010-01-29. {{cite journal}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help); Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
• West, Bing (2005). No True Glory: A Frontline Account of the Battle for Fallujah. New York, NY: Bantam Books. p. 380. ISBN 978-0-553-80402-7.
• West, Bing (2008). The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics, and the Endgame in Iraq. New York, NY: Random House. p. 417. ISBN 978-1-4000-6701-5.

External links

• Bill Roggio, The Anbar Campaign, The Long War Journal
• The Beautiful People – Iraq – "Moto" (Motivational) Video made by Marines in Anbar (Warning: Graphic).
• Combat Diary: The Marines of Lima Company at IMDb – Follows 3rd Battalion 25th Marines in Western Anbar in 2005.
• Producer: Michael Kirk (2007-06-19). "Endgame". Frontline. PBS. {{cite episode}}: Unknown parameter |serieslink= ignored (|series-link= suggested) (help)
• Producer: Tom Roberts (2006-02-21). "The Insurgency". Frontline. PBS. {{cite episode}}: Unknown parameter |serieslink= ignored (|series-link= suggested) (help)
• Producer: Arun Rath (2008-02-19). "Rules of Engagement". Frontline. PBS. {{cite episode}}: Unknown parameter |serieslink= ignored (|series-link= suggested) (help)