Winter War
 | This article may require copy editing for grammar, style, cohesion, tone, or spelling. (July 2009) |
| Winter War | |||||||||
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| Part of World War II | |||||||||
 Finnish machine gun crew during the Winter War. | |||||||||
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| Belligerents | |||||||||
 Finland |
 Soviet Union | ||||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||||
| Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim |
Kliment Voroshilov Kirill Meretskov Semyon Timoshenko | ||||||||
| Strength | |||||||||
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337,000–346,500 men[Notes 1][1][2] 32 tanks[Notes 2][1] 114 aircraft[Notes 3][3] |
1,000,000 men 6,541 tanks[4] 3,880 aircraft[5][6] | ||||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||||
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25,904 dead or missing [Notes 4][7] 43,557 wounded[8] 1,000 captured[Notes 5][9] 957 civilians in air raids[7] |
87,506+ dead 188,671 wounded & contused 39,369 captured and missing 58,370 sick 17,867 frostbites[10] [unreliable source?] 2,268+ tanks[11] (Soviet estimate) | ||||||||
The Winter War (Finnish: talvisota, [Зимняя война] Error: {{Lang-xx}}: text has italic markup (help)[12], Swedish: vinterkriget) began when the Soviet Union attacked Finland on 30 November 1939, three months after the invasion of Poland by Germany (and later USSR) and the start of World War II. Because the attack was judged as illegal, the Soviet Union was expelled from the League of Nations on 14 December.[13] Russian historians prefer the name Soviet–Finnish War (Russian: Советско-финская война).
The Soviet forces had four times as many soldiers as the Finns, 30 times as many aircraft and 218 times as many tanks.[5] However, the Red Army had recently been subjected to a drastic purge in 1937 that crippled it, reducing its morale and efficiency shortly before the outbreak of hostilities.[14] With up to 50% of army officers executed/in custody, including the vast majority of those of the highest rank, the Red Army in 1939 had many inexperienced senior officers.[15] Due to a combination of these factors, and an extremely high commitment and morale in the Finnish forces, the Finns were able to resist the invasion of their country with great success and for far longer than the Soviets had expected.
Finland held out until March 1940, when it signed the Moscow Peace Treaty, ceding about 9% of its pre-war territory and 20% of its industrial capacity to the Soviet Union. Soviet losses on the front were large, and the country's international standing also suffered. Moreover, the fighting ability of the Red Army was questioned, a factor that may have contributed to Adolf Hitler's decision to launch Operation Barbarossa. Finally, the Soviet forces did not accomplish their primary objective of the conquest of Finland but gained sufficient territory along Lake Ladoga to provide a buffer for Leningrad. The Finns retained their sovereignty and gained considerable international goodwill.
The 12 March peace treaty thwarted a half-hearted Franco-British plan to send troops to Finland through northern Scandinavia (the Allied campaign in Norway). One of the Allied operation's major goals was to take control of northern Sweden's iron ore and cut deliveries to Germany.
Background of the Finnish politics before the War
| Chronology: 1917–1932[16] |
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First steps of the Republic
Finland had long been the eastern part of the Swedish kingdom when Imperial Russia conquered it in 1809 during the Napoleonic Wars, converting it to an autonomous buffer state in the Russian Empire to protect Saint Petersburg, the imperial capital. Finland enjoyed wide autonomy and its own Senate until the turn of the century, when Russia began attempts to assimilate Finland as a part of a larger policy to strengthen central government and unify the Empire by Russification. The attempts ruined relations and increased the support of Finnish movements vying for self-determination.[17]
The outbreak of The First World War gave Finnish a window of opportunity. They sought aid from both Germany and the Bolsheviks. On 6 December 1917 the Senate of Finland announced declaration of independence. The government of new Soviet Russia was weak and soon the Civil War would break out. Bolshevik leader Vladimir Lenin could spare no troops or little attention for Finland. Soviet Russia recognized the new Finnish government just three weeks after the declaration. In 1918 the Finns fought a short Civil War, where the Red Guards was armed by some 40,000 Russian soldiers stationed in Finland.[17]
After the First World War, an inter-governmental organization the League of Nations was founded. The League's goals included preventing war through collective security, settling disputes between countries through negotiation and diplomacy.
Finnish–Swedish co-operation
After the 1917 Finnish independence and the Civil War, the Scandanavian countries would have been candidates for a political alliance. Unfortunately, during the Civil war Sweden occupied the Åland Islands, and the dispute was resolved by the League of Nations in 1921. Other reasons for the reserved relations was the question of Finnish Jäger troops, who received their military training in Germany. Nevertheless, Finnish–Swedish relations improved consistently before the Winter War.[18]
In 1920, Finland joined the League of Nations. Finland sought security guarantees from the League, but Finns did not have high expectations. In the mid-1920s Finns established particular planning committee, the so called Committee of Erich. It consisted of top politicians and military persons, and the Committee defined possible military collaborations of Finland. The prime goal was co-operation with the Scandinavian countries.[18]
Military co-operation between Finland and Sweden was wide, but in practice it was more focused on the exchange of military information and a defence planning for the Åland islands, than military exercises or materiel. The Government of Sweden was aware of a military co-operation, but it carefully avoided commiting itself to Finnish foreign policy.[18]
Finnish–German relations
Germans trained the Finnish Jäger troops during World War I. The troops played a key role during the Finnish Civil War. Also Germans sent their own troops at the end of the Finnish Civil War. These operations created close ties to Germany. Still, Scandinavian relations were closer and the main goal of the Finnish foreign policy.[18]
After the National Socialist rose to power, relations with Germany diluted – Finns admired the Imperial Germany, not the radical Nazi Germany. In time, Finnish consevatives did not accept the state violence and church policy of the Nazis. Still, there was sympathy for Nazi Germany, although the offical Finnish policy was reserved. Finnish nazis and ultranationalist parties such as Patriotic People's Movement had only a minor support in multiple elections, especially after the Mäntsälä rebellion in 1932.[18][19]
Secret militarial co-operation with Estonia
Finnish–Estonian relations had its peak in a diplomatic level after the Estonian Freedom War in 1920s. The diplomatic relations lowered later, but the military relations remained high. In Finnish point of view, the close relations with Estonia did not exclude the the Scandinavian neutrality policy. Nevertheless, the military relations were top secret, and countries held joint military exercises. Estonia sought public security guarantees and signed the Baltic Entente in 1934 with Latvia and Lithuania.[18]
Relations with the Great Britain and France
After the collapse of Imperial Germany in November 1919, Finns sought new political partners. Great Britain had been a significant trading partner from the 18th century and Finns warmed the relations for the next two decades. In the 1930s Finaland purchased Thornycroft boats from Great Britain, but did not buy bombers from Germany because of protests from Great Britain. Finland also bought modern Bristol Blenheim planes from Great Britain which later served successfully during the Winter War.[18]
Relations with France had an important role after World War I and in the 1920s. France had a leading role in the arrangement of a new European security. In the 1930s France started to fear new Nazi Germany and began to approach the Soviet Union, which strained Finnish–France relations. However, during the Winter War France was one of the most important suppliers of military materiel.[18]
Soviet Union and the Treaty of Tartu
The relationship between the Soviet Russia and Finland had been tense— the two periods of forced Russification at the turn of the century and the legacy of the failed Soviet-backed socialist rebellion in Finland. Also group of Finnish nationalists made expeditions – the Viena expedition in 1918 and the Aunus expedition of 1919 – Russian East Karelia.
On 14 October 1920 Finland and Soviet Russia signed Treaty of Tartu. It confirmed that the Finnish-Soviet border would follow the old border between the autonomous Grand Duchy of Finland and Imperial Russia. Additionally Finland received Petsamo, with its ice-free harbour on the Arctic Ocean. In 1923 countries signed the Border Peace Agreement, which controlled border incidents. These agreements normalized the border. Still Finns felt the Soviet Union as a military threat.[18]
The Soviet Union started collectivization in Ingria from 1928. During the collectivization and the ethnic cleansing Soviets captured, killed and deported ingrian peasants. The event was widely criticized by the Finnish media in 1930. Two years after the event, the Lapua Movement attempted to unsuccessfully overthrow the Finnish government in the Mäntsälä rebellion.[18]
Nevertheless during the 1930s the relationship between Finns and Soviets had occasionally better moments. From the 1920s, the Soviet Union had offered different non-aggression pacts with Finland but they were all rejected. Now the pact was offered as a net of pacts around western border countries of the Soviet Union. In 1932 the Soviet Union signed a non-aggression pact with Finland. The agreement was re-affirmed in 1934 for ten years.[18]
The Soviet Union joined the League of Nations in 1934, and accepted also other "progressive forces" beside Communist parties. Partly the changed attitude of the Soviet Union, and partly the internal politics in Finland, enabled that countries had a short thaw in 1937.[18]
Finnish defence plans
The Finnish Defence Forces, as any army, had defence plans against any intruders. The General staff's military operation plan against Soviet Russia was named as Venäjän keskitys (VK) in 1920s. In the latest 1934 plan, the Finns saw two possible scenarios. In the VK1 scenario, Soviets levy in all its Western Front, and it had a limited army against Finland. The Finns would make manouvers cross the border. Other, the VK2 scenario was much unfavourable. The main defense line would be in the Karelian Isthmus. The Finns would repell Soviet attacks in favouvarble positions, and destroy the enemy by counterattacks. In the Winter War, VK2 scenario was flexible and its basis were right, but the Finnish General staff badly underestimated a count of the Red Army.[20]
Finland had a small defence budget during its independence and especially in 1930s. The Finnish Defence Forces was lack of military materiel almost in all branches. Also, materiel was old-fashioned, and later during the Winter War, even unsuitable for the field. During the Winter War materiel situation became better, but still it was never near of the modern and well-equipped Red Army.[1]
Soviet Union demands and preparations for the War
| Chronology: August 1939 – November 1939[16] |
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First demands in 1938
In April 1938 the Soviet Union was no longer satisfied with the status quo of its relations with Finland. A junior diplomatic official named Boris Yartsev contacted the Finnish foreign minister Rudolf Holsti and prime minister Aimo Cajander. According to Yartsev, the Soviets did not trust Germany, as war was considered possible between the two countries and Germany might have used Finland as a base for operations against the Soviet Union. The Red Army would not wait passively behind the borderline but would rather "advance to meet the enemy". If Finland were to fight against Germany, then the Soviet Union would offer all possible economic and military assistance. The Soviets would also accept the fortification of Åland islands. The Soviet Union needed "positive guarantees".[18][21]
The Finns assured Yartsev that Finland was committed to a policy of neutrality, and the country would resist any armed incursion. Yartsev was not satisfied with the reply, given Finland's military weakness. He suggested that Finland would cede, or lease, some islands in the Gulf of Finland along the seaward approaches to Leningrad. Finland turned down the offer.[18][21] Earlier in the mid-1930s the Leningrad party leader Andrei Zhdanov and the leader of the embassy of the Soviet Union in Helsinki Eric Assmus presented a similar proposal.[18]
Negotiations continued during Autumn 1938. The Soviets had reduced their demands; the Red Army operation was not an option anymore and the focus was securing the Gulf of Finland. The Soviets wanted keys to the Gulf blockade, the military concept by Finns and Estonians. Furthermore Yartsev suggested that Finns could fortify the Suursaari island, but the Soviet would take care of its defence. By the winter of 1939 the Soviets further reduced their demands and sent Boris Stein to negotiate. The Finnish foreign minister Eljas Erkko met him five times. Erkko declined offers and replied, the Soviet demands would mean the end of the Finnish neutrality policy and displease the Germans. The chairman of the Finnish Defense Council C.G.E. Mannerheim was informed of the negotations. In his opinion the Finns should give up the Suursaari islands because they would not be able to defend them anyway during a war. Mannerheim's arguments did not persuade the majority of the Finnish government.[18]
The Finns had many reasons to turn down Soviet offers. Finland had started a military co-operation negotiations with Sweden, and Finns had great hopes for the Finnish–Swedish joint-defense for the Ålands islands. The Finnish government did not want to jeopardize these negotiations. Also the collectivization, purges, trials and death penalties in the Stalin's Soviet Union had a bad reputation. Furthermore, the Finnish Communist elite in the Soviet Union was executed during the Great Purge. The Soviet Union did not seem to be the most reliable contracting party.[18]
The Soviet Union itself had violated the Treaty of Tartu in 1937, by blockading Finnish merchant ships navigating between Lake Ladoga and the Gulf of Finland.
Soviet–German alliance and Soviet–demands in 1939
The Soviet Union and Germany signed Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact in Moscow on August 23, 1939, by the Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov and the German foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop. Nominally, the pact was a non-aggression treaty, but it included a secret protocol in which the independent countries of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania were divided into spheres of interest of the parties. Finland was under the Soviet interest.[18]
After the Pact, the Scandinavian countries and Finland were relieved. Germans and Soviets were allied, and there is no German-threat against the Soviet Union. But shortly afterwards Germany invaded Poland in September and Great Britain and France declared war against Germany. Next, the Soviets invaded eastern Poland, and later Moscow requested that the Baltic countries allow them to establish military bases and to station troops on their soil. The government of Estonia accepted the ultimatum, signing the corresponding agreement in September. Latvia and Lithuania followed in October.[18]
On October 5 the Soviet Union called Finland to negotiate in Moscow. The Finnish government did not hasten time, as the Estonian government did earlier. Unlike the Baltic countries, the Finns started a gradual mobilization under the name "additional refresher training". The Finnish government did not send the foreign minister, but its ambassador in Stockholm J.K. Paasikivi to negotiate in Moscow. The action was made on purpose to limit the jurisdiction of the Finnish negotiator. In the Soviet side, Paasikivi met Vyacheslav Molotov and Joseph Stalin in Moscow.[18]
The Soviet Union demanded the frontier between Russian and Finland in the Karelian Isthmus region be moved westward to a point only 30 kilometers east of Viipuri, the line between Koivisto and Lipola. Also the Finns should destroy all existing fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus. Finland should cede to the Soviet Union the island of Suursaari, Tytärsaari, and Koivisto in the Gulf of Finland. From the north the Soviets demanded Kalastajansaarento peninsula. Furthermore, the Finns should lease the Hanko Peninsula for the thirty years, and permit the Soviets to establish a military base. To same extent the Soviet Union would cede Repola and Porajärvi from the Eastern Karelia; areas twice the side the Soviets demanded.[18][22]
The Soviet offer shared the Finnish government. The foreign minister Eljas Erkko and the defence minister Juho Niukkanen rejected the offer, and they were backed up by the president Kyösti Kallio. J.K. Paasikivi and C.G.E. Mannerheim supported the Soviet offer. Also beside Paasivi the later appointed negotiator Väinö Tanner supported a policy of conciliation. The Finns relied on the military assistance from Sweden, and Eljas Erkko took part of the Stockholm assembly of Scandinavian leaders between October 18 and October 19. Erkko met the Swedish foreign minister Rickard Sandler in private, and Sandler assured that he will persuade the majority of Swedish government to assist Finland during the possible war. Later Sandler failed the task and resigned.[18]
On October 30 in the assembly of the Supreme Soviet, Molotov announced Soviet-demands in public. The Finns made two counteroffers – the first in 23 October and the second on 3 November. In both offers Finland would cede the Terijoki area to the Soviet Union, which was far less than Soviet-demands. The Finnish delegation returned home on 13 November, taking for granted the negotations will continue in the future.[18]
Soviets start military and political attack
The Soviet Union had started an intensive rearmament near Finnish border in 1938–1939. Necessary assault troops deployments and commandments had been initiated not until October 1939, though military operation plans on September aimed the attack on November. Stalin was sure that the Finns will change their opinion under the Soviet demands and cede its territories.[23] The Soviet General Staff under Boris Shaposhnikov and Alexander Vasilevsky planned for an offensive.
On 26 November, the Soviets staged the shelling of Mainila, an incident in which Soviet artillery shelled areas near the Russian village of Mainila, then announced that a Finnish artillery attack had killed Soviet troops.[24] The Soviet Union demanded that the Finns apologize for the incident and move their forces 20–25 kilometres from the border. The Finns denied any responsibility for the attack and rejected the demands, which the Soviet Union then used as an excuse to withdraw from the non-aggression pact.
On 30 November, Soviet forces invaded Finland with 27 divisions, totalling 630,000 men, bombed civilian boroughs of Helsinki and quickly reached the Mannerheim Line. Legally, the Soviet attack without declaration of war violated three different non-aggression pacts; Treaty of Tartu signed 1920, the Non-aggression Pact between Finland and the Soviet Union signed 1932 and again 1934, and further the Charter of the League of Nations signed 1934.[18] C.G.E. Mannerheim became Commander-in-Chief of the Finnish army after the Soviet attack. Furthermore the Finnish government changed as Risto Ryti was appointed as new prime minister and Väinö Tanner as foreign minister.[25]
On 1 December, the Soviet Union installed a new government for Finland, the Finnish Democratic Republic. It was a puppet regime headed by O. W. Kuusinen. The goverment was also called "The Terijoki Government", since the village of Terijoki was a first place "liberated" by the Red Army. The puppet regime was unsuccesful, and it was quietly buried during winter 1940. From the begin of the regime, the working-class Finns standed beside the legal government.[26] The national unity againt the Soviet invasion was later called the spirit of the Winter War.
Soviets advance to Mannerheim Line
| Chronology: December 1939[16] |
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-XXX- Finnish Corps Boundary
Soviets order of battle
In the begin of the war, Stalin was not worred about the result. After all, the Red Army had just finished inundating the east of Poland, at a cost of less than a thousand casualties. He was backed up by Andrei Zhdanov and Kliment Voroshilov. However, there were some doubts among strategists. The chief of staff of the Red Army Boris Shaposhnikov advocated a serious buildup, extensive logistical and fire support preparations, and a rational order of battle, deploying the army's best units. Zhdanov's military commander Kirill Meretskov reported at the start of the hostilities: "The terrain of coming operations is split by lakes, rivers, swamps, and is almost entirely covered by forests... The proper use of our forces will be difficult". However, these doubts did not shown in his troop deployments. Meretskov announced publicly that the Finnish war campaign requires two weeks at the most.[28]
The Soviet military generals had been impressed by the success of the German's blitzkrieg tactics. They did not pay regard to fact that the blitzkrieg was tailored to central European conditions: a familiar landscape with network of modern roads. Armies fighting on mainland Europe had clearly regocnized centers of supply and communications, which are excellent targets for armored vehicles. Finnish army centers were deep inside the country and the terrain has only few roads but lots of forest. Also Red Army did not appreciate the tactical coordination between the components arms, network of communications, and instill its frontline commanders individual iniative. Instead battlefield decisions had to be seconded by a political commissar.[28]
The Soviet forces were positioned as follows:[28]
- Seventh Army was located on the Karelian Isthmus; comprising twelve to fourteen divisions. The objective was city of Viipuri. Later, the force was divided into the Seventh and Thirteenth armies.
- Eight Army was located on north of Lake Ladoga; comprising six rifle divisions and two tank bridgades. Its mission was to circling around Lake Ladoga and striking to the Mannerheim Line from the rear.
- Ninth Army was located on middle of Finland; comprising five rifle divisions. The mission was to thrust westwards and to cut Finland in half.
- Fourteenth Army was based in Murmansk; comprising three mediocore divisions. The objective was to capture artic port of Petsamo and later advanced to the town of Rovaniemi.
Finnish order of battle
The Finnish strategy dictated in geography. The frontier with the Soviet Union was a thousand kilometers long, and it was mostly impenetrable except along a handful of unpaved roads. In prewar calculations, the Finnish General staff estimated seven Soviet divisions on the Isthmus and no more than five along the whole border north of Lake Ladoga. It that case the ratio for an attacker would been three-to-one. But the main problem would be a long period of time if attacks keep continue, but there was always hope for outside help. In reality, the situation was much worse. For example the Soviets deployed twelve divisions north of Lake Ladoga, as the Finns had planned defense against only five divisions.[28]
Even bigger problems then men was materiel. Foreign shipments of antitank and anticraft were arriving in small quantities. The ammunitition situation was alarming, as stockpiles had cartidges, shells and fuel only 19–60 days. The Finnish tank forces were operationally nonexistent. The ammunition shortage seldon allowed Finns the heavy counterbattery or saturation fire. The Finns established wartime headquarters in the town of Mikkeli.[28]
The Finnish forces were positioned as follows:[28]
- Army of the Karelian Isthmus had six divisions under Hugo Österman. On the right flank, was located Second Corps. On the left flank, was located Third Corps.
- Fourth Corps was located on north of Lake Ladoga; comprising two divisions under Woldemar Hägglund.
- North Finland Group was a collection of Civic Guards, border guards, and activated reservist units under W. E. Tuompo.
First battles
In the Karelian isthmus front, the Finns were entrenched mainly to the Mannerheim Line. There was a buffer zone 20–60 kilometers deep between the frontier and the Mannerheim Line. The Finns had employed about 21,000 men, whose mission was to delay and cause damage for the Red Army. As Soviets reached the combat range, the biggest case of the confusion among Finnish soldier was Soviet tanks. The Finns did not have enough anti-tank materiel, and training against modern tanks. The Soviet armored tactics was very simple straight-ahead charge, which later proved its weakness, as Finns learned to handle the tank problem. Finns learned that close-range tank could be dealt with many ways – logs and crowbars to bogie wheels often immobilized a tank. Soon, Finns manufactured a better weapon, the Molotov Coctail. It containted a bottle blend of gasoline, kerosene, tar and chloride with a ampoule of sulfuric acid taped to the bottle's neck. Molotov cocktails were eventually mass-produced by the Finnish Alko corporation at its Rajamäki distillery, bundled with matches to light them. Eighty Soviet tanks were destroyed in the border-zone fighting.[29]
By 6 December all the Finnish covering troop had withdrawn into the Mannerheim Line. The Soviets begin the first major blown against the Line in Taipale – area between the ashore of Lake Ladoga, the Taipale river and the Suvanto waterway. Along the Suvanto sector the Finns had a slight advantage of elevation and a dry ground to dig in. Also, the Finnish artillery had ranged and fire planned the area in advanced. The battle of Taipale began by the Soviet heavy artillery preparation. After a forty-hour artilley fire, the Red infantry attacked, but it suffered heavy casulties in a open ground. From 6 December to 12 December the Red Army tried to engage using only one division. Next, the Red Army strenghted its artillery, and brought tanks and another division, the 10th Division, to the Taipale front. On 14 December, stronger Soviet troops launched a new attack, but again the Red Army was pushed back. A third Soviet division entered the fight, but it performed poorly and panicked under shell fire. The attacks continued without success and caused heavy losses. For example one typical Soviet attack during the battle lasted just a hour, but left 1,000 dead and twenty-seven tanks strewn on the ice.[29]
North of the Lake Ladoga, in the Ladoga Karelia front, the Finns relied on the nature of the geography. Ladoga Karelia did not have road networks for the modern Red Army, and a large forest wilderness. Instead the Soviet Eight Army had extended a new railroad line to the border, and it could doubled supply capability on the front. The Soviet 139th Division, supported 56th Division, attacked against road net at Tolvajärvi.[25]
In the central and northern Finland, roads were few and terrain hostile. The Finns did not expected large-scale Soviet attacks. Instead Soviets sent eight divisions, heavily supported by armor and artillery. In Lieksa, the Soviets attacked by 155th Division. And further north in Kuhmo, the attacker was 44th Division. The town of Suomussalmi was in the middle of Finland, and the Finnish side offered a fair road directly to the city of Oulu. The Soviets deployed 163rd Division and give it the mission to cut Finland in half marching via Raate Road. In the Finnish Lapland, in Salla, the Soviets attacked by 88th and 122nd Divisions. In the artic port of Petsamo, 104th Division attacked by sea and land, supported naval gunfire.[25]
During the Winter War the Finnish foreign minister Tanner placed the Soviet invasion before the League of Nations. The League of Nations expelled the Soviet Union on 14 December 1939.[26]
Finns repel all Soviet attacks
| Chronology: December 1939 – January 1940[16] |
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Mannerheim Line
From the north to Lake Ladoga the Finns used guerilla tactics on a massive scale. The Red Army was superior by men and materiel, but the Finns used advantages of speed, daring and economy of force. However the terrain on the Karelian Isthmus did not give exercise guerilla tactics, so Finns used a fortified line with its flanks protected by large bodies of water, later named Mannerheim Line. The Soviet propaganda claimed that it was as strong as or even stronger than the Maginot Line. The Finnish historians have belittled the line's strength, insisting that it was mostly just conventional trenches and log-covered dugouts; The real strength of the line was stubborn deferenders with a lot of sisu – the Finnish idiom roughly translated as guts.[30]
The Soviet troops stopped against the Mannerheim Line. They had a poor morale, shortage of supplies and officers worked overtime as troops refused to participate more suicidal frontal attacks. The Finns decided to launch a counterattack and encircle three Soviet divisions into a pocket, a motti, near Viipuri on 23 December. The plan of General Harald Öhquist was bold, but it failed. The Finns lost 1,300 men, and later the Soviets were estimated a same number.[31]
Battles of Tolvajärvi, Raate road and Suomussalmi
Mottis and materiel
 | This section needs additional citations for verification. (March 2008) |
The Finnish troops turned out to be fierce adversaries employing small-unit surrounding "motti" tactics, fast-moving ski troops in white camouflage suits, and local knowledge. Many were familiar with life in the forest; the vast majority of Finns were rural dwellers until the 1950s. The conditions of the winter of 1939–40 were harsh; temperatures of −40 °C (−40 °F) were not unusual, and the Finns were able to use this to their advantage. Often, they opted not to engage the enemy in conventional warfare, instead targeting field kitchens (which were crucial for survival in the cold weather) and picking off Soviet troops huddled around camp fires.
At the beginning of the war, only those Finnish soldiers who were in active service at the time had uniforms and weapons. The rest had to make do with their own clothing, which was their normal winter clothing in many instances, with a semblance of an insignia added. These mismatched "uniforms" were nicknamed "Model Cajander" after the Prime Minister Aimo Cajander. The Finns alleviated their shortages by making extensive use of equipment, weapons and ammunition captured from the enemy. The army had not changed the calibre of its weapons after independence and was able to use Soviet ammunition. The deployment of poorly trained and badly led Soviet troops gave the advantage to the Finns, allowing the latter ample opportunities to capture war booty. Though the Finns had few anti-tank weapons, the "Molotov Cocktail" an improvised petrol bomb adapted from the Spanish Civil War, was used with great success in destroying or disabling around 2,000 Soviet tanks. One Finnish soldier is quoted as saying: "I never knew a tank could burn for so long."
The Soviets attacked in regimental strength, with their dark uniforms easily visible against the white snow, so they were easily targeted by the Finns' snipers and machine guns. Corporal Simo Häyhä was credited with 505 confirmed kills (542 unconfirmed), making him the deadliest sniper in military history. When the Red Army tried to use their own snipers, the Finns countered with the "Kylmä-Kalle" (Cold Kalle) tactic. A mannequin or other doll was dressed as a tempting target, such as an officer sloppily covering himself. Soviet snipers were usually unable to resist such a target. Once the Finns determined the angle from which the shot had come, a heavy-calibre anti-tank rifle, such as a "Norsupyssy" ("Elephant Gun") or Boys anti-tank rifle, was fired at the Soviet sniper to kill him.
Soviet inexperience, naivety, and lack of motivation were important factors in the Finnish success during the war. The attackers were not expecting much resistance; General Kirill Meretskov estimated it would take only 10 to 12 days for his 26 well-equipped 14,000-man divisions to reach Helsinki. Soviet soldiers had even been warned not to cross the border into Sweden by mistake.[32] Their propaganda had been so convincing, that it was felt that the Finns would wave flags and welcome the Red Army with open arms.
Because of Stalin's purges, the commanders of the Red Army had suffered significant peacetime losses, including 3 of its 5 marshals, 220 of its 264 division-level commanders or higher, and 36,761 officers of all ranks;[33] fewer than half of the officers remained in total.[34] These were commonly replaced by people less competent but considered more "loyal" to their superiors, since Stalin had superseded his commanders with commissars or political officers. Tactics which were already obsolete by World War I were sometimes employed.[citation needed] Tactics were strictly "by the book", because failed initiative carried a high risk of execution. Many Soviet troops were lost because commanders refused to retreat; commissars did not allow them to do so and often executed commanders who disobeyed.
The Soviet army was poorly prepared for winter warfare,[citation needed] particularly in forests,[citation needed] and made heavy use of vulnerable motorized vehicles. These vehicles were kept running continuously, so that their engines would not freeze, which led to increased breakdowns and aggravated fuel shortages. Although the Red Army had modern medium tanks, it persisted at the outset in deploying older, more lightly-armoured models such as the T-26, which the Finns were able to defeat with .55-caliber (14mm) and 20mm anti-tank rifles, or the ubiquitous Molotov Cocktail.
One of the most remarkable losses in military history, the so-called "Battle of Raate-Road", occurred during the month-long Battle of Suomussalmi. The Soviet 163rd and 44th Infantry Divisions, comprising 25,000 troops, were almost completely destroyed by a Finnish ambush as they marched along the forest road. A small unit blocked the Soviet advance, while Finnish Colonel Hjalmar Siilasvuo and his 9th Division of 3,600 troops cut off the retreat route, split the enemy force into smaller fragments, and then destroyed the remnants as they retreated.[35] The Soviets suffered nearly 18,000 casualties, while the Finnish lost only 250 men. In addition, the Finnish troops captured 85 tanks, 437 trucks, 1,620 horses, 92 artillery pieces, 78 anti-tank guns, 20 tractors, 13 anti-aircraft guns, over 6,000 rifles, one airplane, and much-needed ammunition and medical supplies. Col. Siilasvuo was later promoted to General in recognition of his leadership.[36]
The Soviet commander, Vinogradov, and two of his chief officers survived the battle. When they reached the Soviet lines four days later, they were court martialled, found guilty and sentenced to death; the executions were carried out immediately. The charge was losing 55 field kitchens to the enemy.
Following this battle, on 7 January, for the disastrous failures, Kliment Voroshilov was replaced with Semyon Timoshenko as the commander of the Soviet forces in the war (and four months later as the People Commissar [Minister] of Defense as well).
The Soviets failed to take advantage of their numerical superiority at the start of the war. Finland massed 130,000 men and 500 guns in the Karelian Isthmus, the main theater of the war; the Soviets attacked with only 200,000 men and 900 guns. Their 1,000 tanks were ineffectively used and took massive losses.[dubious – discuss]
The vast bulk of the Red Army's troops that fought in the Winter War were taken from the southern regions of the Soviet Union. It was Stalin's opinion that Soviet troops from the area immediately bordering Finland could not be trusted to fight against the Finns.[citation needed] These southern Red Army soldiers had no experience with Arctic winter conditions and virtually no forest survival skills. Not only were they up against the Finns who were experts in winter warfare and knew the land, but the weather during the war was one of the three worst winters in Finland in the 20th century.[37]
Politics during the War
To the surprise of both the Soviets and the Finnish conservatives, the majority of the Finnish socialists did not support the Soviet invasion, but fought alongside their compatriots against the common enemy. Many Finnish communists had moved to the Soviet Union in the 1930s to "build Socialism", only to end up victims of Stalin's Great Purges, which led to widespread disillusionment and even open hatred of the Soviet regime among socialists in Finland.
Another factor was the advancement of Finnish society and laws after the civil war that helped decrease the gap between different classes of society. This healing of the wounds and rifts of the Finnish Civil War (1918) and from Finland's language strife and the coming together of different factions of society is still referred to as "the Spirit of the Winter War". The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact between the Soviet Union and Germany had shaken the world views of both the bourgeois as well as the working class Finns. Many Finns had believed that Germany would eventually intervene against the Soviet Union as Imperial Germany had in 1918. In similar fashion the ordinary workers had believed that the Soviet Union was a guarantee for peace and force against Nazi Germany. After the signing, Germany was in league with the Soviet Union against Finland. The workers had witnessed the Soviet Union invading Poland instead of fighting the Nazis. On the eve of war there was very little trust for any foreign power—be it socialist, German, the League of Nations or the western powers. Nonetheless, some communists were not allowed to fight in Finland's conscripted army because of their political background.
Breakthrough of Mannerheim Line
| Chronology: February 1940 – March 1940[16] |
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By the end of the winter, it became clear that the Finnish forces were becoming exhausted, and German representatives, not knowing that the negotiations were already ongoing, suggested that Finland should negotiate with the USSR. Soviet casualties had been high, and the situation was a source of political embarrassment for the Soviet regime. With the spring thaw approaching, the Soviet forces risked becoming bogged down in the forests, and a draft of peace terms was presented to Finland on 12 February. Both the Germans and the Swedes were keen to see an end to the Winter War; the latter feared the collapse of its neighbor. As Finland's Cabinet hesitated in face of the harsh Soviet conditions, Sweden's King Gustaf V made a public statement, in which he confirmed having declined Finnish pleas for support from Swedish troops.
By the end of February, the Finns had depleted their ammunition supplies. Also, the Soviet Union had finally succeeded in breaking through the Mannerheim Line. On 29 February, the Finnish government agreed to start negotiations. By 5 March, the Soviet army had advanced 10–15 kilometres past the Mannerheim Line and had entered the suburbs of Viipuri. The Finns proposed an armistice on the same day, but the Soviets wanted to keep the pressure on and declined the offer the next day. Indeed, the fighting continued up to noon (Leningrad time), 13 March, half a day after the peace treaty was signed, according to the terms of the protocol.
After the war, the situation of the Finnish army at Karelian Isthmus at the end of the war had created significant discussion. The orders were already given to prepare a retreat to the next line of defence in the Taipale sector. The estimates of how long the enemy could have been held in these kinds of retreat-and-stand operations varied from a few days[38] to a couple of months,[39] most averaging around a few weeks.[40]
It is speculated that Stalin had practically wiped out his intelligence apparatus during the purges, thus damaging the effectiveness of spies in Finland and other countries, as well as cowing operatives into writing the kind of reports they thought Stalin wanted to read. Thus he was not aware of the real situation in Finland and amongst the Western Allies.[41][42]
Soviet intelligence sources were informing their leadership of the Allied plans to intervene in the war, but not of the details or the actual unpreparedness of the Allies. Therefore, the Soviets felt forced to seek a premature end to the war before the Allies intervened and declared war on the Soviet Union.
During four months of fighting, the Soviet Army suffered huge losses. One Red Army General remarked that "we have won enough ground to bury our dead". Casualty estimates vary widely — from 48,000 killed, died from wounds, and missing in action, as quoted by Soviet officials immediately after the war, to 391,800 according to some recent research.[43] According to Nikita Khrushchev, 1.5 million men were sent to Finland and one million of them were killed, while 1,000 aircraft, 2,300 tanks and armored cars and an enormous amount of other war materials were lost.[44][45] The most reliable current estimate puts the figure at 126,875.[10] Finland's losses were limited to 26,662 men.[46]
Aerial activity
At the start of hostilities, the Finnish Air Force had 146 aircraft of all types at its disposal. The primary fighter aircraft were 15 Bristol Bulldog IVs, which had entered service in 1935, and 41 of the more modern Fokker D.XXI. There were also 18 license-built Bristol Blenheim bombers. In 1939, an order had been placed in Italy for 25 Fiat G.50 fighters; two were being assembled in Sweden when the war broke out.
During the war, a number of aircraft were ordered from abroad:
- 30 Gloster Gladiator II biplane fighters from the United Kingdom
- 12 Bristol Blenheim IV bombers from the United Kingdom
- 30 Morane-Saulnier M.S.406 fighters from France
- 44 Brewster 239 fighters from the United States
- 22 Gloster Gauntlet trainers from the United Kingdom
- 10 Fiat G.50 fighters from Italy
In air combat, Finland used the "finger four" formation (four planes split into two pairs, one flying low and the other high, with each plane fighting independently of the others, yet supporting its wingman in combat), which was superior to the Soviet tactic of three fighters flying in a delta formation. This formation and the credo of Finnish pilots to always attack, no matter the odds, contributed to the failure of Soviet bombers to inflict substantial damage against Finnish positions and population centres.[citation needed]
Naval activity
|
The Winter War was also a naval war that went on until the Baltic Sea froze, as it usually does in winter, and made the movement of warships very difficult. On the water, it was a mostly one-sided affair. Although Stalin had purged all but one of the navy's admirals and over three thousand sailors,[33] the Soviet Navy had the advantage in both the quantity of the leftovers from the Tsarist era as well as quality from a building program in the 1930s that had produced everything up to large cruisers. The Finnish Navy was weak in comparison. The most powerful units left from the Finnish civil war were two gunboats from 1917–18. In the inter-war years, a small number of new ships had been ordered. In the early 1930s, five submarines had joined the navy, as well as two well-armed but slow coastal defence ships with 254 mm guns as their main battery.
In addition to its navy, Finland had its coastal artillery batteries guarding important harbours and naval bases along its coast. Most batteries were leftovers from the Russian period, the 15.2 cm gun being the most numerous, but Finland had modernized its old guns and installed a number of new batteries, the largest a 305 mm gun battery originally intended to block the Gulf of Finland to Soviet ships with the help of batteries on the Estonian side.
Soviet warships attacked Finnish coastal batteries as long as the weather allowed. Sending light ships against even old coastal batteries had historically proved very dangerous; with nothing but a sunk destroyer and a number of damaged ships the Soviet Navy did not manage to influence the war.
The Coastal artillery had its greatest effect upon the land war. Batteries near the front were in well-protected fixed positions, with a higher rate of fire and greater accuracy than mobile artillery. Land batteries near the coast helped steady the defence of the Karelian Isthmus in conjunction with army artillery.
In March, as the Soviets had broken through the front, all reserves were thrown into the fighting near Viborg. The Soviets tried to cross the ice of the Gulf of Viipuri and come up behind the city, but the Finnish coastal artillery fired their heaviest guns, breaking the ice under the Soviets and preventing a clean breakthrough.
Foreign support
World opinion at large supported the Finnish cause. The World War had not yet begun in earnest and was known to the public as the Phony War; at that time, the Winter War was the only real fighting in Europe besides the German and Soviet invasion of Poland, and thus held major world interest. The Soviet aggression was generally deemed unjustified. Various foreign organizations sent material aid, such as medical supplies. Finnish immigrants in the United States and Canada returned home, and many volunteers (one of them future actor Christopher Lee) traveled to Finland to join Finland's forces: 1,010 Danes (including Christian Frederik von Schalburg, a captain in Christian X of Denmark's bodyguard and later commander of the Free Corps Denmark (Frikorps Danmark), a volunteer unit created by Nazi Germany in Denmark during WWII), 8,700 Swedes, about 1000 Estonians , 725 Norwegians, 372 Ingrians, 346 Finnish expatriates, 366 Hungarians[47] and 210 volunteers of other nationalities made it to Finland before the war was over. Foreign correspondents in Helsinki wrote, and even greatly exaggerated, reports of Finnish ingenuity and successes in combat.
Franco–British plans for intervention
(Borders as of 1920–1940.)
Within a month, the Soviet leadership began to consider abandoning the operation, and on 29 January 1940, via intermediaries in Sweden, Finland's government was approached on the subject of preliminary peace negotiations. Until this point, Finland had fought for its existence as an independent and democratic country. However, at the news that Finland might be forced to cede its territory or sovereignty, public opinion in France and Britain, already favorable to Finland, swung in favor of intervention. When rumors of an armistice reached governments in Paris and London, both decided to offer military support.
In February 1940, the Allies offered to help: the Allied plan, approved on 4–5 February by the Allied High Command, consisted of 100,000 British and 35,000 French troops that were to disembark at the Norwegian port of Narvik and support Finland via Sweden while securing supply routes along the way. Plans were made to launch the operation on 20 March under the condition that the Finns first make a formal request for assistance (this was done to avoid German charges that the Franco-British forces constituted an invading army). On 2 March, transit rights were officially requested from the governments of Norway and Sweden. It was hoped that Allied intervention would eventually bring the two still neutral Nordic countries, Norway and Sweden, to the Allied side by strengthening their positions against Germany — although Hitler had by December declared to the Swedish government that Western troops on Swedish soil would immediately provoke a German invasion.
When France and Britain realized that Finland was considering a peace treaty, they gave a new offer of 50,000 troops, if Finland asked for help before 12 March. Through Soviet agents in the French and British governments, indications of Franco-British plans reached Stalin, and may have contributed heavily to his decision to increase military pressure on the Finnish Army, while at the same time offering to negotiate an armistice. Because of the Soviet Union's vast numbers of troops and reserves, it has been argued that without massive Allied intervention, nothing could have deterred the Soviet Union from conquering the entirety of Finland.
Peace of Moscow
| This section needs additional citations for verification. (March 2008) |
In the Moscow Peace Treaty of 12 March 1940, Finland was forced to cede the Finnish part of Karelia. The land included the city of Viipuri (the country's second largest), much of Finland's industrialized territory, and significant parts still held by Finland's army: over 10% of pre-war Finland. Some 422,000 Karelians—12% of Finland's population—lost their homes. Military troops and remaining civilians were hastily evacuated; only a few score civilians chose to remain under Soviet governance.
Finland also had to cede a part of the Salla area, the Kalastajansaarento peninsula in the Barents Sea and four islands in the Gulf of Finland. The Hanko Peninsula was also leased to the Soviet Union as a military base for 30 years. While the Soviet troops had captured Petsamo during the war, they returned it to Finland according to the treaty.
As a whole, the peace terms were harsh for Finland. The U.S.S.R. received the city of Viipuri, in addition to their pre-war demands. Sympathy from the League of Nations, Western Allies, and from the Swedes in particular, did not prove to be of much help.
Little more than one year later, hostilities resumed with the Continuation War and a new chapter in the history of Finland began.
In 1948, Stalin wrote in Falsifiers of History that "there could hardly be any doubt that the leading circles of Finland were in league with the Hitlerites, that they wanted to turn Finland into a springboard for Hitler Germany's attack on the U.S.S.R."[48] Regarding the start of the war, Stalin also wrote, "In the war which the Finnish reactionaries started against the Soviet Union, Britain and France rendered the Finnish militarists every kind of assistance. The Anglo-French ruling circles kept inciting the Finnish Government to continue hostilities."[49]
Nikita Khrushchev, who had been a party leader during the winter war, remembered later on the war: "In our war aganist the Finns we could choose the location of the war and the date of its start. In number we were superior to the enemy, we had enough time to get ready for the operation. But on these most favourable terms we could win through only huge difficulties and incredibly great losses. In fact this victory was a moral defeat. Our people certainly never got knowledge of it because we never told them the truth." [50]
Post-Soviet demands for return of territory
After the war, Karelian local governments, parishes and provincial organizations established Karjalan Liitto in order to defend the rights and interests of Karelian evacuees and to find a solution for returning Karelia. During the Cold War, President Urho Kekkonen tried several times to get the territories back by negotiating with the Soviet leadership, but did not succeed. No one openly demanded return. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, disputes were revived. Some minor groups in Finland have been actively demanding the peaceful return to Finland of the ceded territories. The most active group in this field is ProKarelia. In the latest polls, these demands have met with 26– 38% support in Finland.[51] Although the peaceful return of Karelia has always been on its agenda, Karjalan Liitto has, for the most part, stayed away from these demands.
In popular culture
The 1940 play There Shall Be No Night by American playwright Robert E. Sherwood was inspired by a moving Christmas 1939 broadcast to America by war correspondent Bill White of CBS. The play was produced on Broadway in 1940, and won the 1941 Pulitzer prize for Drama.
The 1940 story Biggles Sees It Through by W.E. Johns is set during the final stages of the war.
In 1989, the Finnish movie Talvisota was released. This film tells the story of a Finnish platoon of reservists from Kauhava. The platoon belongs to the 23rd Infantry Regiment, which consists almost solely of men from Southern Ostrobothnia.
The 2006 documentary Fire and Ice: The Winter War of Finland and Russia shows how the Winter War influenced World War II and how Finland mobilized against the world's largest military power.
Swedish heavy metal band Sabaton recorded the song "Talvisota", about the Winter War, on their 2008 album The Art of War.
In a 1992 column in Pelit, "Wexteen" (Jyrki J. J. Kasvi) lamented the difficulty of modelling the war in interactive entertainment. According to Wexteen, if the game mechanics are based on troop strengths, troops will march through Helsinki; if on historical events, through Moscow. The Winter War was featured in a scenario of the grand strategy game Hearts of Iron 2 and received dedicated games in the wargame Squad Battles: Winter War and the educational real-time strategy game Talvisota: Icy Hell.
Finnish black metal band Impaled Nazarene has a song Total War - Winter War on its Suomi Finland Perkele CD.
The 2007 novel The Burnt-out Town of Miracles by Roy Jacobsen (Author), Don Bartlett and Don Shaw (Translators) tells the story of the Winter War through the eyes of one man, Timo the woodcutter, and the small Finnish town of Suomussalmi where he lives.
See also
- List of Finnish wars
- Finnish Army (1939)
- Finnish prisoners of war in the Soviet Union
- Military history of Finland during World War II
- Molotov cocktail
Notes
- ^ At the beginning of the war, Finns had 337,000 men. The Finnish army had only 250,028 rifles (total 281,594 firearms), but White Guards brought their own rifles (over 114,000 rifles, total 116,800 firearms) to the war. The Finns reached the maximum strength at the beginning of March 1940 with 346,000 in uniform.
- ^ Since 1919, the Finns had had 32 French Renault-tanks and few lighter tanks. These Tanks were unsuitable for the War, and they were used as fixed pillboxes. The Finns bought 32 British Vickers-tanks during 1936–39, but without weapons, as these were meant to be manufactured and installed in Finland. Only ten tanks were fit for combat at the beginning of the War.
- ^ Situation in 1st December 1939. The Finns had 114 combat airplanes fit for duty and 7 airplanes for communication and observation purposes. Also there were less than hundred planes for flight training purposes, not suitable for combat, and some planes were under repair. In total, the Finns had 235 aircraft.
- ^ Finnish detailed death casualties: Dead, buried 16,766; Wounded, died of wounds 3,089; Dead, not buried later declared as dead 3,503; Missing, declared as dead 1,712; Died during prisoner of war 20; Other reasons (diseases, accidents, suicides) 677; Unknown 137
- ^ After the War, the Soviet Union returned home 847 Finns. Finnish and Russian researchers have estimated total number of POWs between 800–1,100 Finns, and the number of deaths 10–20. See more: Finnish prisoners of war in the Soviet Union
- ^ A Soviet division consists of 17,500 men, 14,000 rifles, 419 light machine guns, 200 machines guns, 261 infantry mortars, 40 mortars, 48 anti-tank guns. A Finnish division consists of 14,200 men, 11,000 rifles, 250 submachine guns, 250 light machine guns, 116 machine guns, 18 mortars, 18 anti-tank guns. A Soviet division had more men and it was better equipped.[27]
References
Citations
- ^ a b c Palokangas, Markku (1999). "Suomalaisjoukkojen aseistus ja varustus". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen (in Finnish) (1st ed.). Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö. pp. 299–335. ISBN 951-0-23536-9.
- ^ Juutilainen, Antti; Koskimaa, Matti (2005). "Maavoimien joukkojen perustaminen". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Jatkosodan pikkujättiläinen (in Finnish) (1st ed.). Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö. pp. 77–88. ISBN 951-0-28690-7.
- ^ Peltonen, Martti (1999). "Ilmasota talvisodassa". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen (in Finnish) (1st ed.). Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö. pp. 606–649. ISBN 951-0-23536-9.
- ^ Kantakoski, Punaiset panssarit—Puna-armeijan panssarijoukot 1918–1945, p. 260
- ^ a b Tomas Ries, Cold Will—The Defense of Finland, 1988, ISBN 0-08-033592-6, Potomac Books
- ^ Ohto Manninen, Talvisodan salatut taustat, 1994, ISBN 952-90-5251-0, Kirjaneuvos, using declassified Soviet archive material, Manninen found 12 previously unrecognized infantry divisions ordered to Finnish front
- ^ a b Kurenmaa, Pekka; Lentilä, Riitta (2005). "Sodan tappiot". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Jatkosodan pikkujättiläinen (in Finnish) (1st ed.). Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö. pp. 1150–1162. ISBN 951-0-28690-7.
- ^ Lentilä, Riitta; Juutilainen, Antti (1999). "Talvisodan uhrit". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen (in Finnish) (1st ed.). Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö. pp. 816–828. ISBN 951-0-23536-9.
- ^ Malmi, Timo (1999). "Suomalaiset sotavangit". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen (in Finnish) (1st ed.). Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö. pp. 792–802. ISBN 951-0-23536-9.
- ^ a b Template:Ru icon G.F. Krivosheev, Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century, 1997, ISBN 1-85367-280-7, Greenhill Books
- ^ Kantakoski: Punaiset panssarit—Puna-armeijan panssarijoukot 1918–1945 p. 286
- ^ Template:Ru icon В.Н. Барышников. От прохладного мира к Зимней войне. Восточная политика Финляндии в 1930-е годы. Санкт-Петербург, 1997.; В.Н. Барышников, Э. Саломаа. Вовлечение Финляндии во Вторую Мировую войну. In: Крестовый поход на Россию. М., 2005.; О.Д. Дудорова. Неизвестные страницы Зимней войны. In: Военно-исторический журнал. 1991. №9.; Зимняя война 1939-1940. Книга первая. Политическая история. М., 1998. – ISBN 5-02-009749-7; Эрик Ковалев. Зимняя война балтийских подводных лодок (1939–1940 гг.). In: Короли подплава в море червонных валетов. М., 2006.; М. Коломиец. Танки в Зимней войне 1939-1940. In: «Фронтовая иллюстрация», 2001; Александр Широкорад. Северные войны России. М., 2001.; Владимир Холодковский. Эта Зимняя война. In: Ленинская правда. 1990. 4 янв., c. 3.
- ^ Resolution of Council of League of Nations
- ^ http://www.redarmystudies.net/0411030.htm, citing Alan Bullock, Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), 489.
- ^ Glantz, David M., Stumbling Colossus, p. 58.
- ^ a b c d e Trotter 2002, pages 271–274
- ^ a b Trotter 2002, pages 3–7
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x Turtola, Martti (1999). "Kansainvälinen kehitys Euroopassa ja Suomessa 1930-luvulla". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen (in Finnish) (1st ed.). Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö. pp. 13–46. ISBN 951-0-23536-9.
- ^ Statistics of Finnish elections 1927–2003: http://pxweb2.stat.fi/sahkoiset_julkaisut/vuosikirja2004_suppea/excel/vaali_02.xls
- ^ Juutilainen, Antti (1999). "Puolustussuunnittelmat 1930-luvulla". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen (in Finnish) (1st ed.). Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö. pp. 65–69. ISBN 951-0-23536-9.
- ^ a b Trotter 2002, pages 12–13
- ^ Trotter 2002, pages 14–16
- ^ Manninen, Ohto (1999). "Neuvostoliiton tavoitteet ennen talvisotaa ja sen aikana". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen (in Finnish) (1st ed.). Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö. pp. 141–148. ISBN 951-0-23536-9.
- ^ Tanner, Väinö, The Winter War, 1957, Stanford University Press
- ^ a b c Trotter 2002, pages 48–57
- ^ a b Trotter 2002, pages 58–61
- ^ Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen, page 332
- ^ a b c d e f Trotter 2002, pages 33–47
- ^ a b Trotter 2002, pages 67–84
- ^ Trotter 2002, pages 62–66
- ^ Trotter 2002, pages 85–90
- ^ Harry Järv, Oavgjort i två krig, 2006, ISBN 978-91-631-9273-9
- ^ a b Conquest, Robert. The Great Terror: A Reassessment. 40th anniversary ed. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2008, p. 450.
- ^ Dmytryshyn, Basil. USSR: A Concise History. 2nd ed. New York: Scribners, 1971, p. 181-182
- ^ The Finnish Winter War 1939-1940 Feldgrau
- ^ Hjalmar Siilasvuo WWII Database
- ^ Ilmatieteen laitos: Vuodenajat kolmen kalenterikuukauden jaksoissa Template:Fi icon Retrieved 9-16-2007.
- ^ Laaksonen, Lasse, Todellisuus ja harhat, 2005, ISBN 951-20-6911-3, Gummerus
- ^ Wolf H. Halsti, Talvisota 1939-1940, 1955, Otava
- ^ Paasikivi, J.K., Toimintani Moskovassa, 1959, WSOY
- ^ C. Van Dyke, The Soviet Invasion of Finland 1939–40, 1997, London: Frank Cass
- ^ Rentola, Kimmo, Residenttimme ilmoittaa..., Suomen Historiallinen Seura, 2002
- ^ A.E.Taras, Soviet-Finland 1939-1940 war, Minsk, 1999.
- ^ "The Finnish Winter War"
- ^ Mosier, John, The Blitzkrieg Myth: How Hitler and the Allies Misread the Strategic Realities of World War II, HarperCollins, 2004, ISBN 0-06-000977-2, page 88
- ^ Winter War Website
- ^ Tapani Kossila: Foreign volunteers in the Winter War
- ^ Soviet Information Bureau, Falsifiers of History (Historical Survey), Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1948, 272848, page 48
- ^ Soviet Information Bureau, Falsifiers of History (Historical Survey), Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1948, 272848, page 50
- ^ Mihail Heller – Alekszandr Nyekrics: Orosz történelem, II. kötet: A Szovjetunió története.; Osiris Publ. Ltd., Budapest, 2003., page 320 (ISBN 963-389-546-4)
- ^ Karjala-lehti and MC-Info Oy 2005 (36 % vs. 52 %), Karjalan Liitto and Taloustutkimus 5.- 7.4. 2005 (26 % vs. 57 %)[1], HS-Gallup: Selvä enemmistö ei halua Karjalaa takaisin 21.8.2005 (30 % vs. 62 %)[2], STT / Suomen Gallup 2.7. 2004 (38 % vs. 57 %)
Bibliography
- Andersson, Lennart B3 Junkers Ju86 i Sverige
- Cox, Geoffrey (1941) The Red Army Moves (Victor Gollancz, London).
- Engle, Eloise & Paananen, Lauri (1992). The Winter War: The Soviet Attack on Finland 1939-1940. Stackpole Books. ISBN 0-8117-2433-6.
- Jakobson, Max (1961). The Diplomacy of the Winter War: An Account of the Russo-Finnish War, 1939-1940. Cambridge, MA: Harward University Press.
- Öhquist, Harald (1949). Talvisota minun näkökulmastani. Helsinki: WSOY. (in Finnish)
- Ries, Tomas (1988). Cold Will: Defence of Finland. Brassey's. ISBN 0-08-033592-6.
- Schwartz, Andrew J. (1960). America and the Russo-Finnish War. Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press.
- Tanner, Väinö (1957) The Winter War: Finland against Russia 1939-1940 Stanford University Press, California; also London.
- Trotter, William R. (2002, 2006) [1991]. The Winter war: The Russo–Finno War of 1939–40 (5th ed.). New York (Great Britain: London): Workman Publishing Company (Great Britain: Aurum Press). ISBN 1 85410 881 6.
First published in the United States under the title A Frozen Hell: The Russo–Finnish Winter War of 1939–40
{{cite book}}: Check date values in:|year=(help)CS1 maint: year (link) - Upton, Anthony F. (1974). Finland 1939-1940 (University of Delaware Press, Newark: part of series The Politics and Strategy of the Second World War) ISBN 0-87413-156-1
- Van Dyke, Carl (1997). The Soviet Invasion of Finland, 1939-40. Frank Cass Publishers. ISBN 0-7146-4314-9.
- Vehviläinen, Olli (2002). Finland in the Second World War: Between Germany and Russia. New York: Palgrave. ISBN 0-333-80149-0.
- "Finland i Krig 1939-1940" - multiple authors. ISBN 951-50-1182-5
External links
- The Battles of the Winter War comprehensively covered by Sami H. E. Korhonen
- Telegrams from each day of the Winter War Template:Fi icon Template:Sv icon Template:En icon
- Furious Front Across Finland
- USSR expulsion from League of Nations from the League of Nations' Official Journal
- The Front Museum on the Hanko Peninsula, documenting the lease of Hanko to the USSR
- Finnish wartime photos and history website Stories by veterans, historians, and wartime pictures.
- Winter War Template:Sr icon
- Those Burly Finns, History House magazine article
- Photos Winter War from 1939 year
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