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Not to be confused with Emigration or Migration.
"Immigrant" redirects here. For other uses, see Immigrant (disambiguation).
Further information: Immigration by country
Net migration rates for 2011: positive (blue), negative (orange), stable (green), and no data (gray)

Immigration is the movement of people into a destination country to which they are not native or do not possess its citizenship in order to settle or reside there, especially as permanent residents or naturalized citizens, or to take-up employment as a migrant worker or temporarily as a foreign worker.[1][2][3]

When people cross national borders during their migration, they are called migrants or immigrants (from Latin: migrare, wanderer) from the perspective of the country which they enter. From the perspective of the country which they leave, they are called emigrant or outmigrant.[4] Sociology designates immigration usually as migration (as well as emigration accordingly outward migration).

Immigrants are motivated to leave their former countries of citizenship, or habitual residence, for a variety of reasons, including a lack of local access to resources, a desire for economic prosperity, to find or engage in paid work, to better their standard of living, family reunification, retirement, climate or environmentally induced migration, exile, escape from prejudice, conflict or natural disaster, or simply the wish to change one's quality of life. Commuters, tourists and other short-term stays in a destination country do not fall under the definition of immigration or migration, seasonal labour immigration is sometimes included.

In 2013 the United Nations estimated that there were 231,522,215 immigrants in the world (apx. 3.25% of the global population).[5] The United Arab Emirates has the largest proportion of immigrants in the world, followed by Qatar.[6][7]


Sign Immigration near the border between Mali and Mauretania; sponsored by EU

Many animals have migrated across evolutionary history (not including seasonal bird migration), including pre-humans. Human migration started with the migration out of Africa into the Middle East, and then to Asia, Australia, Europe, Russia, and the Americas. This is discussed in the article pre-modern human migration.

Recent history is discussed in the articles history of human migration and human migration.


The global population of immigrants has grown since 1990 but has remained around 3% of the world's population.

As of 2005, the United Nations reported that there were nearly 191 million international immigrants worldwide, about 3 percent of the world's population.[8] In 2013 the United Nations estimated that there were 231,522,215 immigrants in the world (apx. 3.25% of the global population),[5] while the number of immigrants increases along with the world's population the proportion of immigrants as part of the world's population remained relatively consistent since 1990. In 2005 60% of immigrants lived in developed countries while the rest lived in developing countries.

The Midwestern United States, some parts of Europe, some small areas of Southwest Asia, and a few spots in the East Indies have the highest percentages of immigrant population recorded by the UN Census 2005.[citation needed] The reliability of immigrant censuses is low due to the concealed character of undocumented labor migration.[citation needed]

2012 survey

A 2012 survey by Gallup found that given the opportunity, 640 million adults would migrate to another country, with 23% of these would-be immigrant choosing the United States as their desired future residence, while 7% of respondents, representing 45 million people, would choose the United Kingdom. The other top desired destination countries (those where an estimated 69 million or more adults would like to go) were Canada, France, Saudi Arabia, Australia, Germany and Spain.[9]

Understanding of immigration

The largest Vietnamese market in Prague, also known as "Little Hanoi". In 2009, there were about 70,000 Vietnamese in the Czech Republic.[10]
London has become multiethnic as a result of immigration.[11] In London in 2008, Black British and British Asian children outnumbered white British children by about 3 to 2 in government-run schools.[12]

One theory of immigration distinguishes between push and pull factors.[13]

Push factors refer primarily to the motive for immigration from the country of origin. In the case of economic migration (usually labor migration), differentials in wage rates are common. If the value of wages in the new country surpasses the value of wages in one's native country, he or she may choose to migrate, as long as the costs are not too high. Particularly in the 19th century, economic expansion of the US increased immigrant flow, and nearly 15% of the population was foreign born,[14] thus making up a significant amount of the labor force. Poor individuals from less developed countries can have higher standards of living in developed countries than in their originating countries.[citation needed]

As transportation technology improved, travel time and costs decreased dramatically between the 18th and early 20th century. Travel across the Atlantic used to take up to 5 weeks in the 18th century, but around the time of the 20th century it took a mere 8 days.[15] When the opportunity cost is lower, the immigration rates tend to be higher.[15] Escape from poverty (personal or for relatives staying behind) is a traditional push factor, and the availability of jobs is the related pull factor. Natural disasters can amplify poverty-driven migration flows. Research shows that for middle-income countries, higher temperatures increase emigration rates to urban areas and to other countries. For low-income countries, higher temperatures reduce emigration.[16]

Emigration and immigration are sometimes mandatory in a contract of employment: religious missionaries and employees of transnational corporations, international non-governmental organizations, and the diplomatic service expect, by definition, to work "overseas". They are often referred to as "expatriates", and their conditions of employment are typically equal to or better than those applying in the host country (for similar work).[citation needed]

For some migrants, education is the primary pull factor (although most international students are not classified as immigrants). Retirement migration from rich countries to lower-cost countries with better climate is a new type of international migration. Examples include immigration of retired British citizens to Spain or Italy and of retired Canadian citizens to the US (mainly to the US states of Florida and Texas).[citation needed]

Non-economic push factors include persecution (religious and otherwise), frequent abuse, bullying, oppression, ethnic cleansing, genocide, risks to civilians during war, and social marginalization.[17][18] Political motives traditionally motivate refugee flows; for instance, people may emigrate in order to escape a dictatorship.[19]

Some migration is for personal reasons, based on a relationship (e.g. to be with family or a partner), such as in family reunification or transnational marriage (especially in the instance of a gender imbalance). Recent research has found gender, age, and cross-cultural differences in the ownership of the idea to immigrate.[20] In a few cases, an individual may wish to immigrate to a new country in a form of transferred patriotism. Evasion of criminal justice (e.g., avoiding arrest) is a personal motivation. This type of emigration and immigration is not normally legal, if a crime is internationally recognized, although criminals may disguise their identities or find other loopholes to evade detection. For example, there have been cases of those who might be guilty of war crimes disguising themselves as victims of war or conflict and then pursuing asylum in a different country.[citation needed]

Barriers to immigration come not only in legal form or political form; natural and social barriers to immigration can also be very powerful. Immigrants when leaving their country also leave everything familiar: their family, friends, support network, and culture. They also need to liquidate their assets, often at a large loss,[citation needed] and they incur the expense of moving. When they arrive in a new country, this is often with many uncertainties including finding work, where to live, new laws, new cultural norms, language or accent issues, possible racism, and other exclusionary behavior towards them and their family. These barriers act to limit international migration (scenarios where populations move en masse to other continents, creating huge population surges, and their associated strain on infrastructure and services, ignore these inherent limits on migration).[citation needed]

The Iron Curtain in Europe was designed as a means of preventing emigration. "It is one of the ironies of post-war European history that, once the freedom to travel for Europeans living under communist regimes, which had long been demanded by the West, was finally granted in 1989/90, travel was very soon afterwards made much more difficult by the West itself, and new barriers were erected to replace the Iron Curtain." —Anita Böcker[21]

The politics of immigration have become increasingly associated with other issues, such as national security and terrorism, especially in western Europe, with the presence of Islam as a new major religion. Those with security concerns cite the 2005 French riots and point to the Jyllands-Posten Muhammad cartoons controversy as examples of the value conflicts arising from immigration of Muslims in Western Europe. Because of all these associations, immigration has become an emotional political issue in many European nations.[citation needed]

Studies have suggested that some special interest groups lobby for less immigration for their own group and more immigration for other groups since they see effects of immigration, such as increased labor competition, as detrimental when affecting their own group but beneficial when impacting other groups. A 2010 European study suggested that "employers are more likely to be pro-immigration than employees, provided that immigrants are thought to compete with employees who are already in the country. Or else, when immigrants are thought to compete with employers rather than employees, employers are more likely to be anti-immigration than employees."[22] A 2011 study examining the voting of US representatives on migration policy suggests that "representatives from more skilled labor abundant districts are more likely to support an open immigration policy towards the unskilled, whereas the opposite is true for representatives from more unskilled labor abundant districts."[23]

Another contributing factor may be lobbying by earlier immigrants. The Chairman for the US Irish Lobby for Immigration Reform—which lobby for more permissive rules for immigrants, as well as special arrangements just for Irish people—has stated that "the Irish Lobby will push for any special arrangement it can get—'as will every other ethnic group in the country.'"[24][25]

Economic migrant

Further information: Economic migrant
The Indo-Bangladeshi barrier in 2007. India is building a separation barrier along the 4,000 kilometer border with Bangladesh to prevent illegal immigration.

The term economic migrant refers to someone who has travelled from one region to another region for the purposes of seeking employment and an improvement in quality of life and access to resources. An economic migrant is distinct from someone who is a refugee fleeing persecution.

Many countries have immigration and visa restrictions that prohibit a person entering the country for the purposes of gaining work without a valid work visa. As a violation of a State's immigration laws a person who is declared to be an economic migrant can be refused entry into a country.

The process of allowing immigrants into a particular country is believed to have effects on wages and employment. In particular lower skilled workers are thought to be directly affected by economic migrants, but evidence suggests that this is due to adjustments within industries.[26]

The World Bank estimates that remittances totaled $420 billion in 2009, of which $317 billion went to developing countries.[27]

Laws and ethics

UNHCR tents at a refugee camp following episodes of anti-immigrant violence in South Africa, 2008

Treatment of migrants in host countries, both by governments, employers, and original population, is a topic of continual debate and criticism, as many cases of abuse and violation of rights are being reported frequently.[citation needed] Some countries have developed a particularly notorious reputation regarding treatment of migrants. The United Nations Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, has been ratified but by 20 states, all of which are heavy exporters of cheap labor. With the sole exception of Serbia, none of the signatories are western countries, but all are from Asia, South America, and North Africa. Arab states of the Persian Gulf, which are known for receiving millions of migrant workers, have not signed the treaty as well.[citation needed] Although freedom of movement is often recognized as a civil right in many documents such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), the freedom only applies to movement within national borders: it may be guaranteed by the constitution or by human rights legislation. Additionally, this freedom is often limited to citizens and excludes others.[citation needed]

Proponents of immigration maintain that, according to Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, everyone has the right to leave or enter a country, along with movement within it (internal migration), although article 13 actually restricts freedom of movement to "within the borders of each state." Additionally, the UDHR does not mention entry into other countries when it states that "everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country."[28] Some argue that the freedom of movement both within and between countries is a basic human right, and that the restrictive immigration policies, typical of nation-states, violate this human right of freedom of movement.[29] Such arguments are common among anti-state ideologies like anarchism and libertarianism.[30]

As philosopher and Open borders activist Jacob Appel has written, "Treating human beings differently, simply because they were born on the opposite side of a national boundary, is hard to justify under any mainstream philosophical, religious or ethical theory." However, Article 14 does provide that "everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution."[31]

Where immigration is permitted, it is typically selective. As of 2003, family reunification accounted for approximately two-thirds of legal immigration to the US every year.[32] Ethnic selection, such as the White Australia policy, has generally disappeared, but priority is usually given to the educated, skilled, and wealthy. Less privileged individuals, including the mass of poor people in low-income countries, cannot avail themselves of the legal and protected immigration opportunities offered by wealthy states. This inequality has also been criticized as conflicting with the principle of equal opportunities, which apply (at least in theory) within democratic nation-states. The fact that the door is closed for the unskilled, while at the same time many developed countries have a huge demand for unskilled labor, is a major factor in illegal immigration. The contradictory nature of this policy—which specifically disadvantages the unskilled immigrants while exploiting their labor—has also been criticized on ethical grounds.

Immigration policies which selectively grant freedom of movement to targeted individuals are intended to produce a net economic gain for the host country. They can also mean net loss for a poor donor country through the loss of the educated minority—the brain drain. This can exacerbate the global inequality in standards of living that provided the motivation for the individual to migrate in the first place. One example of competition for skilled labour is active recruitment of health workers from the Third World by First World countries.

Economic effects

A survey of leading economists shows a consensus behind the view that high-skilled immigration makes the average American better off.[33] A survey of the same economists also shows strong support behind the notion that low-skilled immigration makes the average American better off.[34] According to David Card, Christian Dustmann, and Ian Preston, "most existing studies of the economic impacts of immigration suggest these impacts are small, and on average benefit the native population".[35] In a survey of the existing literature, Örn B Bodvarsson and Hendrik Van den Berg write, "a comparison of the evidence from all the studies... makes it clear that, with very few exceptions, there is no strong statistical support for the view held by many members of the public, namely that immigration has an adverse effect on native-born workers in the destination country."[36]

Whereas the impact on the average native tends to be small and positive, studies show more mixed results for low-skilled natives.[37][38] Overall immigration has not had much effect on native wage inequality[39] but low-skill immigration has been linked to greater income equality in the native population.[40] Research also suggests that cultural diversity has a net positive effect on the productivity of natives.[41] A literature review of the economic impacts of immigration finds that the net fiscal impact of migrants varies across studies but that the most credible analyses typically find small and positive fiscal effects on average.[42] According to the authors, "the net social impact of an immigrant over his or her lifetime depends substantially and in predictable ways on the immigrant's age at arrival, education, reason for migration, and similar".[42] Studies of refugees' impact on native welfare are scant but the existing literature shows mixed results (negative, positive and no significant effects on native welfare).[38][43][44][45][46][47][48][49][50][51] According to labor economist Giovanni Peri, the existing literature suggests that there are no economic reasons why the American labor market could not easily absorb 100,000 Syrian refugees in a year.[52]

Research suggests that migration is beneficial both to the receiving and sending countries.[53] According to one study, welfare increases in both types of countries: "welfare impact of observed levels of migration is substantial, at about 5% to 10% for the main receiving countries and about 10% in countries with large incoming remittances".[53] According to Branko Milanovic, country of residency is by far the most important determinant of global income inequality.[54] A study of equivalent workers in the United States and 42 developing countries found that "median wage gap for a male, unskilled (9 years of schooling), 35 year-old, urban formal sector worker born and educated in a developing country is P$15,400 per year at purchasing power parity".[55] A 2014 survey of the existing literature on emigration finds that a 10 percent emigrant supply shock would increase wages in the sending country by 2-5.5%.[56] According to economists Michael Clemens and Lant Pratchett, "permitting people to move from low-productivity places to high-productivity places appears to be by far the most efficient generalized policy tool, at the margin, for poverty reduction".[57] A successful two-year in situ anti-poverty program, for instance, helps poor people make in a year what is the equivalent of working one day in the developed world.[57] Research on a migration lottery that allowed that allowed Tongans to move to New Zealand found that the lottery winners saw a 263% increase in income from migrating (after only one year in New Zealand) relative to the unsuccessful lottery entrants.[58] A longer-term study on the Tongan lottery winners finds that they "continue to earn almost 300 percent more than non-migrants, have better mental health, live in households with more than 250 percent higher expenditure, own more vehicles, and have more durable assets".[59] A conservative estimate of their lifetime gain to migration is NZ$315,000 in net present value terms (approximately US$237,000).[59]

Studies show that the elimination of barriers to migration would have profound effects on world GDP, with estimates of gains ranging between 67–147.3%.[60][61][62] Research also finds that migration leads to greater trade in goods and services.[63][64] Using 130 years of data on historical migrations to the United States, one study finds "that a doubling of the number of residents with ancestry from a given foreign country relative to the mean increases by 4.2 percentage points the probability that at least one local firm invests in that country, and increases by 31% the number of employees at domestic recipients of FDI from that country. The size of these effects increases with the ethnic diversity of the local population, the geographic distance to the origin country, and the ethno-linguistic fractionalization of the origin country."[65] Mass migration can also boost innovation and growth, as shown by the Huguenot Diaspora in Prussia,[66] German Jewish Émigrés in the US[67] and the Mariel boatlift.[68]

One study finds "some evidence that larger immigrant population shares (or inflows) yield positive impacts on institutional quality. At a minimum, our results indicate that no negative impact on economic freedom is associated with more immigration."[69]

The Cato Institute finds little or no effect of immigration on the income of citizens belonging to established populations.[70] The Brookings Institution finds a 2.3% depression of wages from immigration from 1980 to 2007.[71] The Center for Immigration Studies finds a 3.7% depression wages from immigration from 1980 to 2000.[72]

Research indicates that immigrants are more likely to work in risky jobs than U.S.-born workers, partly due to differences in average characteristics, such as immigrants' lower English language ability and educational attainment.[73] Further, some studies indicate that higher ethnic concentration in metropolitan areas is positively related to the probability of self-employment of immigrants.[74]

Professional economic advisers suggest that lowering the number of undocumented immigrants in the United States would significantly strengthen its economy.[75]


Some research has found that as immigration and ethnic heterogeneity increase, government funding of welfare and public support for welfare decrease.[76] Ethnic nepotism may be an explanation for this phenomenon. Other possible explanations include theories regarding in-group and out-group effects and reciprocal altruism.[77]

Research however also challenges the notion that ethnic heterogeneity reduces public goods provision.[78][79] Studies that find a negative relationship between ethnic diversity and public goods provision often fail to take into account that strong states were better at assimilating minorities, thus decreasing diversity in the long run.[78] Ethnically diverse states today consequently tend to be weaker states.[78] Because most of the evidence on fractionalization comes from sub-Saharan Africa and the United States, the generalizability of the findings is questionable.[79] Much of the fractionalization in the US comes from African Americans, whose ancestors were involuntary immigrants.

Research finds that Americans' attitudes towards immigration influences their attitudes towards welfare spending.[80]


One study finds that non-native speakers of English in the UK have no causal impact on the performance of other pupils.[81] The presence of immigrant children in classrooms has no significant impact on the test scores of Dutch children.[82] An Austrian study finds no effect on grade repetition among native students exposed to migrant students.[83] A North Carolina study found that the presence of Latin American children in schools had no significant negative effects on peers, but that students with limited English skills had slight negative effects on peers.[84]


Research finds that first generation immigrants from countries with less egalitarian gender cultures adopt gender values more similar to natives over time.[85][86] According to one study, "this acculturation process is almost completed within one generational succession: The gender attitudes of second generation immigrants are difficult to distinguish from the attitudes of members of mainstream society. This holds also for children born to immigrants from very gender traditional cultures and for children born to less well integrated immigrant families."[85] Similar results are found on a study of Turkish migrants to Western Europe.[86] The assimilation on gender attitudes has been observed in education, as one study finds "that the female advantage in education observed among the majority population is usually present among second-generation immigrants."[87]

First-generation immigrants tend to hold less accepting views of homosexual lifestyles but opposition weakens with longer stays.[88] Second-generation immigrants are overall more accepting of homosexual lifestyles, but the acculturation effect is weaker for Muslims and to some extent, Eastern Orthodox migrants.[88]

A study of Bangladeshi migrants in East London found they shifted towards the thinking styles of the wider non-migrant population in just a single generation.[89]

A study on Germany found that foreign-born parents are more likely to integrate if their children are entitled to German citizenship at birth.[90]

Social capital

There is some research that suggests that immigration adversely affects social capital. One study, for instance, found that "larger increases in US states’ Mexican population shares correspond to larger decreases in social capital over the period" 1986-2004.[91]


Much of the empirical research on the causal relationship between immigration and crime has been limited due to weak instruments for determining causality.[92] The problem with causality primarily revolves around the location of immigrants being endogenous, which means that immigrants tend to disproportionally locate in deprived areas where crime is higher (because they cannot afford to stay in more expensive areas) or because they tend to locate in areas where there is a large population of residents of the same ethnic background.[93] A burgeoning literature relying on strong instruments provides mixed findings.[93][94][95][96][97][98][99][100] As one economist describes the existing literature in 2014, "most research for the US indicates that if any, this association is negative... while the results for Europe are mixed for property crime but no association is found for violent crime".[93]

Research suggests that legal status largely explains the differences in crime between legal and illegal immigrants, most likely because legal status leads to greater job market opportunities for the immigrants.[101][102][103]

See also


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Further reading

  • Appel, Jacob. The Ethical Case for an Open Immigration Policy May 4, 2009.
  • Balin, Bryan. State Immigration Legislation and Immigrant Flows: An Analysis Johns Hopkins University, 2008.
  • Bauder, Harald. Labor Movement: How Migration Regulates Labor Markets, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.
  • Borjas, George J. (2014). Immigration Economics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0-674-04977-2. 
  • Center for Immigration Studies Refer to "Publications" for research on illegal immigration, demographic trends, terrorism concerns, environmental impact, and other subjects.
  • De La Torre, Miguel A., Trails of Hope and Terror: Testimonies on Immigration. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Press, 2009.
  • Esbenshade, Jill. Division and Dislocation: Regulating Immigration through Local Housing Ordinances. Immigration Policy Center, American Immigration Law Foundation, Summer 2007.
  • Ewing, Walter A. Border Insecurity: U.S. Border-Enforcement Policies and National Security, Immigration Policy Center, American Immigration Law Foundation, Spring 2006.
  • Fell, Peter and Hayes, Debra. What are they Doing Here? A Critical Guide to Asylum and Immigration, Birmimgham, Venture Press, 2007.
  • Fitzgerald, David Scott; Cook-Martin, David (2014). Culling the Masses: The Democratic Origins of Racist Immigration Policy in the Americas. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0674-72904-9. 
  • Freeman, Joe. Living and Working in the European Union for Non-EU Nationals., 2007. ISBN 0-9786254-0-4
  • Immigration Policy Center. Economic Growth & Immigration: Bridging the Demographic Divide. Immigration Policy Center, American Immigration Law Foundation, November 2005.
  • Karakayali, Nedim. 2005. "Duality and Diversity in the Lives of Immigrant Children: Rethinking the 'Problem of Second Generation' in Light of Immigrant Autobiographies", Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 325–344.
  • Kolb, Eva. The Evolution of New York City's Multiculturalism: Melting Pot or Salad Bowl. Immigrants in New York from the 19th Century until the End of the Gilded Age. BOD, 2009. ISBN 3-8370-9303-4
  • Legrain, Philippe. Immigrants: Your Country Needs Them. Little Brown, 2007. ISBN 0-316-73248-6
  • Massey, Douglas S. Beyond the Border Buildup: Towards a New Approach to Mexico-U.S. Migration. Immigration Policy Center, American Immigration Law Foundation, September 2005.
  • Massey, Douglas S., Joaquín Arango, Hugo Graeme, Ali Kouaouci, Adela, Pellegrino, and J. Edward Taylor.Worlds in Motion: Understanding International Migration at the End of the Millennium. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. ISBN 0-19-928276-5
  • Meilander, Peter C. Towards a Theory of Immigration. Palgrave Macmillan, 2001. ISBN 978-0-312-24034-9
  • Molina, Natalia. Fit to Be Citizens?: Public Health and Race in Los Angeles, 1879-1940. University of California Press, 2006.
  • Myers, Dowell. Immigrants and Boomers: Forging a New Social Contract for the Future of America. Russell Sage Foundation, 2007. ISBN 978-0-87154-636-4
  • Passel, Jeffrey S. Estimates of the Size and Characteristics of the Undocumented Population. Pew Hispanic Center, March 2005.
  • Passel, Jeffrey S. Growing Share of Immigrants Choosing Naturalization. Pew Hispanic Center, March 2007.
  • Passel, Jeffrey S. and Roberto Suro. Rise, Peak and Decline: Trends in U.S. Immigration. Pew Hispanic Center, September 2005.
  • Pearce, Susan C. Immigrant Women in the United States: A Demographic Portrait. Immigration Policy Center, American Immigration Law Foundation, Summer 2006.
  • Portes, Alejandro and József Böröcz, "Contemporary Immigration: Theoretical Perspectives on Its Determinants and Modes of Incorporation" International Migration Review, 23,3, Silver Anniversary Issue, International Migration: an Assessment for the 90's. (Autumn, 1989), pp. 606–630.
  • Rumbaut, Ruben and Walter Ewing. "The Myth of Immigrant Criminality and the Paradox of Assimilation: Incarceration Rates among Native and Foreign-Born Men." The Immigration Policy Center, Spring 2007.
  • Sintès Pierre, La raison du mouvement : territoires et réseaux de migrants albanais en Grèce, Karthala, Maison Méditerranéenne des sciences de l'homme, Ecole française d'Athènes, Paris - Aix-en-Provence - Athens, 2010.
  • Sirkeci, Ibrahim The Environment of Insecurity in Turkey and the Emigration of Turkish Kurds to Germany, ISBN 9780773457393 New York, Edwin Mellen Press, 2006.
  • Valle, Isabel. Fields of Toil: A Migrant Family's Journey. ISBN 978-0-87422-101-5
  • West, Lorane A. Color: Latino Voices in the Pacific Northwest. ISBN 978-0-87422-274-6
  • Zolberg, Aristide. A Nation by Design: Immigration Policy in the Fashioning of America. Harvard University Press, 2006. ISBN 0-674-02218-1

External links