Terrorism in China

Terrorism in the People's Republic of China is a topic of some contention. The definition of terrorism differs among scholars, between international and national bodies, and across time. In the cultural setting of China, the term is relatively new and ambiguously defined.A common definition of terrorism is the systematic use or threatened use of violence to intimidate a population or government and thereby effect political, religious, or ideological change.

Using this definition, terrorism in China is comparatively rare in recent decades. Many media and scholarly accounts of terrorism in contemporary China focus on violence committed in the name of ethnic separatist movements in Xinjiang and Tibet, and on the Chinese government's counter-terrorism campaigns in those regions. Some scholars have also characterized political campaigns under Mao Zedong as a form of state terrorism.

The government of the People's Republic of China considers terrorism to be closely related to ethnic separatism and religious fundamentalism, and has embarked on strike-hard campaigns to suppress these tendencies, particularly in Xinjiang and Tibetan regions. Since the September 11 attacks in 2001, the PRC government has strengthened its involvement in multilateral and bilateral counter-terrorism efforts. As a result of these efforts, some Uyghur separatist groups have been named as terrorist organizations by the United Nations and U.S. Department of State. However, some scholars and human rights organizations such as Amnesty International has accused the Chinese government of applying the charge of terrorism in an inconsistent and sometimes politicized manner, and using the label to legitimize human rights abuses against ethnic minorities.

Chinese cultural context

The concept of terrorism, as it evolved and is understood in the West, did not exist in imperial China. In that setting, political criminality took the form as violence against the emperor, and was viewed as harmful insofar as it induced fear and caused “chaos.” With the exception of “good” political violence against rulers whose lack of propriety and virtue resulted in loss of the mandate of heaven, violence was seen as contrary to human nature and the Tao. Kam Wong argues that the dynamics of imperial China form the basis for contemporary Chinese understandings of terrorism.

Fear of chaos and social disorder is a powerful factor in mobilizing political will to combat potential threats. In the modern context, any group or force with the potential to challenge the existing social order or the political security of the rulers may be considered a form of terrorism, “to be condemned unrelentingly and suppressed at all costs.”

There is currently no clearly established definition for terrorism either nationally or internationally, though the National People's Congress is in the process of drafting legislation that would clarify the use of the term in Chinese law. The draft legislation, as reported by Xinhua News Agency, classified as terrorism acts that "cause or aim to cause severe harm to society by causing casualties, bringing about major economic losses, damaging public facilities or disturbing social order." Human rights groups charge that the term is sometimes applied to non-violent dissidents in China.

Ethnic Separatism

Xinjiang

Main article: East Turkestan independence movement

Xinjiang, literally "new frontier," is a provincial-level autonomous region situated in the northwest of the People's Republic of China

Media reports and scholarly studies of terrorism in contemporary China frequently focus on members of the largely Muslim Uyghur ethnic group, who are concentrated in the Northwestern province of Xinjiang. After the Sino-Soviet split, the Soviet Union amassed troops on the Russian border with Xinjiang, and bolstered "East Turkestan" separatist movements, which received moral and material support from other regional militant groups. China accused the Soviets of engineering riots, and improved the military infrastructure there to combat it.

According to Ogden, throughout their centuries-long history of contact within China, the Uyghurs have resisted assimilation to Han Chinese culture, and identify more closely with the cultures of Central Asia. There is no single Uyghur agenda, and while some Uyghurs desire an independent state in line with Turkic ethnic groups of Central Asia, others desire greater political autonomy and participation, while others favor intergration with the Chinese political system. The desire for independence largely stems from resentment over restrictions to religious and cultural expression, ethnic conflict with the local Han Chinese population, income inequality, and the perception that Beijing's government is misallocating Xinjiang’s natural resource wealth. Some groups have adopted violent tactics in pursuit of these goals, and groups identified in Chinese government documents as having involvement in violent attacks include the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), East Turkistan Liberation Organization (ETLO), United Revolutionary Front of East Turkestan (URFET), and the Uyghur Liberation Organization (ULO). Members of these groups are believed to have received training in Central Asian nations such as Afghanistan and Pakistan,. Such violent groups has been noted as frequently splintering, merging, and collapsing, and makes claims which are difficult to substantiate. In addition, China's Muslim Hui people, who were well intergrated into society, regard Uyghur separatist groups as radical Islamists and unpatriotic, gaving Chinese Muslims a bad name.

Ogden notes that violence in Xinjiang is not an extension of global Islamic terrorism, nor is it religiously motivated, but part of an indigenous, ethno-nationalistic secessionist movement. Ogden claims that only six incidents in China from 1990 to 2005 meet the strictest definition of terrorism, meaning the use of "random" violence against innocent civilians to cause terror, and excluding calculated violence against the state to advance a secessionist movement. Among the events identified by Ogden was an incident on 6 February 1992 when Uyghur separatists (possibly belonging to the East Turkestan Islamic Party) detonated a bomb on a public bus in Urumqi, and a bomb attack on a hotel in Kashgar on 17 June 1992. Instances of violence by ethnic Uyghurs against security forces, organs or infrastructure of the state are far more common, but are distinguished by scholars from terrorism aimed against the civilian population. According to Martin, Chinese authorities frequently classify any act of violence or separatist activity in Xinjiang as a manifestation of terrorism, while comparable acts by ethnic Han Chinese would not be classified in this manner.

Tibet

The Tibetan Autonomous Region, highlighted in red, is home to approximately half of the country's ethnic Tibetan population.

China is home to approximately 4.6 million Tibetans, about half of whom live in the Tibetan Autonomous Region ("Tibet") and slightly more in the neighboring provinces of Qinghai, Yunnan, Gansu and Sichuan. According to Ogden, following the flight of the 14th Dalai Lama and some 100,000 Tibetans in the aftermath of the 1959 Tibetan uprising, Chinese authorities imposed radical social reforms and further restrictions to religious freedom. However, by 1980, Deng Xiaoping ascension to leadership and the implementation of the Chinese economic reform program led to reform of earlier repressive policies against ethnic minorities, and granted nominal political autonomy to Tibet. While the Chinese government has invested considerably in the development of the Tibetan economy, education system and infrastructure, the continuing restrictions to religious expression and political participation resulted in resentment amongst the Tibetan populace, leading to the 1987–1989 Tibetan unrest. The unrest prompted Chinese authorities to focus more on the economic, educational, and infrastructural development of the region, intensify efforts to undermine the religious and political influence of the Dalai Lama, and encourage ethic Han migration to the region.

According to Ogden, many Tibetans desire greater cultural and political autonomy, if not full independence, and outbreaks of violent clashes with authorities in the region occur only intermittently, such as in the 2008 Lhasa violence. Ogden credits the low incidence of conventional terrorism in Tibet to an undereducated population, swift and harsh responses to terrorism by the Chinese state, and the pacific influence of Buddhism. Nonetheless, there are segments of the Tibetan and Tibetan diasporic population who reject the leadership of the Dalai Lama and view violent opposition as the only viable route towards independence. Notable instances of violence against civilians include a series of attacks 1996 in the Tibetan capital of Lhasa, and a bombing in a public square in the city of Chengdu in April 2002, which Chinese authorities allege were carried out by Tibetan separatists. Chinese authorities adopt a broad definition of terrorism with respect to Tibet, and have labelled a variety of protests and expressions of opposition as terrorism. In 2012, for instance, authorities referred to the Dalai Lama's prayer sessions for Tibetan self-immolators as "terrorism in disguise." Authorities have also ascribed terrorist motives to Tibetan exiles who call for independence, and to Tibetan monks who travel to India without government authorization.

In 1958, Chushi Gangdruk ("Four Rivers, Six Ranges"), a Tibetan paramilitary group, was founded by Tibetan exiles with the aim of driving Chinese forces out of Tibet. The group operated from Mustang in northern Nepal, and received covert funding from the Central Intelligence Agency as well as the Kuomintang government in the Republic of China. Until 1960 around 259 Tibetans received arms training in Camp Hale, Colorado, under the guidance of CIA's Special Activities Division. Their activities ceased after 1972 Nixon visit to China normalized Sino-American relations, leading to the termination of the program by the CIA.

Terrorism in contemporary China

Legal definition and use

Under China's criminal law, acts of terrorism can carry a prison sentence of up to ten years. Since 2001, over 7,000 Chinese citizens have been convicted on terrorism charges. However, the law does not clearly define what constitutes a terrorist organization or activity. In October 2011, Chinese authorities began crafting a bill that would more clearly define terrorism. According to the state-run Xinhua News Agency, the draft bill defines terrorist acts as those that are intended "induce public fear or to coerce state organs or international organisations by means of violence, sabotage, threats or other tactics...These acts cause or aim to cause severe harm to society by causing casualties, bringing about major economic losses, damaging public facilities or disturbing social order." The government of the People's Republic of China identifies terrorism as one of "Three Evils" which also include separatism and religious fundamentalism. These forces are seen by Beijing as inter-connected threats to social stability and national security. In particular, terrorism is viewed as a violent manifestation of ethnic separatism, and separatism is understood as a corollary of religious zealotry.

Human rights and international law experts have raised concerns over the implications of the bills in light of the lack of judicial independence in the People's Republic of China. A representative of Human Rights Watch was reported as saying “strengthening law enforcement powers without appropriate judicial checks and balances is dangerous,” and further noted that it was unclear how and by whom organizations and individuals would be designated as terrorists.

Organizations designated as terrorists

The Ministry of Public Security issued a list of what it considers terrorist organizations on 15 December 2003. These include the Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement, the East Turkestan Liberation Organization, the World Uyghur Congress, and the East Turkistan Information Center. The Ministry further named eleven individuals as terrorists.

Out of these groups, the ETIM and ETLO were also designated to be terrorist groups by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and the United Nations. The United States refused China's request to designate the ETLO as such in 2003,, although US State Department says the ETLO has engaged "small politically-motivated bombings and armed attacks".

The Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement, whose aim is to the establishment of a fundamentalist Muslim state to be called "East Turkistan" and the conversion of all Chinese people to Islam, operates throughout Central Asia and claimed responsibility for over 200 acts of terrorism from 1990 to 2001, resulting in at least 162 deaths and 440 injuries. The group has a close relation with al-Qaeda and Taliban, having receiving funding and training in Afghanistan. The group was considerable weakened following the American-led invasion of Afghanistan which saw the death of its leader Hasan Mahsum, as well as Emir Abu Mohammed, who was killed in October 2003 in raid on an al-Qaeda training camp in Waziristan by Pakistani forces. According to Stratfor, following the death of Mahsum, the group fractured and a successor movement with ties to Central Asian militants was formed in Afghanistan, under the leadership of Abdul Haq. The reformed ETIM issuing several videos including threats to attack the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing, although no such large scale attacks took place. Haq was allegedly killed by an US drone strike in Afghanistan in March 2010.

ETIM's capabilities and existance as depicted by the Chinese government has raised doubt amongst Uyghur dissident groups; according to Uyghur expert Dru Gladney, the majority of information on ETIM derive from Chinese government sources and lack independent verification, while other analysts noted that the ETIM was "obscure but not unknown" before the 9/11 attacks, having been documented for over 20 years by both Chinese and non-Chinese scholars.

Furthermore, Uyghur dissident groups criticized the inclusion of the World Uyghur Congress and East Turkistan Information Center, claming that both groups are non-government organizations based in Germany which mainly serve to report information. Chinese state-media published a statement from terrorism scholar Rohan Gunaratna, who claimed that there are "many sympathizers and supporters" within the the WUC, and noted ETIM's role in "fuelling hatred" between the Han Chinese and Uyghur populace.

Chronology of major events

Following is a partial list of events that have been described as terror attacks or attempted terror attacks by non-state actors in the People's Republic of China. Due to variations in the definitions and applications of the term, the characterization of some events as terrorist attacks may be disputed. Many incidents listed occurred in Xinjiang or Tibet—areas where foreign journalists have extremely limited access, and are closely monitored if and when they gain permission to report in the regions. As such, many reports of violence or terror attacks cannot be confirmed independently, and foreign reporting frequently relies on information released by the government of China or in the state-run press. In several instances, conflicting narratives of these have emerged from witnesses or from diaspora groups.

Date	Location	Main article	Description
5 February 1992	Urumqi, Xinjiang	5 February 1992 Urumqi Bombings	Two buses exploded in Urumqi, resulting in at least 3 deaths, and 23 injured. Unconfirmed reports indicated the attacks were perpetrated by the East Turkestan Islamic Party. According to government documents, other bombs were discovered and defused in a local cinema and a residential building.
13 January 1996	Lhasa, Tibet		Four major attacks were acknowledged, although unofficial sources reported more. The attacks generally targeted and successfully wounded people, whereas earlier bombings targeted buildings, such an obelisk on the Qinghai-Tibet highway. On 13 January, a Tibetan Buddhist monk exploded a homemade bomb at a shop owned by Han Chinese. Five days later on 18 January, the house of Sengchen Lobsang Gyaltsen, the head lama of the Panchen Lama's Tashilhunpo Monastery, was bombed. Gyaltsen had opposed the 14th Dalai Lama to ordain Gyaincain Norbu in the 11th Panchen Lama controversy. He was out of his house at the time of the explosion, but a person nearby was "seriously injured", according to the South China Morning Post. No group claimed responsibility for the bombings, but China blamed forces loyal to the Dalai Lama. On 18 March, a bomb exploded at the regional government and local Communist Party compound. The government temporarily shut down tourism in Tibet in response. China initially denied all of the blasts, but later attributed them to separatists. The final blast of the year was detonated by remote control at 1:30 am on Christmas day, in front of the central Lhasa municipal government offices. Five people were injured, including two night watchmen and three shopkeepers. The official Radio Tibet called the blast "an appalling act of terrorism", and the Chinese government offered a $120,000 reward for the perpetrator. Vice Chairman of the Tibet Autonomous Region Gyamco called on residents to "heighten our alertness and strengthen preventive measures".
27 February 1997	Urumqi, Xinjiang	Urumqi bus bombs	Bombs detonated on three buses in Urumqi, leaving nine dead and 68 seriously wounded. The Uyghur Liberation Party claims responsibility for the bombings.
February - April 1998	Qaghiliq, Xinjiang		A series of six explosions ocurred in February and March aimed at economic and industrial targets. The following month, authorities reported that bombs exploded at homes and offices of local communist party and public security agents.
16 March 2001	Shijiazhuang, Hebei	Shijiazhuang bombings	108 civilians were killed when bombs tore through four city blocks in the city of Shijiazhang. The perpetrator, 41-year-old Jin Ruchao, was allegedly motivated by hated of his ex-wife. The government account was greeted with skepticism, however; and some sources suggested Jin may have been a scapegoat, and that the bombings may have been the work of disgruntled former factory workers frustrated by layoffs. The bombings were described in the New York Times as the deadliest mass murder in decades, and was characterized by China scholar Andrew Scobell as perhaps the worst terrorist act in the history of the People's Republic of China.
3 April 2002	Chengdu, Sichuan		On 3 April, 2002, a bomb described as a "simple fuse device" detonated in Tianfu Square in Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan province. According to local media reports, one individual was seriously injured, and many others were hurt in the blast. Two men were apprehended: 52-year-old Tibetan religious leader Tenzin Deleg Rinpoche, and 26-year-old Lobsang Dondrub. On 2 December, Rinpoche was given a two-year suspended death sentence for "causing explosions [and] inciting the separation of the state." Dondrub was also sentenced to death, and executed on 26 January 2003. The men maintained their innocence, and international observers expressed concerns over the legality of the trial.
5 January 2007	Pamirs Plateau, Xinjiang	Xinjiang raid	Chinese police raided a suspected East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) training camp in Akto County in the Pamirs plateau near the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. A spokesperson for the Xinjiang Public Security Bureau said that 18 terror suspects were killed and 17 captured. The raid also resulted in the death of one Chinese police officer and the injury of another. The Bureau said they confiscated hand grenades, guns, and makeshift explosives from the site.
9 March 2008	Urumqi, Xinjiang		Authorities had successfully foiled a terrorist attack on a commercial jet. The Souther China flight departed from Urumqi, and made an emergency landing in Lanzhou while en route to Beijing. Two individuals were reportedly taken into custody after flight crew discovered flammable material in the plane's toilet. Xinjiang Governor Nuer Baikeli told reporters that the perpetrators "attempted to create an air disaster," but authorities provided no further details.
4 August 2008	Kashgar, Xinjiang	2008 Kashgar attack	Suspected ETIM militants reportedly drove a truck into a group of approximately 70 jogging policemen. According to Chinese media accounts, they then got out of the truck wielding machetes, and lobbed grenades at the officers, killing 16 people. However, three tourists in the vicinity provided a different account of the event, saying that the attackers appeared to be uniformed paramilitary police officers attacking other officers with machetes.
10 August 2008	Kuqa County, Xinjiang		Seven men armed with homemade explosives reportedly drove taxis into government buildings, in Kuqa, Xinjiang, injuring at least two police officers and a security guard. Five of the assailants were shot and killed. The attacks began at 2:30 am when five assailants drove taxis into the local public security and industry and commerce buildings. The Communist Party chief in Xinjiang called the attack a "terrorist act" and suspected the ETIM was responsible.
12 August 2008	Yamanya, Xinjiang		Three security officers were allegedly killed in a stabbing incident in Yamanya, near Kashgar in Xinjiang. The report did not specify what the attacker’s affiliations were.
19 August 2010	Aksu, Xinjiang	2010 Aksu bombing	Six Uyghur men were allegedly involved in loading a vehicle with explosives and driving into a group of security officers at a highway intersection near Aksu, Xinjiang. Seven people, including two attackers, were killed, according to police. In the wake of the attack, authorities in the region vowed to crack down "relentlessly" on criminal activity.
18 July 2011	Hotan, Xinjiang	2011 Hotan attack	18 people died when 18 young Uyghur men stormed a police station in the city of Hotan. The men were alleged to have stabbed a security guard and two female hostages, and killed another security guard with a bomb. The attack ended when security officers shot and killed 14 of the attackers. Chinese media initially referred to the attackers as rioters or thugs, though subsequent accounts called the event a terrorist attack. The Germany-based World Uyghur Congress provided a different accounts of event, saying that authorities provoked clashes by opening fire on Uyghurs participating in a non-violent protest against heavy-handed security crackdowns in the city. The Turkistan Islamic Party later claimed responsibility for the attack.
30 - 31 July 2011	Kashgar, Xinjiang		At least 18 people died in an series of attacks in the city of Kashgar. According to local media accounts, the violence began when two Uyghur men hijacked a truck, ran it into a crowded street, and started stabbing people, killing six. The attack ended when the assailants were overpowered by the crowd, which killed one attacker. On the second day, it was reported that a "group of armed terrorists" stormed a restaurant, killed the owner and a waiter, and set it ablaze. They then proceeded to indiscriminately kill four more civilians. Armed clashes then reportedly ensured, ending with police capturing or killing the attackers. The Turkistan Islamic Party later claimed responsibility for the attack. One of the suspects appeared in a TIP video training in Pakistan.

Counter-terrorism

Domestic counter-terrorism

A soldier on patrol Lhasa, Tibet. Chinese authorities have launched "strike-hard" campaigns targeting unsanctioned religious activity and separatism.

According to politics professor Chien-peng Chung, following a spate of unrest and violence in Xinjiang and Tibet in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Chinese authorities adopted a variety of approach to suppress what it considers the "three evils": terrorism, separatism, and religious fundamentalism, which the government considers to be interconnected threats to its authorities. To combat these, the government promoted economic development through investments in infrastructure, tourism, and capital investment to spur growth, and encouraged ethnic Han migration into the western regions. In addition, authorities launched "strike hard" campaigns against crime, which also had the effect of targeting expressions of separatism and unauthorized religious practice.

Chien noted that in recent years, Chinese authorities have allowed for a gradual expansion of individual freedoms in many spheres, all the while maintaining strict control over religious, cultural, and literary associations of ethnic minorities in Xinjiang and Tibet. In 1997, a "strike hard" campaign began in Tibet and Xinjiang involving in tightly controlling religious activities and festivals. In Tibet, authorities sought to curtail the influence of the Dalai Lama by banning all displays of his image, and in 1995, authorities replaced his choice of the number two Panchen Lama with a Beijing-approved candidate. In Xinjiang, authorities placed restrictions on unofficial religious practices, and closely monitored Muslims returning from madrasah schools overseas. Following the September 11 attacks, such schools were perceived as hotbeds of religious extremism and anti-Western sentiments.

Chien also noted that corresponding to the launch of strike-hard campaigns and economic stimulus efforts, there was a apparent decrease in the level of organized violent protest or bombings in the Western autonomous regions. Whereas levels of anti-government violence were high from 1987-1997, reported instances were virtually non-existent in the several years that followed. In the aftermath of the strike-hard campaigns, Tibetan and Uyghur dissident groups overseas have adjusted their strategies in promoting their causes: as of 1998 the Dalai Lama has no longer called for outright Tibetan independence, and Uyghur groups have become more adept in framing their cause as one of human rights and free elections. Chien noted that while instances of violent organized protest and bombings have decreased, heightened tensions between local ethnic groups and the Han Chinese who have migrated into Xinjiang and Tibet en masse since the 1990s. According to Chien, in terms of public relations and reporting incidences of violence, local authorities are encouraged to take accounts of foreign investments so that they would not be discouraged by violence, but at the same time, authorities needed justifications to initiate actions against separatist groups.

International relations

The government of the People’s Republic of China has engaged in cooperation at the bilateral and multilateral level to gain support for its efforts to combat terrorism and ethnic separatism. This has increased following the September 11 attacks in the United States, which led to the global War on Terror.

Much of this cooperation involves the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, which includes several Central Asian states, home to large ethnic Uyghur populations. The Chinese government has periodically requested that authorities in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan crack down on Uyghur secessionists, and that they extradite suspected terrorists and separatists to China. The Government of Kazakhstan has consistently extradited Uyghur terrorist suspects to China and in 2006 participated in a large-scale, joint counter-terrorism drill.

The Chinese and Kyrgyz governments increased security along their borders with each other and Tajikistan in January 2007 after Chinese government officials expressed concern that alleged international terrorists were traveling through Xinjiang and Central Asia to carry out attacks. The warning followed a high-profile raid on a training camp in Akto County, Xinjiang run by suspected East Turkestan Islamic Movement members.

In 2006, American forces captured 22 Uyghur militants from combat zones in Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2006 on information that they were linked to Al-Qaeda. They were imprisoned for five to seven years in Guantanamo Bay, where they testified that they were trained by ETIM leader Abdul Haq, at an ETIM training camp. After being reclassified as No Longer Enemy Combatant, a panel of judges ordered them released into the United States, as they could not be released back to China because of human rights concerns. A Chinese government spokesman denounced the move as a violation of international law and demanded the return of the men to China.

See also

• Terrorism in Central Asia
• Terrorism in Russia
• Crime in the People's Republic of China

External links

• Senior Chinese official issues Bush rebuke
• Explosions in Xinjiang
• Pakistan hands over Muslim separatist leader-China
• Al-Qaeda's China problem
• China's Post 9/11 Terrorism Strategy
• Five Lessons from China's War on Terror
• Violent Separatism in Xinjiang
• Uyghur Muslim Ethnic Separatism in Xinjiang, China