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The loss of life did not meet the scale of the 1943 Bengal or earlier famines but continued to be a problem. Jean Drèze finds that the post-Independence Indian government "largely remedied" the causes of the three major failures of 1880–1948 British famine policy, "an event which must count as marking the second great turning-point in the history of famine relief in India over the past two centuries".{{sfn|Drèze|1991|p=35}} Although large scale famines have disappeared from India after independence, mass poverty and hunger are persistent problems. The relief measures had proved to be effective and they limited the impact of the devastating drought causing relatively little damage in terms of excess mortality, nutritional deficits and asset depletion.{{sfn|Drèze|1991|p=99}}
The loss of life did not meet the scale of the 1943 Bengal or earlier famines but continued to be a problem. Jean Drèze finds that the post-Independence Indian government "largely remedied" the causes of the three major failures of 1880–1948 British famine policy, "an event which must count as marking the second great turning-point in the history of famine relief in India over the past two centuries".{{sfn|Drèze|1991|p=35}} Although large scale famines have disappeared from India after independence, mass poverty and hunger are persistent problems. The relief measures had proved to be effective and they limited the impact of the devastating drought causing relatively little damage in terms of excess mortality, nutritional deficits and asset depletion.{{sfn|Drèze|1991|p=99}}


====Bihar, Maharashtra and West Bengal droughts====
C====Bihar, Maharashtra and West Bengal droughts====
[[File:Starved child.jpg|thumb|A child suffering [[Marasmus]], extreme starvation, in 1972.]]
[[File:Starved child.jpg|thumb|A child suffering [[Marasmus]], extreme starvation, in 1972.]]
Annual production of food grains dropped in Bihar from 7.5 million tonnes in 1965-1966 to 7.2 million tonnes in 1966-1967 during the Bihar drought with an even sharper drop in 1966-1967 to 4.3 million tonnes. The national grain production dropped from 89.4 million tonnes in 1964-65 to 72.3 in 1965-1966, a 19% drop. Rise in prices of food grains caused migration and starvation but the public distribution system, relief measures by government and voluntary organizations limited the impact.{{sfn|American Association for the Advancement of Science|Indian National Science Academy|International Rice Research Institute|Indian Council of Agricultural Research|1989|pp=378-9}} On a number of occasions the Indian-government sought food and grain from the United States to provide replacement for damaged crops. In order to prevent deaths from the famine, the government setup more than 20,000 fair-price stores to provide food at regulated prices for the poor or those with limited incomes.{{sfn|Cuny|1999|p=54}} A large scale famine in Bihar was adverted due to this import, although livestock and crops were destroyed. The Bihar drought of 1966–67 gave impetus to further changes in agricultural policy and this resulted in the Green Revolution.{{sfn|Thakur|Sinha|Prasad|Pratap|2005|p=585}} After several years of good monsoons and a good crop in the early 1970s India considered exporting food and being self-sufficient. Earlier in 1963 the government of the state of Maharashtra asserted that the agricultural situation in the state was constantly being watched and relief measures were taken as soon as any scarcity was detected. On the basis of this and asserting that the word 'famine' had now become obsolete in this context, the government passed the ‘The Maharashtra Deletion Of The Term “Famine” Act, 1963”{{sfn|Sainath|2010|p=1}} but they were unable to foresee the drought in 1972. The drought occurred while India was drawing on it's own food reserves, first to feed the 10 million refugees from East Pakistan then to export food to the newly independent Bangladesh in 1972.{{sfn|Brown|Eckholm|1974|p=}} In 1972 the United States stopped supplying food aid and shortages of fertilizer due to a lack of foreign currency did not help. Some 25 million people needed help during this drought. The relief measures undertaken by the Government of Maharashtra included employment, programs aimed at creating productive assets such as tree plantation, conservation of soil, excavation of canals and building [[Man-made lentic water bodies of Maharashtra|artificial lentic water bodies]]. The public distribution system distributed food through fair price shops. No deaths from starvation were reported.{{sfn|American Association for the Advancement of Science|Indian National Science Academy|International Rice Research Institute|Indian Council of Agricultural Research|1989|pp=379}}
Annual production of food grains dropped in Bihar from 7.5 million tonnes in 1965-1966 to 7.2 million tonnes in 1966-1967 during the Bihar drought with an even sharper drop in 1966-1967 to 4.3 million tonnes. The national grain production dropped from 89.4 million tonnes in 1964-65 to 72.3 in 1965-1966, a 19% drop. Rise in prices of food grains caused migration and starvation but the public distribution system, relief measures by government and voluntary organizations limited the impact.{{sfn|American Association for the Advancement of Science|Indian National Science Academy|International Rice Research Institute|Indian Council of Agricultural Research|1989|pp=378-9}} On a number of occasions the Indian-government sought food and grain from the United States to provide replacement for damaged crops. In order to prevent deaths from the famine, the government setup more than 20,000 fair-price stores to provide food at regulated prices for the poor or those with limited incomes.{{sfn|Cuny|Hill|1999|p=54}} A large scale famine in Bihar was adverted due to this import, although livestock and crops were destroyed. The Bihar drought of 1966–67 gave impetus to further changes in agricultural policy and this resulted in the Green Revolution.{{sfn|Thakur|Sinha|Prasad|Pratap|2005|p=585}} After several years of good monsoons and a good crop in the early 1970s India considered exporting food and being self-sufficient. Earlier in 1963 the government of the state of Maharashtra asserted that the agricultural situation in the state was constantly being watched and relief measures were taken as soon as any scarcity was detected. On the basis of this and asserting that the word 'famine' had now become obsolete in this context, the government passed the ‘The Maharashtra Deletion Of The Term “Famine” Act, 1963”{{sfn|Sainath|2010|p=1}} but they were unable to foresee the drought in 1972. The drought occurred while India was drawing on it's own food reserves, first to feed the 10 million refugees from East Pakistan then to export food to the newly independent Bangladesh in 1972.{{sfn|Brown|Eckholm|1974|p=}} In 1972 the United States stopped supplying food aid and shortages of fertilizer due to a lack of foreign currency did not help. Some 25 million people needed help during this drought. The relief measures undertaken by the Government of Maharashtra included employment, programs aimed at creating productive assets such as tree plantation, conservation of soil, excavation of canals and building [[Man-made lentic water bodies of Maharashtra|artificial lentic water bodies]]. The public distribution system distributed food through fair price shops. No deaths from starvation were reported.{{sfn|American Association for the Advancement of Science|Indian National Science Academy|International Rice Research Institute|Indian Council of Agricultural Research|1989|pp=379}}
This help was provided in the form of large scale employment to the deprived sections of Maharashtrian society which attracted considerable amounts of food to Maharashtra. The implementation of the Scarcity Manuals in the Bihar and Maharashtra droughts prevented the mortality arising from severe food shortages. While the relief program in Bihar was poor, Drèze calls the one in Maharastra a model program. The relief works initiated by the government helped employ over 5 million people at the height of the drought in Maharashtra leading to effective famine prevention.{{sfn|Waal|1997|p=15}} The effectiveness of the Maharashtra was also attributable to the direct pressure on the government of Maharashtra by the public via marching, picketing and even rioting who perceived that employment via the relief works program was their right.{{sfn|Drèze|1991|pp=92–93}} Drèze reports a laborer saying "they would let us die if they thought we would not make a noise about it."{{sfn|Drèze|1991|pp=93}}
This help was provided in the form of large scale employment to the deprived sections of Maharashtrian society which attracted considerable amounts of food to Maharashtra. The implementation of the Scarcity Manuals in the Bihar and Maharashtra droughts prevented the mortality arising from severe food shortages. While the relief program in Bihar was poor, Drèze calls the one in Maharastra a model program. The relief works initiated by the government helped employ over 5 million people at the height of the drought in Maharashtra leading to effective famine prevention.{{sfn|Waal|1997|p=15}} The effectiveness of the Maharashtra was also attributable to the direct pressure on the government of Maharashtra by the public via marching, picketing and even rioting who perceived that employment via the relief works program was their right.{{sfn|Drèze|1991|pp=92–93}} Drèze reports a laborer saying "they would let us die if they thought we would not make a noise about it."{{sfn|Drèze|1991|pp=93}}
The dought of 1979-80 in West Bengal was the next major drought causing a 17% decline in food production with a shortfall of 13.5 million tonnes of food grain. Stored food stocks were leveraged by the government and there was no net import of food grains. The drought was relatively unknown outside of India.{{sfn|American Association for the Advancement of Science|Indian National Science Academy|International Rice Research Institute|Indian Council of Agricultural Research|1989|pp=380}} The lessons learned from the Maharashtra and West Bengal droughts led to the Desert Development Program and the Drought Prone Area Program. The motivation of these programs was to reduce the negative effects of droughts by applying eco-friendly land use practices and also by conserving water. Major schemes in improving rural infrastructure, extend area under irrigation and diversifying agriculture were also launched. The learning from the 1987 drought brought to light the need for employment generation, watershed planning, and ecologically integrated development.{{sfn|Thakur|Sinha|Prasad|Pratap|2005|p=585}}
The dought of 1979-80 in West Bengal was the next major drought causing a 17% decline in food production with a shortfall of 13.5 million tonnes of food grain. Stored food stocks were leveraged by the government and there was no net import of food grains. The drought was relatively unknown outside of India.{{sfn|American Association for the Advancement of Science|Indian National Science Academy|International Rice Research Institute|Indian Council of Agricultural Research|1989|pp=380}} The lessons learned from the Maharashtra and West Bengal droughts led to the Desert Development Program and the Drought Prone Area Program. The motivation of these programs was to reduce the negative effects of droughts by applying eco-friendly land use practices and also by conserving water. Major schemes in improving rural infrastructure, extend area under irrigation and diversifying agriculture were also launched. The learning from the 1987 drought brought to light the need for employment generation, watershed planning, and ecologically integrated development.{{sfn|Thakur|Sinha|Prasad|Pratap|2005|p=585}}

Revision as of 02:35, 29 October 2010

Template:Famines in India Famine has been a recurrent feature of life in South Asia, reaching its numerically deadliest peak in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Historical and legendary evidence names some 90 famines in 2,500 years of history, two-thirds of those since 1700.[1] There were 14 famines in India between 11th and 17th century. Famines in India resulted in more than 37 million deaths over the course of the 18th, 19th, and early 20th centuries. The last famines were the Bihar starvation in December 1966 and a drought in Maharashtra in 1970–1973.

Indian agriculture is heavily dependent on the climate of India: a favorable southwest summer monsoon is critical in securing water for irrigating Indian crops. In the past, droughts have periodically led to major Indian famines, including the Bengal famine of 1770, the Chalisa famine, the Doji bara famine, the Great Famine of 1876–78; and the Bengal famine of 1943.[2][3] Some historians, social scientists, contemporary critics, and participants have identified British government inaction and adherence to utilitarian, mercantilist, and Malthusian policies as contributing factors to the severity of famine during the time that India was under British rule. The post-1880 Indian Famine Codes, some transportation improvements, and democratic rule after independence have been identified as furthering famine relief. In India, traditionally, agricultural laborers and rural artisans are the primary victims in famines. In worse conditions cultivators are also susceptible.[4]

Famines by period

Famines in pre-colonial South Asia

One of the earliest treatises on famine relief goes back more than 2000 years, commonly attributed to Kautilya, who recommends that the good king build new forts, water-works, share his provisions with the people or entrust the country to another king.[5] Historically, Indian rulers have employed several methods in famine relief. Some of these were direct such as free distribution of food grains, throwing open grain stores and kitchens to the people. Other measures were monetary policies such as remission of revenue, remission of taxes, increase of pay to soldiers and payment of advances. Yet other measures included construction of public works, canals and embankments, sinking wells; even migration was encouraged.[5] The ancient Ashokan edicts of the Mauryan age around 269 BC record the emperor Ashoka's conquest of Kalinga, roughly the modern state of Orissa. The major rock and pillar edicts mention that massive human toll of the war of about 100,000 and that an even larger number, many times of the 100,000 later perished presumably from wounds and famine.[6] During the 1022–1033, great famines made all the provinces in India depopulated.[citation needed] The Tughlaq dynasty under Muhammad bin Tughluq held power in Delhi during the famine of 1335–42 in and around Delhi. The sultanate offered no relief to the starving residents of Delhi during this famine which took the lives of residents of Delhi and surrounding areas.[7] The oldest famine in pre-colonial Deccan with well preserved local documentation is the famine of 1791–92. Relief was provided by the ruler, the Peshwa Sawai Madhavrao II, in the form of imposing restrictions on export of grain and importing rice in large quantities from Bengal via private trading. Other pre-colonial famines in the Deccan were the great Durgadevi famine between 1396 and 1407, the Damajipant famine of 1460 and the famines starting in 1520 and 1629. The Famine in the Deccan and Gujarat killed at least 2 million people in 1630–32. The Damajipant famine is said to have caused equal ruin both in the northern and southern parts of the Deccan.[8]

Famines under British rule

A contemporary print of the Madras famine of 1877 showing the distribution of relief in Bellary, Madras Presidency. From the Illustrated London News (1877)

The late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries saw the worst famines.[fn 1] The first, the Bengal famine of 1770, is estimated to have taken nearly one-third of the population of the region, about 10 million people.[9] The impact of the famine caused East India Company revenues from Bengal to decline to £ 174,300 in 1770-1771. As a result, the stock price of the East India Company fell sharply. The company was forced to obtain a loan of £ 1 million from the Bank of England to fund the annual military budget of between pounds 60,000 to 1 million.[10] Attempts were later made to show that net revenue was unaffected by the famine but this was possible only due to the fact that the collection had been "violently kept up to its former standard".[11][fn 2] The 1901 Famine Commission found that twelve famines and four "severe scarcities" took place between 1765 and 1858.

The famines were a product both of uneven rainfall and British economic and administrative policies.[13][14][15] Colonial polices implicated include rack-renting, additional levies for war, free trade policies, the expansion of export agriculture, and neglect of agricultural investment.[16][17] Indian exports of opium, rice, wheat, indigo, and cotton were a key component of the economy of the British empire, generating vital foreign currency primarily from China and stabilizing low prices in the British grain market.[18][19] However, export crops displaced millions of acres used for domestic subsistence, increasing the vulnerability of Indians to food crises.[18] The Orissa famine of 1866–67 was one such famine which later spread through the Madras Presidency to Hyderabad and Mysore.[20] Similar famines followed in western Ganges region, Rajasthan, central India (1868–70), Bengal and eastern India (1873–1874), Deccan (1876–78) and again in Ganges region, Madras, Hyderabad, Mysore, Bombay (1876–1878).[20] These famines were typically followed by various infectious diseases such as the bubonic plague and influenza attacking and killing an already weakened population due to the starvation from famines.[21] The Bengal famine of 1943 reached its peak between July and November of that year. Famine fatality statistics were unreliable and a range of between 2–4 million has been suggested. Mike Davis – has claimed that these famines were actually 'Late Victorian Holocausts' in 1870s and 1890s. This negative image of British rule enjoys wide currency in India.[22]

Major famines in India (Death estimates in millions, where available)

Before British rule (1000–1745)[23][24][25] Under British rule (1800–1900)[23][24][25]
Century Famines Location
11th
2
local
13th
1
Around Delhi
14th
3
local
15th
2
local
16th
3
All local
17th
3
Area not defined
18th
(1745)
4
Northwestern provinces
Delhi, Sindh (twice), local
Total
18
-
Years Famines Deaths
1800 - 1825
5
1
1835–1850
2
5
1850–1875
6
5
1875–1900
18
26
Total
31
37

British response

The first major famine that took place under British rule was the Bengal Famine of 1770. About a quarter to a third of the population of Bengal starved to death in about a ten month period. East India Company's raising of taxes disastrously coincided with this famine[26] and exacerbated it even if the famine was not caused by the British regime.[27] Following this famine "Successive British governments were anxious not to add to the burden of taxation."[28] In 1866 the rains failed again in Bengal and Orissa. Food was rushed into the famine stricken zones. The result of which was that the famine was alleviated in Bengal although a Monsoon in Orissa forced the closure of the harbor. As a result food could not be imported into Orissa as easily as Bengal.[29] In 1865–66, severe drought struck Orissa and was met by British official inaction. The British Secretary of State for India Lord Salisbury did nothing for two months by which time a million people had died. The lack of taking any precautions whatsoever caused Salisbury to never feel free from the blame.[fn 3] Some British citizens such as William Digby agitated for policy reforms and famine relief, but Lord Lytton, the governing British viceroy in India, opposed such changes in the belief that they would stimulate shirking by Indian workers. Reacting against calls for relief during the 1877–79 famine, Lytton replied, "Let the British public foot the bill for its 'cheap sentiment,' if it wished to save life at a cost that would bankrupt India," substantively ordering "there is to be no interference of any kind on the part of Government with the object of reducing the price of food," and instructing district officers to "discourage relief works in every possible way.... Mere distress is not a sufficient reason for opening a relief work."[31] In 1874 the response from the British authorities was better. Famine was completely averted. Then in 1876 a huge famine broke out in Madras. Lord Lytton's administration believed that 'market forces alone would suffice to feed the starving Indians.'[26][fn 4]

The results of such thinking proved fatal (some 5.5 million starved)[33] and so such a policy was abandoned. Lord Lytton established the Famine Insurance Grant, a system in which, in times of financial surplus, 1,500,000 would be applied to famine relief works. The results of this were that the British prematurely assumed that the problem of famine had been solved forever which made future British viceroys complacent and this proved disastrous in 1896.[34] Lord Curzon tried to alleviate the famine, he spent 68,000,000 (about £10,000,000) to try and reduce the effects of the famine[35][dubiousdiscuss] and, at its peak, 4.5 million people were on famine relief. However, Curzon stated that such philanthropy would be criticized and not doing so would be a crime.[fn 5] He also cut back rations that he characterized as "dangerously high" and stiffened relief eligibility by reinstating the Temple tests.[37] In total, between 1.25 to 10 million people were killed in the famine.[38][39] The Famine during World War II lead to the development of the Bengal Famine Mixture this would later save tens of thousands of lives at the liberated concentration camps such as Belsen.[40]

Famine Codes

The Famine Commission of 1880 observed that each province in British India, including Burma, had a surplus of food grains, and the annual surplus amounted to 5.16 million tons (Bhatia, 1970). The product of the Famine Commission were a series of government guidelines and regulations on how to respond to famines and food shortages. These had to wait until the exit of the viceroy Edward Robert Bulwer-Lytton, Lord Lytton and were finally passed in 1883 under a liberal British viceroy, George Fredrick Samuel Robinson, Lord Ripon and were called the Famine code. They presented an early-warning system to detect and respond to food shortages.[41] Despite the codes, mortality from famine was the highest in last 25 years of the 19th century.[42][43] At that time, annual export of rice and other grains from India was approximately one million tons. At about the same time the British engaged themselves in a series of canal building and irrigation improvements.[citation needed] Development economist Jean Drèze evaluates the conditions before and after Famine Commission policy changes: "a contrast between the earlier period of frequently recurring catastrophes, and the latter period when long stretches of tranquility were disturbed by a few large scale famines" in 1896–97, 1899–1900, and 1943–44.[44] Drèze explains these "intermittent failures" by four factors—failure to declare a famine (particularly in 1943), the "excessively punitive character" of famine restrictions such as wages for public works, the "policy of strict non-interference with private trade," and the natural severity of the food crises.[44] In 1907 and in 1874[citation needed] the response from the British was better: in both cases rice was imported abroad and famine was averted.

There was the threat of famine but after 1902 there was no major famine in India until the Bengal famine of 1943 which was the most devastating, killing between 2.5 and 3 million during World War II.[45] In India as a whole, the food supply was rarely inadequate even in times of droughts and the Famine Commission of 1880 identified that the loss of wages from lack of employment of agricultural laborers and artisans was the cause of famines. The Famine Codes applied a strategy of generating employment for these sections of the population and relied on open ended public works for doing so.[46] Many of these Famine Codes have been updated in independent India and have been renamed "Scarcity Manuals"; in some parts of the country, the Famine Codes are no longer used but that is primarily because the rules embodied in them have become routine procedure in famine relief strategy.[47]

Impact of rail transport

Railroad network on the eve of the worst famines in Indian history in 1870

During the famines of the 1870s, the failure to provide food to the millions who were hungry has been blamed both on the absence of adequate rail infrastructure and the incorporation of grain into the world market through rail and telegraph. Davis[48] notes that, "The newly constructed railroads, lauded as institutional safeguards against famine, were instead used by merchants to ship grain inventories from outlying drought-stricken districts to central depots for hoarding (as well as protection from rioters)" and that telegraphs served to coordinate a rise in prices so that "food prices soared out of the reach of outcaste laborers, displaced weavers, sharecroppers and poor peasants." Members of the British administrative apparatus were also concerned that the larger market created by railway transport encouraged poor peasants to sell of their reserve stocks of grain.[49]

However, rail transport also played an essential role in supplying grain from food-surplus regions to famine-stricken ones. The 1880 Famine Codes urged a restructuring and massive expansion of railways, with an emphasis on intra-Indian lines, as opposed to the existing port-centered system. These new lines, extended the existing network to allow food to flow to famine-afflicted regions.[50] Jean Drèze (1991) also finds that the necessary economic conditions were present for a national market in food to reduce scarcity by the end of the 19th century, but that export of food continued to result from that market even during times of relative scarcity. The effectiveness of this system, however, relied on government provision of famine relief: "Railroads could perform the crucial task of moving grain from one part of India to another, but they could not assure that hungry people would have the money to buy that grain".[51]

Railways also had a separate impact on reducing famine mortality: by generating broader areas of labor migration, and facilitating the massive emigration of Indians during the late 19th century, they provided famine-afflicted people the option to leave to other parts of the country and the world. By the 1912–13 scarcity crisis, migration and relief supply were able to absorb the impact of a medium-scale shortage of food.[52] Drèze concludes, "In sum, and with a major reservation applying to international trade, it is plausible that the improvement in communication toward the end of the nineteenth century did make a major contribution to the alleviation of distress during famines. However, it is also easy to see that this factor alone could hardly account for the very sharp reduction in the incidence of famines in the twentieth century".[53]

Famines since independence

Indian Independence in 1947 did not stop damage to crops nor lack of rain; the threat of famines did not go away. India faced a number of threats of severe famines in 1967, 1973, 1979 and 1987 in Bihar, Maharashtra, West Bengal and Gujarat respectively. However these did not materialize in to famines due to government intervention.[54] The loss of life did not meet the scale of the 1943 Bengal or earlier famines but continued to be a problem. Jean Drèze finds that the post-Independence Indian government "largely remedied" the causes of the three major failures of 1880–1948 British famine policy, "an event which must count as marking the second great turning-point in the history of famine relief in India over the past two centuries".[55] Although large scale famines have disappeared from India after independence, mass poverty and hunger are persistent problems. The relief measures had proved to be effective and they limited the impact of the devastating drought causing relatively little damage in terms of excess mortality, nutritional deficits and asset depletion.[56]

C====Bihar, Maharashtra and West Bengal droughts====

A child suffering Marasmus, extreme starvation, in 1972.

Annual production of food grains dropped in Bihar from 7.5 million tonnes in 1965-1966 to 7.2 million tonnes in 1966-1967 during the Bihar drought with an even sharper drop in 1966-1967 to 4.3 million tonnes. The national grain production dropped from 89.4 million tonnes in 1964-65 to 72.3 in 1965-1966, a 19% drop. Rise in prices of food grains caused migration and starvation but the public distribution system, relief measures by government and voluntary organizations limited the impact.[57] On a number of occasions the Indian-government sought food and grain from the United States to provide replacement for damaged crops. In order to prevent deaths from the famine, the government setup more than 20,000 fair-price stores to provide food at regulated prices for the poor or those with limited incomes.[58] A large scale famine in Bihar was adverted due to this import, although livestock and crops were destroyed. The Bihar drought of 1966–67 gave impetus to further changes in agricultural policy and this resulted in the Green Revolution.[42] After several years of good monsoons and a good crop in the early 1970s India considered exporting food and being self-sufficient. Earlier in 1963 the government of the state of Maharashtra asserted that the agricultural situation in the state was constantly being watched and relief measures were taken as soon as any scarcity was detected. On the basis of this and asserting that the word 'famine' had now become obsolete in this context, the government passed the ‘The Maharashtra Deletion Of The Term “Famine” Act, 1963”[59] but they were unable to foresee the drought in 1972. The drought occurred while India was drawing on it's own food reserves, first to feed the 10 million refugees from East Pakistan then to export food to the newly independent Bangladesh in 1972.[60] In 1972 the United States stopped supplying food aid and shortages of fertilizer due to a lack of foreign currency did not help. Some 25 million people needed help during this drought. The relief measures undertaken by the Government of Maharashtra included employment, programs aimed at creating productive assets such as tree plantation, conservation of soil, excavation of canals and building artificial lentic water bodies. The public distribution system distributed food through fair price shops. No deaths from starvation were reported.[61] This help was provided in the form of large scale employment to the deprived sections of Maharashtrian society which attracted considerable amounts of food to Maharashtra. The implementation of the Scarcity Manuals in the Bihar and Maharashtra droughts prevented the mortality arising from severe food shortages. While the relief program in Bihar was poor, Drèze calls the one in Maharastra a model program. The relief works initiated by the government helped employ over 5 million people at the height of the drought in Maharashtra leading to effective famine prevention.[62] The effectiveness of the Maharashtra was also attributable to the direct pressure on the government of Maharashtra by the public via marching, picketing and even rioting who perceived that employment via the relief works program was their right.[63] Drèze reports a laborer saying "they would let us die if they thought we would not make a noise about it."[64] The dought of 1979-80 in West Bengal was the next major drought causing a 17% decline in food production with a shortfall of 13.5 million tonnes of food grain. Stored food stocks were leveraged by the government and there was no net import of food grains. The drought was relatively unknown outside of India.[65] The lessons learned from the Maharashtra and West Bengal droughts led to the Desert Development Program and the Drought Prone Area Program. The motivation of these programs was to reduce the negative effects of droughts by applying eco-friendly land use practices and also by conserving water. Major schemes in improving rural infrastructure, extend area under irrigation and diversifying agriculture were also launched. The learning from the 1987 drought brought to light the need for employment generation, watershed planning, and ecologically integrated development.[42]

Malnutrution

Deaths from malnutrition on a large scale have continued across India into modern times. In Maharashtra alone, for example, there were around 45,000 childhood deaths due to mild or severe malnutrition in 2009, according to the Times of India.[66] Another Times of India report in 2010 has stated that 50% of childhood deaths in India are attributable to malnutrition.[67] Around 7.5 million people a year die of malnutrition in modern India, the largest death rate of any country on earth for this cause of death.

Infrastructure development after independence

National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development
NABARD logo
NABARD logo
HeadquartersMumbai, Maharashtra, India
EstablishedJuly 12, 1982[68]
CurrencyRupees ()
Reserves118,176 crore (US$14 billion) (March 31, 2009)[69]
WebsiteOfficial Website

Deaths from starvation were reduced by improvements to famine relief mechanisms after the British left. In independent India, policy changes aimed to make people self reliant to earn their livelihood and by providing food through the public distribution system at discounted rates.[42] Between 1947–64 the initial agricultural infrastructure was laid by the founding of organizations such as Central Rice Institute in Cuttack, the Central Potato Research Institute in Shimla, and universities such as the Pant Nagar University. The population of India was growing at 3% a year and food imports were required despite the improvements from the new infrastructure . At its peak 10 million tonnes of food was imported from the United States.[70] In the twenty year period between 1965–1985 gaps in infrastructure were bridged by the establishment of The National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD). During times of famines, droughts and other natural calamities, NABARD provides loan rescheduling and loan conversion facilitates to eligible institutions such as State Cooperative banks and Regional Rural Banks for periods up to 7 years.[71][72] In the same period, high yielding varieties of wheat and rice were introduced. Steps taken in this phase resulted in the Green Revolution which led to a mood of self confidence in India's agricultural capability.[70] The Green Revolution in India was initially hailed as a success but has recently been 'downgraded' to a 'qualified success' not because of a lack of increased food production but because the increase in food production has slowed down and has not been able to keep pace with population growth.[73] Between 1985–2000 emphasis was laid on production of pulses and oilseed as well as vegetables and fruits and milk. A wasteland development board was setup and rain fed areas were given more attention but public investment in irrigation and infrastructure declined. The period also saw a gradual collapse of the cooperative credit system.[70] In 1998-99, NABARD introduced a credit scheme to allow banks to issue short-term and timely credit to farmers in need via the Kisan Credit Card scheme. The scheme has become popular among issuing bankers and the recipient farmers with a total credit of 33,994 crore (US$4.1 billion) made available via the issuing of 23,200,000 credit cards as of November 2002.[74] Between 2000 and present day land use for food or fuel has become a competing issue due to a demand for ethanol.

Famines are easy to prevent if there is a serious effort to prevent them, and a government of a democratic country-facing elections, criticisms from opposition parties and independent newspapers-cannot but make a serious effort to prevent famines. Not surprisingly, while India continued to have famines under British rule right up to independence (the last famine was in 1943, four years before independence, which I witnessed as a child), they disappeared suddenly, after independence, with the establishment of a multi-part democracy with a free press.[75]

It is to the credit of Independent India that famines of this kind have not been allowed to occur, although our population has grown from 350 million in 1947 to 1,100 million now.[70]

Warnings

Growing export prices, the melting of the Himalayan glaciers due to global warming, changes in rainfall and temperatures are the primary issues. If agricultural production does not remain above the population growth rate, there are indications that a return to the pre-independence famine days is a likelihood. People from various walks of life, such as social activist Vandana Shiva and researcher Dan Banik agree about the elimination of famines and the resulting large scale loss of life from starvation after Indian independence in 1947.[fn 6] However Shiva warned in 2002 that if further action wasn't taken, famines, would make a comeback to the scale seen in the Horn of Africa in three or four years.[76]

See also

Footnotes

  1. ^ "Although all of India suffered to some extent in the early eighteenth century, without question the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were that country’s time of famines."[1]
  2. ^ The Company was widely regarded as a pack of bloodsuckers, the Whig leader Lord Rockingham, calling them guilty of "rapine and oppression" in Bengal.[12]
  3. ^ "I did nothing for two months. Before that time the monsoon had closed the ports of Orissa—help was impossible—and—it is said—a million people died. The Governments of India and Bengal had taken in effect no precautions whatever.… I never could feel that I was free from all blame for the result." --The British Secretary of State for India, Lord Salisbury.[30]
  4. ^ In the despatch addressed to the Duke of Buckingham, in which the Viceroy announced his intention of visiting the famine districts of Madras and Mysores, the general principles for the management of famine affairs were once more laid down. After stating that the Government of India, with approval of Her Majesty’s Government, were resolved to avert death by starvation by the employment of all means available, the Viceroy first expressed his conviction that ‘absolute non-interference with the operations of private commercial enterprise must be the foundation of their present famine policy.’ This on the ground that ‘free and abundant trade cannot co-exist with Government importation’ and that more food will reach the famine stricken districts if private enterprise is left to itself (beyond receiving every possible facility and information from the government) than if it were paralysed by Government competition.[32]
  5. ^ Any government which imperiled the financial position of India in the interests of prodigal philanthropy would be open to serious criticism; but any government which by indiscriminate alms-giving weakened the fiber and demoralized the self-reliance of the population, would be guilty of a public crime.[36]
  6. ^ There has not been a large-scale loss of life since 1947.[76]

Citations

  1. ^ a b Murton 2000, p. 1412.
  2. ^ Nash 2003, pp. 22–23.
  3. ^ Collier & Webb 2002, p. 67.
  4. ^ Drèze 1991, p. 17.
  5. ^ a b Drèze 1991, p. 19.
  6. ^ Keay 2001, p. 91.
  7. ^ Walsh 2006, pp. 71, 292.
  8. ^ Bombay (India : State) 1883, p. 105.
  9. ^ Visaria & Visaria 1983, p. 477.
  10. ^ James 2000, pp. 49–52.
  11. ^ Bowen 2002, p. 104.
  12. ^ James 2000, pp. 51.
  13. ^ Srivastava 1968.
  14. ^ Sen 1982.
  15. ^ Bhatia 1985.
  16. ^ Mander 2009, p. 1.
  17. ^ Davis 2001, p. 299.
  18. ^ a b Davis 2001, pp. 299–300.
  19. ^ Wong 1998.
  20. ^ a b walsh 2006, p. 145.
  21. ^ walsh 2006, p. 144-145.
  22. ^ Ferguson 2004, p. 22.
  23. ^ a b Bose 1918, pp. 79–81.
  24. ^ a b Rai 2008, pp. 263–281.
  25. ^ a b Koomar 2009, pp. 13–14.
  26. ^ a b Ferguson 2004.
  27. ^ Schama 2003.
  28. ^ Johnson 2003, p. 30.
  29. ^ Fiske 1869.
  30. ^ Davis 2001, p. 32.
  31. ^ Davis 2001, pp. 31, 52.
  32. ^ Balfour 1899, p. 204.
  33. ^ Keay 2001, p. 454.
  34. ^ Gilmour 2007, p. 116.
  35. ^ James 2000.
  36. ^ Davis 2001, p. 162.
  37. ^ Davis 2001, p. 164.
  38. ^ Davis 2001, p. 173.
  39. ^ Nash 2003.
  40. ^ Channel 4 Television 2007.
  41. ^ Walsh 2006, pp. 144–145.
  42. ^ a b c d Thakur et al. 2005, p. 585.
  43. ^ Desai 1984, p. 504.
  44. ^ a b Drèze 1991, pp. 32–33.
  45. ^ Portillo 2008.
  46. ^ Drèze 1991, p. 98.
  47. ^ Drèze 1991, p. 26.
  48. ^ Davis 2001, pp. 26–27.
  49. ^ McAlpin 1979, p. 148.
  50. ^ McAlpin 1979, pp. 149–50.
  51. ^ McAlpin 1979, p. 150.
  52. ^ McAlpin 1979, pp. 155–57.
  53. ^ Drèze 1991, p. 25.
  54. ^ Drèze & Sen 1991, p. 9.
  55. ^ Drèze 1991, p. 35.
  56. ^ Drèze 1991, p. 99.
  57. ^ American Association for the Advancement of Science et al. 1989, pp. 378–9.
  58. ^ Cuny & Hill 1999, p. 54.
  59. ^ Sainath 2010, p. 1.
  60. ^ Brown & Eckholm 1974.
  61. ^ American Association for the Advancement of Science et al. 1989, pp. 379.
  62. ^ Waal 1997, p. 15.
  63. ^ Drèze 1991, pp. 92–93.
  64. ^ Drèze 1991, pp. 93.
  65. ^ American Association for the Advancement of Science et al. 1989, pp. 380.
  66. ^ TNN 2010, p. 1.
  67. ^ Dhawan 2010, p. 1.
  68. ^ Prabhu 2007, p. 1.
  69. ^ National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development 2009, p. 30.
  70. ^ a b c d Swaminathan 2007, p. 1.
  71. ^ Somashekher 2004, p. 222.
  72. ^ Singla et al. 2004, p. 376.
  73. ^ Rorabacher 2010, pp. 442–443.
  74. ^ Singla et al. 2004, p. 379.
  75. ^ Sen 2001, pp. 12–14.
  76. ^ a b Massing 2003, p. 1.

References and further reading