Piracy off the coast of Somalia

Pirates holding the crew of the Chinese fishing vessel Tian Yu No. 8, guarding the crew on the bow

Map of areas under threat by Somalian pirates

Piracy off the Somali coast has been a threat to international shipping since the second phase of the Somali Civil War in the early 21st century. Since 2005, many international organizations, including the International Maritime Organization and the World Food Programme, have expressed concern over the rise in acts of piracy. Piracy has contributed to an increase in shipping costs and impeded the delivery of food aid shipments. Ninety percent of the World Food Programme's shipments arrive by sea, and ships into this area now require a military escort.

A United Nations report and several news sources have suggested that piracy off the coast of Somalia is caused in part by illegal fishing and the dumping of toxic waste in Somali waters by foreign vessels that have, according to Somali fishermen, severely constrained the ability of locals to earn a living and forced many to turn to piracy instead. Other articles allege that 70 percent of the local coastal communities "strongly support the piracy as a form of national defense of the country's territorial waters", and that the pirates believe they are protecting their fishing grounds and exacting justice and compensation for the marine resources stolen. Some pirates have suggested that, in the absence of an effective national coast guard following the outbreak of the Somali Civil War and the subsequent disintegration of the Armed Forces, they became pirates in order to protect their waters. This belief is also reflected in the names taken on by some of the pirate networks, such as the National Volunteer Coast Guard (NVCG).

Combined Task Force 150, a multinational coalition task force, took on the role of fighting Somali piracy by establishing a Maritime Security Patrol Area (MSPA) within the Gulf of Aden. The increasing threat posed by piracy has also caused concern in India since most of its shipping trade routes pass through the Gulf of Aden. The Indian Navy responded to these concerns by deploying a warship in the region on 23 October 2008. In September 2008, Russia announced that it too would join international efforts to combat piracy. Some reports have also accused certain government officials in Somalia of complicity with the pirates, with authorities from the Galmudug administration in the north-central Hobyo district reportedly attempting to use pirate gangs as a bulwark against Islamist insurgents from the nation's southern conflict zones. However, according to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon, both the former and current administrations of the autonomous Puntland region in northeastern Somalia appear to be more actively involved in combating piracy. The latter measures include on-land raids on pirate hideouts, and the construction of a new naval base in conjunction with Saracen International, a UK-based security company. By the first half of 2010, these increased policing efforts by Somali government authorities on land and international naval vessels at sea reportedly contributed to a drop in pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden from 86 a year prior to 33, forcing pirates to shift attention to other areas such as the Somali Basin and the wider Indian Ocean. According to Ecoterra, as of mid-November 2010, more than 500 crew members and at least 31 foreign vessels remain in the hands of Somali pirates. As of December 11, 2010, Somali pirates are holding at least 35 ships with more than 650 hostages.

==History==dirt dirty dirt bags scum of the eart should all die ,, a burning death end of story During the Siad Barre regime, Somalia received aid from Denmark, Great Britain, Iraq, Japan, Sweden, USSR and West Germany to develop its fishing industry. Cooperatives had fixed prices for their catch, which was often exported due to the low demand for seafood in Somalia. Aid money improved the ships and supported the construction of maintenance facilities. After the fall of the Barre regime, the income from fishing decreased due to the Somali Civil War.

Also, there was no coast guard to protect against fishing trawlers from other countries illegally fishing and big companies dumping waste which killed fish in Somali waters. This led to the erosion of the fish stock. Local fishermen started to band together to protect their resources. Due to the clan-based organization of Somali society, the lack of a central government, and the country's strategic location at the Horn of Africa, conditions were ripe for the growth of piracy in the early 1990s.

Armed pirates in the Indian Ocean near Somalia. After the picture was taken, the vessel's crew members opened fire on U.S. Navy ships and the ship's crew members returned fire. One suspected pirate was killed and 12 were taken into custody.

Precise data on the current economic situation in Somalia is scarce but with an estimated per capita GDP of $600 per year, it remains one of the world's poorest countries. Millions of Somalis depend on food aid and in 2008, according to the World Bank, as much as 73% of the population lived on a daily income below $2. These factors and the lucrative success of many hijacking operations have drawn a number of young men toward gangs of pirates, whose wealth and strength often make them part of the local social and economic elite. Abdi Farah Juha who lives in Garoowe (100 miles from the sea) told the BBC, "They have money; they have power and they are getting stronger by the day. [...] They wed the most beautiful girls; they are building big houses; they have new cars; new guns."

Some pirates are former fishermen, whose livelihoods were hurt by foreign ships illegally fishing in Somali waters. Most of the pirates, observers say, are not former fishermen. After seeing the profitability of piracy, since ransoms are usually paid, warlords began to facilitate pirate activities, splitting the profits with the pirates. Pirates even target ships carrying humanitarian aid. In most of the hijackings, the bandits have not harmed their prisoners.

The Transitional Federal Government has made some efforts to combat piracy, occasionally allowing foreign naval vessels into Somali territorial waters. However, more often than not, foreign naval vessels chasing pirates were forced to break off when the pirates entered Somali territorial waters. The Royal Navy has regularly released Somali pirates, even when caught in the act, because of the risk they would claim asylum if prosecuted in Europe. The government of Puntland has made more progress in combating piracy, evident in recent interventions.

Summary of recent events

On 28 May 2007, Chinese sailor was killed by the pirates because the ship's owners failed to meet their ransom demands.

On 5 October 2008, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 1838 calling on nations with vessels in the area to apply military force to repress the acts of piracy. At the 101st council of the International Maritime Organization, India called for a United Nations peacekeeping force under unified command to tackle piracy off Somalia. (There has been a general and complete arms embargo against Somalia since 1992.)

On 21 November 2008, BBC News reported that the Indian Navy had received United Nations approval to enter Somali waters to combat piracy.

In November 2008, Somali pirates began hijacking ships well outside the Gulf of Aden, perhaps targeting ships headed for the port of Mombasa, Kenya. The frequency and sophistication of the attacks also increased around this time, as did the size of vessels being targeted. Large cargo ships, oil and chemical tankers on international voyages became the new targets of choice for the Somali hijackers. This is in stark contrast to the pirate attacks which were once frequent in the Strait of Malacca, another strategically important waterway for international trade, which were according to maritime security expert Catherine Zara Raymond, generally directed against "smaller, more vulnerable vessels carrying trade across the Straits or employed in the coastal trade on either side of the Straits."

On 19 November 2008, the Indian Navy warship INS Tabar sank a suspected pirate mothership. Later, it was claimed to be a Thai trawler being hijacked by pirates. The Indian Navy later defended its actions by stating that they were fired upon first.

On 8 April 2009, four Somali pirates seized the Maersk Alabama 240 nautical miles (440 km; 280 mi) southeast of the Somalia port city of Eyl. The ship was carrying 17,000 metric tons of cargo, of which 5,000 metric tons were relief supplies bound for Somalia, Uganda, and Kenya. On 12 April 2009, United States Navy SEAL snipers killed the three pirates that were holding Captain Richard Phillips hostage aboard a lifeboat from the Maersk Alabama after determining that Captain Phillips' life was in immediate danger. A fourth pirate, Abdul Wali Muse, surrendered and was taken into custody. On May 18, a federal grand jury in New York returned a ten-count indictment against him.

On 20 April 2009, United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton commented on the capture and release of 7 Somali pirates by Dutch Naval forces who were on a NATO mission. After an attack on the Handytankers Magic, a petroleum tanker, the Dutch frigate De Zeven Provinciën tracked the pirates back to a pirate "mother ship" and captured them. They confiscated the pirates weapons and freed 20 Yemeni fishermen whom the pirates had kidnapped and who had been forced to sail the pirate "mother ship". Since the Dutch Naval Forces were part of a NATO exercise, but not on an EU mission, they lacked legal jurisdiction to keep the pirates so they released them. Clinton stated that this action "sends the wrong signal" and that additional coordination was needed among nations.

On 23 April 2009, international donors pledged over $250 million for Somalia, including $134 million to increase the African Union peacekeeping mission from 4,350 troops to 8,000 troops and $34 million for Somali security forces. Secretary-General of the United Nations Ban Ki-moon told delegates at a donors' conference sponsored by the U.N. that "Piracy is a symptom of anarchy and insecurity on the ground", and that "More security on the ground will make less piracy on the seas." Somali President Sharif Ahmed pledged at the conference that he would fight piracy and to loud applause said that "It is our duty to pursue these criminals not only on the high seas, but also on terra firma,". The Somali government has not gone after pirates because pirate leaders currently have more power than the government. It has been estimated by piracy experts that in 2008 the pirates gained about $80 million through ransom payments.

On 2 May 2009, Somali pirates captured the MV Ariana with its 24 Ukrainian crew. The ship was released on 10 December 2009 after a ransom of almost $3,000,000 was paid.

On 8 November 2009, Somali pirates threatened that a kidnapped British couple would be "punished" if a German warship did not release seven pirates. Omer, one of the pirates holding the British couple, claims that the seven men are fishermen, but a European Union Naval Force spokesman says that they were captured as they fired AK-47 assault rifles at a French fishing vessel. They were released on 14 November 2010 after 388 days of captivity. At least two ransom payments, reportedly over GBP 500 000, had been made.

April 2010, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) alluded to possible covert and overt action against the pirates. CIA officials had been publicly warning of this potential threat for months. In a Harpers Magazine article, a CIA official said, "We need to deal with this problem from the beach side, in concert with the ocean side, but we don't have an embassy in Somalia and limited, ineffective intelligence operations. We need to work in Somalia and in Lebanon, where a lot of the ransom money has changed hands. But our operations in Lebanon are a joke, and we have no presence at all in Somalia."

On 11 May 2010, Somali pirates seized a Bulgarian-flagged ship in the Gulf of Aden. The Panega, with 15 Bulgarian crew members aboard, was en route from the Red Sea to India or Pakistan. This was the first such hijacking of a Bulgarian-flagged ship.

On 12 May 2010, Athens announced that Somali pirates have seized a Greek vessel in the Gulf of Aden with at least 24 people onboard, including two Greek citizens and some Filipinos. The vessel, sailing under the Liberian flag, was transporting iron from Ukraine to China.

On 14 January 2011, while speaking to reporters, Commodore Michiel Hijmans of the Royal Netherlands Navy stated that use of hijacked vessels in more recent hijackings have led to increased range of pirating activities, as well as difficulty to actively thwart future events due to the use of kidnapped sailors as human shields.

On 15 January 2011, thirteen Somali pirates seized the Samho Jewelry a Maltese-flagged chemical carrier operated by Samho Shipping 650 km southeast of Muscat. The Republic of Korea Navy destroyer Choi Young shadowed the Samho Jewlry for several days. In the early morning of 21 January 2011, 25 ROK Navy SEALs on small boats launched from the Choi Young boarded the Samho Jewelry while the Choi Youngs Westland Super Lynx provided covering fire. Eight pirates were killed and five captured in the operation, the crew of 21 was freed with the Captain suffering a gunshot wound to the stomach.

On 28 January 2011, an Indian Coast Guard aircraft while responding to a distress call from the CMA CGM Verdi, located two skiffs attempting a piracy attack near Lakshadweep. Seeing the aircraft, the skiffs immediately aborted their piracy attempt and dashed towards the mother vessel, MV Prantalay 14 - a hijacked Thai trawler, which hurriedly hoisted the two skiffs onboard and moved westward. The Indian Navy deployed the INS Cankarso which located and engaged the mothership 100 nautical miles north of the Minicoy island. 10 pirates where killed while 15 were apprehended and 20 Thai and Myanmarese fishermen being held aboard the ship as hostages were rescued.

Within a week of its previous success, the Indian Navy captured another hijacked Thai trawler, MV Prantalay 11 and captured 28 pirates aboard in an operation undertaken by the INS Tir purusuant to receiving information that a Greek merchant ship had been attacked by pirates on board high-speed boats, although it had managed to avoid capture. When INS Tir ordered the pirate ship to stop and be boarded for inspection, it was fired upon. The INS Tir returned fire in which 3 pirates were injured and caused the pirates to raise a white flag indicating their surrender. The INS Tir subsequently joined by CGS Samar of the Indian Coast Guard. Officials from the Indian Navy reported that a total of 52 men were apprehended, but that 24 are suspected to be Thai fishermen who were hostages of the 28 African pirates.

Pirates

Profile

A collage of pirates armed with AKM assault rifles, RPG-7 rocket-propelled grenade launchers and semi-automatic pistols.

Many pirates are 20–35 years old and come from the region of Puntland, in northeastern Somalia. The East African Seafarers' Association estimates that there are at least five pirate gangs and a total of 1,000 armed men. According to a BBC report, the pirates can be divided into three main categories:

• Local Somali fishermen, considered the brains of the pirates' operations due to their skill and knowledge of the sea. Many think that foreign boats have no right to cruise next to the shore and destroy their boats.
• Ex-militiamen, who previously fought for the local clan warlords, or ex-military from the former Barre government used as the muscle.
• Technical experts, who operate equipment such as GPS devices.

According to Globalsecurity.org, there are four main groups operating off the Somali coast. The National Volunteer Coast Guard, commanded by Garaad Mohamed, is said to specialize in intercepting small boats and fishing vessels around Kismayo on the southern coast. The Marka group, under the command of Yusuf Mohammed Siad Inda'ade, is made up of several scattered and less organized groups operating around the town of Marka. The third significant pirate group is composed of traditional Somali fishermen operating around Puntland and referred to as the Puntland Group. The last set are the Somali Marines, reputed to be the most powerful and sophisticated of the pirate groups with a military structure, a fleet admiral, admiral, vice-admiral and a head of financial operations.

The conduct of a typical pirate attack has been analyzed and shows that while attacks can be expected at any time, most occur during the day, often in the early hours. They may involve two or more skiffs that can reach speeds of up to 25 knots. With the help of motherships that include captured fishing and merchant vessels the operating range of the skiffs has been increased far into the Indian Ocean. An attacked vessel is approached from quarter or stern, and RPGs and small arms are used to intimidate the operator to slow down and allow boarding. Light ladders are brought along to climb aboard. Pirates then will try and get control of the bridge to take operational control of the vessel.

Effects and perceptions

There have been both positive and negative effects of the pirates' economic success. Local residents have complained that the presence of so many armed men makes them feel insecure, and that their free spending ways cause wild fluctuations in the local exchange rate. Others fault them for excessive consumption of alcoholic beverages and khat.

On the other hand, many other residents appreciate the rejuvenating effect that the pirates' on-shore spending and re-stocking has had on their impoverished towns, a presence which has often provided jobs and opportunity when there were none. Entire hamlets have in the process been transformed into veritable boomtowns, with local shop owners and other residents using their gains to purchase items such as generators -- "allowing full days of electricity, once an unimaginable luxury."

Local fishermen in the Malindi area of Kenya to the south have reported their largest catches in forty years, catching hundreds of kilos of fish and earning fifty times the average daily wage as a result. They attribute the recent abundance of marine stock to the pirates scaring away the foreign fishing trawlers, which it is claimed have for decades deprived local dhows of a livelihood. Marine biologists agree, saying that the indicators are that the local fishery is recovering because of the lack of commercial scale fishing.

The Somalian piracy appears to have a positive impact on the problem of overfishing in Somali waters by foreign vessels, as a comparison has been made with the situation in Tanzania further to the south, which suffers from the same problem, and also lacks the means to enforce the protection and regulation of its territorial waters. There, the catches have dropped to dramatic low levels, whereas in Somalia they have risen back to more acceptable levels since the beginning of the piracy.

Weaponry and funding

The pirates get most of their weapons from Yemen, but a significant amount come from Mogadishu, Somalia's capital. Weapons dealers in the capital receive a deposit from a hawala dealer on behalf of the pirates and the weapons are then driven to Puntland where the pirates pay the balance. Various photographs of pirates in situ indicate that their weapons are predominantly AKMs, RPG-7s, AK47s, and semi-automatic pistols such as the TT-30. Additionally, given the particular origin of their weaponry, they are likely to have hand grenades such as the RGD-5 or F1.

The funding of piracy operations is now structured in a stock exchange, with investors buying and selling shares in upcoming attacks in a bourse in Harardhere. Pirates say ransom money is paid in large denomination US dollar bills. It is delivered to them in burlap sacks which are either dropped from helicopters or cased in waterproof suitcases loaded onto tiny skiffs. Ransom money has also been delivered to pirates via parachute, as happened in January 2009 when an orange container with $3 million cash inside it was dropped onto the deck of the supertanker MV Sirius Star to secure the release of ship and crew. To authenticate the banknotes, pirates use currency-counting machines, the same technology used at foreign exchange bureaus worldwide. According to one pirate, these machines are, in turn, purchased from business connections in Dubai, Djibouti, and other areas. Hostages seized by the pirates usually have to wait 45 days or more for the ships' owners to pay the ransom and secure their release.

Somali pirates allegedly get help from the Somali diaspora. Somali expatriates, including reputedly some among the 200,000 Somalis living in Canada, offer funds, equipment and information.

Economic issues

The purpose of piracy is to get ransom money for release of the crew, ship, and cargo. Pirates' income from ransom has been estimated to be about 39 million euro (about $58 million) in 2009 and $238 million in 2010. Direct costs of piracy are much higher and estimated to be between $7 to 12 billion as they also include insurance, naval support, legal proceedings, re-routing of slower ships, and individual protective steps taken by ship-owners. Further, piracy in Somalia leads to a decrease of revenue for Egypt as less ships use the Suez canal (estimated loss of about $642 million), impedes trades with a number of countries such as Kenya and Yemen, and is detrimental to tourism and fishing in the Seychelles.

On the other hand, the lack of Somalia's sovereign control has led to violations of its economic zone by foreign fishing fleets and ships dumping waste (as discussed below) that has hurt the local economy.

Sovereignty and environmental protection

According to UNEP and other sources, foreign companies are dumping toxic and nuclear waste in the unpatrolled waters off the Somali coastline. Many pirates have alleged that they are protecting Somalia's territorial waters from exploitation, while the Somali federal government has suggested that the key to limiting pirate attacks is to help local authorities combat illegal fishing and toxic waste dumping on the part of foreign vessels.

The UN envoy for Somalia, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, has stated that "because there is no (effective) government, there is ... much irregular fishing from European and Asian countries," and that the UN has "reliable information" that European and Asian companies are dumping toxic and nuclear waste off the Somali coastline. However, he stresses that "no government has endorsed this act, and that private companies and individuals acting alone are responsible." In addition, Ould-Abdallah told the press that he believes the toxic waste dumping is "a disaster off the Somali coast, a disaster (for) the Somali environment, the Somali population", and that what he terms "this illegal fishing, illegal dumping of waste" helps fuel the civil war in Somalia since the illegal foreign fishermen pay off corrupt local officials or warlords for protection or to secure counterfeit licenses. However, Ould-Abdallah noted that piracy will not prevent waste dumping: "The intentions of these pirates are not concerned with protecting their environment", and "What is ultimately needed is a functioning, effective government that will get its act together and take control of its affairs."

Somali pirates which captured MV Faina, a Ukrainian ship carrying tanks and military hardware, accused European firms of dumping toxic waste off the Somali coast and declared that the $8m ransom for the return of the ship they will go towards cleaning up the waste. The ransom demand is a means of "reacting to the toxic waste that has been continually dumped on the shores of our country for nearly 20 years", Januna Ali Jama, a spokesman for the pirates said. "The Somali coastline has been destroyed, and we believe this money is nothing compared to the devastation that we have seen on the seas."

These issues have generally not been reported in international media when reporting on piracy.

Pirate leader Sugule Ali said their motive was "to stop illegal fishing and dumping in our waters... We don't consider ourselves sea bandits. We consider sea bandits [to be] those who illegally fish and dump in our seas and dump waste in our seas and carry weapons in our seas." Also, the independent Somalian news-site WardherNews found that 70 percent "strongly supported the piracy as a form of national defence of the country's territorial waters".

Waste dumping

See also: Radioactive waste dumping by the 'Ndrangheta

Following the Indian Ocean tsunami of December 2004, there have emerged allegations that after the outbreak of the Somali Civil War in late 1991, Somalia's long, remote shoreline was used as a dump site for the disposal of toxic waste. The huge waves which battered northern Somalia after the tsunami are believed to have stirred up tonnes of nuclear and toxic waste that was illegally dumped in Somali waters by several European firms. The European Green Party followed up these revelations by presenting before the press and the European Parliament in Strasbourg copies of contracts signed by two European companies—the Italian Swiss firm, Achair Partners, and an Italian waste broker, Progresso—and representatives of the warlords then in power, to accept 10 million tonnes of toxic waste in exchange for $80 million (then about £60 million). According to a report by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) assessment mission, there are far higher than normal cases of respiratory infections, mouth ulcers and bleeding, abdominal haemorrhages and unusual skin infections among many inhabitants of the areas around the northeastern towns of Hobbio and Benadir on the Indian Ocean coast—diseases consistent with radiation sickness. UNEP continues that the current situation along the Somali coastline poses a very serious environmental hazard not only in Somalia but also in the eastern Africa sub-region.

Under Article 9(1)(d) of the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, it is illegal for "any transboundary movement of hazardous wastes or other wastes: that results in deliberate disposal (e.g. dumping) of hazardous wastes or other wastes in contravention of this Convention and of general principles of international law".

According to Nick Nuttall of the United Nations Environmental Programme, "Somalia has been used as a dumping ground for hazardous waste starting in the early 1990s, and continuing through the civil war there", and "European companies found it to be very cheap to get rid of the waste, costing as little as $2.50 a tonne, where waste disposal costs in Europe are something like $1000 a tonne."

Illegal fishing

At the same time, foreign trawlers began illegally fishing Somalia's seas, with an estimated $300 million of tuna, shrimp, and lobster being taken each year, depleting stocks previously available to local fishermen. Through interception with speedboats, Somali fishermen tried to either dissuade the dumpers and trawlers or levy a "tax" on them as compensation. In an interview, Sugule Ali, one of the pirate leaders explained "We don't consider ourselves sea bandits. We consider sea bandits (to be) those who illegally fish and dump in our seas." Peter Lehr, a Somalia piracy expert at the University of St. Andrews says "It's almost like a resource swap, Somalis collect up to $100 million a year from pirate ransoms off their coasts and the Europeans and Asians poach around $300 million a year in fish from Somali waters." The UK's Department for International Development (DFID) issued a report in 2005 stating that, between 2003 and 2004, Somalia lost about $100 million in revenue due to illegal tuna and shrimp fishing in the country's exclusive economic zone by foreign trawlers.

According to Roger Middleton of Chatham House, "The problem of overfishing and illegal fishing in Somali waters is a very serious one, and does affect the livelihoods of people inside Somalia […] the dumping of toxic waste on Somalia's shores is a very serious issue, which will continue to affect people in Somalia long after the war has ended, and piracy is resolved." To lure fish to their traps, foreign trawlers reportedly also use fishing equipment under prohibition such as nets with very small mesh sizes and sophisticated underwater lighting systems.

Under Article 56(1)(b)(iii) of the Law of the Sea Convention:

"In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this Convention with regard to the protection and preservation of the marine environment".

Article 57 of the Convention in turn outlines the limit of that jurisdiction:

"The exclusive economic zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured".

Weapons testing allegations

In March 2010, the international environmental organization ECOTERRA also alleged that newly-leaked information revealed that the anti-piracy activities in the Gulf of Aden serve as a cover-up for the live testing of recently developed less-lethal and sub-lethal weapons systems. The latter allegedly include Human Electro-Muscular Incapacitation (HEMI) Bioeffects devices that emit electrical waveforms for which it is not yet scientifically understood what are the long-term effects on a human body. See also: Illegal Electronic harassment

Chronology of selected attacks

Main article: List of ships attacked by Somali pirates

Somali pirates have attacked dozens of vessels with a fraction of those attacks resulting in a successful hijacking. In 2008, there were 111 attacks which included 42 successful hijackings. The rate of attacks in January and February 2009 was about 10 times higher than during the same period in 2008 and "there have been almost daily attacks in March", with 79 attacks, 21 successful, by mid April. Most of these attacks occur in the Gulf of Aden but the Somali pirates have been increasing their range and have started attacking ships as far south as off the coast of Kenya in the Indian Ocean.

Anti-piracy measures

"Best Management Practice" self-defense

A number of steps have been recommended in the Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy off the Coast of Somalia and in the Arabian Sea Area guide that has been issued and updated by a consortium of interested international shipping and trading organizations. It is considered essential to inform naval operations of an intended passage by contacting the Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa (MSCHOA)- the planning and coordination authority for EU forces (EU NAVFOR) in the Gulf of Aden and the Somalia - via UKMTO and, if possible, stay in shipping lanes that are more closely guarded. A ship should have protocols in place and its crew trained. A special pirate alarm needs to be operational to alert the crew in case of an attack. Steps can be taken to make the bridge, a prime target of the attacker, less vulnerable and safer for the operator. Freeboards exceeding 8 m provide difficulty for pirates unless construction of the ship facilitates climbing. Sea states of 3 or more seem to pose problems for attackers. Vessels need look-outs to recognize attacks early and be able to take appropriate steps including immediate notification for naval support. Most attacks occur during the day often in the early hours with two or more skiffs approaching from quarter or stern. Ships with higher speed (>18 knots) seem to be able to outrun attackers. Appropriate manoeuvring and taking advantage of wind and sea conditions can make it difficult for pirates to come close to the ship and foil an attack. The vessel itself can be made hostile for the attacker by removing items that facilitate climbing the freeboard and by securing the outboard perimeter with razor wire. While it is not recommended to man waterguns, they can be preset that they sprout water to areas likely to be attacked by pirates. Closed-circuit TV is useful to monitor critical areas of the ship without endangering crew.

While the non-wartime 20th century tradition has been for merchant vessels not to be armed, the U.S. Government has recently changed the rules so that it is now "best practice" for vessels to embark a team of private security guards. This has given birth to a new breed of private security companies such as Argos International. These companies provide training and protection for crew members and cargo. The USCG leaves it to the shippers' discretion to determine if those guards will be armed.

Military presence

Ships of the multinational fleet Combined Task Force 150, March 2004.
From the left: DM F-213 Augsburg, JMSDF DD-106 Samidare, RNZN F-111 Te Mana, JMSDF DDG-175 Myōkō, MMI F-573 Scirocco, Spanish Navy Victoria (F82), US Navy USS Leyte Gulf, JMSDF AOE-422 Towada, USS Cushing

The military response to pirate attacks has brought about a rare show of unity by countries that are either openly hostile to each other, or at least wary of cooperation, military or otherwise. Military counter-piracy operations are conducted by naval ships from the Combined Task Force 150 (CTF-150), Russia, China and India. Countries of the CTF-150 share information during the monthly Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) meetings, a mechanism established in December 2008. In response to the increased activity of the INS Tabar, India sought to augment its naval force in the Gulf of Aden by deploying the larger INS Mysore to patrol the area. Somalia also added India to its list of states, including the U.S. and France, who are permitted to enter its territorial waters, extending up to 12 nautical miles (22 km; 14 mi) from the coastline, in an effort to check piracy. An Indian naval official confirmed receipt of a letter acceding to India's prerogative to check such piracy. "We had put up a request before the Somali government to play a greater role in suppressing piracy in the Gulf of Aden in view of the United Nations resolution. The TFG government gave its nod recently." India also expressed consideration to deploy up to four more warships in the region.

Similarly, Russia also chose to send more warships to combat piracy near Somalia. This announcement followed the International Maritime Bureau terming the menace as having gone "out of control." Germany said it was willing to add 1,400 troops to join an E.U. mission in the area that would begin in December. United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) commander, General William E. Ward, added that the United States was concerned about the rise in piracy, and was involved in multilateral efforts to provide security, "The United States is participating in those activities currently, but again, that is not specifically being controlled by the United States Africa Command."

As part of the International effort, Europe is also playing a significant role in combating piracy of the Horn of Africa. The European Union under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) launched EU NAVFOR Somalia - Operation Atalanta ( In support of Resolutions 1814 (2008), 1816 (2008), 1838 (2008) and 1846 (2008) of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)). This operation is working to protect humanitarian aid and reduce the disruption to the shipping routes and the de-stabilising of the maritime environment in the region. To date, 26 countries have brought some kind of contribution to the operation. 13 EU Member States have provided an operational contribution to EU NAVFOR, either with ships, with maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft, or with Vessel Protection Detachment (VPD) team. This includes France, Spain, Germany, Greece, Sweden, Netherlands, Italy, Belgium, United Kingdom (also hosting the EU NAVFOR Operational headquarters), Portugal, Luxembourg, Malta and Estonia. 9 other EU Member States have participated in the effort providing military staff to work at the EU NAVFOR Operational Headquarters (Northwood Headquarters – UK) or onboard units. These are Cyprus, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Ireland and Finland. Finally, 4 non EU Member States, Norway (who has also provided an operational contribution with a warship regularly deploying), Croatia, Ukraine and Montenegro have so far also brought their contribution to EU NAVFOR. At any one time, the European force size fluctuates according to the monsoon seasons, which determine the level of piracy. It typically consists of 5 to 10 Surface Combatants (Naval ships), 1 to 2 Auxiliary ships and 2 to 4 Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft. Including land-based personnel, Operation Atalanta consists of a total of around 2,000 military personnel. The European Naval Force operates in a zone comprising the south of the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the western part of the Indian Ocean including the Seychelles, which represents an area of 2,000,000 square nautical miles.

A boarding team from USS Gettysburg and US Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachment 409 capture suspected pirates.

A maritime conference was also held in Mombasa to discuss the rising concern of regional piracy with a view to give regional and world governments recommendations to deal with the menace. The International Transport Workers Federation (ITWF) organised the regional African maritime unions’ conference, the first of its kind in Africa. Godfrey Matata Onyango, executive secretary of the Northern Corridor Transit Coordination Authority said that "We cannot ignore to discuss the piracy menace because it poses a huge challenge to the maritime industry and if not controlled, it threats to chop off the regional internal trade. The cost of shipping will definitely rise as a result of the increased war insurance premium due to the high risk off the Gulf of Aden." Pakistan offered the services of Pakistan Navy to the United Nations in order to help combat the piracy in Somalia "provided a clear mandate was given."

On 26 December 2008, China dispatched three warships (Haikou (171), Wuhan (169) and the supply ship Weishanhu) to the Gulf of Aden. A team of 16 Chinese Special Forces members from its Marine Corps armed with attack helicopters were on board. Since then, China has maintained a three-ship flotilla of two warships and one supply ship in the Gulf of Aden by assigning ships from the South Sea Fleet and/or East Sea Fleet to the area on a three month basis.

Norway announced on 27 February 2009, that it would send the frigate HNoMS Fridtjof Nansen to the coast of Somalia to fight piracy. Royal Norwegian Navy Fridtjof Nansen joins EU's international naval force in August. As of 18 December 2008, naval ships from eleven NATO, four SCO, and 4 other countries have been deployed in the region in order to serve as escorts and to deter acts of piracy. As of 29 May 2009, Australia pledged its support, re-directing Australian Warship, HMAS Warramunga from duties in the Persian Gulf to assist in the fighting of Piracy.

On 30 March 2010, a Seychelles patrol boat rescued 27 hostages and sunk two pirate vessels. On 1 April 2010, a skiff manned by pirates opened fire on the USS Nicholas off the coast of Kenya and Somalia, also in the vicinity of the Seychelles. The U.S. Navy ship returned fire, sinking the skiff, and captured a pirate mothership.

Current fleet of vessels in operation

Vessels, aircraft and personnel whose primary mission is to conduct anti-piracy activities come from different countries and are assigned to the following missions: Ocean Shield (NATO and partner states), Atalanta (EU and partner states), Combined Task Force 151, independent missions of Japan, India, Russia, PR China, South Korea, Iran, Malaysia. Additionally resources dedicated for the War on Terror missions of Combined Task Force 150 and Enduring Freedom – Horn of Africa also operate against the pirates.

Country	Mission	Sailors	Ships	Cost [Mil of USD per annum]	Start	End
Royal Australian Navy	CTF 150	~250	1 (HMAS Toowoomba)	?	June 2009	?
Belgian Navy	Atalanta	170	1 Frigate Louise-Marie	?	Sep 1st 2009 Oct 20th 2010	Dec 16th 2009 Jan 20th 2011
Bulgarian Navy	Ocean Shield	130	Wielingen class frigate 41 Drazki	?	?	?
Canadian Navy	Ocean Shield	240	HMCS Fredericton	?	November 2009	May 4, 2010
People's Liberation Army Navy		~800 including PLA marines	1st Flotilla: Haikou (Type 052C/DDG-171), Wuhan (Type 052B/DDG-169), Weishanhu (Qiandaohu Class/887) 2nd Flotilla: Shenzhen (Type 051B/DDG-167), Huangshan (Type 054A/FFG-570), Weishanhu (Qiandaohu Class/887) 3rd Flotilla: Zhoushan (Type 054A/FFG-529), Xuzhou (Type 054A/FFG-530), Qiandaohu (Qiandaohu Class/886) 4th Flotilla: Ma'anshan (Type 054/FFG-525), Wenzhou (Type 054/FFG-526), Qiandaohu (Qiandaohu Class/886), Chaohu (Type 054A/FFG-568) 5th Flotilla: Guangzhou (Type 052B/DDG-168), Chaohu (Type 054A/FFG-568)), Weishanhu (Qiandaohu Class/887) 6th Flotilla: Kunlun Shan (Type 071/LPD-998), Lanzhou (Type 052C/DDG-170), Weishanhu (Qiandaohu Class/887) 7th Flotilla: Zhoushan (Type 054A/FFG-529), Xuzhou (Type 054A/FFG-530), Qiandaohu (Qiandaohu Class/886)	?	Jan 6, 2009 Apr 15, 2009 Aug 1, 2009 Nov 27, 2009 (Chaohu Dec 21, 2009) March 2010 July 2010 Nov 2010	?
Royal Danish Navy	Ocean Shield	300	2 (Command and Support Ship HDMS Absalon (L16); Patrol Ship HDMS Thetis (F357)	?	February 2007	April 2009
French Navy	Ocean Shield or Atalanta	?	Germinal, Floréal, La Fayette, avisos, Améthyste	?	?	?
German Navy	Atalanta	230	1 (Frigate Emden (F210))	60 (45 Mio. EUR)	December 8, 2008	December 17, 2010
Greek Navy	Ocean Shield	176-196	1 (HS Themistokles)	?	?	?
Indian Navy		540	2 (Destroyer INS Mysore (D60); Frigate INS Tabar)	1	?	?
Islamic Republic of Iran Navy		?	?	1	?	?
Italian Navy	Ocean Shield	240	1 (D560 Durand de la Penne)	?	?	?
Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force		400	1st Flotilla:DD-113 Sazanami, DD-106 Samidare 2nd Flotilla:DD-102 Harusame, DD-154 Amagiri, 3rd Flotilla:DD-110 Takanami, DD-155 Hamagiri 4th Flotilla:DD-111 Onami, DD-157 Sawagiri 5th Flotilla:DD-101 Murasame, DD-153 Yugiri 6th Flotilla:DD-112 Makinami, DD-156 Setogiri 7th Flotilla:DD-104 Kirisame, DD-103 Yudachi	?	March 14, 2009 July 6, 2009 October 13, 2009 January 29, 2010 May 10, 2010 August 23, 2010 December 1, 2010	?
Republic of Korea Navy	CTF 150	300	1 Destroyer (Currently Choi Young DDH-981)	1	April 16, 2009	?
Royal Malaysian Navy		136	Support Ship KD Mahawangsa	3	?	?
Royal Netherlands Navy	Atalanta	174-202	HNLMS De Zeven Provinciën	1	March 26, 2009	August 2010
Pakistan Navy	CTF 150	~500	PNS Badr	?	?	?
Portuguese Navy	Ocean Shield	?	1 (Frigate NRP Corte Real – NATO flotilla flagship)	?	June 2009	January 2010
Royal Saudi Navy	Ocean Shield	?	?	?	?	?
Russian Navy		~350	3 (Destroyer Admiral Panteleyev (BPK 548), Salvage Tugboat, Tanker	?	April 2009	?
Republic of Singapore Navy	CTF 151	240	LST RSS Persistence (209)	?	24 April 2009	?
Spanish Navy	Ocean Shield	423	2 Frigates (F86 Canarias and F104 Méndez Núñez)	?	?	?
Swedish Navy	Atalanta	152	3 (OPV HMS Carlskrona)	?	April 14, 2010	November 15, 2010
Royal Thai Navy	CTF 150	371 including 20 marine special warfare task force	2 (OPV HTMS Pattani (OPV 511); Replenishment Ship HTMS Similan (871))	8.757 (270 Mil THB)	September 10, 2010	January 14, 2011
Turkish Navy	Ocean Shield	503	2 (Frigates TCG Giresun (F 491), TCG Gokova (F 496)	?	?	?
British Royal Navy	Ocean Shield	950	HMS Cumberland HMS Montrose HMS Northumberland	?	?	?
United States Navy	Ocean Shield, CTF 150, CTF 150	?	US 5th Fleet	?	?

Former contributions during previous rotation periods

USS San Antonio, CTF-151 flagship.

As of 8 January 2009, Brian Murphy of the Associated Press reports that Rear Admiral Terence E. McKnight, U.S. Navy, is to command a new multi-national naval force to confront piracy off the coast of Somalia. This new anti-piracy force was designated Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151), a multinational task force of the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF). The USS San Antonio was designated as the flagship of Combined Task Force 151, serving as an afloat forward staging base (AFSB) for the following force elements:

• 14-member U.S. Navy visit, board, search and seizure (VBSS) team.
• 8-member U.S. Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachment (LEDET) 405.
• Scout Sniper Platoon, 2nd Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (26 MEU) cross-decked from the USS Iwo Jima (LHD-7).
• 3rd platoon of the 2nd Battalion, 6th Marine's 'Golf' Infantry Company, a military police detachment, and intelligence personnel.
• Fleet Surgical Team 8 with level-two surgical capability to deal with trauma, surgical, critical care and medical evacuation needs.
• Approximately 75 Marines with six AH-1W Super Cobra and two UH-1N Huey helicopters from the Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 264 (HMM-264) of the 26th MEU cross-decked from the USS Iwo Jima.
• Three HH-60H helicopters from Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron 3 (HS-3) cross-decked from the USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71).

Initially, CTF-151 consisted of the San Antonio, USS Mahan (DDG-72), and HMS Portland (F79), with additional warships expected to join this force.

Samidare (DD-106)

On 28 January 2009, Japan announced its intention of sending a naval task force to join international efforts to stop piracy off the coast of Somalia. The deployment would be highly unusual, as Japan's non-aggressive constitution means Japanese military forces can only be used for defensive purposes. The issue has been controversial in Japan, although the ruling party maintains this should be seen as fighting crime on the high seas, rather than a "military" operation. The process of the Prime Minister of Japan, Taro Aso, giving his approval is expected to take approximately one month. However, the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) and the Japanese government face legal problems on how to handle attacks by pirates against ships that either have Japanese personnel, cargo or are under foreign control instead of being under Japanese control as current Article 9 regulations would hamper their actions when deployed to Somalia. It was reported on 4 February 2009, that the JMSDF was sending a fact-finding mission led by Gen Nakatani to the region prior to the deployment of the Murasame-class destroyer JDS DD-106 Samidare and the Takanami-class destroyer JDS DD-113 Sazanami to the coast of Somalia with a 13-man team composed of Japanese Ministry of Defense personnel, with members coming from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the JMSDF to visit Yemen, Djibouti, Oman, and Bahrain from February 8 to 20. Both JMSDF vessels are units of the 8th Escort Division of the 4th Escort Flotilla based in Kure, Hiroshima Prefecture. The JMSDF's special forces unit, the Special Boarding Unit is also scheduled to potentially deploy to Somalia. The SBU has been deployed alongside the two destroyers to Somalia on 14 March 2009. According to JMSDF officials, the deployment would "regain the trust of the shipping industry, which was lost during the war." The JMSDF task force would be deployed in Somalia for 4 months. In their first mission, the Takanami-class destroyer JDS DD-113 Sazanami was able to ward off pirates attempting to hijack a Singaporean cargo ship. In addition, JMSDF P-3Cs are to be deployed in June from Djibouti to conduct surveillance on the Somali coast. The House of Representatives of Japan has passed an anti-piracy bill, calling for the JMSDF to protect non-Japanese ships and nationals, though there are some concerns that the pro-opposition House of Councillors may reject it. The Diet of Japan has passed an anti-piracy law that called for JMSDF forces to protect all foreign ships traveling off the coast of Somalia aside from protecting Japanese-owned/manned ships despite a veto from the House of Councillors, which the House of Representatives have overturned. In 2009, the destroyers Harusame and DD-154 Amagiri left port from Yokusuka to replace the two destroyers that had been dispatched earlier on March 2009. Under current arrangements, Japan Coast Guard officers would be responsible for arresting pirates since SDF forces are not allowed to have powers of arrest.

The South Korean navy is also making plans to participate in anti-piracy operations after sending officers to visit the US Navy's 5th Fleet in Bahrain and in Djibouti. The South Korean cabinet had approved a government plan to send in South Korean navy ships and soldiers to the coast of Somalia to participate in anti-pirate operations. The ROKN was sending the Chungmugong Yi Sun-sin class destroyer DDH 976 Munmu the Great to the coast of Somalia. The Cheonghae Unit task force was also deployed in Somalia under CTF 151.

The Swiss government calls for the deployment of Army Reconnaissance Detachment operators to combat Somali piracy with no agreement in Parliament as the proposal was rejected after it was voted. Javier Solana had said that Swiss soldiers could serve under the EU's umbrella.

The Philippine government ordered the dispatch of a Naval Gunfire Liaison Officers to work with the US Navy's 5th Fleet as part of its contribution against piracy.

On 12 June 2009, Bulgaria also announced plans to join the anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and protect Bulgarian shipping, by sending a frigate with a crew of 130 sailors.

The Danish Institute for Military Studies has in a report proposed to establish a regionally-based maritime unit: a Greater Horn of Africa Sea Patrol, to carry out surveillance in the area to secure free navigation and take on tasks such as fishery inspection and environmental monitoring. A Greater Horn of Africa Sea Patrol would comprise elements from the coastal states - from Egypt in the north to Tanzania in the south. The unit would be established with the support of the states that already have a naval presence in the area.

In February 2010, Danish special forces from the Absalon freed 25 people from the Antigua and Barbuda-flagged vessel Ariella after it was hijacked by pirates off the Somali coast. The crew members had locked themselves into a store-room.

Somalia

Between 2009 and 2010, the government of the autonomous Puntland region in northeastern Somalia enacted a number of reforms and pre-emptive measures as a part of its officially declared anti-piracy campaign. The latter include the arrest, trial and conviction of pirate gangs, as well as raids on suspected pirate hideouts and confiscation of weapons and equipment; ensuring the adequate coverage of the regional authority's anti-piracy efforts by both local and international media; sponsoring a social campaign led by Islamic scholars and community activists aimed at discrediting piracy and highlighting its negative effects; and partnering with the NATO alliance to combat pirates at sea. In May 2010, construction also began on a new naval base in the town of Bandar Siyada, located 25 km west of Bosaso, the commercial capital of Puntland. The facility is funded by Puntland's regional government in conjunction with Saracen International, a UK-based security company, and is intended to assist in more effectively combating piracy. The base will include a center for training recruits, and a command post for the naval force. These numerous security measures appear to have borne fruit, as many pirates were apprehended in 2010, including a prominent leader. Puntland's security forces also reportedly managed to force out the pirate gangs from their traditional safe havens such as Eyl and Gar'ad, with the pirates now operating from only one main town, Harardhere.

Government officials from the Galmudug administration in the north-central Hobyo district have also reportedly attempted to use pirate gangs as a bulwark against Islamist insurgents from southern Somalia's conflict zones; other pirates are alleged to have reached agreements of their own with the Islamist groups, although a senior commander from the Hizbul Islam militia vowed to eradicate piracy by imposing sharia law when his group briefly took control of Harardhere in May 2010 and drove out the local pirates.

By the first half of 2010, these increased policing efforts by Somali government authorities on land along with international naval vessels at sea reportedly contributed to a drop in pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden from 86 a year prior to 33, forcing pirates to shift attention to other areas such as the Somali Basin and the wider Indian Ocean.

Arab League summit

Following the seizure by Somali pirates of an Egyptian ship and a Saudi oil supertanker worth $100 million of oil, the Arab League, after a meeting in Cairo, has called for an urgent summit for countries overlooking the Red Sea, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Somalia, Jordan, Djibouti and Yemen. The summit would offer several solutions for the piracy problem, in addition to suggesting different routes and looking for a more secure passageway for ships.

Another possible means of intervention by the Red Sea Arab nations' navy might be to assist the current NATO anti-piracy effort as well as other navies.

United Nations

In June 2008, following the letter of the Transitional Federal Government to the President of the Council asking for assistance from the international community in its efforts to address acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships off the coast of Somalia, the UN Security Council unanimously passed a declaration authorizing nations that have the agreement of the Transitional Federal Government to enter Somali territorial waters to deal with pirates. The measure, which was sponsored by France, the United States and Panama, lasted six months. France initially wanted the resolution to include other regions with pirate problems, such as West Africa, but were opposed by Vietnam, Libya and most importantly by veto-holding China, who wanted the sovereignty infringement limited to Somalia.

The UN Security Council adopted a resolution on 20 November 2008, that was proposed by Britain to introduce tougher sanctions against Somalia over the country's failure to prevent a surge in sea piracy. The US circulated the draft resolution that called upon countries having naval capacities to deploy vessels and aircraft to actively fight against piracy in the region. The resolution also welcomed the initiatives of the European Union, NATO and other countries to counter piracy off the coast of Somalia. US Alternate Representative for Security Council Affairs Rosemary DiCarlo said that the draft resolution "calls on the secretary-general to look at a long-term solution to escorting the safe passage of World Food Programme ships." Even Somalia's Islamist militants stormed the Somali port of Harardheere in the hunt for pirates behind the seizure of a Saudi supertanker, the MV Sirius Star. A clan elder affiliated with the Islamists said "The Islamists arrived searching for the pirates and the whereabouts of the Saudi ship. I saw four cars full of Islamists driving in the town from corner to corner. The Islamists say they will attack the pirates for hijacking a Muslim ship."

On 17 December 2008, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted a tougher resolution, allowing for the first time international land and sea occupations in the pursuit of pirates. Four ships, a Chinese fishing boat, a Turkish cargo ship, a Malaysian tug, and a private yacht were seized by pirates that same day. Resolution 1851 takes current anti-piracy measures a step further.

A Russian drafted resolution, Security Council Resolution 1918, adopted on 27 April 2010, called on all states to criminalise piracy and suggested the possibility of establishing a regional or international tribunal to prosecute suspected pirates.

Trials

Many of the suspects arrested in military operations in the Gulf of Aden in recent years have had to be set free for lack of evidence. Nearby countries in Africa have been reluctant to take on the burden of trials. Moreover, in 2008, the Royal Navy was instructed by the Foreign Office not to arrest pirates for fear of breaching their human rights.

In May 2010, a Yemeni court sentenced six Somali pirates to death and jailed six others for 10 years each for hijacking a Yemeni oil tanker, killing one cabin crew and leaving another missing in April 2009.

Also in May 2010, another Somali, Abdiwali Abdiqadir Muse, pleaded guilty in a New York federal court to seizing a United States-flagged ship Maersk Alabama and kidnapping its captain last year. He plead guilty, and was sentenced to 33 years imprisonment.

The first European trial of alleged Somali pirates opened in the Netherlands in May 2010. They were arrested in the Gulf of Aden in January 2009 when their high-speed boat was intercepted by a Danish frigate while allegedly preparing to board cargo ship Samanyolu registered in the Netherlands Antilles. The pirates were sentenced to five years in prison, which was less than the maximum possible sentence. It is unlikely the men will be returned to Somalia after their sentence, as Somalia is considered too dangerous for deportation. One of the five has already applied for asylum in the Netherlands. Consequently, there are concerns that trials in European courts would encourage, rather than deter, pirates.

The Somali government has also questioned the authority of foreign countries to try the pirates abroad. The European Union has attempted to focus the prosecutions locally by involving Somalia's neighbors, but Somali authorities have called for the pirates to be tried at home.

On April 1, 2010, the USS Nicholas (FFG-47) was on patrol off the Somali coast when it took fire from men in a small skiff. After chasing down the skiff and its mothership, US military captured five Somalis. Judge Raymond A. Jackson, a Federal District judge in Norfolk, Va threw out the piracy charge because when the piracy statute was enacted in 1819, piracy was defined only as robbery at sea. The penalty for piracy is mandatory life in prison, therefore the government is appealing the ruling.

On January 28, 2011, pursuant to the naval engagement of the pirate mother vessel MV Prantalay (a hijacked Thai trawler) by the INS Cankarso, the Indian Navy and the Indian Coast Guard killed 10 pirates and apprehended 15, while rescuing 20 Thai and Myanmarese fishermen being held aboard the ship as hostages. The rescued fishermen were sent to Kochi while the 15 pirates, of Somali, Ethiopian and Kenyan origin, have been taken to Mumbai. The Mumbai Police have confirmed that they have registered a case against the pirates for attempt to murder and various other provisions under the Indian Penal Code and the Passports Act for entering the Indian waters without permission.

Private initiatives

There have been reports of pirates repelled by private initiatives. One such case would have occurred by the end of 2008, by armed personnel of transportation entrepreneur Barthe Cortes.

Other vessel owners and shipping line companies have also hired private security outfits for assistance. One such firm is Espada Logistics and Security Group based in San Antonio, Texas, whose security officers provide on-board protection from a ship's point of entry to its point of destination. They also offer anti-piracy training en route to the Gulf of Aden, and have teamed up with African Shipping Lines, a leading international shipping line company, to provide security to vessels traveling along the coast of East Africa. Another private venture is MUSC, which specializes in counterpiracy and ship's security.

Proposed solutions

In November 2008, the International Association of Independent Tanker Owners, a group of ship-owners representing 75% of the world's independent tanker fleet, asked for United Nations intervention. It called on the United Nations to co-ordinate anti-piracy patrols, and suggested the possibility of a naval blockade of Somalia and monitoring all vessels leaving the country's coastline. However, NATO responded by saying that it would be impossible to effectively blockade Somalia's vast coast. It also suggested that all home ports of Somali pirates be blockaded, or that ground forces be inserted in Somalia itself to destroy pirate bases.

Ultimately, many authors argue that the long term solution to Somali piracy is political securitisation. Governments would have to employ socioeconomic measures such as poverty alleviation and good governance in order to deal with piracy (and even terrorism) effectively. In particular, a sustainable solution requires the establishment not only of effective governance but also the rule of law, reliable security agencies, and alternative employment opportunities for the Somali people.

See also

• International Maritime Bureau
• International Maritime Organization
• Operation Enduring Freedom - Horn of Africa
• Operation Atalanta
• Combined Task Force 150 and Combined Task Force 151 coalition force counter-piracy operations in the region.
• Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal
• CIA's Special Activities Division
• August 2009 Egyptian hostage escape
• Pirate Round

External links

• European Union Naval Force Somalia - Operation Atalanta
• United States Institute of Peace Working Paper - Counting the Costs of Somali Piracy
• Toxic Waste Behind Somali Pirates
• Piracy Challenges Global Governance by Daniele Archibugi and Marina Chiarugi, Open Democracy, April 9, 2009
• 'Toxic waste' Behind Somali piracy, Al Jazeera, October 2008
• You are Being Lied to About Pirates by Johann Hari, The Independent, January 5, 2009
• 2004 vs 2007 Global Piracy Summary by The Economist
• Piracy in Somalia: Threatening Global Trade, Feeding Local Wars
• IUU Fishing and Insecurity Impacts on Somali Fisheries and Marine Resources
• Avoiding the Institutional ‘Beauty Contest’ in Countering Somali Piracy RUSI Analysis, December 2008
• Somali Pirates Guided by London Intelligence Team, Report Says by The Guardian
• Misreading the Somali Threat by Karen Rothmyer, The Nation, April 22, 2009
• FBI: Department of Justice Press Release January 12, 2010
• Somalian piracy
• Al Jazeera - 'In video: Meet the pirates'
• ECOTERRA Intl. Somali Marine & Coastal Monitor - SMCM updates
• The Oil Factor in Somalia: Four American petroleum giants had agreements with the African nation before its civil war began. | By Mark Fineman | January 18, 1993 | Los Angeles Times