North Korea and weapons of mass destruction

"Nuclear program of North Korea" redirects here. For its nuclear power program, see Nuclear power in North Korea.

Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Nuclear program start date	1957
First nuclear weapon test	October 9, 2006
Last nuclear test	February 12, 2013
Largest yield test	6~40 kt (The yield is disputed. The North-Korean government never announced the exact yield.)
Total tests	3, possibly 5
Current stockpile	12-27 nuclear weapons equivalents (ISIS mid-range estimate)
Maximum missile range	4,000 km (BM25 Musudan)
NPT signatory	Yes, but withdrew in 2003

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North Korea and weapons
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Events Missile tests 1993 1998 2006 2009 2013 Nuclear tests 2006 2009 2013 Weapons Taepodong-1 Taepodong-2 See also North Korea crisis Tonghae Satellite Launching Ground Ryanggang explosion Yongbyon Korean People's Army Songun

North Korea (officially the Democratic People's Republic of Korea or DPRK) declared in 2009 that it had developed a nuclear weapon, and is widely believed to possess a small stockpile of relatively simple nuclear weapons. The U.S. Department of Defense believes North Korea probably has a chemical weapons program and is likely to possess a stockpile of chemical weapons. North Korea was a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty but withdrew in 2003, citing the failure of the United States to fulfill its end of the Agreed Framework, a 1994 agreement between the states to limit North Korea's nuclear ambitions, begin normalization of relations, and help North Korea supply some energy needs through nuclear reactors. The IAEA has met with Ri Je Son, The Director General of the General Department of Atomic Energy (GDAE) of DPRK, to discuss nuclear matters. Ri Je Son was also mentioned in this role in 2002 in a United Nations article.

On October 9, 2006, the North Korean government issued an announcement that it had successfully conducted a nuclear test for the first time. Both the United States Geological Survey and Japanese seismological authorities detected an earthquake with a preliminary estimated magnitude of 4.3 in North Korea, corroborating some aspects of the North Korean claims. On January 6, 2007, the North Korean government further confirmed that it had nuclear weapons.

In April 2009, reports surfaced that North Korea has become a "fully fledged nuclear power", an opinion shared by IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei. On May 25, 2009, North Korea conducted another nuclear test, which is believed to have been the cause of a magnitude 4.7 seismic event. Although there is no official information about the test's location, it is believed that it happened at the site of the first nuclear test at Mantapsan, Kilju County, in the north-eastern part of North Korea.

On February 11, 2013, the USGS detected a magnitude 5.1 seismic disturbance, reported to be a third underground nuclear test. North Korea has officially reported it as a successful nuclear test with a lighter warhead, and yet delivers more force than before without mentioning the exact yield. South Korean sources put the yield estimation at 6 to 7kt of TNT. However, the Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources, a state-run geology research institute in Germany, estimated the yield at 40 kilotons. while South Korean sources later revised the yield to 6-9 kilotons using the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization’s calculation method. The Korea Institute of Geosciences and Mineral Resources estimated the yield as 7.7-7.8 kilotons.

History

Main article: Timeline of North Korea nuclear program

Korean War

Korea has been a divided country since 1945, when it was liberated from the defeated Japan after World War II. The Korean War was fought from June 25, 1950, until an Armistice Agreement was signed on July 27, 1953. As part of the Armistice, both sides, including U.S. forces, conduct military patrols within the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC) serves the purpose of regulating and supervising the conditions of the Armistice agreement.

During the Korean War, North Korea was dependent on military assistance from both the Soviet Union and China. USSR and China were not just assistants in military matters, and continued to be pivotal trading partners and diplomatic pillars to North Korea until the 1990s. The fall of the Soviet Union and the end of communism in Europe caused significant change with Moscow and Pyongyang’s relations. This divide was further widened when Russia entered into diplomatic relations with South Korea in 1990. China was also growing closer and friendlier with Seoul. North Korea’s ties with China have also decreased. China ultimately established diplomatic relations with South Korea in August 1992. These diplomatic losses coupled with future sanctions from countries such as the United States continue to isolate North Korea from the rest of the world.

In September 1956 the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Radford told the U.S. Department of State that the U.S. military intention was to introduce atomic weapons into Korea. From January 1957 the U.S. National Security Council considered, on President Eisenhower's instruction, and then agreed. However, paragraph 13(d) of the Korean Armistice Agreement mandated that both sides should not introduce new types of weapons into Korea, thus preventing the introduction of nuclear weapons and missiles. The U.S. decided to unilaterally abrogate paragraph 13(d), breaking the Armistice Agreement, despite concerns by United Nations allies. At a June 21, 1957, meeting of the Military Armistice Commission the U.S. informed the North Korean representatives that the U.N. Command no longer considered itself bound by paragraph 13(d) of the armistice.

In August 1957 NSC 5702/2 permitting the deployment of nuclear weapons in Korea was approved. In January 1958 nuclear armed Honest John missiles and 280mm atomic cannons were deployed to South Korea, a year later adding nuclear armed Matador cruise missiles with the range to reach China and the Soviet Union.

North Korea denounced the abrogation of paragraph 13(d) as an attempt to wreck the armistice agreement and turn Korea into a U.S. atomic warfare zone. At the U.N. General Assembly in November 1957 the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia condemned the decision of the United Nations Command to introduce nuclear weapons into Korea.

North Korea responded militarily by digging massive underground fortifications resistant to nuclear attack, and forward deployment of its conventional forces so that the use of nuclear weapons against it would endanger South Korean and U.S. forces as well. In 1963 North Korea asked the Soviet Union for help in developing nuclear weapons, but was refused. However, instead the Soviet Union agreed to help North Korea develop a peaceful nuclear energy program, including the training of nuclear scientists. Later, China, after its nuclear tests, similarly rejected North Korean requests for help with developing nuclear weapons.

Tensions between North and South have run high on numerous occasions since 1953. The deployment of the U.S. Army's Second Infantry Division on the Korean peninsula and the American military presence at the DMZ are publicly regarded by North Korea as an occupying army. In several areas, North Korean and American/South Korean forces operate in extreme proximity to the border, adding to tension. This tension has led to numerous clashes, including the Axe Murder Incident of 1976.

In the early 1960s security concerns in the region and an apparent Soviet dismissal of these concerns hastened the DPRK's efforts to acquire the technology to produce nuclear weapons. In the wake of the student-led April 19 movement in 1960 that overthrew the South Korean president Rhee Syngman and the May 16, 1961, military coup d'état that brought General Park Chung-hee to power in the south, North Korea sought a mutual defense treaty with the Soviet Union and China.

Soviet leaders reportedly did not even consider such a pact necessary, despite the military posture of the anti-communist Park regime, as long as the Soviets improved relations with the United States.

Perhaps the two most important factors in North Korea's attempts to obtain nuclear weapons and become militarily self-reliant were the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 and the prospect of a U.S.–Japan–ROK alliance following the 1965 establishment of diplomatic relations between the ROK and Japan. Kim Il-sung reportedly did not trust that the Soviets would live up to the conditions of the mutual defense pact and guarantee North Korea's security since they betrayed Castro by withdrawing nuclear missiles in an effort to improve relations with the United States.

As a North Korean official explained to Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin in 1965, "the Korean leaders were distrustful of the CPSU and the Soviet government, they could not count on that the Soviet government would keep the obligations related to the defense of Korea it assumed in the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, Kim Il-sung said, and therefore they were compelled to keep an army of 700,000 and a police force of 200,000." In explaining the cause of such mistrust, the official claimed that "the Soviet Union had betrayed Cuba at the time of the Caribbean crisis." However, as recently declassified Russian, Hungarian, and East German materials confirm, no communist governments were willing to share the technology with the North Koreans, out of fear that they would share the technology with China.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, North Korean leaders recognized the need for a new security relationship with a major power since Pyongyang could not afford to maintain its military posture. North Korean leaders therefore sought to forge a new relationship with the United States, the only power strong enough to step into the vacuum left by the collapse of the Soviet Union. From the early 1990s, throughout the first nuclear crisis, North Korea sought a non-aggression pact with the United States.

The U.S. rejected North Korean calls for bilateral talks concerning a non-aggression pact, and stated that only six-party talks that also include the People's Republic of China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea are acceptable. The American stance was that North Korea had violated prior bilateral agreements, thus such forums lacked accountability. Conversely, North Korea refused to speak in the context of six-party talks, stating that it would only accept bilateral talks with the United States. This led to a diplomatic stalemate.

On October 9, 2006, the North Korean government issued an announcement that it had successfully conducted a nuclear test for the first time. Both the United States Geological Survey and Japanese seismological authorities detected an earthquake with a preliminary estimated magnitude of 4.3 in North Korea, corroborating some aspects of the North Korean claims.

On November 19, 2006, North Korea's Minju Joson newspaper accused South Korea of building up arms in order to attack the country, claiming that "the South Korean military is openly clamoring that the development and introduction of new weapons are to target the North." North Korea accused South Korea of conspiring with the United States to attack it, an accusation made frequently by the North and routinely denied by the United States. The United Nations Security Council condemned the test in Resolution 1874.

On May 25, 2009, North Korea conducted a second test of a nuclear weapon at the same location as the original test (not confirmed). The test weapon was of the same magnitude as the atomic bombs dropped on Japan in the 2nd World War, (confirmed South Korea and Russia). At the same time of the test North Korea tested two short range missiles (reported a South Korean News Network YTN – not officially confirmed).

In July 2011, Abdul Qadeer Khan, the key figure in Pakistan's nuclear weapons development, allegedly claimed that North Korea had gained access to Pakistan's nuclear technology in the late 1990s by paying bribes to Pakistan's senior military officials, a claim Pakistan's senior officials disputed. Khan stated that he had personally helped transfer $3 million in gratuities to senior Pakistan's military officers, though he never provided any proofs to his claims.

North Korea is not a member state of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CNTBTO).

North Korea – United States relations

Main article: North Korea – United States relations

After the loss of partners in the former USSR and China, North Korea looked to strengthen ties with the United States, but was ultimately unsuccessful.

Under the 1994 Agreed Framework, the U.S. government agreed to facilitate the supply of two light water reactors to North Korea (which were never completed). Such reactors are considered "more proliferation-resistant than North Korea's graphite-moderated reactors," but not "proliferation proof." The Swiss based company ABB in 2000 signed a $200 million contract to deliver equipment and services for two nuclear power stations at Kumho, on North Korea's east coast. Donald Rumsfeld, who later became the U.S. Secretary of Defence, was on the board of ABB when it won this deal, but a Pentagon spokeswoman, Victoria Clark, said that Rumsfeld did not recall it being brought before the board at any time.

Even though U.S. President George W. Bush had named North Korea as part of an "Axis of evil" following the September 11, 2001 attacks, U.S. officials stated that the United States was not planning any immediate military action.

On January 21, 2004, Siegfried S. Hecker, an American delegate, was sent to observe the situation. During the visit, North Korea continued to show interest in resuming six-party talks. Furthermore, the reprocessing plant was running at the time of the visit. North Korean Vice Minister Kim expressed concern over inviting the delegate over. During the visit North Korea admitted to repurposing plutonium so that they could be used for creating nuclear weaponry (see Nuclear Deterrence). However, after the delegate requested later discussions, the Vice Minister had to decline. The Agreed Framework pact with the United States was created to ensure that two light reactors were shipped to North Korea.

However, because America persuaded the KEBO board to stop shipments of oil, the pact was terminated. Furthermore, North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty. During the delegation Vice Minister Kim also stated the need for haste, suggesting that time spent without negotiation would be time North Korea could spend repurposing more plutonium. The delegate’s visit ended with Vice Minister Kim asking whether or not the United States would refrain from action if repurposing was finished. The delegate suggested that the visit allowed the United States to confirm North Korea’s nuclear capabilities.

According to John Feffer, co-director of the Foreign Policy in Focus, in 2006

The primary problem is that the current U.S. administration fundamentally doesn’t want an agreement with North Korea. The Bush administration considers the 1994 Agreed Framework to have been a flawed agreement. It doesn’t want be saddled with a similar agreement, for if it did sign one, it would then be open to charges of "appeasing" Pyongyang. The Vice President has summed up the approach as: "We don’t negotiate with evil, we defeat evil."

Diplomatic efforts at resolving the North Korean situation are complicated by the different goals and interests of the nations of the region. While none of the parties desire a North Korea with nuclear weapons, Japan and South Korea are especially concerned about North Korean counter-strikes following possible military action against North Korea. The People's Republic of China and South Korea are also very worried about the economic and social consequences should this situation cause the North Korean government to collapse.

The Obama administration has demonstrated more willingness to negotiate with North Korea than the previous administration and has indicated that denuclearizing the Korean peninsula is a priority. Recent bilateral activities between the United States and North Korea have included an April 2011 visit by former President Jimmy Carter, a July 2011 meeting between U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Policy Stephen Bosworth and North Korean First Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye Gwan, and a February 2012 bilateral meeting in Beijing that resulted in an agreement to halt uranium enrichment in exchange for U.S. food aid (which has now been cancelled due to North Korea's April 2012 long-range missile test). Additionally, the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance Report declared a rebalancing of national security and military focus towards the Asia-Pacific region with special mention of North Korea:

"We will maintain peace on the Korean Peninsula by effectively working with allies and other regional states to deter and defend against provocation from North Korea, which is actively pursuing a nuclear weapons program."

In February 2012, North Korea announced that it would suspend uranium enrichment at the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center and not conduct any further tests of nuclear weapons while productive negotiations involving the United States continue. This agreement included a moratorium on long-range missiles tests. Additionally, North Korea agreed to allow IAEA inspectors to monitor operations at Yongbyon. The United States reaffirmed that it had no hostile intent toward the DPRK and was prepared to improve bilateral relationships, and agreed to ship humanitarian food aid to North Korea. The United States called the move "important, if limited," but said it would proceed cautiously and that talks would resume only after North Korea made steps toward fulfilling its promise. However, after North Korea conducted a provocative long-range missile test in April 2012 that ended in failure, the United States decided not to proceed with the promised food aid.

The United States has on occasion turned a blind eye to relations between Egypt and North Korea. North Korea and Egypt have been trading partners for years, to the point where Egypt has had assistance in creating missiles and munitions.

Nuclear deterrence

Former South Korean Government sources, as well as some scholars and analysts, have argued that North Korea is using nuclear weapons primarily as a political tool to begin re-establishing normal relations with the U.S., Japan and South Korea, and to end the long-standing economic embargo against North Korea. They point out that the threat of nuclear weapons is the only thing that has brought the U.S., Japan and South Korea into serious negotiations. In a lecture in 1993, Bruce Cumings asserted that based on information gathered by the CIA, the activity around the Yongbyon facility may have been done expressly to draw the attention of U.S. satellites. He also pointed out that the CIA had not claimed North Korea had nuclear weapons, but that they had enough material to create such weapons should they choose to do so. Others argue that North Korea is developing nuclear weapons for the same reason most other countries develop them—namely to give their nation a sense of power in the world, enabling them to further their goals without fear of reprisal.

Further to this argument is the observation that many parties have a vested interest in the claim that North Korea has nuclear weapons. For North Korea, it has been a bargaining tool for opening diplomatic discussions. The nuclear development program can be manipulated in exchange for foreign aid. Nuclear posturing has also been seen as a threat that could force the re-unification of the Korean peninsula. The Grand National Party, currently the ruling party in South Korea, have stated that they will not return to the Sunshine policy before North Korea gives up their nuclear weapons. South Korean newspapers have warned that North Korea's nuclear arsenal could destroy South Korea's conventional forces, and that the strategic military balance has irrevocably shifted in the aftermath of North Korea's nuclear test. Finally, the threat of a nuclear-armed North Korea has fed South Korea's perceived need for a larger standing army and defence force.

During the 2004 visit by the U.S delegate, discussions with Ambassador Li and Vice Minister Kim in Pyongyang, the two stressed that North Korea is in possession of a nuclear deterrent and that U.S actions have caused them to strengthen the deterrent. This was done in both quality and quantity. According to Hecker, in order to make a deterrent it is required that a state have the following three things: 1.) The ability to make plutonium metal 2.) The ability to design and build a nuclear device 3.) The ability to integrate the nuclear device into a delivery system. The delegate reports confirming only the first requirement.

Some LDP politicians in Japan have openly expressed a desire to change Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, which prohibits the use of force as a tool for resolving international disputes. This desire has become increasingly relevant given the ability of North Korea's Rodong-1 missile to strike Tokyo, and it has gained increasing support as a result. Some estimates have claimed that as many as 3 of the 200 Rodong-1 missiles currently deployed may be fitted with nuclear warheads. Further fears about North Korea's ability to generate weapons-grade fissile materials in its projected civilian nuclear reactors have led to the consideration of the threat posed by the entire Rodong-1 missile fleet being armed with nuclear warheads and targeted on the Japanese home islands. (The missiles are able to cover 90% of Japanese territory. Moreover, their accuracy is so poor that they are only valid delivery systems when targeted on very large military installations or cities.)

Because it is impossible to be certain of shooting down every ballistic missile, it is preferable to ensure that the weapons cannot be manufactured in the first place. An attack on a plutonium production reactor, such as that carried out by the Israelis on the Iraqi reactor complex at Osirak (Operation Opera), may prevent or delay later nuclear attacks, though such an act could be seen as an act of war and subject to retaliation (albeit with conventional weaponry). Perhaps because of this, both the Clinton and Bush administrations did not attempt an attack on North Korean nuclear facilities. Other avenues leading to the same result have failed: during the 2006 negotiations, North Korea rejected the suggestion that it demolish its two larger reactors.

On March 17, 2007, North Korea told delegates at international nuclear talks that it is preparing to shut down its main nuclear facility. The agreement was reached following a series of six-party talks, involving North Korea, South Korea, China, Russia, Japan and the U.S. begun in 2003. According to the agreement, a list of its nuclear programs will be submitted and the nuclear facility will be disabled in exchange for fuel aid and normalization talks with the U.S. and Japan. This had been delayed from April due to a dispute with the United States over Banco Delta Asia, but on July 14, International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors confirm the shutdown of North Korea's Yongbyon nuclear reactor.

North Korea's ability to fulfill its energy needs has been deteriorating since the 1990s. Although North Korea's indigenous nuclear power-generating capacity is insignificant, the two light-water moderated plants would be an important source of electricity in a nation with scant resources. Donald Rumsfeld demonstrated the severe lack of electricity for the entire nation in a photograph released in October 2006.

Reactivation

USGS image of the earthquake caused by the nuclear test.

During 2008 tensions resurfaced between North Korea and the U.S. due to disagreements over the six-party talks disarmament process. According to one account, the talks began to break down after the United States insisted on more intrusive verification measures than North Korea was prepared to accept. On October 8, 2008, IAEA inspectors were forbidden by the North Korean government to conduct further inspections of the site. But two days later, the U.S. removed North Korea from the U.S. State Sponsors of Terrorism list and the Yongbyon deactivation process was expected to resume.

On April 25, 2009, however, the North Korean government announced that the country's nuclear facilities have been reactivated, and that spent fuel reprocessing for arms-grade plutonium has been restored.

On May 25, 2009, North Korea confirmed to have performed a "successful" underground nuclear test. It was the second such test and it was said to be much more powerful than the first. The same day a successful short range missile test was also conducted. The confirmation came little more than an hour after the U.S. Geological Survey reported a magnitude 4.7 seismic disturbance on the proximity of the site of North Korea's first nuclear test conducted in October 2006, other agencies such as the International Data Center of the CTBTO, and the Japanese Meteorological Center, also registered the seismic variations. North Korea's Korean Central News Agency said the test was conducted as part of the measures to bolster up its nuclear deterrent for self-defense in every way.

Nuclear weapons

Stockpile Estimates and Projections

ISIS

For 2013, the Institute for Science and International Security gives a mid-range estimate of 12 to 27 "nuclear weapon equivalents", including plutonium and uranium stockpiles. By 2016, North Korea is projected to have 14 to 48 nuclear weapon equivalents. (For uranium weapons, each weapon is assumed to contain 20 kilograms of weapon-grade uranium.)

FAS

As-of 2012, the Federation of American Scientists estimates North Korea has fewer than 10 plutonium warheads.

Hardware

North Korea produces most of its plutonium in a 5 megawatt gas-graphite moderated Magnox-type reactor. It is also alleged to have an enriched uranium program using centrifuges and technology provided by Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan.

Plutonium

5 MWe experimental reactor at Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center

North Korea has had two operating reactors, both located at the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center. The older reactor is a Soviet supplied IRT-2000 research reactor completed in 1967. Uranium irradiated in this reactor was used in North Korea's first plutonium separation experiments in 1975. Nevertheless, the primary purpose of the reactor is not to produce plutonium and North Korea has had trouble acquiring enough fuel for constant operation. The U.S. Department of Energy estimated that this reactor could have been used to produce up to 1–2 kg of plutonium, though the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee said that the amount was no more than a few hundred grams.

North Korea's main reactor, where practically all of its plutonium has been produced, is a 5MWe gas-graphite moderated Magnox type reactor. A full core consists of 8,000 fuel rods and can yield a maximum of 27–29 kg of plutonium if left in the reactor for optimal burnup. The North Korean Plutonium Stock, Mid-2006, it is estimated to be able to produce 0.9 grams of plutonium per thermal megawatt every day of its operations. The material required to make a single bomb is approximately four to eight kilograms. Often, North Korea has unloaded the reactor before reaching the maximum burnup level. There are three known cores which were unloaded in 1994 (under IAEA supervision in accordance with the Agreed Framework), 2005, and 2007.

In 1989, the 5MWe reactor was shut down for a period of seventy to a hundred days. In this time it is estimated that up to fifteen kilograms of plutonium could have been extracted. In 1994, North Korea unloaded its reactors again. The International Atomic Energy Agency had these under full surveillance until later being denied the ability to observe North Korean power plants. Under normal operation, the reactor can produce about 6 kg of plutonium per year although the reactor would need to be shut down and the fuel rods extracted to begin the plutonium separation process. Hence, plutonium separation takes place in campaigns. Reprocessing (also known as separation) is known to have taken place in 2003 for the first core and 2005 for the second core.

North Korea also had two additional graphite moderated reactors being built, but that have since become unsalvageable since maintenance of their construction sites was not allowed under the Agreed Framework. The first of these two partially constructed reactors was also in the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center. It was to be 50MWe and able to produce 60 kg of plutonium per year, enough for approximately 10 weapons. The second partially constructed reactor was in nearby Taechon. It was to be 200 MWe and able to produce roughly 220 kg of plutonium annually, enough for approximately 40 weapons.

On March 12, 1993, North Korea said that it planned to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and refused to allow inspectors access to its nuclear sites. By 1994, the United States believed that North Korea had enough reprocessed plutonium to produce about 10 bombs with the amount of plutonium increasing. Faced with diplomatic pressure after UN Security Council Resolution 825 and the threat of American military air strikes against the reactor, North Korea agreed to dismantle its plutonium program as part of the Agreed Framework in which South Korea and the United States would provide North Korea with light water reactors and fuel oil until those reactors could be completed.

Because the light water reactors would require enriched uranium to be imported from outside North Korea, the amount of reactor fuel and waste could be more easily tracked, making it more difficult to divert nuclear waste to be reprocessed into plutonium. However, with bureaucratic red tape and political obstacles from the North Korea, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), established to advance the implementation of the Agreed Framework, had failed to build the promised light water reactors because the United States failed to uphold their end of the agreement by providing energy aid, and in late 2002, North Korea returned to using its old reactors.

In 2006, there were eight sites identified as potential test explosion sites for current (and future) tests according to a statement by the South Korean Parliament. These sites are distinguished from a number of other nuclear materials production facilities in that they are thought to be most closely identified with a military, or potentially military purpose:

1. Hamgyong Bukdo (North Hamgyong) Province – 2 Sites:

• Chungjinsi – Nuclear fuel storage site, military base & unidentified underground facility
• Kiljugun – Extensive military buildup with motorized troop formations and construction of new advanced underground facility – Site of May 25, 2009, Nuclear Test.
• Phunggyere – Site of October 9, 2006, Nuclear Test

2. Chagangdo Province – 1 Site: Kanggyesi – Production center of North Korea's advanced equipment and munitions since 1956. Also, extensive intelligence of highly advanced underground facility.

3. Pyongan Bukdo (North Pyongan) Province – 4 Sites:

• Yongbyonsi – 2 Sites – Location of Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center, and the facility's Experimental Test Explosion facility and two unidentified underground facilities. In addition, there is a gas-graphite reactor, HE test site, nuclear fuel fabrication site, nuclear waste storage site
• Kusungsi – Between 1997 and September 2002, approximately 70 test explosions of North Korean munitions took place. Also, existence of underground facility
• Taechongun – 200MWe Nuclear Energy Plant construction site. Location of unidentified underground facility and nuclear arms/energy related facilities known to exist

4. Pyongan Namdo (South Pyongan) Province – 1 Site: Pyongsungsi – Location of National Science Academy and extensive underground facility whose purpose is not known.

Enriched uranium and foreign assistance

With the abandonment of its plutonium program, U.S. officials claimed North Korea began an enriched uranium program. North Korea possesses uranium mines containing an estimated 4 million tons of high grade uranium ore. Prime minister Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan, allegedly, through Pakistan's former top scientist, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, supplied key data, stored in CDs, on uranium enrichment and information to North Korea in exchange for missile technology around 1990–1996, according to U.S. intelligence officials. President Pervez Musharraf and Prime minister Shaukat Aziz acknowledged in 2005 that Khan had provided centrifuges and their designs to North Korea. On May 30, 2008, ABC News reported that Khan, who previously confessed to his involvement with Iran and North Korea, now denies involvement with the spread of nuclear arms to those countries. He claimed in an interview with ABC News that the Pakistan Government, under Shaukat Aziz, and President Pervez Musharraf forced him to be a "scapegoat" for the "national interest". He also denied ever traveling to Iran or Libya, and claimed that North Korea's nuclear program was well advanced before his visit.

This program was publicized in October 2002 when the United States asked North Korean officials about the program. Under the Agreed Framework, North Korea explicitly agreed to freeze plutonium programs (specifically, its "graphite moderated reactors and related facilities"). The agreement also committed North Korea to implement the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, in which both Koreas committed not to have enrichment or reprocessing facilities. The United States argued North Korea violated its commitment not to have enrichment facilities.

In December 2002, the United States persuaded the KEDO Board to suspend fuel oil shipments, which led to the end of the Agreed Framework. North Korea responded by announcing plans to reactivate a dormant nuclear fuel processing program and power plant north of Pyongyang. North Korea soon thereafter expelled United Nations inspectors and withdrew from the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

In 2007, reports emanating from Washington suggested that the 2002 CIA reports indicating that North Korea was developing uranium enrichment technology had overstated or misread the intelligence. U.S. officials were no longer making this a major issue in the six-party talks.

Nuclear fusion claims

In May 2010, the Rodong Sinmun announced in an article that North Korea had successfully carried out a nuclear fusion reaction. The aforementioned article, referring to the alleged test as "a great event that demonstrated the rapidly developing cutting-edge science and technology of the DPRK", also makes mention of efforts by North Korean scientists to develop "safe and environment-friendly new energy", and made no mention of plans to use fusion technology in its nuclear weapons program. This claim has been greeted with skepticism, as no country has successfully mastered nuclear fusion, despite decades of advanced research work around the world.

In 2013, the South Korean Defense Ministry speculated that North Korea may be trying to develop a hydrogen bomb and such a device may be North Korea's next weapons test.

Biological and chemical weapons

North Korea acceded to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1987, and the Geneva Protocol on January 4, 1989, but has not signed the Chemical Weapons Convention. The U.S. Department of Defense believes North Korea probably has a chemical weapons program and is likely to possess a stockpile of weapons. It reportedly acquired the technology necessary to produce tabun and mustard gas as early as the 1950s.

Since 1989 North Korea has been believed to have the capability to indigenously produce nerve, blister, choking and blood chemical agents in bulk.^{[citation needed]} Furthermore, North Korea has spent substantial resources in defensive measures such as extensive training in the use of gas masks, suits, detectors and decontamination systems for both the civilian populace and the military.

North Korea maintains at least eight industrial facilities that are capable of creating biochemical weaponry.^{[citation needed]} The United States estimates North Korea’s likely stockpile of chemical weaponry from at least a few hundred tons, to at most a few thousand tons. Using a study by the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London, it was confirmed that there was a stockpile of biological and chemical weaponry. South Korea estimates North Korea to have roughly 5,000 tons worth of biological and chemical weapons.^{[citation needed]}

The South Korean government further estimated production capability, with a low of 4,500 tons in peacetime, and a high of 12,000 tons in wartime.^{[citation needed]} However, during the 1990s, natural disasters and increasing economic restrictions hindered North Korea’s ability to manufacture biochemical weapons. Under emergency situations, North Korea may be able to create up to 20,000 tons of chemical agents annually. The range of chemical weapons North Korea had been capable of producing during the nineties was said to hold a plethora of weapons, such as: adamsite (DM), chloroacetophenone (CN), chlorobenzylidene malononitrile (CS), hydrogen cyanide (AC), mustard-family (H or HD), phosgene (CG and CX), sarin (GB), soman (GD), tabun (GA), and V-agents (VM and VX).^{[citation needed]}

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea likely concentrated on weapons such as mustard, phosgene, sarin, and V-agents for operational and technical reasons. North Korea may have also began the production of binary agents. Binary agents are toxic only when the two chemicals (normally physically separated) are combined. By creating binary agents, North Korea can increase their safety when handling hazardous material. Deployment of chemical and biological weapons is fairly simple and can be fired from artillery, dropped from aircraft, or fired from any other delivery system. North Korean military units conduct regular nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) training exercises in a chemical environment. North Korean chemical and biological warfare units are equipped with decontamination and detection equipment. In 2010, the Omaha World-Herald reported that North Korea has chemical weapons which could cause millions of casualties in South Korea, where gas masks are only provided to the military and top government officials.

Delivery systems

See also: Strategic Rocket Forces (North Korea) and North Korean missile tests

History

In the 1960s, DPRK first received shipments of short-range ballistic missiles from its main ally, the Soviet Union. The first weapons of this kind to be delivered were the tactical FROG-series. In the late 1970s or early 1980s, the DPRK received several longer range Scud-B missiles from Egypt (which in turn received those missiles from the USSR, Bulgaria and Poland). The USSR had refused to supply Scuds to North Korea. A local production basis was established, and the first modified copy was named Hwasong-5. With time, more advanced types of missiles were developed. Eventually North Korea equipped itself with ballistic missiles, capable of reaching Japan.

Testing

Early 2000s

North Korea's ability to deliver weapons of mass destruction to a hypothetical target is somewhat limited by its missile technology. As of 2005, North Korea's total range with its Nodong missiles estimated as 900 km with a 1000 kg payload, enough to reach South Korea, and parts of Japan, Russia and China. It is not known if this missile is capable of carrying the nuclear weapons North Korea may have developed.

The BM25 Musudan is a North Korean designed intermediate-range ballistic missile with range capabilities of up to 1,550 miles (2,490 km), and could carry a nuclear warhead. As of 2010, Western sources had no indication that the missile system had ever been tested, or was operational. North Korea has also developed the Taepodong-1 missile, which has a range of 2,500 km, but it is unlikely to have been deployed.

With the development of the Taepodong-2 missile, with an expected range of 5,000–6,000 km, North Korea could hypothetically deliver a warhead to almost all countries in Southeast Asia, as well as the western side of North America. The Taepodong-2 missile was unsuccessfully tested on July 4, 2006. U.S. intelligence estimates that the weapon will not be operational for another 11 years. The Taepodong-2 could theoretically hit the western United States and other U.S. interests in the Western hemisphere. The current model of the Taepodong-2 could not carry nuclear warheads to the United States. Former CIA director George Tenet has claimed that, with a light payload, Taepodong-2 could reach western parts of Continental United States, though with low accuracy.^{[citation needed]} A few Taepodong-2 missiles may exist, but launch procedures are lengthy and visible.

2009

On April 5, 2009, North Korea launched the Unha-2 space booster (allegedly based on the long-range Taepodong-2). Although the launch was more successful than the 2006 test, the third stage still failed to separate properly. A missile test or a satellite attempt, the launch still violates the UN Security Council's decision. Because the Unha-2's first stage engine is the Musudan (Nodong-B / Taepodong-X), North Korea claims they have demonstrated the 4000 km range and reliability of its new Musudan missile.

This means North Korea may be able to develop/deploy mobile ICBMs, which can survive a U.S. first strike, within 7–10 years.

On July 2, 2009, North Korea test fired a series of at least four surface-to-ship cruise missiles into the Sea of Japan (East Sea). Two days later, on July 4, they proceeded to test fire a further seven Scud-type ballistic missiles into the same sea. The tests are seen by world powers as a symbol of defiance to the United Nations set over North Korea after their nuclear test on May 25, 2009. These launches come only a week after U.S. President Barack Obama extended U.S. economic sanctions against North Korea. This is also a response to the UN's sanctions that were imposed in June 2009, after Pyongyang's nuclear test in May 2009, as well as the new UN resolution that any nation can inspect a North Korean vessel that the investigating nation believes is carrying weaponry. It has been suggested that the test firing of missiles is an act of defiance against the United States national holiday, Independence Day.

Japan Ministry of Defense's analyst Takesada points out that North Korea's desire of unification is similar to North Vietnam, and warns of the possibility of North Korea's compulsory merger with South Korea by threats of nuclear weapons, taking advantage of any possible decrease in the U.S. military presence in South Korea, after North Korea deploys several hundred mobile ICBMs aimed at the U.S.

Delivery Systems

Estimated maximum range of some North Korean missiles

There is evidence that North Korea has been able to miniaturize a nuclear warhead for use on a ballistic missile. Re-entry technology to protect the warheads en route to their targets is lacking. A 2012 display of missiles purporting to be ICBMs were declared fakes by Western analysts, and indicated North Korea was a long way from having a credible ICBM.

Successfully tested

• KN-1 – a short-range anti-ship cruise missile. Its range is estimated to be around 160 kilometers, and is most probably an improved version of the Soviet Termit missile (NATO codename "Styx").
• KN-2 Toksa – a short-range, solid-fueled, highly accurate mobile missile, modified copy of the Soviet OTR-21. Unknown number in service, apparently deployed either in the late 1990s or early 2000s (decade).
• Hwasong-5 – initial Scud modification. Road-mobile, liquid-fueled missile, with an estimated range of 330 km. It has been tested successfully. It is believed that North Korea has deployed some 150–200 such missiles on mobile launchers.
• Hwasong-6 – later Scud modification. Similar to the Hwasong-5, yet with an increased range (550–700 km) and a smaller warhead (600–750 kg). Apparently this is the most widely deployed North Korean missile, with at least 400 missiles in use.
• Nodong-1 – larger and more advanced Scud modification. Liquid-fueled, road-mobile missile with a 650 kg warhead. First production variants had inertial guidance, later variants featured GPS guidance, which improves CEP accuracy to 190–250 m. Range is estimated to be between 1,300 and 1,600 km.
• Taepodong-1 – three-stage technology demonstrator testbed. First stage was adapted from a Rodong-1. Second stage was adapted from a Hwasong-6. A satellite-delivery launch was attempted in 1998. The satellite failed, but the first two stages apparently functioned adequately. According to some analysts, the Taepodong-1, if developed into an ICBM platform, could have a range of nearly 6,000 km with a third stage and a payload of less than 100 kg. The US Defense Intelligence Agency estimates that the Taepodong-1 was a test-bed, not intended or usable as a weapon. The US National Air and Space Intelligence Center made a similar assessment.
• Musudan-1 – a modified copy of the Soviet R-27 Zyb SLBM. It was tested successfully as the first or second stage of Unha^{[citation needed]} . Despite the failure of the satellite, the first and second stages of the missile apparently flew without any problems. The missile, also known under the names Nodong-B, Taepodong-X and BM25, has a range of 4,000 kilometers.^{[citation needed]}
• Unha 3 – After a failed first launch, the second launch of this space launch vehicle took place on December 12, 2012, at 09:51 am local time and placed an object into orbit.

Untested / failed

• Taepodong-2 – North Korea's domestic ICBM attempt. First test occurred in 2006, when the missile failed 40 seconds after launch. On April 5, 2009, a space booster variant was launched with a satellite on board. As in 1998, the satellite itself failed to reach orbit, but the missile flew several thousand kilometers before falling in the Pacific Ocean. Estimates of the range vary widely – from 4,500 to 10,000 kilometers (most estimates put the range at about 6,700 km).

• The Unha 3 rocket was launched on April 13, 2012, at 7:39 am local time but disintegrated approximately ninety seconds after launch. North Korea claims that the satellite was to monitor weather, crops and forestation.

International Response

Exports

In April 2009 the United Nations named the Korea Mining and Development Trading Corporation (aka KOMID) as North Korea's primary arms dealer and main exporter of equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons. The UN lists KOMID as based in Central District Pyongyang. However it also has offices in Beijing and sales offices worldwide which facilitate weapons sales and seek new customers for North Korean weapons.

KOMID has sold missile technology to Iran and has done deals for missile related technology with the Taiwanese. KOMID representatives were also involved in a North Korean deal to mass-produce Kornet anti-tank guided missiles for Syria and KOMID has also been responsible for the sale of equipment, including missile technologies, gunboats, and multiple rocket artilleries, worth a total of over $100 million, to Africa, South America and the Middle East.

North Korea's military has also used the company Hap Heng to sell weapons overseas. Hap Heng was based in Macau in the 1990s to handle sales of weapons and missile and nuclear technology to nations such as Pakistan and Iran. Pakistan's medium-range ballistic missile, the Ghauri, is considered to be a copy of North Korea's Rodong 1. Even in 1999, intelligence sources said North Korea had sold missile components to Iran. Listed directors of Hap Heng include Kim Song in and Ko Myong Hun. Ko Myong Hun is now a listed diplomat in Beijing and may be involved in the work of KOMID.

A UN sanctions committee report stated that North Korea operates an international smuggling network for nuclear and ballistic missile technology, including to Burma, Syria, and Iran.

Export partners

These are countries which allegedly operate North Korean ballistic missiles, allegedly bought such or received assistance for establishing local production.

Pakistan

North Korean entities continued to provide assistance to Pakistan's ballistic missile program during the first half of 1999 in return for nuclear weapons technology [4]. Such assistance is critical for Islamabad's efforts to produce ballistic missiles. In April 1998, Pakistan flight-tested the Ghauri MRBM, which is based on North Korea's Nodong missile. Also in April 1998, the U.S. imposed sanctions against Pakistani and North Korean entities for their role in transferring Missile Technology Control Regime Category I ballistic missile-related technology.

Cuba

No confirmed information for North Korea shipping Hwasong-6 missiles to Cuba.

Egypt

Egypt has received technologies and assistance for making both the Hwasong-5 and Hwasong-6, and may have as well provided guidance systems or information on longer-range missiles to North Korea from its Condor program.

Ethiopia

Unconfirmed information for possessing Hwasong-5 missiles.

Iran

One of the first buyers of North Korean missiles. Iran has established local production for the Hwasong-5 (Shahab-1), Hwasong-6 (Shahab-2) and the Rodong-1 (Shahab-3). Also possesses some 18 land-based BM25 missiles. North Korean weapons sales to Iran are estimated to total $2 billion annually.

Libya

Libya during the reign of Muammar Gaddafi had been known to receive technological assistance, blueprints and missile parts from North Korea.

Nigeria

In January 2004, the Nigerian government announced that North Korea agreed to sell its missile technology, but a month later Nigeria rejected the agreement under U.S. pressure.

Republic of the Congo

There is some (although unconfirmed) information, that the Republic of the Congo has acquired Hwasong-5 missiles.

Sudan

There is some information that Syria shipped some of its North Korean designed Scud missiles to Sudan in 2004.

Syria

Uses two types of North Korean missiles – the Hwasong-6 and Rodong-1.

United Arab Emirates

25 Hwasong-5s purchased from North Korea in 1989. The Military of the United Arab Emirates were not satisfied with the quality of the missiles, and they were kept in storage.

Vietnam

Acquired Hwasong-5/6 missiles in 1998.

Yemen

Known to have bought Hwasong-5 missiles from the DPRK in the 1990s – a total of 15 missiles, 15 TELs with 15 HE warheads.

See also

• North Korea-Pakistan relations
• Nuclear power in North Korea
• Foreign relations of North Korea
• North Korea – United States relations
• List of Korea-related topics
• Sohae Satellite Launching Station
• 2002 State of the Union Address
• List of North Korean nuclear tests

External links

• Federation of American Scientists guide to North Korean chemical weapons
• Jonathan D. Pollack, "North Korea's Nuclear Weapon Development: Implications for Future Policy" Proliferation Papers, Paris, IFRI, Spring 2010
• North Korea's missile arsenal– Key facts (based on South Korean defense ministry data); AFP, June 1, 2005
• North Korea: Problems, Perceptions and Proposals– Oxford Research Group, April 2004
• Second nuclear test conducted by North Korea on May 25, 2009
• Nuclear Files.org Information on the North Korean nuclear program including links to source documents
• [5]
• Annotated bibliography for the North Korean nuclear weapons program from the Alsos Digital Library
• A.Q. Khan hand in North Korea bomb, by Venkatesan Vembu, Daily News & Analysis, October 10, 2006
• The February 13 Action Plan and the Prospects for the North Korean Nuclear Issue – analysis by Narushige Michishita, IFRI Proliferation Papers n° 17, 2007
• North Korean International Documentation Project Contains primary source documents related to the DPRK's efforts to obtain nuclear technology dating back to the mid-1960s
• TIME Archives A Collection of stories regarding North Korea's Nuclear Program
• Chung Min Lee, "The Evolution of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Implications for Iran", Proliferation Papers, Paris, IFRI, Winter 2009
• Norris, Robert S. and Kristensen, Hans M., "North Korea’s nuclear program, 2005", "The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2005
• The Woodrow Wilson Center's Nuclear Proliferation International History Project The Wilson Center's Nuclear Proliferation International History Project contains primary source material relating to North Korea's nuclear weapon program.
• Normalizing Japan: Supporter, Nuisance, or Wielder of Power in the North Korean Nuclear Talks – An analysis of Japan's role in the Six-Party Talks by Linus Hagström.
• Critiquing the Idea of Japanese Exceptionalism: Japan and the Coordination of North Korea Policy – An analysis of Japan's role in the nuclear talks prior to the commencement of the Six-Party Talks. Also by Linus Hagström.
• North Korea: Economic Sanctions
• Chronology of U.S. – North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy
• North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy Congressional Research Service.
• IISS North Korea’s Ballistic Missile Programme