Wikipedia:Requests for comment/Arbitration Committee 2

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The following discussion is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

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Closing Statement: The election of editors to the Arbitration Committee is one of the most important meta tasks we undertake as part of this project. No single process garners more participation, more emotion, or more drama than these elections - so much so that we must relegate them to an annual event. For all that, this RFC, called as it was on the eve of the election, could well have been filled with drama and shenanigans. I'm pleased to note, then, that the discussion seems to have been taken seriously by all participants, and that the proposals herein were seriously discussed, seriously considered, and appear to have been judged on the merits. That makes my task, in closing this RFC, that much easier.

In reviewing this RFC, I am mindful of the fact that 124 editors participated over the course of the past 28 days, and I'm using that number in evaluating all of the proposals here.

First, the low hanging fruit:

  • Strong Consensus exists for an Arbitration Committee composed of 18 Members elected to terms of 2 Years. There is also support for the related issue of the Elimination of Tranches, but participation in that section was low enough to preclude a firm statement. Functionally, having two year terms means that an arb is either up for election this year or next year, so tranches as a balancing mechanism may be deprecated anyway, and several editors seem to have assumed as much in supporting particular terms.
  • There is interest in mandatory support percentages, with support narrowly favoring the 60% minimum. The strongest argument here is that all arbitrators elected in 2008 (and, in fact, 2007 and 2006) met the 60% threshold, so it's not an unreasonable level of support to expect - and it appears to be the closest thing we have to a status quo, which is where a No Consensus puts it. Participation was lower here than elsewhere in the RFC (17% of participants), and Several editors noted that support and oppose percentages could change with a change in election format, which is a consideration. Of the items under discussion, this one is one that I think would benefit from additional discussion after this year's election. The question was whether to state a minimum acceptable support percentage, though - So, on this item, No Consensus exists to formally state a minimum.
  • No Consensus on voter eligibility. This item was added late in the game (last week), and participation was too low for meaningful consensus. I note that the proposal with the most support (7 Editors) was the current status quo - 150 Mainspace edits prior to the month in which the election cycle begins. There were several good proposals, though, worth exploration after the election.

The last two items (and the most discussed) were deeply interrelated, with Support for particular voting formats being contingent on particular methods (i.e. "I want Preferential Voting, but only if we use Securepoll" and the like). So, let's talk about voting method first.

  • There is Consensus for a Secret Ballot. It is not an overwhelming consensus, but it is a measurable one. 57% of participating editors favor the use of Securepoll to conduct a secret ballot, most frequently citing secrecy as a balance against concerns of voter intimidation, fraud, and sockpuppetry. There are great arguments in favor of an open ballot process - and several who supported the secret ballot option also supported some sort of venue for Open discussion and debate of candidates. But the broader support for a Secret Ballot is the critical factor, here.
  • Consensus is slightly narrower for Support/Oppose Voting, but it is clear as well - especially when editors who support it only with a secret ballot are taken into account. Most editors who went in for preferential voting seemed to assume the Schulze method would be chosen, and that was the stated example of the method - but several editors favored a Single-Transferable Vote, which has merit but muddied the waters a bit. The weight of precedent factors, as well, since Support/Oppose has been used in past elections.

To summarize, the consensus of this RFC is as follows:

  • The Arbitration Committee shall consist of 18 Members elected to 2 Year Terms.
  • Arbitrators will be elected by Secret Ballot using the Securepoll extension.
  • Ballots will invite editors to Support or Oppose candidates.
  • Voters must have 150 mainspace edits before the election cycle to vote (Status Quo)

Thank you to all who participated. UltraExactZZ Said ~ Did 16:13, 24 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Statement of the Issues Discussed[edit]

This RfC is designed to ascertain community consensus regarding certain aspects of the annual Arbitration Committee elections. A previous RfC (held a few months ago) indicated potential support for secret elections and the Schulze method. See Wikipedia:Requests for comment/ArbCom secret ballot. This new RfC should conclusively determine present opinions on these and other matters of importance.

Back in 2008, there was a strong consensus for a reduction in the duration of arbitrator terms. This can be seen in the 2008 RFC about the Arbitration Committee, where the opinion with the second highest support was SirFozzie's "reduce ArbCom terms" view. A lot of water has gone under the bridge since then, and term lengths were not changed for the 2008 election.

The question of the number of arbitrator seats, and the length of their terms, is again being raised in a variety of locations, including on Jimbo's talk page, and the 2009 election talk page. Traditionally Jimbo has made decisions about these matters after the election, however this year has seen a significant increase in the community wanting a say in these governance decisions. (e.g. User:Giano/The future followed by User:Giano/Findings of "The Future")

If the community is going to decide, or provide Jimbo with a loud signal, we need to do so now. We do not need to come up with a system that will be future proof. We can have another RFC next year to cater to the different needs of the next election.

This RfC began on this date: 14:09, 27 October 2009 (UTC).

Poll[edit]

This is a poll to gather consensus on how the community feels about the number of arbitrators, the length of their term, and the method by which they are chosen.

Please keep comments to a minimum in the poll sections. Long-form discussion should take place on the talk page, and exchanges which veer off the topic will also be transferred to the talk page.

Please place your views and proposals below the poll.

Sign multiple options if more than one is desirable to you.

Term lengths[edit]

6 months[edit]

  1. I'm ru.wiki arbiter, and it's hard to keep high activity for a long time.·Carn !? 20:02, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  2. Support this in spirit, but the election process does not make this practical.--Tznkai (talk) 22:04, 3 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

One year[edit]

  1. Everyking (talk) 07:17, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  2. Hipocrite (talk) 14:06, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  3. Majorly talk 17:55, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  4. Per my comments below. Offliner (talk) 22:29, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  5.  – iridescent 22:42, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  6. MoreThings (talk) 00:42, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  7. Less is more. -Atmoz (talk) 02:05, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  8. I understand the arguments that a year is too short, but I would nevertheless prefer to see a quick turnaround. SlimVirgin talk|contribs 20:45, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  9. Sounds about right. They can stand for reelection, of course. But considering the fast changing environment of Wikipedia, longer then that is a "way too long". The community needs to make reassessment of such crucial appointments often. --Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus| talk 00:47, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  10. YellowMonkey (bananabucket) 02:01, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  11. support in principle, similar to my comments about six months above.--Tznkai (talk) 22:05, 3 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  12. Two year terms currently have much more support, but a shorter term might reduce burnout and encourage more good candidates who don't wish to take such a long engagement. Jonathunder (talk) 23:38, 4 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  13. Two years too long. –Juliancolton | Talk 22:28, 5 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  14. It worked for the Romans, it should work for us. RayTalk 22:36, 11 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  15. One year should be enough to prevent burn out plus being able to be involved more in the community has to be a plus. --CrohnieGalTalk 15:23, 16 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  16. In "internet years", this is plenty long. Priyanath talk 16:12, 18 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  17. Per the comments above. To avoid complete turnover after each election, two elections could be held each year. You'd probably need to do September and March (or October and April) for this to work though, since keeping one in December would mean in election in July, when (in theory) fewer people are around. (I realize this has little to know shot of passing, but why not suggest it) Deserted Cities (talk) 14:41, 19 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  18. A year can be a long time. It might be best to start with one year and run for more if you think you're up for it. I Feel Tired (talk) 01:11, 20 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  19. Burnout after this length of time is a common problem, and a quality candidate can always be re-elected for more than one year. Lankiveil (speak to me) 05:44, 21 November 2009 (UTC).[reply]
  20. Suitable period, good candidates can be always re-elected.--Staberinde (talk) 22:38, 22 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  21. The candidates can always run again after a year. — Oli OR Pyfan! 01:43, 23 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

18 months[edit]

  1. John Vandenberg (chat) 09:15, 29 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  2.  Skomorokh, barbarian  10:15, 29 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  3. ~ Amory (u • t • c) 16:39, 29 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  4. Tactical voting because 2 years is two long and 1 year is optimal but 1 year is unlikey to have support. Hipocrite (talk) 14:14, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  5. I also think two years would be better than three, but 18 months allows us to continue to easily stagger 3 tranches of arbitrators with elections falling at the same time of year.--chaser (talk) 06:55, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  6. second choice (first choice is two years) Sssoul (talk) 09:25, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  7. Many AC members burn out pretty damn fast, let's give them the opportunity to be reelected if they still want to be part of the community after 18 long months in wikijail :). -- Luk talk 10:31, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  8. Enough time to get into the job but not enough to burn out. --rannṗáirtí anaiṫnid (coṁrá) 00:40, 4 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  9. This would be good.--Tznkai (talk) 05:40, 10 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  10. - Disclaimer. This is my personal view as a contributor and does not reflect the views of the Wikimedia Foundation, my employer. - Philippe 23:18, 11 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  11. One year is likely too short due to the nature of length of cases. I would suggest that once a case is started that those who were ArbCom members continue on without new members entering the case. There is also a real argument that one year may not be long enough to learn procedures. Ideally a two-year initial term with one year renewals would be my choice. Collect (talk) 11:42, 12 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  12. 1 year is too short; 3 years is the point where arbs can get exhausted. Ncmvocalist (talk) 06:40, 14 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Two years[edit]

  1. John Vandenberg (chat) 09:15, 29 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  2.  Skomorokh, barbarian  10:15, 29 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  3. SoWhy 12:42, 29 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  4. Mr.Z-man 14:47, 29 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  5. ~ Amory (u • t • c) 16:39, 29 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  6. Karanacs (talk) 16:52, 29 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  7. Davewild (talk) 18:44, 29 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  8. Manning (talk) 06:36, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  9. rspεεr (talk) 07:44, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  10. Keegan Three years is too long, one year is getting your feet wet. This is particularly important because active cases may come up again in year's time. Keegan (talk) 07:46, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  11. Moreschi (talk) 09:01, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  12. Sjakkalle (Check!) 09:44, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  13. Understanding that some sitting Arbs might consider running again for a second term, which should be encouraged (as long as they were effective previously). LessHeard vanU (talk) 14:04, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  14.  Sandstein  14:24, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  15. --Dirk Beetstra T C 15:19, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  16. Three years has obviously been too long, and 18 months introduces too many issues relative to election cycles. Nathan T 15:22, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  17. MBisanz talk 16:08, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  18. For clarity and stability. —Finn Casey * * * 17:06, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  19. JoshuaZ (talk) 17:36, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  20. Two years seems like a good period of time. Basket of Puppies 17:37, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  21. NW (Talk) 17:43, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
    (commented below with !vote) — Ched :  ?  17:52, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  22. - Mjroots (talk) 18:38, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  23. --Elonka 18:47, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  24. —NMajdan•talk 19:31, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  25. Durova349 19:54, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  26. Cirt (talk) 20:12, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  27. John Carter (talk) 20:38, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  28. Jayron32 20:42, 30 October 2009 (UTC) Two is good for continuity. It should be noted that this more closely reflects current practice anyways; few arbitrators actually complete their 3 year term anyways.[reply]
  29. Almost no-one wants to go on for three years, partly because it's a high stress position, mostly because it tends to take up all the time on wikipedia. However, 18 months is too short to get continuity and experience which the committee needs. Sam Blacketer (talk) 20:51, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  30. Very few people have in practice served effectively for longer than two years. Continuity is good, but this is the longest length that is realistic. . DGG ( talk ) 21:11, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  31. — Jake Wartenberg 21:20, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  32. Experience shows that three-year terms just don't work, for the reasons stated by Sam, DGG and others. Short Brigade Harvester Boris (talk) 22:14, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  33. One year is too short, three is too long, and I don't like the idea of having switchouts every half-year. ThemFromSpace 22:20, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  34.  M2Ys4U (talk) 22:42, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  35. Even number. One and a half years would be harder to implement.   Will Beback  talk  23:27, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  36. the wub "?!" 00:45, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  37. Second choice. I prefer staying with 3 year terms. But two year terms is acceptable too. - jc37 02:02, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  38. First choice. Three years is punishingly long for an arb. One year seems too short given the need for accumulated experience and overlapping terms on the Committee. Two years is idea, IMO. Tony (talk) 05:32, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  39. This is best, in my view. Arbs who can do the role for longer should be seeking re-election after two years in any case, ideally with a break of a year. By the third year, they may no longer have the same support they had two years previously. Carcharoth (talk) 07:15, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  40. This is the number I've been supporting publicly and privately. — Coren (talk) 12:45, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  41. I'd also consider 18 months reasonable. Heimstern Läufer (talk) 13:16, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  42. FloNight♥♥♥♥ 14:14, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  43. Two years seems to be a fair length to balance community power over ArbCom membership and the need for terms to be long enough for new ArbCom members to get momentum and experience. Three year terms are also simply too long for a voluntary but heavily demanding job like being on this committee with few members ever completing their full terms. Camaron · Christopher · talk 19:56, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  44. Second choice. I would actually prefer one year; 18 months would be good too, but I can't see how that would fit with annual elections, and having elections more often than that would be a lot of extra work. SlimVirgin talk|contribs 20:45, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  45. Ironholds (talk) 22:22, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  46. NellieBly (talk) 22:31, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  47. Sensible length for arbs, and means that with resignations a majority of seats are up for election each year.--Scott Mac (Doc) 23:46, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  48. Three years is just too long. Master&Expert (Talk) 03:38, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  49. Few stick around the full three years, so shortening a bit is a wise idea.--chaser (talk) 06:55, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  50. --Cybercobra (talk) 08:40, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  51. first choice (18 months is second choice) Sssoul (talk) 09:23, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  52. --KrebMarkt 10:20, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  53. This would seem best; 3 years is definitely too long and generates burnout, but a year wouldn't be enough to get up momentum. Stifle (talk) 10:27, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  54. Mailer Diablo 10:56, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  55. 2 years is a really good number to serve on a board or a committee the 1st to get to know what you are doing and the 2nd to get things done. When there is a 3rd year the 3rd is sent thinking about how much fun you could be having doing something else... RP459 (talk) 13:24, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  56. Acceptable, slightly prefer 3 years but not by much. Casliber (talk · contribs) 13:47, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  57. Antandrus (talk) 14:37, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  58. Please change to 2 years as soon as feasible. AGK 14:52, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  59. Just right. --Joopercoopers (talk) 16:08, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  60. Best option here. AtheWeatherman 17:10, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  61. Wikipedia years are like dog years. Two is plenty. Greg L (talk) 18:14, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  62. Two years are good, but I'd like to then see a two year break between terms. Who then was a gentleman? (talk) 19:19, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  63. Amalthea 23:14, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  64. IMO 18 months is a bit too short and 2 years is just a tad too long, so I'm going to be conformist and go with this one. Terms need to be long enough so that decisions aren't made with a "view towards next election" but burn out is also a potential problem - balancing the two goals makes this seem like the right length.radek (talk) 06:25, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  65. — Kusma talk 10:21, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  66. --Cube lurker (talk) 14:02, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  67. -- PhantomSteve (Contact Me, My Contribs) 15:18, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  68. Or longer is fine. -- EA Swyer Talk Contributions 17:37, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  69. Three years has proven too long for most to endure the hot seat. Just look at how many resign before their terms are up or do not stand for reelection! One year is hardly enough time to learn the ropes and gain enough experience. So by default, two might be the magic number.--R.D.H. (Ghost In The Machine) (talk) 20:02, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  70.  Burningview  ✉ 00:50, 3 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  71. Two seems long enough. GlassCobra 20:55, 3 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  72. -FASTILYsock (TALK) 00:25, 4 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  73. iMatthew talk at 22:36, 4 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  74. Rami R 11:29, 5 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  75. BrianY (talk) 01:25, 6 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  76. Three years is too long, 18 months is too short. Cla68 (talk) 05:25, 10 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  77. If we must.--Tznkai (talk) 05:41, 10 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  78. My thoughts are similar to Keegan's above. Split the group, 2 years terms, 1/2 elected each year. — Ched :  ?  15:51, 10 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  79. SirFozzie (talk) 21:51, 11 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  80. MZMcBride (talk) 22:06, 11 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  81. 2 year terms but are staggered so half are elected each year. The veterans can teach the newbies the ropes and not be lame ducks when they're doing it. Valley2city‽ 04:20, 12 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  82. --Russavia I'm chanting as we speak 03:31, 14 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  83. 1 year is too short; 3 years is the point where arbs can get exhausted. Ncmvocalist (talk) 06:39, 14 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  84. Two years seems like a reasonable balance between the need to ramp up vs. potential burnout. 18 months might work for this also, but as SlimVirgin notes above, it is hard to fit that with annual elections. --RL0919 (talk) 23:14, 14 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  85. BejinhanTalk 04:28, 16 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  86. Captain panda 05:48, 16 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  87. Fut.Perf. ☼ 09:52, 16 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  88. Seems long enough to accomplish something, and short enough to avoid entrenchment...Modernist (talk) 05:07, 17 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  89. Offers enough time to master the system, but short enough to avoid burnout. SteveMcCluskey (talk) 15:06, 17 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  90. Two seems about the right amount of time, as per my opinion. --Île flottɑnte~Floɑting islɑnd Talk 02:02, 21 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  91. Seems right. --Patar knight - chat/contributions 04:12, 22 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  92. Let's say two years now and study how this affected ArbCom retention and burnout. 18 months begets weird election cycles. 1 year seems too short. (I bet it takes months just to get into the swing of the job.) JakeZ (talk) 19:51, 22 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Three years[edit]

Note: This is the current maximum term length.
  1. But if arbs want to retire earlier thats fine too. Christopher Parham (talk) 18:40, 29 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  2. I first proposed the two year term idea. Because we were seeing quite a bit of "arbitrator fatigue". However, After talking with others, including User:Jimbo Wales, I have changed my mind, and think that it should be three years. ALong with that, arbitrators should be free to resign whenever they wish. And short wikibreaks should also be freely allowed. I am wholly against 1 year terms. - jc37 13:39, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  3. Arbs are of course welcome to resign earlier, but three years seems reasonable if they want to stick it out. The election process is a time-consuming and distracting one, arbs shouldn't be required to go through it more often than is necessary. It's better to keep their attention on other things (such as cases). --Elonka 18:46, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  4. Arb elections are time-consuming, and it takes time for new arbs to come up to speed; I don't believe two-year terms will be helpful and in fact could penalize some of the more effective arbs. SandyGeorgia (Talk) 22:55, 30 October 2009 (UTC) A problem here, apparently my "vote" was lost in this edit; it's good thing I noticed, re-added, and I hope others are watching. SandyGeorgia (Talk) 01:04, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  5. A shorter term means more campaigning, less arbitrating. Chick Bowen 04:05, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  6. This is still acceptable, but two years is better. Carcharoth (talk) 07:15, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  7. Either 2 or 3 year terms is reasonable. FloNight♥♥♥♥ 14:17, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  8. It takes so long to get up to speed. Also, consider a 3 year term like a 2 year one with an option. Casliber (talk · contribs) 13:46, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  9. Arbs should have time to learn the ropes and get up to speed on things. ---Irbisgreif-(talk | e-mail)-(contribs) 14:46, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  10. I think arbitrators should have the option of staying for three years, though I would like to see intermediate appointments if attrition rates reduce the number of arbitrators significantly -- Александр Дмитрий (Alexandr Dmitri) (talk) 20:42, 3 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  11. Two years is a popular choice, but it means come a January you might have no one at all there who has served more than 12 months. Agree with Casliber's points. Charles Matthews (talk) 16:06, 19 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Leave it adaptable to the current situation[edit]

As I remember after the last elections some arbitrators were appointed for 1 year terms, some for 2 years and remaining for 3 years. I think that the term length should remain flexible, so that User:Jimbo Wales can decide term lengths based upon the number of votes each candidate receives during elections and upon other circumstances. Ruslik_Zero 12:18, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

I should have mentioned above that I support flexibility in appointing people to shorter terms to even things up. Two years is currently the most popular option for a maximum term length. But this should be decided before the election, not based on support achieved during the election. Specifically, in this case, when the 10 arbitrators with terms continuing beyond this year consist of: 6 arbs on terms ending in December 2010, and 4 arbs with terms ending in December 2011; it makes little sense to appoint all 8 seats from these elections to two-year terms. As I've pointed out, that ends up with 6 seats up for election in December 2010, and 12 seats up for election in December 2011. The easiest way, IMO, to even it up, is to have the first 5 seats for 2-year terms and the next 3 seats for 1-year terms. That results in 9 seats for election in December 2010, and 9 seats for election in December 2011. With any resignations of arbs in their first year leading, as Scott MacDonald noted, to a slight majority of the committee being decided in an election (or half, if there are no resignations). Carcharoth (talk) 17:49, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  1. Support - I don't think all arbitrators should necessarily serve the same length of time. There's some value in the current system, where the candidates who received most support serve longer terms, while those who received less support serve shorter ones (that's how Jimbo did it in the last election, anyway). Perhaps the current term lengths need to change - 3 years probably is too long - but we should remain flexible rather than trying to force all arbitrators into a rigid system. Robofish (talk) 02:47, 3 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Number of seats[edit]

12 seats[edit]

The Arbitration Committee had 12 seats from inception until the end of 2004.

Based on 10 arbitrators being appointed to serve into 2010, 12 seats would result in only 2 appointments in the upcoming election.

  1. Arbs are not the Apostles and Jimbo is definitely not Jesus, but the more arbs there are, the easier it is for each arb to avoid taking responsibility as an individual. Deacon of Pndapetzim (Talk) 20:18, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  2. Less is more. -Atmoz (talk) 02:05, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  3. Twelve or thirteen arbitrators would probably be an optimal number if we could count on everyone being able to participate. Of course, that's not always a fair assumption given real-life commitments that come up, etc. If we make this choice, we need to elect more than 2 arbitrators in this election, though, so we might have to transition back over time rather than all at once. In any event, it looks like the consensus is to stick with the larger committee. Newyorkbrad (talk) 21:45, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  4. Groups of more than about a dozen members, even ones which meet face to face, need to have more structure and devote more time to their own functioning (see The Mythical Man-Month and the rules for small assemblies in Robert's Rules of Order Newly Revised). Jonathunder (talk) 23:46, 4 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  5. Smaller numbers reduces difficulty in the committee finding a quorum and minimizes the rate with which we collectively tap out our brain trust. The downside is that the individuals are more likley to burn out.--Tznkai (talk) 16:08, 5 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

15 seats[edit]

The Arbitration Committee had 15 seats between 2005 and the end of 2008.

Based on 10 arbitrators being appointed to serve into 2010, 15 seats would result in 5 appointments in the upcoming election.

  1.  Skomorokh, barbarian  10:15, 29 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  2. Fifteen is a better number considering four to five arbitrators are inactive at any given time, and the council shouldn't be too large to convolute discussion and slow the process even more. Keegan (talk) 07:48, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  3. Probably the best model between sharing workload efficiently and not being too unwieldy as to hamper progress. LessHeard vanU (talk) 14:00, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  4. Preferable. MBisanz talk 17:44, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  5. See reasons on talk. Durova349 19:57, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  6. Larger numbers actually makes decision-making more difficult. Sam Blacketer (talk) 20:53, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  7. If we go to 2 years, 15 seats is enough, because fewer of the arbs will be inactive through burnout. But we might consider this one time having it 18 seats as a transition. DGG ( talk ) 21:13, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  8. — Jake Wartenberg 21:21, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  9. A good compromise. Larger numbers require reaching further down the list of candidates to those with less solid community support. Short Brigade Harvester Boris (talk) 22:12, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  10. Anything more and each arb doesn't get much of an individual say in the matter. Also, per the above. ThemFromSpace 22:19, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  11. Keegan, Sam Blacketer, and SBHB have it right. Fifteen positions should be ample with 2 year terms. Risker (talk) 00:03, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  12. Somewhere between 12 and 16 should be fine. And since this is between 12 and 16... Also, As a few others have said, I don't like the idea that arbitratorship is given out to those less-than-worthy simply to fill seats. - jc37 02:02, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  13. Second option, if 18 seats results in dipping into lower Support percentages. SandyGeorgia (Talk) 02:22, 31 October 2009 (UTC) First choice: there aren't enough qualified candidates this year to expand the Committee. SandyGeorgia (Talk) 14:32, 19 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  14. This is equally acceptable to the eighteen seat option. —Finn Casey * * * 02:35, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  15. Cirt (talk) 04:19, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  16. Second option. Needs to be an even number if you have two-year terms, or you have alternate number of seats up for election each year (8, then 7, then 8, then 7, etc). Carcharoth (talk) 07:20, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  17. Strongly prefer the Committee is scaled back to 12 to 15 people. A large part of the burn out comes from the difficulty in coordinating Committee work of more than a dozen people scattered all across the globe. Fewer is more in this situation. FloNight♥♥♥♥ 13:31, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  18. Per FloNight. Newyorkbrad (talk) 21:43, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  19. Agree that 15 is about right, as (given holidays and the like) it would give around 12 arbitrators available. NellieBly (talk) 22:34, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  20. Per the arbs commenting in this section, who must know best what it's like coordinating behind the scenes.--chaser (talk) 06:58, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  21. what chaser said. Sssoul (talk) 09:21, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  22. Slightly prefer 18 as it allows leeway for breaks etc. I did feel that larger numbers did impair some quick decision making too as per others above. Casliber (talk · contribs) 13:50, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  23. Second choice (first choice is 18). However, 15 is acceptable as well, since it's going to be somewhat dependent on whether there are sufficient quality candidates. ArbCom is a grueling job that not everyone is interested in. --Elonka 16:42, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  24. Continuing with being a wishy-washy moderate, splitting the difference here as well. Too few arbitrators means under staffing. Too many means that ... honestly, it means some people who shouldn't be on there might wind up on there (looking at results from past elections).radek (talk) 06:28, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  25. Shouldn't be too large. Reducing the term legnths should reduce burn-out, and hopefully allow for arbs to be active for more of their term. — Kusma talk 10:22, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  26. With 15 seats, even allowing for some being on wikibreaks, etc, there should always be 10-12 active at any one time - and if they are all active, then 15 isn't too unmanageable, I would have thought -- PhantomSteve (Contact Me, My Contribs) 15:21, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  27. -FASTILYsock (TALK) 00:26, 4 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  28. - Based upon the number of arbs who are inactive at any given time. - Philippe 23:20, 11 November 2009 (UTC) Standard disclaimer: this is my personal opinion as a long time contributor, and not that of the Wikimedia Foundation, my employer. [reply]
  29. 15 seems right to me after reading the arguments. JakeZ (talk) 19:58, 22 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

18 seats[edit]

The Arbitration Committee was expanded to 18 seats after the 2008 election, however it only consisted of 16 arbitrators for the first six months, and there are only 13 bums on seats at the moment.

Based on 10 arbitrators being appointed to serve into 2010, 18 would result in 8 appointments in the upcoming election.

  1. John Vandenberg (chat) 09:15, 29 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  2.  Skomorokh, barbarian  10:15, 29 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  3. Considering the size of this community and the amount of necessary fluctuation that always happens with Arbitrators, a larger ArbCom is in the community's best interest (also to weaken "cabal!"-accusations and to allow to reflect on the diversity of users on this project). Regards SoWhy 12:45, 29 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  4. More is generally better, but I think there should be some minimum support required in the election (if there isn't already) in case there aren't many candidates. I'd rather have a couple fewer than have some with too little trust. Mr.Z-man 14:50, 29 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  5. ~ Amory (u • t • c) 16:39, 29 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  6. with the same caveat as Mr. Z-Man. Karanacs (talk) 16:53, 29 October 2009 (UTC) Note: I think the minimum threshold should be 66% Karanacs (talk) 13:27, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  7. Davewild (talk) 18:45, 29 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  8. Manning (talk) 06:36, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  9. Everyking (talk) 07:17, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  10. With Z-man's caveat. rspεεr (talk) 07:44, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  11. Clearly the only sensible option with the Committe's current workload (which I believe is far too high, but). Moreschi (talk) 09:03, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  12. Sjakkalle (Check!) 09:44, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  13. To allow for inacitvity, etc., and task delegation.  Sandstein  14:26, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  14. Allow for inactivity, recusals, could this be combined with a minimum number of active arbs (e.g. 9?), and that the active Arbs on a case are decided on before the case opens (no additions during the case, except with clear and transparent notice which and why an arb is being added when the number would drop below the minimum)? --Dirk Beetstra T C 15:23, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  15. Because otherwise by the end of the first year we'd have no arbs. I've asked the committee on perhaps 5 or 6 separate occasions to follow through on Jimbo's request for the development of a procedure to replace inactive arbitrators. As the committee has never addressed this publicly in any way, we obviously cannot have a committee so small that attrition renders it completely ineffective between elections. Nathan T 15:26, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  16. Probably easiest. —Finn Casey * * * 17:07, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  17. With consideration of gauging consensus for reserving one or more seats for non-admin editors. Basket of Puppies 17:38, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  18. NW (Talk) 17:43, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  19. Only 18 seats? I would have thought that number was on the low side. Mjroots (talk) 18:44, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  20. I'd support a larger Committee, but perhaps not require all of them to weigh in on every case. For example, a maximum of 9-10 active arbs reviewing any particular case would seem sufficient. --Elonka 18:50, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  21. SPLETTE :] How's my driving? 19:33, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  22. John Carter (talk) 20:40, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  23. --Jayron32 21:06, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  24. Offliner (talk) 22:29, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
    Agree with Z-man; expand the committee only if that doesn't mean dipping too low into Support percentages. SandyGeorgia (Talk) 22:57, 30 October 2009 (UTC) Struck: there are not enough top candidates this year to expand the Committee. SandyGeorgia (Talk) 14:29, 19 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  25. The comittee has so many responsibilities that more hands would be beneficial. It might also be worthwhile to create an "alternates" list made up of those who've gained sufficient support but aren't needed immediately to fill the committee.   Will Beback  talk  23:30, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  26. the wub "?!" 00:42, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  27. There are three compelling reasons to stick to Jimbo's intuition that 18, an historic increase in seats, is now appropriate: (1) Arb. burn-out is a concern, and we would do well to make it normal, unremarkable, for arbs to take scheduled refresher breaks. (2) The trend is towards greater delegation and arb involvement in specific roles such as serving on subcommittees. Giving the Committee the flexibility to temporarily re-allocate members to tasks other than formal hearings will serve the project well. (3) If we go to two-year terms, as seems likely, 18 maximises the overlap of terms, which is good for internal mentoring and the transfer of skills and knowledge. Tony (talk) 05:46, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  28. This option is best because it allows further streamlining and delegation, as John has pointed out. Carcharoth (talk) 07:20, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  29. Having a little slack at the beginning of the year, while sometimes a little suboptimal, gives better odds that the committee can keep up with the workload all the way to the end of the year in case of inactivity or attrition. — Coren (talk) 12:46, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  30. Given the heavy workload of the committee 18 members seems appropriate. A larger committee will also more accurately reflect the diversity of the community, plus absorb burnouts and resignations. It should also ideally be an even number if two year terms are implemented i.e. 12, 14, 16, or 18 members. Camaron · Christopher · talk 20:07, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  31. More Arbs is good from the workload point of view, but also because the larger the number, the greater diversity of views, and the less inward-looking. SlimVirgin talk|contribs 20:47, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  32. More arbs is good. The Law situation demonstrated that we don't even have enough arbs to handle casework and email, and some comments from Durova indicate that other mailing list comments have gone similarly unanswered for long periods of time. If I could, I'd up the number. Ironholds (talk) 22:23, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  33. ArbCom is obviously a stressful job that involves a great deal of work, reading through tons of emails and analyzing full pages of evidence; and often it seems as though very few appreciate all the Arbs are doing for us. Because it involves having numerous things to focus on at once, having more committee members will ideally allow them to go through things faster, and were one member to burn out, they could still continue on and compensate for whatever break he or she may go on. Master&Expert (Talk) 03:29, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  34. Distributes the workload more and ensures quorum when several arbs need to recuse themselves. --Cybercobra (talk) 08:42, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  35. Best option. --KrebMarkt 10:27, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  36. Given that the number of active arbs is 10 at the moment, I tend towards this one. Stifle (talk) 10:28, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  37. Needs more people to share the workload. Mailer Diablo 10:57, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  38. Support we need more hands t share the load... RP459 (talk) 13:22, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  39. I found this number was easier to spread workload around. Casliber (talk · contribs) 13:51, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  40. For load-leveling, to allow for breaks, for general sanity. Antandrus (talk) 14:37, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  41. Any more, and we have a "too many cooks" situation. Any less, and performance would be affected at those times where several arbitrators go on a wikibreak. AGK 14:53, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  42. Accounts for the inevitable inactivity wastage. --Joopercoopers (talk) 16:12, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  43. As much as I despise the word “diversity” because of its overuse in PC situations, that’s what we need on ArbCom. Wikipedia is big, the issues varied, and Wikipedia will hopefully recruit more Admins and Arbs who spend a little more time off Wikipedia. Greg L (talk) 18:18, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  44. Expand to allow more points of view. Who then was a gentleman? (talk) 19:20, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  45. This would (hopefully) prevent trainwrecks like the Mattisse clarification request, where only 6 arbitrators are non-recused listed as active, and only two are truly active. UA 23:15, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  46. Amalthea 23:16, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  47. The more the merrier. I am not really happy with 18; it is obvious that this will not be enough either. Currently 10 arbs take ~2 months to solve a case, ~18 and guesstimate a month is still too long. --Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus| talk 00:46, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  48. So they can adapt to members going inactive. -- Luk talk 10:32, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  49. They are volunteers and therefore you need spare capacity. ϢereSpielChequers 12:30, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  50. Not too much to comment on. It's been said before. ---Irbisgreif-(talk | e-mail)-(contribs) 14:44, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  51. Caseload gets bigger as Wikipedia gets bigger -- EA Swyer Talk Contributions 17:35, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  52. Indeed...simply to maintain enough active arbs to work the caseload (and now subcommittee work and motions) requires 18.--R.D.H. (Ghost In The Machine) (talk) 20:06, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  53.  Burningview  ✉ 00:51, 3 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  54. Because of the demanding nature of the work, we loose some, so we need the larger number. Diderot's dreams (talk) 15:26, 3 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  55. The Arbitration Committee was set at 18 seats but with (i) attrition (ii) the fact that the planned intermediate election never happened and (iii) arbitrators understandably going inactive the numbers can get quite low. Currently only 8 arbitrators listed as active out of a theoretical 18. -- Александр Дмитрий (Alexandr Dmitri) (talk) 20:39, 3 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  56. Because ArbCom is our only real deliberative body at the moment. GlassCobra 21:01, 3 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  57. More the better but we it should be kept below 20, beyond that people lose visibilty of each other. --rannṗáirtí anaiṫnid (coṁrá) 00:41, 4 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  58. I am in favour of a large(r) pool of arbitrators, but think that the actual number of arbitrators actively participating in any specific given case should be much less than 18 and be limited to maybe six members. Arbitrators should be able to recuse themselves without having to worry about the extra burden on the other arbitrators; also, cases should ideally be handled promptly and without delay, and arbitrators should also be able to refrain from participating in a case because of a (hopefully temporary) problem in giving it the required time and attention. (I'm also in favour of more flexibility if it increases the size of the pool of available arbitrators.)  --Lambiam 18:32, 4 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  59. iMatthew talk at 22:37, 4 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  60. –Juliancolton | Talk 22:29, 5 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  61. Because of how high the current workload is. Cla68 (talk) 05:24, 10 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  62. High workload, plenty of recusals, and high retirement rate. — Ched :  ?  15:55, 10 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  63. --Russavia I'm chanting as we speak 03:32, 14 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  64. Provides some padding for resignations and recusals, and is divisible by two or three for creating tranches. --RL0919 (talk) 23:17, 14 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  65. BejinhanTalk 04:29, 16 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  66. Captain panda 05:51, 16 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  67. --CrohnieGalTalk 15:26, 16 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  68. Given the nature of things...Modernist (talk) 05:09, 17 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  69. Could the ArbCom divide its workload among subcommittees to avoid burnout. In that case 18 might be a a low number. SteveMcCluskey (talk) 15:10, 17 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  70. More is better they say... I Feel Tired (talk) 01:13, 20 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  71. The more the people, the smaller the chance of a mistake. --Île flottɑnte~Floɑting islɑnd Talk 02:04, 21 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  72. More is, well...more. --Patar knight - chat/contributions 04:13, 22 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  73. Suitable amount.--Staberinde (talk) 22:39, 22 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Leave it adaptable to the current situation[edit]

Personally, I think that there are situations that come up, such as last year's elections, in which there were several who were REALLY close in votes. I think User:Jimbo Wales should be able to expand or contract the number of seats, based upon current events of the election, and current resignations, and so on. - jc37 13:39, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]

  1. This option does have merits. Flexibility is still present in the other options as well, though, mainly brought about by arbitrator resignation and departure. The question is who decides on the tweaks (Jimbo?) and when (before or after the election?). Carcharoth (talk) 07:20, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  2. Per Carcharoth. Newyorkbrad (talk) 21:40, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  3. There is no need to have a fixed number of arbitrators. Any system with a fixed number will be too rigid and incapable of adaptation to changing circumstances. Ruslik_Zero 12:12, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  4. Receptive to this - ultimately there is no "correct" number, and is good in situations of close votespread such as last years' election. Casliber (talk · contribs) 13:52, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  5. Agree with Jc37 and Casilber here, gives good flexibility and judgement options. AtheWeatherman 17:14, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  6. Rami R 11:32, 3 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  7. Per closeness, also, size is generally irrelevant/doesn't correlate to results. YellowMonkey (bananabucket) (help the Invincibles Featured topic drive) 01:12, 4 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  8. Second choice, because of the dearth of qualified candidates this year, flexibility in the final decision will be important. SandyGeorgia (Talk) 14:30, 19 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Discussion[edit]

New section for threaded discussion because I can't figure out a way to jam it in to the proper format yet. What is the goal the community has for the number of active arbitrators at any one time? The comments above suggest some commentors have the same goal number of active arbs, but have different ways to try to find that number with either a smaller, leaner committee (with shorter terms) or a larger committee where members can take breaks without issue.

Keep in mind the current subcommittee system, which I would qualify as a success if only measured by work output, has two 3 seat groups which could survive overlap, and a coordinator position. In addition there is room for a deputy coordinator, there has been suggestions for an eventual arb/clerk coordinator, and there is some noise (I don't know how the committee feels about it) about some sort of admin behavior subcommittee. Currently, all committeee members have voting responsibilities and I personally don't see that changing. I personally would aim for about 9 or 10 active Arbitrators at any one time. Thoughts?--Tznkai (talk) 16:23, 5 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

  • Adding here (it seemed like the best section) my opinion that the number of seats available for election should be calculated before the election starts, and be chosen in such a way as to minimise variations from year-to-year and keep it as close to 9 as possible. A natural consequence of my proposal below is that if large numbers of arbs resign, then the committee naturally reduces in size, rather than automatically trying to fill up all the vacant seats in a "super-election". The schedules below assume no resignations of first-year arbs (with two-year terms, hopefully such resignations will be reduced), though the system can accommodate one or two such resignations. Once things have stabilised at nine seats for election each year, then if more than one first-year arb resigns in a given year, then seats have to be left empty to keep the number of seats elected each year about the same.
    • Current probable schedule for seats available for election:
      • 8 seats for election - all 18 seats filled (December 2009)
      • 6 seats for election - all 18 seats filled (December 2010)
      • 12 seats for election - all 18 seats filled (December 2011)
      • 6 seats for election - all 18 seats filled (December 2012)
    • Proposed schedule A for seats available for election:
      • 7 seats for election - only 17 of 18 seats filled (December 2009)
      • 7 seats for election - all 18 seats filled (December 2010)
      • 9 seats for election - only 16 of 18 seats filled (December 2011)
      • 9 seats for election - all 18 seats filled (December 2012)
    • Proposed schedule B for seats available for election:
      • 8 seats for election - all 18 seats filled (December 2009)
      • 6 seats for election - all 18 seats filled (December 2010)
      • 9 seats for election - only 15 of 18 seats filled (December 2011)
      • 9 seats for election - all 18 seats filled (December 2012)
  • All the above are seats with 2-year terms. At the start of 2010, there will be 12 arbs with 2 years left, and 6 with 1 year left. Other variations are possible. The idea of the above is to damp down the imbalances in the numbers elected each year by carrying excess empty seats over to the following year. Carcharoth (talk) 19:05, 13 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Election method[edit]

For a list of options, see {{electoral systems}}.

Support/Oppose[edit]

The method used in the December 2008 elections, and in previous years, by which a voter may choose to support or oppose each candidacy, but is not required to enter a judgement about every candidacy (see example). Under the SecurePoll method, voters are required to enter judgements about every candidacy, but have the added option of being neutral (see example). The candidates are ranked by the ratio of supports to opposes.

  1. SecurePoll plus Support/Oppose is the best option. It's simple and familiar.  Roger Davies talk 13:10, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  2. Karanacs (talk) 13:26, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  3. The method must be intuitive and non-complex, and must be designed to elect multiple candidates. The Schulze method is specifically designed to elect a single candidate, and is also very complex and counter-intuitive. Cumulative voting is also very complex (allocating portions of one's vote to various candidates) and its main use is in corporate elections where the number of votes each elector has can vary widely. Complicated systems have a tendency to disenfranchise voters who simply want to voice their opinion on individual candidates and not have to do complex calculations to figure out what weight their votes should get. Risker (talk) 14:55, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  4. Simple = best. Also not at all sure that weighted voting methods promote the right sort of candidates for a consensus-driven community; specifically I mean that minority support, regardless of strength, should not cancel out broad opposition, while minority opposition, even if strong, should not cancel out broad support. Christopher Parham (talk) 15:30, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  5. Manning (talk) 15:36, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  6. Preferential voting requires that a voter research all candidates in detail. This makes it simpler, and also allows those with little time to research candidates to just vote for a few candidates. NW (Talk) 17:45, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  7. The support/oppose system works well. Though as I've indicated in another section of this RfC, I prefer that we stick with public voting, rather than moving to secret ballots. --Elonka 18:52, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  8. Durova349 20:12, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  9. Cirt (talk) 20:13, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  10. KISS. Short Brigade Harvester Boris (talk) 20:14, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  11. Oppose votes should have weight. Preferential voting is a bit scary, and it will only reward those who make an effort to become famous and loved in the run up to the election. Deacon of Pndapetzim (Talk) 20:21, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  12. John Carter (talk) 20:42, 30 October 2009 (UTC)\[reply]
  13. Per Boris. Sam Blacketer (talk) 20:54, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  14. Simple, clear, and understandable. DGG ( talk ) 21:15, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  15. Offliner (talk) 22:30, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  16. I don't see the added benefit of the more complicated methods for our purposes.  Sandstein  22:32, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  17. SandyGeorgia (Talk) 22:58, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  18. Simple. -Atmoz (talk) 02:05, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  19. Possibly other systems are better, but need to think about it more. Carcharoth (talk) 07:42, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  20. I admit to finding other systems exceedingly frustrating. This still works fine. Heimstern Läufer (talk) 13:18, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  21. Keep it simple. SlimVirgin talk|contribs 20:48, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  22. This seems simpler, but it also seems to be better at giving opposition a say. NellieBly (talk) 22:36, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  23. Because it works. Mailer Diablo 10:58, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  24. Simplest. AGK 12:44, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  25. Been okay so far. My main opposition to it is public opposes can spread ill-will, but this is negated by secret ballot. Casliber (talk · contribs) 13:54, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  26. Per the KISS_principle. >Radiant< 14:25, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  27. In combination with secret ballot. Antandrus (talk) 14:38, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  28. Simple and effective. AtheWeatherman 17:19, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  29. Yes, it's important for people to be able to oppose candidates so that others can see the reasons for opposition. Who then was a gentleman? (talk) 19:20, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  30. Although there are a lot of problems surrounding the ArbCom, I don't think the election method is one of them. Preferential voting would be interesting, but I think the old support/oppose method is fine too. Everyking (talk) 06:17, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  31. No perfect system of voting can exist [1] so simplicity is just that little extra something that makes this one slightly less imperfect then the others.radek (talk) 06:31, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  32. --Cube lurker (talk) 14:04, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  33. Using SecurePoll, this is the easiest option -- PhantomSteve (Contact Me, My Contribs) 15:25, 2 November 2009 (UTC) (amended per my comments to be added in a moment in "public v secret" below)[reply]
  34. KISS--R.D.H. (Ghost In The Machine) (talk) 20:09, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  35. First choice -- Александр Дмитрий (Alexandr Dmitri) (talk) 20:25, 3 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  36. Per Boris. KISS. GlassCobra 21:03, 3 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  37. -FASTILYsock (TALK) 00:29, 4 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  38. First choice. Approval voting (or our small variation on it that allows abstention) has worked fine for us, with the bonus that it allows a sanity check that makes sure each elected candidate has enough support. rspεεr (talk) 05:35, 4 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  39. Support only with public voting. Still on the fence regarding which voting system w/ secret ballots. Rami R 11:58, 5 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  40. Though I don't like SecurePolls. –Juliancolton | Talk 22:30, 5 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  41. The preferential voting systems have a lot of merits, but I'm not convinced they'll be able to accommodating the occasional need to improvise as needed, as was done when expanding the committee last year.--Tznkai (talk) 07:18, 10 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  42. Simple, and doesn't require you to view all the candidates before you vote for/against some. עוד מישהו Od Mishehu 10:20, 10 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  43. Сlickрор (talk) 03:50, 11 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  44. Simple and doesn't require the voters to vote for or against candidates that they aren't familiar with. Vyvyan Basterd (talk) 04:47, 12 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  45. Support. Arbitrators should be elected based on the breadth (i.e. not the depth) of their support. Please clarify that the difference of support and oppose votes is the relevant criterion, not any kind of ratio. (I would also propose to use absolute number of votes rather than any percentage that relates that number to the total votes for a particular candidate.)  Cs32en  01:46, 14 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  46. Support, although it would be better to rank the candidates by the number of votes, [support - oppose], rather than the ratio, [support/(support+oppose)] --96.32.130.165 (talk) 00:49, 17 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  47. Seems basic...Modernist (talk) 05:17, 17 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  48. WP:KISS.--Staberinde (talk) 22:44, 22 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  49. Support/Oppose with securepoll. — Oli OR Pyfan! 01:45, 23 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
A point of contention
    • Oppose the wording of this. The system used was not approval voting, due to the presence of 'oppose votes' which do not exist in an approval voting method. The existence of oppose votes actually produces something similar to the Borda count, which is much more complex and has significant downsides that have not been discussed. --Barberio (talk) 13:40, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
      • Agree with Barberio. —SlamDiego←T 17:37, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
        • Suggest pointing this out to whoever wrote the wording here. Was that Roger? Carcharoth (talk) 17:54, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
      • That's not the Borda count in any way. The Borda count suffers because you have to give a different number of points to each person, leading to bizarre dominant strategies. This is 1/0/-1 range voting, which is very similar to approval. rspεεr (talk) 05:27, 4 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
        • The presence of a negative number is arbitrary. This is result identical to score allocation for being placed higher or lower than alternative candidates, except that the score for being below another candidate is allocated in negative numbers, which is in no way similar to approval voting. The closest formal model I see to it is Borda count, however the positioning of the candidates is not explicit or linear, but expressed by the oppose voting. --Barberio (talk) 15:47, 4 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
          • You are missing the point, and I think you should go brush up on some of our voting system articles. Negative numbers are indeed arbitrary, and they have nothing to do with it. In the Borda count, you must assign a different score, from an equally-spaced scale, to every candidate. This results in it being strategically very different from approval voting (and gives a strong incentive to not vote your true preferences). The formal model of our system is called range voting, and we have an article on it. The article mentions that it is strategically identical to approval voting (because a rational voter will simply use their vote to its full effect and not abstain on anyone). rspεεr (talk) 04:17, 11 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Cumulative voting[edit]

Cumulative voting is a multiple-winner voting system intended to promote proportional representation while also being simple to understand.

An ideal setup would be to give each voter one vote per seat, for them to distribute across the candidates as they see fit (in whole numbers; no fractions). It does not have oppose votes, and it is simple.

  1. John Vandenberg (chat) 13:54, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  2. Actually this method, while sounding more complicated, would reflect the community's will far better than a simple support/oppose system where one can only give equal preference to different candidates they want to support. Regards SoWhy 13:56, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  3. This is the method that people actually use in the real world - you know, where things have been demonstrated to work in practice as opposed to both fail in practice and in theory, like we have here. Hipocrite (talk) 14:11, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  4. No strong opinion on this issue. However, this method seems worth a try. —Finn Casey * * * 17:12, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  5. — Jake Wartenberg 21:21, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  6. Might as well have a parliament. YellowMonkey (bananabucket) 02:02, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  7. Sure, I can dig trying this out as an experiment. It may cut down on conflict and it does not violate the KISS principle.--R.D.H. (Ghost In The Machine) (talk) 20:12, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  8. Those bastards in Canberra make us do it this way (sort of) so why not try it here. --Russavia I'm chanting as we speak 03:33, 14 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  9. First choice. Vassyana (talk) 09:30, 17 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Approval AND Cumulative voting[edit]

Basically: Have Support/Neutral/Oppose, as in approval voting, but only can support a number of candidates up to the number of seats available, as in cumulative voting.

  1. - jc37 03:58, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  2. Gosox5555 (talk) 17:48, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  3. (Qualified support.) People should make a choice on which candidates they actually want to be elected, not vote on each single candidate ("I like/don't like him/her."). It may be difficult to check that a particular user voted correctly.  Cs32en  02:10, 22 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Preferential voting[edit]

Preferential voting is a method by which voters rank the candidates in order of preference, so that winners are selected based on the breadth and depth of support for their candidacies. An example of preferential voting is the Schulze method which was used in the 2008 and 2009 Wikimedia Foundation Board of Trustees elections.

  1. Only if Support/Oppose is resoundingly rejected. This is over-complicated to start off with.  Roger Davies talk 13:10, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  2. Davewild (talk) 13:23, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  3. Second preference (first is cumulative). Reagrds SoWhy 13:56, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  4. Preferential systems are much better at representing the wishes of voters as a whole. They are easy to understand once one grasps the initial concept, as I think the WMF board vote (and their long-standing use in legislative elections) shows. Approval voting is a crude metric that allows the election of candidates which a sizeable minority of voters might strongly disapprove of, encourages tactical voting and cannot express any difference in strengths of support (If I vote for eight candidates, it treats this expressing equal support for all eight, which is likely to be highly distorting). It's time we matured.  Skomorokh, barbarian  13:58, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  5. Everyking (talk) 14:30, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  6. This system is as complicated as the voter wants it to, giving maximum freedom to the voter. Most of the complications are in the counting instead of the voting. If the voter prefers to make a simple "approval" vote, just put a "1" next to all you approve, and "2" next to those you disapprove, and if you want something more sophisticated feel free. I prefer this over cumulative voting because it allows people to support more candidates than there are seats (if they are mostly interested in preventing someone getting on ArbCom), and making 100% support behind a single candidate an attractive option is not so good if there are multiple seats. Sjakkalle (Check!) 15:54, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
    • it allows people to support more candidates than there are seats (if they are mostly interested in preventing someone getting on ArbCom) - This is the problem the world has come to with all these bad voting systems that have been used... people are so familiar with tactical voting such that it is seen as the way to prevent undesirable candidates from winning. The support/oppose system has a non-tactical way for a voter to express disapproval of a candidate: simply vote oppose. What's wrong with that?
  7. --Jayron32 21:07, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  8. Always. Any system of preferential voting is ideal (I personally like IRV) when compared to a system that is biased towards polarizing candidates. As Sjakkalle points out, this essentially includes Support/Oppose as an option within it. ~ Amory (u • t • c) 23:23, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  9. This system has many benefits. However there should be some mechanismm to prevent joke candidates from running. A problem with approval voting is that it gives disproportionate weight to opposition. If 80% is the threshold then 21% of the participants can veto any candidate. With a larger committee it's desirable to have a great range of views, even ones that might not be supported by a quarter of the community.   Will Beback  talk  23:36, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  10. I'm not sure why people think this is complicated. For voters, it's simply ranking candidates in order. I would actually say this is simpler than cumulative voting and on a par with approval. For counting, although Schulze method looks scary, there are established and trusted programs that will do all that for us. the wub "?!" 00:38, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  11. I'd prefer range voting (see the "Bayesian regret" analysis), but since it's not an option and I'm not so bold as to add it, this is the next best option. --Cybercobra (talk) 02:20, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  12. This is a much better expression of individual and community will and should be adopted more widely on WP (whether Schultze, here, or a simpler method for some RfCs). Voters don't have to be experts in operating the system it to cast their rankings. Voters are encouraged to weigh up their preference for candidates rather more carefully than under the clunky, ham-fisted Support/Oppose system (and I still couldn't work out how the final percentage was calculated lat December, and was too shy to ask). I presume Schultze for ArbCom would be "optional preferential", where voters don't have to rank all candidates, but choose how many they wish to rank; but it doesn't matter—it's still the best on offer. My second choice would be "Cumulative voting". Why couldn't we have listed these very alternatives here in terms of ranked preferences? (3,2,4,1 so simple) Tony (talk) 06:04, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  13. Preferential voting will tend to favor the candidates you have widest support, even if that support is less massive in absolute numbers. This improves the odd that the selected candidates end up being "acceptable" to most of the electorate, even if some others would have been more strongly supported by specific groups (and thus also more polarizing; which is, IMO, an undesirable property). — Coren (talk) 12:49, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  14. Simplest true proportional rep vote to implement. 'Oppose' voting has been primarily used tactically and not as a honest statement of preference in previous votes, in particular with some campaigning to ask for oppose votes against all other candidates in order to double their 'net vote'.--Barberio (talk) 13:09, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  15. Will more accurately reflect the will of the community, and as others have said it really is as complicated as users want it to be, with it being up to voters on how many candidates they rank. Camaron · Christopher · talk 20:25, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  16. Yes, being Irish I'd support PR-STV. Stifle (talk) 21:22, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  17. Yes. I dislike the current system, as it tends to favour candidates who offend few, but may also be the only weakly preferred by any. I'd rather see some candidates who may represent strong minority interests have a chance.--Scott Mac (Doc) 23:50, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  18. Markus Schulze 11:29, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  19. RP459 (talk) 13:25, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  20. Support/Oppose voting is designed for cases where we don't have a limit on the number of seats. It would be a bad idea to choose one candidate over another just because the former got 78.5% of the vote and the latter got 78.4%. -- King of ♥ ♦ ♣ ♠ 18:08, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  21. I like this approach because it better reflects the grey areas inherent in making choices with sketchy information and conflicting virtues and shortcomings. Greg L (talk) 18:21, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  22. Support/Oppose can be falsify: "Oppose" vote weight more than "Support". Schulze method most perfect·Carn !? 20:52, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  23. Amalthea 23:13, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  24. — Jake Wartenberg 01:23, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  25. — Kusma talk 10:22, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  26. Better than Support/Oppose voting. -- Luk talk 10:34, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  27. Diversity is healthy, and a diverse arbcom could avoid a divide emerging between the arbs and the community ϢereSpielChequers 12:32, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  28. I strongly support the Schulze method. ---Irbisgreif-(talk | e-mail)-(contribs) 14:47, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  29.  Burningview  ✉ 00:52, 3 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  30. Likely to produce a more accurate result than straight approval voting. Robofish (talk) 02:54, 3 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  31. Preference system are better at producing results that reflect genuine opinion. --rannṗáirtí anaiṫnid (coṁrá) 00:44, 4 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  32. Second choice behind approval. Preferential voting is often a good idea, but here it has the slight drawback that it loses us the ability to judge how much support each candidate has overall. rspεεr (talk) 05:37, 4 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  33. Second choice behind cumulative voting. John Vandenberg (chat) 12:46, 4 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  34. --Joopercoopers (talk) 11:52, 11 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  35. Support Schulze method only for use w/ secret ballots. Rami R 22:34, 16 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  36. As a 2nd choice...Modernist (talk) 05:21, 17 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  37. Second choice to cumulative. Vassyana (talk) 09:31, 17 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  38. Preferential Voting using a Single transferable vote counting system is widely used and insures minority groups in the community are represented in ArbCom. SteveMcCluskey (talk) 15:43, 17 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  39. Support only with secret voting. Priyanath talk 16:13, 18 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  40. As per everyone else, only with secret voting. – iridescent 2 16:38, 19 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  41. I think this system will probably be the most accurate. I Feel Tired (talk) 01:18, 20 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  42. I'm willing to give this a try as this allows for the most flexibility. For those who prefer a Support voting system, editors could rank all candidates he supports as a "1". JakeZ (talk) 20:14, 22 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Random ballot preferential voting[edit]

Each eligible voter ranks one or more candidates from highest to lowest. Once all ballots are collected, one ballot is selected at random and the candidate who is ranked highest is elected. As long as there continue to be unfilled positions, another ballot is selected at random and the net-yet-elected candidate who is ranked highest (if any) is thus elected.

  1. This approach gives much incentive to vote your true preferences rather than to game the system in some way. This approach is supportive of proportional representation in that a large voting block does not automatically completely control the entire election. For statistical ties (and actual ties), this approach in effect employs a coin flip rather than finding resolution via a statistically insignificant number of votes. This process is randomized, and can occasionally permit a dark horse candidate to win, thus infusing new perspectives into our ever evolving Wikipedia. Quantling (talk) 19:51, 20 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
    It's an interesting system. However, it's highly unsuited here as Arbcom's small size and huge authority mean that just one rogue arb can break the system. Overall I'd say that could potentially work for larger committees/political bodies were rogue members are "averaged out", and that the members don't have much authority beyond being part of the committee itself. Rami R 20:26, 20 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Public polling v. Secret ballot[edit]

Previous Request for Comment: ArbCom secret ballot

Discussion[edit]

Public voting[edit]

Votes are made and signed publicly; anyone can see how a user has voted. (this is the method that was used in elections from the last few years)

  1. Go openly as we have always done without any real problems. Seriously, what is trying to be fixed by making everything a secret? We're meant to be open and honest. Arbcom is not a government.Majorly talk 17:40, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
    I'm surprised you can claim there are no problems when elsewhere you say: "an election is basically an opportunity for the bullies ... to come out of their holes and dish their dirt"? Surely public voting simply gives bullies a platform, whereas secret polling doesn't?  Roger Davies talk 08:51, 12 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  2. Especially with something as important as ArbCom, which really depends on a perception of community trust, open and public voting is the way go. --Elonka 17:56, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  3. We definitely need to have everything out in the open. Arbcom already handles too many things in secret. Tex (talk) 19:39, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  4. I don't think there are significant problems with this method and there are advantages of transparency and openness. Christopher Parham (talk) 19:49, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  5. Primarily to handle sophisticated Poetlister-like sockfarm voting schemes. A public and open vote is harder to game, and easier to remedy if fraud occurs. Durova349 20:19, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  6. Being more open also makes it, as Durova indicated, easier to check up on. John Carter (talk) 20:43, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  7. --Jayron32 21:08, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
    Second choice. The best reason against public voting, tactical voting, would be greatly reduced by preferential voting, and even without preferential voting, is overwhelmed by problems associated with secret voting. -kotra (talk) 21:49, 30 October 2009 (UTC) Struck vote in favor of #New compromise solution, which solves the problems associated with normal secret voting. -kotra (talk) 02:28, 14 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  8. Most definitely, to preserve transparency and facilitate discussion. Open discourse is essential in the way we operate and is most necessary in the deciding of our upper-level officials. ThemFromSpace 22:15, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  9. Deacon of Pndapetzim (Talk) 22:34, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  10. Previous rfc spoke of buying votes. Not quite sure what currency was intended, but I'm open to offers :) MoreThings (talk) 00:44, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  11. Secret ballots are a terrible idea. A public vote enables us to see the cabals and cliques in action, and weight their views accordingly. A secret ballot opens the way to off-wiki canvassing and tactical voting on a massive scale, and we'd never know. Moreschi (talk) 01:54, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  12. Open. User:Themfromspace said exactly what I was thinking. While I do like the convenience of secure poll, I like having a permanent record on the wiki, even more. That and, if secret ballots start happening, I think we'll have to raise the requirement for voting, since it will be less transparent. - jc37 02:02, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  13. Open. -Atmoz (talk) 02:05, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  14. What I said here: it's helpful to both the community and candidates to see who voted for/against and why. Also, if some arbitrators are obviously using their position to "get back" at people who opposed them (though I can't think of a situation where this happened), they should be removed immediately. RfA/Bs aren't done in secret (and it's a good thing they're not), so neither should these. I'm disappointed that the secret voting method was pushed through in an RfC where less than 100 people participated, especially when hundreds of people vote in the ArbCom elections. Acalamari 02:14, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  15. I note that many respected community members present convincing arguments for a secret vote. However, Wikipedia is not an experiment in democracy. The same arguments regarding retribution and bloc voting could be made regarding RfA & RfB, but no one is seriously proposing a secret approval vote for administrator privileges. There is no compelling reason to exempt this election from the traditional open consensus model that has proved to be the foundation of Wikipedia. —Finn Casey * * * 02:33, 31 October 2009 (UTC) Note that I accept the below noted compromise option as a compelling middle-ground. —Finn Casey * 03:21, 14 November 2009 (UTC) [reply]
  16. I agree with Finn Casey. The public system has previously worked fine and it is much more useful to identify canvassing attempts than a secret voting system would be. Regards SoWhy 10:21, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  17. Everyking (talk) 13:25, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  18. While I do understand the reasons for going over to a secret ballot, I haven't seen enough evidence of intimidation based on votes to consider it to be at the same threat level as possible unchecked meatpuppety and cabalism under a secret ballot. Heimstern Läufer (talk) 13:29, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  19. I'm sympathetic to some of the arguments for secret ballots. But in my years on Wikipedia I've seen arbcom correspondence published on Wikipedia Review, leaking of mailing lists, postings of detailed personal information, and many other things to make me extremely skeptical that "secret" balloting would be truly secret. Short Brigade Harvester Boris (talk) 19:46, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  20. Secret ballots have their advantages, but the principal advantages don't really help us any and the disadvantages are particularly salient. Wikipedia does not have an (explicit) problem with voter intimidation. Wikipedia has a serious problem with the appearance of backstage dealings and private power struggles. A secret ballot works well if you trust the mechanism and you trust the reporter. Even in advanced democracies, there are legitimacy problems with the mechanism and the reporting. We should not pretend that technology obviates those problems for us (because they are mostly in the minds of critics). Obviously the argument will be made that WP is going to use some third party tech (probably hosted on some third party site), but how long will we go before we realize that candidate A has received an anomalous number of negative votes and have to 'correct' for this (in the sense that we might if they were public? What happens if we have to knock 100 votes off a tally? How do we explain this verifiably? Do we say "trust us, we would only remove truly illegitimate votes"? If we ignore non-technical disruption (i.e. we allow any account within some set parameters to vote and never molest the count), how do we deal with the obvious problems of ballot stuffing, double voting, etc? Protonk (talk) 08:50, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
    Small comment. I'm aware that the Secure-vote protocol allows that editors check who has voted (just not for whom), offering some measure of transparency. This is better than obscuring the vote entirely. I'm not certain it is enough to prevent problems or the appearance of problems WRT transparency. Protonk (talk) 19:10, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  21. I agree with Protonk. I also think that (very) marginal benefits of the secret ballot do not justify the extreme complexity of their organization in such an open editing environment as Wikipedia. Ruslik_Zero 12:05, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  22. Public voting is always preferable, but I'd like us to use some variant of the SecurePoll interface that allows the public to see who voted, and for which candidates. This setup would remedy the problems pointed out by Durova, as would allowing the checkusers full access to the voting logs (as they would have for on-wiki voting). AGK 12:50, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  23. Per Finn and Boris. Wikipedia has always been based on openness. We have already seen Arbitration moving from a mostly open, interactive process to something that mostly happens on the private mailing list - and that has not been an improvement. What's next, anonymous contributions to articles so that stalking becomes harder? Voting on Wikipedia is voluntary. Most actions are under public scrutiny, and should be. That's what protects us from the abuse of power - not increasing levels of obscurity and intransparency. --Stephan Schulz (talk) 13:13, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  24. Essentially what Protonk said. Transparency is very important, and Wikipedia has repeatedly made the mistake of thinking that problems can be resolved by hiding information from the public. >Radiant< 14:26, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  25. Per protonk, Durova and Finn. AtheWeatherman 19:19, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  26. Secret voting would pretty well eliminate the oppose/support balloting method. Who then was a gentleman? (talk) 19:21, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  27. Transparency is the key. I don't see how Wikipedia:Requests for comment/ArbCom secret ballot has a "result [that] was an overwhelming yes" as this RFC claims. Public voting, as AGK said, is the preferred way to go. As elections have shown, secret voting is much easier to game...and that is what will happen in future arbcom elections. Also, what is with this duopoly...allow for a discussion area outside this yes/no paradigm...Smallman12q (talk) 19:32, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  28. Users see the situation and can change the criteria online. unlikely that open voting can end without electing enough people·Carn !? 20:54, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
    Amalthea 23:16, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  29. As expressed in RFC #1 --Cube lurker (talk) 14:05, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  30. Transparency is the most important thing.M0RD00R (talk) 16:41, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  31. Secrecy has caused enough problems on Wikipedia in the past. Secret polls are more subject to fraud and manipulation by the powers that be. We've had quite enough of that...it is time for WP's power structure to embrace open democracy, even while kicking and screaming if necessary. Besides, ghosts do it with transparency!--R.D.H. (Ghost In The Machine) (talk) 20:18, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  32.  Burningview  ✉ 00:53, 3 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  33. (Reluctantly) A big problem with open voting is early trends leading later voters to just go along, IMO. But without open voting, transparency is lost. Since have no "paper trail" in Wikipedia elections, the public listing of votes serves as our check. And this is important, there have been several instances of abuse of power here at the encyclopedia. I favor open voting where the individual votes are not revealed until after "the polls close" and no running totals are kept during voting. Diderot's dreams (talk) 15:42, 3 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
    I'm sorry, but your position confuses me. If you favor open voting, then it is not possible to not reveal votes until the polls close: the votes are, by definition, out in the open. Not revealing the individual votes and not running totals until the polls close is what secret ballots are. Did you mean to support the section below? — Coren (talk) 16:15, 3 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
    It seems to be rather a third option where the votes are secret during the election, after which we would see whom everyone voted for. The current "secret voting" proposal, as I understand it, would never reveal individual votes. Evidently, there are a variety of middle grounds between "open" and "secret" voting not being considered here. Christopher Parham (talk) 16:55, 3 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
    SecurePoll could easily be tweaked to release voting lists after the election had closed. Happy‑melon 22:16, 3 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
    ... or more *wink wink* --rannṗáirtí anaiṫnid (coṁrá) 22:27, 3 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
    As the options were presented to us in this vote, I favor open voting over secret ballot as the best choice of those presented. This is because I think it is more important to have transparency than to get rid of the "go along with the early trend" phenomenon. (There are other considerations too, of course). What I really favor is the third option that Christopher deduced I wanted. And what Happy-melon said could be done by modifying the secret ballot option. Diderot's dreams (talk) 20:17, 4 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  34. If we move to a secret ballot then we will be placing a lot of trust in (effectively) strangers. Will need to trust that these strangers will conduct and count the election properly and announce the true result. While others may decry that these strangers would not "cheat" us in any way, it is unwise to place unquestionable trust in anyone we don't know. This isn't a statement of paranoia or cynicism, it simply a matter of not being so naive. I would be willing to change to a method of secret balloting should there be more safe-guards to confidence, such as described in my proposal below. Without safeguards of this kind, a change to a secret ballot is a definite 'no, no'. --rannṗáirtí anaiṫnid (coṁrá) 18:28, 3 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  35. Per many above (transparency is important, etc). Although most voters simply sign their names, many do leave rationales that could influence the opinions of others voting; if we were to convert to a secret ballot, this would be lost. GlassCobra 20:04, 3 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  36. Wikipedians have demonstrated time and again that they cannot be trusted to behave with integrity behind closed doors. Of course secret ballots are preferable in democracies, where there are also pollwatchers, and watchers of the watchers, and press, and etc., etc. It's not hard at all to imagine the audit subcommittee going into moral panic about some issue and deciding that it's time to lead, follow or get out of the way or some such pompous overblown panic rhetoric and thus conclude it's time to stage a coup for the sake of morality. Unfortunately, in a community as underdeveloped as ours a secret poll would be a step away from Democratic governance rather than toward it. --JayHenry (talk) 04:12, 4 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  37. Bloc voting (particularly ethnic bloc voting) is my main concern. In a secret vote, there is no means of knowing of such votes before the results are finalized; Thus the community cannot counter-act unreasonable votes. See Wikipedia:Arbitration Committee Elections December 2008/Vote/Jayvdb where such a bloc vote did take place. Rami R 16:34, 4 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  38. iMatthew talk at 22:39, 4 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  39. Outright votes should rarely be used, let alone hidden and secretive ones. –Juliancolton | Talk 22:31, 5 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  40. BrianY (talk) 01:26, 6 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  41. Voting is evil to begin with, and the problem of multiple voting by sock operators is bad enough with the votes out in the open. Secret voting would make the election results completely untrustworthy. Also per GlassCobra, rationales are informative. 69.228.171.150 (talk) 12:32, 9 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  42. Having read the various comments here, I am persuaded that a public ballot would be a better choice, as opposed to my previous 'secret' vote. The transparency of votes is required - and I have no objection with people seeing who I supported/opposed. If that pisses off someone at any RfA I might make, I'll take that chance - it might be that other editors at a hypothetical RfA might actually prefer that I show which mast I nail my colours to, rather than it being hidden - even if they disagree with me on my vote! -- PhantomSteve (Contact Me, My Contribs) 13:35, 9 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  43. This would allow for more transparency for the elections - while some of the issues are clearly computer-detectable objective criteria, others (such as sock-related issues) aren't. עוד מישהו Od Mishehu 10:16, 10 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
    (moved to new option) Normally I'd prefer a more private method, but I see a lot of agenda driven things here that push me to prefer a more transparent view of the situation in this case. — Ched :  ?  15:58, 10 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  44. I don't trust Jimbo Wales, especially to make his decisions when support and opposition are kept secret. Сlickрор (talk) 03:06, 11 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  45. Transparency is the way of the Wiki, despite the flaws that it may have. bibliomaniac15 05:33, 11 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
    Transparency is more important that having secret elections when the systems that would normally ensure a fair election aren't in place. I'm especially concerned about bloc voting and frankly I think there are bigger issues to be concerned about at the moment than asking people to make their opinions public. I retract my support per what John Vandenberg has written further down on this page. No principle on a website is worth that. Vyvyan Basterd (talk) 04:56, 12 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  46. I would like to see transparency on this... I don't like really secretive things on such an important issue as Arbcom elections... Until It Sleeps Happy Thanksgiving 21:51, 12 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  47. At the end of the day, if arbs are handling a lot of matters in secret, and their jobs are not easy, they need to be trusted in the eyes of the public, and all actions should be under public scrutiny. A number of arb resignations involved precisely this sort of thing, as well as cases lacking natural justice, leaking of mailing lists, postings of detailed personal information and private correspondance, and many other actions. For better or worse, this does include reputations too, past instances where candidates have exercised good/poor judgement, candidates actions who appear to repeatedly be guided by political agenda and manipulating others on and off wiki, candidates who are unlikely to be able to work with the community, etc - would such candidates benefit this project in an arb position, even by default? It is also voluntary voting; users need to be confident they can speak out against unfit candidates - there will be far less confidence by such users while the most important aspect of the elections is held in secrecy: voting. Rationales are important. Finally, the community should be trusted to see through users who are grinding an axe and users who are truly bringing quality perspective to the table, while any potential socking that occurs during the election period also needs to be identified. Ncmvocalist (talk) 02:50, 13 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  48. The most serious actual disruption in a voting process that I have witnessed during the last few years, the attempted national canvassing/votestacking against one candidate last year, would likely have gone unnoticed and would have had a much better chance of actually affecting the outcome if it had been in a secret ballot. Openness is useful. Fut.Perf. ☼ 11:29, 16 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  49. Openness matters a great deal. We should have sound reasons for resorting to secrecy in any matter. I don't see that such reasons do exist, or could exist, when it comes to selecting arbitrators. Angus McLellan (Talk) 20:30, 16 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  50. In the light of day...Modernist (talk) 05:23, 17 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  51. Per Future Perfect above. Further, the loss of ability to read the rationales of others would be deeply unfortunate. Unomi (talk) 18:36, 17 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  52. Strong support It's distressing that many editors want secrecy and a lack of transparency. They should be held accountable for wanting to undermine our fundamental principles. ChildofMidnight (talk) 03:16, 19 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  53. It's disappointing to see so many wikipedians in good standing supporting this half-baked notion of secret ballots. Yes, there are disadvantages to public ballots, but I think they are considerably outweighed by the advantages. The major advantage is that other users can be alerted to problems with the candidate they simply weren't aware of - which is a far more important function in my opinion than the possibility that the occasional worthwhile candidate may get shafted now and then by a small but vocal group of opponents. The fact is that most of us simply don't have the time to conduct in depth research on every candidate for a position, we really need to see the opinion of all those with some familiarity with the candidate in order to get a comprehensive view. One only has to look at the large number of RfA candidates who are doing quite well until their shortcomings are exposed by someone with knowledge of their flaws. Does anyone seriously believe we would be getting better quality admins if we had secret ballots? On the contrary, most of the quality control would go straight out the window. For candidates standing for even more important positions such as arbcom, it is all the more important that transparency be maintained. Gatoclass (talk) 07:38, 20 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Secret ballot (SecurePoll)[edit]

Votes are recorded and tallied by MediaWiki; the lists of "who voted" and "which candidates were voted for" are separated, so no one can see which way a user voted. A real time tally of who has voted is publicly-viewable (example from the current AUSC election).

  1. As I supported on the previous request for comment on this issue. Davewild (talk) 18:06, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  2. SPLETTE :] How's my driving? 19:35, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  3. Cirt (talk) 20:13, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  4. It is more likely that socks would be caught with SecurePoll as all IP information is available to the scrutineers. Having legitimate elections unbiased by social pressure is very important. It is also important to remember that the lists of who voted will be open to all. — Jake Wartenberg 21:22, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  5. As per the previous RFC. Voting without fear of retribution or harassment is more important than catching socks. That said, SecurePoll allows everyone to see who is voting, so it is still possible to look for accounts which appear to be socks. John Vandenberg (chat) 21:38, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  6. Per Wikipedia:Requests_for_comment/ArbCom_secret_ballot, where this was generally supported. Please read for pros and cons. Why are we doing this again? Is this RfC advertised widely enough, or should we plan three more just in case? Nathan T 21:56, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  7. Vote secrecy is very important. Offliner (talk) 22:32, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  8. The current implementation seems to allow for adequate antisock safeguards, and secret votes are more likely to correctly represent community opinion, since the whole social networking aspect is filtered out.  Sandstein  22:36, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  9. If the safeguards against fraud are in place then this is better system then open voting.   Will Beback  talk  23:38, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  10. It's not often I prefer secrecy to openness, but John Vandenberg said it best. the wub "?!" 23:59, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  11. As per Jake W, John V and Sandstein Manning (talk) 01:47, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  12. Per John Vandenberg and Sandstein. ArbCom elections are explicitly not a "consensus" - they are a majority vote, as such we should treat it as one, and not as some sort of discussion-less discussion. Mr.Z-man 03:11, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  13. Per this discussion, but we should re-evaluate next year in the event new problems surface as a result of secret balloting. SandyGeorgia (Talk) 03:38, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  14. (i) It makes an arbitrator's job more difficult, not easier, to know who supported or who opposed them (yes, people do bring this up). (ii) I'm cannot see why it's anyone else's business how I choose to cast my votes. (iii) Public voting disenfranchises those who are not confident about speaking up publicly and those who fear having their votes challenged by vociferous editors with an axe to grind.  Roger Davies talk 04:03, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  15. Exactly what Roger said. In addition, private voting is the obvious system to minimise the incentives for canvassing and, in a mirror image, for secretive influence before and after the election. Tony (talk) 06:11, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  16. The sensible thing to do, for all of the reasons outlined above. --Malleus Fatuorum 06:19, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  17. There should be no possibility of peer pressure on how you vote. Sjakkalle (Check!) 07:30, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  18. But only if there is vigorous and open public debate on the candidates and their election statements and answers to questions. That, coupled with open declarations of support where people prefer to do that, and analysis of the list of voters (which is available for all to see), should meet most concerns. But no-one should be forced to disclose who they voted for, unless they choose to do so. Carcharoth (talk) 07:52, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  19. It's no coincidence that absolutely every single true democratic system of the world uses secret ballots. The ability for voters to pick candidates without having to publicly justify their decision, or being able to "prove" they voted one way or another to a third party, and fundamental requirements of true democracy. Having public voting is an invitation to manipulation, coercion, and bribery. — Coren (talk) 12:54, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  20. Strong preference for secure voting that lets people give there opinion publicly or not as they personally choose. Under this system people will be able to ask questions and make comments about their preferred candidates. But the voting will be outside the view of other people thus making people more likely to freely give their opinion. I see this as extremely important because of the nature of the work done by the Arbitration Committee. FloNight♥♥♥♥ 14:28, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  21. I like the community have found myself divided on this, though I have ultimately come down in favour of secret voting. No matter if it is public or private this is going to be a democratic vote. The consensus model is good and works in many places, but not in something with hundreds of people participating. Unlike processes such as AfD it also is really down to personal opinion on who you support or oppose, not policy and guidelines, hence a secret vote is more appropriate. Public discussion about candidates will likely happen anyway, but on this model it is up to voters to decide on if to make their votes public or not, and privacy may in many cases improve honesty. I personally have already decided that I am to give feedback to candidates as I did last year, and I'm sure others will join in. I respect concerns over corruption e.t.c. with a secret vote but such issues should not be insurmountable if given proper attention. Finally, a secret vote allows a fairer election system to be used (per above). Camaron · Christopher · talk 20:39, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  22. We need a secret ballot for all the reasons democratic states use them; people are otherwise reluctant to express their views, and may support or oppose under peer pressure. SlimVirgin talk|contribs 20:51, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  23. Any risk of socking is countered by the fact that the information still exists and, IP-wise, can be checked if needed. Ironholds (talk) 22:25, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  24. Many people won't vote in a public ballot for fear their vote will be held against them. A secret ballot may be more representative for that reason, and as Ironholds says socks can still be ferreted out if necessary. --NellieBly (talk) 22:38, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  25. Fairer and less open to manipulation.--Scott Mac (Doc) 23:51, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  26. Per many above, particularly Coren. I agree with SandyGeorgia's point about revisiting this, as well.--chaser (talk) 07:06, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  27. A much better idea. Stifle (talk) 10:29, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  28. I like what I'm seeing in the AUSC elections. We could save ourselves a lot of drama on this. - Mailer Diablo 10:59, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  29. Markus Schulze 11:29, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  30. RP459 (talk) 13:25, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  31. Roger Davies summed it up succinctly - furthermore as an arb, as was aware of who supported me and who opposed me. This did cross my mind when people came up in arbitration and I had to judge their actions, although I did my best to ignore or negate any feelings I had. This more than anything pushes me to a secret ballot, as an open voting process can subtly impact on arb impartiality subsequently. Casliber (talk · contribs) 14:00, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  32. To counteract the insidious peer-pressure of our increasingly politicized social network. Antandrus (talk) 14:40, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  33. ArbCom members are people. It is asking too much for an Arb to be unbiased when he or she knows that an individual voted against them or has an Arb friend who had been voted against. Greg L (talk) 18:23, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  34. Secret ballot is a democratic milestone, ensuring that those in power will not be able to punish those who disagree with them. As long as we use support/oppose votes, this is simply necessary to avoid intimidating editors and scaring them away from opposing. --Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus| talk 00:49, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  35. This one seems obvious - avoids COI, boot lickin' votes and factionalism.radek (talk) 06:34, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  36. Its time to face the facts: ArbCom elections is the the most wiki-political of acts on Wikipedia, except perhaps the position one takes on an ANI thread concerning a high profile user. We can't put the genie back in the bottle - elections are now and will continue to be a place where voters gain social credit with the wikipedian sub groups of their choice. Secret elections allow people to voice honestly what they think without fear of damaging their reputations or starting fights with their Wiki-pals. Additionally, we won't have to deal with the horse race problems that often skew results away from a genuine reflection of community will.--Tznkai (talk) 07:23, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  37. — Kusma talk 10:25, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  38. But in that case there's a need for someone to supervise the voting process. -- Luk talk 10:35, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  39. Who watches the watchmen? Hipocrite (talk) 19:28, 30 October 2009 (UTC) Per Coren on talk - ability to oppose candidates who everyone thinks will pass may result in those candidates not passing outweighs watchman factor. Hipocrite (talk) 13:54, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  40. Secret ballots are vital to fair elections. ---Irbisgreif-(talk | e-mail)-(contribs) 14:49, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
    Secret votes would allow people to vote how they feel, rather than how they think they should be seen to vote. -- PhantomSteve (Contact Me, My Contribs) 15:30, 2 November 2009 (UTC) Struck as I have changed my mind having read the various arguments presented -- PhantomSteve (Contact Me, My Contribs) 13:35, 9 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  41. Voters should feel free to support or oppose without having to worry about it affecting their public reputation. This would make the ArbCom vote less 'political' (ironically enough), and hopefully reduce the level of drama around it. Robofish (talk) 02:58, 3 November 2009 (UTC) (I'm not against people publicly expressing their support or opposition for the candidates, of course, just so long as the actual votes themselves are secret.) Robofish (talk) 03:00, 3 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  42. Privatemusings (talk) 08:16, 3 November 2009 (UTC)is this a vote, by the way? - hope so.[reply]
  43. Avoids retribution for voting against certain candidates. OhanaUnitedTalk page 13:13, 3 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  44. Too many good arguments in this section to vote otherwise. -- Александр Дмитрий (Alexandr Dmitri) (talk) 20:23, 3 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  45. -FASTILYsock (TALK) 00:26, 4 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  46. Under the current system, people who don't vote right away may be discouraged to vote later on (if the candidate(s) they support get little support) or may be influenced to change votes (candidate x seems popular, so I need to vote for him). Private polling should work if proper monitoring is done. Deserted Cities (talk) 17:25, 5 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  47. This really makes sense. MBisanz talk 13:52, 9 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  48. But there should be a section for people to publicly endorse (or attack) the candidacy. RayTalk 17:21, 10 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
    Absolutely agree, using the Comments section of the candidate's page, for example. It's an absolutely essential part of the husting/stump.  Roger Davies talk 17:26, 10 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  49. "Only oppose if your concern is worth getting badgered about" makes some sense at RfA; we need lots of admins, and it's supposedly no big deal. This, however, is an actual election for a limited number of seats of some importance. The social pressure of public voting doesn't have an upside in this situation. --Chris Johnson (talk) 04:23, 11 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  50. Yep - for all the reasons it's a good idea in general elections. Arise you silent majority! But concerned re. the checks and balances of counting.--Joopercoopers (talk) 11:54, 11 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  51. Without fear or favour. Collect (talk) 11:51, 12 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  52. Public voting can cause people to feel that they ought to votes for a certain candidate for the sake of others' opinions of them. Captain panda 17:55, 12 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  53. Unlike some other processes, this is a vote. As in so many real-world elections, secret ballots are important to the integrity of the election. rspεεr (talk) 02:12, 13 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  54. Obviously Awadewit (talk) 06:21, 13 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  55. Public discussion but secret vote. And obviously, vote count cannot be visible when new editors cast their vote. "Consensus" does not apply if this is indeed an election; in fact a consensus vote is what should be avoided. This does not prevent anyone from arguing publicly; but why should one's vote be public if they don't want it to be? Technical concerns must be dealt with, but it seems possible to go forward with this now. Antipastor (talk) 03:07, 14 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  56. Secret voting; too easy for a guy to shout flagrantly false rubbish and get a few others to freak out and oppose as well YellowMonkey (bananabucket) (help the Invincibles Featured topic drive) 04:34, 14 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  57. Among other reasons, I'm switching from public to secret balloting since the Support/Oppose type voting appears to come out ahead, and I expect annoying strategic voting issues to have less impact if your strategic opposition is hidden and thus more people use it. Amalthea 15:42, 15 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  58. I held off on voting in this area until we had the opportunity to see how the AUSC election worked out, and what technical issues arose. There were a couple of probably fixable ones (reviewing one's previous ballot is a case in point). On the whole, that election went extremely smoothly. I know for a fact that public voting has triggered both pile-on supports and pile-on opposes in the past, and I believe there is a lot to be said about the "chill" that people may feel if they must publicly oppose a candidate they feel is unsuitable, particularly if that candidate has a reputation for holding grudges. I do not believe that secret balloting will make any difference at all in canvassing; it will be no easier or more difficult than with public voting. Full secret ballot, without later revelation of who voted for whom, is my only choice here. Risker (talk) 04:16, 16 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  59. My choice BejinhanTalk 04:31, 16 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  60. I found the previous voting worked out well. If the changes are made to be able to see your own votes in case a change is wanted is made that would be good too. That was the main item I saw editors asking for during the RFC. I think less drama and gaming will happen with this method too. --CrohnieGalTalk 15:30, 16 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  61. To encourage more participation and to mitigate attempts of slander at the polling booth, as User:YellowMonkey states above. Additionally, secret voting allows voters to vote their conscience without thought of retaliation or criticism. Jehochman Talk 16:37, 16 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
    Public voting makes slandering, grudge mongering, and intimidation much easier. I'd prefer that voters and candidates not be subjected to undue influences. Our community is fragmented enough already. We don't need people keeping lists of supporters and opponents and using this election as an opportunity for settling scores. Public voting encourages that sort of poor behavior. In a legitimate democracy, ballots are secret. Jehochman Talk 03:01, 17 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  62. There is a plethora of fine reasons why secret ballots are SOP in real world elections. Most of them apply here. People have detailed many good reasons to use secret polling above as well. Vassyana (talk) 09:38, 17 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  63. Per John Vandenberg below. No principles on a website are worth that. Regardless of how much I prefer open and transparent processes it shouldn't be at the expense of those who offer their time and effort here. That was just scary to read... Vyvyan Basterd (talk) 17:50, 17 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  64. Allow discussion, but keep voting secret, just as it is done in all enlightened societies. Priyanath talk 02:20, 18 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  65. Absolutely. Wikipedia has been demonstrating for the last five years why open voting doesn't work in this context. – iridescent 2 16:39, 19 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  66. It seems so hard to chose whether to go for secret or open, but from what I've read above harassment and other types of politisation seem to run rampant in these elections so maybe the protection of a secret ballot outweighs the risks of corruption. Like I said it's a vert tough call, but I'm going for a secret ballot. I Feel Tired (talk) 01:26, 20 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  67. Per usual suspects voting for public only. I have been harassed my fair share of times for offering an honest opinion on a candidate, and would welcome an option not to be cyber bullied by drama mongering admins this year. Vodello (talk) 06:44, 21 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  68. Please refer to my view for a rationale. Cenarium (talk) 16:19, 21 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  69. Don't think there's anything new for me to cover. I think this should be used for all of these kinds of elections. - Rjd0060 (talk) 22:46, 21 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  70. Like this as long as there exists a voter's guide with discussion. I like seeing well-reasoned arguments for or against candidates beyond the shallow Q&A. JakeZ (talk) 20:17, 22 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  71. For all good reasons mentioned above.--Staberinde (talk) 22:47, 22 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Proposed extension to SecurePoll[edit]

A large part of the opposition expressed during the last RFC to holding a secret ballot was concern over confidence in the result of a secret ballot (including my own opposition). This concern was maybe best expressed by Carn: "It does not matter who votes, it is important who counts". Secret ballots work in real life because of measures that ensure that the count cannot be manipulated in some way. How would we do this online?

Following on from the last RFC, I gave thought to a method in which SecurePoll could be extended to allow all users to have confidence that a secret ballot was not manipulated. The method I am proposing is explained here: Wikipedia:Secret ballot process. --rannṗáirtí anaiṫnid (coṁrá) 19:34, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

  1. First choice. Not fool-proof against voter fraud, but makes it a prohibitively difficult headache for anyone trying to ballot-stuff behind the scenes. Keeps the benefits of secret voting with SecurePoll with fewer of its drawbacks. -kotra (talk) 20:47, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Compromise (hybrid) solution[edit]

A third way is possible, which will satisfy many of the objections from both the "Public polling" and "Secret ballot" camps, with a specially modified version of SecurePoll using the usual Support/Oppose voting for the election itself. During the election, the ballot would be secret, thus eradicating pile-on voting and intimidation, and allowing voters to benefit from SecurePoll's inherent convenience and ease of use. Then, once the election closes, an overall tally is published, along with the individual tallies for each candidate, specifying which voters supported and opposed them, with say a week set aside for public scrutiny, prior to the appointments being made clarification added, per requests  Roger Davies talk.

To clarify, does this mean the votes are essentially "open" (as in the old/current system), with all votes listed transparently, for a limited time (you say a week as an example) after the election closes? -kotra (talk) 19:42, 12 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
This would mean that the list of votes would be private during the election, appearing exactly the same as the AUSC election did. The process of eliminating socks would proceed initially as with a private election, based on voter details. Then the results would be released, and with them the public record of who voted for whom. So during the election and for a short time afterwards, the votes would be private; after that time they would be public, and would be public in perpetuity. Hope this clarifies. Happy‑melon 12:15, 13 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Thanks! Clarified further here. -kotra (talk) 02:15, 14 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Question: User:Happy-melon, who has been involved in the implementation of SecurePoll, stated a few weeks ago that "SecurePoll ballots cannot be publicised. There is a public list of who has voted, and a list of what votes were recorded for each candidate, but there is no list, and no way to create a list, that combines both data. [2] Such a statement would seem to render this compromise proposal impossible. Has there been a change since that time? —Finn Casey * * * 22:37, 12 November 2009 (UTC) Answered at User talk:Happy-melon. —Finn Casey * * * 00:37, 13 November 2009 (UTC) [reply]
  1. Support.  Roger Davies talk 15:52, 6 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  2. Support - Since the proposal requires complete public disclosure of every editor's vote, it is a highly acceptable alternative to public voting. I am glad to be able to find a middle ground! —Finn Casey * * * 02:39, 7 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  3. Support. Though the scrutiny time period needs to be longer, maybe just make it permanant. Diderot's dreams (talk) 06:19, 9 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  4. Support. The above RFC seems very unlikely to deliver a clear consensus and this seems like the best possible compromise between the two camps. (I still prefer the Secret option however, and hopefully we will move towards that in the longer term)Manning (talk) 04:47, 11 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  5. Support, unhappily, as transitional, hoping the 2010 vote will give full privacy. Tony (talk) 11:20, 11 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  6. I could live with it as very much a second choice to secret voting. Davewild (talk) 18:46, 11 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
    Acceptable as a second choice to fully-secret voting, but that would remain my first choice. Robofish (talk) 02:21, 12 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  7. I prefer actually secret balloting, since the issue of retaliation or bad feelings resulting from an oppose isn't alleviated in the compromise method, but I'd prefer this to the normal public vote. Nathan T 20:42, 12 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  8. This would be very preferable. It would prevent comments from crowding in on voting (of course comments would still be available elsewhere) but it would also address the issue of transparency/legitimacy. It would combine the benefits of an automated vote, separated voting/commenting, eliminate "pile-on" voting and maintain the transparency/legitimacy of an open ballot. Excellent suggestion. My entire opposition to SecurePoll would vanish should the voting records be opened to scruity after. I would say however that these tallies should be available for always, not only for a limited period after the vote has closed. --rannṗáirtí anaiṫnid (coṁrá) 21:04, 12 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  9. Support While everyone needs to feel secure in being able to cast their lot for those they feel strongly about without fear of retribution, I believe that everyone needs to be accountable for the weight they throw towards our scales. Too much "privacy" can lead to hidden agendas, too much transparency can lead to a lack of privacy. I think this is a good compromise. — Ched :  ?  22:01, 12 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  10. Still better than the current system, though I'd prefer fully secret voting as this only has a portion of the benefits. Mr.Z-man 00:07, 13 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  11. Why not? It may not be perfect but this should be enough to make both camps happy enough. ~ Amory (u • t • c) 16:22, 13 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  12. Support. --Bfigura (talk) 22:25, 13 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  13. Second choice to full privacy for voters. — Jake Wartenberg 00:49, 14 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  14. Support as first (or second) choice. Retains the (admittedly watered-down) benefits of a fully secret poll with none of the drawbacks. -kotra (talk) 01:48, 14 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  15. Support. watered down but at least a workable compromise. Casliber (talk · contribs) 01:55, 14 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  16. Support Least evil option with a chance to pass. MBisanz talk 03:06, 14 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  17. I support this abomination as a distant second choice to a proper private ballot. It reduces the opportunity for a opposition campaigns to be based on FUD and strength of numbers. People wishing to persuade other voters should do so by presenting facts and engaging in dialog, which is messy if done on the same page that votes are being recorded on. And this compromise will also mean that the last few days are not dominated by vote switches intended to counteract the votes made by other people, resulting in a messy game and a big distraction. John Vandenberg (chat) 03:21, 14 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  18. Support but only as a second choice after a full secret ballet. As I see it this gets some of the benefits of open voting, more transparency, plus some of the drawbacks, with only temporary privacy for voters. Overall, I don't see it as much better than a full secret vote, and another problem is this system may only work with the Support/Oppose voting system. Camaron · Christopher · talk 12:22, 15 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  19. Support --CrohnieGalTalk 15:34, 16 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  20. Best of both worlds: simplicity of SecurePoll; openness of public voting. Support. AGK 15:20, 17 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Opposed to the hybrid solution
  1. Oppose, strongly, as the worst of all worlds. Has the disadvantages of open voting (people know who voted for whom) without the advantages (explanatory comments along with votes which others may then consider or not). Or if you prefer, has the disadvantages of secret voting (lack of feedback during the election) without the advantages (confidentiality). Short Brigade Harvester Boris (talk) 07:41, 14 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  2. Oppose not sure how the worst of both worlds can be called a workable compromise or middle ground; madness summarizes it more aptly - even the notion of temp desysops isn't this bad. Ncmvocalist (talk) 08:07, 14 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  3. I will continue to refrain from voting in arbcom elections until my vote can be cast as a proper secret ballot. I don't care if other people case their votes publicly. But this option would not permit me to vote, and therefore I cannot support it. — Carl (CBM · talk) 13:01, 14 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  4. Oppose. Worst of both worlds. rspεεr (talk) 09:03, 15 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  5. Oppose Negates the very rationale for a secret ballot. Collect (talk) 12:21, 15 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  6. Oppose; I also see this as the worst of both worlds with none of the benefits of a secret ballot and none of the benefits of an open process where voting is an interactive process. Christopher Parham (talk) 15:31, 16 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  7. Unfortunately I have to agree that this eliminates the benefits of both public voting and SecurePoll. Of course, I prefer public voting, but let's stick to one either way. –Juliancolton | Talk 17:52, 16 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  8. Public voting's great advantage is not the scrutiny, but the discussion, the secret ballot's advantage is the lower pressure environment for the voter. This solution has neither.--Tznkai (talk) 15:30, 17 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  9. On second thoughts, Oppose. I hadn't really thought this through - the comments above make very good points. Robofish (talk) 00:05, 19 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  10. Oppose per Boris, who hit it on the head. This really is the worst of both worlds - lose ongoing feedback as the election is happening, but open voters up for retaliation and anger afterwords. RayTalk 01:07, 19 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  11. Oppose agree with everything said above. -Atmoz (talk) 06:29, 19 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  12. Bad idea. Does this occur in real life elections? Nope. I guess that sums up everything. OhanaUnitedTalk page 06:40, 20 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Tranches: keep or eliminate?[edit]

When we change the term lengths, will we keep the notion that the elected arbitrators are to fill "tranches" of specified sizes that determine when their term expires?

Keep tranches[edit]

The elected arbitrators will be placed into two "tranches" that determine when their term expires, so some arbitrators will be elected for one year instead of two. The tranches will be balanced so that at least half of the seats will be open at each election.

  1. Yes. No real reason given to get rid of them. Haven tranches (akin to what the US Senate does) ensures that half the committee stays the same each year (assuming there are no resignations, which 2 year terms should help keep down). Nine arbs are elected each year for a two year term, if a seat needed to be filled, the candidates finishing in places 10+ would get them, depending on how many extra seats need to be filled (or a special election could be held). Also, if the number of seats up for election changes each year, its not fair to the candidates. If the top 12 get in (for two year terms) one year, and only the top 8 the next year (assuming two resignations), people could (and likely would) fail to win in the second year while garnering more support than those who got in the on the first year. Keeping tranches could keep this disparity from happening. Deserted Cities (talk) 19:15, 13 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  2. Traches are much superior as they guarantee a stable transfer from one set of members to another. I'm not sure what is meant by "some arbitrators will be elected for one year instead of two" - all should be elected for the same term, the start times of those terms should be staggered into to groups. --rannṗáirtí anaiṫnid (coṁrá) 19:43, 13 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
    Discussion about replacing of members moved to talk page. --rannṗáirtí anaiṫnid (coṁrá) 00:17, 14 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  3. Tranches make it less likely that we'll have some year where we lose all (or nearly all) of the members. With such an event, it could be difficult to recruit sufficiently many candidates, and there could be loss of knowledge continuity. Quantling (talk) 18:59, 20 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  4. Having staggered elections provides more stability; incoming Arbs will have the knowledge of the other, more experienced Arbs. GlassCobra 02:53, 24 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Eliminate tranches[edit]

All arbitrators elected from now on get 2-year terms. The number of seats to be filled at each election will be determined only by the number of retiring arbitrators and the number whose terms naturally expire.

  1. As I've said elsewhere, this is our chance to simplify. rspεεr (talk) 08:11, 13 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  2. Without mking any tranchant remarks, the utility of them was limited at best. I still prefer a 2 year term only for the first term, and one year renewals. Collect (talk) 11:13, 13 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  3. Tranches are now a meaningless artifact. Arb terms have a start date and and end date. End of story. Tony (talk) 12:19, 13 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  4. per Tony1. John Vandenberg (chat) 00:00, 15 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  5. Per Colin Chapman. Short Brigade Harvester Boris (talk) 00:12, 15 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  6. As discussed on the talk page this is already effectively true. --Tznkai (talk) 05:38, 15 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  7. Seems simplest way to go. Cirt (talk) 06:11, 16 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  8. Makes sense. Fut.Perf. ☼ 11:30, 16 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  9. Simpler is better. Jehochman Talk 16:39, 16 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  10. As an arb, I never gave the concept of tranches a second thought before or after being elected. Makes a simple discussion of dates complicated. Casliber (talk · contribs) 03:43, 19 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  11. kiss -Atmoz (talk) 06:32, 19 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  12. I have always felt the tranche system was unnecessarily complex. JakeZ (talk) 20:21, 22 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Retain balance from year to year[edit]

All arbitrators elected will get 2-year terms. The number of seats to be filled at each election will be determined by adding together the number of seats made available by terms that have ended normally, and the number of seats that have come up for election a year early. The number of seats available for election (presuming a committee of 18) shall not be more than 10 or less than 8 (i.e. half the number, plus or minus one). If more than ten seats are available for election, the extra seats shall be held empty until the next election to avoid the number of seats available in that future election dropping below eight.

  1. This won't work for next year (which will see only 6 seats available for election, unless two of the four arbs on three-year terms resign a year early), but will work for subsequent years. The reasoning here is to avoid situations where 6 seats are available one year and 12 the next. That is too much of an imbalance. Presuming you get 20 candidates each year, and 9 of them are well-supported by the community and the other candidates are not, you lose out on three potentially good arbitrators in the year when only 6 seats are available, and you either elect 3 candidates with substantially less support in the year when 12 seats are available, or have to leave three seats empty. Either way, we shouldn't be drawing vastly differing amounts of arbitrators from elections in different years. See also the schedules listed here in a section elsewhere on this page. Carcharoth (talk) 18:06, 13 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  2. I would be okay with this, too. rspεεr (talk) 22:12, 15 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Minimum support percentage and vote totals[edit]

50% +1[edit]

Proposed: In order to be appointed to the Arbitration Committee, candidates must achieve a minimum of

  • (a) 50%+1 support percentage and
  • (b) 125 or more total support + oppose votes.
  1. Reasoning is fairly obvious for the percentage; nobody should be able to be elected to the Committee with less than 50% support. It is better to leave a seat empty than to appoint a candidate with that low a support percentage. The minimum number of votes is to ensure that a candidate whom the electorate ignores cannot be appointed. Risker (talk) 04:04, 16 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  2. Yes. This of course, is the rock bottom minimum.--Tznkai (talk) 04:05, 16 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  3. Definitely. This is especially a concern if the number of seats is enlarged. I'd be more comfortable with 60% support but can live with 50%. (I don't think it's practical to require a figure higher than 60%.) Short Brigade Harvester Boris (talk) 04:19, 16 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  4. Yes, however 60% would be best. Cirt (talk) 06:10, 16 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
    Intellectually, I agree with you. Practically speaking, last year (with many more candidates than we have this year), there was only one candidate above 60% support who was not appointed to the Committee, and he would have been Seat #18 (one seat was not filled, as Deskana's resignation had not been announced during the election period). I am not certain we can fill 18 seats if we require 60% support. Jimbo has previously said he will not appoint below 50% +1, which is why I have identified it as the baseline. Risker (talk) 14:37, 16 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  5. 60%. At least that is 1.5 supports for each oppose. 1-1 is a bit low YellowMonkey (bananabucket) (help the Invincibles Featured topic drive) 06:12, 16 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  6. Support item (b), and support (a) being 60% as per YellowMonkey. Manning (talk) 06:48, 16 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
    Yes, as for YellowMonkey. Tony (talk) 07:23, 16 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  7. Support, 50% rather than 60% because we might not always have the luxury of many well-supported candidates to meet the need to feed the beast, and 50% is superior because it is non-arbitrary – editors who can't muster net support don't belong in positions of responsibility. The number of voters specified is arbitrary but acceptable.  Skomorokh, barbarian  07:47, 16 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  8. Support. I'm more comfortable with the 60% cutoff, but would be willing to accept 50%+1. --Elonka 08:21, 16 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  9. Support. Both are an acceptable minimum, however if we have a private ballot (b) should either be much higher (200) or relative to the number of voters. John Vandenberg (chat) 09:00, 16 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  10. Support, in both the 50%+1 and 60% versions. Maybe after we see one post-RfC election, we'll know more about what the 50%-60% range means and we can revisit this. rspεεr (talk) 09:05, 16 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  11. Support This is in line with historic traditions and a good idea in general. MBisanz talk 14:42, 16 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
    I think it is important to not set the bar too high, especially while there is still possibility of using secret ballots which may affect the "normal" range of support candidates get. — Coren (talk) 14:49, 16 November 2009 (UTC) Striking as I've made a good argument against requiring a ratio with a support/oppose system given that the actual end result percentages do not, in fact, reflect the actual support because of voting artifacts. — Coren (talk) 14:02, 23 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  12. Yes. 50% is the right level as I think setting 60% gives far too much likelihood thst we will not manage to fill all the seats. Davewild (talk) 18:15, 16 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  13. First choice: In favour of having a minimum level of support, which has to be at least a majority (50%+1). I would prefer the minimum number of votes cast requirement to be a fraction of the total votes cast, rather than a fixed number (125), which obviously does not scale. --RexxS (talk) 07:19, 21 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  14. As an absolute floor, 50%+1 is reasonable. I would lower the absolute number threshold to 100. JakeZ (talk) 20:26, 22 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

60%[edit]

Proposed: as above, but with 60% rather than 50%+1 as the cutoff.

  1. 50% just isn't enough. Somebody who has just as many opposers as they have supporters cannot validly claim to enjoy the trust of the community at large. Fut.Perf. ☼ 11:33, 16 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  2. Weak support. I think this will be a good number, but I'm concerned with the possibly uncharted waters here, if we use secure poll, we can expect higher oppose values. Remember, in some real political elections, 60% approval is a landslide.--Tznkai (talk) 16:31, 16 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  3. Per FPAS. I am definitely uncomfortable with wins by slim majorities, particularly because it seems unnecessary to allow that much leeway to fill seats. If we are not filling the seats, we should address the underlying problems, not paint over the rust by permitting lower standards. Vassyana (talk) 09:50, 17 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  4. At least We're considering appointing arbs with 50% community support? YIKES! I would think 75 or 80 should be the baseline. ChildofMidnight (talk) 04:00, 19 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
    Check past elections Wikipedia:Arbitration Committee Elections December 2007/Results, and Wikipedia:Arbitration Committee Elections December 2008/Results. In 2008, only three of ten appointees exceeded 75% support. In 2007 only three of six exceeded 75%. However, in both elections all appointees had at least 63% support. Jehochman Talk 14:48, 19 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  5. SandyGeorgia (Talk) 14:33, 19 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  6. Amalthea 14:39, 19 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
    Switching from 60% support in the wrong section, above, but how many last December passed this mark? Tony (talk) 15:57, 19 November 2009 (UTC) Striking since it's a disastrous requirement given the current voting system and the decision to elect the eight highest-scoring candidates. Tony (talk) 13:32, 23 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
    Exactly the 10 who were appointed and nobody else. Jehochman Talk 16:09, 19 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  7. 60% sounds like a reasonable number. I Feel Tired (talk) 01:35, 20 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  8. Second choice: support per my comments in the previous section, but second choice because I think it would be a mistake potentially to leave a seat vacant, rather than appoint someone who received 59.9% support. --RexxS (talk) 07:22, 21 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  9. Support We need a safety valve, since we have less candidates than normal this year and so many seats to fill. ⇌ Jake Wartenberg 02:10, 24 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  10. Support As noted above, the candidates election from last year all had at least 60%; I find this to be a reasonable expectation of community support to serve as an arb. Considering that the decision to expand the number of seats on ArbCom was relatively recent, I don't think it would be the worst thing in the world even if we ended up having a slightly small number of arbitrators than expected. GlassCobra 02:30, 24 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Comment on ex post facto categorization[edit]

Note that the addition of an option for 60% was made after quite a few people (including myself) had already mentioned a preference for 60%, before there was an option for separate percentages.[3] I'm a little concerned that people may look only at the numbers under each heading above and infer that there's a clear majority favoring 50% rather than 60%. I think it's too much to expect everyone to go back and move their vote to the proper heading, so I'd like to suggest removing the 50%/60% divisions to avoid confusion. Short Brigade Harvester Boris (talk) 19:52, 17 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

it not like the two numbers are in competition actually. Both need to get past the hump first, I'm not convinced at this rate we'll get enough input to declare consensus on 60%--Tznkai (talk) 19:56, 17 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

First past the post[edit]

Proposed: The first seat on the Committee will go to the candidate with the highest net total of support, the second seat to the candidate with the next net total support, and so on until all the vacant seats are filled.

  1. Primarily to ensure than people whom no one cares about at all (save 125) do not get chosen. Frankly, as long as all those chosen are supported by a large number of people, we can trust that, on average, the committee will accurately represent the entire community. Insisting that each individual member must represent all points of view ensures that the committee will be too homogeneous. WP is heterogeneous, and so ought the ArbCom be. Collect (talk) 19:05, 16 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
    I'm confused by what you mean. I thought it was obvious that we'll be giving seats to the people with the highest approval percentages (which isn't what the term first past the post means, by the way). Is your proposal just to fill all the seats, even if it means electing someone with, say, 20% approval? Or are you proposing to count "abstain/neutral" votes in the denominator of the percentage, so that they have the same effect as oppose votes? Where does the number 125 come in? Given that what you have proposed does not involve any form of proportional representation (which I think is not well suited for the ArbCom anyway), how does this make the ArbCom heterogeneous? rspεεr (talk) 02:35, 17 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
I had not written the section above my position (which was almost the reverse of my position). I count "net total support" (yeas minus nays) here ... not percentage. Hence making my comment about 125 votes. Which would not make sense if I intended that a person with a total of one yea and no nays would be elected with 100%. Collect (talk) 11:32, 17 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Sorry, still confused. You're proposing something that's almost the reverse of the opening sentence of this section? Did you mean to mark it as an oppose vote? rspεεr (talk) 08:52, 18 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Nope. The decision should go to the candidates with the highest net number of plus votes. Just like real elections. Collect (talk) 19:14, 18 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Quota using Single Transferable Vote[edit]

Proposed: If elections were done using some form of single transferable vote, the number of votes required (or quota), would depend on the number of candidates. By one method, the number of votes required is given by:

where:

  • Votes = the total number of valid (unspoiled) votes cast
  • Seats = the number of seats to be filled

Note that in STV systems, although voters are encouraged to cast votes for more than one candidate, only one of their votes is counted in each round of the computations, and is thus used in the formula to determine the quota. One consequence of STV systems is that candidates strongly favored by a small portion of the community have the possibility of being elected. Thus the ArbCom would be more representative of the diversity of the community, which provides some defense against the claim that a clique or cabal is running things. --SteveMcCluskey (talk) 15:31, 17 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

STV systems are designed to give a single winner, not multiple winners. That is the weakness of almost all of the alternative systems that have been proposed here. As well, there is no valid reason to restrain people from only voting in support of the number of candidates for which there are seats. I may well find that there are 10 candidates I would find acceptable and support each of them, even though only 8 will be selected by the overall strength of their support within the community. Risker (talk) 15:42, 17 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
STV systems are actually used in multiple winner elections. For example, they are used in Cambridge, Mass to elect the nine members of the City Council and are used in Ireland to elect representatives in multi-member constituencies. As to your second concern, if you prefer ten of the candidates running for eight seats, you need only rank them 1 through 10; your vote for one of your candidates (perhaps the tenth, depending on how other people vote) will factor into the final result. --SteveMcCluskey (talk) 15:54, 17 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
That simply isn't true Risker. A variant of STV has long been used in Irish parliamentary elections selecting 3-5 winners.  Skomorokh, barbarian  17:50, 17 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
I like STV in real-world political elections. However, I do not feel that proportional representation is appropriate for ArbCom. We actually want ArbCom to be a majoritarian body, not a proportional one. In a proportional election, 1/8 of the voters could band together and form the Disruptive Troll Party and get their own arbitrator. rspεεr (talk) 18:19, 17 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Arguendo -- why not? I doubt, in fact, that such a group has 1/8 of WP behind it -- but say (as a pure frinstance) there was a "Deletionist Party" candidate -- do you feel it wrong that if 1/8 of all the voters chose him on their first choice line that this would be a "bad thing"? A single arbitrator in a group of 8 has precisely how much individual "power"? I seriously doubt this would be a "bad thing" to be sure. Collect (talk) 18:25, 17 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
The Deletionist Party would, sadly, be likely to get more than one seat if it formed. The point is that ArbCom is a body that needs to come to agreement often. It should not be a microcosm of Wikipedia and all its disagreements, because it needs to be in a position to resolve those disagreements, not perpetuate them at a higher level. ArbCom should represent people who agree on the prevailing norms of Wikipedia. rspεεr (talk) 18:46, 17 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Agree, if we want things to come down to partisan votes we can just do that directly at any old RFC. Arbcom should be a centrist body capable of resolving disagreements in a way that is viewed as fair; this works best if its members have broad support and can work together, rather than representing specific (and potentially conflicting) minority interests and being forced to work in opposition. Ideally nobody with less than majority support would be appointed, no matter than strength of the minority's view. Christopher Parham (talk) 18:55, 17 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
I also like STV but I don't think that it would be a good choice. I too would prefer a "conservative" body over a "representative" one. --rannṗáirtí anaiṫnid (coṁrá) 19:48, 17 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Voter eligibility[edit]

50 edits before the elections[edit]

Proposed: 150 edits seems too many for me. We use editcount thresholds very sparingly on Wikipedia, and should set them as low as reasonably possible. If someone can make 50 edits without getting blocked, I don't think we should demand another 100 before accepting they're a good-faith account.

  1. Support, as proposer. Robofish (talk) 00:14, 19 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

150 edits before the elections[edit]

All users must have at least 150 mainspace edits before the election process begins in order to participate (current practice).

  1. Please. Let's leave editcount inflation out of the ArbCom elections. rspεεr (talk) 03:07, 18 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  2. Strong Support - limiting suffrage is a step backwards. —Finn Casey * 05:20, 18 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  3. Support - There are numerous valid issues concerning ArbCom elections but this is not one of them. Manning (talk) 08:55, 18 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  4. Support Keep as open as possible to allow as many editors as possible to feel they can participate. Davewild (talk) 17:57, 18 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  5. This seems like as good a measure as any to qualify for voting, and not everyone has the time to make 150 edits in one year but they still should have a vote. Also some editors may have most of their recent contributions on the Talk Pages rather than in the mainspace, so that should be considered too. I Feel Tired (talk) 01:48, 20 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  6. Support. As someone who has made moderate contributions to the Wikipedia over 4 years and was denied a vote in a recent election, I feel strict suffrage requirements are against the spirit of the Wikipedia. Our aim here is to increase the voter pool, so even us little guys can have a say on who serves us on ArbCom.
  7. Support Status quo in this matter is sufficient. GlassCobra 02:57, 24 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

150 edits before the elections, including 50 in the year before[edit]

All users must have at least 150 mainspace edits before the election process begins in order to participate, including at least 50 mainspace edits in the year before.

  1. This gives a recent activity criterion, w/o eliminating "meta-editors." Rami R 21:01, 20 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

150 edits in the year before the elections[edit]

All users must have made at least 150 mainspace edits in the year prior to the elections in order to participate.

  1. Rami R 20:45, 17 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  2. Weak second choice - limiting suffrage is a step backwards. —Finn Casey * 05:20, 18 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  3. Would disqualify this guy, for one. Not saying whether that's a good or a bad thing. Short Brigade Harvester Boris (talk) 15:14, 18 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  4. Strong support, but I would much prefer the lower threshold of more current edits. John Vandenberg (chat) 23:42, 18 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  5. I hope all current arbitrators and candidates meet this threshold! Carcharoth (talk) 00:07, 19 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
    • That threshold is higher than you think. That's 150 mainspace edits per year. I would be disqualified from voting. So would the founder of our project and many, many other active Wikipedians. I guarantee that if you limited suffrage this drastically, ArbCom would lose all legitimacy. rspεεr (talk) 06:54, 19 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Why do you have so few mainspace edits? Get cracking! I don't think Jimbo needs to vote and I don't see how Arbcom would lose legitimacy. If a bunch of new editors show up to vote that's problematic. Especially since we don't know which ones are Chillum's alternate accounts. ChildofMidnight (talk) 07:09, 19 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Why do you have so few newbie-helping edits? Get cracking! Or just get off your high horse and accept that not everyone has to edit like you to be valuable. Also, limiting your edit counting to the past year has absolutely no effect on whether new users are counted. rspεεr (talk) 07:18, 19 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
I'm doing some counting, out of curiosity. And I found that Coren, a current arbitrator and a standing candidate, doesn't meet this threshold, with about 100 mainspace contributions in this time span. Is this proposal looking thoroughly ridiculous yet? rspεεr (talk) 07:37, 19 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
In all fairness, currently sitting Arbitrators are probably a poor example because of the time drain (and I'm admittedly one of the poorest in the bunch given that I'm am not much of a writer to begin with). I agree however that excluding metapedians — who also are important contributors in their own way — isn't a good idea. — Coren (talk) 12:01, 19 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Arbitrators should have a feel for what the place is like for people who, you know, actually work on articles. Short Brigade Harvester Boris (talk) 02:03, 20 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

30 edits in the quarter before the elections[edit]

All users must have made at least 30 mainspace edits in the quarter prior to the elections in order to participate.

  1. This will help reduce the number of throw-away accounts that can vote, and gives checkusers a decent amount of data to work with if the scrutineers are concerned about a vote. John Vandenberg (chat) 23:42, 18 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
    The problem I have w/ this is it can potentially discriminate against those busy during this time of year. In Israel, summer vacation is July-August, the school year starts September, high holidays are September/October and right after that the academic school year starts. Sort of like how AFDs and RFAs are 7 days to account for those who only edit once a week, I think we should account for does who don't edit much during these times of the year. Rami R 21:01, 20 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
    This obviously doesn't affect you, as you have many more than 30 mainspace edits in the last quarter for the years 2006-2009. Rather than worry about hypotheticals, could you look around at people who you think this may affect? If there are real people who are affected, maybe we can reduce it a little. I have noticed that I included "mainspace" - that isn't important, so I have struck it. John Vandenberg (chat) 22:10, 22 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
    It's not about who is or isn't affected, it's about who maybe affected. We're currently looking at a complete overhaul of the election process and have no real idea at what's going to happen. We must worry about hypotheticals. Rami R 12:25, 23 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  2. Despite what I say above, the proposal is reasonable. Rami R 12:25, 23 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

300 edits before the elections[edit]

All users must have at least 300 mainspace edits before the election process begins in order to participate.

  1. Support. A voter should have a good appreciation for what they are voting on. John Vandenberg (chat) 00:52, 19 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

300 edits in the year before the elections[edit]

All users must have made at least 300 mainspace edits in the year prior to the elections in order to participate.

500 edits before the elections[edit]

All users must have at least 500 mainspace edits before the election process begins in order to participate.

  1. Weak support. If we went down this path, and were using SecurePoll (as it is so quick and easy and there is no reason not to vote), I would want all a bot to notify all active accounts, asking that they participate in the election. I want higher participation, but not necessary a lower caliber of participant. John Vandenberg (chat) 00:55, 19 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  2. At least This election looks like it's going to be rigged based on the Arbs pushing secret voting and low limits on minimum edits. Very very troubling. ChildofMidnight (talk) 04:04, 19 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  3. 500 doesn't seem high enough, frankly. --Île flottɑnte~Floɑting islɑnd Talk 02:05, 21 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

500 edits in the year before the elections[edit]

All users must have made at least 500 mainspace edits in the year prior to the elections in order to participate.

Views[edit]

View by John Vandenberg[edit]

Three years is a long time to be strapped to these chairs. It is a commitment that many sensible people are not able to make because they have a real life in addition to Wikipedia, or they don't know what the next three years holds for them. Reducing the term to two years will mean more candidates feel comfortable making the commitment, and feel capable of enduring to the end of their term. The argument that shorter terms result in loss of institutional knowledge don't sit well with me. After a shorter term, arbs can seek re-election or retire to be a functionary, where their knowledge can easily be tapped into.

One of the themes of the 2008 arbcom RFC was that arbitrators rarely ever make it to the end of their allocated term, and that the committee becomes unexpectedly short staffed when an arb resigns or retires. One way to alleviate this is to have extra non-voting members in the committee at the beginning of each year, and allocate them to work initially on the constant stream of ban appeals and other auxiliary tasks.

With a committee of 18 people next year, of which only 12 are voting members, six people can be working on the tasks which would otherwise divert arbitrator attention away from case work, and there is a pool of six people who are "in sync" with the committee and are able to rotate into a voting seat to account for inactivity, retirements or resignations.

The goal for 2010 could be to always have 12 voting members active on arbitration pages, while also ensuring that committee members take proper breaks to recharge their batteries.

Agree. Tony (talk) 13:06, 14 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
The less time, the better. We need to be getting people relatively after getting the wiki bug and then being an admin for maybe a year. People who will put in 40-60 hour weeks. We need effort more than experience. - Peregrine Fisher (talk) (contribs) 04:04, 17 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

View by rspεεr: tranches are obsolete[edit]

We have a tremendous opportunity to simplify the system here. Let's finish the job and do away with the obsolete notion of "tranches". Instead, we should give every elected arbitrator a term of the same length (which I'm assuming is two years).

Tranches were a system of staggering the expiration dates of the arb seats, even if this meant giving different term lengths to different people elected in the same election. They were devised based on the assumption that most arbitrators would finish their terms. This assumption turns out not to be true, so tranches serve no purpose.

I think many people are assuming this will happen anyway, because there has been no discussion about how to convert the three-year tranches into two-year tranches if we adopt two-year terms, but we might as well make this explicit to avoid confusion. Here's my specific proposal:

  • An arbitrator who is elected in a yearly election gets to keep their seat until the end of the election two years later.
  • An arbitrator who is appointed mid-year by some other process (should this situation arise) gets to keep their seat until the end of the next election.
  • An arbitrator who was elected before tranches were abolished keeps the same expiration date they already had in their tranche.

rspεεr (talk) 08:09, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]

View by SoWhy: Defending cumulative voting[edit]

Risker has outlined above that they think cumulative voting is too complex to be used in ArbCom elections and I think some people considering how to opine in this RFC will share such doubts. I think they are misplaced though. Cumulative voting can be both simple and complex, allowing both simply support/oppose votes and more complex preferences to be cast.
Let me elaborate with an example:

Let's assume the election will be held to fill 8 seats. As a result, each voter will get 8 votes. They can now choose the simple or the complex voting system. If they choose the simple one, they can support as many candidates as they wish but don't have to. Their votes will automatically be distributed equally amongst those candidates. For example, if they support 4 candidates, each one will receive 2 votes while the voter's only thing to do was to choose the candidates to support. The rest is done by the software. This means that the election is very simple for those who wish it to be.
For those who want to rank their candidates, cumulative voting would allow them to choose a different option when voting. They could give multiple votes (although I think there should be a limit per candidate, e.g. 3 votes maximum) to those candidates they prefer over others at the cost of not being able to support 8 candidates. For example, candidate A could receive 3 votes and candidates B and C 2 votes each with the last vote going to candidate Z.
All voters can decide only to use a certain number of their votes but are not forced to do so.

Cumulative voting has also the advantage that there are no oppose votes which are frankly not needed. Since the system means that those with the highest amount of votes will be elected, we also get rid of the need for having to set a bar, i.e. requiring a certain % of support. As such, I think this system would satisfy both the need for simplicity for the majority of users as well as the request for preferential voting that many experienced users probably have. Regards SoWhy 15:26, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]

We have an article on cumulative voting which is quite up-front about its fatal flaw: "Tactical voting is the rational response to this system." In cumulative voting, if you don't bullet vote for your favorite candidate, you're voluntarily weakening your vote. And this flaw is easily avoided in a system very similar to cumulative voting -- that system being range voting, which is what we use now.
Yes, range voting has a different way of voluntarily weakening your vote, which is to abstain, but if everyone takes this into account and votes up or down on all candidates you get the perfectly fine system of approval voting.
I can see the argument from those who want to change to a preferential system, but there is absolutely no reason to change from range voting to cumulative voting. rspεεr (talk) 03:43, 11 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

View by Finn Casey[edit]

  • A simplification of the present tri-tranche system is desirable. A two-year staggered term length system would give the process both clarity and stability. Electing half the arbitrators each year to a two-year term will be much simpler than the present arrangement. Such a process will also tend to reduce the endemic drop-out problem.
  • Wikipedia has traditionally operated in an open atmosphere. There is no compelling reason to switch to an atmosphere of secrecy to indulge the theoretical fears of certain editors. We are not, and do not wish to be, a real-life political system. Wikipedia is at its best when it is free of the partisanship that is evident in real-life secret elections.

View by Majorly[edit]

Seriously, why change what worked perfectly well (with regards to how we vote)? Majorly talk 17:43, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]

  1. Support It's nuts. Secret balloting with a 50 edit minimum? Yikes. No transparency or accountablity. Looks like some kind of takeover attempt. ChildofMidnight (talk) 04:06, 19 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  1. Support Unomi (talk) 01:58, 21 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

View by Jayron32[edit]

The Oppose/Support system works well for proposals and many other things at Wikipedia, but for elections where people are being chosen to fill an office, such things become bogged down in discussion, which often spirals out of control. A simple vote works much better in these cases, the "support/oppose" system is too open to hijacking by a few dedicated "haters". Lets instead keep discussion on discussion pages, and let the voting be unsullied by such events. Furthermore, not voting support in an election like this is equal to oppose anyways. --Jayron32 21:16, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]

God forbid an ArbCom election be mired in loathsome discussion. Best to tuck that sort of stuff away on the dark recesses of a Talk page nobody reads. Badger Drink (talk) 18:33, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  • Opposition is critical to include. Discussion has to be weighed. ChildofMidnight (talk) 04:08, 19 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  • There are actually a number of 'uncontroversial' RfAs that have no such discussion. Removing the ability for people to air legitimate grievances for others to see, which, lets face it, moving to a separate page would entail, goes against the grain. Unomi (talk) 01:56, 21 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

View by Offliner[edit]

Arbitrators should have one year terms only. Two years is very long time in Wikipedia. Personally, I'm extremely disappointed with the low efficiency of the previous and current ArbComs, and I think the community should have reasonably quick way of getting rid of bad arbitrators who cannot organize their work properly. Anything longer than a year is way too long — it allows the arbitrators to become confident that no matter how sloppy they are, they will still be allowed to continue for what is basically an eternity in WP. Cases dragging on for months is simply ridiculous, as is the extreme uncommunicativity of the committee members (it often takes weeks for ArbCom to answer even simple yes-or-no questions.) I'm 100% certain that the job can be done much better than that. We need to keep changing the Arbs in a quick fashion to try to find a constitution that works. I'd also like to note that, in contrast to real life, organizing elections doesn't cost anything in WP, so I really do not see any reason why we couldn't organize an election every year. Offliner (talk) 22:56, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Yeah. - Peregrine Fisher (talk) (contribs) 04:04, 17 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Response on the talk page. Vassyana (talk) 10:19, 17 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

View by Durova[edit]

If the problem is herding cats, one doesn't solve that problem by making the herd larger. ArbCom's core mission is to evaluate evidence in relation to policies. The larger the Committee gets, the harder it becomes to discuss matters and achieve quorum. Delays make problems worse because disruptive editors deliberately clog case pages.[4]

Moreover, what Wikipedia needs right now is better checks and balances. The principal check and balance upon ArbCom is Jimbo, but he's been under considerable pressure to refrain from intervention. That leaves a vacuum which would be healthier to replace with new bodies that serve separate functions and that answer directly to the community. A larger Committee is not the solution: that way leads to oligarchy. Durova349 04:26, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]

View by Carcharoth[edit]

Copied from earlier post elsewhere.

In the interests of transparency, I'm going to post my views here. I'm speaking here as a community member, with current experience of the arbitration committee, and as someone who thinks that ultimately the community should decide issues such as the size of the committee, and the term lengths, and the voting method.

  • Term lengths - I think two years is a good term length. It is long enough to effect changes and to get up to speed in the first six months. Three years is too long, and two sets of two-year services (ideally with a break in-between) is better than two lots of three-year services. The problems arise with turnover and the need to keep the committee stable (having more than half its members change each year is not good). If you have elections to fill all vacant seats with 2-year terms, then the number of seats up for election depends on the number of resignations, and the number of departing arbs whose term has ended (though they can, of course, run for re-election). Ideally, you would have staggered terms (i.e. tranches), as this avoids situations where you have (say) eight seats up for election one year, six seats up for election the next year, and twelve the year after that (this is the current situation given the number of arbs on 1-, 2-, and 3-year terms, if all eight seats this year were appointed to 2-year terms). [...] The advantage of a three-tranche system is that you don't replace half the committee each year (that can also be a disadvantage), but the disadvantage is that if you have annual elections, you need three-year terms, which are too long for some. The advantage of a two-tranche system is that you only need 2-year terms, but the disadvantage is that you replace half the committee each year and if arbitrators resign the year they were elected, then the following election results in more than half the committee being replaced (i.e. less stability). It's not an easy thing to weigh in the balance.
  • Size of committee - I think 18 is a workable size (though at the upper limit). 15 would also be workable (though if you have 2-year terms, you either need an even number of seats, or the theoretical number of seats available for election goes up and down by one each year). I think anything below 12 becomes unworkable when you have arbitrators either resigned, recused, or inactive/burnt out, as you can end up with as few as 5 arbitrators voting on an issue towards the end of the year, which is not good. So anything between 18 and 12 is workable, in my view, with a preference for a number between 15 and 18 to allow for resignations and inactivity/burnout.
  • Voting method - I have reservations about secret ballots, but some of the arguments for this have swayed me. My primary concern is that the discussions and "endorsement" pages that will inevitably spring up will get out of hand. There should be vigorous discussions about the candidates, but it should be kept under control. I do think more discussion about the practicalities of a secret ballot are needed (the RfC endorsed the concept, but little was said about how it would work in practice). I would urge those following these discussions to follow the AUSC elections and help point out and correct any bugs or problems that arise.

So overall, 2-year term lengths, 18 arbs on the committee, and secret ballot (for this year at least). With the caveat that three of the eight seats this year need to be for 1-year terms to avoid a pile-up of 12 seats for re-election in December 2011. And repeating here that this is my personal view, and that these issues are, ultimately, for the community to decide. Carcharoth (talk) 07:10, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]

View by jc37[edit]

(To whoever assesses the RFC for consensus, please include these comments as part of determining my position on the issues.)

As may be seen by my "votes" above, I'm a bit torn beyween 2 year terms and 3 year terms. So to clarify:

If it's to be 3 years with 3 tranches, then it should be 15 members. With 3 tranches of 5.
If it's to be 2 years with 2 tranches, then it should be 16 members. With 2 tranches of 8

1 year is too short, and 18 members is just too many. (We're just creeping too close to 20.)

I'd like to see the Support/Neutral/Oppose method, but modified so that each voter must vote in support of a number of candidates equal to the number of seats. No less and no more. (I've commented more about this on the talk page.)

I don't like any method which does not allow for someone to oppose a candidate.

And while I am sympathetic to concerns, secret ballots are simply anti-wiki.

And whatever is decided here should be loosely configured, so that User:Jimbo Wales can modify as the situation may merit. - jc37 09:47, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]

View by Vecrumba[edit]

It typically takes someone six months to learn the basics of a job, a year to become proficient in it. I would suggest two year terms for first time individuals, with their having the option to re-up for one more to three. Prior members can serve again for as little as one year, with an option to re-up to a total of three. I have not seen any persuasive argument that more members translate to an improvement in throughput or efficiency.

Equally importantly, work needs to be done on improving due process, if you will, where "appeal to Jimbo" or lobbying until one finds a "receptive" admin are discouraged. That is completely independent of how many or for how long. Issues of efficacy and efficiency relate to proper organization and enforcement of workflow, not to the number of hands on deck. We should take care not to conflate the two.  PЄTЄRS VЄСRUМВА ►talk  23:06, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]

On secrecy, either it's fully transparent or fully secret. The only thing worse than knowing who voted for whom (that is, confirming opinions of editors, pro or con, and creating "blocs" in one's perceptions) is assuming who voted for whom (that is, confirming one's own opinion absent of fact). Not to mention invisible peer pressure to vote certain positions because votes are in the open. Or sucking up to potential future admins in one's comments and vote. We may not be electing world leaders, but there is a reason that even the most innocuous of ballots are secret to assure people can vote their conscience, not their stated public position.

Per some of the concerns expressed elsewhere, there would need to be some auditing of users voting, that is, username and IP, to insure issues such as ballot stuffing, double voting, et al. are caught. All this said, open voting has worked well in the past—until there is some persuasive evidence that it has failed in some significant fashion, there's likely no impetus to change it. I would support some fashion of limited preferential voting.  PЄTЄRS VЄСRUМВА ►talk  23:16, 2 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

View by Smallman12q Opposing Secret Ballots[edit]

I find the following statement of this RFC to be an utter falsity.

The result was an overwhelming yes, with support also being expressed for implementing a Schulze method of electing arbitrators.

The result was not an overwhelming yes as you deceptively assert...it was anything but. If you take the time to read the statements left at Wikipedia:Requests for comment/ArbCom secret ballot you will see that a number of editors have shown concern as to exactly why a secret ballot is necessary.

I still do not understand the reason behind having a secret vote...and this sudden need for secrecy. As we have all seen before...secrecy and a lack of transparency corrupts(federal reserve anyone)...now while that may not happen on Wikipedia, a public vote would be much more assuring than a private one.Smallman12q (talk) 19:12, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

  • Agree. There was not "an overwhelming yes". --rannṗáirtí anaiṫnid (coṁrá) 19:25, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  • Well, looking at the state of the RfC, I have to agree. The RfC produced a rather underwhelming yes for secret ballots (which I happen to support). And there were actually more people supporting our existing approval-like method than supporting a ranked method. We should work this out for a future year. rspεεr (talk) 07:13, 14 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

View by Mr.Z-man: Transparency of secret voting[edit]

One of the main reasons for opposing secret voting seems to be a lack of transparency. But what transparency are we actually losing?

  • We know who the candidates are
  • We know who voted
  • We know who the election admins are

The only thing we no longer know is who voted for who. Why do we need to know this? If someone is eligible to vote, how is it our business to know how they voted? If they don't tell us why they voted, then its mostly useless information for any beneficial purposes. If knowing how they voted would create any more or any less of a reason to look at them with suspicion, then that's just another positive aspect of secret voting. Mr.Z-man 23:58, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Talk moved to the, well, talk page. Thattaway. — Coren (talk) 00:27, 3 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

View by MZMcBride[edit]

Tranche is a stupid and archaic word and we would do well to stop using it. --MZMcBride (talk) 23:58, 10 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Given that I already posted that in more words several sections up, I agree. rspεεr (talk) 03:57, 11 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Brevity is the soul of wit. (Also, I hadn't read most of this page; far too lazy. If anyone wishes to merge this section elsewhere or dissolve it completely, feel free.) --MZMcBride (talk) 03:50, 12 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
I read this as a proposal/plea to stop using the word, not necessarily the process. A rose by any other name would smell as sweet, but calling a rose a tranche wouldn't be nearly as romantic. ~ Amory (u • t • c) 16:27, 13 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Can we move this to the talk page as it repeats what is expressed (and being voted on) further up the page? Casliber (talk · contribs) 03:47, 19 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

View by Juliancolton[edit]

Please don't use SecurePoll for the upcoming Arbitration Committee election. Judging by the above poll, roughly half of the editors endorse the use of SecurePoll and half are against it. This is hardly sufficient consensus to justify implementing such a major change to the voting method. I'd assume that barring adequate support to utilize SecurePoll in the election, the default is to continue public voting.

SecurePoll undermines several fundamental Wikipedia policies and concepts, notably the fact that WP is not a democracy, is based on community consensus, and strives for transparency. With that said, I see no compelling reason whatsoever to hide such things as the ArbCom election from the community. I'd be far more comfortable with the use of SecurePoll if 1) the tallies are made publicly available, and 2) it is possible to post, as well as readily display, any and all comments relevant to one's vote. But if we do so the benefits of using a type of secret ballot become marginal.

Among the arguments I've heard for using SecurePoll is that it's more efficient than editing the candidates' subpages. My response to this is: what? This is a wiki; it is therefore based solely on the ability to edit pages, and I imagine that most contributors have hundreds, thousands, or even hundreds of thousands of edits. It does seem rather silly to suggest that we should be forced into using SecurePoll in order to avoid making a few odd edits.

I'm not necessarily concerned about vote manipulation, although I note that such issues don't become obsolete with the use of a secret ballot. In my eyes, SecurePoll is more vulnerable to a few standard problems (ie. canvassing).

Finally, we have relatively little information about who reviews the information and enacts upon the results. As I mentioned above, transparency is crucial to the project, and knowing so little about where my vote goes makes me uncomfortable. –Juliancolton | Talk 19:25, 12 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

  • Agree. Well said. —Finn Casey * * * 19:42, 12 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  • Agree. Actually I strongly support the change to secret voting, so I disagree with the bulk of JC's comments. However I agree that there should be no change in voting procedure for this election. The Public/Private section of the RFC is guaranteed to be ruled "no consensus" (barring an unlikely change in voting patterns). IMO this RFC clearly indicates that there are still strong doubts in the community which must be overcome prior to implementing such a significant change. I still intend to campaign for secret voting, but it seems clear to me that the community is not yet sufficiently convinced. Manning (talk) 00:19, 13 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  • nope - disagree - I rather suspect that there are some who have chosen to remain less than vocal about the merits of a secret ballot because they felt that it was rather straight forwardly a positive step. The polarity in the community (in this, as with other issues) is a problem, but it's one that is exacerbated by the 'anyone can pop their oar in' way we choose to run these discussions. Regardless of how others' feel (both the silent I refer to previously, and the less so above) - running a secret ballot was a progressive step many years ago - today it's a well established necessity for fair and smooth election processes. I hope we're sensible enough to do it :-) Privatemusings (talk) 00:31, 13 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  • Oh please. Using a secret ballot is undermining policies but having an open vote that still works purely by numbers and comments with votes aren't allowed is perfectly fine? The option here is not "vote or no vote", its "secret vote or public vote." I don't understand the "little information about who reviews the information" - for the AUSC elections, the stewards overseeing it signed off on the results, where is the lack of information? Mr.Z-man 00:43, 13 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  • Disagree. Secret ballots are useful. Also, this is an election, and we can't reasonably run it on the "this isn't a vote wink wink" model of RfA. rspεεr (talk) 02:09, 13 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  • I don't disagree, but I'm not sure how that's relevant. I never said it shouldn't be a vote, just not a dubiously secret vote. –Juliancolton | Talk 02:29, 13 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
perhaps we should call it a 'private ballot' - wouldn't be the first time folk have confused these terms ;-) Privatemusings (talk) 02:35, 13 November 2009 (UTC)ps. I don't think describing secure poll as 'dubiously secret' is reasonable - try and tone down the language a little mebbe?[reply]
Right now, it is a dubious herd vote where everyone looks at each other for what to do - "pile on's" and "group think" are much more likely in a public vote. Awadewit (talk) 06:25, 13 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Agree with Awadewit. Julian, you're OK that I'll feel under pressure to vote differently if everyone can look over my shoulder as I do it? Tony (talk) 12:25, 13 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
It depends why you feel that pressure I think. Evidently if a specific individual is applying inappropriate pressure against you personally, e.g. by threatening you, then that's a serious issue but not one that the secret ballot necessarily solves. If you are talking about general social pressure, I'm not so worried about it - as a community operating by consensus, it is appropriate to make concessions to the opinions of our peers. This probably results in better success for broadly acceptable candidates (vs. narrowly-but-strongly acceptable candidates), as well as higher mandates for the winners, both of which I think are positive and help the arbitration committee perform its role within the project. Christopher Parham (talk) 14:15, 13 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Yes, exactly. At the risk of sounding a bit cold-hearted, if an editor submits themselves or their work for community consideration in any sort of election, they should expect criticism—both constructive and more blunt. This happens at FAC, RfA, functionary elections, et cetera. Awadewit: yes, true; but by using the standard public voting, we can determine for ourselves whether or not pile-ons were an issue. With SecurePoll, we risk off-wiki canvassing that has an even greater risk of going unnoticed. –Juliancolton | Talk 14:50, 13 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  • Interesting points all, Julian. May I start please by asking whether your view is based on a philosophical stance rather than on actual experience in ArbCom elections? Have you never seen pile-on? And the complete inability of the community to deal with it? Have you never ever perhaps even been swayed yourself, especially when dealing with an editor you've never interacted with?

    I accept totally what you say about candidates needing thick skins but isn't this a red herring? After all, SecurePoll doesn't render the "Comments" section of the candidate's page obsolete and this is probably the best place to make remarks about the candidate's fitness or otherwise for office. The flaw with attaching comments to votes is that they are frequently highly polarised soundbytes, designed to publicly legitimise the voter's position. With secret balloting, the voter is under no pressure to justify himself and is thus much more likely to be even-handed in "Comments". Elections do not have to be gladiatorial contests, where the bullies and the besotted have a disproportionately weighty voice. And were half a dozen pile-ons appear before the candidate has had a chance to respond.

    Turning now to the issue of block votes, with public voting, the manipulator can see exactly how many votes he needs to conjure to scupper/improve his favourite's chances. This gives him an incentive to try. In sharp contrast, with SecretPoll, the fraudster is working entirely in the dark, with no idea how many voices to bring to bear, and this is a great disincentive to misbehaviour. Additionally, SecurePoll offers the community a unified voting log - much easier than trawling through 30 candidate pages - with IP addresses and other technical tools available for the scrutineers. the inescapable conclusion is that the risking of gaming are greatly exaggerated.

    There are other considerations too. Candidates may vote without fear of rebuke or retribution. Arbitrators and functionaries, who often have unique insights, may also vote for or against their colleagues, without fear or favour.

    Quite apart from this, turnout for ArbCom elections has historically been ridiculously low. If the objective is to keep the selection of arbitrators effectively within the gift of a smallish elite group of about a thousand editors, public polling does the job well. If the intention, however, is genuinely to involve the community, SecurePoll surely does the job so much better?  Roger Davies talk 17:26, 13 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

The lesson which I think can be taken from the AUSC election is that community discussion of the candidates is likely to be very much smaller, and the vote will have very little community input (though perhaps more total voters - the two are very much NOT the same in our non-democracy). As you say, voters will no longer feel obligated to justify their votes - not only will this of course lead to an increased incidence of unjustifiable votes, but many users will simply skip providing a rationale out of convenience. The chance of being persuaded by the comments made by other editors is greatly reduced beacuse I'm much less likely to vote without browing through others' opinions; the collaborative power of the wiki is basically eliminated from the process. Christopher Parham (talk) 22:50, 13 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
do you feel that voters really should feel obliged to justify their votes, christopher? Privatemusings (talk) 23:09, 13 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
If asked, certainly; voting in these elections is an action bearing on the project and the community and people should be prepared to justify their actions, from edits to deletions to blocks to arbitration votes. Christopher Parham (talk) 23:16, 13 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
I've gotten into the habit of just signing my name in matters that appear to me to be votes, or polls - because it's my perception that trying to justify / explain / go on a bit about why I'm leaning in any specific direction actually creates its own problems (too much noise, essentially) - I don't feel that the comments which have been part of the arb votes in the past have actually helped really, it's my feeling that they create undesirable social pressure in a number of ways. I hope that the simple fact that I am enfranchised is enough to justify my 'right' to have a vote counted, and I'd rather be facilitated to cast my vote in as unpressured, fair and calm a manner as possible, which I think is a secret ballot. Privatemusings (talk) 23:22, 13 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Remember that we already had a perfectly valid RfC that endorsed use of SecurePoll for our elections. That's why it was used in the AUSC election, and we planned to use it in this election, too. That shouldn't be changed due to "no consensus" result here. This poll is also problematic as many voters seem to have cast "drive by" votes without informing themselves. The previous RfC was a much more informed discussion. We won't know for sure how things will go until we try. We should wait until after this election to evaluate what to do. — Jake Wartenberg 14:43, 13 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

I can respect your viewpoint. However, this RfC has clearly had relatively high participation and visibility. It has shown that there is not a consensus for secret voting. Perhaps there have been a few "drive-by" votes on each side of the issue. However, the general result is clearly a lack of agreement for such a dramatic change from traditional Wikipedia practice and principle. As a side point, the arguments regarding improved voter participation do not seem persuasive to me. Perhaps more people would contribute to the encyclopedia if we eliminated the notability requirements. Yet our goal is not simply to get more participants - in writing or voting - our goal is to encourage greater participation while staying true to the accepted principles, such as transparency. Our current Committee has overall done an admirable job - there is obviously no need to fix what isn't broken. —Finn Casey * * * 17:43, 13 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
And equally why should we assume that SecurePoll, which has been used for WMF elections for ages, is broken?
It's also worth mentioning that in addition to the previous RfC, there is also strong support for using SecurePoll has been expressed at the SecurePoll workshop. So, on balance, while consensus may not be clear here, there is clearly is community consensus to at least try SecurePoll.  Roger Davies talk 17:52, 13 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
PS: An I alone in being surprised by the strong positions against SecurePoll taken by people appear never to have participated in ArbCom elections?
It is true that I (assuming you refer to me) did not participate in the previous Committee elections. I base my opinion on principle, not personal experience. Yet there are 50+ users listed above, most of whom did participate in the election, who also support tradition and transparency. Whatever course we end up taking, I believe this discussion has been valuable in hearing a variety of viewpoints. —Finn Casey * * * 18:55, 13 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
The fact of the matter is that an electoral system that enables four or five editors to totally derail a candidate's chances with spurious or exaggerated opposes cast in the opening minutes of the poll opening ain't worth the powder and shot. This is not transparency: it's mob rule.  Roger Davies talk 19:11, 13 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
I have spent some time more closely familiarizing myself with past Committee elections, and it still remains difficult for me to see widespread and systemic examples of such mob rule. Nonetheless, I suspect the compromise option would satisfy both of us (not to mention most everyone else :). —Finn Casey * 01:29, 14 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Yes, it is not easy to detect but early withdrawals are an obvious symptom. Also look for "runs" of oppose or support votes that break the previous pattern following a comment by a high profile or influential editor.
If the compromise solution satisfies you, I invite you to switch your vote immediately :)  Roger Davies talk 02:19, 14 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
My name is right beneath yours. —Finn Casey * 03:13, 14 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  • Christopher Parham, I'd like to respond to two of your statements:
    • "The lesson which I think can be taken from the AUSC election is that community discussion of the candidates is likely to be very much smaller"—ArbCom elections have a much more elaborate infrastructure for discussion and scrutiny: General Questions, many more Individual Questions, and longer Candidate Statements. It's actually far too big a deal, IMO, but I hope that addresses your concern that private voting might squeeze out discussion and scrutiny.
    • "Evidently if a specific individual is applying inappropriate pressure against you personally, e.g. by threatening you,..."—It's much more subtle than that. It's the very real possibility that a voter will feel they're betraying an editor they collaborate with, exchange views with on the same talk pages, get along with just fine. Or it's the feeling that, say, wikifriend A doesn't like the candidate one bit, but I've no problem with her/him; is my friend's enemy my enemy too? I don't want to have to justify myself, whether explicitly or implicitly, but rather to come to clean decisions on the basis of what I alone really think. This is quite apart from what is probably the less common but still possible risk of overt pressure, with inherent social rewards/punishment. This is all a fact of life, which is why voting is so often confidential in real life. We have the chance now to take a big step away from voting that is deeply embedded in the social, the interpersonal. Tony (talk) 03:32, 14 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
    • To respond to your two points: (1) Those venues are primarily for voters questioning the candidate, not for discussion between voters. A big advantage of the current system is that the discussion and vote are quite proximate which increases the degree to which voters are sharing information and developing a genuine community view. With the SecurePoll method, the electorate is more likely to be simply a collection of individual voters, with little community interaction. (2) I don't think this is actually a corruption of the process. In a secret poll, where voters can act however they want, they ask the question "which candidate is best for me?" In an open poll, voters are accountable to the peers who will suffer or benefit from the quality of their participation, and thus ask "which candidate is best for us?" The second I think is the question we should be encouraging. Christopher Parham (talk) 15:03, 17 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  • Agree mostly. Not too concerned about the ability to post comments since in the Audit Committee election (which used SecurePoll) there was a prominently displayed area to discuss... it was underutilized only because we aren't used to that form of discussion yet. This will fix itself in time, I'm confident. Anyway, the main point is a 50/50 split is not good enough for such a major change. -kotra (talk) 04:01, 14 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  • Agree; close to a 50/50 split is no where near enough for such a major change. My own view is amenable to change, but quite clearly, not now. Ncmvocalist (talk) 06:17, 14 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  • Agree with concern over implementing SecurePoll now, there isn't strong enough support for it at this time so the current system should remain. Disagree with comments over WP:DEMO/WP:CON concerns, it is going to be a vote whatever, the issue is if it is going to be secret or not per Mr.Z-man. Camaron · Christopher · talk 12:14, 15 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  • Disagree; (disclaimer: I am running in the election, so that the result of any discussion will affect me - but I don't think that invalidates my opinion as a member of the community). It's clear that there is no vastly overwhelming consensus to switch to secret ballots, but it's not unremarkable that there has been majority support in every venue where this was discussed. Another year of discussion of the hypotheticals of secret ballots would not be as useful, I think, than switching for one election and doing a serious postmortem analysis of how things actually went would be. Data points such as participation rate cannot be guessed at, only observed after the fact. This is a Wiki, and the best way to know if a change is good is to go ahead, do it, and see if it sticks. — Coren (talk) 17:56, 15 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  • Agree. There is no consensus for change. There has been no evidence of bullying or herding, just assertions, and mostly assertions that other people have been bullied or herded. It doesn't make sense to change the system to see if it fixes a problem when there is no evidence that the problem exists and no metric with which to measure it. If an influential editor votes and others follow her lead, that doesn't necessarily make them unthinking sheep. Influential editors are influential because people respect their views. If I see an editor I respect voting for a particular candidate, then that is useful information. It won't be the be-all and end-all but it will certainly be something that I take into account. MoreThings (talk) 20:26, 15 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  • Openness is preferable, given the fact that open dialogue and differing opinions developing toward consensus is what characterizes this enterprise from the outset...Modernist (talk) 05:38, 17 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  • Suggestion. I don't know whether it's too late to suggest this, but if people really are worried about the secret ballot, an alternative would be to run both for this one election. That is, run the election as we always do, and run a secret ballot alongside it. That would give us a lot of information about whether the different processes produced different results, and whether they attracted a different electorate. SlimVirgin talk|contribs 14:26, 17 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
    • This would seem fine as long as it was clear in advance how the results would be derived from the outcomes of the two elections; otherwise it would introduce the potential for significant unnecessary controversy. Christopher Parham (talk) 15:14, 17 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  • Yes, true. Is it worth suggesting this somewhere and thinking it through, or is the issue settled one way or the other? I've not been keeping up. SlimVirgin talk|contribs 16:01, 17 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Wow, if ever there was a way to make an Arbcom election *more* drama-filled, I doubt it would top this idea. It is a guarantee that the results will be different using two parallel voting systems, if for no other reason than that not every voter will be motivated to go through the same voting process twice. No matter which poll was determined in advance to be the "official" one, there will be interminable arguments over which one was actually "correct" or showed the "true" intentions of the community. As a result, it will tarnish every successful candidate for their entire term, particularly if they came out on the "winning" side on the officially accepted results, but the "losing" side on the other voting process. Risker (talk) 17:58, 17 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
It would have to be decided in advance which was the decisive one, and this would only be a suggestion worth looking at if there really is widespread unhappiness at the idea of a secret ballot. It would be very interesting to see what the differences were. I don't agree that voters would be put off going through two processes: the recent Audit Committee ballot took seconds. But, as I said above, I threw it out only in case no consensus was forming. SlimVirgin talk|contribs 18:11, 17 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Just as an idea, we could probably find a way to use the combined total from both polls as the "official number". This would, I imagine, largely put a stop to any "omg which poll COUNTS" drama (barring a few exceedingly unlikely scenarios). If the "peer pressure problem" is truly as severe as SecurePoll supporters would have us believe, this trial run would provide invaluable data to support that argument - and if, as I suspect, the "peer pressure problem" is but a tempest in a teacup, this trial run will show that, as well. Badger Drink (talk) 19:48, 17 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  • To answer SlimVirgin's question above about whether this has been proposed before, I did suggest this earlier here (a few posts down in that section). There are disadvantages to this (mainly that the running total for the open part of the ballot would give organisers of bloc votes pointers on which candidates to throw their weight behind by using the secret ballot). Of course, if something like this is done (using both methods), the results have to be combined. You can't say one voting method will be used to determine the result, and then ignore the votes cast by the alternative method. But combining results is trivially easy. You generate a voter list for both methods, and you simply compare them and discard the 'open' votes cast by those who also used SecurePoll, and then combine the votes. But I can't claim credit for this idea, as UltraExactZZ pointed out to me that Jimbo suggested something very similar last year. Carcharoth (talk) 03:18, 18 November 2009 (UTC) The difference being that rather than having two separate votes with different methods, you have a single vote, but give the electorate a choice of method for casting their vote.[reply]
  • It's not just a vote. The supports and opposes should be weighed. Just like always. What's this push for secrecy and against transparency. What are y'all hiding? ChildofMidnight (talk) 04:16, 19 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

View by Tznkai[edit]

In last years election, I did not vote, because it was a public vote. At the time I was an Arbitration clerk as well as working as a coordinator for the election, so I felt it somehow improper for me to voice my opinion, lest I sway, or appear to sway, appear to be trying to sway the elections somehow. Furthermore, I was going to have to work with these people (arbitrators) in the future, and I would either possibly appear to be trying to curry their favor (by supporting) or jeopardizing a working relationship (by oppossing) or getting into who knows what mess (depending on what the candidates thought of each other). Nor do I want to prejudice a working relationship, or make the candidates feel like they need to be on guard for accusations of bias based on my vote. Many of the candidates and I think some of the other clerks did not vote for substantively the same reasons. This is the reality that all of us, by which I mean all of the editors participating in this RfC and beyond, face to one extent or another, since this is a collaborative project where we end up working with a relatively small group of people relatively often. While we can hope beyond hope that our better natures and those of others will prevail, it is only human nature to care about what others think - and even if we don't care, we can never escape the perception that we do. The defenders of the public vote want the transparency of knowing what people think. I want the secret ballot because I want to know what people really think.

Yes, except I'd clarify that as "I want individuals to vote as they really think, and I want to know as a whole what the community really thinks." In addition, there's the awkward matter of candidates' voting (publicly) for or against each other. They don't need that complication with their colleagues if they become arbs. Tony (talk) 07:27, 16 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
You can avoid swaying a public vote by waiting til the last minute before voting. I don't see the other issues as being much different from how they are at RFA. 69.228.171.150 (talk) 01:56, 18 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

View by John Vandenberg: bloc voting and defamation[edit]

A few people have supported public voting because of bloc voting. Everyone should go back and read Wikipedia:Administrators' noticeboard/Possible ethnic block voting in ArbCom elections.

Notice that nothing was done?

Votes by socks like User:Larno Man and user:MagneticFlux were not removed, and I am pretty confident that they are banned users and that their main account also voted (i.e. four oppose votes); and there were many accounts which were inactive either before or after the election, however there was no way to differentiate them from admin Samir (talk · contribs) who came back from a year long break. So the votes remain.

Because the bloc voting became widely known, a few people did change there votes to counteract it, however there are a few other factors which need to be taken into account:

  1. The bloc voters usually supported other candidates who were positioned closely to me in the election, in effect doubling their vote (as is their right)
  2. There were a number of voters who were swayed by the unfounded allegations of impartiality, due to the size of the bloc vote.
  3. Instead of answering questions, I was spending my time refuting those unfounded allegations because the number of oppose voters citing a pro-Azeri bias was growing rapidly, and I have always edited using my real name. I had just accepted a new job, with my boss aware of my commitment to Wikipedia and the ongoing election. The public face of this was far more important to me than "winning" the election, and half way through the election I was going to throw in the towel in order to tackle these allegations with a bit more fervor than I could while also trying to answer election questions. In the end I asked my boss for some time off.

A secret ballot will mean that canvassed bloc voting will be harder to notice, however a secret ballot will mean that candidates can run in the election without fear of being subjected to defamation of this kind. Scrutineers will pick up more socks, because the software alerts them to any problems which would warrant engaging a checkuser.

The part that was most disruptive to me personally was the character assassination and lack of discourse. These people were allowed to say whatever they liked with their oppose votes. This also happens on RFA, however on RFAs people freely discuss oppose votes, and RFAs are not a zero-sum game. We can have as many admins as we want. The Arbcom election is a zero-sum game, it is conducted as a vote for a limited number of seats, and I felt powerless as I dont think it is appropriate to badger so many voters. A vote page is not a good venue for discussion.

If you browse though Wikipedia:Administrators' noticeboard/Possible ethnic block voting in ArbCom elections, the consensus was that the solution to bloc voting was to bring in more voters, and that is what we should be doing. Here are a few ways SecurePoll helps:

  1. the voting interface is simple and easy to use, and the interface is translated into the preferred language of the reader
  2. it incorporates suffrage into the software, so potential voters know whether they can vote or not
  3. votes lodged via SecurePoll can not result in badgering, so there is no unexpected visits from highly motivated candidates
  4. (if the vote remains private) the voter knows there will be no retribution.

Public voting means that we can see bloc voting but, in reality, the dynamics of a public election means that early oppose votes which defame the candidate are rewarded, we don't want to call it out, and are not willing prevent it for fear of interfering with the election. John Vandenberg (chat) 15:54, 16 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

As the target of skillful defamation last year, I strongly oppose public voting. Voters should make up their own minds when voting. We should not allow loudmouths to poison the well against a candidate on the voting page. There are plenty of other places available to voice criticism, such as the voter guides and discussion pages. Jehochman Talk 16:44, 16 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Unexpected visits from highly motivated candidates??? Like that would work in a place like this. Look at the uproar over the relatively tame fundraising banners, and we're worrying about wiki-politicos showing up on talkpages trying to kiss babies? I don't think so. The sock issue seems a lot worse. At least it was detected in that election JVDB describes. I think with secret ballots, a lot more will slip by. Just about every day on ANI, some vandal slips up and gets an incident report, and then checkuser finds dozens of socks. Now consider that checkuser data goes stale after a couple weeks and you have to figure that those same idiots are sitting on hundreds of sock accounts for years. Combining secret ballots with letting long-inactive accounts vote is a recipe for totally delegitimatizing the election. In the last election, voters needed N mainspace edits no older than a few months before the election, which means at least the socks would have to keep exercising. I'm pretty sure if I set my mind to it I could enroll a new account every day and make 150 acceptable mainspace edits with it. I could even program a bot to do it. If some of the edits are bad and get reverted or even blocked, so what? At the end of the year I control hundreds of votes, and if I'm the slightest bit careful, with SecurePoll, who's going to notice? With open voting I'd have to be rather subtle, and also cast the votes manually instead of with a bot. And JVDB, if you chose on your own initiative to edit under your real name, the resulting consequences are by your own choice. 69.228.171.150 (talk) 12:34, 17 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
I've tested the theory of editing under own name. In the real world people don't grok the wikipolitical battles. It doesn't matter what people say here; it doesn't seem to transfer over into real life. If you've got an army of socks ready to vote, please send me the names of all the accounts, along with your bank account details and several pieces of blank stationery with samples of your signature. My wealthy uncle in Nigeria will send along whatever payment you require. :) Jehochman Talk 14:16, 17 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
I've reconsidered being the real me following recent events. Then again, if I don't have the courage of conviction to stand behind what I say and do, regardless of slings and arrows, then I ultimately don't believe in my own integrity or the integrity of my position.  PЄTЄRS VЄСRUМВА ►talk  20:14, 17 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
We are volunteers here. We contribute out of altruism and as recreation. If we're required to subject ourselves to idiots hassling us at work if we make an edit they don't like, it's just not worth it. It does spill into real life. Jehochman and Peters Vecrumba might talk to Snowspinner or Katefan0 or various others about this. 69.228.171.150 (talk) 21:46, 17 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
I certainly think that people should be permitted to reply inline to, and challenge, both supports and opposes. The misguided notion that responding to comments is "badgering" is perhaps the problem; I think that as a candidate you should have felt free to respond courteously to comments questioning your qualifications. Christopher Parham (talk) 18:45, 17 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

View by Cenarium[edit]

ArbCom elections are for a group of people who is going to make binding decisions on user conduct issues. A public vote of opposition to a candidate may prejudice the candidate against the voter if elected. Users should have the right to cast their vote without fear of retaliation of prejudice in arbitration cases. Of course, discussion of candidates should also happen on-wiki, and any user can argument against a candidate, or endorse a candidate if they so wish. Agree particularly with Tznkai above - this is highly political, so most arguments for secrecy of voting from the 'real world' apply here too. Overall; secret ballot would allow more users to vote, and vote without fear, and more candidates to stand, it would be positive for the whole ArbCom process. Concerning some arguments by supporters of public voting:

  • RFA/RFB is concerned with one person being given a few additional tools and the inherited authority, not for a small group of people to make binding decisions on us; so all the argument for secret ballot are, even if still applicable for most, greatly diminished in strength. The politicization of ArbCom elections making a case for privacy of votes is also not that present for RFAs/RFBs, primarily because they are individual requests, not elections.
  • an arb may be prejudiced against a person to the point of affecting case decisions without this being noticed at all, it may not be even conscious, so it's not as simple 'as remove those who do this'
  • WP:NOT#DEMOCRACY - this is evidently true - apples and oranges actually - but it doesn't mean we shouldn't use any applicable concept that are used by democracies
  • openness/transparency: fundamental but not universal on WP. Why do we have private watchlists, why is deleted content accessible only to sysops, why do we even have oversight, the arbcom wiki is private and so on ? To respond to a legitimate need for privacy, and this is the same here, for the reasons given above.
  • consensus: we already don't use consensus for arbcom elections, so this won't change anything
  • sockpuppetry et al: everyone can see who votes, and results can be verified by those we put in charge for election oversight.
  • manipulation: it's technically unfeasible, and independent stewards can verify that the announced results are correct. Well, maybe some may say that there could still be a conspiracy in the Wikimedia foundation to rig the results....
  • comments along votes being lost: those who want to comment on a candidate can do so at the candidate's comment pages; it should definitely be made more prominent in case of private voting. Cenarium (talk) 16:18, 21 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

View by SandyGeorgia[edit]

There are unfortunate and unforeseen consequences of this RFC. The community is asking for a Committee of 18, while at the same time asking that appointments must have 50–60% support. Setting aside how unfortunate it would be if we had an ArbCom composed of members who only got 50% support, it might not be possible for these two conditions to be met simultaneously. Does the community really want a committee of 18 even if support tallies dip below 50%? Should the support numbers under a new voting system (secret) be lower than historical numbers, this is precisely the sort of situation where Jimbo should be able to exercise discretion, weigh all factors, and decide the size of the Committee. It would be most unfortunate if community demands for a large Committee resulted in appointment of candidates with marginal support. SandyGeorgia (Talk) 11:09, 23 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

I don't agree with the view that someone else needs to intervene. The community is now running the process; the community can fix it if something is wrong. The previous arrangement posed significant problems. Tony (talk) 11:28, 23 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  • The current president of the United States received 52.9% support. His predecessor received 47.9% and 50.7% respectively. Make of this what you will. Our current system of support/oppose polling rewards voters who support those they like and oppose all the rest. When there are 22 candidates for 8 spots, if each voter attempts to maximize their voting power, there should be 14 oppose votes cast per 8 support votes. This skews support percentages downward, though in practice not all voters follow this "optimal" voting strategy (optimal from the perspective of game theory). A candidate may receive oppose votes that are not based on dislike of the candidate but rather a greater liking for some other candidate. Jehochman Talk 11:29, 23 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
    • Which is, arguendo, a strong argument for preferential voting systems (or first-past-the-post approval) because you illustrate the perverse incentive of the current system: the ability to oppose was meant to allow an opportunity to say "definitely not them", not to reinforce a support vote— but that some voters are misusing it in that way means that every rational voter must do so otherwise their own votes end up "weaker".

      The net result remains "okay-ish" insofar as the most supported candidates still end up with the biggest ratios anyways, but it skews the support percentages down to the point of meaninglessness. — Coren (talk) 12:06, 23 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

      • Correct. Jehochman Talk 12:09, 23 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
        • You're right, Coren. On that basis, I'm striking my support for any minimum. The current Support/oppose system makes this inappropriate. Let's not confuse it with the typical minima required in, say, RfAs and RfBs, which have a different voting system. Tony (talk) 13:25, 23 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
The discussion above is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.
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