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==External Relations==
==External relations==


===Relations to the State of Syria===
===Relations to Syria===
{{main|Rojava–Syrian government relations}}[[File:Flag of Syrian Democratic Forces.svg|thumb|Flag of [[Syrian Democratic Forces]]]]For the time being, the relations of Rojava to the state of Syria are determined by the context of the [[Syrian Civil War]]. As for the time being, the [[Constitution of Syria]] and the [[Constitution of Rojava]] are legally incompatible with respect to legislative and executive authority. Practical interaction is pragmatic ad hoc. In the military realm, combat between the Rojava [[People's Protection Units]] (YPG) and Syrian government forces has been rare, in the most notable instances some of the territory still controlled by the Syrian government in [[Qamishli]] and [[al-Hasakah]] has been lost to the YPG. In some military campaigns, in particular in northern Aleppo governate and in al-Hasakah, there has been a tacit cooperation between the YPG and Syrian government forces against Islamist forces, the [[Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant]] (ISIL) and other.<ref>{{cite news|title=Syria’s war: Assad on the offensive|url=http://www.economist.com/news/21690203-city-was-once-syrias-largest-faces-siege-assadu2019s-grip-tightens|accessdate=2016-05-01|work=[[The Economist]]|date=2016-02-13}}</ref>
{{main|Rojava–Syrian government relations}}[[File:Flag of Syrian Democratic Forces.svg|thumb|Flag of [[Syrian Democratic Forces]]]]For the time being, the relations of Rojava to the state of Syria are determined by the context of the [[Syrian Civil War]]. As for the time being, the [[Constitution of Syria]] and the [[Constitution of Rojava]] are legally incompatible with respect to legislative and executive authority. Practical interaction is pragmatic ad hoc. In the military realm, combat between the Rojava [[People's Protection Units]] (YPG) and Syrian government forces has been rare, in the most notable instances some of the territory still controlled by the Syrian government in [[Qamishli]] and [[al-Hasakah]] has been lost to the YPG. In some military campaigns, in particular in northern Aleppo governate and in al-Hasakah, there has been a tacit cooperation between the YPG and Syrian government forces against Islamist forces, the [[Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant]] (ISIL) and other.<ref>{{cite news|title=Syria’s war: Assad on the offensive|url=http://www.economist.com/news/21690203-city-was-once-syrias-largest-faces-siege-assadu2019s-grip-tightens|accessdate=2016-05-01|work=[[The Economist]]|date=2016-02-13}}</ref>


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While the Rojava administration is not invited to the [[Geneva peace talks on Syria (2016)|Geneva III peace talks on Syria]],<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-kurds-idUSKCN0YE2NI|title=Syrian Kurds point finger at Western-backed oppositionn|publisher=Reuters|date=2016-05-23|accessdate=2016-05-24}}</ref> in particular [[Russia]], which calls for their inclusion, does to some degree carry their positions into the talks, as documented in Russia's May 2016 draft for a new constitution for Syria.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/NewsReports/567021-russia-finishes-draft-for-new-syria-constitution-report|title=Russia finishes draft for new Syria constitution|publisher=Now.MMedia/Al-Akhbar|date=2016-05-24|accessdate=2016-05-24}}</ref>
While the Rojava administration is not invited to the [[Geneva peace talks on Syria (2016)|Geneva III peace talks on Syria]],<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-kurds-idUSKCN0YE2NI|title=Syrian Kurds point finger at Western-backed oppositionn|publisher=Reuters|date=2016-05-23|accessdate=2016-05-24}}</ref> in particular [[Russia]], which calls for their inclusion, does to some degree carry their positions into the talks, as documented in Russia's May 2016 draft for a new constitution for Syria.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/NewsReports/567021-russia-finishes-draft-for-new-syria-constitution-report|title=Russia finishes draft for new Syria constitution|publisher=Now.MMedia/Al-Akhbar|date=2016-05-24|accessdate=2016-05-24}}</ref>


===Rojava Revolution as a transnational topic===
===Rojava as a transnational topic===
{{See also|Libertarian socialism|Communalism}}
{{See also|Libertarian socialism|Communalism}}The socio-political transformations of the "Rojava Revolution" have inspired much attention in international media, both in mainstream media<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/29/magazine/a-dream-of-utopia-in-hell.html|title=A Dream of Secular Utopia in ISIS’ Backyard|publisher=New York Times|date=2015-11-24|accessdate=2016-05-20}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/30/opinion/the-kurds-democratic-experiment.html|title=The Kurds’ Democratic Experiment|publisher=New York Times|date=2015-09-30|accessdate=2016-05-20}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/oct/08/why-world-ignoring-revolutionary-kurds-syria-isis|title=Why is the world ignoring the revolutionary Kurds in Syria?|publisher=The Guardian|date=2014-10-08|accessdate=2016-05-20}}</ref> and in dedicated [[Progressivism|progressive leftist]] media.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/2015/11/25/rojava_is_a_radical_experiment_in_democracy_in_northern_syria_american_leftists.html|title=American Leftists Need to Pay More Attention to Rojava|publisher=Slate|date=2015-11-25|accessdate=2016-05-20}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.dissentmagazine.org/online_articles/the-revolution-in-rojava|title=The Revolution in Rojava|publisher=Dissent|date=2015-04-22|accessdate=2016-05-20}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.opendemocracy.net/arab-awakening/evangelos-aretaios/rojava-revolution|title=The Rojava revolution|publisher=OpenDemocracy|date=2015-03-15|accessdate=2016-05-20}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://new-compass.net/articles/statement-academic-delegation-rojava|title=Statement from the Academic Delegation to Rojava|publisher=New Compass|date=2015-01-15|accessdate=2016-05-20}}</ref>
The socio-political transformations of the "Rojava Revolution" have inspired much attention in international media, both in mainstream media<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/29/magazine/a-dream-of-utopia-in-hell.html|title=A Dream of Secular Utopia in ISIS’ Backyard|publisher=New York Times|date=2015-11-24|accessdate=2016-05-20}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/30/opinion/the-kurds-democratic-experiment.html|title=The Kurds’ Democratic Experiment|publisher=New York Times|date=2015-09-30|accessdate=2016-05-20}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/oct/08/why-world-ignoring-revolutionary-kurds-syria-isis|title=Why is the world ignoring the revolutionary Kurds in Syria?|publisher=The Guardian|date=2014-10-08|accessdate=2016-05-20}}</ref> and in dedicated [[Progressivism|progressive leftist]] media.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/2015/11/25/rojava_is_a_radical_experiment_in_democracy_in_northern_syria_american_leftists.html|title=American Leftists Need to Pay More Attention to Rojava|publisher=Slate|date=2015-11-25|accessdate=2016-05-20}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.dissentmagazine.org/online_articles/the-revolution-in-rojava|title=The Revolution in Rojava|publisher=Dissent|date=2015-04-22|accessdate=2016-05-20}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.opendemocracy.net/arab-awakening/evangelos-aretaios/rojava-revolution|title=The Rojava revolution|publisher=OpenDemocracy|date=2015-03-15|accessdate=2016-05-20}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://new-compass.net/articles/statement-academic-delegation-rojava|title=Statement from the Academic Delegation to Rojava|publisher=New Compass|date=2015-01-15|accessdate=2016-05-20}}</ref>


The "Rojava Revolution" in its diverse aspects is a hotly debated topic in libertarian socialist and communalist as well as generally anti-capitalist circles worldwide.{{#tag:ref|Diverse aspects of the Rojava revolution have led some anti-capitalists to criticise the revolution for not going far enough e.g. [https://libcom.org/news/anarchist-federation-statement-rojava-december-2014-02122014 'Anarchist Federation statement on the Rojava revolution']; Gilles Dauve, [http://www.troploin.fr/node/83 'Rojava: reality and rhetoric']; Alex de Jong, [http://www.internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article3914 'Stalinist caterpillar into libertarian butterfly? - the evolving ideology of the PKK']; Anti War, [https://libcom.org/library/%E2%80%98i-have-seen-future-it-works%E2%80%99-%E2%80%93-critical-questions-supporters-rojava-revolution '‘I have seen the future and it works.’ – Critical questions for supporters of the Rojava revolution'], [https://libcom.org/library/grim-reality-rojava-revolution-anarchist-eyewitness 'The grim reality of the Rojava Revolution - from an anarchist eyewitness'] and Devrim Valerian, [https://libcom.org/blog/bloodbath-syria-class-war-or-ethnic-war-03112014 'The bloodbath in Syria: class war or ethnic war?']. Other anti-capitalists have been significantly less critical e.g. David Graeber, [https://libcom.org/forums/news/no-genuine-revolution-interview-graeber-evrensel-newspaper-29122014 'No. This is a Genuine Revolution']; Janet Biehl, [http://www.biehlonbookchin.com/poor-in-means/ 'Poor in means but rich in spirit'], [http://www.crimethinc.com/blog/2015/10/22/from-germany-to-bakur/ 'From Germany to Bakur'] and the [https://libcom.org/tags/kurdistan-anarchist-forum Kurdistan Anarchist Forum]|group=note}}
The "Rojava Revolution" in its diverse aspects is a hotly debated topic in libertarian socialist and communalist as well as generally anti-capitalist circles worldwide.{{#tag:ref|Diverse aspects of the Rojava revolution have led some anti-capitalists to criticise the revolution for not going far enough e.g. [https://libcom.org/news/anarchist-federation-statement-rojava-december-2014-02122014 'Anarchist Federation statement on the Rojava revolution']; Gilles Dauve, [http://www.troploin.fr/node/83 'Rojava: reality and rhetoric']; Alex de Jong, [http://www.internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article3914 'Stalinist caterpillar into libertarian butterfly? - the evolving ideology of the PKK']; Anti War, [https://libcom.org/library/%E2%80%98i-have-seen-future-it-works%E2%80%99-%E2%80%93-critical-questions-supporters-rojava-revolution '‘I have seen the future and it works.’ – Critical questions for supporters of the Rojava revolution'], [https://libcom.org/library/grim-reality-rojava-revolution-anarchist-eyewitness 'The grim reality of the Rojava Revolution - from an anarchist eyewitness'] and Devrim Valerian, [https://libcom.org/blog/bloodbath-syria-class-war-or-ethnic-war-03112014 'The bloodbath in Syria: class war or ethnic war?']. Other anti-capitalists have been significantly less critical e.g. David Graeber, [https://libcom.org/forums/news/no-genuine-revolution-interview-graeber-evrensel-newspaper-29122014 'No. This is a Genuine Revolution']; Janet Biehl, [http://www.biehlonbookchin.com/poor-in-means/ 'Poor in means but rich in spirit'], [http://www.crimethinc.com/blog/2015/10/22/from-germany-to-bakur/ 'From Germany to Bakur'] and the [https://libcom.org/tags/kurdistan-anarchist-forum Kurdistan Anarchist Forum]|group=note}}


===Rojava in transnational Kurdish issues===
===Kurdish question===
{{See also|Kurdistan}}[[File:Kurdish-inhabited area by CIA (1992).jpg|thumb|Kurdish-inhabited areas in 1992 according to the [[CIA]]]]Rojava's dominant political party, the [[Democratic Union Party (Syria)|Democratic Union Party]] (PYD), is a member organisation of the [[Group of Communities in Kurdistan]] (KCK) organisation. As KCK member organisations in the neighbouring states with autochthonous Kurdish minorities are either outlawed (Turkey, Iran) or politically marginal with respect to other Kurdish parties (Iraq), PYD-governed Rojava has acquired the role of a model for the KCK political agenda and blueprint in general.
{{See also|Kurdistan}} [[File:Kurdish-inhabited area by CIA (1992).jpg|thumb|Kurdish-inhabited areas in 1992 according to the [[CIA]]]]
Rojava's dominant political party, the [[Democratic Union Party (Syria)|Democratic Union Party]] (PYD), is a member organisation of the [[Group of Communities in Kurdistan]] (KCK) organisation. As KCK member organisations in the neighbouring states with autochthonous Kurdish minorities are either outlawed (Turkey, Iran) or politically marginal with respect to other Kurdish parties (Iraq), PYD-governed Rojava has acquired the role of a model for the KCK political agenda and blueprint in general.


There is much sympathy for Rojava in particular among [[Kurds in Turkey]]. During the [[Siege of Kobanî]], a large number of ethnic Kurdish citizens of Turkey crossed the border and volunteered in the defence of the town. Some of these upon their return to Turkey took up arms in the [[Kurdish–Turkish conflict (1978–present)|Kurdish–Turkish conflict]], where skills acquired by them during combat in Kobanî brought a new quality of urban warfare to the conflict in Turkey.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/09/turkey-kurds-pkk-daglica-war-be-sustained-bloody-day.html|title=6 reasons why Turkey's war against the PKK won't last|publisher=Al-Monitor|date=2015-09-08|accessdate=2016-05-20}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://warontherocks.com/2016/03/kurdish-militants-and-turkeys-new-urban-insurgency/|title=Kurdish Militants and Turkey’s New Urban Insurgency|publisher=War On The Rocks|date=2016-03-23|accessdate=2016-05-20}}</ref>
There is much sympathy for Rojava in particular among [[Kurds in Turkey]]. During the [[Siege of Kobanî]], a large number of ethnic Kurdish citizens of Turkey crossed the border and volunteered in the defence of the town. Some of these upon their return to Turkey took up arms in the [[Kurdish–Turkish conflict (1978–present)|Kurdish–Turkish conflict]], where skills acquired by them during combat in Kobanî brought a new quality of urban warfare to the conflict in Turkey.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/09/turkey-kurds-pkk-daglica-war-be-sustained-bloody-day.html|title=6 reasons why Turkey's war against the PKK won't last|publisher=Al-Monitor|date=2015-09-08|accessdate=2016-05-20}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://warontherocks.com/2016/03/kurdish-militants-and-turkeys-new-urban-insurgency/|title=Kurdish Militants and Turkey’s New Urban Insurgency|publisher=War On The Rocks|date=2016-03-23|accessdate=2016-05-20}}</ref>
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The relationship of Rojava with the [[Kurdistan Regional Government]] in Iraq is complicated. One context being that the governing party there, the [[Kurdistan Democratic Party]] (KDP), views itself and its affiliated Kurdish parties in other countries as a more conservative and nationalist alternative and competitor to the KCK political agenda and blueprint in general.<ref name="MiddleEastEye"/>
The relationship of Rojava with the [[Kurdistan Regional Government]] in Iraq is complicated. One context being that the governing party there, the [[Kurdistan Democratic Party]] (KDP), views itself and its affiliated Kurdish parties in other countries as a more conservative and nationalist alternative and competitor to the KCK political agenda and blueprint in general.<ref name="MiddleEastEye"/>


===International relations===
===Relations to Foreign States===
{{main|Foreign relations of Rojava}}
{{main|Foreign relations of Rojava}}
[[Turkey]] has been strictly hostile towards Rojava, fearing that its emergence fuels activism for autonomy or separatism among [[Kurds in Turkey]] and the [[Kurdish–Turkish conflict (1978–present)|Kurdish–Turkish conflict]]. It claims the Rojava [[People's Protection Units|YPG]] militia were identical to the [[PKK]] (a Turkey-based member organisation of the KCK), which is considered a terrorist organisation by Turkey (and also the [[EU|European Union]], the [[USA]], [[NATO]], [[Canada]] and [[Australia]], but not by the [[United Nations]], [[Russia]], [[China]] and [[Switzerland]]). However, the European Union, the USA and NATO do not consider the YPG a terrorist organization and cooperate with them in the fight against the [[Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant]] (ISIL).<ref name=YpgState>{{cite web|title=U.S. says YPG not a terrorist organization|url=http://aranews.net/2015/09/u-s-says-ypg-not-a-terrorist-organization/|website=ARA news|accessdate=22 November 2015}}</ref> Rojava and YPG leaders insist that the PKK is a separate organization.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/29/world/us-newest-allies-syrian-kurds/index.html|title=Meet America's newest allies: Syria's Kurdish minority|last=CNN|first=Ivan Watson and Gul Tuysuz|website=CNN|access-date=2016-05-22}}</ref> In 2014 Turkey was accused of supporting ISIL in attacks on Rojava, allowing them to conduct attacks from the Turkish side of the border and providing logistical support.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-l-phillips/research-paper-isis-turke_b_6128950.html?utm_hp_ref=tw|title=Research Paper: ISIS-Turkey List|work=The Huffington Post|accessdate=18 February 2015}}</ref> Various Western counrtries have faced strategic and public opinion incentives to cooperate with Rojava, for example In January 2015, a [[UK|United Kingdom]] parliament committee asked the government to explain and justify its policy of not working with the Rojava military to combat ISIL.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/foreign-affairs-committee/news/report-kurdistan-region/|title=Build Kurdistan relationship or risk losing vital Middle East partner - News from Parliament|website=UK Parliament|access-date=2016-05-22}}</ref> [[France]] has also been publicly supportive of Rojava.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/02/turkey-france-kurdish-guerillas-elysee.html#|title=Hollande-PYD meeting challenges Erdogan|accessdate=7 August 2015}}</ref> In the arena of international diplomacy, the power most ostentatiously supportive of Rojava has been [[Russia]].
[[Turkey]] has been strictly hostile towards Rojava, fearing that its emergence fuels activism for autonomy or separatism among [[Kurds in Turkey]] and the [[Kurdish–Turkish conflict (1978–present)|Kurdish–Turkish conflict]]. It claims the Rojava [[People's Protection Units|YPG]] militia were identical to the [[PKK]] (a Turkey-based member organisation of the KCK), which is considered a terrorist organisation by Turkey (and also the [[EU|European Union]], the [[USA]], [[NATO]], [[Canada]] and [[Australia]], but not by the [[United Nations]], [[Russia]], [[China]] and [[Switzerland]]). However, the European Union, the USA and NATO do not consider the YPG a terrorist organization and cooperate with them in the fight against the [[Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant]] (ISIL).<ref name=YpgState>{{cite web|title=U.S. says YPG not a terrorist organization|url=http://aranews.net/2015/09/u-s-says-ypg-not-a-terrorist-organization/|website=ARA news|accessdate=22 November 2015}}</ref> Rojava and YPG leaders insist that the PKK is a separate organization.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/29/world/us-newest-allies-syrian-kurds/index.html|title=Meet America's newest allies: Syria's Kurdish minority|last=CNN|first=Ivan Watson and Gul Tuysuz|website=CNN|access-date=2016-05-22}}</ref> In 2014 Turkey was accused of supporting ISIL in attacks on Rojava, allowing them to conduct attacks from the Turkish side of the border and providing logistical support.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-l-phillips/research-paper-isis-turke_b_6128950.html?utm_hp_ref=tw|title=Research Paper: ISIS-Turkey List|work=The Huffington Post|accessdate=18 February 2015}}</ref> Various Western counrtries have faced strategic and public opinion incentives to cooperate with Rojava, for example In January 2015, a [[UK|United Kingdom]] parliament committee asked the government to explain and justify its policy of not working with the Rojava military to combat ISIL.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/foreign-affairs-committee/news/report-kurdistan-region/|title=Build Kurdistan relationship or risk losing vital Middle East partner - News from Parliament|website=UK Parliament|access-date=2016-05-22}}</ref> [[France]] has also been publicly supportive of Rojava.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/02/turkey-france-kurdish-guerillas-elysee.html#|title=Hollande-PYD meeting challenges Erdogan|accessdate=7 August 2015}}</ref> In the arena of international diplomacy, the power most ostentatiously supportive of Rojava has been [[Russia]].

Revision as of 21:24, 5 June 2016

Federation of Northern Syria – Rojava
اتحاد شمال سوريا و روج آفا
Federasyona Bakurê Sûriyê – Rojava
  De facto territory claimed by Rojava and controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces
  Claimed territory of Rojava not currently under control of the SDF
StatusDe facto autonomous federation of Syria
CapitalQamişlo (Qamishli)[1][2]
Official languagesKurdish
Arabic[3]
Syriac-Aramaic
GovernmentDirect Democracy (Democratic confederalist)[4][5][6][7][8][9]
• Co-President
Hediya Yousef[10]
• Co-President
Mansur Selum[10]
Autonomous region
• Autonomy proposed
July 2013
• Autonomy declared
November 2013
• Regional government established
November 2013
• Interim constitution adopted
January 2014
• Federation Declared
17 March 2016
Population
• 2014 estimate
4.6 million (half of them internal refugees)[11][12][13]
CurrencySyrian pound (SYP)
Time zoneUTC+2 (EET)
Drives onright

Rojava (IPA: [roʒɑːˈvɑ], "the West"), also known as Syrian Kurdistan, Western Kurdistan (Kurdish: ڕۆژاڤای کوردستان, Rojavayê Kurdistanê), is a de facto autonomous region originating in three self-governing cantons in northern Syria. Rojava is formed of most of Al-Hasakah Governorate, northern parts of Al-Raqqah Governorate and northern parts of Aleppo Governorate.

The region gained its autonomy in November 2013, as part of the ongoing Rojava conflict, establishing a society based on principles of direct democracy, gender equality, and sustainability.[14] Rojava consists of the three cantons of (from east to west) Jazira, Kobani, and Afrin.[15] It is unrecognized as autonomous by the government of Syria[16] and is a participant in the Syrian Civil War.[17] On 16 March 2016, the de facto administration of Rojava declared the establishment of a federal system of government as the Federation of Northern Syria – Rojava ([Federasyona Bakurê Sûriyê – Rojava] Error: {{Lang-xx}}: text has italic markup (help)).[18][19][20]

Nationalist Kurds generally consider Rojava to be one of the four parts of a greater Kurdistan, which also includes parts of eastern and southeastern Turkey (Northern Kurdistan), northern Iraq (Southern Kurdistan), and northwestern Iran (Eastern Kurdistan).[21] However, Rojavan government and society is polyethnic.[22]

Name

Rojava (rojava, "west"), is the short name of the Kurdish name West Kurdistan (Kurdish: Rojavayê Kurdistanê)[23][24] It is also known as Syrian Kurdistan and Kurdistan under the line/border (Kurdistana Binxetê; simply Binxet (IPA: [bɪnxɛt]), "Underline"; bin "under" + xet "line").[25]

Geography

Rojava lies to the west of the River Tigris along the Turkish border. There are four cantons: Jazira Canton, Kobani Canton, Shahba Canton and separately Afrin Canton. Jazira Canton also borders Iraqi Kurdistan to the southeast. Other borders are disputed in the Syrian Civil War. All cantons are at latitude approximately 36 and a half degrees north. They are relatively flat except for the Kurd Mountains in Afrin Canton.

Historical background

One of the oldest historic sites in thie area is Tell Halaf. It is an archaeological site in the Al Hasakah governorate of northeastern Syria, near the Turkish border, just opposite Ceylanpınar. It was the first find of a Neolithic culture, subsequently dubbed the Halaf culture, characterized by glazed pottery painted with geometric and animal designs. The site dates to the 6th millennium BCE and it is the location of the Aramean city-state of Guzana or Gozan in the 10th century BCE.

The Kurd Mountains were already Kurdish-inhabited when the Crusades broke out at the end of the 11th century.[26] According to René Dussaud, the region of Kurd-Dagh and the plain near Antioch were settled by Kurds since antiquity.[27][28]

Ottoman period

During the Ottoman period (1299–1922), large Kurmanji-speaking Kurdish tribal groups both settled in and were deported to areas of northern Syria from Anatolia. The largest of these tribal groups was the Reshwan confederation, which was initially based in the Adiyaman region but eventually also settled throughout Anatolia. The Milli confederation, which was documented in Ottoman sources from the year 1518 onward, was the most powerful tribal group and dominated the entire northern Syrian steppe in the second half of the 18th century. Their influence continued to rise and eventually their leader Timur was appointed Ottoman governor of Raqqa (1800-1803).[29][30] The Kurdish dynasty of Janbulads ruled the region of Aleppo as governors for the Ottomans from 1591 to 1607 and were allied with the Medici of Tuscany.[31] At the beginning of the 17th century, districts of Jarabulus and Seruj on the left bank of the Euphrates had been settled by Kurds.[32]

The Danish writer Carsten Niebuhr who traveled to Jazira in 1764 recorded five nomadic Kurdish tribes (Dukurie, Kikie, Schechchanie, Mullie and Aschetie) and one Arab tribe. According to Niebuhr, those tribes were settled near Mardin in Turkey, and paid the governor of that city for the right of grazing their herds in the Syrian Jazira.[26][33] These Kurdish tribes gradually settled in villages and cities and are still present in Jazira (modern Syria's Hasakah Governorate).[34]

The Ottoman province of Diyarbekir, which included parts of modern-day northern Syria, was called Eyalet-i Kurdistan during the Tanzimat reforms period (1839-1867).[35] Until the 19th century, Kurdistan did not include the lands of Syrian Jazira in some books.[note 1][36] The Treaty of Sèvres' putative Kurdistan did not include any part of today's Syria.[37]

According to McDowall, Kurds slightly outnumbered Arabs in Jazira in 1918.[38] The demographics of Northern Syria saw a huge shift in the early part of the 20th century when the Ottoman Empire (Turks) conducted ethnic cleansing of its Christian populations and some Kurdish tribes joined in the atrocities committed against the Arameans.[39][40][41] Many Assyrians fled to Syria during the genocide and settled mainly in the Jazira area.[42][42][43][44]

The Arameans of Nusaybin crossed the border into Syria and settled in Qamishli, which was separated by the railway (new border) from Turkey. Nusaybin became Kurdish and Qamishli became an Aramaic city.[45]

French Mandate Period

Things soon changed, however, with the immigration of Kurds beginning in 1926 following the failure of the Sheikh Said rebellion against the Turkish authorities.[46] While many of the Kurds in Syria have been there for centuries, waves of Kurds fled their homes in Turkey and settled in Syria, where they were granted citizenship by the French mandate authorities.[47] This large influx of Kurds moved to Syria’s Jazira province. It is estimated that 25,000 Kurds fled at this time to Syria.[48]

In the late 1930s a small but vigorous separatist movement emerged in Qamishli. With some support from French Mandate officials, the movement actively lobbied for autonomy direct under French rule and separation from Syria on the ground that majority of the inhabitants were not Arabs. Syrian nationalists saw the movement as a profound threat to their eventual rule. The Syrian nationalists allied with local Arab Shammal tribal leader and Kurdish tribes. They together attacked the Christian movement in many towns and villages. Local Kurdish tribes who were allies of Shammal tribal sacked and burned Assyrian town of Amuda.[49][50][51] In 1941, the Aramaic community of al-Malikiyah was subjected to a vicious assault. Even though the assault failed, Arameans felt threatened and left in large numbers, and the immigration of Kurds from Turkey to the area converted al-Malikiya, al-Darbasiyah and Amuda to Kurdish-majority cities.

According to the French report to the League of Nations in 1937, the population of Jazira consisted of 82,000 Kurdish villagers, 42,000 Muslim Arab pastoralists, and 32,000 Christian town dwellers.[52]

Between 1932 and 1939, a Kurdish-Christian autonomy movement emerged in Jazira. The demands of the movement were autonomous status similar to the Sanjak of Alexandretta, the protection of French troops, promotion of Kurdish language in schools and hiring of Kurdish officials. The movement was led by Michel Dome, mayor of Qamishli, Hanna Hebe, general vicar for the Syriac-Catholic Patriarch of Jazira, and the Kurdish notable Hajo Agha. Some Arab tribes supported the autonomists while others sided with the central government. In the legislative elections of 1936, autonomist candidates won all the parliamentary seats in Jazira and Jarablus, while the nationalist Arab movement known as the National Bloc won the elections in the rest of Syria. After victory, the National Bloc pursued an aggressive policy toward the autonomists. The Jazira governor appointed by Damascus intended to disarm the population and encourage the settlement of Arab farmers from Aleppo, Homs and Hama in Jazira.[53] In July 1937, armed conflict broke out between the Syrian police and the supporters of the movement. As a result, the governor and a significant portion of the police force fled the region and the rebels established local autonomous administration in Jazira. [54] In August 1937 a number of Christians in Amuda were killed by a pro-Damascus Kurdish chief.[55] In September 1938, Hajo Agha chaired a general conference in Jazira and appealed to France for self-government.[56] The new French High Commissioner, Gabriel Puaux, dissolved parliament and created autonomous administrations for Jabal Druze, Latakia and Jazira in 1939 which lasted until 1943.[57]

Modern period

Rojava under Syrian rule had little investment or development from the central government. Laws discriminated against Kurds from owning property, and many were without citizenship. Property was routinely confiscated by government loansharks. There were no high schools, and Kurdish language education in middle schools was forbidden, compromising Kurdish students' education. Hospitals lacked equipment for advanced treatment and instead patients had to be transferred outside Rojava.[58]

According to Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and Human Rights Watch, successive Syrian governments continued to adopt a policy of ethnic discrimination and national persecution against Kurds, completely depriving them of their national, democratic and human rights. Syrian governments imposed ethnically-based programs, regulations and exclusionary measures on various aspects of Kurds’ lives – political, economic, social and cultural – among which are the following:[59][60]

  • 1958: The Baath party integrated[dubiousdiscuss] Syria with Egypt in the United Arab Republic (UAR). As a result, recordings of Kurdish music were smashed in cafes and the publication and even possession of Kurdish books were offences punishable by imprisonment. Also Egyptian teachers were sent into Kurdish regions.[61][62]
  • Between 1946 and 1957, the Kurds in Syria had no political organization. The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Syria (KDPS) was founded in 1957. In 1960, the leaders were arrested and tortured. Finally, more than 5000 associated people were arrested.[61][62]
  • Kurds in Syria were also victims of racist propaganda of the Arab media. One campaign launched by the Arab media sported slogans such as 'Save Arabism from Jazira' or 'Fight the Kurdish Menace'.[citation needed][when?]
  • 1960: The inhabitants of Amuda (a Kurdish town) accused the authorities of causing a fire in a movie house that caused the death of 283 Kurdish children. The perpetrators were presumably motivated by anti-Kurdish sentiments.[61][62]
  • In the 1960s, Syrian authorities planned to change the original Kurdish names of scores of villages in Hasakeh governorate in the northeast and in the Kurdish area in the Kurd Mountains, in the northwest near Afrin in the governorate of Aleppo, and began to implement it in the 1970s. In Afrin the names of all Kurdish villages were changed to Arabic. Some of the names which were changed to Arabic are: Kobaniya (now Ain al-Arab), Girdeem (Sa`diyya), Chilara (Jowadiyya), Derunakoling (Deir Ayoub), and BaniQasri (Ain Khadra).[60]
  • Kurdish language remained forbidden and the public school became for the Kurds a place of Arabization. According to "Syria's Kurds: History, Politics and Society" by Dr. Jordi Tejel, "with the increase in literate children in the Kurdish regions, a tight surveillance system was established there, following the example of the Turks, by means of 'spies,' to stop the children from speaking Kurdish among themselves. Children discovered in flagrant 'defiance' could be physically punished."[61][62]
  • In 1962 the Syrian authorities in Hasaka randomly stripped tens of thousands of Kurdish families (more than 120,000 Kurds[63]) of their Syrian nationality. A census was implemented exclusively in Hasaka province for a period of just 24 hours only, and as a result tens of thousands of Syrian citizens of Kurdish origins lost their nationality and found themselves deprived of their citizenship. The census prevented all those affected by it from exercising all the natural rights that are based on citizenship – civil, social, political, cultural and economic – from exercising their right to work, to employment, to education, travel, the right to own a property and use agricultural land and from living normal lives.[59][60]
  • In 1967, all references to Kurds in Syria were removed from geography curriculum books, and many Kurdish citizens were subject to pressure from the staff of the Civil Registry Departments to not give their children Kurdish names.[59][60]
  • In 1973 in the province of Hasaka, the Syrian authorities confiscated an area of fertile agricultural land owned and cultivated by tens of thousands of Kurdish citizens and gave it to Arab families brought in from the provinces of Aleppo and Ar-Raqqa. The National Leadership Bureau of the ruling Baath Party issued orders to establish 41 settlement centers in these areas, in order to change the demographic composition of these areas by evicting and displacing the Kurdish inhabitants. In 2007, Syrian authorities in the Agricultural Association in Malikiyah, Hasaka province, signed contracts granting 150 Arab families from the Shaddadi region, Hasaka province, about six thousand square kilometers in Malikiyah. At the same time, it evicted tens of thousands of Kurdish people from these villages, and forced them to move to other areas inside and outside of Syria in search of a decent living.[59][60]
  • In 1986, the governor of Hasaka issued a decree which prohibited the use of the Kurdish language in the workplace. In 1989, the governor of Hasaka, Mohammed Mustafa Miro, issued another decree to re-confirm this ban on speaking Kurdish and added to it a prohibition on non-Arabic songs at weddings and holidays.[59][60]

History

Military situation in the Syrian Civil War as of January 2024.
  Controlled by Syrian Arab Republic
  Controlled by Syrian Salvation Government (HTS)
  Controlled by the Islamic State (IS)

(For a more detailed, interactive map, see Template:Syrian Civil War detailed map.)

During the Syrian Civil War, Syrian government forces withdrew from three Kurdish enclaves, leaving control to local militias in 2012. Because of the war, People's Protection Units (YPG) were created by the Kurdish Supreme Committee to defend the Kurdish-inhabited areas in Syria. In July 2012 the YPG established control in the towns of Kobanî, Amuda and Afrin.[64] The two main Kurdish groups, the Kurdish National Council (KNC) and the Democratic Union Party (PYD), afterwards formed a joint leadership council to administer the towns.[64][dead link] Later that month the cities of Al-Malikiyah (Dêrika Hemko), Ra's al-'Ayn (Serê Kaniyê), Al-Darbasiyah (Dirbêsî), and Al-Maabadah (Girkê Legê) also came under the control of the People's Protection Units.

The only major Kurdish-majority cities that remained under government control were Al-Hasaka and Qamishli,[65][66] although parts of both soon also came under the control of the YPG.

In July 2013, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) began to forcibly displace Kurdish civilians from towns in Ar-Raqqah governorate. After demanding that all Kurds leave Tell Abyad or else be killed, thousands of civilians, including Turkmen and Arab families, fled on 21 July. Its fighters looted and destroyed the property of Kurds, and in some cases, resettled displaced Arab Sunni families from the Qalamoun area (Rif Damascus), Dayr Az-Zawr and Ar-Raqqah, in abandoned Kurdish homes. A similar pattern was documented in Tel Arab and Tal Hassel in July 2013. As ISIL consolidated its authority in Ar-Raqqah, Kurdish civilians were forcibly displaced from Tel Akhader, and Kobanî in March and September 2014, respectively.[67]

Map of the territory changes during the YPG-led Northern Syria offensive (2015)

In 2014, Kobanî was besieged by ISIL and later liberated by YPG forces and the Free Syrian Army cooperating as Euphrates Volcano, with air support from United States-led airstrikes.

In January 2015, the YPG fought against Syrian regime forces in Hassakeh,[68] and clashed with those stationed in Qamishli in June 2015.[69] After the latter clashes, Nasir Haj Mansour, a Kurdish official in the northeast stated "The regime will with time get weaker ... I do not imagine the regime will be able to strengthen its position".[70]

On 13 October 2015, Amnesty International accused YPG of demolishing homes of village residents and forcing them out of areas under Kurdish control.[71] According to Amnesty International, some displaced people said that the YPG has targeted their villages on the pretext of supporting ISIL; some villagers revealed the existence of a small minority that might have sympathized with the group.[71][72] The YPG also threatened the villagers with US coalition airstrikes if they failed to leave. The village of Husseiniya was completely razed to the ground leaving 14 out of 225 houses standing.[71]

The YPG seized the Menagh military airbase and the Sunni Arab town of Tal Rifaat and announced that they had been given Kurdish names.[73]

On 17 March 2016, at a conference in Rmeilan, Syrian Turkmen, Arab, Christian and Kurdish officials declared the establishment the Federation of Northern Syria - Rojava in the areas they controlled in Northern Syria which would encompass ethnic minority groups. The conference was led in large part by the Kurdish PYD Party.[74] Though officials reaffirmed they would not support dividing Syria, the declaration was quickly renounced by both the Syrian Government and oppositional Syrian National Coalition.[19]

Politics

The four cantons of Rojava: Efrîn (orange), Kobanê (red), Shahba Canton and Cizîrê (green).

The Kurdish Supreme Committee (Desteya Bilind a Kurd, DBK) was established by the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the Kurdish National Council (KNC) as the governing body of Rojava in July 2012.[75] The member board consists of an equal number of PYD and KNC members.[76] In November 2013, the PYD announced an interim government divided into three non-contiguous autonomous areas or cantons, Afrin, Jazira and Kobani.[77]

The political system of Rojava is inspired by democratic confederalism and communalism. It is influenced by anarchist and libertarian principles, and is considered by many a type of libertarian socialism.[78] The basic unit at the local level is the community which pools resources for education, protection and governance. At a national level communities are unrestricted in deciding their own economic decisions on how they wish to sell to and how resources are allocated. There is a broad push for social reform, gender equality and ecological stabilization in the region.[79]

Political writer David Romano describes it as pursuing "a bottom-up, Athenian-style direct form of democratic governance". He contrasts the local communities taking on responsibility versus the strong central governments favoured by many states. In this model, states become less relevant and people govern through councils.[80] Rojava divides itself into regional administrations called cantons named after the Swiss cantons.[81]

Local administration

The governance model of Rojava has an emphasis on local management, with regions divided into cantons with democratically elected committees to make decisions. The Movement for a Democratic Society (also known as TEV-DEM) is the political coalition governing Rojava.

Its programme immediately aimed to be "very inclusive" and people from a range of different backgrounds became involved, including Kurds, Arabs, Assyrians, and Turkmen & Yazidis (from Muslim, Christian, and Yazidi religious groups). It sought to "establish a variety of groups, committees and communes on the streets in neighborhoods, villages, counties and small and big towns everywhere". The purpose of these groups was to meet "every week to talk about the problems people face where they live". The representatives of the different community groups meet 'in the main group in the villages or towns called the "House of the People"'.

According to Zaher Baher of the Haringey Solidarity Group, the TEV-DEM has been "the most successful organ" in Rojava because it has the "determination and power" to change things, it includes many people who "believe in working voluntarily at all levels of service to make the event/experiment successful", and it has "set up an army of defence consisting of three different parts" - the YPG (a "mixed force of men and women that exists in the towns and all the checkpoints outside the towns to protect civilians from any external threat"), the YPJ ("a special unit for women only, to deal with issues of rape and domestic violence"[82] along with national defense), and the Asayish which is a democratically elected police force.

Government

Alongside TEV-DEM there is the Kurdish Supreme Committee, the interim governing body of Rojava which consists of an equal number of Democratic Union Party (PYD) and Kurdish National Council (KNC) members, and a smaller number of Syriac Union Party (Syria) members.[76] This council is mainly concerned with external affairs.

There are no plans for independence from Syria, but for self-administration and control of local resources.[83]

Elections for a new government were planned to be held before the end of 2014,[84] but this was postponed due to fighting. Local elections were eventually held in March 2015.

There are 20 ministries dealing with the economy, agriculture, natural resources, and foreign affairs.[84] Among other stipulations outlined is a quota of 40% for women’s participation in government, as well as another quota for youth. In connection with a decision to introduce affirmative action for ethnic minorities, all governmental organizations and offices are based on a co-presidential system.[85]

Education

Under the Baath-Regime, school education consisted of only Arabic language public schools, supplemented by Assyrian private confessional schools.[86] The Rojava administration in 2015 introduced primary education in native language either Kurdish or Arabic and secondary education mandatory bilingual in Kurdish and Arabic for public schools, with English as a mandatory third language.[87][88][89] There are ongoing disagreements and negotiations over curricula with the Syrian central government, which generally still pays the teachers in public schools.[90][91] For Assyrian private confessional schools there have been no changes, other than a newfound interest of Kurdish and Arab parents to send their children there.[92]

There was no institution of tertiary education on the territory of Rojava before the Syrian Civil War.[93] In September 2014, the Mesopotamian Social Sciences Academy in Qamishli started teaching.[94] Further such academies designed under a libertarian socialist academic philosophy and concept are in the process of founding or planning.[95] In August 2015, the traditionally designed University of Afrin in Afrin started teaching, with initial programs in literature, engineering and economics, including institutes for medicine, topographic engineering, music and theater, business administration and the Kurdish language.[96]

Economy

Development of the Rojava Economy

The autonomous administration is supporting efforts for workers to form cooperatives, such as this sewing cooperative in Derik.

In 2012, the PYD launched what it originally called the Social Economy Plan, later renamed the People’s Economy Plan (PEP). The PEP's policies are based primarily on the work of Abdullah Öcalan and ultimately seek to move beyond capitalism in favor of democratic confederalism.[97]

Private property and entrepreneurship are protected under the principle of "ownership by use", although accountable to the democratic will of locally organized councils. Dr Dara Kurdaxi, a Rojavan economist, has said that: "The method in Rojava is not so much against private property, but rather has the goal of putting private property in the service of all the peoples who live in Rojava."[98]

The private sector is comparatively small, with the focus being on expanding social ownership of production and management of resources through communes and collectives. Several hundred instances of collectivization have occurred across towns and villages in all four cantons, with each commune consisting of approximately 20-35 people.[99] According to the Ministry of Economics, approximately three quarters of all property has been placed under community ownership and a third of production has been transferred to direct management by workers councils.[100]

There are also no taxes on the people or businesses in Rojava. Instead money is raised through border crossings, and selling oil or other natural resources.[101][102] In May 2016, The Wall Street Journal reported that traders in Syria experience Rojava as "the one place where they aren’t forced to pay bribes.".[103]

Price controls are managed by democratic committees per canton, which can set the price of basic goods such as for food and medical goods. This mechanism can also be used for managing public production to, for instance, produce more wheat to keep prices low for important goods.[102]

The economy of Rojava has on average experienced less destruction in the Syrian Civil War than other parts of Syria, and masters the challenges of the circumstances comparatively well. In May 2016, Ahmed Yousef, head of the Economic Body and chairman of Afrin University, estimated that at the time, Rojava's economic output (including agriculture, industry and oil) accounted for about 55% of Syria's gross domestic product.[104]

Investment in public infrastructure is one priority of the Rojava administration. The Rojavaplan website lists some exemplary projects.[105]

Resources and External Relations

The government is seeking outside investment to build a power plant and a fertilizer factory.[106]

Oil and food production exceeds demand[84] so exports include oil and agricultural products such as sheep, grain and cotton. Imports include consumer goods and auto parts.[107] The border crossing of Yaroubiyah is intermittently closed by the Kurdistan Regional Government side. Turkey does not allow Syrian Kurd businesspeople or their goods to cross its border [108] although Rojava would like the border to be opened.[109] Trade as well as access to both humanitarian and military aid is difficult as Rojava remains under a strict embargo enforced by Turkey.[110]

Before the war, Al-Hasakah governorate was producing about 40,000 barrels of crude oil a day. However, during the war the oil refinery has been only working at 5% capacity due to lack of refining chemicals. Some people work at primitive oil refining, which causes more pollution.[111]

In 2014, the Syrian government was still paying some state employees,[112] but fewer than before.[113] The Rojavan government says that "none of our projects are financed by the regime".[109]

Law and security

Civil Justice

The civil laws of Syria are valid in Rojava, as far as they do not conflict with the Constitution of Rojava. One notable example for amendment is the family law, where Rojava proclaims absolute equality of women under the law and a ban on polygamy.[114]

Criminal Justice

A new criminal justice system has been implemented that emphasizes restoration over retribution. Prisons are operated by TEV-DEM, housing mostly those charged with terrorist activity related to ISIL and other extremist groups.[citation needed]

Police

The police function in Rojava-controlled areas is performed by the Asayish armed formation. They are supported by the Assyrian Sutoro police force.

The existing police force is trained in non-violent conflict resolution as well as feminist theory before being allowed access to a weapon. Directors of the Asayiş police academy have said that the long-term goal is to give all citizens six weeks of police training before ultimately eliminating the police.[115]

Militias

Female fighters of the YPJ play a significant combat role in Rojava.

The DBK's armed wing is the People's Protection Units (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel, YPG). Military service was declared compulsory in July 2014 [116] due to the ongoing war against Daesh.

The People's Protection Units was founded by the PYD party after the 2004 Qamishli clashes, but it was not active until the Syrian Civil War.[117] As of the signing of the Arbil Agreement by the PYD and Kurdish National Council (KNC), the YPG came under the nominal command of the Kurdish Supreme Committee, although in reality it is almost exclusively still the armed wing of the PYD.[118] The Syriac Military Council is an Assyrian militia, the armed wing of Syriac Union Party.

The YPG is a trained force utilizing snipers and mobile weaponry to launch hit-and-run attacks and maneuver quickly.

Relying on speed, stealth, and surprise, it is the archetypal guerrilla army, able to deploy quickly to front lines and concentrate its forces before quickly redirecting the axis of its attack to outflank and ambush its enemy. The key to its success is autonomy. Although operating under an overarching tactical rubric, YPG brigades are inculcated with a high degree of freedom and can adapt to the changing battlefield.[119]

All militias in Rojava are under the umbrella of the Syrian Democratic Forces.

Demographics

The demographics of this area saw a huge shift in the early part of the 20th century due to the Assyrian and Armenian Genocides. Tens of thousands of Assyrians and Armenians fled to Syria from Turkey.

During the Syrian Civil War, Rojava’s population has more than doubled to about 4.6 million. Among the newcomers are many who have fled from violence taking place in other parts of Syria.

Ethnicity

Religion

Most ethnic Kurdish or Arab people in Rojava are Sunni Muslim, most ethnic Assyrian people are Syriac Orthodox, Chaldean Catholic or Syriac Catholic Christian. There are also adherents to other faiths, such as Zoroastrians and Yazidis among ethnic Kurds. Many people in Rojava support secularism and laicism.[132] The dominant PYD party and the political administration in Rojava are decidedly secular and laicist and contrary to most of the Middle East, religion is no marker of socio-political identity.[133]

Languages spoken

Kurdish, Arabic, Syriac-Aramaic and Turkish (Syrian Turkmen dialect) are spoken.

Population centres

This list includes all cities, towns and villages controlled or claimed by Rojava with more than 10,000 inhabitants. The population figures are given according to the 2004 Syrian census.[134] Cities in white are under the control of Rojava. Cities in bright grey are only partially under the control of Rojava, and partially under the control of the Syrian government. Cities in dark grey are under the control of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) or other Islamist forces. Cities in boldface are the capital of their respective cantons.

English Name Kurdish Name Arabic Name Syriac Name Population Canton
Al-Hasakah Hesîçe الحسكة ܚܣܟܗ 188,160 Jazira Canton
Al-Qamishli Qamişlo القامشلي ܩܡܫܠܐ 184,231 Jazira Canton
Manbij Manbiç منبج ܡܒܘܓ 99,497 Shahba Canton[135]
Al-Bab Bab الباب 63,069 Shahba Canton[135]
Kobanî Kobanî عين العرب 44,821 Kobanî Canton
Afrin Efrîn عفرين 36,562 Afrin Canton
Azaz Ezaz أعزاز 31,623 Afrin Canton
Ras al-Ayn Serêkaniyê رأس العين ܪܝܫ ܥܝܢܐ 29,347 Jazira Canton
Amuda Amûdê عامودا 26,821 Jazira Canton
Al-Malikiyah Dêrika Hemko المالكية ܕܪܝܟ 26,311 Jazira Canton
Tell Rifaat Arpêt تل رفعت 20,514 Afrin Canton
Al-Qahtaniyah Tirbespî القحطانية ܩܒܪ̈ܐ ܚܘܪ̈ܐ 16,946 Jazira Canton
Mare Mare مارع 16,904 Afrin Canton
Al-Shaddadah Şeddadê الشدادي 15,806 Jazira Canton
Al-Muabbada Girkê Legê المعبدة 15,759 Jazira Canton
Tell Abyad Girê Spî تل أبيض 14,825 Kobanî Canton
Al-Sabaa wa Arbain السبعة وأربعين 14,177 Jazira Canton
Jandairis Cindarêsê جنديرس 13,661 Afrin Canton
Al-Manajir Menacîr المناجير 12,156 Jazira Canton
Jarabulus Cerablus جرابلس 11,570 Shahba Canton[135]
Qabasin قباسين 11,382 Shahba Canton[135]

External relations

Relations to Syria

Flag of Syrian Democratic Forces

For the time being, the relations of Rojava to the state of Syria are determined by the context of the Syrian Civil War. As for the time being, the Constitution of Syria and the Constitution of Rojava are legally incompatible with respect to legislative and executive authority. Practical interaction is pragmatic ad hoc. In the military realm, combat between the Rojava People's Protection Units (YPG) and Syrian government forces has been rare, in the most notable instances some of the territory still controlled by the Syrian government in Qamishli and al-Hasakah has been lost to the YPG. In some military campaigns, in particular in northern Aleppo governate and in al-Hasakah, there has been a tacit cooperation between the YPG and Syrian government forces against Islamist forces, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and other.[136]

The Federation of Northern Syria - Rojava is not drafted as an ethnic Kurdistan region, but rather a blueprint for a future decentralised and democratic Syria.[137] Rojava is the birthplace and main sponsor of the Syrian Democratic Forces and the Syrian Democratic Council, a military and a political umbrella organisation, with the agenda of implementing a secular, democratic and federalist system for all of Syria.

While the Rojava administration is not invited to the Geneva III peace talks on Syria,[138] in particular Russia, which calls for their inclusion, does to some degree carry their positions into the talks, as documented in Russia's May 2016 draft for a new constitution for Syria.[139]

Rojava as a transnational topic

The socio-political transformations of the "Rojava Revolution" have inspired much attention in international media, both in mainstream media[140][141][142] and in dedicated progressive leftist media.[143][144][145][146]

The "Rojava Revolution" in its diverse aspects is a hotly debated topic in libertarian socialist and communalist as well as generally anti-capitalist circles worldwide.[note 2]

Kurdish question

Kurdish-inhabited areas in 1992 according to the CIA

Rojava's dominant political party, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), is a member organisation of the Group of Communities in Kurdistan (KCK) organisation. As KCK member organisations in the neighbouring states with autochthonous Kurdish minorities are either outlawed (Turkey, Iran) or politically marginal with respect to other Kurdish parties (Iraq), PYD-governed Rojava has acquired the role of a model for the KCK political agenda and blueprint in general.

There is much sympathy for Rojava in particular among Kurds in Turkey. During the Siege of Kobanî, a large number of ethnic Kurdish citizens of Turkey crossed the border and volunteered in the defence of the town. Some of these upon their return to Turkey took up arms in the Kurdish–Turkish conflict, where skills acquired by them during combat in Kobanî brought a new quality of urban warfare to the conflict in Turkey.[147][148]

The relationship of Rojava with the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq is complicated. One context being that the governing party there, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), views itself and its affiliated Kurdish parties in other countries as a more conservative and nationalist alternative and competitor to the KCK political agenda and blueprint in general.[137]

International relations

Turkey has been strictly hostile towards Rojava, fearing that its emergence fuels activism for autonomy or separatism among Kurds in Turkey and the Kurdish–Turkish conflict. It claims the Rojava YPG militia were identical to the PKK (a Turkey-based member organisation of the KCK), which is considered a terrorist organisation by Turkey (and also the European Union, the USA, NATO, Canada and Australia, but not by the United Nations, Russia, China and Switzerland). However, the European Union, the USA and NATO do not consider the YPG a terrorist organization and cooperate with them in the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).[149] Rojava and YPG leaders insist that the PKK is a separate organization.[150] In 2014 Turkey was accused of supporting ISIL in attacks on Rojava, allowing them to conduct attacks from the Turkish side of the border and providing logistical support.[151] Various Western counrtries have faced strategic and public opinion incentives to cooperate with Rojava, for example In January 2015, a United Kingdom parliament committee asked the government to explain and justify its policy of not working with the Rojava military to combat ISIL.[152] France has also been publicly supportive of Rojava.[153] In the arena of international diplomacy, the power most ostentatiously supportive of Rojava has been Russia.

There is major military cooperation of Rojava with Iraqi Kurdistan and in particular with the USA.[154][155] During the May 2016 offensive against ISIL in Northern Raqqa, US Special Operation Forces were widely reported and photographed to be present, and to wear badges of YPG and YPJ on their uniforms.[156]

In February 2016 the Rojava administration opened their first foreign consulate in Moscow (Russia).[157][158] In April 2016, a consulate in Stockholm (Sweden)[159] and in May 2016 consulates in Berlin (Germany)[160] and Paris (France)[161] followed. Further consulates in London, in Washington, and in several Arab countries are planned.[158][159][162] Rojava's YPG self-defence militia since April 2016 has an official representation in Prague (Czech Republic).[163]

See also

Notes

  1. ^ Modern Curdistan is of much greater extent than the ancient Assyria, and is composed of two parts, the Upper and Lower. In the former is the province of Ardelaw, the ancient Arropachatis, now nominally a part of Irak Ajami, and belonging to the north-west division called Al Jobal. It contains five others, namely, Betlis, the ancient Carduchia, lying to the south and south-west of the lake Van. East and south-east of Betlis is the principality of Julamerick—south-west of it, is the principality of Amadia—the fourth is Jeezera ul Omar, a city on an island in the Tigris, and corresponding to the ancient city of Bezabde—the fifth and largest is Kara Djiolan, with a capital of the same name. The pashalics of Kirkook and Solimania also comprise part of Upper Curdistan. Lower Curdistan comprises all the level tract to the east of the Tigris, and the minor ranges immediately bounding the plains, and reaching thence to the foot of the great range, which may justly be denominated the Alps of western Asia.
    A Dictionary of Scripture Geography (1846), John Miles.[36]
  2. ^ Diverse aspects of the Rojava revolution have led some anti-capitalists to criticise the revolution for not going far enough e.g. 'Anarchist Federation statement on the Rojava revolution'; Gilles Dauve, 'Rojava: reality and rhetoric'; Alex de Jong, 'Stalinist caterpillar into libertarian butterfly? - the evolving ideology of the PKK'; Anti War, '‘I have seen the future and it works.’ – Critical questions for supporters of the Rojava revolution', 'The grim reality of the Rojava Revolution - from an anarchist eyewitness' and Devrim Valerian, 'The bloodbath in Syria: class war or ethnic war?'. Other anti-capitalists have been significantly less critical e.g. David Graeber, 'No. This is a Genuine Revolution'; Janet Biehl, 'Poor in means but rich in spirit', 'From Germany to Bakur' and the Kurdistan Anarchist Forum

References

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