Islam and democracy

Islamic democracy refers to a political ideology that seeks to apply Islamic principles to public policy within a democratic framework. In practice, three kinds of Muslim democracies can be recognized in Muslim world. The basis of this distinction has to do with how comprehensively Islam is incorporated into the affairs of the state.

1. A democratic secular state which does not recognize any religion as its state religion, such as Turkey and Turkmenistan.
2. A democratic nation state which recognizes Islam as its state religion and a source of legislation, such as Malaysia and Maldives. Only few religious values are incorporated into public law, since Islam is not the only source of law.
3. A democratic state which endeavors to institute Sharia and offers more comprehensive inclusion of Islam into the affairs of the state. Iran is the only firm proponent of this form.

Not all of these states are recognized internationally as democratic under concepts of liberal democracy. There are also states in the Muslim world which are secular democracies rather than religious democracies.

The concepts of liberalism and democratic participation were already present in the medieval Islamic world. The Rashidun Caliphate is perceived by it proponents as an early example of a democratic state and it is claimed that the development of democracy in the Islamic world eventually came to a halt following to the Sunni–Shia split.

Sunni viewpoint

See also: Political aspects of Islam, Islamism, and Shura

Deliberations of the Caliphates, most notably the Rashidun Caliphate were not democratic in the modern sense rather, decision-making power lay with a council of notable and trusted companions of Muhammad and representatives of different tribes (most of them selected or elected within their tribes).

In the early Islamic Caliphate, the head of state, the Caliph, had a position based on the notion of a successor to Muhammad's political authority, who, according to Sunnis, were ideally elected by the people or their representatives, as was the case for the election of Abu Bakr, Uthman and Ali as Caliph. After the Rashidun Caliphs, later Caliphates during the Islamic Golden Age had a much lesser degree of democratic participation, but since "no one was superior to anyone else except on the basis of piety and virtue" in Islam, and following the example of Muhammad, later Islamic rulers often held public consultations with the people in their affairs.

The legislative power of the Caliph (or later, the Sultan) was always restricted by the scholarly class, the ulama, a group regarded as the guardians of the law. Since the law came from the legal scholars, this prevented the Caliph from dictating legal results. Laws were decided based on the ijma (consensus) of the Ummah (community), which was most often represented by the legal scholars. In order to qualify as a legal scholar, it was required that they obtain a doctorate known as the ijazat attadris wa 'l-ifttd ("license to teach and issue legal opinions") from a madrasa. In many ways, classical Islamic law functioned like a constitutional law.

Democratic religious pluralism also existed in classical Islamic law, as the religious laws and courts of other religions, including Christianity, Judaism and Hinduism, were usually accommodated within the Islamic legal framework, as seen in the early Caliphate, Al-Andalus, Islamic India, and the Ottoman Millet system.

Legal scholar L. Ali Khan argues that Islam is fully compatible with democracy. In his book, A Theory of Universal Democracy, Khan provides a critique of liberal democracy and secularism. He presents the concept of "fusion state" in which religion and state are fused. There are no contradictions in God's universe, says Khan. Contradictions represent the limited knowledge that human beings have. According to the Quran and the Sunnah, Muslims are fully capable of preserving spirituality and self-rule.

Furthermore, counter arguments to these points assert that this attitude presuppose democracy as a static system which only embraces a particular type of social and cultural system, namely that of the post-Christian West. See: constitutional theocracy.

Muslim democrats, including Ahmad Moussalli (professor of political science at the American University of Beirut), argue that concepts in the Quran point towards some form of democracy, or at least away from despotism. These concepts include shura (consultation), ijma (consensus), al-hurriyya (freedom), al-huqquq al-shar'iyya (legitimate rights). For example shura (Al Imran 3:159, Ash-Shura 42:38) may include electing leaders to represent and govern on the community’s behalf. Government by the people is not therefore necessarily incompatible with the rule of Islam, whilst it has also been argued that rule by a religious authority is not the same as rule by a representative of God. This viewpoint, however, is disputed by more traditional Muslims. Moussalli argues that despotic Islamic governments have abused the Quranic concepts for their own ends: "For instance, shura, a doctrine that demands the participation of society in running the affairs of its government, became in reality a doctrine that was manipulated by political and religious elites to secure their economic, social and political interests at the expense of other segments of society," (In Progressive Muslims 2003).

Much debate occurs on the subject of which Islamic traditions are fixed principles, and which are subject to democratic change, or other forms of modification in view of changing circumstances. Some Muslims allude to an "Islamic" style of democracy which would recognize such distinctions. Another sensitive issue involves the status of monarchs and other leaders, the degree of loyalty which Muslims owe such people, and what to do in case of a conflicting loyalties (e.g., if a monarch disagrees with an imam).

Shia viewpoint

According to the Shia understanding, Muhammad named as his successor (as leader, with Muhammad being the final prophet), his son-in-law and cousin Ali. Therefore the first three of the four elected "Rightly Guided" Caliphs recognized by Sunnis ('Ali being the fourth), are considered usurpers, notwithstanding their having been "elected" through some sort of conciliar deliberation (which the Shia do not accept as a representative of the Muslim society of that time). The largest Shia grouping — the Twelvers branch — recognizes a series of Twelve Imams, the last of which (Muhammad al-Mahdi, the Hidden Imam) is still alive and the Shia are waiting for his reappearance.

Since the revolution in Iran, Twelver Shia political thought has been dominated by the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Khomeini argued that in the absence of the Hidden Imam and other divinely-appointed figures (in whom ultimate political authority rests), Muslims have not only the right, but also the obligation, to establish an "Islamic state." To that end they must turn to scholars of Islamic law (fiqh) who are qualified to interpret the Quran and the writings of the imams. Khomeini distinguishes between Conventional Fiqh and Dynamic Fiqh, which he believes to also be necessary.

Khomeini divides the Islamic commandments or Ahkam into three branches:

• the primary commandments (Persian: حكم اوليه)
• the secondary commandments (Persian: حكم ثانويه) and
• the state commandments (Persian: حكم حكومتي).

This list includes all commandments which relate to public affairs, such as constitutions, social security, insurance, bank, labour law, taxation, elections, congress etc. Some of these codes may not strictly or implicitly pointed out in the Quran and generally in the Sunnah, but should not violate any of the two, unless there's a collision of rules in which the more important one is given preference (an apparent, but not inherent, violation of a rule). Therefore, Khomeini emphasized that the (elected) Islamic state has absolute right (Persian: ولايت مطلقه) to enact state commandments, even if it (appears as if it) violates the primary or secondary commandments of Islam. This should happen when a more important primary or secondary commandment is in danger because of some limitations.

For example an (elected) Islamic state can ratify (according to some constitutions) mandatory insurance of employees to all employers being Muslim or not even if it violates mutual consent between them. This shows the compatibility of Islam with modern forms of social codes for present and future life, as various countries and nations may have different kinds of constitutions now and may have new ones in future.

Philosophical viewpoint

The early Islamic philosopher, Al-Farabi (c. 872-950), in one of his most notable works Al-Madina al-Fadila, theorized an ideal Islamic state which he compared to Plato's The Republic. Al-Farabi departed from the Platonic view in that he regarded the ideal state to be ruled by the prophet, instead of the philosopher king envisaged by Plato. Al-Farabi argued that the ideal state was the city-state of Medina when it was governed by Muhammad, as its head of state, as he was in direct communion with God whose law was revealed to him. In the absence of the prophet, Al-Farabi considered democracy as the closest to the ideal state, regarding the republican order of the Rashidun Caliphate as an example within early Muslim history. However, he also maintained that it was from democracy that imperfect states emerged, noting how the republican order of the early Islamic Caliphate of the Rashidun caliphs was later replaced by a form of government resembling a monarchy under the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties.

A thousand years later, the modern Islamic philosopher, Muhammad Iqbal, also viewed the early Islamic Caliphate as being compatible with democracy. He "welcomed the formation of popularly elected legislative assemblies" in the Muslim world as a "return to the original purity of Islam." He argued that Islam had the "gems of an economic and democratic organization of society", but that this growth was stunted by the monarchist rule of Umayyad Caliphate, which established the Caliphate as a great Islamic empire but led to political Islamic ideals being "repaganized" and the early Muslims losing sight of the "most important potentialities of their faith."

Another internationally acclaimed Muslim scholar and thinker Muhammad Asad viewed Democracy as perfectly compatible with Islam. In his book The Principles of State and Government in Islam, he notes: "Viewed from this historical perspective, 'democracy' as conceived in the modern West is infinitely nearer to the Islamic than to the ancient Greek concept of liberty; for Islam maintains that all human beings are socially equal and must, therefore, be given the same opportunities for development and self-expression. On the other hand, Islam makes it incumbent upon Muslims to subordinate their decisions to the guidance of the Divine Law revealed in the Qur'ãn and exemplified by the Prophet: an obligation which imposes definite limits on the community's right to legislate and denies to the 'will of the people' that attribute of sovereignty which forms so integral a part of the Western concept of democracy."

Islamic democracy in practice

Obstacles

See also: Democracy in the Middle East

Waltz writes that transformations to democracy seemed on the whole to pass by the Islamic Middle East at a time when such transformations were a central theme in other parts of the world, although she does note that, of late, the increasing number of elections being held in the region indicates some form of adoption of democratic traditions. There are several ideas on the relationship between Islam in the Middle East and democracy. Writing on The Guardian website, Brian Whitaker, the paper's Middle East editor, argued that there were four major obstacles to democracy in the region: the imperial legacy, oil wealth, the Arab–Israeli conflict and militant or "backward-looking" Islam.

The imperial legacy includes the borders of the modern states themselves and the existence of significant minorities within the states. Acknowledgment of these differences is frequently suppressed usually in the cause of "national unity" and sometimes to obscure the fact that minority elite is controlling the country. Brian Whitaker argues that this leads to the formation of political parties on ethnic, religious or regional divisions, rather than over policy differences. Voting therefore becomes an assertion of one's identity rather than a real choice.

The problem with oil and the wealth it generates is that the states' rulers have the wealth to remain in power, as they can pay off or repress most potential opponents. Brian Whitaker argues that as there is no need for taxation there is less pressure for representation. Furthermore, Western governments require a stable source of oil and are therefore more prone to maintain the status quo, rather than push for reforms which may lead to periods of instability. This can be linked into political economy explanations for the occurrence of authoritarian regimes and lack of democracy in the Middle East, particularly the prevalence of rentier states in the Middle East. A consequence of the lack of taxation that Whitaker talks of in such rentier economies is an inactive civil society. As civil society is seen to be an integral part of democracy it raises doubts over the feasibility of democracy developing in the Middle East in such situations.

Whitaker's third point is that the Arab–Israeli conflict serves as a unifying factor for the countries of the Arab League, and also serves as an excuse for repression by Middle Eastern governments. For example, in March 2004 Sheikh Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah, Lebanon's leading Shia cleric, is reported as saying "We have emergency laws, we have control by the security agencies, we have stagnation of opposition parties, we have the appropriation of political rights - all this in the name of the Arab-Israeli conflict". The West, especially the USA, is also seen as a supporter of Israel, and so it and its institutions, including democracy, are seen by many Muslims as suspect. Khaled Abou El Fadl, a lecturer in Islamic law at the University of California comments "modernity, despite its much scientific advancement, reached Muslims packaged in the ugliness of disempowerment and alienation."

This repression by secularist Arab rulers has led to the growth of radical Islamic movements, as they believe that the institution of an Islamic theocracy will lead to a more just society. However, these groups tend to be very intolerant of alternative views, including the ideas of democracy. Many Muslims who argue that Islam and democracy are compatible live in the West, and are therefore seen as "contaminated" by non-Islamic ideas.

Orientalist scholars offer another viewpoint on the relationship between Islam and democratisation in the Middle East. They argue that the compatibility is simply not there between secular democracy and Arab-Islamic culture in the Middle East which has a strong history of undemocratic beliefs and authoritarian power structures. Kedourie, a well known Orientalist scholar, said for example: "to hold simultaneously ideas which are not easily reconcilable argues, then, a deep confusion in the Arab public mind, at least about the meaning of democracy. The confusion is, however, understandable since the idea of democracy is quite alien to the mind-set of Islam." A view similar to this that understands Islam and democracy to be incompatible because of seemingly irreconcilable differences between Sharia and democratic ideals is also held by some Islamists. However, within Islam there are ideas held by some that believe Islam and democracy in some form are indeed compatible due to the existence of the concept of shura (meaning consultation) in the Quran. Views such as this have been expressed by various thinkers and political activists in the Middle East. They continue to be the subject of controversy, e.g. at the second Dubai Debates, which debated the question "Can Arab and Islamic values be reconciled with democracy?"

Practice

See also: List of Islamic democratic political parties

Following the Arab Spring, professor Olivier Roy of the European University Institute in an article in Foreign Policy has described political Islam as "increasingly interdependent" with democracy, such that "neither can now survive without the other".

• The Green Algeria Alliance is an Islamist coalition of political parties, created for the legislative election, 2012 in Algeria. It consists of the Movement of Society for Peace (Hamas), Islamic Renaissance Movement (Ennahda) and the Movement for National Reform (Islah). The alliance is led by Bouguerra Soltani of the Hamas. However, the incumbent coalition, consisting of the FLN of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika and the RND of Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia, held on to power after winning a majority of seats and the Islamist parties of the Green Algeria Alliance lost seats in legislative election of 2012.

• Shia Islamist Al Wefaq, Salafi Islamist Al Asalah and Sunni Islamist Al-Menbar Islamic Society are dominant democratic forces in Bahrain.

• During the Bangladesh Liberation War, the Jamaat-e-Islami of Pakistan opposed the independence of Bangladesh, but established itself there as an independent political party, the Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami after 1975. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party is the second largest party in the Parliament of Bangladesh and the main opposition party. The BNP promotes a center-right policy combining elements of conservatism, Islamism, nationalism and anti-communism. The party believes that Islam is an integral part of the socio-cultural life of Bangladesh, and favors Islamic principles and cultural views. Since 2000, it has been allied with the Islamic parties Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh and Islami Oikya Jote.

• The Party of Democratic Action is the largest political party in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Party of Democratic Action was founded in May 1990 by reformist Islamist Alija Izetbegović, representing the conservative Bosniaks and other Slavic Muslim population in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the former Yugoslavia.

• In the Egyptian parliamentary election, 2011–2012, the political parties identified as "Islamist" and "democratic" (the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party, Salafist Al-Nour Party and liberal Islamist Al-Wasat Party) won 75% of the total seats. Mohamed Morsi, an Islamist democrat of the Muslim Brotherhood is first democratically elected president of Egypt.

• Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah are two very influential Islamist social movement in Indonesia. National Awakening Party, United Development Party and Prosperous Justice Party are major Indonesian Islamist parties, active in country's democratic process.

• The Islamic Action Front is Jordan's Islamist political party and largest democratic political force in country. The IAF's survival in Jordan is primarily due to its flexibility and less radical approach to politics.

• The Islamic Group is a Sunni Islamist and Hezbollah is a Shia Islamist political party in Lebanon.

• The Justice and Construction Party is the Muslim Brotherhood's political arm in Libya and the second largest political force in the country. National Forces Alliance, largest political group in country, doesn't believe the country should be run entirely by Sharia law or secular law, but does hold that Sharia should be "the main inspiration for legislation." Party leader Jibril has said the NFA is a moderate Islamic movement that recognises the importance of Islam in political life and favours Sharia as the basis of the law.

• The United Malays National Organisation is the dominant party of Malaysia since that county's independence in 1957. UMNO sees and defines itself as a moderate Islamist, Islamic democratic and social conservative party of Muslim Malays. The Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party is a major opposition party and is relatively more conservative and traditionalist than the UMNO.

• The Justice and Development Party has been the ruling party in Morocco since 29 November 2011. The Justice and Development Party advocates Islamism and Islamic democracy.

• Hamas is the Sunni Islamist organization of Palestine that governs the Gaza Strip with Sharia law. Hamas also has a military resistance wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades.

• The Muslim Brotherhood of Syria is a Sunni Islamist force in Syria and very loosely affiliated to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. It has also been called the "dominant group" or "dominant force" in the Arab Spring uprising in Syria. The group's stated political positions are moderate and in its most recent April 2012 manifesto it "pledges to respect individual rights", to promote pluralism and democracy.

• The Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan is Tajikistan's Islamist party and main opposition and democratic force in that country.

• The Ennahda Movement, also known as Renaissance Party or simply Ennahda, is a moderate Islamist political party in Tunisia. On 1 March 2011, after the government of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali collapsed in the wake of the 2011 Tunisian revolution, Tunisia's interim government granted the group permission to form a political party. Since then it has become the biggest and most well-organized party in Tunisia, so far outdistancing its more secular competitors. In the Tunisian Constituent Assembly election, 2011, the first honest election in the country's history with a turn out of 51.1% of all eligible voters, the party won 37.04% of the popular vote and 89 (41%) of the 217 assembly seats, far more than any other party.

• The moderate Islamist Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi) (AKP) headed by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has held power in Turkey since 2002. It has been successful enough to prompt talk of a Turkish model of modern, moderate, liberal and democratic Islamism. This Turkish model of Islamism is hailed as an inspiration by many Arab Islamists after victories of Islamic democratic parties in post-Arab Spring democratic elections.

Pakistan

Early in the history of the state of Pakistan (12 March 1949), a parliamentary resolution (the Objectives Resolution) was adopted in accordance with the vision of the founding fathers of the Pakistan Movement (Muhammad Iqbal, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan). proclaiming:

Sovereignty belongs to Allah alone but He has delegated it to the State of Pakistan through its people for being exercised within the limits prescribed by Him as a sacred trust.

• The State shall exercise its powers and authority through the elected representatives of the people.
• The principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice, as enunciated by Islam, shall be fully observed.
• Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accordance with the teachings of Islam as set out in the Quran and Sunnah.
• Provision shall be made for the religious minorities to freely profess and practice their religions and develop their cultures.

This resolution later became key source of inspiration for the writers of the Constitution of Pakistan and is included in it as preamble. However, Pakistan is practically an semi-secular state and Islamists and Islamic democratic parties in Pakistan are relatively less influential then democratic Islamists of other Muslim democracies.

Iran

Theory

The idea and concept of Islamic democracy has been accepted by many Iranian clerics, scholars and intellectuals. The most notable of those who have accepted the theory of Islamic democracy is probably Iran's Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who mentions Islamic democracy as "Mardomsalarie Dini" in his speeches.

There are also other Iranian scholars who oppose or at least criticise the concept of Islamic democracy. Among the most popular of them are Ayatollah Naser Makarem Shirazi who have written: "If not referring to the people votes would result in accusations of tyranny then it is allowed to accept people vote as a secondary commandment." Also Mohammad-Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi has more or less the same viewpoint.

On the other hand, clergy like Hasan Yousefi Eshkevari believe that: "The obligatory religious commandments in public domain not necessarily imply recognition of religious state. These obligations can be interpreted as the power of Muslims' religious conscience and applying that through civil society". These clergies strictly reject the concept of Islamic state regardless of being democratic or not. They also believe no relationship between Islam and democracy at all, opposing the interpretation of clergy like Ayatollah Makarim al-Shirazi from Islamic state. But they do not mention how legal laws as an example can not be implemented using civil societies and how to administer a country relying on conscience only.

Practice

Some Iranians, including Mohammad Khatami, categorize the Islamic republic of Iran as a kind of religious democracy. They maintain that Ayatollah Khomeini held the same view as well and that's why he strongly chose "Jomhoorie Eslami" (Islamic Republic) over "Hokoomate Eslami" (Islamic State).

Othesr maintain that not only is the Islamic Republic of Iran undemocratic (see Politics of Iran) but that Khomeini himself opposed the principle of democracy in his book Hokumat-e Islami: Wilayat al-Faqih, where he denied the need for any legislative body saying, "no one has the right to legislate ... except ... the Divine Legislator", and during the Islamic Revolution, when he told Iranians, "Do not use this term, 'democratic.' That is the Western style." Although it is in contrast with his commandment to Mehdi Bazargan. It is a subject of lively debate among pro-Islamic Iranian intelligentsia. Also they maintain that Iran's sharia courts, the Islamic Revolutionary Court, blasphemy laws of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Mutaween (religious police) violate the principles of democratic governance. However, it should be understood that when a democracy is accepted to be Islamic by people, the law of Islam becomes the democratically ratified law of that country. Iranians have ratified the constitution in which the principle rules are explicitly mentioned as the rules of Islam to which other rules should conform.

Indices of democracy in Muslim countries

There are several non-governmental organizations that publish and maintain indices of freedom in the world, according to their own various definitions of the term, and rank countries as being free, partly free, or unfree using various measures of freedom, including political rights, economic rights, freedom of the press and civil liberties.

The following lists Muslim-majority countries and shows the scores given by two frequently used indices: Freedom in the World (2013) by the US-based Freedom House and the 2012 Democracy Index by the Economist Intelligence Unit. These indices are frequently used in Western media, but have attracted some criticism and may not reflect recent changes.

As of 2012, Indonesia is the only Muslim-majority nation acknowledged as democratic by both Freedom House and Economist democracy indexes.

Key: * - Electoral democracies ‡ - Disputed territory (according to Freedom House)

Location	Democracy Index Score	Democracy Index Rank	Democracy Index Category	Freedom in the World Status	Type of government	Religion and State
Afghanistan	2.48	152	Authoritarian regime	Not free	Islamic republic, Presidential system	Islamic state
*Albania	5.67	90	Hybrid regime	Partly free	Parliamentary republic	Secular state
Algeria	3.83	118	Authoritarian regime	Not free	Semi-presidential system	State religion
Azerbaijan	3.15	139	Authoritarian regime	Not free	Presidential system	Secular state
Bahrain	2.53	150	Authoritarian regime	Not free	Constitutional monarchy	State religion
*Bangladesh	5.86	84	Hybrid regime	Partly free	Parliamentary republic	State religion
Brunei	-	-	Authoritarian regime	Not free	Absolute monarchy	State religion
Burkina Faso	3.52	127	Authoritarian regime	Partly free	Semi-presidential system	Secular state
Chad	1.62	165	Authoritarian regime	Not free	Presidential system	Secular state
*Comoros	3.52	127	Authoritarian regime	Partly free	Presidential system, Federal republic	State religion
Djibouti	2.74	147	Authoritarian regime	Not free	Semi-presidential system	Secular state
Egypt	4.56	109	Hybrid regime	Partly free	Semi-presidential system	State religion
Guinea	2.79	146	Authoritarian regime	Partly free	Presidential system	Secular state
*Indonesia	6.76	53	Flawed democracy	Free	Presidential system	Secular state, Islamic state (only in Aceh)
Iran	1.98	158	Authoritarian regime	Not free	Islamic republic, Presidential system, Theocracy	Islamic state
Iraq	4.10	113	Hybrid regime	Not free	Parliamentary republic	State religion
Jordan	3.76	121	Authoritarian regime	Not free	Constitutional monarchy	State religion
Kazakhstan	2.95	143	Authoritarian regime	Not free	Presidential system	Secular state
Kosovo	-	-	-	Partly free		Secular state
Kuwait	3.78	119	Hybrid regime	Partly free	Constitutional monarchy	State religion
Kyrgyzstan	4.69	106	Hybrid regime	Partly free	Parliamentary republic	Secular state
Lebanon	5.05	99	Hybrid regime	Partly free	Confessionalist Parliamentary republic	Secular state
*Libya	5.15	95	Hybrid regime	Partly free	Parliamentary republic	State religion
Malaysia	6.41	64	Flawed democracy	Partly free	Constitutional monarchy, parliamentary democracy	State religion
*Maldives	-	-	-	Partly free		State religion
Mali	5.12	97	Hybrid regime	Not free	Semi-presidential system	Secular state
Mauritania	4.17	110	Hybrid regime	Not free	Islamic republic, Semi-presidential system	Islamic state
Morocco	4.07	115	Hybrid regime	Partly free	Constitutional monarchy	State religion
*Niger	4.16	111	Hybrid regime	Partly free	Semi-presidential system	Secular state
Nigeria	3.77	120	Authoritarian regime	Partly free	Federalism, presidential system	Secular state, Islamic state (only in the northern Nigerian states)
‡Northern Cyprus (Cyprus)	-	-	-	Free		Secular state
Oman	3.26	135	Authoritarian regime	Not free	Absolute monarchy	State religion
*Pakistan	4.57	108	Hybrid regime	Partly free	Federalism, parliamentary republic	State religion
‡Palestine (occupied by Israel)	4.80	103	Hybrid regime	Not free	Semi-presidential system	Secular state (in West Bank), de-facto Islamic state (in Gaza Strip)
Qatar	3.18	138	Authoritarian regime	Not free	Absolute monarchy	State religion
Saudi Arabia	1.71	163	Authoritarian regime	Not free	Islamic absolute monarchy	Islamic state
*Senegal	6.09	74	Flawed democracy	Free	Semi-presidential system	Secular state
*Sierra Leone	4.71	104	Hybrid regime	Free	Presidential system	Secular state
Somalia				Not free	Federalism, Semi-presidential system	State religion
‡Somaliland (Somalia)				Partly free
Sudan	2.38	154	Authoritarian regime	Not free	Federalism, presidential system	Secular state (de jure), Islamic state (de facto)
Syria	1.63	164	Authoritarian regime	Not free	Semi-presidential system	Secular state
Tajikistan	2.51	151	Authoritarian regime	Not free	Presidential system	Secular state
The Gambia	3.31	134	Authoritarian regime	Not free	Presidential system	Secular state
*Tunisia	5.67	90	Hybrid regime	Partly free	Semi-presidential system	State religion
*Turkey	5.76	88	Hybrid regime	Partly free	Parliamentary republic	Secular state
Turkmenistan	1.72	161	Authoritarian regime	Not free	Presidential system, single-party state	Secular state
United Arab Emirates	2.58	149	Authoritarian regime	Not free	Federalism, Constitutional monarchy	State religion
Uzbekistan	1.72	161	Authoritarian regime	Not free	Presidential system	Secular state
‡Western Sahara (controlled by Morocco)	-	-	-	Not free		-
Yemen	3.12	140	Authoritarian regime	Not free	Presidential system	Islamic state

See also

• Institute on Religion and Democracy
• Dialogue Among Civilizations
• The Clash of Civilizations
• Christian democracy
• Freedom deficit
• Islamic ethics
• Islamic revival
• Islamism

Bibliography

• Mahmoud Sadri and Ahmad Sadri (eds.) 2002 Reason, Freedom, and Democracy in Islam: Essential Writings of Abdolkarim Soroush, Oxford University Press
• Omid Safi (ed.) 2003 Progressive Muslims: On Justice, Gender and Pluralism, Oneworld
• Azzam S. Tamimi 2001 Rachid Ghannouchi: A Democrat within Islamism, Oxford University Press
• Khan L. Ali 2003 A Theory of Universal Democracy, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers
• Khatab, Sayed & G.Bouma, Democracy in Islam, Routledge 2007

External links

• Liberal Democracy and Political Islam: The Search for Common Ground
• Islam and Democracy: Perceptions and Misperceptions by Dr. Mohammad Omar Farooq
• Democracy and the Muslim World
• Islamic Democracies (article)
• Preview of the Seoul Conference on The Community of Democracies: Challenges and Threats to Democracy
• Marina Ottoway, et al., Democratic Mirage in the Middle East Carnegie Endowment for Ethics and International Peace, Policy Brief 20, (October 20, 2002).
• The Muslim's world future is freedom Book review, with some controversial content.
• Expect the Unexpected: A Religious Democracy in Iran
• Iranian President Mohammad Khatami Vows to Establish Religious Democracy in Iran
• Recent Elections and the Future of Religious Democracy in Iran
• Democracy Lacking in Muslim World