Chinese Indonesians

For notable Indonesian people of Chinese descent, see List of Chinese Indonesians.

Chinese Indonesians

An ethnic Chinese man and his son during the 2010 chap go meh parade in Jakarta
Total population
> 2,400,000 (Han Chinese ) Han Chinese (including those of ancestral descent)
Regions with significant populations
Jakarta, West Kalimantan, East Java, Riau, Central Java, West Java, Bangka–Belitung Islands, Banten
Languages
Indonesian, Mandarin, Min Nan (Hokkien and Teochew), Hakka, Cantonese, Xinghua, and other dialects
Religion
Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, Confucianism, and Hinduism
Related ethnic groups
Most trace their ancestry to the Hokkien, Teochew, Hakka, and Cantonese peoples of southern China.

Chinese Indonesians
Traditional Chinese	印度尼西亞華人
Simplified Chinese	印度尼西亚华人
Transcriptions Standard Mandarin Hanyu Pinyin Yìndùníxīyà Huárén

Template:Contains Chinese text Chinese Indonesians, also known as the Indonesian Chinese, are an overseas Chinese group whose ancestors emigrated from China to Indonesia, formerly a colony of the Netherlands as the Dutch East Indies. Indonesia's 2000 census reported more than 2.4 million self identified ethnic Chinese citizens, or 1.2 percent of the country's population at the time. This figure is disputed because it is impossible to determine the exact number of Chinese Indonesians, in some cases because of fear from being identified as one in the years following anti-Chinese violence in 1998.

Maritime trade drove early migration patterns of the Chinese into the Malay Archipelago, in addition to the 1293 Mongol invasion of the island of Java and expeditions led by mariner Zheng He in the 15th century. When European explorers began arriving in Southeast Asia in the 16th and 17th centuries, they established ports of trade in the region and began interacting with Chinese traders and merchants who were already present. After the Dutch East India Company established Batavia (now the capital city of Jakarta) as its headquarters on Java in 1609, it became a hub of trade between China and India. In order to expand their colony, the Dutch contracted laborers from the Fujian and Guangdong regions of southern China. For the next 300 years, members of the Hokkien, Hakka, Teochew, and Cantonese ethnic groups entered the Dutch East Indies as construction and plantation workers, miners, and artisans.

At the turn of the 20th century, nationalist movements began to emerge in both China and Indonesia. Fueled by the visit of Chinese revolutionary figure Sun Yat-sen to Southeast Asia in 1900, a Chinese nationalist movement oriented toward the homeland gained popularity. On the other hand, there were those who advocated for maintaining relations with the Dutch and those who fought for the right of Indonesia's self-determination. Coincidentally for the Chinese community, Dutch recognition of an independent Indonesia and the establishment of a communist People's Republic of China both occurred in 1949. Growing anti-communist sentiment in the following decades meant that the Chinese eventually became targets of the worst mass violence in Indonesian history in 1965–1966.

Chinese culture in Indonesia was founded upon three main pillars: clan associations, ethnic media, and Chinese language schools. Under the government of the New Order, which came into power in 1966–1967, these institutions were dismantled in favor of assimilation policies as a solution to the "Chinese Problem". Over the next three decades, the government exploited Chinese economic aptitude to fund its development programs. A culture of corruption grew and became associated with the ethnic Chinese community, which had become dependent on law enforcement officials for protection against ethnic violence. Indonesia depended on Chinese business networks for economic support, prior to and following the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.

In general, the ethnic Chinese are more urbanized than the indigenous population, though significant rural and agricultural communities also exist outside the main islands. Emigrant communities emerged in more industrialized nations beginning in the second half of the 20th century. Among the overseas residents, their identities are noticeably more Indonesian than Chinese.

Alternative names

Scholars studying ethnic Chinese emigrants often refer to the group as a "monolithic entity": the overseas Chinese. Such treatment also persisted in Indonesia with a majority of the population referring to them as orang Cina, orang Tionghoa (both meaning "Chinese people"), or hoakiau (華僑). Ethnic Chinese were categorized in the 1930 Dutch East Indies census as foreign orientals and registered separately from the indigenous population. Ethnographic literature describe them as Chinese Indonesians. They were previously described as the Indonesian Chinese, but there is a shift in terminology as it emphasizes group's "Chineseness", while the more recent one its "Indonesianness". Scholars believe the shift is "necessary to debunk the stereotype that they are an exclusive group" and also "promotes a sense of nationalism" among them.

Other terms used for identifying sectors of the community include peranakan and totok. The former, used to describe the local born, is derived from the root Indonesian word anak (child) and thus means "child of the land". The latter is derived from Javanese and means "new" or "pure" to describe the foreign born and new immigrants. There is also a significant number of Chinese Indonesians living in the People's Republic of China and Hong Kong who are considered part of the population of "returned overseas Chinese" (歸國華僑). In order to identify Chinese Indonesians, contemporary scholars separate them by citizenship into those who are citizens of the host country and those who are resident aliens. They are further broken down by cultural orientation and social identification.

History

Main article: History of Indonesia

Early interactions

Chinese junks Sin Tong Heng and Tek Hwa Seng in the Singapore Strait, c. 1936

The first recorded movement of people from China into the Malay Archipelago was the arrival of Mongol forces under Kublai Khan that culminated in the invasion of Java in 1293. The Mongols introduced Chinese technology to the island, particularly shipbuilding and coinage. Their intervention also hastened the decline of classical kingdoms and precipitated the rise of the Majapahit empire. Some Chinese and Portuguese sources indicate that Chinese traders were the first to arrive on Ternate and Tidore in the Maluku Islands to buy cloves, but they were later driven out by Javanese traders as Majapahit expanded.

Chinese Muslim traders from the eastern coast of China arrived at the coastal towns of Indonesia and Malaysia in the early 15th century. They were led by the mariner Zheng He, who led several expeditions to Southeast Asia between 1405 and 1430. In the book The Overall Survey of the Ocean's Shores (瀛涯勝覽), his translator Ma Huan documented the activities of the Chinese Muslims in the archipelago and the legacy left by Zheng He and his men. These traders settled along the northern coast of Java, but there is no further documentation of their settlements beyond the 16th century. Scholars believe that the Chinese Muslims became absorbed into the majority Muslim population. Between 1450 and 1520, the Ming Dynasty's interest in Southeast Asia reached a low point, and trade (both legal and illegal) rarely reached the archipelago. The Portuguese also made no mention of any resident Chinese minority population when they arrived in Indonesia in the early 16th century. Trade from the north was re-established when China legalized private trade in 1567 and began licensing 50 junks a year. Several years later, silver began flowing into the region from Japan, Mexico, and Europe, and trade flourished once again. Distinct Chinese colonies emerged in hundreds of ports throughout Southeast Asia, including the pepper port of Banten.

Colonial period (1600–1900)

Chinese workers await the preparation of their contracts by immigration officials at Medan's labor inspectorate, c. 1920–1940.

By the time the Dutch arrived in the early 17th century, major Chinese settlements were already in existence along the northern coast of Java. Most were traders and merchants, but they also practiced agriculture in some inland areas. The Dutch contracted many of them as skilled artisans in the construction of Batavia on the northwestern coast of Java. The new harbor was selected as the new headquarters of the Dutch East India Company (Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, VOC) in 1609 by Jan Pieterszoon Coen. It soon grew into a major hub for trade with China and India. Batavia became the largest Chinese community in the archipelago and remains so today as the Indonesian capital of Jakarta.

The first Dutch Chinese Schools were established in 1892 following a split in curriculum from the native population.

Under the colonial government, the Chinese were perceived as temporary residents and encountered difficulties in obtaining land rights. Plots near mining areas were restricted to state and private mining enterprises because mineral deposits such as tin could be found anywhere. Europeans were also prioritized in the choice of plantation areas, and colonial officials believed the remaining plots must be protected and preserved for the natives. Short-term and renewable leases were later introduced as a temporary measure, but many Chinese remained on these lands upon expiration of their contracts and became squatters.

Divided nationalism (1900–1949)

Chinese school owned by the Tiong Hoa Hwe Koan in Sungailiat, Bangka Island

Chinese revolutionary figure Sun Yat-sen visited Southeast Asia in 1900, and later that year the socio-religious organization Tiong Hoa Hwe Koan ([[[:wikt:中華|中華]]會館] Error: {{Lang}}: unrecognized language tag: zh-Han (help)), also known as the Chinese Association, was founded to urge ethnic Chinese in the Indies to support the revolutionary movement in China. In its effort to build Chinese schools, the association argued that the teaching of English and Chinese languages should be prioritized over Dutch in order to provide themselves with the means of taking "a two or three-day voyage (Java–Singapore) into a wider world where they can move freely" and overcome restrictions of their activities. Several years later, Dutch authorities abandoned its segregation policies, abolished travel permits for the Chinese, and allowed them to freely move throughout the colony. For the Chinese, the 1911 Xinhai Revolution and the 1912 founding of the Republic of China coincided with a growing nationalist movement within the Indies.

Until 1908, there was no recognizable nationalist movement among the indigenous population. However, Dutch authorities feared that nationalist sentiments would spread with the growth of ethnically mixed associations, known as kongsi. In 1911, Javanese members of the Kong Sing association in Surakarta broke away and clashed with the Chinese. The incident led to the creation of Sarekat Islam, the first organized popular nationalist movement in the Indies. Indigenous groups saw the Chinese nationalist sentiment as "haughty" and led to antagonism between the two sides. The spread of anti-Chinese sentiment spread throughout Java led to a 1918 mass violence carried out by members of Sarekat Islam on the Chinese in Kudus. In the wake of this incident, the left-wing Chinese nationalist daily Sin Po called on both sides to work together to improve living conditions because it viewed most Chinese, like most of the indigenous population, as poor.

Early draft of the Indonesia Raya, later adopted as a national anthem, in a 1928 weekly edition of the Sin Po newspaper.

In addition to the Sin Po group which advocated Chinese nationalism, there was also a faction which argued for Chinese participation in Dutch political institutions such as the Volksraad and to improve their economic position while maintaining Dutch rule. This group criticized Sin Po's approach and manifested during the Chung Hwa Congress of 1927. In 1932, pro-Indonesian counterparts founded the Partai Tionghoa Indonesia to absorption of the Chinese into the Javanese population and support the call for self-government of Indonesia. Members of this group were primarily peranakan. These divisions continued into the period of Japanese occupation (1942–1945). Under the occupation, Chinese communities were attacked by Japanese forces in part because of suspected sympathizers of the Kuomintang as a consequence of the Second Sino-Japanese War. When the Dutch returned following the end of the war, the chaos caused by advancing forces and retreating revolutionaries also saw radical Muslim groups attack Chinese communities.

Although revolutionary leaders were sympathetic toward the Chinese, they were unable to stop the sporadic violence. Those who were affected fled the rural areas to Dutch controlled cities, a move many Indonesians saw as proof of pro-Dutch sentiments. There was evidence, however, that Chinese Indonesians were represented and participated in independence efforts. Four members of the Committee for the Investigation of the Preparation for Indonesian Independence (Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia, BPUPKI) and one member on the Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence (Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia, PPKI) had names that were clearly Chinese.

Loyalty in question (1950–1966)

The Netherlands relinquished its territorial claims in the archipelago (with the exception of West Papua) following the 1949 Round Table Conference, which is the same year the Kuomintang retreated to Taiwan, allowing the Communist Party of China to take control of mainland China. Most considered a communist China less attractive than a newly independent Indonesia, but their loyalty were questioned. Ethnic Chinese born in the Dutch East Indies and whose parents were domiciled under Dutch administration were regarded as citizens of the new state according to the principle of jus soli, or right of the soil. However Chinese law considered a person as a Chinese citizen according to the principle of jus sanguinis, or right of blood. This meant that all Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent were also claimed as citizens by China. After several attempts by both governments to resolve this issue, Indonesia and China signed a Dual Nationality Treaty on the sidelines of the 1955 Asian–African Conference in Bandung. One of its provisions was the ability to renounce Chinese citizenship for those who wished to solely remain Indonesian citizens.

They had thought they were unwanted in Southeast Asia because they were Chinese; then they were rejected in China because they were Indonesian.

—Charles Coppel

As many as 390,000 ethnic Chinese—two-thirds of those with rightful claims to Indonesian citizenship—renounced their Chinese status when the treaty came into effect in 1962. On the other hand, an estimated 60,000 ethnic Chinese students left for the People's Republic of China in the 1950s and early 1960s. The first wave of students were almost entirely educated in Chinese-language schools but were not able to find opportunities for tertiary education in Indonesia. Seeking high quality science professions, they entered China with high hopes for their future and that of the mainland. Subsequent migrations occurred in 1960 as part of a repatriation program and in 1965–1966 following a series of anti-communist violence that also drew anger toward the Chinese. As many as 80 percent of the original students who entered the mainland eventually became refugees in Hong Kong. Under the programs of China's Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), the returned overseas Chinese were questioned for their loyalty and targeted because of their foreign connections. Because most grew up in an urban environment, they were sent to the countryside, told to "rebel against their own class background", and eventually lost contact with their families. They were attacked as "imperialists", "capitalists", "spies", "half-breeds", and "foreign devils".

In 1959, following the introduction of soft-authoritarian rule through Guided Democracy, the Indonesian government and military began placing restrictions on alien residence and trade, which affected the ethnic Chinese. These regulations culminated in the enactment of Presidential Regulation 10 of 1959 in November, banning retail services by non-indigenous persons in rural areas. Chinese, Arab, and Dutch businessmen were specifically targeted during its enforcement in order to provide a more favorable market for indigenous businesses. This move was met with protests from the Chinese government and some circles of Indonesian society. Javanese writer Pramoedya Ananta Toer later criticized the policies in his 1961 book Hoakiau di Indonesia. An integrationist movement led by the Chinese Indonesian political party Baperki (Badan Permusjawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia) began to gather interest, including that of President Sukarno, in 1963. However, a series of attacks on Chinese communities in West Java in May proved it to be shortlived despite the government's condemnation of the violence. When Baperki was branded communist by a growing anti-communist movement in 1965, the Chinese ethnicity became generally identified as communist. As many as 500,000 people people died in the massacres of 1965–1966, the single most bloody event of violence in Indonesia's history.

Managing the "Chinese Problem" (1967–1998)

See also: Legislation on Chinese Indonesians

Pancasila, visualized through this shield image, suppressed all discussions of a unique Chinese identity in favor of political stability.

When the New Order government of General Suharto came into power in 1966–1967, it introduced a political system based only on the Pancasila (five principles) ideology and suppressed "a sharpening of opinions that can result in dissension". In order to prevent the ideological battles that occurred during Sukarno's presidency to resurface, Suharto's "Pancasila democracy" sought a depoliticized system, where discussions of forming a cohesive Chinese identity was no longer allowed. A government committee was formed in 1967 to examine various aspects of the "Chinese Problem" (Masalah Cina) and agreed that forced emigration of whole communities was not a solution. "The challenge was to take advantage of their economic aptitude whilst eliminating their perceived economic dominance." The semi-governmental Institute for the Promotion of National Unity (Lembaga Pembina Kesatuan Bangsa, LPKB) was then formed to advise the government in facilitating assimilation of Chinese Indonesians. This process was done through highlighting the differences between the Chinese and the indigenous pribumi, rather than seeking similarities. Expressions of Chinese culture through language, religion, and festivals were banned by presidential instructions, and the ethnic Chinese were encouraged to adopt Indonesian-sounding names.

During the 1970s and 1980s, Suharto and his government brought in Chinese Indonesian businesses to participate in the economic development programs of the New Order while keeping them highly vulnerable in order to strengthen its power and restrict political freedoms. Patron-client relationships, mainly through the exchange of money for security, became an accepted norm among the Chinese to maintain a social contract through which they could claim a sense of belonging in the country. A minority of the elites secured relationships with Suharto's family members and members of the military for protection, while small business owners also relied on local law enforcement officials for protection. Stereotypes of the wealthy minority became accepted as facts, but these generalizations fail to acknowledge that these businessmen are very few compared to small traders and shop owners. In a 1989 interview conducted by scholar Adam Schwarz for his book A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia's Search for Stability, the interviewee stated that "to most Indonesians, the word 'Chinese' is synonymous with corruption". The economic role of the Chinese was contradictory because it did not translate to acceptance of their status in the greater society. They were politically weak and often faced social harassment.

Many homes and businesses owned by ethnic Chinese in Jakarta were looted and burned in the May 1998 riots.

Anti-Chinese sentiment gathered intensity through the 1990s, and major riots broke out in Situbondo (October 1996), Tasikmalaya (December 1996), and Rengasdengklok (January 1997). President Suharto had gathered the most powerful businessmen—mostly Chinese Indonesians—in a nationally televised 1990 meeting at his private ranch to call on them to contribute 25 percent of their shares to cooperatives. Commentators described the spectacle as "good theatre" as it only served to reinforce resentment and suspicion of the ethnic Chinese among the indigenous population. When Suharto entered his seventh term as President following an uncontested election on 10 March 1998, Indonesian students began a series of major demonstrations in protest of the New Order regime, continuing for weeks and culminating in the shootings of four students by security forces at Trisakti University in May.

The incident sparked major violence in Jakarta, Solo, Surabaya, Lampung, and Palembang during 12–15 May. Property and businesses owned by Chinese Indonesians were targeted by mobs, and over 100 women were sexually assaulted. In the absence of security forces, large groups of men, women, and children looted and burned the numerous shopping malls in major cities. In Jakarta and Solo, over 1,000 people died inside these shopping malls. Tens of thousands of ethnic Chinese fled the country following these events, and bankers estimated that US$20 billion of capital had left the country in 1997–1999 to destinations such as Singapore, Hong Kong, and the United States.

Social policy reforms (1999–present)

Lantern display in Pekanbaru, Riau, during the 2009 Chinese New Year

Suharto unexpectedly resigned on 21 May 1998, one week after he returned from a Group of 15 meeting in Cairo following the riots. The reform government formed by his successor Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie began a campaign to rebuild the confidence of Chinese Indonesians, particularly businessmen, who had fled the country. Along with one of his envoys James Riady, son of financial magnate Mochtar Riady, Habibie appealed to Chinese Indonesians seeking refuge throughout East Asia, Australia, and North America to return with promises of security from various government ministries as well as other political figures such as Abdurrahman Wahid and Amien Rais. Despite Habibie's efforts, he was met with skepticism because of remarks he made, as Vice President and later as President, which suggested that the message was insincere. One special envoy described Chinese Indonesians as the key to restoring "badly needed" capital and economic activity, prioritizing businessmen as the target of their pleas. Others, including economist Kwik Kian Gie, saw the government's efforts as perpetuating the myth of Chinese economic domination rather than affirming the ethnic Chinese identity.

Symbolic reforms to Chinese Indonesian rights under Habibie's administration were made through two Presidential Instructions. The first abolished the use of the terms "pribumi" and "non-pribumi" in official government documents and business. The second abolished the ban on the study of Mandarin Chinese and reaffirmed a 1996 instruction which abolished the use of the Indonesian Citizenship Certificate (Surat Bukti Kewarganegaraan Republik Indonesia, SKBRI) to identify citizens of Chinese descent. Habibie established a taskforce to investigate the May 1998 violence, yet his government later dismissed its findings. As an additional legal gesture, Indonesia ratified the 1965 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination on 25 May 1999. In 2000, newly elected President Wahid abolished the ban on public displays of Chinese cultural objects and allowed Chinese traditions be practiced freely without the need of a permit. Two years later, President Megawati Sukarnoputri declared that Chinese New Year (Imlek) would be marked as a national holiday beginning in 2003.

Origins

See also: Chinese emigration

The tin mines of Bangka Island almost entirely employed Chinese workers.

Chinese immigrants to the archipelago almost entirely originated from ethnic Han groups of what are now Fujian and Guangdong provinces in southern China, known for its regional diversity. The Han Chinese form the largest ethnic group in the world with a "far from negligible" number living in Southeast Asia. Nearly all Chinese Indonesians are either patrilineal descendants of these early immigrants or new immigrants born in mainland China.

As the first group of Chinese people to settle in large numbers, the Hokkien of southern Fujian became the dominant immigrant group until the middle of the 19th century. Their mercantilistic culture is materialized through their trade occupations while in Indonesia. Descendants of Hokkiens are the dominant group in eastern Indonesia, Central and East Java, and the western coast of Sumatra. Teochews, southern neighbors of the Hokkien, are found throughout the eastern coast of Sumatra, in the Riau Archipelago, and in western Borneo. They were preferred as plantation laborers in Sumatra but have become traders in regions where Hokkiens are not well represented.

Coolies disembark at the port of Belawan.

Unlike the Hokkien and the Teochew, the Hakka originate from the mountainous inland regions of Guangdong and do not have a maritime culture. Due to the unproductive terrain of their home region, the Hakka emigrated out of economic necessity in several waves from 1850 to 1930 and were the poorest of the Chinese immigrant groups. Although they initially populated the mining centers of western Borneo and Bangka Island, Hakkas became attracted to the rapid growth of Batavia (now Jakarta) and West Java in the late 19th century.

Cantonese people, like the Hakka, were well known throughout Southeast Asia as mineworkers. Their migration in the 19th century was largely directed toward the tin mines of Bangka, off the east coast of Sumatra. Notable traditionally as skilled artisans, the Cantonese benefited from close contact with Europeans in Guangdong and Hong Kong by learning machinery and lessons in industrial success. They migrated to Java about the same time as the Hakka but for different reasons. In Indonesia's cities, they became artisans, machine workers, and owners of small businesses such as restaurants and hotelkeeping services. The Cantonese are evenly dispersed throughout the archipelago and number far less than the Hokkien or the Hakka. Consequently, their roles are of secondary importance in the Chinese communities.

Demographics

See also: Demographics of Indonesia

During the 2000 census, the peak of the ethnic Chinese population pyramid occurred in the 15–19 age group.

Indonesia's 2000 census reported 2,411,503 (1.20 percent) citizens as ethnic Chinese. An additional 93,717 (0.05 percent) ethnic Chinese were reported as foreign citizens, mostly those of the People's Republic of China and Republic of China who may not be able to pay the cost of becoming an Indonesian citizen. Because the census employed the method of self-identification, those who refused to identify themselves as Chinese or had assumed the identity of other ethnic groups were recorded as non-Chinese. It is also likely that some did not identify themselves for fear of repercussions in the wake of anti-Chinese violence in 1998. According to data collected from the 2005 Intercensal Population Survey, the population slightly decreased to an estimated 2.31 million. Scholars attribute this to falling fertility rates, an outflow of Chinese Indonesians to foreign countries, a growing segment of the population who did not consider themselves as Chinese, and possible underestimation because the data set was collected as a survey rather than a formal census.

Prior estimates on the exact number of the population relied on the 1930 Dutch East Indies census, which collected direct information on ethnicity. This census reported 1.23 million self-identified ethnic Chinese living in the colony, representing 2.03 percent of the total population, and was perceived to be an accurate account of the group's population. Ethnic information would not be collected again until the 2000 census, and this information was deduced from other census data such as language spoken and religious affiliation during the intermediate years. In an early survey of the Chinese minority, anthropologist G. William Skinner estimated that between 2.3 million (2.4 percent) and 2.6 million (2.7 percent) lived in Indonesia in 1961. Former foreign minister Adam Malik provided a figure of 5 million in a report published in the Harian Indonesia daily in 1973. Many media and academic sources subsequently estimated between 4 and 5 percent of the total population as Chinese regardless of the year. Estimates within the past decade placed the figure between 6 and 7 million, and the Overseas Compatriot Affairs Commission of the Republic of China estimated a population as high as 7.67 million in 2006.

The Chinese district of Medan, North Sumatra, in 1925. The city is a large center of ethnic Chinese population on the island.

Approximately one-fifth of Chinese Indonesians lived in the capital city of Jakarta, located on the island of Java. When the island's other provinces—Banten, West Java, Central Java, Yogyakarta, and East Java—are included, this population accounted for nearly half (45.92 percent) of all Chinese Indonesians. Outside of Java, the provinces of West Kalimantan, North Sumatra, Riau, the Bangka–Belitung Islands, and South Sumatra accounted for an additional 45.16 percent of the population. The Bangka–Belitung Islands had the highest local concentration of ethnic Chinese (11.75 percent of the province's population), followed by West Kalimantan (9.62 percent), Jakarta (5.83 percent), Riau (4.11 percent), and North Sumatra (3.07 percent). They accounted for 1 percent or less of the total population in each of the remaining provinces. Most Chinese Indonesians in North Sumatra lived in the provincial capital of Medan, but they constituted only a small percentage because of the relatively large population of the province. Bangka–Belitung, West Kalimantan, and Riau are grouped around the hub of ethnic Chinese economic activity in Singapore, and, with the exception of Bangka–Belitung, these settlements existed long before Singapore's founding in 1819.

The population has seen declining fertility rates since prior to 1980 in some areas.

The ethnic Chinese population grew by an average of 4.3 percent annually between 1920 and 1930. It slowed following this decade due to the effects of the Great Depression, and many areas experienced a net emigration. Falling growth rates were also attributed to a significant decrease in the number of Chinese immigrants admitted into Indonesia since the 1950s. The population is relatively old according to the 2000 census, having the lowest percentage of population under 14 years old nationwide and the second largest percentage of population over 65. Their population pyramid had a narrow base with a rapid increase until the 15–19 age group, indicating a rapid decline in total fertility rates. This was evidenced by a decline in the absolute number of births since 1980. In Jakarta and West Java, the population peak occurred in the 20–24 age group, indicating that the decline in fertility rates began as early as 1975. The upper portion of the pyramid exhibited a smooth decline with increasing population age. It is estimated that 60.7 percent of the population in 2000 constitute the generation of Chinese Indonesians which experienced political and social pressures under the New Order government. With a life expectancy of 75 years, those born prior to this regime change will completely disappear by 2032.

Emigrant communities

Main article: Overseas Indonesian

In the second half of the 20th century, new migrants began moving from Indonesia and other Southeast Asian countries to more industrialized regions around the world. Although these migrants possess a Chinese heritage, they often were not identified as such. There have been several independent estimates made on the Chinese Indonesian population living in other countries. Scholars estimated that half of over 30,000 Indonesians living in Australia in the late 1990s are ethnically Chinese, and they have since merged with other Chinese communities. In New Zealand, many migrants reside in the suburbs of Auckland. Some 1,500 sought asylum from the 1998 upheaval, of which two-thirds were granted residency. Australian scholar Charles Coppel believes they also constitute a large majority of returned overseas Chinese living in Hong Kong. Though it is impossible to accurately count this number, news sources provided estimates ranging from 100,000 to 150,000. Of the 57,000 Indonesians living in the United States in 2000, one-third were estimated to be ethnic Chinese. Locally knowledgeable migrants in Southern California estimate that 60 percent of Indonesian Americans living in the area are of Chinese descent. Their families usually resided in Indonesia for several generations and may have intermarried with pribumi.

Society

It may be stated as a general rule that if a given area of Indonesia was settled by Chinese in appreciable numbers prior to this century, Chinese society there is in some degree dichotomous today. In one sector of the society, adults as well as children are Indonesia-born, the orientation toward China is attenuated, and the influence of the individual culture is apparent. In the other sector of the society, the population consists of twentieth-century immigrants and their immediate descendants, who are less acculturated and more strongly oriented toward China. The significance and pervasiveness of the social line between the two sectors varies from one part of Indonesia to another.

— G. William Skinner, "The Chinese Minority", Indonesia

Scholars studying Chinese Indonesians often distinguish members of the group according to their racial and sociocultural background: the totok and the peranakan. The two terms were initially used to racially distinguish the pure-blooded Chinese from those with mixed ancestry. A secondary meaning to the terms later arose that meant the totok were born in China, and anyone born in Indonesia is considered peranakan. Segmentation within totok communities occurs through division in speech groups, a pattern that has become less apparent since the turn of the 20th century. Among the peranakan, segmentation occurs through social class, which is graded according to education and family standing rather than wealth.

Gender and kinship

See also: Chinese Indonesian surname

Chinese Indonesian women and children, accompanied by a pribumi nanny. Almost all household maids and drivers employed by Chinese Indonesians are pribumi.

Kinship structure in the totok community follows the patrilineal, patrilocal, and patriarchal traditions of Chinese society, a practice which has lost emphasis in peranakan familial relationships. Instead, kinship patterns in peranakan families have incorporated elements of matrilocal, matrilineal, and matrifocal traditions found in Javanese society. Within this community, both sons and daughters can inherit the family fortune, including ancestral tablets and ashes. Political, social, and economic authority in peranakan families is more evenly distributed between the two genders than in totok families. In this bilateral system, kin terms do not distinguish between maternal and paternal relatives, and polygyny is strongly frowned upon. Western influence in peranakan society is evidenced by the high proportion of childless couples compared to totok families. Those who did have children also had fewer of them than totok couples.

Despite their break from traditional kinship patterns, peranakan families are closer to traditional Chinese values than the totok in some respects. Because the peranakan have lost much of the connection to their ancestral homes in the coastal provinces of China, they are less affected by the modernization patterns of the 20th century which has transformed the region. The peranakan have a stricter attitude toward divorce, though the separation rates among both peranakan and totok families are generally lower than other groups. Arranged marriages are more common in peranakan families, and these familial relationships tend to be more nepotistic. A high degree of secularization among the totok meant that the peranakan carry out ancestral rituals to a higher degree, and peranakan youth tend to be more religious. Through education provided by high quality Catholic and Protestant schools, the peranakan are much more likely than the totok to convert to Christianity.

In the 21st century, the conceptual differences of the two groups have become dated and do not sufficiently describe the development of Chinese communities. Interracial marriage and cultural assimilation often prevent the formation a precise definition of the Chinese in line with any simple racial criterion. Use of a Chinese surname in some form or circumstance is generally a sign of cultural self-identification as Chinese or alignment with a Chinese social system.

Economic aptitude

See also: Economy of Indonesia

Advertisement in Chinese and Indonesian languages, c. 1950

Members of the totok community are more inclined to be entrepreneurs and adhere to the practice of guanxi, which is based on the idea that one's existence is influenced by the connection to others, implying the importance of business connections. In the first decade following independence, their business standing strengthened after being limited only to small businesses in the colonial period. By the 1950s, virtually all retail stores in Indonesia were owned by ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs, whose businesses ranged from selling groceries to construction material. Discontentment soon grew among indigenous merchants who felt they could not compete with Chinese businesses. Under pressure from indigenous merchants, the government enacted the Benteng program and Presidential Regulation 10 of 1959, which imposed restrictions on Chinese importers and rural retailers. Chinese businesses persisted due to their integration into larger networks throughout Southeast Asia, and their dominance continued despite continuous state and private efforts to encourage the growth of indigenous capital.

Government policies shifted dramatically after 1965 and became more favorable toward economic expansion. In an effort to rehabilitate the economy, the government turned to those possessing the capability to invest and expand corporate activity. Chinese capitalists, called the cukong, were strengthened by the military, which emerged as the dominant political force after 1965. Indigenous businessmen once again demanded greater investment support from the government in the 1970s, but each legislation fell short of reducing Chinese dominance. In a 1995 study published by the East Asia Analytical Unit of Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, approximately 73 percent of the market capitalization value of listed firms (excluding foreign and state-owned companies) were owned by Chinese Indonesians. Additionally, they owned 68 percent of the top 300 conglomerates and nine of the top ten private sector groups at the end of 1993. The figure propagated the general belief that ethnic Chinese—then estimated at 3 percent of the population—controlled 70 percent of the economy. Amid dispute surrounding the accuracy of this figure, it was evident that a wealth disparity existed along ethnic boundaries. The image of an economically powerful Chinese community was further fostered by the government through its inability to dissociate itself from the patronage networks.

Lippo Group executives were implicated in the 1996 United States campaign finance controversy involving Lippo Bank.

The top five conglomerates in Indonesia prior to the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis—the Salim Group, Astra International, the Sinar Mas Group, Gudang Garam, and the Lippo Group—were all owned by ethnic Chinese, with annual sales totaling Rp 112 trillion (US$ 47 billion). When the crisis finally hit the country, the rupiah's plunge severely disrupted corporate operations. Numerous conglomerates collapsed after losing a majority of their assets. Over the next several years, other conglomerates struggled to repay international and domestic debts. Reforms introduced following 1998 were meant to steer the economy away from oligarchic arrangements established under the New Order. However, plans for reform proved too optimistic. When President B. J. Habibie announced in a 19 July 1998 interview with The Washington Post that Indonesia was not dependent on Chinese businessmen, the rupiah's value plunged 5 percent. This unexpected reaction prompted immediate changes in policies, and Habibie soon began enticing conglomerates for their support in the reform plans. Most were initially fearful of democratization, but the process of social demarginalization meant that the Chinese were regarded as equal members of society for the first time in the nation's history. Increased regional autonomy allowed surviving conglomerates to explore new opportunities in the outer provinces, and economic reforms created a freer market beneficial for established capitalists.

Political activity

Between the 18th and early 20th centuries, Chinese communities were dominated by the peranakan presence. This period was followed by the growth of totok society. As part of a resinification effort by the peranakan, a new pan-Chinese movement emerged with the goal of seeking a unified Chinese political identity. The movement later split in the 1920s when peranakan elites resisted the leadership of the totok in the nationalist movement, and the two groups developed their own objectives. When it became apparent that unification was being achieved on totok terms, peranakan leaders chose to align their community with the Dutch, who had abandoned the segregation policies in 1908. The two communities once again found common ground in opposition against the invading Japanese when the occupying forces treated all Chinese groups with contempt.

File:Mega-Hasyim-CH.jpg

Poster supporting Megawati Sukarnoputri and Hasyim Muzadi in the 2004 presidential election with Chinese text reading: "This is the our selection as ethnic Chinese."

The issue of nationality following independence politicized the ethnic Chinese and led to the formation of Baperki in 1954 as the first and largest Chinese Indonesian political party or mass organization. Baperki and its majority peranakan membership led the opposition against a draft law which would have restricted the number of Chinese who could gain Indonesian citizenship. This movement was met by the Islamic Masyumi Party in 1956 when it called for the implementation of affirmative action for indigenous businesses. During the 1955 legislative election, Baperki received 178,887 votes and gained a seat on the People's Representative Council (DPR). Later that year, two Baperki candidates were also elected to the Constitutional Assembly.

Ethnic-based political parties were banned ender the government of President Suharto, leaving only the three indigenous-dominated parties of Golkar, the United Development Party (PPP), and the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI). The depoliticizing of Indonesian society confined Chinese activities to the economic sector. Chinese Indonesian critics of the regime were mostly peranakan and projected themselves as Indonesians, leaving the Chinese with no leaders to represent them. On the eve of the 1999 legislative election after Suharto's resignation, the news magazine Tempo conducted a survey of likely Chinese Indonesian voters on their political party of choice for the election. Although respondents were able to choose more than one party, 70 percent favored the Indonesian Democratic Party – Struggle (PDI–P), whose image of a nationalist party was considered favorable toward the ethnic Chinese. The party also benefited from the presence of economist Kwik Kian Gie, who was well respected by both Chinese and non-Chinese voters.

New ethnic political parties such as the Chinese Indonesian Reform Party (Partai Reformasi Tionghoa Indonesia, PARTI) and the Indonesian Bhinneka Tunggal Ika Party (Partai Bhinneka Tunggal Ika Indonesia, PBI) failed to garner much support in the 1999 election. Despite this result, the number of candidates standing in national election increased from fewer than 50 in 1999 to almost 150 in 2004. Of the 58 candidates of Chinese descent who ran for office as representatives from Jakarta in the 2009 legislative election, two won seats.

Culture

Language

Linguistic map of Fujian and Guangdong, China, showing the region's predominant Chinese dialects

Three major Chinese speech groups are represented in Indonesia: Hokkien, Hakka, and Cantonese. In addition to these, the Teochew speak a dialect that is mutually intelligible with Hokkien. Distinction between the two, however, are accentuated outside of their regions of origin. There were an estimated 2 million speakers of various Chinese dialects in 1982: 700,000 speakers of the Min Nan language family (including Hokkien and the Teochew dialect); 640,000 Hakka speakers; 460,000 Mandarin speakers; 180,000 Cantonese speakers; and 20,000 speakers of the Min Dong language family (including Xinghua). Additionally, an estimated 20,000 spoke varieties of the Indonesian language which mix elements of other Chinese dialects.

Many Indonesians, including the ethnic Chinese, believe the existence of a certain dialect of Malay language: Chinese Malay, known locally as Melayu Tionghoa or Melayu Cina. The growth of peranakan literature in the second half of the 19th century gave rise to such a variant, popularized through silat (martial arts) stories translated from Chinese or written in Malay and Indonesian. However, scholars argue it is different from the mixture of spoken Javanese and Malay that is perceived to be "spoken exclusively by ethnic Chinese".

[E]xcept for a few loan words from Chinese, nothing about 'Chinese Malay' is uniquely Chinese. The language was simply low, bazaar Malay, the common tongue of Java's streets and markets, especially of its cities, spoken by all ethnic groups in the urban and multi-ethnic environment. Because Chinese were a dominant element in the cities and markets, the language was associated with them, but government officials, Eurasians, migrant traders, or people from different language areas, all resorted to this form of Malay to communicate.

— Mary Somers Heidhues, The Encyclopedia of the Chinese Overseas

Academic literature discussing Chinese Malay commonly note that ethnic Chinese do not speak the same dialect of Malay throughout the archipelago. Furthermore, although the Dutch colonial government introduced the first orthography of Malay in 1901, Chinese newspapers did not follow this standard until some time after independence. Because of these factors, they play a "significant role" in the development of modern Indonesian as the largest group during the colonial period to communicate in a variety of Malay dialects.

Religion

See also: Religion in Indonesia

Two children bring flowers for their deceased parents at a Chinese temple.

The Ministry of Religious Affairs grants official status to six religion groups: Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism. Scholarly work devoted to the religious life of the Chinese of Southeast Asia is largely absent. The 1977 French book Les Chinois de Jakarta: Temples et V́ie Collective on temples in Jakarta is the only major study to assess the Chinese religious life in Indonesia.

According to the 2000 census data, almost 90 percent of Chinese Indonesians were Buddhist or Christian (Catholic and Protestant). Buddhists accounted for 53.82 percent of the Chinese Indonesian population, and Christians accounted for 35.09 percent. Conversion from the "Chinese religion" to Christianity often occur in the younger generations. It is not uncommon to find families with Christian children and parents still adhering to the traditional religion. The first wave of conversions occurred in the 1950s and 1960s in response to intolerance of Chinese culture, and the number of Chinese Catholics during this period increased by more than 400 percent. The second wave followed after the government withdrew Confucianism's status as a recognized religion in the 1970s. It was estimated in 2006 that 70 percent of the Chinese population was Christian with active proselytism from international churches.

In a country where nearly 90 percent of the population are Muslims, the Chinese Muslims did not form a small minority of the ethnic Chinese population. The 2000 census counted 5.41 percent of Chinese Indonesians were followers of Islam. Associations such as the Organization of Chinese Muslims of Indonesia (Persatuan Islam Tionghoa Indonesia, PITI) had been in existence in the late 19th century. It was re-established in 1963 as a modern organization but occasionally experienced periods of inactivity. PITI would later build the Muhammad Cheng Hoo Mosque in Surabaya. Confucians were included in the category of other religions in 2000 and accounted for 3.91 percent of the Chinese Indonesian population. The Supreme Council for Confucian Religion in Indonesia (Majelis Tinggi Agama Khonghucu Indonesia, MATAKIN) estimated that 95 percent of Confucians are ethnic Chinese.

Architecture

See also: Chinese architecture and Indonesian architecture

Rear view of Chinese houses along a river in Semarang, Central Java, c. 1925

Various forms of Chinese architecture exist throughout in Indonesia with marked differences between urban and rural areas and among the different islands. Architectural developments by the Chinese in Southeast Asia differ from those in mainland China. By blending local and European (Dutch) design patterns, numerous variations of fusion styles emerged. Chinese architecture in Indonesia manifested in three forms: religious temples, study halls, and houses. Cities during the colonial period were divided into three racial districts: European, oriental (Chinese, Arabs, and other Asians), and indigenous. There were usually no physical boundaries among the zones except for rivers, walls, or roads in several cases. Such legal boundaries promoted densification within each zone, especially in the Chinese quarters, often leading to poor environmental conditions.

Early settlers did not adhere to traditional architectural practices when constructing houses but instead adapted to living conditions in Indonesia. Although the earliest houses are no longer standing, they were likely built from wood or bamboo with thatched roofs, resembling indigenous houses found throughout Sumatra, Borneo, and Java. More permanent constructions replaced these settlements in the 19th century. Segregation policies under the Dutch forbade the use of European architectural styles by non-European ethnic groups. The Chinese and other foreign and indigenous groups lived according to their own cultures. Chinese houses along the north coast of Java were renovated to include Chinese ornamentation. As racial segregation eased at the turn of the 20th century, the Chinese who lave lost their identity embraced European culture and began removing ethnic ornaments from their buildings. Government policies prohibiting the public display of Chinese culture during the New Order also accelerated the transition toward local and Western architecture.

Cuisine

Main article: Chinese Indonesian cuisine

Example Chinese loanwords for food

Loanword	English name
bakmi	egg noodles with meat
kuetiao	rice noodles
bihun	Chinese vermicelli
juhi and cumi	cuttlefish
lobak	radish or turnip
kuachi	melon seed
Source: Tan 2002, p. 158

Chinese culinary culture is particularly evident in Indonesian cuisine through the Hokkien, Hakka, and Cantonese loanwords used for various dishes. Words beginning with bak ([[[wikt:肉|肉]]] Error: {{Lang}}: unrecognized language tag: zh-Han (help)) signify the presence of meat, e.g. bakpau (meat bun); words ending with cai ([[[wikt:菜|菜]]] Error: {{Lang}}: unrecognized language tag: zh-Han (help)) signify vegetables, e.g. pecai (Chinese white cabbage). Most of these loanwords for food dishes and their ingredients are Hokkien in origin and are used throughout the Indonesian language and/or the vernacular speech of large cities. Because they have become an integral part of the local language, many ethnic Indonesians and Chinese do not recognize their Hokkien origins. Some food and ingredients are part of the daily diet of both the indigenous and Chinese populations as side dishes to accompany rice, the staple food of most of the country. Among ethnic Chinese families, whether they are strongly Chinese oriented or already acculturated, pork is often the preferred meat. Its consumption has, however, decreased in recent years due to a recognition of its contribution to health hazards such as high cholesterol levels and heart disease.

In a 1997 restaurant listing published by the English-language daily The Jakarta Post, which largely caters to expatriates and middle class Indonesians, at least 80 locations within the city can be considered Chinese out of the 10-page list. Additionally, major hotels generally operate one or two Chinese restaurants, and many more can be found in large shopping centers. Upscale Chinese restaurants in Jakarta can be found serving delicacies such as shark fin soup and bird's nest soup, where the urban character of the ethnic Chinese is well established. Food with healing properties, generally under traditional Chinese medicine, are highly sought after.

See also

• People's Republic of China – Indonesia relations
• Peranakan

Bibliography

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Primary sources

• Hellwig, Tineke; Tagliacozzo, Eric, eds. (2009), The Indonesia Reader: History, Culture, Politics, Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, ISBN 978-0-8223-4424-7. {{citation}}: Unknown parameter |lastauthoramp= ignored (|name-list-style= suggested) (help)
• Suryadinata, Leo, ed. (1997), Political Thinking of the Indonesian Chinese, 1900–1995: A Sourcebook (2nd ed.), Singapore: Singapore University Press, ISBN 978-9971-69-201-8.

External links

• Anti Discrimination Movement (Gerakan Perjuangan Anti Diskriminasi, GANDI)
• Chinese Indonesian Association (Perhimpunan Indonesia Tionghoa, INTI)
• Indonesian Chinese Social Association (Paguyuban Sosial Marga Tionghoa Indonesia, PSMTI)