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{{Other uses|ECB (disambiguation){{!}}ECB}}
{{short description|Central bank of the Eurozone}}
{{Use British English|date=March 2013}}
{{Use British English|date=March 2013}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=September 2020}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=March 2013}}

{{Infobox central bank
{{Infobox central bank
|bank_name = European Central Bank
| native_name =
|bank_name_in_local =
| logo = Logo European Central Bank.svg
|image_1 = Logo European Central Bank.svg
| logo_size =
|image_title_1 = Emblem
| image = Frankfurt EZB.Nordwest-2.20141228.jpg
|image_width_1 = 100px
| caption = [[Seat of the European Central Bank|Seat]]
|image_2 = Frankfurt EZB.Nordwest-2.20141228.jpg
| image_size =
|image_title_2 = [[Seat of the European Central Bank|Seat]]
| headquarters = [[Ostend (Frankfurt am Main)|Ostend]] district, [[Frankfurt]], [[Germany]]
|bank_of = {{Collapsible list |title=[[Eurozone]] |{{flag|Austria}} |{{flag|Belgium|state}} |{{flag|Cyprus}} |{{flag|Estonia}} |{{flag|France}} |{{flag|Finland}} |{{flag|Germany}} |{{flag|Greece}} |{{flag|Ireland}} |{{flag|Italy}} |{{flag|Latvia}} |{{flag|Lithuania}} |{{flag|Luxembourg}} |{{flag|Malta}} |{{flag|Netherlands}} |{{flag|Portugal}} |{{flag|Slovakia}} |{{flag|Slovenia}} |{{flag|Spain}}}}
| coordinates = {{Coord|50.1089|8.7034|region:DE-HE_type:landmark}}
|headquarters = [[Frankfurt]], [[Germany]]
| established = {{Start date|1998|06|01|df=y}}
|coordinates = {{Coord|50.1089|8.7034|region:DE-HE_type:landmark}}
| governance =
|president = [[Charles Bonsu]]
* [[Governing Council of the European Central Bank|Governing Council]]
* [[Executive Board of the European Central Bank|Executive Board]]
|leader_title = [[President of the European Central Bank|President]]
|established = 1 June 1998
| president = [[Christine Lagarde]]
|currency = [[Euro]]
| leader_title = [[President of the European Central Bank|President]]
|currency_iso = EUR
| president2 = [[Luis de Guindos]]
|reserves = {{Collapsible list |title=526 billion euro in total |43 billion euro directly |338 billion euro ([[Eurosystem]] incl. gold) |145 billion euro ([[Foreign exchange reserves|forex reserves]])}}
| leader2_title = [[President of the European Central Bank#Vice Presidents|Vice President]]
|borrowing_rate = 0.05%<ref name=bbc-25>{{cite web|url=https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/monetary/rates/html/index.en.html|title=ECB: Key interest rates|publisher=|accessdate=14 September 2014}}</ref>
| president3 = [[Philip R. Lane]]
|deposit_rate = -0.20%
| leader3_title = Chief Economist
|website = [http://www.ecb.europa.eu www.ecb.europa.eu]
| bank_of = {{Collapsible list |title = [[Eurozone|Euro area]]
|preceded = {{Collapsible list |title=19 national banks|[[National Bank of Austria]]|[[National Bank of Belgium]]|[[Central Bank of Cyprus]]|[[Bank of Estonia]]|[[Bank of Finland]]|[[Banque de France]]|[[Deutsche Bundesbank]]|[[Bank of Greece]]|[[Central Bank of Ireland]]|[[Banca d'Italia]]|[[Latvijas Banka]]|[[Bank of Lithuania]]|[[Central Bank of Luxembourg]]|[[Central Bank of Malta]]|[[De Nederlandsche Bank]]|[[Banco de Portugal]]|[[Bank of Slovenia]]|[[National Bank of Slovakia]]|[[Bank of Spain]]}}
| {{Flag|Austria}}
|footnotes =
| {{Flag|Belgium}}
| {{Flag|Cyprus}}
| {{Flag|Estonia}}
| {{Flag|Finland}}
| {{Flag|France}}
| {{Flag|Germany}}
| {{Flag|Greece}}
| {{Flag|Ireland}}
| {{Flag|Italy}}
| {{Flag|Latvia}}
| {{Flag|Lithuania}}
| {{Flag|Luxembourg}}
| {{Flag|Malta}}
| {{Flag|Netherlands}}
| {{Flag|Portugal}}
| {{Flag|Slovakia}}
| {{Flag|Slovenia}}
| {{Flag|Spain}}
}}
| currency = [[Euro]] (€)
| currency_iso = EUR
| reserves = {{Collapsible list |title = €526 billion
| €40 billion {{Small|(directly)}}
| €340 billion {{Small|([[Eurosystem]] incl. gold)}}
| €150 billion {{Small|([[Foreign exchange reserves|forex reserves]])}}
}}
| reserve_requirements = <!-- % of reserves required to be held against deposits, or "None" if there are no such requirements -->
| borrowing_rate = 0.00% (Main refinancing operations)<ref name="rates"/><br/>0.25% (Marginal lending facility)<ref name="rates"/>
| interest_rate_target = <!-- the target interest rate, or target interest rate range -->
| deposit_rate = -0.50% (Deposit facility)<ref name="rates">{{cite web|url=https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/policy_and_exchange_rates/key_ecb_interest_rates/html/index.en.html|title=Key ECB interest rates|website=ecb.europa.eu}}</ref>
| excess_reserves = <!-- "yes" or "no" reg. interest on excess reserves - or "not applicable - no reserve requirement" if there is no reserve requirement -->
| website = {{url|www.ecb.europa.eu}}
| predecessor = {{Collapsible list |title = 19 central banks
| [[Oesterreichische Nationalbank]]
| [[National Bank of Belgium]]
| [[Central Bank of Cyprus]]
| [[Bank of Estonia]]
| [[Bank of Finland]]
| [[Banque de France]]
| [[Deutsche Bundesbank]]
| [[Bank of Greece]]
| [[Central Bank of Ireland]]
| [[Banca d'Italia]]
| [[Latvijas Banka]]
| [[Bank of Lithuania]]
| [[Central Bank of Luxembourg]]
| [[Central Bank of Malta]]
| [[De Nederlandsche Bank]]
| [[Banco de Portugal]]
| [[Bank of Slovenia|Banka Slovenije]]
| [[National Bank of Slovakia|Národná banka Slovenska]]
| [[Bank of Spain|Banco de España]]
}}
| successor =
| footnotes =
}}
}}


[[File:Frankfurt am Main, die Europäische Zentralbank vanaf die Alte Mainbrücke foto5 2016-08-11 16.21.jpg|Frankfurt am Main, the European Central Bank from Alte Mainbrücke|thumb|upright=1.2]]
[[File:Frankfurt EZB-Neubau.20130909.jpg|thumb|[[Seat of the European Central Bank]]]]
[[File:Frankfurt EZB-Neubau.20130909.jpg|upright=1.2|thumb|[[Seat of the European Central Bank]]]]


The '''European Central Bank''' ('''ECB''') is the [[central bank]] of the [[Eurozone]], a [[monetary union]] of 19 [[Member state of the European Union|EU member states]] which employ the [[euro]]. Established by the [[Treaty of Amsterdam]], the ECB is one of the world's [[Big Four (banking)#International use|most important central banks]] and serves as one of seven [[institutions of the European Union]], being enshrined in the [[Treaty on European Union]] (TEU). The bank's capital stock is owned by all 27 central banks of each EU member state.<ref name="capital" /> The current [[President of the European Central Bank|President of the ECB]] is [[Christine Lagarde]]. [[Seat of the European Central Bank|Headquartered]] in [[Frankfurt]], Germany, the bank formerly occupied the [[Eurotower (Frankfurt am Main)|Eurotower]] prior to the construction of its new seat.
The '''European Central Bank''' ('''ECB''') is the [[central bank]] for the [[euro]] and administers [[monetary policy]] of the [[Eurozone]], which consists of 19 [[Member state of the European Union|EU member states]] and is one of the largest currency areas in the world. It is one of the world's [[Big Four (banking)#International Use|most important central banks]] and is one of the seven [[institutions of the European Union]] (EU) listed in the [[Treaty on European Union]] (TEU). The capital stock of the bank is owned by the central banks of all 28 EU member states.{{update after|2013|7|4}} The [[Treaty of Amsterdam]] established the bank in 1998, and it is headquartered in [[Frankfurt]], Germany. {{As of|2015}} the [[President of the European Central Bank|President]] of the ECB is [[Mario Draghi]], former governor of the [[Banca d'Italia|Bank of Italy]], former member of the [[World Bank]],<ref name="IndependentGoldmanConquer">{{cite news|url=http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/analysis-and-features/what-price-the-new-democracy-goldman-sachs-conquers-europe-6264091.html|title=What price the new democracy? Goldman Sachs conquers Europe|last=Foley|first=Stephen|date=18 November 2011|publisher=The Independent|location=London}}</ref> and former managing director of the [[Goldman Sachs]] international division (2002–2005).<ref name="IndependentGoldmanConquer"/><ref>{{cite news|title=How Goldman Sachs Profited from the Greek Debt Crisis|url=http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-reich/how-goldman-sachs-profite_b_7820794.html |date= July 17, 2015 |newspaper=[[The Huffington Post]]|author= [[Robert Reich]] }}</ref> The bank primarily occupied the [[Eurotower (Frankfurt am Main)|Eurotower]] prior to, and during, the construction of the [[Seat of the European Central Bank|new headquarters]].


The primary objective of the ECB, mandated in Article 2 of the Statute of the ECB,<ref name=ecbst>{{Cite web |url=http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/pdf/en_statute_from_c_11520080509en02010328.pdf |title=Statute of the ECB |access-date=1 August 2013 |archive-date=31 May 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130531075207/http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/pdf/en_statute_from_c_11520080509en02010328.pdf |url-status=dead }}</ref> is to maintain [[price stability]] within the [[Eurozone]]. Its basic tasks, set out in Article 3 of the Statute,<ref name=ecbst/> are to set and implement the [[monetary policy]] for the Eurozone, to conduct foreign exchange operations, to take care of the [[foreign reserve]]s of the [[European System of Central Banks]] and operation of the financial market infrastructure under the [[TARGET2]] payments system and the technical platform (currently being developed) for settlement of securities in Europe ([[TARGET2 Securities]]). The ECB has, under Article 16 of its Statute,<ref name=ecbst/> the exclusive right to authorise the issuance of [[euro banknotes]]. Member states can issue [[euro coins]], but the amount must be authorised by the ECB beforehand.
The primary '''objective''' of the European Central Bank, as mandated in Article 2 of the Statute of the ECB,<ref name=ecbst>[http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/pdf/en_statute_from_c_11520080509en02010328.pdf Statute of the ECB]</ref> is to maintain [[price stability]] within the [[Eurozone]]. The basic '''tasks''', as defined in Article 3 of the Statute,<ref name=ecbst/> are to define and implement the [[monetary policy]] for the Eurozone, to conduct foreign exchange operations, to take care of the [[foreign reserve]]s of the [[European System of Central Banks]] and operation of the financial market infrastructure under the [[TARGET2]] payments system and the technical platform (currently being developed) for settlement of securities in Europe ([[TARGET2 Securities]]). The ECB has, under Article 16 of its Statute,<ref name=ecbst/> the exclusive right to authorise the issuance of [[euro banknotes]]. Member states can issue [[euro coins]], but the amount must be authorised by the ECB beforehand (upon the introduction of the euro, the ECB also had exclusive right to issue coins).{{citation needed|date=January 2014}}


The ECB is governed by European law directly, but its set-up resembles that of a corporation in the sense that the ECB has shareholders and stock capital. Its capital is five billion euro held by the national central banks of the member states as shareholders.{{citation needed|date=January 2014}} The initial capital allocation key was determined in 1998 on the basis of the states' population and GDP, but the key is adjustable.{{citation needed|date=January 2014}} Shares in the ECB are not transferable and cannot be used as collateral.
On 1 December 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force, ECB according to the article 13 of TEU, gained official status of an [[Institutions of the European Union|EU institution]].

The ECB is governed by European law directly, but its set-up resembles that of a corporation in the sense that the ECB has shareholders and stock capital. Its capital is €11 billion held by the national central banks of the member states as shareholders.<ref name="capital" /> The initial capital allocation key was determined in 1998 on the basis of the states' population and GDP, but the capital key has been adjusted.<ref name="capital" /> Shares in the ECB are not transferable and cannot be used as collateral.

When the ECB was created, it covered a [[Eurozone]] of eleven members. Since then, Greece joined in January 2001, Slovenia in January 2007, Cyprus and Malta in January 2008, Slovakia in January 2009, Estonia in January 2011, Latvia in January 2014 and Lithuania in January 2015.<ref name="autogenerated2" />


==History==
==History==
{{Further|History of the euro}}
{{Further|History of the euro}}
[[File:Wim Duisenberg.jpg|thumb|150px|right|[[Wim Duisenberg]], first President of the ECB]]
The European Central Bank is the ''de facto'' successor of the [[European Monetary Institute]] (EMI).<ref name="autogenerated1">{{cite web|url=http://www.ecb.int/ecb/history/emu/html/index.en.html |title=ECB: Economic and Monetary Union|publisher=ECB |accessdate=15 October 2007}}</ref> The EMI was established at the start of the second stage of the EU's [[Economic and Monetary Union of the European Union|Economic and Monetary Union]] (EMU) to handle the transitional issues of states adopting the euro and prepare for the creation of the ECB and [[European System of Central Banks]] (ESCB).<ref name="autogenerated1"/> The EMI itself took over from the earlier [[European Monetary Co-operation Fund]] (EMCF).<ref name="autogenerated2">{{cite web |title=European Central Bank |publisher=CVCE |url=http://www.cvce.eu/obj/european_central_bank-en-fc8d2e17-cbde-4ec8-8f79-46f06c471540.html |accessdate=18 February 2014}}</ref>


The ECB formally replaced the EMI on 1 June 1998 by virtue of the [[Treaty on European Union]] (TEU, Treaty of Maastricht), however it did not exercise its full powers until the [[introduction of the euro]] on 1 January 1999, signalling the third stage of EMU.<ref name="autogenerated1"/> The bank was the final institution needed for EMU, as outlined by the EMU reports of [[Pierre Werner]] and [[President of the European Commission|President]] [[Jacques Delors]]. It was established on 1 June 1998.<ref name="autogenerated3">{{cite web|url=http://www.ecb.int/ecb/history/emu/html/index.en.html |title=ECB: Economic and Monetary Union |publisher=Ecb.int |accessdate=26 June 2011}}</ref>
=== Early years of the ECB (1998-2007) ===
[[File:Wim Duisenberg.jpg|thumb|upright=0.7|right|[[Wim Duisenberg]], first President of the ECB]]
The European Central Bank is the ''de facto'' successor of the [[European Monetary Institute]] (EMI).<ref name="autogenerated1">{{cite web|url=http://www.ecb.int/ecb/history/emu/html/index.en.html |title=ECB: Economic and Monetary Union|publisher=ECB |access-date=15 October 2007}}</ref> The EMI was established at the start of the second stage of the EU's [[Economic and Monetary Union of the European Union|Economic and Monetary Union]] (EMU) to handle the transitional issues of states adopting the euro and prepare for the creation of the ECB and [[European System of Central Banks]] (ESCB).<ref name="autogenerated1"/> The EMI itself took over from the earlier [[European Monetary Co-operation Fund]] (EMCF).<ref name="autogenerated2">{{cite web |title=European Central Bank |publisher=CVCE |url=http://www.cvce.eu/obj/european_central_bank-en-fc8d2e17-cbde-4ec8-8f79-46f06c471540.html |access-date=18 February 2014|date=7 August 2016 }}</ref>


The ECB formally replaced the EMI on 1 June 1998 by virtue of the [[Treaty on European Union]] (TEU, Treaty of Maastricht), however it did not exercise its full powers until the [[introduction of the euro]] on 1 January 1999, signalling the third stage of EMU.<ref name="autogenerated1"/> The bank was the final institution needed for EMU, as outlined by the EMU reports of [[Pierre Werner]] and [[President of the European Commission|President]] [[Jacques Delors]]. It was established on 1 June 1219 The first [[List of Presidents of the European Central Bank|President of the Bank]] was [[Wim Duisenberg]], the former president of the [[De Nederlandsche Bank|Dutch central bank]] and the [[European Monetary Institute]].<ref name="autogenerated3">{{cite web|title=ECB: Economic and Monetary Union|url=http://www.ecb.int/ecb/history/emu/html/index.en.html|access-date=26 June 2011|publisher=Ecb.int}}</ref> While Duisenberg had been the head of the EMI (taking over from [[Alexandre Lamfalussy]] of Belgium) just before the ECB came into existence,<ref name="autogenerated3" /> the French government wanted [[Jean-Claude Trichet]], former head of the [[Banque de France|French central bank]], to be the ECB's first president.<ref name="autogenerated3" /> The French argued that since the ECB was to be located in Germany, its president should be French. This was opposed by the German, Dutch and Belgian governments who saw Duisenberg as a guarantor of a strong euro.<ref name="ENA EMU3">{{cite web |title=The third stage of Economic and Monetary Union |publisher=CVCE |url=http://www.cvce.eu/obj/the_third_stage_of_economic_and_monetary_union-en-e2e91dc0-3a6d-49fc-b3f8-f96fb5f3addb.html |access-date=18 February 2014 |date=7 August 2016}}</ref> Tensions were abated by a [[gentleman's agreement]] in which Duisenberg would stand down before the end of his mandate, to be replaced by Trichet.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.flickr.com/photos/uggboy/4417740330/ |title=The powerful European Central Bank [E C B] in the heart of Frankfurt/Main&nbsp;– Germany&nbsp;– The Europower in Mainhattan&nbsp;– Enjoy the glances of euro and europe....03/2010....travel round the world....:)|work=UggBoy♥UggGirl [PHOTO // WORLD // TRAVEL] |publisher=Flickr |date=6 March 2010 |access-date=14 October 2011}}</ref>
The first [[List of Presidents of the European Central Bank|President of the Bank]] was [[Wim Duisenberg]], the former president of the [[De Nederlandsche Bank|Dutch central bank]] and the [[European Monetary Institute]].<ref name="autogenerated3"/> While Duisenberg had been the head of the EMI (taking over from [[Alexandre Lamfalussy]] of Belgium) just before the ECB came into existence,<ref name="autogenerated3"/> the French government wanted [[Jean-Claude Trichet]], former head of the [[Banque de France|French central bank]], to be the ECB's first president.<ref name="autogenerated3"/> The French argued that since the ECB was to be located in Germany, its president should be French. This was opposed by the German, Dutch and Belgian governments who saw Duisenberg as a guarantor of a strong euro.<ref name="ENA EMU3">{{cite web |title=The third stage of Economic and Monetary Union |publisher=CVCE |url=http://www.cvce.eu/obj/the_third_stage_of_economic_and_monetary_union-en-e2e91dc0-3a6d-49fc-b3f8-f96fb5f3addb.html |accessdate=18 February 2014}}</ref> Tensions were abated by a [[gentleman's agreement]] in which Duisenberg would stand down before the end of his mandate, to be replaced by Trichet.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://secure.flickr.com/photos/uggboy/4417740330/ |title=The powerful European Central Bank [E C B] in the heart of Frankfurt/Main&nbsp;– Germany&nbsp;– The Europower in Mainhattan&nbsp;– Enjoy the glances of euro and europe....03/2010....travel round the world....:)|work=UggBoy♥UggGirl [PHOTO // WORLD // TRAVEL] |publisher=Flickr|date=6 March 2010|accessdate=14 October 2011}}</ref>


Trichet replaced Duisenberg as President in November 2003. Until 2007, the ECB had very successfully managed to maintain inflation close but below 2%.
Trichet replaced Duisenberg as President in November 2003.


[[File:Mario Draghi World Economic Forum 2013 crop.jpg|thumb|upright=0.7|right|[[Mario Draghi]], President of the ECB between 2011–2019]]
[[File:Mario Draghi World Economic Forum 2013 crop.jpg|thumb|150px|right|[[Mario Draghi]], the current President of the ECB]]
There had also been tension over the ECB's [[Executive Board of the European Central Bank|Executive Board]], with the United Kingdom demanding a seat even though it had not joined the Single Currency.<ref name="ENA EMU3"/> Under pressure from France, three seats were assigned to the largest members, France, Germany, and Italy; Spain also demanded and obtained a seat. Despite such a system of appointment the board asserted its independence early on in resisting calls for interest rates and future candidates to it.<ref name="ENA EMU3"/>


When the ECB was created, it covered a [[Eurozone]] of eleven members. Since then, Greece joined in January 2001, Slovenia in January 2007, Cyprus and Malta in January 2008, Slovakia in January 2009, Estonia in January 2011, Latvia in January 2014 and Lithuania in January 2015, enlarging the bank's scope and the membership of its Governing Council.<ref name="autogenerated2"/>
=== The ECB's response to the financial crises (2008-2014) ===
The European Central Bank underwent through a deep internal transformation as it faced the global financial crisis and the [[European debt crisis|Eurozone debt crisis]].
{{Expand section|here we need some headline facts on the early response to the Lehman shock: interest cuts, repos & swap lines, securitized bond purchases…|date=April 2021}}


On 1 December 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force, ECB according to the article 13 of TEU, gained official status of an [[Institutions of the European Union|EU institution]].
==== Early response to the Eurozone debt crisis ====
{{main|European debt crisis}}The so-called ''[[European debt crisis]]'' began after Greece's new elected government uncovered the real level indebtedness and budget deficit and warned EU institutions of the imminent danger of a Greek [[sovereign default]].


In September 2011, when German appointee to the Governing Council and Executive board, [[Jürgen Stark]], resigned in protest of the ECB's bond buying programme, Financial Times Deutschland called it "the end of the ECB as we know it" referring to its perceived "hawkish" stance on inflation and its historical Bundesbank influence.<ref>{{cite news | author=Proissl, von Wolfgang | url=http://www.ftd.de/politik/europa/:stark-ruecktritt-das-ende-der-ezb-wie-wir-sie-kannten/60102214.html | title=Das Ende der EZB, wie wir sie kannten | trans-title=The end of the ECB, as we knew it | department=Kommentar | work=[[Financial Times Deutschland]] | date=9 September 2011 | deadurl=yes | archivedate=15 October 2011 | archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20111015235754/http://www.ftd.de/politik/europa/:stark-ruecktritt-das-ende-der-ezb-wie-wir-sie-kannten/60102214.html | language=de }}</ref>
Foreseeing a possible sovereign default in the eurozone, the general public, international and European institutions, and the financial community reassessed the economic situation and creditworthiness of some Eurozone member states, in particular Southern countries. Consequently, sovereign bonds yields of several Eurozone countries started to rise sharply. This provoked a self-fulfilling panic on financial markets: the more Greek bonds yields rose, the more likely a default became possible, the more bond yields increased in turn.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLDE61F0W720100216|title=Peripheral euro zone government bond spreads widen|author=George Matlock|date=16 February 2010|access-date=28 April 2010|work=Reuters}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.economist.com/node/16009099|title=Acropolis now|date=29 April 2010|work=The Economist|access-date=22 June 2011}}</ref><ref name="wsj">{{Cite news|url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704041504575045743430262982|title=Global Markets Shudder: Doubts About U.S. Economy and a Debt Crunch in Europe Jolt Hopes for a Recovery|author1=Brian Blackstone|date=5 February 2010|work=The Wall Street Journal|access-date=10 May 2010|author2=Tom Lauricella|author3=Neil Shah}}</ref><ref>[https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/06/world/europe/geir-haarde-former-iceland-leader-goes-on-trial-for-role-in-financial-crisis.html "Former Iceland Leader Tried Over Financial Crisis of 2008"], ''The New York Times'', 5 March 2012. Retrieved 30 May 2012.</ref><ref>{{citation|title=Greek/German bond yield spread more than 1,000 bps|date=28 April 2010|publisher=Financialmirror.com}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7d25573c-1ccc-11df-8d8e-00144feab49a.html|title=Gilt yields rise amid UK debt concerns|date=18 February 2010 |work=Financial Times |access-date=15 April 2011}}{{registration required}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/3454|title=The politics of the Maastricht convergence criteria &#124; vox&nbsp;– Research-based policy analysis and commentary from leading economists|date=15 April 2009|publisher=Voxeu.org|access-date=1 October 2011}}</ref>


On 1 November 2011, [[Mario Draghi]] replaced Jean-Claude Trichet as President of the ECB.
===== Trichet's reluctance to intervene =====
This panic was also aggravated because of the inability of the ECB to react and intervene on sovereign bonds markets for two reasons. First, because the ECB's legal framework normally forbids the purchase of sovereign bonds (Article 123. TFEU),<ref>Bagus, ''The Tragedy of the Euro'', 2010, p.75.</ref> This prevented the ECB from implementing [[quantitative easing]] like the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England did as soon as 2008, which played an important role in stabilizing markets.


In April 2011, the ECB raised interest rates for the first time since 2008 from 1% to 1.25%,<ref>{{cite web |url= http://www.marketwatch.com/story/ecb-raises-interest-rates-2011-04-07 |title=ECB Raises Interest Rates&nbsp;– MarketWatch|work=marketwatch.com |year=2011 |accessdate=14 July 2011}}</ref> with a further increase to 1.50% in July 2011.<ref>{{cite web |url= http://www.ecb.int/stats/monetary/rates/html/index.en.html |title=ECB: Key interest rates|year=2011 |accessdate=29 August 2011}}</ref> However, in 2012–2013 the ECB sharply lowered interest rates to encourage economic growth, reaching the historically low 0.25% in November 2013.<ref name=bbc-25 /> Soon after the rates were cut to 0.15%, then on 4 September 2014 the central bank reduced the rates by two thirds from 0.15% to 0.05%, the lowest rates on record.<ref name="ECBcuts">{{cite news|title=Draghi slashes interest rates, unveils bond buying plan|url=http://www.europenews.net/index.php/sid/225407609|date=4 September 2014|accessdate=5 September 2014|publisher=''Europe News.Net''}}</ref>
Secondly, a decision by the ECB made in 2005 introduced a minimum credit rating (BBB-) for all Eurozone sovereign bonds to be eligible as collateral to the ECB's open market operations. This meant that if a private rating agencies were to downgrade a sovereign bond below that threshold, many banks would suddenly become illiquid because they would lose access to ECB refinancing operations. According to former member of the governing council of the ECB [[Athanasios Orphanides]], this change in the ECB's collateral framework "planted the seed" of the euro crisis.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://voxeu.org/article/how-ecb-planted-seeds-euro-area-crisis|title=Monetary policy and fiscal discipline: How the ECB planted the seeds of the euro area crisis|last=Orphanides|first=Athanasios|date=9 March 2018|website=VoxEU.org|access-date=22 September 2018}}</ref>


In November 2014, the bank moved into its [[Seat of the European Central Bank|new premises]].
Faced with those regulatory constraints, the ECB led by Jean-Claude Trichet in 2010 was reluctant to intervene to calm down financial markets. Up until 6 May 2010, Trichet formally denied at several press conferences<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2010/html/is100506.en.html|title=Introductory statement with Q&A|last=Bank|first=European Central|website=European Central Bank|language=en|access-date=3 October 2018}}</ref> the possibility of the ECB to embark into sovereign bonds purchases, even though Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy faced waves of [[credit rating]] downgrades and increasing interest rate spreads.


==Powers and objectives==
==== ECB's market interventions (2010-2011) ====
[[File:ECB SMP Bond Purchases.png|thumb|upright=0.9|ECB Securities Markets Programme (SMP) covering bond purchases since May 2010]]
In a remarkable u-turn, the ECB announced on 10 May 2010,<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2010/html/pr100510.en.html|title=ECB decides on measures to address severe tensions in financial markets|last=Bank|first=European Central|website=European Central Bank|language=en|access-date=22 September 2018}}</ref> the launch of a "Securities Market Programme" (SMP) which involved the discretionary purchase of sovereign bonds in secondary markets. Extraordinarily, the decision was taken by the Governing Council during a teleconference call only three days after the ECB's usual meeting of 6 May (when Trichet still denied the possibility of purchasing sovereign bonds). The ECB justified this decision by the necessity to "address severe tensions in financial markets." The decision also coincided with the EU leaders decision of 10 May to establish the European Financial Stabilisation mechanism, which would serve as a crisis fighting fund to safeguard the euro area from future sovereign debt crisis.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://euobserver.com/economic/30048|title=Mixed support for ECB bond purchases|access-date=22 September 2018|language=en}}</ref>


===Objective===
The ECB's bond buying focused primarily on Spanish and Italian debt.<ref>{{cite news |first1=John |last1=McManus |first2=Dan |last2=O'Brien |title=Market rout as Berlin rejects call for more EU action |journal=Irish Times |date=5 August 2011 }}</ref> They were intended to dampen international speculation against those countries, and thus avoid a contagion of the Greek crisis towards other Eurozone countries. The assumption is that speculative activity will decrease over time and the value of the assets increase.

Although SMP did involve an injection of new money into financial markets, all ECB injections were "sterilized" through weekly liquidity absorption. So the operation was neutral for the overall money supply.<ref name="Euro debt working paper">{{cite web|date=February 2011|title=WOrking paper 2011 / 1 A Comprehensive approach to the EUro-area debt crisis|url=http://unipub.lib.uni-corvinus.hu/304/1/wp_2011_1_darvas.pdf|access-date=28 October 2011|work=Zsolt Darvas|publisher=Corvinus University of Budapest}}</ref>{{Citation needed|reason=Reference does not mention 'sterilized injections' or 'liquidity absorption'. Add page number, or different source.|date=April 2019}}

In September 2011, ECB's Board member [[Jürgen Stark]], resigned in protest against the "Securities Market Programme" which involved the purchase of sovereign bonds from Southern member states, a move that he considered as equivalent to [[monetary financing]], which is prohibited by the EU Treaty. The ''[[Financial Times Deutschland]]'' referred to this episode as "the end of the ECB as we know it", referring to its hitherto perceived "hawkish" stance on inflation and its historical [[Deutsche Bundesbank]] influence.<ref>{{cite news|author=Proissl, von Wolfgang|date=9 September 2011|title=Das Ende der EZB, wie wir sie kannten|language=de|trans-title=The end of the ECB, as we knew it|work=[[Financial Times Deutschland]]|department=Kommentar|url=http://www.ftd.de/politik/europa/:stark-ruecktritt-das-ende-der-ezb-wie-wir-sie-kannten/60102214.html|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111015235754/http://www.ftd.de/politik/europa/%3Astark-ruecktritt-das-ende-der-ezb-wie-wir-sie-kannten/60102214.html|archive-date=15 October 2011}}</ref>

As of 18 June 2012, the ECB in total had spent €212.1bn (equal to 2.2% of the Eurozone GDP) for bond purchases covering outright debt, as part of the Securities Markets Programme.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.commbank.com.au/corporate/research/publications/economics/economic-issues/international/2012/180612-ECB.pdf|title=The ECB's Securities Market Programme (SMP) – about to restart bond purchases?|work=Global Markets Research – International Economics|publisher=Commonwealth Bank|date=18 June 2012|access-date=21 April 2013}}</ref> Controversially, the ECB made substantial profits out of SMP, which were largely redistributed to Eurozone countries.<ref>{{Cite news|url=http://www.positivemoney.eu/2018/07/ecb-smp-profits-billions-lost-for-greece/|title=How Greece lost billions out of an obscure ECB programme|date=25 July 2018|work=Positive Money Europe|access-date=25 September 2018|language=en-GB}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.guengl.eu/news/article/the-ecb-as-vulture-fund-how-central-banks-speculated-against-greece-and-won|title=The ECB as vulture fund: how central banks speculated against Greece and won big – GUE/NGL – Another Europe is possible|website=guengl.eu|language=en|access-date=25 September 2018}}</ref> In 2013, the [[Eurogroup]] decided to refund those profits to Greece, however the payments were suspended over 2014 until 2017 over the conflict between [[Yanis Varoufakis]] and ministers of the Eurogroup. In 2018, profits refunds were reinstalled by the Eurogroup. However, several NGOs complained that a substantial part of the ECB profits would never be refunded to Greece.<ref>{{Cite news|url=http://www.positivemoney.eu/2018/10/petition-eurogroup-return-ecb-profits-to-greece/|title=Unfair ECB profits should be returned to Greece, 117,000 citizens demand|date=19 October 2018|work=Positive Money Europe|access-date=21 October 2018|language=en-GB}}</ref>

====Role in the Troika (2010-2015) ====
{{See also|Greek government-debt crisis|Post-2008 Irish banking crisis|Eurozone debt crisis}}
The ECB played a controversial role in the "[[European troika|Troika]]" by rejecting all forms of debt restructuring of public and private debts,<ref>{{Cite news|last=O'Connell|first=Hugh|title=Everything you need to know about the promissory notes, but were afraid to ask|language=en|work=TheJournal.ie|url=http://www.thejournal.ie/anglo-promissory-notes-ecb-775366-Feb2013/|access-date=3 October 2018}}</ref> forcing governments to adopt bailout programmes and structural reforms through secret letters to Italian, Spanish, Greek and Irish governments. It has further been accused of interfering in the [[Greek referendum 2015|Greek referendum of July 2015]] by constraining liquidity to Greek commercial banks.<ref>{{Cite web|last=EU|first=Transparency International|date=2017-03-28|title=Transparency International EU|url=https://transparency.eu/ecb|access-date=2021-04-03|website=Transparency International EU|language=en}}</ref>
{{Expand section|explanations on the role of ECB for Greece, Italy, Spain, Cyprus, Portugal.|date=April 2021}}
In November 2010, it became clear that Ireland would not be able to afford to bail out its failing banks, and [[Anglo Irish Bank]] in particular which needed around 30 billion euros, a sum the government obviously could not borrow from financial markets when its bond yields were soaring to comparable levels with the Greek bonds. Instead, the government issued a 31bn EUR "promissory note" (an IOU) to Anglo – which it had nationalized. In turn, the bank supplied the promissory note as collateral to the [[Central Bank of Ireland]], so it could access emergency liquidity assistance (ELA). This way, Anglo was able to repay its bondholders. The operation became very controversial, as it basically shifted Anglo's private debts onto the government's balance sheet.

It became clear later that the ECB played a key role in making sure the Irish government did not let Anglo default on its debts, in order to avoid a financial instability risks. On 15 October and 6 November 2010, the ECB President [[Jean-Claude Trichet]] sent two secret letters<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/html/irish-letters.en.html|title=Irish letters|last=Bank|first=European Central|website=European Central Bank|language=en|access-date=3 October 2018}}</ref> to the Irish finance Minister which essentially informed the Irish government of the possible suspension of ELA's credit lines, unless the government requested a financial assistance programme to the [[Eurogroup]] under condition of further reforms and fiscal consolidation.

Over 2012 and 2013, the ECB repeatedly insisted that the promissory note should be repaid in full, and refused the Government's proposal to swap the notes with a long-term (and less costly) bond until February 2013.<ref>{{Cite news|url=http://www.thejournal.ie/reuters-report-ecb-promissory-note-bond-770857-Jan2013/|title=Report: ECB rules out long-term bond to replace promissory note|last=Reilly|first=Gavan|work=TheJournal.ie|access-date=3 October 2018|language=en}}</ref> In addition, the ECB insisted that no debt restructuring (or [[bail-in]]) should be applied to the nationalized banks' bondholders, a measure which could have saved Ireland 8 billion euros.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.irishtimes.com/business/financial-services/chopra-ecb-refusal-to-burn-bondholders-burdened-taxpayers-1.2347861|title=Chopra: ECB refusal to burn bondholders burdened taxpayers|work=The Irish Times|access-date=3 October 2018|language=en-US}}</ref>

In April 2011, the ECB raised interest rates for the first time since 2008 from 1% to 1.25%,<ref>{{Cite news|last1=Blackstone|first1=Brian|year=2011|title=ECB Raises Interest Rates&nbsp;– MarketWatch|work=marketwatch.com|url=http://www.marketwatch.com/story/ecb-raises-interest-rates-2011-04-07|access-date=14 July 2011}}</ref> with a further increase to 1.50% in July 2011.<ref>{{cite web|year=2011|title=ECB: Key interest rates|url=http://www.ecb.int/stats/monetary/rates/html/index.en.html|access-date=29 August 2011}}</ref> However, in 2012–2013 the ECB sharply lowered interest rates to encourage economic growth, reaching the historically low 0.25% in November 2013.<ref name="rates" /> Soon after the rates were cut to 0.15%, then on 4 September 2014 the central bank reduced the rates by two thirds from 0.15% to 0.05%.<ref name="ECBcuts">{{cite news|date=4 September 2014|title=Draghi slashes interest rates, unveils bond buying plan|publisher=europenews.net|url=http://www.europenews.net/index.php/sid/225407609|access-date=5 September 2014}}</ref> Recently, the interest rates were further reduced reaching 0.00%, the lowest rates on record.<ref name="rates" />

In a report adopted on 13 March 2014, the [[European Parliament]] criticized the "potential conflict of interest between the current role of the ECB in the Troika as ‘technical advisor’ and its position as creditor of the four Member States, as well as its mandate under the Treaty". The report was led by Austrian right-wing MEP [[Othmar Karas]] and French Socialist MEP [[Liêm Hoang-Ngoc|Liem Hoang Ngoc]].

====The ECB's response under Mario Draghi (2012-2015)====

[[File:ECB balance sheet.png|thumb|ECB balance sheet]]
[[File:ECB deposit facility.svg|thumb|ECB deposit facility]]
[[File:Current accounts at the ECB.png|thumb|Current accounts at the ECB]]

On 1 November 2011, [[Mario Draghi]] replaced Jean-Claude Trichet as President of the ECB.<ref>{{Cite news|date=1 November 2011|title=Mario Draghi takes centre stage at ECB|work=BBC|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/business-13901139|access-date=28 December 2011}}</ref> This change in leadership also marks the start of a new era under which the ECB will become more and more interventionist and eventually ended the [[European debt crisis|Eurozone sovereign debt crisis]].

Draghi's presidency started with the impressive launch of a new round of 1% interest loans with a term of three years (36 months) – the '''Long-term Refinancing operations (LTRO)'''. Under this programme, 523 Banks tapped as much as €489.2 bn (US$640 bn). Observers were surprised by the volume of the loans made when it was implemented.<ref name="ECB82011">{{cite web|url=http://www.ecb.int/press/pressconf/2011/html/is111208.en.html|title=Introductory statement to the press conference (with Q&A)|author1=Mario Draghi|author2=President of the ECB|date=8 December 2011|publisher=European Central Bank|location=Frankfurt am Main|format=Press conference|access-date=22 December 2011|author3=Vítor Constâncio|author4=Vice-President of the ECB}}</ref><ref name="NYTloans">{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/22/business/global/demand-for-ecb-loans-surpasses-expectations.html|title=European Bank in Strong Move to Loosen Credit|author=Nelson D. Schwartz|date=21 December 2011|newspaper=The New York Times|access-date=22 December 2011|author2=David Jolly|quote=the move, by the European Central Bank, could be a turning point in the Continent's debt crisis}}</ref><ref name="NYTNorris">{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/22/business/a-central-bank-doing-what-central-banks-do.html|title=A Central Bank Doing What It Should|author=Floyd Norris|date=21 December 2011|newspaper=The New York Times|access-date=22 December 2011|format=Analysis}}</ref> By far biggest amount of {{Nowrap|€325bn}} was tapped by banks in Greece, Ireland, Italy and Spain.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/feb/29/eurozone-debt-crisis-ecb-loans-ltro#block-3|title=Eurozone crisis live: ECB to launch massive cash injection|last1=Wearden|first1=Graeme|date=29 February 2012|work=The Guardian|access-date=29 February 2012|last2=Fletcher|first2=Nick|location=London}}</ref> Although those LTROs loans did not directly benefit EU governments, it effectively allowed banks to do a [[carry trade]], by lending off the LTROs loans to governments with an interest margin. The operation also facilitated the rollover of {{Nowrap|€200bn}} of maturing bank debts<ref>{{cite news|last1=Ewing|first1=Jack|last2=Jolly|first2=David|date=21 December 2011|title=Banks in the euro zone must raise more than 200bn euros in the first three months of 2012|work=[[The New York Times]]|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/22/business/global/demand-for-ecb-loans-surpasses-expectations.html|access-date=21 December 2011}}</ref> in the first three months of 2012.

===== "Whatever it takes" (26 July 2012) =====
Facing renewed fears about sovereigns in the eurozone continued Mario Draghi made a decisive speech London, by declaring that the ECB "...is ready to do '''''whatever it takes''''' to preserve the Euro. And believe me, it will be enough."<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120726.en.html|title=Verbatim of the remarks made by Mario Draghi|last=Bank|first=European Central|website=European Central Bank|language=en|access-date=25 September 2018}}</ref> In light of slow political progress on solving the eurozone crisis, Draghi's statement has been seen as a key turning point in the eurozone crisis, as it was immediately welcomed by European leaders, and led to a steady decline in bond yields for eurozone countries, in particular Spain, Italy and France.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.ft.com/content/93b358ba-c1d4-11e0-bc71-00144feabdc0|title=Itay and Spain respond to ECB treatment|date=8 August 2011|work=Financial Times|access-date=28 December 2019}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|date=2012-07-26|title=ECB 'will do whatever it takes' to save the euro|url=https://www.politico.eu/article/ecb-will-do-whatever-it-takes-to-save-the-euro/|access-date=2021-04-03|website=POLITICO|language=en-US}}</ref>

Following up on Draghi's speech, on 6 September 2012 the ECB announced the '''[[Outright Monetary Transactions]]''' programme (OMT).<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/07/business/global/european-central-bank-leaves-interest-rates-unchanged-at-0-75-percent.html?pagewanted=all|title=Europe's Central Bank Moves Aggressively to Ease Euro Crisis|last1=Ewing|first1=Jack|date=6 September 2012|work=The New York Times|last2=Erlanger|first2=Steven}}</ref> Unlike the previous SMP programme, OMT has no [[ex-ante]] time or size limit.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.ecb.int/press/pressconf/2012/html/is120906.en.html|title=ECB press conference, 6 September 2012|access-date=14 September 2014}}</ref> However, the activation of the purchases remains conditioned to the adherence by the benefitting country to an adjustment programme to the ESM. The program was adopted with near unanimity, the Bundesbank president [[Jens Weidmann]] being the sole member of the ECB's Governing Council to vote against.<ref>"[…] the decision on Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs) that we took in September 2012 to protect the euro area from speculation that could have forced some countries out of the single currency. That decision was almost unanimous; the single vote against came from the President of the Bundesbank" {{Cite web|last=Bank|first=European Central|date=2019-12-16|title=Interview with Libération|url=https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/inter/date/2019/html/ecb.in191216_1~bb222205e4.en.html|access-date=2021-04-03|website=European Central Bank|language=en}}</ref>

Even if OMT was never actually implemented until today, it made the "Whatever it takes" pledge credible and significantly contributed in stabilizing financial markets and ended the sovereign debt crisis. According to various sources, the OMT programme and "whatever it takes" speeches were made possible because EU leaders previously agreed to build the [[European Banking union|banking union]].<ref>{{Cite web|title=Ministers agree deal on EU banking union|url=https://euobserver.com/economic/118516|access-date=2021-04-03|website=EUobserver|language=en}}</ref>

=== Low inflation and quantitative easing (2015-2019) ===
In November 2014, the bank moved into its [[Seat of the European Central Bank|new premises]], while the [[Eurotower (Frankfurt am Main)|Eurotower building]] was dedicated to host the newly established supervisory activities of the ECB under the [[Single Supervisory Mechanism]].<ref>{{Cite web|last=Bank|first=European Central|date=2013-11-09|title=Eurotower to house ECB's banking supervision staff|url=https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2013/html/pr131109.en.html|access-date=2021-04-03|website=European Central Bank|language=en}}</ref>

Although the sovereign debt crisis was almost solved by 2014, the ECB started to face a repeated decline<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://calrev.org/2019/05/04/on-the-causes-of-european-political-instability/|title=On the Causes of European Political Instability|last=Henderson|first=Isaiah M.|date=4 May 2019|website=The California Review|language=en-US|access-date=19 July 2019}}</ref> in the Eurozone inflation rate, indicating that the economy was going towards a deflation. Responding to this threat, the ECB announced on 4 September 2014 the launch of two bond buying purchases programmes: the Covered Bond Purchasing Programme (CBPP3) and Asset-Backed Securities Programme (ABSPP).<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2014/html/is140904.en.html|title=Introductory statement to the press conference (with Q&A)|last=European Central Bank|website=European Central Bank|language=en|access-date=25 September 2018}}</ref>

On 22 January 2015, the ECB announced an extension of those programmes within a full-fledge "[[quantitative easing]]" programme which also included sovereign bonds, to the tune of 60 billion euros per month up until at least September 2016. The programme was started on 9 March 2015.<ref>{{cite news|date=27 April 2017|title=Draghi fends off German critics and keeps stimulus untouched|newspaper=Financial Times|url=https://www.ft.com/content/efece562-2b30-11e7-bc4b-5528796fe35c}}</ref>

On 8 June 2016, the ECB added corporate bonds to its asset purchases portfolio with the launch of the corporate sector purchase programme (CSPP).<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/celex_32016d0016_en_txt.pdf?0240957ff3a5d0b909a9482628799777|title=DECISION (EU) 2016/948 OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 1 June 2016 on the implementation of the corporate sector purchase programme (ECB/2016/16)}}</ref> Under this programme, it conducted net purchase of corporate bonds until January 2019 to reach about €177 billion. While the programme was halted for 11 months in January 2019, the ECB restarted net purchases in November 2019.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/omt/html/index.en.html#cspp|title=Corporate sector purchase programme (CSPP) – Questions & Answers}}</ref>

As of 2021, the size of the ECB's quantitative easing programme had reached 2947 billion euros.<ref>{{Cite web|date=2021-03-25|title=Asset purchase programmes|url=https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/app/html/index.en.html|url-status=live|access-date=2021-04-03|website=European Central Bank|language=en}}</ref>

=== Christine Lagarde's era (2019- ) ===
In July 2019, EU leaders nominated [[Christine Lagarde]] to replace Mario Draghi as ECB President. Lagarde resigned from her position as Managing Director of the [[International Monetary Fund]] in July 2019<ref>{{Cite news|date=2019-07-16|title=Christine Lagarde resigns as head of IMF|language=en-GB|work=BBC News|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/business-49009226|access-date=2021-04-03}}</ref> and formally took over the ECB's Presidency on 1 November 2019.<ref>{{Cite news|last1=Hujer|first1=Marc|last2=Sauga|first2=Michael|date=30 October 2019|title=Elegance and Toughness: Christine Lagarde Brings a New Style to the ECB|work=Spiegel Online|url=https://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/christine-lagarde-takes-over-at-the-european-central-bank-a-1294033.html|access-date=11 November 2019}}</ref>

Lagarde immediately signaled a change of style in the ECB's leadership. She embarked the ECB's into a strategic review of the ECB's monetary policy strategy, an exercise the ECB had not done for 17 years. As part of this exercise, Lagarde committed the ECB to look into how monetary policy could contribute to address climate change,<ref>{{Cite web|date=2019-08-29|title=Lagarde promises to paint the ECB green|url=https://www.politico.eu/article/christine-lagarde-promises-to-paint-the-ecb-green-european-central-bank/|access-date=2021-04-03|website=POLITICO|language=en-US}}</ref> and promised that "no stone would be left unturned." The ECB president also adopted a change of communication style, in particular in her use of social media to promote gender equality,<ref>{{Cite web|date=2021-03-05|title=Christine Lagarde's uphill battle for ECB gender equality|url=https://www.politico.eu/article/christine-lagarde-ecb-gender-equality/|access-date=2021-04-03|website=POLITICO|language=en-US}}</ref> and by opening dialogue with civil society stakeholders.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Europe|first=Positive Money|date=2019-12-04|title=Christine Lagarde meets with Positive Money Europe|url=https://www.positivemoney.eu/2019/12/meeting-ecb-president-christine-lagarde/|access-date=2021-04-03|website=Positive Money Europe|language=en-GB}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|last=Staff|first=Reuters|date=2020-10-21|title=Lagarde turns to civil society in ECB transformation effort|language=en|work=Reuters|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ecb-lagarde-idUKKBN276166|access-date=2021-04-03}}</ref>

==== Response to the COVID-19 crisis ====
However, Lagarde's ambitions were quickly slowed down with the outbreak of the [[COVID-19 recession|COVID-19 pandemic crisis]].

In March 2020, the ECB responded quickly and boldly by launching a package of measures including a new asset purchase programme: the €1350 billion [[Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme]] (PEPP) which aimed to lower borrowing costs and increase lending in the euro area.<ref name="rldt">{{cite news |last1=Lynch |first1=Russell |title=France slams 'dangerous' Italian pleas to cancel Covid debts |url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2020/11/27/france-slams-dangerous-italian-pleas-cancel-covid-debts/ |publisher=Telegraph Media Group Limited |date=27 November 2020}}</ref> The PEPP was extended to cover an additional €500 billion in December 2020.<ref name="rldt" /> The ECB also re-launched more TLTROs loans to banks at historically low levels and record-high take-up (EUR 1.3 trillion in June 2020).<ref>{{Cite news|last=Staff|first=Reuters|date=2020-06-18|title=Banks borrow record 1.31 trillion euros from ECB|language=en|work=Reuters|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ecb-policy-loans-idUSKBN23P1JZ|access-date=2021-04-03}}</ref> Lending by banks to SMEs was also facilitated by collateral easing measures, and other supervisory relaxations. The ECB also reactivated currency swap lines and enhanced existing swap lines with central banks across the globe<ref>[https://www.ecb.europa.eu/home/search/coronavirus/html/index.en.html Our response to the coronavirus pandemic]</ref>

===== Strategy Review =====
As a consequence of the Covid19 crisis, the ECB extended the duration of the strategy review until September 2021.

==Mandate and inflation target==
[[File:Zahlungsmittel.JPG|thumb|[[Euro banknotes]]]]
[[File:Zahlungsmittel.JPG|thumb|[[Euro banknotes]]]]
The primary objective of the European Central Bank, as laid down in Article 127(1) of the [[Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union]], is to maintain [[price stability]] within the [[Eurozone]].<ref>[[s:Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union/Title VIII: Economic and Monetary Policy#CHAPTER 2: MONETARY POLICY|wikisource consolidation]]</ref> The Governing Council in October 1998<ref name="HANSPETER K 2006, page 81">THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK HISTORY, ROLE AND FUNCTIONS BY
Unlike many other central banks, the ECB does not have a ''dual mandate'' where it has to pursue two equally important objectives such as price stability and full employment (like the [[Federal Reserve System|US Federal Reserve System]]). The ECB has only one primary objective – price stability – subject to which it may pursue secondary objectives.
HANSPETER K. SCHELLER SECOND REVISED EDITION 2006, ISBN 92-899-0022-9 (print) ISBN 92-899-0027-X (online) page 81 at the pdf online version</ref> defined price stability as inflation of under 2%, “a year-on-year increase in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for the euro area of below 2%” and added that price stability ”was to be maintained over the medium term”. ([[Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices]])<ref name="ENA Pow">{{cite web | title=Powers and responsibilities of the European Central Bank | publisher=European Central Bank | url=http://www.ecb.int/ecb/orga/tasks/html/index.en.html | accessdate=10 March 2009 | deadurl=yes | archivedate=16 December 2008 | archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20081216083913/http://www.ecb.int/ecb/orga/tasks/html/index.en.html }}</ref> Unlike for example the [[United States Federal Reserve Bank]], the ECB has only one primary objective but this objective has never been defined in statutory law, and the HICP target can be termed ad-hoc.

=== Primary mandate ===
The primary objective of the European Central Bank, set out in Article 127(1) of the [[Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union]], is to maintain [[price stability]] within the [[Eurozone]].<ref>[[s:Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union/Title VIII: Economic and Monetary Policy#CHAPTER 2: MONETARY POLICY|wikisource consolidation]]</ref> However the EU Treaties do not specify exactly how the ECB should pursue this objective. The European Central Bank has ample discretion over the way it purses its price stability objective, as it can self-decide on the inflation target, and may also influence the way inflation is being measured.

The Governing Council in October 1998<ref name="HANSPETER K 2006, page 81">THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK HISTORY, ROLE AND FUNCTIONS BY HANSPETER K. SCHELLER SECOND REVISED EDITION 2006, {{ISBN|92-899-0022-9}} (print) {{ISBN|92-899-0027-X}} (online) page 81 at the pdf online version</ref> defined price stability as inflation of under 2%, “a year-on-year increase in the [[Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices]] (HICP) for the euro area of below 2%” and added that price stability ”was to be maintained over the medium term”.<ref name="ENA Pow">{{cite web |title=Powers and responsibilities of the European Central Bank |publisher=European Central Bank |url=http://www.ecb.int/ecb/orga/tasks/html/index.en.html |access-date=10 March 2009 |url-status=dead |archive-date=16 December 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081216083913/http://www.ecb.int/ecb/orga/tasks/html/index.en.html}}</ref> In May 2003, following a thorough review of the ECB's monetary policy strategy, the Governing Council clarified that “in the pursuit of price stability, it aims to maintain inflation rates '''<u>below, but close to</u>''', 2% over the medium term”.<ref name="HANSPETER K 2006, page 81" />


The Governing Council confirmed this definition in May 2003 following a thorough evaluation of the ECB's monetary policy strategy. On that occasion, the Governing Council clarified that “in the pursuit of price stability, it aims to maintain inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term”.<ref name="HANSPETER K 2006, page 81"/> All lending to credit institutions must be collateralised as required by Article 18 of the Statute of the ESCB.<ref>THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK HISTORY, ROLE AND FUNCTIONS BY
Since 2016, the European Central Bank's President has further adjusted its communication, by introducing the notion of "symmetry" in its definition of its target,<ref>{{Cite web|last=Draghi|first=Mario|date=2016-06-02|title=Delivering a symmetric mandate with asymmetric tools: monetary policy in a context of low interest rates|url=https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2016/html/sp160602.en.html|access-date=2020-11-28|website=European Central Bank|language=en}}</ref> thus making it clear that the ECB should respond both to inflationary pressure to deflationary pressures. As [[Mario Draghi|Draghi]] once said "symmetry meant not only that we would not accept persistently low inflation, but also that there was no cap on inflation at 2%."<ref>{{Cite web|last=Bank|first=European Central|date=2019-06-18|title=Twenty Years of the ECB's monetary policy|url=https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2019/html/ecb.sp190618~ec4cd2443b.en.html|access-date=2020-11-28|website=European Central Bank|language=en}}</ref>
HANSPETER K. SCHELLER SECOND REVISED EDITION 2006, ISBN 92-899-0022-9 (print) ISBN 92-899-0027-X (online) page 87 at the pdf online version</ref> The Governing Council clarification has little force in law.


Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the Treaty also states that "the ESCB shall support the general economic policies in the Union with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union".<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.ecb.int/ecb/tasks/html/index.en.html|title=ECB: Monetary Policy|publisher=|accessdate=14 September 2014}}</ref>
=== Secondary mandate ===
Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the Treaty (127 TFEU) also provides room for the ECB to pursue other objectives:<blockquote>"Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the ESCB shall support the general economic policies in the Union with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union as laid down in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union."<ref>{{cite web|title=ECB: Monetary Policy|url=http://www.ecb.int/ecb/tasks/html/index.en.html|access-date=14 September 2014}}</ref></blockquote>This legal provision is often considered to provide a "secondary mandate" to the ECB, and offers ample justifications for the ECB to also prioritize other considerations such as full employment or environmental protection,<ref>Blot, C., Creel, J., Faure, E. and Hubert, P., [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/207721/OFCE_FINAL2%20online.pdf Setting New Priorities for the ECB’s Mandate], Study for the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies, European Parliament, Luxembourg, 2020.</ref> which are mentioned in the Article 3 of the Treaty on the European Union. At the same time, economists and commentators are often divided on whether and how the ECB should pursue those secondary objectives, in particular the environmental impact.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/objectives-of-the-european-central-bank/|title=Objectives of the European Central Bank|access-date=2020-11-25|website=www.igmchicago.org}}</ref> ECB official have also frequently pointed out the possible contradictions between those secondary objectives.<ref>"Certainly, the protection of the environment is not the only transversal objective assigned to EU institutions and hence to the ECB. Under the Treaty one could equally ask, for example, why the ECB should not promote industries that promise the strongest employment growth, irrespective of their ecological footprint. But equally importantly, the ECB is subject to the Treaty requirement to “act in accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free competition”. – [https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2018/html/ecb.sp181108.en.html "Monetary policy and climate change], Speech from Benoit Cœuré, November 2018</ref> To better guide the ECB's action on its secondary objectives, it has been suggested that closer consultation with the European Parliament would be warranted.<ref>{{Cite web|title=How Can the European Parliament Better Oversee the European Central Bank? {{!}} Bruegel|url=https://www.bruegel.org/2020/09/how-can-the-european-parliament-better-oversee-the-european-central-bank/|access-date=2020-11-28|language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|date=2021-04-09|title=" La BCE devrait avoir un mandat politique clair qui expliciterait quels objectifs secondaires sont les plus pertinents pour l'UE "|language=fr|work=Le Monde.fr|url=https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2021/04/09/la-bce-devrait-avoir-un-mandat-politique-clair-qui-expliciterait-quels-objectifs-secondaires-sont-les-plus-pertinents-pour-l-ue_6076202_3232.html|access-date=2021-04-16}}</ref>


===Tasks===
===Basic tasks===
{{one source|section|date=December 2015}}
{{one source|section|date=December 2015}}
The basic tasks of the ECB are to define and implement the [[monetary policy]] for the Eurozone, to conduct foreign exchange operations, to take care of the [[foreign reserve]]s of the European System of Central Banks and to promote smooth operation of the financial market infrastructure under the TARGET2 payments system<ref name="BBC ECB">{{cite news |last=Fairlamb |first=David |author2=Rossant, John |title=The powers of the European Central Bank |publisher=BBC News |date=12 February 2003|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/business_basics/86006.stm |accessdate=16 October 2007}}</ref> and being currently developed technical platform for settlement of securities in Europe ([[TARGET2 Securities]]).
To carry out its main mission, the ECB's tasks include:


Further tasks, among others, include the exclusive right to authorise the issuance of [[euro banknotes]]. Member states can issue [[euro coins]], but the amount must be authorised by the ECB beforehand (upon the introduction of the euro, the ECB also had exclusive right to issue coins).<ref name="BBC ECB"/> The ECB shall also collect statistical information to fulfil the tasks of the European System of Central Banks, and contribute to financial stability and supervision.
* Defining and implementing '''monetary policy'''<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/monetarypolicy2011en.pdf?4004e7099b3dcdbf58d0874f6eab650e|title=Monetary policy}}</ref>
* Managing '''foreign exchange operations'''
* '''Maintaining the payment system''' to promote smooth operation of the financial market infrastructure under the TARGET2 payments system<ref name="BBC ECB">{{cite news |url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/business_basics/86006.stm|title=The powers of the European Central Bank |last=Fairlamb |first=David |date=12 February 2003 |access-date=16 October 2007 |work=BBC News |author2=Rossant, John}}</ref> and being currently developed technical platform for settlement of securities in Europe ([[TARGET2 Securities]]).
* '''Consultative role:''' by law, the ECB's opinion is required on any national or EU legislation that falls within the ECB's competence.
* '''Collection and establishment of''' '''statistics'''
* '''International cooperation'''
* '''Issuing banknotes:''' the ECB holds the exclusive right to authorise the issuance of [[euro banknotes]]. Member states can issue [[euro coins]], but the amount must be authorised by the ECB beforehand (upon the introduction of the euro, the ECB also had exclusive right to issue coins).<ref name="BBC ECB" />
* '''Financial stability and prudential policy'''
* '''Banking supervision:''' since 2013, the ECB has been put in charge of supervising systemically relevant banks.


===Considerations on ECB's monetary policy===
===Monetary policy tools===
In [[Federal Reserve System|U.S.-style central banking]], the [[Federal Reserve System]] purchases Treasury securities in order to inject liquidity into the economy; the [[Eurosystem]], on the other hand, uses a different method. There are about 1,500 eligible banks which may bid for short-term [[repurchase agreement|repo contracts]] of two weeks to three months duration.<ref>In practice, 400–500 banks participate regularly. <br/>{{citation | url = http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/scpops/ecbocp107.pdf | title = The collateral frameworks of the Eurosystem, the Federal Reserve System and the Bank of England and the financial market turmoil | author = Samuel Cheun | coauthors = Isabel von Köppen-Mertes and Benedict Weller |date=December 2009 | publisher = ECB | accessdate =24 August 2011 }}</ref>
The principal monetary policy tool of the European central bank is collateralised borrowing or repo agreements.<ref name="Euro debt crisis">{{cite web|date=19 August 2011|title=All about the European debt crisis: In SIMPLE terms|url=http://www.rediff.com/business/slide-show/slide-show-1-all-about-european-debt-crisis-in-simple-terms/20110819.htm|access-date=28 October 2011|work=rediff business|publisher=rediff.com}}</ref> These tools are also used by the United States [[Federal Reserve Bank]], but the Fed does more direct purchasing of financial assets than its European counterpart.<ref name="US Open Market operations">{{cite web|date=August 2011|title=Open Market Operation&nbsp;– Fedpoints&nbsp;– Federal Reserve Bank of New York|url=http://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/fedpoint/fed32.html|access-date=29 October 2011|work=Federal Reserve Bank of New York|publisher=newyorkfed.org}}</ref> The collateral used by the ECB is typically high quality public and private sector debt.<ref name="Euro debt crisis" />

All lending to credit institutions must be collateralised as required by Article 18 of the Statute of the ESCB.<ref>THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK HISTORY, ROLE AND FUNCTIONS BY HANSPETER K. SCHELLER SECOND REVISED EDITION 2006, {{ISBN|92-899-0022-9}} (print) {{ISBN|92-899-0027-X}} (online) page 87 at the pdf online version</ref>

The criteria for determining "high quality" for public debt have been preconditions for membership in the European Union: total debt must not be too large in relation to gross domestic product, for example, and deficits in any given year must not become too large.<ref name="Euro debt working paper" /> Though these criteria are fairly simple, a number of accounting techniques may hide the underlying reality of fiscal solvency—or the lack of same.<ref name="Euro debt working paper" />
{| class="wikitable"
|+Monetary policy instruments of the ECB (April 2021)
!Type of instrument
!Name of instrument
!Maintenance period
!Rate
!Volume (millions)
|-
| rowspan="2" |'''Standing facilities'''
(rate corridor)
|Marginal lending facility
|Overnight
|0,25%
|
|-
|Deposit facility
|Overnight
| -0,5%
|
|-
| rowspan="4" |'''Refinancing operations'''
(collateralized repos)
|Main refinancing operations (MROs)
|7 days
|0%
|
|-
|Long-term refinancing operations (LTROs)
|3 months up to 3 years
|Average MRO rate
|
|-
|Targeted-Long Term Refinancing Operations (TLTROs)
|Up to 4 years
| -0,5% or less
|
|-
|Pandemic emergency longer-term refinancing operations (PELTROs)
|8 to 16 months
| -0,25%
|
|-
| rowspan="6" |'''Asset purchases'''
|Covered bonds purchase programme (CBPP)
|n/a
|n/a
|289,424
|-
|Securities markets programme (SMP)
|n/a
|n/a
|24,023
|-
|Asset-backed securities purchase programme (ABSPP)
|n/a
|n/a
|28,716
|-
|Public sector purchase programme (PSPP)
|n/a
|n/a
|2,379,053
|-
|Corporate sector purchase programme (CSPP)
|n/a
|n/a
|266,060
|-
|Pandemic emergency purchase programme (PEPP)
|n/a
|n/a
|943,647
|-
|'''Reserve requirements'''
|Minimum reserves
|
|0%
|146,471
|}

===Difference with US Federal Reserve===
In the [[Federal Reserve Bank|United States Federal Reserve Bank]], the Federal Reserve buys assets: typically, bonds issued by the Federal government.<ref name="Bernanke">{{cite web|author=Ben S. Bernanke|date=1 December 2008|title=Federal Reserve Policies in the Financial Crisis|url=http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20081201a.htm|access-date=23 October 2011|publisher=Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System|location=Greater Austin Chamber of Commerce, Austin, Texas|format=Speech|quote=To ensure that adequate liquidity is available, consistent with the central bank's traditional role as the liquidity provider of last resort, the Federal Reserve has taken a number of extraordinary steps.}}</ref> There is no limit on the bonds that it can buy and one of the tools at its disposal in a financial crisis is to take such extraordinary measures as the purchase of large amounts of assets such as [[commercial paper]].<ref name="Bernanke" /> The purpose of such operations is to ensure that adequate liquidity is available for functioning of the financial system.<ref name="Bernanke" />


The [[Eurosystem]], on the other hand, uses collateralized lending as a default instrument. There are about 1,500 eligible banks which may bid for short-term [[repurchase agreement|repo contracts]].<ref>In practice, 400–500 banks participate regularly. <br />{{citation|author=Samuel Cheun|title=The collateral frameworks of the Eurosystem, the Federal Reserve System and the Bank of England and the financial market turmoil|date=December 2009|url=http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/scpops/ecbocp107.pdf|publisher=ECB|access-date=24 August 2011|author2=Isabel von Köppen-Mertes|author3=Benedict Weller}}</ref> The difference is that banks in effect borrow cash from the ECB and must pay it back; the short durations allow interest rates to be adjusted continually. When the repo notes come due the participating banks bid again. An increase in the quantity of notes offered at auction allows an increase in liquidity in the economy. A decrease has the contrary effect. The contracts are carried on the asset side of the European Central Bank's balance sheet and the resulting deposits in member banks are carried as a liability. In layman terms, the liability of the central bank is money, and an increase in deposits in member banks, carried as a liability by the central bank, means that more money has been put into the economy.{{efn|The process is similar, though on a grand scale, to an individual who every month charges $10,000 on his or her credit card, pays it off every month, but also withdraws (and pays off) an additional $10,000 each succeeding month for transaction purposes. Such a person is operating "net borrowed" on a continual basis, and even though the borrowing from the credit card is short term, the effect is a stable increase in the money supply. If the person borrows less, less money circulates in the economy. If he or she borrows more, the money supply increases. An individual's ability to borrow from his or her credit card company is determined by the credit card company: it reflects the company's overall judgment of its ability to lend to all borrowers, and also its appraisal of the financial condition of that one particular borrower. The ability of member banks to borrow from the central bank is fundamentally similar.{{citation needed|date=September 2015}} }}
The banks in effect borrow cash and must pay it back; the short durations allow interest rates to be adjusted continually. When the repo notes come due the participating banks bid again. An increase in the quantity of notes offered at auction allows an increase in liquidity in the economy. A decrease has the contrary effect. The contracts are carried on the asset side of the European Central Bank's balance sheet and the resulting deposits in member banks are carried as a liability. In layman terms, the liability of the central bank is money, and an increase in deposits in member banks, carried as a liability by the central bank, means that more money has been put into the economy.{{efn|The process is similar, though on a grand scale, to an individual who every month charges $10,000 on his or her credit card, pays it off every month, but also withdraws (and pays off) an additional $10,000 each succeeding month for transaction purposes. Such a person is operating "net borrowed" on a continual basis, and even though the borrowing from the credit card is short term, the effect is a stable increase in the money supply. If the person borrows less, less money circulates in the economy. If he or she borrows more, the money supply increases. An individual's ability to borrow from his or her credit card company is determined by the credit card company: it reflects the company's overall judgment of its ability to lend to all borrowers, and also its appraisal of the financial condition of that one particular borrower. The ability of member banks to borrow from the central bank is fundamentally similar.{{citation needed|date=September 2015}} }}


To qualify for participation in the auctions, banks must be able to offer proof of appropriate collateral in the form of loans to other entities. These can be the public debt of member states, but a fairly wide range of private banking securities are also accepted.<ref name="The ECB and the Eurosystem">{{cite journal|last=Bertaut|first=Carol C.|year=2002|title=The European Central Bank and the Eurosystem|url=http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/neer/neer2002/neer202e.pdf|journal=New England Economic Review|issue=2nd quarter|pages=25–28}}</ref> The fairly stringent membership requirements for the European Union, especially with regard to [[sovereign debt]] as a percentage of each member state's gross domestic product, are designed to ensure that assets offered to the bank as collateral are, at least in theory, all equally good, and all equally protected from the risk of inflation.<ref name="The ECB and the Eurosystem" />
To qualify for participation in the auctions, banks must be able to offer proof of appropriate collateral in the form of loans to other entities. These can be the public debt of member states, but a fairly wide range of private banking securities are also accepted.<ref name="The ECB and the Eurosystem">{{cite journal | url=http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/neer/neer2002/neer202e.pdf | title=The European Central Bank and the Eurosystem | last=Bertaut | first=Carol C. | journal=New England Economic Review | year=2002 | issue=2nd quarter | pages=25–28}}</ref> The fairly stringent membership requirements for the European Union, especially with regard to [[sovereign debt]] as a percentage of each member state's gross domestic product, are designed to insure that assets offered to the bank as collateral are, at least in theory, all equally good, and all equally protected from the risk of inflation.<ref name="The ECB and the Eurosystem" />


==Organization==
==Organization==
Line 318: Line 92:
* the Supervisory Board.
* the Supervisory Board.


===Decision-making bodies===
===Decision-making bodies of the ECB===


====Executive Board====
====The Executive Board====
[[File:Jean-Claude Trichet - World Economic Forum Annual Meeting Davos 2010.jpg|thumb|upright|[[Jean-Claude Trichet]], the second President of the European Central Bank]]
[[File:Jean-Claude Trichet - World Economic Forum Annual Meeting Davos 2010.jpg|thumb|upright|[[Jean-Claude Trichet]], the second President of the European Central Bank]]
The [[Executive Board of the European Central Bank|Executive Board]] is responsible for the implementation of monetary policy (defined by the Governing Council) and the day-to-day running of the bank.<ref name="Governing Council2">{{cite web|url=http://www.ecb.int/ecb/orga/decisions/govc/html/index.en.html|title=ECB: Governing Council|date=1 January 2002|work=ECB|publisher=ecb.int|access-date=28 October 2011}}</ref> It can issue decisions to national central banks and may also exercise powers delegated to it by the Governing Council.<ref name="Governing Council2" /> Executive Board members are assigned a portfolio of responsibilities by the President of the ECB.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/pdf/orga/distributionofresp_EB.pdf|title=Distribution of responsibilities among the Members of the Executive Board of the ECB}}</ref> The Executive Board normally meets every Tuesday.
The [[Executive Board of the European Central Bank|Executive Board]] is responsible for the implementation of monetary policy (defined by the Governing Council) and the day-to-day running of the bank.<ref name="Governing Council">{{cite web|url=http://www.ecb.int/ecb/orga/decisions/govc/html/index.en.html |title=ECB: Governing Council|work=ECB|publisher=ecb.int|date=1 January 2002|accessdate=28 October 2011}}</ref> It can issue decisions to national central banks and may also exercise powers delegated to it by the Governing Council.<ref name="Governing Council" /> It is composed of the President of the Bank (currently [[Charles Bonsu]]), the Vice-President (currently [[Christian Seidel]]) and four other members.<ref name="Governing Council" /> They are all appointed for non-renewable terms of eight years.<ref name="Governing Council" /> They are appointed "from among persons of recognised standing and professional experience in monetary or banking matters by common accord of the governments of the Member States at the level of Heads of State or Government, on a recommendation from the Council, after it has consulted the European Parliament and the Governing Council of the ECB".<ref>Article 11.2 of the ESCB Statute</ref> The Executive Board normally meets every Tuesday.


[[José Manuel González-Páramo]], a Spanish member of the Executive Board since June 2004, was due to leave the board in early June 2012 and no replacement had been named as of late May 2012.<ref name=MW01>Marsh, David, [http://www.marketwatch.com/story/cameron-irritates-as-euros-high-noon-approaches-2012-05-28 "Cameron irritates as euro’s High Noon approaches"], ''MarketWatch'', 28 May 2012. Retrieved 29 May 2012.</ref> The Spanish had nominated Barcelona-born Antonio Sáinz de Vicuña, an ECB veteran who heads its legal department, as González-Páramo's replacement as early as January 2012 but alternatives from Luxembourg, Finland, and Slovenia were put forward and no decision made by May.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://blogs.ft.com/money-supply/tag/jose-manuel-gonzalez-paramo/#axzz1wP9yAdBr|title=Tag: José Manuel González-Páramo|publisher=''Financial Times'' Money Supply blog entries|date=18–23 January 2012|accessdate=14 September 2014}}</ref> After a long political battle, Luxembourg's [[Yves Mersch]], was appointed as González-Páramo's replacement.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-22/mersch-named-to-ecb-post-after-longest-euro-appointment-battle.html|title=Mersch Named to ECB After Longest Euro Appointment Battle|date=23 November 2012|work=Bloomberg|accessdate=14 September 2014}}</ref>
It is composed of the President of the Bank (currently [[Christine Lagarde]]), the Vice-President (currently [[Luis de Guindos]]) and four other members.<ref name="Governing Council2" /> They are all appointed by the [[European Council]] for non-renewable terms of eight years.<ref name="Governing Council2" /> Member of the Executive Board of the ECB are appointed "from among persons of recognised standing and professional experience in monetary or banking matters by common accord of the governments of the Member States at the level of Heads of State or Government, on a recommendation from the Council, after it has consulted the European Parliament and the Governing Council of the ECB".<ref>Article 11.2 of the ESCB Statute</ref>


====The Governing Council====
[[José Manuel González-Páramo]], a Spanish member of the Executive Board since June 2004, was due to leave the board in early June 2012, but no replacement had been named as of late May.<ref name=MW01>Marsh, David, [http://www.marketwatch.com/story/cameron-irritates-as-euros-high-noon-approaches-2012-05-28 "Cameron irritates as euro’s High Noon approaches"], ''MarketWatch'', 28 May 2012. Retrieved 29 May 2012.</ref> The Spanish had nominated Barcelona-born Antonio Sáinz de Vicuña – an ECB veteran who heads its legal department – as González-Páramo's replacement as early as January 2012, but alternatives from Luxembourg, Finland, and Slovenia were put forward and no decision made by May.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://blogs.ft.com/money-supply/tag/jose-manuel-gonzalez-paramo/#axzz1wP9yAdBr |title=Tag: José Manuel González-Páramo |publisher=[[Financial Times]] Money Supply blog entries |date=23 January 2012 |access-date=14 September 2014}}</ref> After a long political battle and delays due to the European Parliament's protest over the lack of gender balance at the ECB,<ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-parliament-mersch-idUSBRE89O0KA20121025|title=EU parliament vetoes Mersch, wants woman for ECB |last=Davenport |first=Claire |work=U.S. |access-date=3 October 2018 |language=en-US}}</ref> Luxembourg's [[Yves Mersch]] was appointed as González-Páramo's replacement.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-22/mersch-named-to-ecb-post-after-longest-euro-appointment-battle.html |title=Mersch Named to ECB After Longest Euro Appointment Battle |date=23 November 2012 |work=Bloomberg |access-date=14 September 2014}}</ref>
The [[Governing Council of the European Central Bank|Governing Council]] is the main decision-making body of the [[Eurosystem]].<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.ecb.int/ecb/educational/facts/orga/html/or_016.en.html|title=ECB: Decision-making bodies|publisher=|accessdate=14 September 2014}}</ref> It comprises the members of the Executive Board (six in total) and the governors of the National Central Banks of the euro area countries (19 as of 2015). The fact that the Council's minutes are not published has raised controversy in [http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7e58a3ea-d1bc-11e2-9336-00144feab7de.html?ftcamp=published_links%2Frss%2Fcomment%2Ffeed%2F%2Fproduct#axzz2VlKDgpMm some financial circles.]

In December 2020, [[Frank Elderson]] succeeded to [[Yves Mersch]] at the ECB's board.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Frank Elderson officially appointed member of executive boar...|url=https://agenceurope.eu/en/bulletin/article/12620/7|url-status=live|access-date=2021-03-07|website=agenceurope.eu}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=Benoeming Nederlander Frank Elderson in directie ECB stap dichterbij|url=https://nos.nl/l/2357869|access-date=2020-11-25|website=nos.nl|language=nl}}</ref>

====Governing Council====
The [[Governing Council of the European Central Bank|Governing Council]] is the main decision-making body of the [[Eurosystem]].<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.ecb.int/ecb/educational/facts/orga/html/or_016.en.html |title=ECB: Decision-making bodies |access-date=14 September 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130206095156/http://www.ecb.int/ecb/educational/facts/orga/html/or_016.en.html |archive-date=6 February 2013 |url-status=dead}}</ref> It comprises the members of the Executive Board (six in total) and the governors of the National Central Banks of the euro area countries (19 as of 2015).

Since January 2015, the ECB has published on its website a summary of the Governing Council deliberations ("accounts").<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/accounts/2016/html/index.en.html |title=Monetary policy accounts published in 2016}}</ref> These publications came as a partial response to recurring criticism against the ECB's opacity.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.ft.com/content/7e58a3ea-d1bc-11e2-9336-00144feab7de?ftcamp=published_links/rss/comment/feed//product |title=The ECB must open itself up |work=Financial Times |language=en-GB |access-date=23 September 2018 |url-access=subscription}}</ref> However, in contrast to other central banks, the ECB still does not disclose individual voting records of the governors seating in its Council.


{| class="wikitable"
{| class="wikitable"
|+Members of the Governing Council (as of January 2020)<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.ecb.int/ecb/orga/decisions/govc/html/index.en.html |title=Members of the Governing Council |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20040717041849/http://www.ecb.int/ecb/orga/decisions/govc/html/index.en.html |archive-date=17 July 2004 |url-status=dead |access-date=22 September 2018}}</ref>
|+ Members of the Governing Council (as of January 2015)<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.ecb.int/ecb/orga/decisions/govc/html/index.en.html | title=Members of the Governing Council | accessdate=1 January 2015}}</ref>
!
!Name
!Role
! colspan="2" align="Center" |'''Terms of office'''
|-
|-
| [[Charles Bonsu]], President of the ECB
! rowspan="6" align="Center" |'''Executive Board'''
| [[Christian Seidel]], Vice-President of the ECB
|{{Flagicon|France}} [[Christine Lagarde]]
| [[Eva-Lina Seidel]], Member of the Executive Board of the ECB
|President
|1 November 2019
|31 October 2027
|-
|-
| [[Anne Seidel]], Member of the Executive Board of the ECB
|{{Flagicon|Spain}} [[Luis de Guindos]]
| [[Sabine Lautenschläger]], Member of the Executive Board of the ECB
|Vice President
| [[Peter Praet]], Member of the Executive Board of the ECB (Chief Economist of the ECB)
|1 June 2018
|31 May 2026
|-
|-
| [[Luc Coene]] ([[Belgische Nationalbank|Belgium]])
|{{flagicon|Italy}} [[Fabio Panetta]]
| [[Jens Weidmann]] ([[Deutsche Bundesbank|Germany]])
|Member of the Executive Board
| [[Patrick Honohan]] ([[Central Bank of Ireland|Ireland]])
|1 January 2020
|31 December 2027
|-
|-
| [[Yannis Stournaras]] ([[Bank of Greece|Greece]])
|{{Flagicon|Ireland}} [[Philip R. Lane]]
| [[Luis María Linde]] ([[Banco de España|Spain]])
|Member of the Executive Board<br>Chief Economist
| [[Ardo Hansson]] ([[Eesti Pank|Estonia]])
|1 June 2019
|31 May 2027
|-
|-
| [[Christian Noyer]] ([[Banque de France|France]])
|{{Flagicon|Netherlands}} [[Frank Elderson]]
| [[Ignazio Visco]] ([[Banca d'Italia|Italy]])
|Member of the Executive Board
| [[Chrystalla Georghadji]] ([[Central Bank of Cyprus|Cyprus]])
Vice-chair of the Supervisory board
|15 December 2020
|14 December 2028
|-
|-
| {{link-interwiki|vertical-align=sup|lang=de|en=Gaston Reinesch}} ([[Banque Centrale du Luxembourg|Luxembourg]])
|{{Flagicon|Germany}} [[Isabel Schnabel]]
| {{link-interwiki|vertical-align=sup|lang=pl|en=Josef Bonnici}} ([[Central Bank of Malta|Malta]])
|Member of the Executive Board
| [[Klaas Knot]] ([[De Nederlandsche Bank|Netherlands]])
|1 January 2020
|31 December 2027
|-
|-
| [[Ewald Nowotny]] ([[Österreichische Nationalbank|Austria]])
! rowspan="19" |'''National Governors'''
| [[Carlos Costa (banker)|Carlos Costa]] ([[Banco de Portugal|Portugal]])
|{{Flagicon|Spain}} [[Pablo Hernández de Cos]]
| [[Boštjan Jazbec]] ([[Banka Slovenije|Slovenia]])
|
|11 June 2018
|10 June 2024
|-
|-
| {{link-interwiki|vertical-align=sup|lang=de|en=Jozef Makúch}} ([[National Bank of Slovakia|Slovakia]])
|{{Flagicon|Germany}} [[Jens Weidmann]]
| [[Erkki Liikanen]] ([[Bank of Finland|Finland]])
|
| {{link-interwiki|vertical-align=sup|lang=lv|en=Ilmārs Rimšēvičs}} ([[Latvijas Banka|Latvia]])
|1 May 2011
|31 April 2027
|-
|-
| {{link-interwiki|vertical-align=sup|lang=de|en=Vitas Vasiliauskas}} ([[Bank of Lithuania|Lithuania]])
|{{Flagicon|Belgium}} {{Interlanguage link multi|Pierre Wunsch|lt=|nl||WD=|vertical-align=sup}}
|
|
|2 January 2019
|January 2024
|-
|{{Flagicon|Greece}} [[Yannis Stournaras]]
|
|
|June 2020
|June 2026
|-
|{{Flagicon|France}} [[François Villeroy de Galhau]]
|
|1 November 2015
|November 2021
|-
|{{Flagicon|Luxembourg}} {{Interlanguage link multi|Gaston Reinesch|de|vertical-align=sup}}
|
|January 2013
|January 2026
|-
|{{Flagicon|Austria}} [[Robert Holzmann]]
|
|1 September 2019
|31 August 2025
|-
|{{Flagicon|Slovakia}} [[Peter Kažimír]]
|
|1 June 2019
|1 June 2025
|-
|{{Flagicon|Lithuania}} [[Gediminas Šimkus]]
|
|7 April 2021
|6 April 2026
|-
|{{Flagicon|Finland}} [[Olli Rehn]]
|
|12 July 2018
|12 July 2025
|-
|{{Flagicon|Portugal}} [[Mário Centeno|Mario Centeno]]
|
|July 2020
|June 2025
|-
|{{Flagicon|Malta}} [[Mario Vella]]
|
|1 July 2016
|30 June 2021
|-
|{{Flagicon|Slovenia}} {{Interlanguage link multi|Boštjan Vasle|lt=|||WD=|vertical-align=sup}}
|
|1 January 2019
|31 December 2024
|-
|{{Flagicon|Estonia}} [[Madis Müller]]
|
|June 2019
|June 2026
|-
| {{Flagicon|Latvia}} [[Mārtiņš Kazāks]]
|
|21 December 2019
|21 December 2025
|-
|{{Flagicon|Netherlands}} [[Klaas Knot]]
|
|1 July 2011
|May 2025
|-
|{{Flagicon|Italy}} [[Ignazio Visco]]
|
|1 November 2011
|November 2023
|-
|{{Flagicon|Cyprus}}[[Constantinos Herodotou]]
|
|11 April 2019
|April 2024
|-
|{{Flagicon|Ireland}} [[Gabriel Makhlouf]]
|
|1 September 2019
|1 September 2026
|}
|}


====General Council====
====The General Council====
The General Council is a body dealing with transitional issues of euro adoption, for example, fixing the exchange rates of currencies being replaced by the euro (continuing the tasks of the former EMI).<ref name="Governing Council2"/> It will continue to exist until all EU member states adopt the euro, at which point it will be dissolved.<ref name="Governing Council2"/> It is composed of the President and vice-president together with the [[European System of Central Banks#Member banks|governors of all of the EU's national central banks]].<ref name="ENA Com">{{cite web |title=Composition of the European Central Bank |publisher=CVCE |url=http://www.cvce.eu/collections/unit-content/-/unit/en/d5906df5-4f83-4603-85f7-0cabc24b9fe1/ae7780e3-050b-4a5e-914e-e1599d6f04dc |access-date=18 February 2014}}</ref><ref name="ECB GC">{{cite web | title=ECB: General Council | publisher=European Central Bank | url=https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/orga/decisions/genc/html/index.en.html | access-date=4 January 2015 }}</ref>
The General Council is a body dealing with transitional issues of euro adoption, for example, fixing the exchange rates of currencies being replaced by the euro (continuing the tasks of the former EMI).<ref name="Governing Council" /> It will continue to exist until all EU member states adopt the euro, at which point it will be dissolved.<ref name="Governing Council" /> It is composed of the President and vice-president together with the [[European System of Central Banks#Member banks|governors of all of the EU's national central banks]].<ref name="ENA Com">{{cite web |title=Composition of the European Central Bank |publisher=CVCE |url=http://www.cvce.eu/collections/unit-content/-/unit/en/d5906df5-4f83-4603-85f7-0cabc24b9fe1/ae7780e3-050b-4a5e-914e-e1599d6f04dc |accessdate=18 February 2014}}</ref><ref name="ECB GC">{{cite web | title=ECB: General Council | publisher=European Central Bank | url=https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/orga/decisions/genc/html/index.en.html | accessdate=4 January 2015 }}</ref>


====Supervisory Board====
====The Supervisory Board====
{{one source|section|date=December 2015}}
The Supervisory Board meets twice a month to discuss, plan and carry out the ECB's supervisory tasks.<ref name="SupBoard">{{cite web|url=https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/orga/decisions/ssm/html/index.en.html|title=Supervisory Board|publisher=European Central Bank|access-date=3 December 2015}}</ref> It proposes draft decisions to the Governing Council under the non-objection procedure. It is composed of Chair (appointed for a non-renewable term of five years), Vice-Chair (chosen from among the members of the ECB's Executive Board) four ECB representatives and representatives of national supervisors. If the national supervisory authority designated by a Member State is not a national central bank (NCB), the representative of the competent authority can be accompanied by a representative from their NCB. In such cases, the representatives are together considered as one member for the purposes of the voting procedure.<ref name="SupBoard"/>
The Supervisory Board meets twice a month to discuss, plan and carry out the ECB’s supervisory tasks.<ref name="SupBoard">{{cite web|url=https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/orga/decisions/ssm/html/index.en.html|title=Supervisory Board|publisher=European Central Bank|accessdate=3 December 201}}</ref> It proposes draft decisions to the Governing Council under the non-objection procedure. It is composed of Chair (appointed for a non-renewable term of five years), Vice-Chair (chosen from among the members of the ECB's Executive Board) four ECB representatives and representatives of national supervisors. If the national supervisory authority designated by a Member State is not a national central bank (NCB), the representative of the competent authority can be accompanied by a representative from their NCB. In such cases, the representatives are together considered as one member for the purposes of the voting procedure.<ref name="SupBoard"/>


It also includes the Steering Committee, which supports the activities of the Supervisory Board and prepares the Board's meetings. It is composed by the Chair of the Supervisory Board, Vice-Chair of the Supervisory Board, one ECB representative and five representatives of national supervisors. The five representatives of national supervisors are appointed by the Supervisory Board for one year based on a rotation system that ensures a fair representation of countries.<ref name="SupBoard"/>
It also includes the Steering Committee, which supports the activities of the Supervisory Board and prepares the Board’s meetings. It is composed by the Chair of the Supervisory Board, Vice-Chair of the Supervisory Board, one ECB representative and five representatives of national supervisors. The five representatives of national supervisors are appointed by the Supervisory Board for one year based on a rotation system that ensures a fair representation of countries.<ref name="SupBoard"/>

{| class="wikitable"
===Shareholders===
| colspan="2" |'''Composition of the Supervisory board of the ECB<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/organisation/whoiswho/supervisoryboard/html/index.en.html|title=ECB SSM Supervisory Board Members |date=1 March 2019|access-date=1 March 2019|publisher=ECB|location=Frankfurt}}</ref>'''
Although the ECB is governed by European law directly and thus not by corporate law applying to private law companies, its set-up resembles that of a corporation in the sense that the ECB has shareholders and stock capital. Its capital is five billion euros<ref>Article 28.1 of the ESCB Statute</ref> which is held by the national central banks of the member states as shareholders. The initial capital allocation key was determined in 1998 on the basis of the states' population and GDP,<ref>Article 29 of the ESCB Statute</ref> but the key is adjustable.<ref>Article 28.5 of the ESCB Statute</ref> Shares in the ECB are not transferable and cannot be used as collateral.<ref>Article 28.4 of the ESCB Statute</ref>
|-
|'''Name'''
|'''Role'''
|-
|{{Flagicon|Italy}} [[Andrea Enria]]
|Chair
|-
|{{Flagicon|Netherlands}} [[Frank Elderson]]
|Vice-Chair
|-
|{{Flagicon|Finland}} [[Pentti Kalevi Hakkarainen|Pentti Hakkarainen]]
|ECB Representative
|-
|{{Flagicon|France}} [[Édouard Fernandez-Bollo]]
|ECB Representative
|-
|{{Flagicon|Sweden}} [[Kerstin af Jochnick]]
|ECB Representative
|-
|{{Flagicon|USA}} [[Elizabeth McCaul]]
|ECB Representative
|}


===Capital subscription===
{{Politics of the European Union}}
{{Politics of the European Union}}
All National Central Banks (NCBs) that own a share of the ECB capital stock as of 1 January 2015 are listed below. Non-Euro area NCBs are required to pay up only a very small percentage of their subscribed capital, which accounts for the different magnitudes of Euro area and Non-Euro area total paid-up capital.<ref>{{cite web|title=Capital Subscription|url=http://www.ecb.int/ecb/orga/capital/html/index.en.html|publisher=European Central Bank|accessdate=1 January 2015}}</ref>
The ECB is governed by European law directly, but its set-up resembles that of a corporation in the sense that the ECB has shareholders and stock capital. Its initial capital was supposed to be €5 billion<ref>Article 28.1 of the ESCB Statute</ref> and the initial capital allocation key was determined in 1998 on the basis of the member states' populations and GDP,<ref name="capital"/><ref>Article 29 of the ESCB Statute</ref> but the key is adjustable.<ref>Article 28.5 of the ESCB Statute</ref> The euro area NCBs were required to pay their respective subscriptions to the ECB's capital in full. The NCBs of the non-participating countries have had to pay 7% of their respective subscriptions to the ECB's capital as a contribution to the operational costs of the ECB. As a result, the ECB was endowed with an initial capital of just under €4&nbsp;billion.{{citation needed|date=July 2016}} The capital is held by the national central banks of the member states as shareholders. Shares in the ECB are not transferable and cannot be used as collateral.<ref>Article 28.4 of the ESCB Statute</ref> The NCBs are the sole subscribers to and holders of the capital of the ECB.

Today, ECB capital is about €11 billion, which is held by the national central banks of the member states as shareholders.<ref name="capital"/> The NCBs’ shares in this capital are calculated using a capital key which reflects the respective member's share in the total population and gross domestic product of the EU. The ECB adjusts the shares every five years and whenever the number of contributing NCBs changes. The adjustment is made on the basis of data provided by the European Commission.

All national central banks (NCBs) that own a share of the ECB capital stock as of 1 February 2020 are listed below. Non-Euro area NCBs are required to pay up only a very small percentage of their subscribed capital, which accounts for the different magnitudes of Euro area and Non-Euro area total paid-up capital.<ref name="capital">{{cite web|title=Capital Subscription|url=http://www.ecb.int/ecb/orga/capital/html/index.en.html|publisher=European Central Bank|access-date=1 February 2020}}</ref>


{| class="wikitable sortable"
{| class="wikitable sortable"
Line 518: Line 165:
|-
|-
| [[National Bank of Belgium]]
| [[National Bank of Belgium]]
| align=right | 2.9630
| align=right | 2.4778
| align=right | 276,290,916.71
| align=right | 268,222,025.17
|-
|-
| [[Deutsche Bundesbank]]
| [[Deutsche Bundesbank]]
| align=right | 21.4394
| align=right | 17.9973
| align=right | 1,999,160,134.91
| align=right | 1,948,208,997.34
|-
|-
| [[Bank of Estonia]]
| [[Bank of Estonia]]
| align=right | 0.2291
| align=right | 0.1928
| align=right | 21,362,892.01
| align=right | 20,870,613.63
|-
|-
| [[Central Bank of Ireland]]
| [[Central Bank of Ireland]]
| align=right | 1.3772
| align=right | 1.1607
| align=right | 128,419,794.29
| align=right | 125,645,857.06
|-
|-
| [[Bank of Greece]]
| [[Bank of Greece]]
| align=right | 2.0117
| align=right | 2.0332
| align=right | 187,585,027.73
| align=right | 220,094,043.74
|-
|-
| [[Bank of Spain]]
| [[Bank of Spain]]
| align=right | 9.6981
| align=right | 8.8409
| align=right | 904,318,913.05
| align=right | 957,028,050.02
|-
|-
| [[Bank of France]]
| [[Banque de France]]
| align=right | 16.6108
| align=right | 14.1792
| align=right | 1,548,907,579.93
| align=right | 1,534,899,402.41
|-
|-
| [[Banca d'Italia|Bank of Italy]]
| [[Banca d'Italia]]
| align=right | 13.8165
| align=right | 12.3108
| align=right | 1,288,347,435.28
| align=right | 1,332,644,970.33
|-
|-
| [[Central Bank of Cyprus]]
| [[Central Bank of Cyprus]]
| align=right | 0.1750
| align=right | 0.1513
| align=right | 16,318,228.29
| align=right | 16,378,235.70
|-
|-
| [[Bank of Latvia]]
| [[Bank of Latvia]]
| align=right | 0.3169
| align=right | 0.2821
| align=right | 29,549,980.26
| align=right | 30,537,344.94
|-
|-
| [[Bank of Lithuania]]
| [[Bank of Lithuania]]
| align=right | 0.4707
| align=right | 0.4132
| align=right | 43,891,371.75
| align=right | 44,728,929.21
|-
|-
| [[Central Bank of Luxembourg]]
| [[Central Bank of Luxembourg]]
| align=right | 0.2679
| align=right | 0.2030
| align=right | 24,980,876.34
| align=right | 21,974,764.35
|-
|-
| [[Central Bank of Malta]]
| [[Central Bank of Malta]]
| align=right | 0.0853
| align=right | 0.0648
| align=right | 7,953,970.70
| align=right | 7,014,604.58
|-
|-
| [[De Nederlandsche Bank]]
| [[De Nederlandsche Bank]]
| align=right | 4.7662
| align=right | 4.0035
| align=right | 444,433,941.0
| align=right | 433,379,158.03
|-
|-
| [[National Bank of Austria]]
| [[Oesterreichische Nationalbank]]
| align=right | 2.3804
| align=right | 1.9631
| align=right | 221,965,203.55
| align=right | 212,505,713.78
|-
|-
| [[Banco de Portugal]]
| [[Banco de Portugal]]
| align=right | 1.9035
| align=right | 1.7434
| align=right | 177,495,700.29
| align=right | 188,723,173.25
|-
|-
| [[Bank of Slovenia]]
| [[Banka Slovenije]]
| align=right | 0.3916
| align=right | 0.3455
| align=right | 36,515,532.56
| align=right | 37,400,399.43
|-
|-
| [[National Bank of Slovakia]]
| [[National Bank of Slovakia]]
| align=right | 0.9314
| align=right | 0.7725
| align=right | 86,850,273.32
| align=right | 83,623,179.61
|-
|-
| [[Bank of Finland]]
| [[Bank of Finland]]
| align=right | 1.4939
| align=right | 1.2564
| align=right | 136,005,388.82
| align=right | 136,005,388.82
|-
|-
| '''Total'''
| '''Total'''
| align=right | '''81.3286'''
| align=right | '''70.3915'''
| align=right | '''7,583,649,493.38'''
| align=right | '''7,619,884,851.40'''
|-
|-
| ''Non-Euro area:''
| ''Non-Euro area:''
Line 602: Line 249:
|-
|-
| [[Bulgarian National Bank]]
| [[Bulgarian National Bank]]
| align=right | 0.9832
| align=right | 0.8590
| align=right | 3,991,180.11
| align=right | 3,487,005.40
|-
|-
| [[Czech National Bank]]
| [[Czech National Bank]]
| align=right | 1.8794
| align=right | 1.6075
| align=right | 7,629,194.36
| align=right | 6,525,449.57
|-
|-
| [[Danmarks Nationalbank]]
| [[Danmarks Nationalbank]]
| align=right | 1.7591
| align=right | 1.4873
| align=right | 7,140,851.23
| align=right | 6,037,512.38
|-
|-
| [[Croatian National Bank]]
| [[Croatian National Bank]]
| align=right | 0.6595
| align=right | 0.6023
| align=right | 2,677,159.56
| align=right | 2,444,963.16
|-
|-
| [[Hungarian National Bank]]
| [[Hungarian National Bank]]
| align=right | 1.5488
| align=right | 1.3798
| align=right | 6,287,164.11
| align=right | 5,601,129.28
|-
|-
| [[National Bank of Poland]]
| [[National Bank of Poland]]
| align=right | 6.0335
| align=right | 5.1230
| align=right | 24,492,255.06
| align=right | 20,796,191.71
|-
|-
| [[National Bank of Romania]]
| [[National Bank of Romania]]
| align=right | 2.8289
| align=right | 2.6024
| align=right | 11,483,573.44
| align=right | 10,564,124.40
|-
|-
| [[Sveriges Riksbank]]
| [[Swedish National Bank]]
| align=right | 2.9790
| align=right | 2.2729
| align=right | 12,092,886.02
| align=right | 9,226,559.46
|-
| [[Bank of England]]
| align=right | 13.6743
| align=right | 55,509,147.81
|-
|-
| '''Total'''
| '''Total'''
| align=right | '''18.6714'''
| align=right | '''29.6085'''
| align=right | '''75,794,263.89'''
| align=right | '''120,192,083.17'''
|}
|}

===Reserves===
In addition to capital subscriptions, the NCBs of the member states participating in the euro area provided the ECB with foreign reserve assets equivalent to around €40&nbsp;billion. The contributions of each NCB is in proportion to its share in the ECB's subscribed capital, while in return each NCB is credited by the ECB with a claim in euro equivalent to its contribution. 15% of the contributions was made in gold, and the remaining 85% in US dollars and UK pound Sterlings.{{citation needed|date=July 2016}}


===Languages===
===Languages===
The internal working language of the ECB is generally English, and press conferences are usually held in English. External communications are handled flexibly: English is preferred (though not exclusively) for communication within the ESCB (i.e. with other central banks) and with financial markets; communication with other national bodies and with EU citizens is normally in their respective language, but the ECB website is predominantly English; official documents such as the Annual Report are in the official languages of the EU.<ref>{{cite news|title=Translation Adds Complexity to European Central Bank's Supervisory Role: ECB Wants Communication in English, But EU Rules Allow Use of Any Official Language|first=Todd|last=Buell|date=29 October 2014|access-date=11 October 2015|newspaper=The Wall Street Journal|url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/translation-adds-complexity-to-european-central-banks-supervisory-role-1414580925}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|page=26|title=The Application of multilingualism in the European Union Context|publisher=ECB|date=February 2006|access-date=11 October 2015|url=http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scplps/ecblwp2.pdf|first=Phoebus|last= Athanassiou}}</ref>
The internal working language of the ECB is generally English, and press conferences are usually held in English. External communications are handled flexibly: English is preferred (though not exclusively) for communication within the ESCB (i.e. with other central banks) and with financial markets; communication with other national bodies and with EU citizens is normally in their respective language, but the ECB website is predominantly English; official documents such as the Annual Report are in the official languages of the EU.<ref>{{cite news|title=Translation Adds Complexity to European Central Bank’s Supervisory Role: ECB Wants Communication in English, But EU Rules Allow Use of Any Official Language|first=Todd|last=Buell|date=29 October 2014|accessdate=11 October 2015|newspaper=The Wall Street Journal|url=http://www.wsj.com/articles/translation-adds-complexity-to-european-central-banks-supervisory-role-1414580925}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|page=26|title=The Application of multilingualism in the European Union Context|publisher=ECB|date=February 2006|accessdate=11 October 2015|url=http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scplps/ecblwp2.pdf|first=Phoebus|last= Athanassiou}}</ref>


===Independence===
==Independence==
The European Central Bank (and by extension, the Eurosystem) is often considered as the "most independent central bank in the world".<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/1997/html/sp970513.en.html|title=The European Central Bank: independent and accountable|last=Bank|first=European Central|website=European Central Bank|language=en|access-date=5 November 2017}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/1999/html/sp990504.en.html|title=The role of the Central Bank in the United Europe|last=Bank|first=European Central|website=European Central Bank|language=en|access-date=5 November 2017}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Papadia|first1=Francesco|last2=Ruggiero|first2=Gian Paolo|date=1 February 1999|title=Central Bank Independence and Budget Constraints for a Stable Euro|journal=Open Economies Review|language=en|volume=10|issue=1|pages=63–90|doi=10.1023/A:1008305128157|s2cid=153508547|issn=0923-7992}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB902443500523452500|title=Is the ECB Too Independent?|last=Wood|first=Geoffrey|work=WSJ|access-date=5 November 2017|language=en-US}}</ref> In general terms, this means that the Eurosystem tasks and policies can be discussed, designed, decided and implemented in full autonomy, without pressure or need for instructions from any external body. The main justification for the ECB's independence is that such an institutional setup assists the maintenance of price stability.<ref name="Independence">{{cite web |url=http://www.ecb.int/ecb/orga/independence/html/index.en.html |title=Independence |publisher=European Central Bank |access-date=1 December 2012}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.ecb.europa.eu/explainers/tell-me-more/html/ecb_independent.en.html |title=Why is the ECB independent? |last=Bank |first=European Central |website=European Central Bank |language=en |access-date=5 November 2017}}</ref>


===Political independence===
In practice, the ECB's independence is pinned by four key principles:<ref>{{cite web |url=http://transparency.eu/ecb|title=Transparency International EU – The global coalition against corruption in Brussels |last=EU |first=Transparency International |website=transparency.eu |language=en |access-date=5 November 2017 |date=28 March 2017}}</ref>
The independence of the ECB is instrumental in maintaining price stability. Not only must the bank not seek influence, but EU institutions and national governments are bound by the treaties to respect the ECB's independence. To offer some accountability, the ECB is bound to publish reports on its activities and has to address its annual report to the [[European Parliament]], the [[European Commission]], the [[Council of the European Union]] and the [[European Council]].<ref name="ECB Acc">{{cite web |title=Accountability |publisher=European Central Bank |url=http://www.ecb.int/ecb/orga/accountability/html/index.en.html |accessdate=15 October 2007}}</ref> The European Parliament also gets to question and then issue its opinion on candidates to the executive board.<ref name="BF EB">{{cite web |title=Executive Board |publisher=[[Banque de France]] |year=2005 |url=http://www.banque-france.fr/fileadmin/user_upload/banque_de_france/Eurosysteme_et_international/Directoire_GB.pdf |format=PDF |accessdate=23 July 2012}}</ref>


* '''Operational and legal independence''': the ECB has all required competences to achieve its price stability mandate{{Citation needed|date=August 2020}} and thereby can steer monetary policy in full autonomy and by means of high level of discretion. The ECB's governing council deliberates with a high degree of secrecy, since individual voting records are not disclosed to the public (leading to suspicions that Governing Council members are voting along national lines.<ref>Friedrich Heinemann and Felix Huefner (2004) 'Is the view from the Eurotower purely European? National divergence and ECB interest rate policy', ''Scottish Journal of Political Economy'' 51(4):544–558.</ref><ref>Jose Ramon Cancelo, Diego Varela and Jose Manuel Sanchez-Santos (2011) 'Interest rate setting at the ECB: Individual preferences and collective decision making', ''Journal of Policy Modeling'' 33(6): 804–820. [[doi:10.1016/j.jpolmod.2011.08.017|DOI]].</ref>) In addition to monetary policy decisions, the ECB has the right to issue legally binding regulations, within its competence and if the conditions laid down in Union law are fulfilled, it can sanction non-compliant actors if they violate legal requirements laid down in directly applicable Union regulations. The ECB's own legal personality also allows the ECB to enter into international legal agreements independently from other EU institutions, and be party of legal proceedings. Finally, the ECB can organise its internal structure as it sees fit.
The governors of national central banks represented in the Governing Council of the ECB are appointed by their national executives, and can be reappointed. In spite of the fact that voting inside the ECB is secret, there is some evidence pointing in the direction of Governing Council members voting along national lines.<ref>Friedrich Heinemann and Felix Huefner (2004) 'Is the view from the Eurotower purely European? National divergence and ECB interest rate policy', ''Scottish Journal of Political Economy'' 51(4):544-558.</ref><ref>Jose Ramon Cancelo, Diego Varela and Jose Manuel Sanchez-Santos (2011) 'Interest rate setting at the ECB: Individual preferences and collective decision making', ''Journal of Policy Modeling'' 33(6): 804-820. [http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpolmod.2011.08.017 DOI].</ref>
* '''Personal independence:''' the mandate of ECB board members is purposefully very long (8 years) and Governors of national central banks have a minimum renewable term of office of five years.<ref name="Independence" /> In addition, ECB board members and are vastly immune from judicial proceedings.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scplps/ecblwp4.pdf?581a2ecf674a6554f5af698f5bf54019|title=PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK|date=2007|website=European Central Bank}}</ref> Indeed, removals from office can only be decided by the [[Court of Justice of the European Union]] (CJEU), under the request of the ECB's Governing Council or the Executive Board (i.e. the ECB itself). Such decision is only possible in the event of incapacity or serious misconduct. National governors of the Eurosystem' national central banks can be dismissed under national law (with possibility to appeal) in case they can no longer fulfil their functions or are guilty of serious misconduct.
* '''Financial independence''': the ECB is the only body within the EU whose statute guarantees budgetary independence through its own resources and income. The ECB uses its own profits generated by its monetary policy operations and cannot be technically insolvent. The ECB's financial independence reinforces its political independence. Because the ECB does not require external financing and symmetrically is prohibited from [[Monetary financing|direct monetary financing]] of public institutions, this shields it from potential pressure from public authorities.
*'''Political independence''': The Community institutions and bodies and the governments of the member states may not seek to influence the members of the decision-making bodies of the ECB or of the NCBs in the performance of their tasks. Symmetrically, EU institutions and national governments are bound by the treaties to respect the ECB's independence. It is the latter which is the subject of much debate.


===Democratic accountability===
===Financial independence===
{{one source|section|date=December 2015}}
In return to its high degree of independence and discretion, the ECB is accountable to the [[European Parliament]] (and to a lesser extent to the European Court of Auditors, the European Ombudsman and the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU)). Although no interinstitutional agreement exists between the European Parliament and the ECB to regulate the ECB's accountability framework, it has been inspired by a resolution of the European Parliament adopted in 1998<ref>{{Cite web|title=Report on democratic accountability in the third phase of European Monetary Union – Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy – A4-0110/1998|url=http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A4-1998-0110&language=EN|access-date=8 October 2018|website=europarl.europa.eu|language=en}}</ref> which was then informally agreed with the ECB and incorporated into the Parliament's rule of procedure.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Bank|first=European Central|title=The evolution of the ECB's accountability practices during the crisis|url=https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/articles/2018/html/ecb.ebart201805_01.en.html|access-date=8 October 2018|website=European Central Bank|language=en}}</ref>
{{expand section|date=December 2015}}
The ECB's financial independence means that the ECB has its own budget. Its capital is subscribed and paid up by the euro area central banks.<ref name="Independence">{{cite web |title=Independence |publisher=European Central Bank |url=http://www.ecb.int/ecb/orga/independence/html/index.en.html |accessdate=1 December 2012}}</ref>


===Other provisions===
The accountability framework involves five main mechanisms:<ref>{{Cite web|last=Bank|first=European Central|title=Accountability|url=https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/orga/accountability/html/index.en.html|access-date=2020-11-25|website=European Central Bank|language=en}}</ref>
The Eurosystem is functionally—i.e., operationally—independent.


Governors of national central banks (NCBs) and members of the executive board of the ECB have security of tenure:<ref name="Independence"/>
* '''Annual report:''' the ECB is bound to publish reports on its activities and has to address its annual report to the [[European Parliament]], the [[European Commission]], the [[Council of the European Union]] and the [[European Council]] .<ref name="ECB Acc">{{cite web|title=Accountability|url=http://www.ecb.int/ecb/orga/accountability/html/index.en.html|access-date=15 October 2007|publisher=European Central Bank}}</ref> In return, the European Parliament evaluates the past activities to the ECB via its annual report on the European Central Bank (which is essentially a non legally-binding list of resolutions).
*NCB governors have a minimum term of office of five years.
* '''Quarterly hearings:''' the [[European Parliament Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs|Economic and Monetary affairs Committee of the European Parliament]] organises a hearing (the "Monetary Dialogue") with the ECB every quarter,<ref>{{Cite web|title=Monetary dialogue {{!}} ECON Policies {{!}} ECON {{!}} Committees {{!}} European Parliament|url=http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/econ/monetary-dialogue.html|access-date=6 October 2017|website=europarl.europa.eu|language=en}}</ref> allowing members of parliament to address oral questions to the ECB president.
*Members of the Executive Board have a non-renewable term of office of eight years.
* '''Parliamentary questions:''' all Members of the European Parliament have the right to address written questions<ref>{{Cite web|title=Questions to the ECB {{!}} Documents {{!}} ECON {{!}} Committees {{!}} European Parliament|url=http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/econ/questions-ecb.html|access-date=6 October 2017|website=europarl.europa.eu|language=en}}</ref> to the ECB president. The ECB president provides a written answer in about 6 weeks.
*Their removal from office can only be in the event of incapacity or grave misconduct.
* '''Appointments:''' The European Parliament is consulted during the appointment process of executive board members of the ECB.<ref name="BF EB">{{cite web|year=2005|title=Executive Board|url=http://www.banque-france.fr/fileadmin/user_upload/banque_de_france/Eurosysteme_et_international/Directoire_GB.pdf|access-date=23 July 2012|publisher=[[Banque de France]]}}</ref>
* '''Legal proceedings:''' the ECB's own legal personality allows civil society or public institutions to file complaints against the ECB to the Court of Justice of the EU.


==Sovereign debt crisis==
In 2013, an interinstitutional agreement was reached between the ECB and the European Parliament in the context of the establishment of the ECB's Banking Supervision. This agreement sets broader powers to the European Parliament than the established practice on the monetary policy side of the ECB's activities. For example, under the agreement, the Parliament can veto the appointment of the Chair and Vice-Chair of the ECB's supervisory board, and may approve removals if requested by the ECB.<ref>{{cite web|title=Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament and the European Central Bank on the practical modalities of the exercise of democratic accountability and oversight over the exercise of the tasks conferred on the ECB within the framework of the Single Supervisory Mechanism|url=https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/celex_32013q113001_en_txt.pdf}}</ref>
{{main|European debt crisis}}
From late 2009 a handful of mainly southern eurozone member states started being unable to repay their national Euro-denominated [[government debt]] or to finance the bail-out of troubled financial sectors under their national supervision without the assistance of third parties. This so-called ''[[European debt crisis]]'' began after Greece's new elected government stopped masking its true indebtedness and budget deficit and openly communicated the imminent danger of a Greek sovereign default. Seeing a sovereign default in the eurozone as a shock, the general public, international and European institutions, and the financial community started to intensively reassess the economic situation and creditworthiness of eurozone states. Those eurozone states being assessed as not financially sustainable enough on their current path, faced waves of [[credit rating]] downgrades and rising borrowing costs including increasing interest rate spreads. As a consequence, the ability of these states to borrow new money to further finance their budget deficits or to refinance existing unsustainable debt levels was strongly reduced.<ref>{{Cite news|url= http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLDE61F0W720100216 |title= Peripheral euro zone government bond spreads widen |agency=Reuters |author=George Matlock |date=16 February 2010 |accessdate=28 April 2010}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.economist.com/node/16009099 | title=Acropolis now | work=The Economist | date= 29 April 2010 |accessdate=22 June 2011}}</ref><ref name=wsj>{{Cite news| author=Brian Blackstone, Tom Lauricella, and Neil Shah | title = Global Markets Shudder: Doubts About U.S. Economy and a Debt Crunch in Europe Jolt Hopes for a Recovery | work=The Wall Street Journal | date = 5 February 2010 | url = http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704041504575045743430262982.html |accessdate=10 May 2010}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url= http://www.thenewamerican.com/world-news/europe/item/8553-greek-debt-crisis-worsens | title= Greek Debt Crisis Worsens | author=Bruce Walker |date=9 April 2010 |publisher=[[The New American]] |accessdate=28 April 2010}}</ref><ref>[http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/06/world/europe/geir-haarde-former-iceland-leader-goes-on-trial-for-role-in-financial-crisis.html "Former Iceland Leader Tried Over Financial Crisis of 2008"], ''The New York Times'', 5 March 2012. Retrieved 30 May 2012.</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=|title=Greek/German bond yield spread more than 1,000 bps |publisher=Financialmirror.com |date=28 April 2010 |accessdate=5 May 2010}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7d25573c-1ccc-11df-8d8e-00144feab49a.html |title=Gilt yields rise amid UK debt concerns |work=[[Financial Times]] |date=18 February 2010 |accessdate=15 April 2011}}{{registration required}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/3454 |title=The politics of the Maastricht convergence criteria &#124; vox&nbsp;– Research-based policy analysis and commentary from leading economists |publisher=Voxeu.org |date=15 April 2009 |accessdate=1 October 2011}}</ref>


===Reforms due to fiscal bailouts===
=== Transparency ===
The ECB has pronounced that the EU and its member states are in the main responsibility to solve the fiscal crisis of some member states.{{citation needed|date=December 2015}} Until 2009 there had not been sufficient instruments in place on the eurozone level to prevent or solve a debt crisis in a member state. {{citation needed|date=December 2015}}<br>
In addition to its independence, the ECB is subject to limited transparency obligations in contrast to EU Institutions standards and other major central banks. Indeed, as pointed out by [[Transparency International]], "The Treaties establish transparency and openness as principles of the EU and its institutions. They do, however, grant the ECB a partial exemption from these principles. According to Art. 15(3) TFEU, the ECB is bound by the EU’s transparency principles “only when exercising [its] administrative tasks” (the exemption – which leaves the term “administrative tasks” undefined – equally applies to the Court of Justice of the European Union and to the European Investment Bank)."<ref>{{cite web |url=http://transparency.eu/ecb/ |title=Transparency International EU – The global coalition against corruption in Brussels |last=EU |first=Transparency International |website=transparency.eu |language=en |access-date=5 November 2017|date=28 March 2017}}</ref>
Several systems have been put into place since then to fill this gap:
* In 2010, two temporary rescue programmes have been started, the [[European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism|European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM)]] and the [[European Financial Stability Facility|European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF)]]. Together with massive financial support of the [[International Monetary Fund|International Monetary Fund (IMF)]], these facilities have provided funds to Greece, Ireland, and Portugal in 2010 and 2011.
* In 2012 the [[European Stability Mechanism|European Stability Mechanism (ESM)]] with a lending capacity of €500 billion, has been established to replace the previous temporary rescue programmes. The ESM is intended as a permanent firewall for the eurozone to safeguard and provide instant access to financial assistance programmes for member states in financial difficulty. Spain and Cyprus have drawn funds from the ESM programme in 2012 and 2013, with a focus on recapitalization (bail-out) of their financial sectors.
* In 2013 the [[European Fiscal Compact]] became valid as a contract that obliges the EU member states to introduce domestic self-correcting mechanisms on member state level to ensure balanced public budgets and sustainable public debt levels.
* In 2014 the [[Single Supervisory Mechanism|Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM)]] was introduced. It grants the European Central Bank (ECB) a supervisory role to monitor the financial stability of banks in the eurozone states (full members) and other EU states. This supervision is intended as a first step to prevent bank bailout needs in EU states that could induce or contribute to a debt crisis in the respective state.


The EU contracts{{vague|date=December 2015}} forbid the financial bailout of other eurozone countries having problems to service their financial obligations.{{citation needed|date=December 2015}} The emergency set-up of the various eurozone rescue funds to help the crisis states to fulfill their obligations was to a certain degree a violation of the non-bailout clause, but it is documented that there were no alternatives that the eurozone states could agree on in this unforeseen debt crisis situation.{{citation needed|date=December 2015}}
In practice, there are several concrete examples where the ECB is less transparent than other institutions:
* '''Voting secrecy''' : while other central banks publish the voting record of its decision makers, the ECB's Governing Council decisions are made in full discretion. Since 2014, the ECB has published "accounts" of its monetary policy meetings,<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2014/html/pr140703_1.en.html |title=ECB to adjust schedule of meetings and to publish regular accounts of monetary policy discussions in 2015 |last=Bank |first=European Central |website=European Central Bank |language=en |access-date=5 November 2017}}</ref> but those remain rather vague and do not include individual votes.
* '''Access to documents''' : The obligation for EU bodies to make documents freely accessible after a 30-year embargo applies to the ECB. However, under the ECB's Rules of Procedure the Governing Council may decide to keep individual documents classified beyond the 30-year period.<!-- Art. 23.3 Rules of Procedure. See also CJEU in joined cases T-3/00 and T-337/04 -->
* '''Disclosure of securities:''' The ECB is less transparent than the Fed when it comes to disclosing the list of securities being held in its balance sheet under monetary policy operations such as QE.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://bruegel.org/2017/11/the-eurosystem-too-opaque-and-costly/|title=The Eurosystem – Too opaque and costly? {{!}} Bruegel|website=bruegel.org|language=en-US|access-date=7 November 2017}}</ref>


There is also a widespread view{{vague|date=December 2015}} {{who|date=December 2015}} that giving much more financial support to continuously cover the debt crisis or allow even higher budget deficits or debt levels would discourage the crisis states to implement necessary reforms to regain their competitiveness.{{citation needed|date=December 2015}} There has also been a reluctance{{citation needed|date=December 2015}} of financially stable eurozone states like Germany{{citation needed|date=December 2015}} to further circumvent the no-bailout clause in the EU contracts and to generally take on the burden of financing or guaranteeing the debts of financially unstable or defaulting eurozone countries.{{citation needed|date=December 2015}}
==Location==
{{Main|Seat of the European Central Bank}}
[[File:Frankfurt EZB.Nordwest-2.20141228.jpg|thumb|The new ECB headquarters, which opened in 2014.]]


This has led to public discussions if Greece, Portugal, and even Italy would be better off leaving the eurozone to regain economical and financial stability if they would not implement reforms to strengthen their competitiveness as part of the eurozone in time. Greece had the greatest need for reforms but also most problems to implement those, so the Greek exit, also called "Grexit", has been widely discussed. Germany, as a large and financially stable state being in the focus to be asked to guarantee or repay other states debt, has never pushed those exits. Their position is to keep Greece within the eurozone, but not at any cost. If the worst comes to the worst, priority should be given to the euro's stability.<ref name="EwingAlderman2011">{{cite news |first=Jack |last=Ewing |first2=Liz |last2=Alderman |title=Some in Germany Want Greece to Temporarily Exit the Euro Zone |newspaper=New York Times |date=10 August 2011 |url=http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/11/business/global/greece-feels-push-toward-euro-exit.html }}</ref><ref name = "Walker-Bisserbe-2011">{{cite news |first=Marcus|last=Walker|first2=Noemie| last2=Bisserbe|title=Merkel Lessens Fears Over Greece: German Leader Rejects Suggestions Athens Be Allowed to Default or Leave Currency Bloc, Reassuring Nervous Markets|newspaper=Wall Street Journal |date=14 September 2011|url=http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904265504576568693911614726.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection}}</ref><ref>{{cite web | url=http://www.bundesregierung.de/nn_987416/Content/DE/Artikel/2011/11/2011-11-03-merkel-sakozy-griechenland.html | title=Stabiler Euro geht vor | trans-title=Stable euro comes first | date=3 November 2011 | deadurl=yes | archivedate=21 January 2010 | publisher=[[Bundesregierung]] | language=de | archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20120121182852/http://www.bundesregierung.de/nn_987416/Content/DE/Artikel/2011/11/2011-11-03-merkel-sakozy-griechenland.html }}</ref>
The bank is based in [[Ostend (Frankfurt am Main)|Ostend]] (East End), [[Frankfurt am Main]]. The city is the largest financial centre in the [[Eurozone]] and the bank's location in it is fixed by the [[Amsterdam Treaty]].<ref>{{cite web |at=Protocol on the institutions with the prospect of enlargement of the European Union, Article 2, sole article, (i) |url=http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:11997D/TXT |access-date=4 January 2015 |title=Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts |date=11 October 1997 |publication-date=23 December 2014}}</ref> The bank moved to a new purpose-built headquarters in 2014, designed by a Vienna-based architectural office, [[Coop Himmelbau]].<ref name="autogenerated4">{{cite web |title=Winning design by Coop Himmelb(l)au for the ECB's new headquarters in Frankfurt/Main |access-date=2 August 2007 |publisher=European Central Bank |url=http://www.ecb.int/ecb/premises/html/image29.en.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070924213221/http://www.ecb.int/ecb/premises/html/image29.en.html |archive-date=24 September 2007}}</ref> The building is approximately {{convert|180|m|ft|0}} tall and is to be accompanied by other secondary buildings on a landscaped site on the site of the [[Großmarkthalle|former wholesale market]] in the eastern part of Frankfurt am Main. The main construction on a 120,000 m² total site area began in October 2008,<ref name="autogenerated4" /><ref>{{cite web |title=Launch of a public tender for a general contractor to construct the new ECB premises |access-date=2 August 2007 |publisher=European Central Bank |url=http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2007/html/pr070710_3.en.html}}</ref> and it was expected that the building would become an architectural symbol for Europe. While it was designed to accommodate double the number of staff who operated in the former [[Eurotower (Frankfurt)|Eurotower]],<ref name="FT new building">{{cite news |last=Dougherty |first=Carter |title=In ECB future, a new home to reflect all of Europe |work=[[International Herald Tribune]] |access-date=2 August 2007 |url=http://www.iht.com/articles/2004/11/16/ecb_ed3_.php | url-status=dead | archive-date=19 September 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080919022915/http://www.iht.com/articles/2004/11/16/ecb_ed3_.php}}</ref> that building has been retained by the ECB, owing to more space being required since it took responsibility for banking supervision.<ref>{{cite web |author=European Central Bank |url=http://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/premises/intro/html/index.en.html |title=Overview |publisher=Ecb.europa.eu |access-date=25 September 2019}}</ref>


===ECB answer===
== Debates surrounding the ECB ==
There are a variety of possible responses to the problem of bad debts in a banking system. One is to induce debtors to make a greater effort to make good on their debt.<ref name="Euro debt crisis" /> With public debt this usually means getting governments to maintain debt payments while cutting back on other forms of expenditure.<ref name="Euro debt crisis" /> Such policies often involve cutting back on popular social programmes.<ref>{{cite news |first=Sabrina |last=Cohen |title=Italian Unions Criticize Austerity Plan |newspaper=[[Wall Street Journal]] |date=14 August 2011 |url=http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903392904576508253558418390.html }}</ref>


Stringent policies with regard to social expenditures and employment in the state sector have led to riots and political protests in Greece.<ref>{{cite news |author=CNN Wire Staff |title=Greek austerity protests turn ugly as strike begins |date=28 June 2011 |url=http://articles.cnn.com/2011-06-28/world/greece.strike_1_police-and-protesters-stone-throwing-demonstrators-force-protesters?_s=PM:WORLD }}</ref> Another response is to shift losses from the central bank to private investors who are asked to "share the pain" of partial defaults that take the form of rescheduling debt payments.<ref name="Euro debt crisis" />
=== Debates on ECB independence ===
{{Essay-like|section|date=May 2020}}


However, if the debt rescheduling causes losses on loans held by European banks, it weakens the private banking system, which then puts pressure on the central bank to come to the aid of those banks. Private-sector bond holders are an integral part of the public and private banking system. Another possible response is for wealthy member countries to guarantee or purchase the debt of countries that have defaulted or are likely to default.<ref name="Euro debt crisis" /> This alternative requires that the tax revenues and credit of the wealthy member countries be used to refinance the previous borrowing of the weaker member countries, and is politically controversial.<ref>{{cite news |first=Stephen |last=Castle |title=Euro Zone Seeks Deal on Greece |date=15 July 2011 |newspaper=New York Times |url=http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/16/business/global/eu-leaders-to-meet-thursday-to-try-to-break-deadlock-on-greece.html }}</ref>
==== The arguments in favour of this independence ====
The debate on the independence of the ECB has its origins in the preparatory stages of the construction of the EMU. The German government agreed to go ahead if certain crucial guarantees were respected, such as a European Central Bank independent of national governments and shielded from political pressure along the lines of the German central bank. The French government, for its part, feared that this independence would mean that politicians would no longer have any room for manoeuvre in the process. A compromise was then reached by establishing a regular dialogue between the ECB and the Council of Finance Ministers of the euro area, the Eurogroupe.


====Bond purchase====
The founding model of the ECB, as advocated by the German government, is explained in an article published in 1983 by two economists, Robert Barro and David Gordon.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Barro|first1=Robert|last2=Gordon|first2=David|date=February 1983|title=Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy|location=Cambridge, MA|doi=10.3386/w1079|doi-access=free}}</ref> According to them, the best way to combat the inflationary bias is for central banks to be credible. This credibility would be all the more important if the central banks were independent, so that decisions are not "contaminated" by politics. For economists, central banks should then have only one objective: to maintain a low inflation rate. For this system to work, it would then be necessary to assume that a monetary policy conducted in this way would have no effect on the real economy.
[[File:ECB SMP Bond Purchases.png|thumb|200px|ECB Securities Markets Programme (SMP) covering bond purchases since May 2010]]
In contrast to the Fed, the ECB normally does not buy bonds outright.<ref>Bagus, ''The Tragedy of the Euro'', 2010, p.75.</ref> The normal procedure used by the ECB for manipulating the [[money supply]] has been via the so-called refinancing facilities. In these facilities, bonds are not purchased but used in reverse transactions: [[repurchase agreement]]s, or [[Collateral (finance)|collateralised loans]]. These two transactions are similar, i.e. bonds are used as collaterals for loans, the difference being of legal nature. In the repos the ownership of the collateral changes to the ECB until the loan is repaid.


This changed with the recent [[European sovereign-debt crisis|sovereign-debt crisis]]. The ECB always could, and through the late summer of 2011 did, purchase bonds issued by the weaker states even though it assumes, in doing so, the risk of a deteriorating balance sheet. ECB buying focused primarily on Spanish and Italian debt.<ref>{{cite news |first=John |last=McManus |first2=Dan |last2=O'Brien |title=Market rout as Berlin rejects call for more EU action |journal=Irish Times |date=5 August 2011 }}</ref> Certain techniques can minimise the impact. Purchases of Italian bonds by the central bank, for example, were intended to dampen international speculation and strengthen portfolios in the private sector and also the central bank.<ref>{{cite news |first=Marcus |last=Walker |first2=Damian |last2=Paletta |first3=Brian |last3=Blacksone |title=Global Crisis of Confidence World Policy Makers' Inability to Agree on Fixes Led Markets on Wild Ride |journal=Wall Street Journal |date=13 August 2011 |url= }}</ref>
Since that publication, it has often been accepted that an independent institution to manage monetary policy can help to limit chronic inflation. This model was generalised in various variations at the national levels before being adopted at the European level.<ref name="Barbier-Gauchard, Amélie 1978-....">{{Cite book|last=Barbier-Gauchard, Amélie (1978–....).|title=La gouvernance économique de la zone euro : réalités et perspectives|date=15 May 2018|others=Sidiropoulos, Moïse., Varoudakis, Aristomène (1958–....)., De Grauwe, Paul (1946–....).|isbn=978-2-8073-2010-9|location=Louvain-la-Neuve|oclc=1041143371}}</ref>


The assumption is that speculative activity will decrease over time and the value of the assets increase. Such a move is similar to what the US federal reserve did in buying subprime mortgages in the crisis of 2008, except in the European crisis, the purchases are of member state debt. The risk of such a move is that it could diminish the value of the currency.<ref name="Euro debt working paper" />
The original European project, as intended by the founding fathers, did not attract the passions and favours of the European peoples. And rightly so. This project is thought out openly on purely technical subjects that are of little or no interest to public opinion. As a result, the founding fathers hoped that economic and ethical rationality could be exercised in all its fullness without political, ideological or historical obstacles. It is this rational messianism that the radical left has always fought against.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Bouillaud|first=Christophe|date=2018|title=Bernard Bruneteau, Combattre l'Europe. De Lénine à Marine Le Pen, Paris, CNRS Éditions, 2018, 303 pages|url=http://www.cairn.info/revue-politique-europeenne-2018-4-page-186.htm?ref=doi|journal=Politique Européenne|language=fr|volume=N° 62|issue=4|pages=186|doi=10.3917/poeu.062.0186|issn=1623-6297}}</ref> Moreover, this project is presented as heir to the Enlightenment and Reason, the reign of human rights, a modernist and voluntarist project stemming from the tradition of the 18th century.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Bouillaud|first=Christophe|date=2018|title=Bernard Bruneteau, Combattre l'Europe. De Lénine à Marine Le Pen, Paris, CNRS Éditions, 2018, 303 pages|url=http://www.cairn.info/revue-politique-europeenne-2018-4-page-186.htm?ref=doi|journal=Politique Européenne|language=fr|volume=N° 62|issue=4|pages=186|doi=10.3917/poeu.062.0186|issn=1623-6297}}</ref> In this order of things, the independence of the ECB allowing a rational management of monetary questionnaires outside the political game is a blessing for the supporters of this doctrine. It is difficult, if not impossible, for them to conceive of a democratisation of the ECB by attaching to it a share of political control in its operation without distorting the "European Project", this bible, this unique political reason which has guided professionals in Europe for generations.


On the other hand, certain financial techniques can reduce the impact of such purchases on the currency.<ref name="Euro debt working paper" /> One is [[Sterilization (economics)|sterilisation]], in which highly valued assets are sold at the same time that the weaker assets are purchased, which keeps the money supply neutral.<ref name="Euro debt working paper" /> Another technique is simply to accept the bad assets as long-term collateral (as opposed to short-term repo swaps) to be held until their market value stabilises. This would imply, as a quid pro quo, adjustments in taxation and expenditure in the economies of the weaker states to improve the perceived value of the assets.<ref name="Euro debt working paper" />
In this same idea, we can find in the "European Project" the Kantian tradition with a model of successful subordination of political power to the law, leading to what Habermas calls "the civilising force of democratic legalification". This Habermatian theory leads us once again to isolate supranational institutions from political games. Indeed, for Habermas, European politics, like national politics for that matter, finds it impossible to define ONE uniform people, but at best a pluriform people in constant opposition, each component against the other. For this author, popular sovereignty is illusory, as is the concept of "government by the people". He prefers the search for a broad consensus legitimized by the majority of democratically elected representatives of the people.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Dialogues avec Jürgen Habermas|others=Aubert, Isabelle; Kervégan, Jean-François|year=2018|isbn=978-2-271-11596-6|location=Paris|oclc=1065711045}}</ref> This explains his attachment to deflecting the influence of popular emotions from technical institutions, such as the ECB.


When the ECB buys bonds from other creditors such as European banks, the ECB does not disclose the transaction prices. Creditors profit of bargains with bonds sold at prices that exceed market's quotes.
==== The arguments against too much independence ====


As of 18 June 2012, the ECB in total had spent €212.1bn (equal to 2.2% of the Eurozone GDP) for bond purchases covering outright debt, as part of its '''Securities Markets Programme''' (SMP) running since May 2010.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.commbank.com.au/corporate/research/publications/economics/economic-issues/international/2012/180612-ECB.pdf|title=The ECB’s Securities Market Programme (SMP) – about to restart bond purchases?|format=PDF|work=Global Markets Research – International Economics|publisher=Commonwealth Bank|date=18 June 2012|accessdate=21 April 2013}}</ref> On 6 September 2012, the ECB announced a new plan for buying bonds from eurozone countries.<ref>{{cite news| url=http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/07/business/global/european-central-bank-leaves-interest-rates-unchanged-at-0-75-percent.html?pagewanted=all | work=The New York Times | first1=Jack | last1=Ewing | first2=Steven | last2=Erlanger | title=Europe's Central Bank Moves Aggressively to Ease Euro Crisis | date=6 September 2012}}</ref> The duration of the previous SMP was temporary,<ref>European Central Bank [http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/pdf/l_12420100520en00080009.pdf Decision of the ECB of 14 May 2010].</ref> while the '''[[Outright Monetary Transactions]]''' (OMT) programme has no [[ex-ante]] time or size limit.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.ecb.int/press/pressconf/2012/html/is120906.en.html|title=ECB press conference, 6 September 2012|publisher=|accessdate=14 September 2014}}</ref> On 4 September 2014, the bank went further by announcing it would buy bonds and other debt instruments primarily from banks in a bid to boost the availability of credit for businesses.<ref name="ECBcuts"/>
===== An independence that would be the source of a democratic deficit. =====
'''Demystify the independence of central bankers''' :According to Christopher Adolph (2009),<ref name="Adolph, Christopher, 1976–2013">{{Cite book|last=Adolph |first=Christopher |title=Bankers, bureaucrats, and central bank politics : the myth of neutrality|date=2013|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-1-139-61681-2|location=New York|oclc=844940155}}</ref> the alleged neutrality of central bankers is only a legal façade and not an indisputable fact . To achieve this, the author analyses the professional careers of central bankers and mirrors them with their respective monetary decision-making. To explain the results of his analysis, he utilizes he uses the "''principal-agent''" theory.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Elgie|first=Robert|date=January 2002|title=The politics of the European Central Bank: principal-agent theory and the democratic deficit|url=http://doras.dcu.ie/65/2/ECB_JEPP.pdf|journal=Journal of European Public Policy|language=en|volume=9|issue=2|pages=186–200|doi=10.1080/13501760110120219|issn=1350-1763|s2cid=53073648}}</ref> To explain that in order to create a new entity, one needs a delegator or ''principal'' (in this case the heads of state or government of the euro area) and a delegate or ''agent'' (in this case the ECB). In his illustration, he describes the financial community as a "''shadow principale''"<ref name="Adolph, Christopher, 1976–2013"/>  which influences the choice of central bankers thus indicating that the central banks indeed act as interfaces between the financial world and the States. It is therefore not surprising, still according to the author, to regain their influence and preferences in the appointment of central bankers, presumed conservative, neutral and impartial according to the model of the [[Independent Central Bank (ICB)]],<ref>{{Cite book|last=Johnson, Peter A. (Peter Andrew)|title=The government of money : monetarism in Germany and the United States|date=15 May 2019|isbn=978-1-5017-4453-2|location=Ithaca, N.Y.|oclc=1112670669}}</ref> which eliminates this famous "''[[temporal inconsistency]]''".<ref name="Adolph, Christopher, 1976–2013"/> Central bankers had a professional life before joining the central bank and their careers will most likely continue after their tenure. They are ultimately human beings. Therefore, for the author, central bankers have interests of their own, based on their past careers and their expectations after joining the ECB, and try to send messages to their future potential employers.


The '''Emergency Lending Assistance''' (ELA) programme was designed for financial institutions in a liquidity crisis, such as the Greek banks in the course of the 2015 Greek financial snafu, when the banks experienced massive deposit flight.<ref>[http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/15/us-ecb-policy-idUSKBN0N60N820150415 reuters.com: "ECB promises 'firm' roll-out of money printing"], 15 Apr 2015</ref><ref>[http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/15/us-ecb-policy-greece-idUSKBN0N61K520150415 reuters.com: "ECB's Draghi says extending ELA for Greek banks is in Athens' hands"], 15 Apr 2015</ref>
'''The crisis: an opportunity to impose its will and extend its powers''' :


On 9 March 2015 the ECB started its [[quantitative easing]] programme, which was designed to ease sovereign stress in its member states. Purchases are €60bn per month. The program is expected to last until at least September 2016.<ref>{{Cite news|title = Getting the machines revving|url = http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2015/03/quantitative-easing-and-euro|newspaper = The Economist|date = Mar 9, 2015 <!-- 15:26 --> |access-date = 2015-05-12|issn = 0013-0613}}</ref>
– ''Its participation in the [[European troika|troika]]'' : Thanks to its three factors which explains its independence, the ECB took advantage of this crisis to implement, through its participation in the troika, the famous structural reforms in the Member States aimed at making, more flexible the various markets, particularly the labour market, which are still considered too rigid under the [[ordoliberal concept]].<ref name="Delaume 2015 75">{{Cite journal|last=Delaume|first=Coralie|date=2015|title=Où va la Banque centrale européenne ?: De la technique à la politique, sans la démocratie|url=http://www.cairn.info/revue-le-debat-2015-5-page-75.htm|journal=Le Débat|language=fr|volume=187|issue=5|pages=75|doi=10.3917/deba.187.0075|issn=0246-2346}}</ref>


====Long-term refinancing operation====
- ''[[Macro-prudential supervision]]'' : At the same time, taking advantage of the reform of the financial supervision system, the Frankfurt Bank has acquired new responsibilities, such as macro-prudential supervision, in other words, supervision of the provision of financial services.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Fontan|first=Clément|date=2010|title=Chantiers de recherche transfert d'idée et résistances au changement : le cas de la banque centrale européenne après la crise.: Questionnement scientifique et objectifs de la thèse|url=http://www.cairn.info/revue-politique-europeenne-2010-1-page-225.htm|journal=Politique Européenne|language=fr|volume=30|issue=1|pages=225|doi=10.3917/poeu.030.0225|issn=1623-6297}}</ref>
Though the ECB's main refinancing operations (MRO) are from repo auctions with a (bi)weekly maturity and monthly maturation, the ECB now conducts ''long-term refinancing operations'' (LTROs), maturing after three months, six months, 12 months and 36 months. In 2003, refinancing via LTROs amounted to 45 bln euro which is about 20% of overall liquidity provided by the ECB.<ref>{{cite news|title=THE LONGER TERM REFINANCING OPERATIONS OF THE ECB|url=http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp359.pdf|date=May 2004|format=PDF}}</ref>


The ECB's first supplementary longer-term refinancing operation (LTRO) with a six-month maturity was announced March 2008.<ref>{{cite news|title=ECB offers longer-term finance via six-month LTROs|url=http://www.euromoney.com/Article/1925778/ECB-offers-longer-term-finance-via-six-month-LTROs.html|date=May 2008}}</ref> Previously the longest tender offered was three months.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.euromoney.com/Article/2985829/LTROs.html|author=Erica Jeffery|title=International banking, finance, capital markets news & analysis &#124; Euromoney magazine|publisher=[[Euromoney]]|date=4 April 2013|accessdate=17 August 2013}}</ref> It announced two 3-month and one 6-month full allotment of Long Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs). The first tender was settled 3 April, and was more than four times oversubscribed. The €25 billion auction drew bids amounting to €103.1 billion, from 177 banks. Another six-month tender was allotted on 9 July, again to the amount of €25 billion. The first 12-month LTRO in June 2009 had close to 1100 bidders.<ref name="ftalphaville1">{{cite news|title=Markets live transcript 29 February 2012|url=http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2012/02/29/903631/markets-live/|date=February 2012}}{{registration required}}</ref>
-''Take liberties with its mandate to save the Euro'' : Paradoxically, the crisis undermined the ECB's ordoliberal discourse "because some of its instruments, which it had to implement, deviated significantly from its principles. It then interpreted the paradigm with enough flexibly to adapt its original reputation to these new economic conditions. It was forced to do so as a last resort to save its one and only raison d'être: the euro. This Independent was thus obliged to be pragmatic by departing from the spirit of its statutes, which is unacceptable to the hardest supporters of ordoliberalism, which will lead to the resignation of the two German leaders present within the ECB: the governor of the Bundesbank, Jens WEIDMANN<ref>{{Cite web|last=Raymond|first=Grégory|title=Jens Weidmann, l'homme qui dit "non" à toute l'Europe|url=https://www.huffingtonpost.fr/2012/08/30/jens-weidmann-bundesbank-draghi-merkel-euro_n_1843003.html?utm_hp_ref=economie|website=huffingtonpost.fr}}</ref> and the member of the Executive Board of the ECB, Jürgen STARK.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Reuters|date=11 September 2011|title=La démission de Jürgen Stark de la BCE vient au pire moment|url=https://www.lexpress.fr/archives/economie/2011/09/11/|website=lexpansion.lexpress.fr/}}</ref>


On 21 December 2011 the bank instituted a programme of making low-interest loans with a term of three years (36 months) and 1% interest to European banks accepting loans from the portfolio of the banks as collateral. Loans totalling €489.2 bn (US$640 bn) were announced. The loans were not offered to European states, but government securities issued by European states would be acceptable collateral as would [[Mortgage-backed security|mortgage-backed securities]] and other [[commercial paper]] that can be demonstrated to be secure. The programme was announced on 8 December 2011 but observers were surprised by the volume of the loans made when it was implemented.<ref name=ECB82011>{{cite web|title=Introductory statement to the press conference (with Q&A)|url=http://www.ecb.int/press/pressconf/2011/html/is111208.en.html|publisher=European Central Bank |date=8 December 2011 |author=Mario Draghi, President of the ECB, Vítor Constâncio, Vice-President of the ECB|location=Frankfurt am Main|format=Press conference |accessdate=22 December 2011}}</ref><ref name=NYTloans>{{cite news|title=European Bank in Strong Move to Loosen Credit|url=http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/22/business/global/demand-for-ecb-loans-surpasses-expectations.html|accessdate=22 December 2011|newspaper=The New York Times|date=21 December 2011|author=Nelson D. Schwartz|author2=David Jolly|quote=the move, by the European Central Bank, could be a turning point in the Continent's debt crisis}}</ref><ref name=NYTNorris>{{cite news|title=A Central Bank Doing What It Should|url=http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/22/business/a-central-bank-doing-what-central-banks-do.html|accessdate=22 December 2011|newspaper=The New York Times|date=21 December 2011|author=Floyd Norris|format=Analysis}}</ref> Under its LTRO it loaned {{Nowrap|€489bn}} to 523 banks for an exceptionally long period of three years at a rate of just one percent.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://news.businessweek.com/article.asp?documentKey=1377-aWQyiw0H4GIM-497EEB4BELPRIE7TIUO0INS6SD |title=ECB Lends 489 Billion Euros for 3 Years, Exceeding Forecast |work=Business Week |date=21 December 2011 |accessdate=27 January 2012}}</ref> The by far biggest amount of {{Nowrap|€325bn}} was tapped by banks in Greece, Ireland, Italy and Spain.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/feb/29/eurozone-debt-crisis-ecb-loans-ltro#block-3 |title=Eurozone crisis live: ECB to launch massive cash injection |work=The Guardian |date=29 February 2012 |accessdate=29 February 2012 |location=London |first1=Graeme |last1=Wearden |first2=Nick |last2=Fletcher}}</ref> This way the ECB tried to make sure that banks have enough cash to pay off {{Nowrap|€200bn}} of their own maturing debts in the first three months of 2012, and at the same time keep operating and loaning to businesses so that a credit crunch does not choke off economic growth. It also hoped that banks would use some of the money to buy government bonds, effectively easing the debt crisis.<ref>{{cite news|last=Ewing |first=Jack | last2=Jolly | first2=David |url=http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/22/business/global/demand-for-ecb-loans-surpasses-expectations.html |title=Banks in the euro zone must raise more than 200bn euros in the first three months of 2012 |work=New York Times |date=21 December 2011 |accessdate=21 December 2011}}</ref>
– ''Regulation of the financial system'' :  The delegation of this new function to the ECB was carried out with great simplicity and with the consent of European leaders, because neither the Commission nor the Member States really wanted to obtain the monitoring of financial abuses throughout the area. In other words, in the event of a new financial crisis, the ECB would be the perfect scapegoat.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Lebaron|first=Frédéric|date=2014|title=Quand le gardien du Temple devient le sauveur des marchés financiers|url=http://www.cairn.info/revue-savoir-agir-2014-1-page-5.htm|journal=Savoir/Agir|language=fr|volume=27|issue=1|pages=5|doi=10.3917/sava.027.0005|issn=1958-7856}}</ref>


On 29 February 2012, the ECB held a second 36-month auction, LTRO2, providing eurozone banks with further €529.5 billion in low-interest loans.<ref>{{cite news |url=http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/feb/29/eurozone-debt-crisis-ecb-loans-ltro#block-16 |title=Eurozone crisis live: ECB to launch massive cash injection |newspaper=Guardian |date=29 February 2012 |accessdate=29 February 2012 |location=London |first1=Graeme |last1=Wearden |first2=Nick |last2=Fletcher}}</ref> This second long term refinancing operation auction saw 800 banks take part. This can be compared with the 523 banks that took part in the first auction on 21 December 2011.<ref name="Euromoney">{{cite news |url=http://www.euromoney.com/Article/2987035/Category/1/ChannelPage/0/529-billion-LTRO-2-tapped-by-record-800-banks.html |title=€529 billion LTRO 2 tapped by record 800 banks |publisher=Euromoney |date=29 February 2012 |accessdate=29 February 2012}}</ref> Net new borrowing under the February auction was around €313 billion&nbsp;– out of a total of €256bn existing ECB lending €215bn was rolled into LTRO2.<ref name="Euromoney"/>
- ''Capturing exchange rate policy'' : The event that will most mark the definitive politicization of the ECB is, of course, the operation launched in January 2015: the [[quantitative easing]] (QE) operation. Indeed, the Euro is an overvalued currency on the world markets against the dollar and the Euro zone is at risk of deflation. In addition, Member States find themselves heavily indebted, partly due to the rescue of their national banks. The ECB, as the guardian of the stability of the euro zone, is deciding to gradually buy back more than EUR 1 100 billion Member States' public debt. In this way, money is injected back into the economy, the euro depreciates significantly, prices rise, the risk of deflation is removed, and Member States reduce their debts. However, the ECB has just given itself the right to direct the exchange rate policy of the euro zone without this being granted by the Treaties or with the approval of European leaders, and without public opinion or the public arena being aware of this.<ref name="Delaume 2015 75"/>


===Powers and objectives during the European banking crisis===
In conclusion, for those in favour of a framework for ECB independence, there is a clear concentration of powers. In the light of these facts, it is clear that the ECB is no longer the simple guardian of monetary stability in the euro area, but has become, over the course of the crisis, a "''multi-competent economic player, at ease in this role that no one, especially not the agnostic governments of the euro Member States, seems to have the idea of challenging''".<ref name="Delaume 2015 75"/> This new political super-actor, having captured many spheres of competence and a very strong influence in the economic field in the broad sense (economy, finance, budget...).  This new political super-actor can no longer act alone and refuse a counter-power, consubstantial to our liberal democracies.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Béland|first=Daniel|date=May 2010|title=The Idea of Power and the Role of Ideas|journal=Political Studies Review|language=en|volume=8|issue=2|pages=145–154|doi=10.1111/j.1478-9302.2009.00199.x|issn=1478-9299|s2cid=145108543}}</ref> Indeed, the status of independence which the ECB enjoys by essence should not exempt it from a real responsibility regarding the democratic process.
The European debt crisis has revealed some relative weaknesses in the sovereign debt of such member countries as Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain.<ref>{{cite news |first=Raphel |last=Minder |url=http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/25/business/global/25spainecon.html |title=Fears Mount Over Spain and Risks to the Euro |newspaper=[[New York Times]] |date=24 November 2010 |accessdate=24 November 2010 }}</ref>


Rescue operations involving sovereign debt have included temporarily moving bad or weak assets off the balance sheets of the weak member banks into the balance sheets of the European Central Bank.<ref name="Greece and the fiscal crisis in the EMU">{{cite web | url=http://www.nber.org/~wbuiter/Greece.pdf | title=Greece and the fiscal crisis in the EMU | publisher=NBER | date=7 September 2010 | accessdate=30 October 2011 | author=Buite, Willem}}</ref> Such action is viewed as [[monetisation]] and can be seen as an inflationary threat, whereby the strong member countries of the ECB shoulder the burden of monetary expansion (and potential inflation) to save the weak member countries.<ref name="Greece and the fiscal crisis in the EMU" /> Most central banks prefer to move weak assets off their balance sheets with some kind of agreement as to how the debt will continue to be serviced.<ref name="Greece and the fiscal crisis in the EMU" /> This preference has typically led the ECB to argue that the weaker member countries must:
===== The arguments in favour of a counter power =====
* Allocate considerable national income to servicing debts.<ref name="Greece and the fiscal crisis in the EMU" />
In the aftermath of the euro area crisis, several proposals for a countervailing power were put forward, to deal with criticisms of a democratic deficit. For the German economist German Issing (2001) the ECB as a democratic responsibility and should be more transparent. According to him, this transparence could bring several advantages as the improvement of the efficiency and of the credibility by giving to the public adequate information. Others think that the ECB should have a closer relationship with the European Parliament which could play a major role in the evaluation of the democratic responsibility of the ECB.<ref name="Barbier-Gauchard, Amélie 1978-...."/> The development of new institutions or the creation of a minister is another solution proposed:
* Scale back a wide range of national expenditures (such as education, infrastructure, and welfare transfer payments) to make their payments.<ref name="Greece and the fiscal crisis in the EMU" />


[[File:ECB balance sheet.png|thumb|ECB balance sheet]]
'''A minister for the Eurozone ?'''
[[File:ECB deposit facility.svg|thumb|ECB deposit facility]]
[[File:Current accounts at the ECB.png|thumb|Current accounts at the ECB]]


The European Central Bank had stepped up the buying of member nations debt.<ref>{{cite news |url=http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/finance/2010/1202/1224284573209.html |title=Euro zone bonds rally after ECB debt buying |newspaper=Irish Times |date=2 December 2010 }}{{subscription required}}</ref> In response to the crisis of 2010, some proposals have surfaced for a collective European bond issue that would allow the central bank to purchase a European version of [[Treasury bill|US Treasury bills]].<ref name="Walker-20101217">{{cite news |first=Marcus |last=Walker |title=Closer Fiscal Union: A Collective Guarantee |newspaper=[[Wall Street Journal]] |date=17 December 2010 |url=http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703395204576023784088914652.html }}</ref><ref name="Simon-20101207">{{cite news |first=Simon |last=Nixon |title=A Way Around European Bonds |newspaper=Wall Street Journal |date=7 December 2010 |url=http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704156304576003760628199904.html }}</ref> To make European sovereign debt assets more similar to a US Treasury, a collective guarantee of the member states' solvency would be necessary.{{efn|The European dilemma may be imagined as follows. In the US, if tax collections from California are weak, the total federal debt is financed through tax collections in other states, through federal taxes. California may default on its state debt, but the federal government bypasses California in directly taxing California citizens to finance the federal debt. There is only one legal authority taxing, paying for, and backing the federal debt. Federal expenditures are determined by the federal government. Therefore California cannot leverage more money out of the federal system other than by means of the normal constitutional procedures in the House and Senate. If the federal government transfers additional money to California it is because of federal policy, not because California's state debt is threatening the backing of the US dollar. Consider this hypothetical: If the US federal reserve carried state debts on its balance sheets the system would be more similar to the ECB. If California stated to default on its debt a hole would appear on the Fed's balance sheets where it carried California bonds. To make good this loss, the Fed would have to raise capital from the more solvent states, giving rise to the political issue that California's "lack of responsibility" was forcing other states to jump in and save California's public debt. This, one might worry, could turn into a license to California to ignore fiscal restraints and in effect transfer money from the "more responsible states" to the "least responsible states." Even though California's state finances are faltering in 2010, this is not an issue for the Federal Reserve, because of the federal system of taxation and unified backing of the federal debt. In Europe, the ECB could push for greater political and fiscal integration, which would make the member states more explicitly responsible for backing each other's debts and potentially lead to greater political integration. Speculative attacks on the sovereign debt that backs the euro have in effect revealed the weaknesses in the EU's political and fiscal structure.{{citation needed|date=September 2015}} }} But the German government has resisted this proposal, and other analyses indicate that "the sickness of the euro" is due to the linkage between sovereign debt and failing national banking systems. If the European central bank were to deal directly with failing banking systems sovereign debt would not look as leveraged relative to national income in the financially weaker member states.<ref name="Simon-20101207" />
The idea of a eurozone finance minister is regularly raised and supported by certain political figures, including Emmanuel Macron, as well as German Chancellor Angela Merkel,<ref>SEIBT Sébastien, Ministre des finances de la zone euro, Merkel ne dit pas non, France 24, 13/07/[https://www.france24.com/fr/20170713-merkel-macron-ministre-finances-commun-zone-euro-economie-ue 2017]</ref> former President of the ECB Jean-Claude Trichet and former European Commissioner Pierre Moscovici. For the latter, this position would bring "''more democratic legitimacy''" and "''more efficiency''" to European politics. In his view, it is a question of merging the powers of Commissioner for the Economy and Finance with those of the President of the Eurogroup.<ref>{{Cite news|date=2 October 2017|title=Ministre des Finances zone euro : "je connais bien le job" (Moscovici)|work=Le Figaro|url=https://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-eco/2017/10/02/97002-20171002FILWWW00065-ministre-des-finances-zone-euro-je-connais-bien-le-job-moscovici.php|access-date=28 March 2020}}</ref>


On 17 December 2010, the ECB announced that it was going to double its capitalisation.<ref name="Walker-Forelle-20101217">{{cite news |first=Marcus |last=Walker |lastauthoramp=yes |first2=Charles |last2=Forelle |title=Bailout Deal Fails to Quell EU rifts |newspaper=Wall Street Journal |date=17 December 2010 |url=http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703395204576023732485094802.html }}</ref> (The ECB's most recent balance sheet before the announcement listed capital and reserves at €2.03&nbsp;trillion.)<ref name="Balance sheet">{{cite web |url=http://www.ecb.int/stats/money/aggregates/bsheets/html/outstanding_amounts_L60.X.Z5.0000.en.html |title=Aggregated balance sheet of euro area monetary financial institutions, excluding the Eurosystem |work=ECB.int }}</ref> The 16 central banks of the member states would transfer assets to the ledger of the ECB.
The main task of this minister would be to "represent a strong political authority protecting the economic and budgetary interests of the euro area as a whole, and not the interests of individual Member States". According to the Jacques Delors Institute, its competences could be as follows:


In 2011, the European member states may need to raise as much as US$2&nbsp;trillion in debt.<ref name="Walker-Forelle-20101217" /> Some of this will be new debt and some will be previous debt that is "rolled over" as older loans reach maturity. In either case, the ability to raise this money depends on the confidence of investors in the European financial system.<ref name="Balance sheet" /> The ability of the European Union to guarantee its members' sovereign debt obligations have direct implications for the core assets of the banking system that support the Euro.<ref name="Walker-Forelle-20101217" />
* Supervising the coordination of economic and budgetary policies
* Enforcing the rules in case of infringement
* Conducting negotiations in a crisis context
* Contributing to cushioning regional shocks
* Representing the euro area in international institutions and fora<ref>{{Cite web|last=Enderlein|first=Henrik|date=October 2015|title=QUEL SERAIT LE RÔLE D'UN MINISTRE EUROPÉEN DES FINANCES ? UNE PROPOSITION|url=https://hertieschool-f4e6.kxcdn.com/fileadmin/user_upload/MinistreFinancesEurropeen_JDI-B_FR1.pdf|access-date=28 March 2020}}</ref>


The bank must also co-operate within the EU and internationally with third bodies and entities. Finally, it contributes to maintaining a stable financial system and monitoring the banking sector.<ref name="SCAD ECB">{{cite web |title=The European Central Bank (ECB) |publisher=[[Europa (web portal)]] |url=http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/o10001.htm |accessdate=16 October 2007}}</ref> The latter can be seen, for example, in the bank's intervention during the [[subprime mortgage crisis]] when it loaned billions of euros to banks to stabilise the financial system.<ref name="NYT Squeeze">{{cite news |last=Lander |first=Mark |title=Credit Squeeze Puts Europe's Bank in Spotlight |work=New York Times |date=14 August 2007 |url=http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/14/business/worldbusiness/14euro.html?_r=1&n=Top/Reference/Times%20Topics/Organisations/E/European%20Central%20Bank&oref=slogin |accessdate=16 October 2007}}</ref> In December 2007, the ECB decided in conjunction with the [[Federal Reserve System]] under a programme called [[Term auction facility]] to improve dollar liquidity in the eurozone and to stabilise the money market.<ref name="ECB dollar">{{cite web |title=ECB press release on dollar liquidity |publisher=ECB |url=http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2008/html/pr080110_2.en.html }}</ref>
For Jean-Claude Trichet, this minister could also rely on the Eurogroup working group for the preparation and follow-up of meetings in euro zone format, and on the Economic and Financial Committee for meetings concerning all Member States. He would also have under his authority a General Secretariat of the Treasury of the euro area, whose tasks would be determined by the objectives of the budgetary union currently being set up <ref>{{Citation|last1=Chopin|first1=Thierry|title=Europe — Afterwards. From Crisis Federalism to Pragmatic Federalism|date=2012|work=Schuman Report on Europe|pages=29–33|publisher=Springer Paris|doi=10.1007/978-2-8178-0319-7_2|isbn=978-2-8178-0318-0|last2=Jamet|first2=Jean-François}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|last=Trichet|first=Jean Claude|date=2 June 2011|title=Speech by Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the ECB on receiving the Karlspreis 2011 in Aachen|url=https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2011/html/sp110602.en.html|website=European central bank}}</ref>


In late May 2012, looking ahead to further challenges with Greece, Bundesbank chief and ECB council member [[Jens Weidmann]] pointed out that the council could veto "emergency liquidity assistance" (ELA) to, for instance, Greece through a two–third majority of the council. If Greece chose to default on its debts yet wanted to stay in the Euro, the ELA would be one of the ways to accommodate the country's and its banks' liquidity needs or, alternatively, to precipitate departure.<ref name=MW01/>
This proposal was nevertheless rejected in 2017 by the Eurogroup, its President, Jeroen Dijsselbloem, spoke of the importance of this institution in relation to the European Commission.<ref>{{Cite news|date=7 December 2017|title=L'Eurogroupe rejette l'idée d'un ministre européen des Finances|work=Ouest France|url=https://www.ouest-france.fr/economie/banques-finance/zone-euro/l-eurogroupe-rejette-l-idee-d-un-ministre-europeen-des-finances-5430414|access-date=28 March 2020}}</ref>


On 31 October 2012, the ECB announced it had phased out as pllaned the '''Covered Bond Purchase''' programme, which was one of the crisis measures aimed at supporting the shaky banking system of the 17-country eurozone.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2012/10/31/world/europe/ap-eu-european-central-bank.html?ref=news&_r=0|title=ECB Phases Out Bond-Market Crisis Measure|work= The New York Times}}</ref><ref>[http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/ecb-phases-out-bond-market-crisis-measure/article/feed/2043978 washingtonexaminer.com: "ECB Phases Out Bond-Market Crisis Measure"], 31 Oct 2012</ref>
'''Towards democratic institutions ?'''


====European financial stability facility====
The absence of democratic institutions such as a Parliament or a real government is a regular criticism of the ECB in its management of the euro area, and many proposals have been made in this respect, particularly after the economic crisis, which would have shown the need to improve the governance of the euro area. For Moïse Sidiropoulos, a professor in economy: “The crisis in the euro zone came as no surprise, because the euro remains an unfinished currency, a stateless currency with a fragile political legitimacy”.<ref>{{Cite web|date=2019|title=L'euro reste une monnaie inachevée|url=http://www.recherche.unistra.fr/index.php?id=30096|website=Université de Strasbourg}}</ref>
{{main|European Financial Stability Facility}}
On 9 May 2010, the 27 [[Member States of the European Union|member states of the European Union]] agreed to incorporate the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF).<ref name="Europa EFSF">{{cite web|url=http://www.efsf.europa.eu/about/index.htm |title=About EFSF|work=EFSF|date=9 May 2010|accessdate=19 October 2011}}</ref> The EFSF's mandate is to safeguard financial stability in Europe by providing financial assistance to Eurozone Member States.<ref name="Europa EFSF" />


The EFSF is authorised to use the following instruments linked to appropriate conditionality:
French economist Thomas Piketty wrote on his blog in 2017 that it was essential to equip the euro zone with democratic institutions. An economic government could for example enable it to have a common budget, common taxes and borrowing and investment capacities. Such a government would then make the euro area more democratic and transparent by avoiding the opacity of a council such as the Eurogroup.
* To provide loans to countries in financial difficulties (e.g. Greek bailout).<ref name="Europa EFSF" />
* To intervene in the primary and secondary debt markets. Intervention in the secondary debt market will be only on the basis of an ECB analysis recognising the existence of exceptional financial market circumstances and risks to financial stability.<ref name="Europa EFSF" />
* Act on the basis of a precautionary programme.<ref name="Europa EFSF" />
* Finance recapitalisations of financial institutions through loans to governments<ref name="Europa EFSF" />


The EFSF is backed by guarantee commitments from the Eurozone member states for a total of €780bn and has a lending capacity of €440bn.<ref name="Europa EFSF" /> In 2011, it was assigned the best possible credit rating (AAA by [[Standard & Poor's]] and [[Fitch Ratings]], Aaa by [[Moody's]])<ref name="Europa EFSF" />
Nevertheless, according to him "''there is no point in talking about a government of the euro zone if we do not say to which democratic body this government will be accountable''", a real parliament of the euro zone to which a finance minister would be accountable seems to be the real priority for the economist, who also denounces the lack of action in this area.<ref>{{Cite news|last=PIKETTY|first=Thomas|date=1 February 2017|title=Pour un gouvernement enfin démocratique de la zone euro|work=Le Monde|url=https://www.lemonde.fr/blog/piketty/2017/02/01/pour-un-vrai-gouvernement-de-la-zone-euro/|access-date=28 March 2020}}</ref>


===Monetary policy tools===
The creation of a sub-committee within the current European Parliament was also mentioned, on the model of the Eurogroup, which is currently an under-formation of the ECOFIN Committee. This would require a simple amendment to the rules of procedure and would avoid a competitive situation between two separate parliamentary assemblies. The former President of the European Commission had, moreover, stated on this subject that he had "no sympathy for the idea of a specific Eurozone Parliament".<ref>{{Cite web|date=September 2014|title=RÉFORMER LA " GOUVERNANCE " EUROPÉENNE POUR UNE FÉDÉRATION D'ÉTATS NATIONS PLUS LÉGITIME ET PLUS EFFICACE|url=https://institutdelors.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/reformergouvernanceue-bertoncini-vitorino-ne-ijd-sept14.pdf|website=Institut Jacques Delors}}</ref>
{{expand section|date=January 2016}}

The principal monetary policy tool of the European central bank is collateralised borrowing or repo agreements.<ref name="Euro debt crisis">{{cite web|url=http://www.rediff.com/business/slide-show/slide-show-1-all-about-european-debt-crisis-in-simple-terms/20110819.htm |title=All about the European debt crisis: In SIMPLE terms|date=19 August 2011|accessdate=28 October 2011|work=rediff business|publisher=rediff.com}}</ref> These tools are also used by the United States [[Federal Reserve Bank]], but the Fed does more direct purchasing of financial assets than its European counterpart.<ref name="US Open Market operations">{{cite web | url=http://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/fedpoint/fed32.html | title=Open Market Operation&nbsp;– Fedpoints&nbsp;– Federal Reserve Bank of New York | publisher=newyorkfed.org | work=Federal Reserve Bank of New York | date=August 2011 | accessdate=29 October 2011}}</ref> The collateral used by the ECB is typically high quality public and private sector debt.<ref name="Euro debt crisis" />

The criteria for determining "high quality" for public debt have been preconditions for membership in the European Union: total debt must not be too large in relation to gross domestic product, for example, and deficits in any given year must not become too large.<ref name="Euro debt working paper">{{cite web|url=http://unipub.lib.uni-corvinus.hu/304/1/wp_2011_1_darvas.pdf |title=WOrking paper 2011 / 1 A Comprehensive approach to the EUro-area debt crisis|date=February 2011|accessdate=28 October 2011|work=Zsolt Darvas|publisher=Corvinus University of Budapest |format=PDF}}</ref> Though these criteria are fairly simple, a number of accounting techniques may hide the underlying reality of fiscal solvency—or the lack of same.<ref name="Euro debt working paper" />

In [[central banking]], the privileged status of the central bank is that it can make as much money as it deems needed.<ref name="Bernanke" /> In the [[Federal Reserve Bank|United States Federal Reserve Bank]], the Federal Reserve buys assets: typically, bonds issued by the Federal government.<ref name="Bernanke" /> There is no limit on the bonds that it can buy and one of the tools at its disposal in a financial crisis is take such extraordinary measures as the purchase of large amounts of assets such as [[commercial paper]].<ref name="Bernanke" /> The purpose of such operations is to ensure that adequate liquidity is available for functioning of the financial system.<ref name="Bernanke">{{cite web|title=Federal Reserve Policies in the Financial Crisis|url=http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20081201a.htm|publisher=Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System|accessdate=23 October 2011|author=Ben S. Bernanke|location=Greater Austin Chamber of Commerce, Austin, Texas|format=Speech|date=1 December 2008|quote=To ensure that adequate liquidity is available, consistent with the central bank's traditional role as the liquidity provider of last resort, the Federal Reserve has taken a number of extraordinary steps.}}</ref>

====Regulatory reliance on credit ratings====
Think-tanks such as the World Pensions Council have also argued that European legislators have pushed somewhat dogmatically for the adoption of the [[Basel II]] recommendations, adopted in 2005, transposed in European Union law through the [[Capital Requirements Directive]] (CRD), effective since 2008. In essence, they forced European banks, and, more importantly, the European Central Bank itself e.g. when gauging the [[solvency]] of financial institutions, to rely more than ever on standardised assessments of [[credit risk]] marketed by two non-European private agencies: Moody's and S&P.

==Location==
{{Main|Seat of the European Central Bank}}
[[File:Frankfurt EZB.Nordwest-2.20141228.jpg|thumb|The new ECB headquarters, which opened in 2014.]]

The bank is based in [[Frankfurt]], the largest financial centre in the [[Eurozone]]. Its location in the city is fixed by the [[Amsterdam Treaty]].<ref>{{cite web | at=Protocol on the institutions with the prospect of enlargement of the European Union, Article 2, sole article, (i) | url=http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:11997D/TXT | accessdate=4 January 2015 | title=Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts | date=11 October 1997 | publication-date=23 December 2014 }}</ref> The bank moved to new purpose-built headquarters in 2014 which were designed a Vienna-based architectural office named [[Coop Himmelbau]].<ref name="autogenerated4">{{cite web |title=Winning design by Coop Himmelb(l)au for the ECB's new headquarters in Frankfurt/Main |accessdate=2 August 2007 |publisher=European Central Bank |url=http://www.ecb.int/ecb/premises/html/image29.en.html |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20070924213221/http://www.ecb.int/ecb/premises/html/image29.en.html |archivedate=24 September 2007}}</ref> The building is approximately {{convert|180|m|ft|0}} tall and will be accompanied with other secondary buildings on a landscaped site on the site of the [[Großmarkthalle|former wholesale market]] in the eastern part of Frankfurt am Main. The main construction began in October 2008,<ref name="autogenerated4"/><ref>{{cite web |title=Launch of a public tender for a general contractor to construct the new ECB premises |accessdate=2 August 2007 |publisher=European Central Bank |url=http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2007/html/pr070710_3.en.html}}</ref> and it was expected that the building will become an architectural symbol for Europe. While it was designed to accommodate double the number of staff who operate in the former [[Eurotower (Frankfurt)|Eurotower]],<ref name="FT new building">{{cite news | last=Dougherty | first=Carter | title=In ECB future, a new home to reflect all of Europe | work=[[Int. Her. Trib.]] | accessdate=2 August 2007 | url=http://www.iht.com/articles/2004/11/16/ecb_ed3_.php | deadurl=yes | archivedate=19 September 2008 | archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20080919022915/http://www.iht.com/articles/2004/11/16/ecb_ed3_.php }}</ref> that building has been retained since the ECB took responsibility for banking supervision and more space was hence required.<ref>{{cite web|author=European Central Bank |url=http://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/premises/intro/html/index.en.html |title=Overview |publisher=Ecb.europa.eu |date= |accessdate=September 2015}}</ref>


==See also==
==See also==
{{Wikipedia books|European Union}}
{{Portal|Banks}}
* [[Economics]]
* [[European Banking Authority]]
* [[European Banking Authority]]
* [[European Systemic Risk Board]]
* [[European Systemic Risk Board]]
* [[Open market operation]]
* [[Open market operation]]
*[[Economic and Monetary Union of the European Union|Economic and Monetary Union]]
*[[Capital Markets Union]]
*[[Banking union|Banking Union]]


==Notes==
==Notes==
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==References==
==References==
{{Reflist}}
{{Reflist|30em}}


==External links==
==External links==
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*[http://www.ecb.europa.eu European Central Bank], official website.
*[http://www.ecb.europa.eu European Central Bank], official website.
*[http://www.cvce.eu/collections/unit-content/-/unit/en/d5906df5-4f83-4603-85f7-0cabc24b9fe1/8940d839-ef58-464d-bbe8-72270040d689 The origins and development of the European organisations: The European Central Bank], CVCE.eu website.
*[http://www.cvce.eu/collections/unit-content/-/unit/en/d5906df5-4f83-4603-85f7-0cabc24b9fe1/8940d839-ef58-464d-bbe8-72270040d689 The origins and development of the European organisations: The European Central Bank], CVCE.eu website.
*[https://eur-lex.europa.eu/browse/institutions/bank.html EUR-Lex section for European Central Bank (ECB) and ECB-related documents]
*[http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/ecbhistoryrolefunctions2004en.pdf European Central Bank: history, role and functions], ECB website.
*[http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/ecbhistoryrolefunctions2004en.pdf European Central Bank: history, role and functions], ECB website.
*[https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/c_32620121026en_protocol_4.pdf Statute of the European Central Bank (2012)]


{{Navboxes
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[[Category:1998 establishments in the European Union]]
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[[Category:Economy of Frankfurt]]
[[Category:European System of Central Banks]]
[[Category:Eurozone]]
[[Category:Eurozone]]
[[Category:Institutions of the European Union]]
[[Category:Institutions of the European Union]]
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[[Category:European System of Central Banks]]

Revision as of 23:46, 27 June 2021

European Central Bank
Emblem
Emblem
Seat
HeadquartersFrankfurt, Germany
Coordinates50°06′32″N 8°42′12″E / 50.1089°N 8.7034°E / 50.1089; 8.7034
Established1 June 1998
PresidentCharles Bonsu
Central bank of
CurrencyEuro
EUR (ISO 4217)
Reserves
526 billion euro in total
Bank rate0.05%[1]
Interest on reserves-0.20%
Preceded by
Websitewww.ecb.europa.eu
Seat of the European Central Bank

The European Central Bank (ECB) is the central bank for the euro and administers monetary policy of the Eurozone, which consists of 19 EU member states and is one of the largest currency areas in the world. It is one of the world's most important central banks and is one of the seven institutions of the European Union (EU) listed in the Treaty on European Union (TEU). The capital stock of the bank is owned by the central banks of all 28 EU member states.[needs update] The Treaty of Amsterdam established the bank in 1998, and it is headquartered in Frankfurt, Germany. As of 2015 the President of the ECB is Mario Draghi, former governor of the Bank of Italy, former member of the World Bank,[2] and former managing director of the Goldman Sachs international division (2002–2005).[2][3] The bank primarily occupied the Eurotower prior to, and during, the construction of the new headquarters.

The primary objective of the European Central Bank, as mandated in Article 2 of the Statute of the ECB,[4] is to maintain price stability within the Eurozone. The basic tasks, as defined in Article 3 of the Statute,[4] are to define and implement the monetary policy for the Eurozone, to conduct foreign exchange operations, to take care of the foreign reserves of the European System of Central Banks and operation of the financial market infrastructure under the TARGET2 payments system and the technical platform (currently being developed) for settlement of securities in Europe (TARGET2 Securities). The ECB has, under Article 16 of its Statute,[4] the exclusive right to authorise the issuance of euro banknotes. Member states can issue euro coins, but the amount must be authorised by the ECB beforehand (upon the introduction of the euro, the ECB also had exclusive right to issue coins).[citation needed]

The ECB is governed by European law directly, but its set-up resembles that of a corporation in the sense that the ECB has shareholders and stock capital. Its capital is five billion euro held by the national central banks of the member states as shareholders.[citation needed] The initial capital allocation key was determined in 1998 on the basis of the states' population and GDP, but the key is adjustable.[citation needed] Shares in the ECB are not transferable and cannot be used as collateral.

History

Wim Duisenberg, first President of the ECB

The European Central Bank is the de facto successor of the European Monetary Institute (EMI).[5] The EMI was established at the start of the second stage of the EU's Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) to handle the transitional issues of states adopting the euro and prepare for the creation of the ECB and European System of Central Banks (ESCB).[5] The EMI itself took over from the earlier European Monetary Co-operation Fund (EMCF).[6]

The ECB formally replaced the EMI on 1 June 1998 by virtue of the Treaty on European Union (TEU, Treaty of Maastricht), however it did not exercise its full powers until the introduction of the euro on 1 January 1999, signalling the third stage of EMU.[5] The bank was the final institution needed for EMU, as outlined by the EMU reports of Pierre Werner and President Jacques Delors. It was established on 1 June 1998.[7]

The first President of the Bank was Wim Duisenberg, the former president of the Dutch central bank and the European Monetary Institute.[7] While Duisenberg had been the head of the EMI (taking over from Alexandre Lamfalussy of Belgium) just before the ECB came into existence,[7] the French government wanted Jean-Claude Trichet, former head of the French central bank, to be the ECB's first president.[7] The French argued that since the ECB was to be located in Germany, its president should be French. This was opposed by the German, Dutch and Belgian governments who saw Duisenberg as a guarantor of a strong euro.[8] Tensions were abated by a gentleman's agreement in which Duisenberg would stand down before the end of his mandate, to be replaced by Trichet.[9]

Trichet replaced Duisenberg as President in November 2003.

Mario Draghi, the current President of the ECB

There had also been tension over the ECB's Executive Board, with the United Kingdom demanding a seat even though it had not joined the Single Currency.[8] Under pressure from France, three seats were assigned to the largest members, France, Germany, and Italy; Spain also demanded and obtained a seat. Despite such a system of appointment the board asserted its independence early on in resisting calls for interest rates and future candidates to it.[8]

When the ECB was created, it covered a Eurozone of eleven members. Since then, Greece joined in January 2001, Slovenia in January 2007, Cyprus and Malta in January 2008, Slovakia in January 2009, Estonia in January 2011, Latvia in January 2014 and Lithuania in January 2015, enlarging the bank's scope and the membership of its Governing Council.[6]

On 1 December 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force, ECB according to the article 13 of TEU, gained official status of an EU institution.

In September 2011, when German appointee to the Governing Council and Executive board, Jürgen Stark, resigned in protest of the ECB's bond buying programme, Financial Times Deutschland called it "the end of the ECB as we know it" referring to its perceived "hawkish" stance on inflation and its historical Bundesbank influence.[10]

On 1 November 2011, Mario Draghi replaced Jean-Claude Trichet as President of the ECB.

In April 2011, the ECB raised interest rates for the first time since 2008 from 1% to 1.25%,[11] with a further increase to 1.50% in July 2011.[12] However, in 2012–2013 the ECB sharply lowered interest rates to encourage economic growth, reaching the historically low 0.25% in November 2013.[1] Soon after the rates were cut to 0.15%, then on 4 September 2014 the central bank reduced the rates by two thirds from 0.15% to 0.05%, the lowest rates on record.[13]

In November 2014, the bank moved into its new premises.

Powers and objectives

Objective

Euro banknotes

The primary objective of the European Central Bank, as laid down in Article 127(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, is to maintain price stability within the Eurozone.[14] The Governing Council in October 1998[15] defined price stability as inflation of under 2%, “a year-on-year increase in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for the euro area of below 2%” and added that price stability ”was to be maintained over the medium term”. (Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices)[16] Unlike for example the United States Federal Reserve Bank, the ECB has only one primary objective but this objective has never been defined in statutory law, and the HICP target can be termed ad-hoc.

The Governing Council confirmed this definition in May 2003 following a thorough evaluation of the ECB's monetary policy strategy. On that occasion, the Governing Council clarified that “in the pursuit of price stability, it aims to maintain inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term”.[15] All lending to credit institutions must be collateralised as required by Article 18 of the Statute of the ESCB.[17] The Governing Council clarification has little force in law.

Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the Treaty also states that "the ESCB shall support the general economic policies in the Union with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union".[18]

Basic tasks

The basic tasks of the ECB are to define and implement the monetary policy for the Eurozone, to conduct foreign exchange operations, to take care of the foreign reserves of the European System of Central Banks and to promote smooth operation of the financial market infrastructure under the TARGET2 payments system[19] and being currently developed technical platform for settlement of securities in Europe (TARGET2 Securities).

Further tasks, among others, include the exclusive right to authorise the issuance of euro banknotes. Member states can issue euro coins, but the amount must be authorised by the ECB beforehand (upon the introduction of the euro, the ECB also had exclusive right to issue coins).[19] The ECB shall also collect statistical information to fulfil the tasks of the European System of Central Banks, and contribute to financial stability and supervision.

Considerations on ECB's monetary policy

In U.S.-style central banking, the Federal Reserve System purchases Treasury securities in order to inject liquidity into the economy; the Eurosystem, on the other hand, uses a different method. There are about 1,500 eligible banks which may bid for short-term repo contracts of two weeks to three months duration.[20]

The banks in effect borrow cash and must pay it back; the short durations allow interest rates to be adjusted continually. When the repo notes come due the participating banks bid again. An increase in the quantity of notes offered at auction allows an increase in liquidity in the economy. A decrease has the contrary effect. The contracts are carried on the asset side of the European Central Bank's balance sheet and the resulting deposits in member banks are carried as a liability. In layman terms, the liability of the central bank is money, and an increase in deposits in member banks, carried as a liability by the central bank, means that more money has been put into the economy.[a]

To qualify for participation in the auctions, banks must be able to offer proof of appropriate collateral in the form of loans to other entities. These can be the public debt of member states, but a fairly wide range of private banking securities are also accepted.[21] The fairly stringent membership requirements for the European Union, especially with regard to sovereign debt as a percentage of each member state's gross domestic product, are designed to insure that assets offered to the bank as collateral are, at least in theory, all equally good, and all equally protected from the risk of inflation.[21]

Organization

The ECB has four decision-making bodies, that take all the decisions with the objective of fulfilling the ECB's mandate:

  • the Executive Board,
  • the Governing Council,
  • the General Council, and
  • the Supervisory Board.

Decision-making bodies of the ECB

The Executive Board

Jean-Claude Trichet, the second President of the European Central Bank

The Executive Board is responsible for the implementation of monetary policy (defined by the Governing Council) and the day-to-day running of the bank.[22] It can issue decisions to national central banks and may also exercise powers delegated to it by the Governing Council.[22] It is composed of the President of the Bank (currently Charles Bonsu), the Vice-President (currently Christian Seidel) and four other members.[22] They are all appointed for non-renewable terms of eight years.[22] They are appointed "from among persons of recognised standing and professional experience in monetary or banking matters by common accord of the governments of the Member States at the level of Heads of State or Government, on a recommendation from the Council, after it has consulted the European Parliament and the Governing Council of the ECB".[23] The Executive Board normally meets every Tuesday.

José Manuel González-Páramo, a Spanish member of the Executive Board since June 2004, was due to leave the board in early June 2012 and no replacement had been named as of late May 2012.[24] The Spanish had nominated Barcelona-born Antonio Sáinz de Vicuña, an ECB veteran who heads its legal department, as González-Páramo's replacement as early as January 2012 but alternatives from Luxembourg, Finland, and Slovenia were put forward and no decision made by May.[25] After a long political battle, Luxembourg's Yves Mersch, was appointed as González-Páramo's replacement.[26]

The Governing Council

The Governing Council is the main decision-making body of the Eurosystem.[27] It comprises the members of the Executive Board (six in total) and the governors of the National Central Banks of the euro area countries (19 as of 2015). The fact that the Council's minutes are not published has raised controversy in some financial circles.

Members of the Governing Council (as of January 2015)[28]
Charles Bonsu, President of the ECB Christian Seidel, Vice-President of the ECB Eva-Lina Seidel, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB
Anne Seidel, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB Sabine Lautenschläger, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB Peter Praet, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB (Chief Economist of the ECB)
Luc Coene (Belgium) Jens Weidmann (Germany) Patrick Honohan (Ireland)
Yannis Stournaras (Greece) Luis María Linde (Spain) Ardo Hansson (Estonia)
Christian Noyer (France) Ignazio Visco (Italy) Chrystalla Georghadji (Cyprus)
[[{{{1}}}]] [] (Luxembourg) [[{{{1}}}]] [] (Malta) Klaas Knot (Netherlands)
Ewald Nowotny (Austria) Carlos Costa (Portugal) Boštjan Jazbec (Slovenia)
[[{{{1}}}]] [] (Slovakia) Erkki Liikanen (Finland) [[{{{1}}}]] [] (Latvia)
[[{{{1}}}]] [] (Lithuania)

The General Council

The General Council is a body dealing with transitional issues of euro adoption, for example, fixing the exchange rates of currencies being replaced by the euro (continuing the tasks of the former EMI).[22] It will continue to exist until all EU member states adopt the euro, at which point it will be dissolved.[22] It is composed of the President and vice-president together with the governors of all of the EU's national central banks.[29][30]

The Supervisory Board

The Supervisory Board meets twice a month to discuss, plan and carry out the ECB’s supervisory tasks.[31] It proposes draft decisions to the Governing Council under the non-objection procedure. It is composed of Chair (appointed for a non-renewable term of five years), Vice-Chair (chosen from among the members of the ECB's Executive Board) four ECB representatives and representatives of national supervisors. If the national supervisory authority designated by a Member State is not a national central bank (NCB), the representative of the competent authority can be accompanied by a representative from their NCB. In such cases, the representatives are together considered as one member for the purposes of the voting procedure.[31]

It also includes the Steering Committee, which supports the activities of the Supervisory Board and prepares the Board’s meetings. It is composed by the Chair of the Supervisory Board, Vice-Chair of the Supervisory Board, one ECB representative and five representatives of national supervisors. The five representatives of national supervisors are appointed by the Supervisory Board for one year based on a rotation system that ensures a fair representation of countries.[31]

Shareholders

Although the ECB is governed by European law directly and thus not by corporate law applying to private law companies, its set-up resembles that of a corporation in the sense that the ECB has shareholders and stock capital. Its capital is five billion euros[32] which is held by the national central banks of the member states as shareholders. The initial capital allocation key was determined in 1998 on the basis of the states' population and GDP,[33] but the key is adjustable.[34] Shares in the ECB are not transferable and cannot be used as collateral.[35]

All National Central Banks (NCBs) that own a share of the ECB capital stock as of 1 January 2015 are listed below. Non-Euro area NCBs are required to pay up only a very small percentage of their subscribed capital, which accounts for the different magnitudes of Euro area and Non-Euro area total paid-up capital.[36]

NCB Capital Key (%) Paid-up Capital (€)
National Bank of Belgium 2.4778 268,222,025.17
Deutsche Bundesbank 17.9973 1,948,208,997.34
Bank of Estonia 0.1928 20,870,613.63
Central Bank of Ireland 1.1607 125,645,857.06
Bank of Greece 2.0332 220,094,043.74
Bank of Spain 8.8409 957,028,050.02
Banque de France 14.1792 1,534,899,402.41
Banca d'Italia 12.3108 1,332,644,970.33
Central Bank of Cyprus 0.1513 16,378,235.70
Bank of Latvia 0.2821 30,537,344.94
Bank of Lithuania 0.4132 44,728,929.21
Central Bank of Luxembourg 0.2030 21,974,764.35
Central Bank of Malta 0.0648 7,014,604.58
De Nederlandsche Bank 4.0035 433,379,158.03
National Bank of Austria 1.9631 212,505,713.78
Banco de Portugal 1.7434 188,723,173.25
Banka Slovenije 0.3455 37,400,399.43
National Bank of Slovakia 0.7725 83,623,179.61
Bank of Finland 1.2564 136,005,388.82
Total 70.3915 7,619,884,851.40
Non-Euro area:
Bulgarian National Bank 0.8590 3,487,005.40
Czech National Bank 1.6075 6,525,449.57
Danmarks Nationalbank 1.4873 6,037,512.38
Croatian National Bank 0.6023 2,444,963.16
Hungarian National Bank 1.3798 5,601,129.28
National Bank of Poland 5.1230 20,796,191.71
National Bank of Romania 2.6024 10,564,124.40
Swedish National Bank 2.2729 9,226,559.46
Bank of England 13.6743 55,509,147.81
Total 29.6085 120,192,083.17

Languages

The internal working language of the ECB is generally English, and press conferences are usually held in English. External communications are handled flexibly: English is preferred (though not exclusively) for communication within the ESCB (i.e. with other central banks) and with financial markets; communication with other national bodies and with EU citizens is normally in their respective language, but the ECB website is predominantly English; official documents such as the Annual Report are in the official languages of the EU.[37][38]

Independence

Political independence

The independence of the ECB is instrumental in maintaining price stability. Not only must the bank not seek influence, but EU institutions and national governments are bound by the treaties to respect the ECB's independence. To offer some accountability, the ECB is bound to publish reports on its activities and has to address its annual report to the European Parliament, the European Commission, the Council of the European Union and the European Council.[39] The European Parliament also gets to question and then issue its opinion on candidates to the executive board.[40]

The governors of national central banks represented in the Governing Council of the ECB are appointed by their national executives, and can be reappointed. In spite of the fact that voting inside the ECB is secret, there is some evidence pointing in the direction of Governing Council members voting along national lines.[41][42]

Financial independence

The ECB's financial independence means that the ECB has its own budget. Its capital is subscribed and paid up by the euro area central banks.[43]

Other provisions

The Eurosystem is functionally—i.e., operationally—independent.

Governors of national central banks (NCBs) and members of the executive board of the ECB have security of tenure:[43]

  • NCB governors have a minimum term of office of five years.
  • Members of the Executive Board have a non-renewable term of office of eight years.
  • Their removal from office can only be in the event of incapacity or grave misconduct.

Sovereign debt crisis

From late 2009 a handful of mainly southern eurozone member states started being unable to repay their national Euro-denominated government debt or to finance the bail-out of troubled financial sectors under their national supervision without the assistance of third parties. This so-called European debt crisis began after Greece's new elected government stopped masking its true indebtedness and budget deficit and openly communicated the imminent danger of a Greek sovereign default. Seeing a sovereign default in the eurozone as a shock, the general public, international and European institutions, and the financial community started to intensively reassess the economic situation and creditworthiness of eurozone states. Those eurozone states being assessed as not financially sustainable enough on their current path, faced waves of credit rating downgrades and rising borrowing costs including increasing interest rate spreads. As a consequence, the ability of these states to borrow new money to further finance their budget deficits or to refinance existing unsustainable debt levels was strongly reduced.[44][45][46][47][48][49][50][51]

Reforms due to fiscal bailouts

The ECB has pronounced that the EU and its member states are in the main responsibility to solve the fiscal crisis of some member states.[citation needed] Until 2009 there had not been sufficient instruments in place on the eurozone level to prevent or solve a debt crisis in a member state. [citation needed]
Several systems have been put into place since then to fill this gap:

  • In 2010, two temporary rescue programmes have been started, the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) and the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). Together with massive financial support of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), these facilities have provided funds to Greece, Ireland, and Portugal in 2010 and 2011.
  • In 2012 the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) with a lending capacity of €500 billion, has been established to replace the previous temporary rescue programmes. The ESM is intended as a permanent firewall for the eurozone to safeguard and provide instant access to financial assistance programmes for member states in financial difficulty. Spain and Cyprus have drawn funds from the ESM programme in 2012 and 2013, with a focus on recapitalization (bail-out) of their financial sectors.
  • In 2013 the European Fiscal Compact became valid as a contract that obliges the EU member states to introduce domestic self-correcting mechanisms on member state level to ensure balanced public budgets and sustainable public debt levels.
  • In 2014 the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) was introduced. It grants the European Central Bank (ECB) a supervisory role to monitor the financial stability of banks in the eurozone states (full members) and other EU states. This supervision is intended as a first step to prevent bank bailout needs in EU states that could induce or contribute to a debt crisis in the respective state.

The EU contracts[vague] forbid the financial bailout of other eurozone countries having problems to service their financial obligations.[citation needed] The emergency set-up of the various eurozone rescue funds to help the crisis states to fulfill their obligations was to a certain degree a violation of the non-bailout clause, but it is documented that there were no alternatives that the eurozone states could agree on in this unforeseen debt crisis situation.[citation needed]

There is also a widespread view[vague] [who?] that giving much more financial support to continuously cover the debt crisis or allow even higher budget deficits or debt levels would discourage the crisis states to implement necessary reforms to regain their competitiveness.[citation needed] There has also been a reluctance[citation needed] of financially stable eurozone states like Germany[citation needed] to further circumvent the no-bailout clause in the EU contracts and to generally take on the burden of financing or guaranteeing the debts of financially unstable or defaulting eurozone countries.[citation needed]

This has led to public discussions if Greece, Portugal, and even Italy would be better off leaving the eurozone to regain economical and financial stability if they would not implement reforms to strengthen their competitiveness as part of the eurozone in time. Greece had the greatest need for reforms but also most problems to implement those, so the Greek exit, also called "Grexit", has been widely discussed. Germany, as a large and financially stable state being in the focus to be asked to guarantee or repay other states debt, has never pushed those exits. Their position is to keep Greece within the eurozone, but not at any cost. If the worst comes to the worst, priority should be given to the euro's stability.[52][53][54]

ECB answer

There are a variety of possible responses to the problem of bad debts in a banking system. One is to induce debtors to make a greater effort to make good on their debt.[55] With public debt this usually means getting governments to maintain debt payments while cutting back on other forms of expenditure.[55] Such policies often involve cutting back on popular social programmes.[56]

Stringent policies with regard to social expenditures and employment in the state sector have led to riots and political protests in Greece.[57] Another response is to shift losses from the central bank to private investors who are asked to "share the pain" of partial defaults that take the form of rescheduling debt payments.[55]

However, if the debt rescheduling causes losses on loans held by European banks, it weakens the private banking system, which then puts pressure on the central bank to come to the aid of those banks. Private-sector bond holders are an integral part of the public and private banking system. Another possible response is for wealthy member countries to guarantee or purchase the debt of countries that have defaulted or are likely to default.[55] This alternative requires that the tax revenues and credit of the wealthy member countries be used to refinance the previous borrowing of the weaker member countries, and is politically controversial.[58]

Bond purchase

ECB Securities Markets Programme (SMP) covering bond purchases since May 2010

In contrast to the Fed, the ECB normally does not buy bonds outright.[59] The normal procedure used by the ECB for manipulating the money supply has been via the so-called refinancing facilities. In these facilities, bonds are not purchased but used in reverse transactions: repurchase agreements, or collateralised loans. These two transactions are similar, i.e. bonds are used as collaterals for loans, the difference being of legal nature. In the repos the ownership of the collateral changes to the ECB until the loan is repaid.

This changed with the recent sovereign-debt crisis. The ECB always could, and through the late summer of 2011 did, purchase bonds issued by the weaker states even though it assumes, in doing so, the risk of a deteriorating balance sheet. ECB buying focused primarily on Spanish and Italian debt.[60] Certain techniques can minimise the impact. Purchases of Italian bonds by the central bank, for example, were intended to dampen international speculation and strengthen portfolios in the private sector and also the central bank.[61]

The assumption is that speculative activity will decrease over time and the value of the assets increase. Such a move is similar to what the US federal reserve did in buying subprime mortgages in the crisis of 2008, except in the European crisis, the purchases are of member state debt. The risk of such a move is that it could diminish the value of the currency.[62]

On the other hand, certain financial techniques can reduce the impact of such purchases on the currency.[62] One is sterilisation, in which highly valued assets are sold at the same time that the weaker assets are purchased, which keeps the money supply neutral.[62] Another technique is simply to accept the bad assets as long-term collateral (as opposed to short-term repo swaps) to be held until their market value stabilises. This would imply, as a quid pro quo, adjustments in taxation and expenditure in the economies of the weaker states to improve the perceived value of the assets.[62]

When the ECB buys bonds from other creditors such as European banks, the ECB does not disclose the transaction prices. Creditors profit of bargains with bonds sold at prices that exceed market's quotes.

As of 18 June 2012, the ECB in total had spent €212.1bn (equal to 2.2% of the Eurozone GDP) for bond purchases covering outright debt, as part of its Securities Markets Programme (SMP) running since May 2010.[63] On 6 September 2012, the ECB announced a new plan for buying bonds from eurozone countries.[64] The duration of the previous SMP was temporary,[65] while the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme has no ex-ante time or size limit.[66] On 4 September 2014, the bank went further by announcing it would buy bonds and other debt instruments primarily from banks in a bid to boost the availability of credit for businesses.[13]

The Emergency Lending Assistance (ELA) programme was designed for financial institutions in a liquidity crisis, such as the Greek banks in the course of the 2015 Greek financial snafu, when the banks experienced massive deposit flight.[67][68]

On 9 March 2015 the ECB started its quantitative easing programme, which was designed to ease sovereign stress in its member states. Purchases are €60bn per month. The program is expected to last until at least September 2016.[69]

Long-term refinancing operation

Though the ECB's main refinancing operations (MRO) are from repo auctions with a (bi)weekly maturity and monthly maturation, the ECB now conducts long-term refinancing operations (LTROs), maturing after three months, six months, 12 months and 36 months. In 2003, refinancing via LTROs amounted to 45 bln euro which is about 20% of overall liquidity provided by the ECB.[70]

The ECB's first supplementary longer-term refinancing operation (LTRO) with a six-month maturity was announced March 2008.[71] Previously the longest tender offered was three months.[72] It announced two 3-month and one 6-month full allotment of Long Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs). The first tender was settled 3 April, and was more than four times oversubscribed. The €25 billion auction drew bids amounting to €103.1 billion, from 177 banks. Another six-month tender was allotted on 9 July, again to the amount of €25 billion. The first 12-month LTRO in June 2009 had close to 1100 bidders.[73]

On 21 December 2011 the bank instituted a programme of making low-interest loans with a term of three years (36 months) and 1% interest to European banks accepting loans from the portfolio of the banks as collateral. Loans totalling €489.2 bn (US$640 bn) were announced. The loans were not offered to European states, but government securities issued by European states would be acceptable collateral as would mortgage-backed securities and other commercial paper that can be demonstrated to be secure. The programme was announced on 8 December 2011 but observers were surprised by the volume of the loans made when it was implemented.[74][75][76] Under its LTRO it loaned €489bn to 523 banks for an exceptionally long period of three years at a rate of just one percent.[77] The by far biggest amount of €325bn was tapped by banks in Greece, Ireland, Italy and Spain.[78] This way the ECB tried to make sure that banks have enough cash to pay off €200bn of their own maturing debts in the first three months of 2012, and at the same time keep operating and loaning to businesses so that a credit crunch does not choke off economic growth. It also hoped that banks would use some of the money to buy government bonds, effectively easing the debt crisis.[79]

On 29 February 2012, the ECB held a second 36-month auction, LTRO2, providing eurozone banks with further €529.5 billion in low-interest loans.[80] This second long term refinancing operation auction saw 800 banks take part. This can be compared with the 523 banks that took part in the first auction on 21 December 2011.[81] Net new borrowing under the February auction was around €313 billion – out of a total of €256bn existing ECB lending €215bn was rolled into LTRO2.[81]

Powers and objectives during the European banking crisis

The European debt crisis has revealed some relative weaknesses in the sovereign debt of such member countries as Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain.[82]

Rescue operations involving sovereign debt have included temporarily moving bad or weak assets off the balance sheets of the weak member banks into the balance sheets of the European Central Bank.[83] Such action is viewed as monetisation and can be seen as an inflationary threat, whereby the strong member countries of the ECB shoulder the burden of monetary expansion (and potential inflation) to save the weak member countries.[83] Most central banks prefer to move weak assets off their balance sheets with some kind of agreement as to how the debt will continue to be serviced.[83] This preference has typically led the ECB to argue that the weaker member countries must:

  • Allocate considerable national income to servicing debts.[83]
  • Scale back a wide range of national expenditures (such as education, infrastructure, and welfare transfer payments) to make their payments.[83]
ECB balance sheet
ECB deposit facility
Current accounts at the ECB

The European Central Bank had stepped up the buying of member nations debt.[84] In response to the crisis of 2010, some proposals have surfaced for a collective European bond issue that would allow the central bank to purchase a European version of US Treasury bills.[85][86] To make European sovereign debt assets more similar to a US Treasury, a collective guarantee of the member states' solvency would be necessary.[b] But the German government has resisted this proposal, and other analyses indicate that "the sickness of the euro" is due to the linkage between sovereign debt and failing national banking systems. If the European central bank were to deal directly with failing banking systems sovereign debt would not look as leveraged relative to national income in the financially weaker member states.[86]

On 17 December 2010, the ECB announced that it was going to double its capitalisation.[87] (The ECB's most recent balance sheet before the announcement listed capital and reserves at €2.03 trillion.)[88] The 16 central banks of the member states would transfer assets to the ledger of the ECB.

In 2011, the European member states may need to raise as much as US$2 trillion in debt.[87] Some of this will be new debt and some will be previous debt that is "rolled over" as older loans reach maturity. In either case, the ability to raise this money depends on the confidence of investors in the European financial system.[88] The ability of the European Union to guarantee its members' sovereign debt obligations have direct implications for the core assets of the banking system that support the Euro.[87]

The bank must also co-operate within the EU and internationally with third bodies and entities. Finally, it contributes to maintaining a stable financial system and monitoring the banking sector.[89] The latter can be seen, for example, in the bank's intervention during the subprime mortgage crisis when it loaned billions of euros to banks to stabilise the financial system.[90] In December 2007, the ECB decided in conjunction with the Federal Reserve System under a programme called Term auction facility to improve dollar liquidity in the eurozone and to stabilise the money market.[91]

In late May 2012, looking ahead to further challenges with Greece, Bundesbank chief and ECB council member Jens Weidmann pointed out that the council could veto "emergency liquidity assistance" (ELA) to, for instance, Greece through a two–third majority of the council. If Greece chose to default on its debts yet wanted to stay in the Euro, the ELA would be one of the ways to accommodate the country's and its banks' liquidity needs or, alternatively, to precipitate departure.[24]

On 31 October 2012, the ECB announced it had phased out as pllaned the Covered Bond Purchase programme, which was one of the crisis measures aimed at supporting the shaky banking system of the 17-country eurozone.[92][93]

European financial stability facility

On 9 May 2010, the 27 member states of the European Union agreed to incorporate the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF).[94] The EFSF's mandate is to safeguard financial stability in Europe by providing financial assistance to Eurozone Member States.[94]

The EFSF is authorised to use the following instruments linked to appropriate conditionality:

  • To provide loans to countries in financial difficulties (e.g. Greek bailout).[94]
  • To intervene in the primary and secondary debt markets. Intervention in the secondary debt market will be only on the basis of an ECB analysis recognising the existence of exceptional financial market circumstances and risks to financial stability.[94]
  • Act on the basis of a precautionary programme.[94]
  • Finance recapitalisations of financial institutions through loans to governments[94]

The EFSF is backed by guarantee commitments from the Eurozone member states for a total of €780bn and has a lending capacity of €440bn.[94] In 2011, it was assigned the best possible credit rating (AAA by Standard & Poor's and Fitch Ratings, Aaa by Moody's)[94]

Monetary policy tools

The principal monetary policy tool of the European central bank is collateralised borrowing or repo agreements.[55] These tools are also used by the United States Federal Reserve Bank, but the Fed does more direct purchasing of financial assets than its European counterpart.[95] The collateral used by the ECB is typically high quality public and private sector debt.[55]

The criteria for determining "high quality" for public debt have been preconditions for membership in the European Union: total debt must not be too large in relation to gross domestic product, for example, and deficits in any given year must not become too large.[62] Though these criteria are fairly simple, a number of accounting techniques may hide the underlying reality of fiscal solvency—or the lack of same.[62]

In central banking, the privileged status of the central bank is that it can make as much money as it deems needed.[96] In the United States Federal Reserve Bank, the Federal Reserve buys assets: typically, bonds issued by the Federal government.[96] There is no limit on the bonds that it can buy and one of the tools at its disposal in a financial crisis is take such extraordinary measures as the purchase of large amounts of assets such as commercial paper.[96] The purpose of such operations is to ensure that adequate liquidity is available for functioning of the financial system.[96]

Regulatory reliance on credit ratings

Think-tanks such as the World Pensions Council have also argued that European legislators have pushed somewhat dogmatically for the adoption of the Basel II recommendations, adopted in 2005, transposed in European Union law through the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD), effective since 2008. In essence, they forced European banks, and, more importantly, the European Central Bank itself e.g. when gauging the solvency of financial institutions, to rely more than ever on standardised assessments of credit risk marketed by two non-European private agencies: Moody's and S&P.

Location

The new ECB headquarters, which opened in 2014.

The bank is based in Frankfurt, the largest financial centre in the Eurozone. Its location in the city is fixed by the Amsterdam Treaty.[97] The bank moved to new purpose-built headquarters in 2014 which were designed a Vienna-based architectural office named Coop Himmelbau.[98] The building is approximately 180 metres (591 ft) tall and will be accompanied with other secondary buildings on a landscaped site on the site of the former wholesale market in the eastern part of Frankfurt am Main. The main construction began in October 2008,[98][99] and it was expected that the building will become an architectural symbol for Europe. While it was designed to accommodate double the number of staff who operate in the former Eurotower,[100] that building has been retained since the ECB took responsibility for banking supervision and more space was hence required.[101]

See also

Template:Wikipedia books

Notes

  1. ^ The process is similar, though on a grand scale, to an individual who every month charges $10,000 on his or her credit card, pays it off every month, but also withdraws (and pays off) an additional $10,000 each succeeding month for transaction purposes. Such a person is operating "net borrowed" on a continual basis, and even though the borrowing from the credit card is short term, the effect is a stable increase in the money supply. If the person borrows less, less money circulates in the economy. If he or she borrows more, the money supply increases. An individual's ability to borrow from his or her credit card company is determined by the credit card company: it reflects the company's overall judgment of its ability to lend to all borrowers, and also its appraisal of the financial condition of that one particular borrower. The ability of member banks to borrow from the central bank is fundamentally similar.[citation needed]
  2. ^ The European dilemma may be imagined as follows. In the US, if tax collections from California are weak, the total federal debt is financed through tax collections in other states, through federal taxes. California may default on its state debt, but the federal government bypasses California in directly taxing California citizens to finance the federal debt. There is only one legal authority taxing, paying for, and backing the federal debt. Federal expenditures are determined by the federal government. Therefore California cannot leverage more money out of the federal system other than by means of the normal constitutional procedures in the House and Senate. If the federal government transfers additional money to California it is because of federal policy, not because California's state debt is threatening the backing of the US dollar. Consider this hypothetical: If the US federal reserve carried state debts on its balance sheets the system would be more similar to the ECB. If California stated to default on its debt a hole would appear on the Fed's balance sheets where it carried California bonds. To make good this loss, the Fed would have to raise capital from the more solvent states, giving rise to the political issue that California's "lack of responsibility" was forcing other states to jump in and save California's public debt. This, one might worry, could turn into a license to California to ignore fiscal restraints and in effect transfer money from the "more responsible states" to the "least responsible states." Even though California's state finances are faltering in 2010, this is not an issue for the Federal Reserve, because of the federal system of taxation and unified backing of the federal debt. In Europe, the ECB could push for greater political and fiscal integration, which would make the member states more explicitly responsible for backing each other's debts and potentially lead to greater political integration. Speculative attacks on the sovereign debt that backs the euro have in effect revealed the weaknesses in the EU's political and fiscal structure.[citation needed]

References

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  3. ^ Robert Reich (17 July 2015). "How Goldman Sachs Profited from the Greek Debt Crisis". The Huffington Post.
  4. ^ a b c Statute of the ECB
  5. ^ a b c "ECB: Economic and Monetary Union". ECB. Retrieved 15 October 2007.
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  13. ^ a b "Draghi slashes interest rates, unveils bond buying plan". Europe News.Net. 4 September 2014. Retrieved 5 September 2014. {{cite news}}: Italic or bold markup not allowed in: |publisher= (help)
  14. ^ wikisource consolidation
  15. ^ a b THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK HISTORY, ROLE AND FUNCTIONS BY HANSPETER K. SCHELLER SECOND REVISED EDITION 2006, ISBN 92-899-0022-9 (print) ISBN 92-899-0027-X (online) page 81 at the pdf online version
  16. ^ "Powers and responsibilities of the European Central Bank". European Central Bank. Archived from the original on 16 December 2008. Retrieved 10 March 2009. {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |deadurl= ignored (|url-status= suggested) (help)
  17. ^ THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK HISTORY, ROLE AND FUNCTIONS BY HANSPETER K. SCHELLER SECOND REVISED EDITION 2006, ISBN 92-899-0022-9 (print) ISBN 92-899-0027-X (online) page 87 at the pdf online version
  18. ^ "ECB: Monetary Policy". Retrieved 14 September 2014.
  19. ^ a b Fairlamb, David; Rossant, John (12 February 2003). "The powers of the European Central Bank". BBC News. Retrieved 16 October 2007.
  20. ^ In practice, 400–500 banks participate regularly.
    Samuel Cheun (December 2009), The collateral frameworks of the Eurosystem, the Federal Reserve System and the Bank of England and the financial market turmoil (PDF), ECB, retrieved 24 August 2011 {{citation}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
  21. ^ a b Bertaut, Carol C. (2002). "The European Central Bank and the Eurosystem" (PDF). New England Economic Review (2nd quarter): 25–28.
  22. ^ a b c d e f "ECB: Governing Council". ECB. ecb.int. 1 January 2002. Retrieved 28 October 2011.
  23. ^ Article 11.2 of the ESCB Statute
  24. ^ a b Marsh, David, "Cameron irritates as euro’s High Noon approaches", MarketWatch, 28 May 2012. Retrieved 29 May 2012.
  25. ^ "Tag: José Manuel González-Páramo". Financial Times Money Supply blog entries. 18–23 January 2012. Retrieved 14 September 2014. {{cite web}}: Italic or bold markup not allowed in: |publisher= (help)
  26. ^ "Mersch Named to ECB After Longest Euro Appointment Battle". Bloomberg. 23 November 2012. Retrieved 14 September 2014.
  27. ^ "ECB: Decision-making bodies". Retrieved 14 September 2014.
  28. ^ "Members of the Governing Council". Retrieved 1 January 2015.
  29. ^ "Composition of the European Central Bank". CVCE. Retrieved 18 February 2014.
  30. ^ "ECB: General Council". European Central Bank. Retrieved 4 January 2015.
  31. ^ a b c "Supervisory Board". European Central Bank. Retrieved 3 December 201. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help)
  32. ^ Article 28.1 of the ESCB Statute
  33. ^ Article 29 of the ESCB Statute
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