Second Nagorno-Karabakh War

2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war
Part of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
(For a more detailed map, see military situation in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict)
Date 27 September 2020 (2020-09-27) – present (3 years, 7 months, 2 weeks and 4 days) Location Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan, Armenia–Azerbaijan border Status Ongoing Territorial changes Azerbaijan claims to have retaken 117 settlements, including Zangilan, Jabrayil, Fuzuli, Hadrut, Mincivan, Madagiz and Talış, several heights including Murovdag, and full control of the Azerbaijan–Iran border.
Belligerents
Azerbaijan Syrian mercenaries Supported by: Turkey Arms suppliers: Israel	Artsakh Armenia Armenian diaspora volunteers Arms suppliers: Russia
Commanders and leaders
Ilham Aliyev Zakir Hasanov Mais Barkhudarov Hikmat Mirzayev Hikmat Hasanov Elchin Guliyev	Arayik Harutyunyan Jalal Harutyunyan Karen Jalavyan Sergey Shakaryan Nikol Pashinyan David Tonoyan Onik Gasparyan Tiran Khachatryan
Units involved
Azerbaijani Armed Forces Syrian mercenaries Hamza Division Sultan Murad Division	Artsakh Defence Army Armed Forces of Armenia
Strength
Unknown regular military 2,050 Syrian fighters Equipment: Unknown number of tanks and armored vehicles Unknown number of Bayraktar TB2 Unknown number of IAI Harop Unknown number of Orbiter 1K TRG-300 guided MLRS BM-30 Smerch MLRS Various artillery	Unknown regular military Equipment: Unknown number of tanks and armored vehicles including T-72 tanks Scud-B and OTR-21 Tochka tactical ballistic missiles Various MLRS Various types of anti-tank guided missiles Various anti-aircraft missiles Various artillery
Casualties and losses
Per Azerbaijan: Undisclosed Per other sources: Unknown regular military killed 170 Syrian mercenaries killed (SOHR) See Casualties for details	Per Armenia: 927 servicemen killed 3 servicemen captured See Casualties for details
65 Azerbaijani and 40 Armenian civilians killed 297 Azerbaijani and 100 Armenian civilians injured 2 Armenian, 1 Azerbaijani, 2 French and 3 Russian journalists injured 1 Iranian civilian injured from stray fire 90,000 people displaced from Artsakh (per Armenia)

The 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war is an ongoing armed conflict between Azerbaijan, supported by Turkey, and the breakaway state Republic of Artsakh together with Armenia, in the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region. It is the latest escalation of the unresolved conflict over the region, which is internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan, but mostly governed by Artsakh, a breakaway state with an Armenian ethnic majority.

Clashes began on the morning of 27 September 2020 along the Nagorno-Karabakh Line of Contact, which had been established in the aftermath of the Nagorno-Karabakh War (1988–1994). In response to the clashes, Armenia and Artsakh introduced martial law and total mobilization, while Azerbaijan introduced martial law and a curfew. On 28 September, partial mobilization was declared in Azerbaijan. The war has been marked by the deployment of drones, sensors, long-range heavy artillery and ballistic missile strikes, as well as by state propaganda and the use of official social media accounts in online information warfare.

Numerous countries and the United Nations strongly condemned the conflict and called on both sides to deescalate tensions and resume meaningful negotiations without delay. Turkey is providing military support to Azerbaijan, although the extent of its support is disputed. International analysts believe that fighting likely began with an Azerbaijani offensive, and that primary goals of the offensive were to reclaim districts in southern Nagorno-Karabakh that are less mountainous and thus easier to take than the region's well-fortified interior. Turkey's support for Azerbaijan is thought to be an attempt to extend its sphere of influence both by increasing the standing of Azerbaijan in the conflict and by marginalizing Russia's influence over the region.

A fragile humanitarian ceasefire brokered by Russia, facilitated by the International Committee of the Red Cross, and agreed to by both Armenia and Azerbaijan, formally came into effect on 10 October. The ceasefire has been completely disregarded by both sides, halting a planned return of the dead and exchange of wounded and prisoners. Total casualties on both sides may be approaching the low thousands, and due to Russian–Turkish geopolitical dynamics and pipeline politics there are concerns regarding a wider regional conflict.

Background

Further information: Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Nagorno-Karabakh War, and List of United Nations Security Council resolutions on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

A map of the Azerbaijani SSR in 1928, including the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast.

The disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh, with its ethnic Armenian majority, is a de jure part of Azerbaijan, but is de facto held by the self-proclaimed Republic of Artsakh, which is supported by Armenia. Ethnic violence began in the late 1980s, and exploded into a war following the dissolution of the USSR in 1991. On 20 February 1988, the Soviet of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast passed a resolution requesting transfer of the oblast from the Azerbaijan SSR to the Armenia SSR; Azerbaijan rejected the request several times. Following the revoking of Nagorno-Karabakh's autonomous status, a referendum was held on 10 December 1991 in the region; it was boycotted by the Azerbaijani population which then constituted around 22.8%: 99.8% voted in favor. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan then became fully independent of the Soviet Union in 1992.

The Nagorno-Karabakh War resulted in the displacement of 750,000 Azerbaijanis and 353,000 Armenians from both Azerbaijan and Armenia. The war ended with a ceasefire in 1994, with the Republic of Artsakh occupying most of the Nagorno-Karabakh region, as well as the surrounding districts of Agdam, Jabrayil, Fuzuli, Kalbajar, Qubadli, Lachin and Zangilan of Azerbaijan.

For three decades, multiple violations of the ceasefire have occurred, the most serious incidents prior to the current conflict being the 2016 Nagorno-Karabakh clashes. Long-standing international mediation attempts to create a peace process were initiated by the OSCE Minsk Group in 1994, with the interrupted Madrid Principles being the most recent iteration. While it is unclear how the present inhabitants of the area want to administer the territory, surveys indicate that they do not want to be part of Azerbaijan. In August 2019, in an unprecedented declaration in favour of unification, the Armenian Prime Minister, Nikol Pashinyan, visited Nagorno-Karabakh, stating, "Artsakh is Armenia, full stop".

Skirmishes occurred on the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan in July 2020. Thousands of Azerbaijanis demonstrated for war against Armenia in response, with Turkey propagandising in support of Azerbaijan.

On 23 July 2020, Armenia announced the start of a joint air defence system exercise with Russia and an analysis of the July 2020 clashes. A week later, Azerbaijan conducted a series of military exercises that lasted from 29 July to 10 August, and further exercises in early September with the involvement of Turkey. Azerbaijan and Turkey are bound by strong ethnic, cultural and historic ties, and refer to their relationship as being one between "two states, one nation"; Turkey (then Ottoman Empire) helped Azerbaijan gain its independence from the Russian Empire back in 1918, and become the first county to recognize Azerbaijan's independence from the Soviet Union back in 1991.

Turkey is also the guarantor of the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic since 1921, which is an exclave of Azerbaijan. Despite that, others have seen Turkey's support for Azerbaijan as connected to its expansionist foreign policy, linking its intervention and neo-Ottoman policies in Syria, Iraq, and the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey's high visibility role in the conflict and its support to Azerbaijan has been perceived by Armenians as a continuation of the Armenian Genocide where 1.5 million Armenians were systematically mass murdered and expelled by the Ottoman Empire, especially given Turkey's denial of the Genocide.

Prior to the resumption of hostilities, allegations emerged that hundreds of Syrian National Army members from the Hamza Division were transferred to Azerbaijan,. The governments of both Azerbaijan and Armenia have denied allegations of involvement by foreign fighters.

Course of the conflict

The conflict began with an Azerbaijani ground offensive that included armored formations, supported by artillery and drones, including loitering munitions. Armenian and Artsakh troops were forced back from their first line of defense in Artsakh's southeast and northern regions, but inflicted significant losses on Azerbaijani armored formations with anti-tank guided missiles and artillery, destroying dozens of vehicles. Azerbaijan made heavy use of drones in strikes against Armenian air defenses, taking out 13 short-range surface-to-air missile systems. Azerbaijani troops managed to make limited gains in the south in the first three days of the conflict. For the next three days, both sides largely exchanged fire from fixed positions. In the north, Armenian/Artsakh forces counterattacked, managing to retake some ground. Their largest counterattack took place on the fourth day, but incurred heavy losses when their armor and artillery units were exposed to Azerbaijani attack drones, loitering munitions, and reconnaissance drones spotting for Azerbaijani artillery as they maneuvered in the open.

On the sixth day, Azerbaijan and Armenia/Artsakh began trading missile and rocket artillery strikes against infrastructure. Among the targets hit were Stepanakert, the capital of Artsakh, which was repeatedly shelled with rocket artillery, a bridge linking Armenia with Nagorno-Karabakh, which was taken out in a missile strike, and Ganja, which was hit four times by Armenian and Artsakh ballistic missiles, with Ganja International Airport among the targets. On the morning of the seventh day, Azerbaijan launched a major offensive. The Azerbaijani Army's First, Second, and Third Army Corps, reinforced by reservists from the Fourth Army Corps, began an advance in the north, making some territorial gains, but the Azerbaijani advance stalled.

Most of the fighting subsequently shifted to the south, in terrain that is relatively flat and underpopulated as compared to the mountainous north. Azerbaijani forces launched offensives toward Jabrayil and Füzuli, managing to break through the multi-layered Armenian/Artsakh defensive lines and recapture a stretch of territory held by Armenian troops as a buffer zone, but the fighting subsequently stalled. Throughout the campaign, Azerbaijan has relied heavily on drones to strike at Armenian/Artsakh forces, and managed to inflict heavy losses. Having successfully targeted tanks, artillery, and air defense systems, Azerbaijani drones also began targeting units of soldiers. However, some Azerbaijani drones were shot down.

On 9 October, both sides agreed to a temporary humanitarian ceasefire. After the declared ceasefire, the President of Artsakh admitted Azerbaijan had been able to achieve some success, moving the front deep into Artsakh territory; the Armenian Prime Minister announced that Armenian forces had conducted a "partial retreat". However, the ceasefire quickly broke down and the Azerbaijani advance continued. Within days Azerbaijan announced the capture of dozens of villages on the southern front. Azerbaijani troops also captured the Khoda Afarin Dam and Khodaafarin Bridges.

Timeline of military engagements

This timeline of engagements relies primarily on official statements from belligerents. The engagements have been characterized by the use of trench warfare, heavy artillery, armoured warfare, rocket attacks, and drone warfare, especially the use of Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 and Israeli loitering munition Harop drones, as well as by the use of cluster munitions (which are banned by most of the international community but not by Armenia or Azerbaijan). A series of ballistic missile attacks inflicted mass civilian casualties in Ganja, Azerbaijan, while civilian infrastructure in Stepanakert, Artsakh's capital, and elsewhere in the zone has been targeted, causing extensive damage and inflicting casualties.

The amount of territory contested is relatively restricted, but the conflict has expanded beyond the borders of Nagorno-Karabakh due to the kind of munitions deployed and spilled over international borders. Shells and rockets have landed in East Azerbaijan Province in Iran, though causing no damage, and Iran have reported that several unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have been downed or crashed within Iran, while Georgia stated that two UAVs had crashed in Kakheti Province.

After the shelling of Khojavend, Artsakh authorities began mobilizing civilians. Just before 04:00 (00:00 GMT) on October 10, Russia reported that both Armenia and Azerbaijan had agreed on a humanitarian ceasefire after 10 hours of talks in Moscow (the Moscow Statement) and announced that both would enter "substantive" talks; fighting continued; a second ceasefire attempt midnight 17 October was also ignored.

27 September

Stepanakert, the capital city of the Republic of Artsakh, has been heavily damaged by Azerbaijani shelling during the conflict.

According to Artsakh authorities, hostilities commenced when at 08:03 Azerbaijani armed forces launched artillery and aerial strikes against civilian settlements, including the capital, Stepanakert. The Armenian Ministry of Defence (MoD) stated that the Azerbaijani offensive, aimed at Stepanakert, began at 08:10 local time (04:10 GMT). Azerbaijani authorities stated that at about 06:00 local time, Armenian armed forces started intensive shelling of Azerbaijani army positions along the entire front and of nearby Azerbaijani settlements. Azerbaijan thus stated that it launched a counteroffensive. In the offensive, Azerbaijan stated it deployed manpower, tank and rocket artillery units, aircraft and UAVs. The Republic of Artsakh introduced martial law and total mobilization of its male population, while the Azerbaijani President addressed the nation.

In the afternoon, Azerbaijan announced martial law and a curfew. The Azerbaijani military deployed tanks, artillery, missile systems and aircraft near the front and entered deeper into Nagorno-Karabakh. According to the Armenian MoD, in the morning Azerbaijani armed forces also attacked in the direction of Vardenis in Armenia proper. The Azerbaijani MoD stated it had taken seven villages in Nagorno-Karabakh. At 16:29, Azerbaijan issued a surrender ultimatum to the Armenian command in the zone, while affirming its compliance with international humanitarian law and the Geneva Conventions. In the afternoon, the Azerbaijani MoD stated it had taken a mountain peak in the Murovdag range. The Ministry also stated that its forces had taken effective control of the Vardenis–Martakert/Aghdara highway connecting Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia;

28 September

Murovdag peak (above) and Vardenis–Martakert/Aghdara M11 highway (below), which came under Azerbaijani control according to the country's defence ministry.

At around 08:00, the Azerbaijani MoD stated that Armenian forces had fired upon Tartar in the early morning and issued a warning in response, while the Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) stated that Armenian forces had purposefully targeted civilian sites and civilians. The President of Artsakh stated that during the morning's clashes, Armenian forces had regained control over a number of previously ceded positions. At approximately 10:00, the Azerbaijani MoD claimed that Azerbaijani forces had gained strategic high ground around Talış while Armenian forces had incurred heavy losses. The President of Artsakh stated that Azerbaijani forces were facing Armenian attacks on all fronts. Shortly after, the Azerbaijani MoD stated that Azerbaijani forces had fired on Armenian artillery units that had been targeting Azerbaijani-controlled settlements in the area of Aghdara; it added Armenian units had incurred losses from artillery fire and withdrew.

At around 19:00, the Azerbaijani MoD stated that Armenian forces had fired upon Yuxarı Ağcakənd and Qaramusalı in Goranboy District. At approximately 20:00, Artsakh authorities stated that Armenian forces had retaken some positions, adding that Armenian forces had repelled Azerbaijani attacks and advanced into Azerbaijani territory. Subsequently, at approximately 21:00, an Armenian MoD-related source, Artsrun Hovhannisyan, stated that Azerbaijani forces had launched a new major offensive operation in the Aras Valley and in the direction of Madagiz–Talış. Around one hour later, Poghosyan claimed that an Azerbaijani airplane had been shot down near Khojavend; Azerbaijan issued a denial. The Azerbaijani MoD denied allegations that Azerbaijan had deployed F-16s, denying it owned any.

29 September

At around 08:00, the Azerbaijani MoD stated that intensified clashes had continued along the front overnight; it added it had repelled an Armenian counterattack. Concurrently, Azerbaijani aerial and ground forces allegedly destroyed a mixed column of Armenian military vehicles travelling from Madagiz in the direction of Aghdara, together with an artillery battery. At approximately 09:00, the Ministry stated that from 07:30, Azerbaijan's Dashkasan District had been shelled from Vardenis, in Armenia; the Armenian MoFA issued a denial, claiming this was a fabrication to justify expanding the theater of operations, including against Armenia. Azerbaijani authorities reiterated its claim of Armenian aggression. The Azerbaijani MoD then stated that its offensive on Fuzuli City continued from the early morning. Subsequently, it denied Armenian claims to have retaken territory.

On 29 September, the clashes spilled over to Vardenis (above) and Daşkəsən (below), on the Armenian–Azerbaijani state border.

At around 11:00, the Armenian MoD stated that Azerbaijani forces had fired on the Armenian military base in Vardenis, within Armenia, also deploying its air force. The Azerbaijani MoD claimed to have destroyed an Armenian motorized rifle regiment stationed in Khojavend District; the ADA issued a denial. Azerbaijan stated it had destroyed an Armenian Uragan multiple rocket launcher in Khojavend District. Subsequently, an Armenian source claimed to have repelled further Azerbaijani attacks.

At around 12:00, one Azerbaijani gunship was claimed to have been downed; the Azerbaijani MoD issued a denial, claiming it had not been deploying helicopters. At approximately 12:40, ADA units claimed to have downed two helicopters using Igla man-portable surface-to-air missiles; Artsakh released footage apparently showing this. An Armenian source then stated that Azerbaijani forces were bombarding areas near Vardenis. The Azerbaijani MoD stated it had destroyed an Armenian command-and-observation post in Hadrut in Khojavend District, while the Armenian MoD announced it would be deploying heavier weapons and was repelling Azerbaijani offensives.

The Azerbaijani MoD stated that an Armenian attempt to assault Azerbaijani-controlled military positions from Aşağı Veysəlli in Fuzuli District had been repelled, with Armenian losses. At approximately 13:20, the Armenian MoD stated that the Azerbaijani military had launched an offensive. Around two hours later, the Azerbaijani MoD claimed that S-300 missile systems defending Yerevan's airspace were being redeployed towards Nagorno-Karabakh and would be targeted. Shortly after, the ADA released footage apparently showing Armenian forces downing an Azerbaijani gunship.

At around 18:00, the Artsakh MoD stated that Azerbaijani forces had attacked along the northern and north-eastern directions of the front, while the ADA had inflicted losses. Shortly after, the Armenian MoD stated that a Turkish F-16, taking off from Ganja International Airport had downed an Armenian Su-25, killing the pilot. Both Azerbaijani and Turkish authorities issued denials; the Armenian MoD released images of a wrecked Su-25. According to Azerbaijan, two Su-25 jets took off on Armenian territory and later crashed into a mountain. At around 22:00, the Armenian MoD stated an Azerbaijani ammunition convoy had been destroyed. Approximately one hour later, the Azerbaijani MoD stated its forces had destroyed an Armenian position near Həsənqaya in Tartar District and another in the direction of Talış.

30 September

According to the Armenian MoD, the clashes continued with lesser intensity overnight. At approximately 08:30, the Azerbaijani MoD stated that Armenian forces had been shelling Tartar City. At approximately 10:20, the Azerbaijani MoD stated that its units had surrounded Armenian forces with the aid of artillery fire, and that clashes continued in the Aghdara/Martakert–Tartar area of the front. At approximately 10:20, the Ministry stated that Armenian forces had started firing upon Aşağı Ağcakənd, in Goranboy District. At approximately 11:10, the Armenian MoD stated that the Azerbaijani Air Force was attacking Armenian positions in the northern direction of the front.

At approximately 12:25, the Azerbaijani MoD stated that the Armenian 7th Mountain Rifle Regiment of the 10th Mountain Rifle Division, stationed in Tonaşen, had incurred heavy losses and retreated; it released footage apparently showing the attack and stated that Azerbaijani forces attacked the command post of tan Armenian regiment of the 18th Motorized Division, inflicting casualties. The Armenian MoD stated that Armenian forces had destroyed a substantial quantity of Azerbaijani materiel, including a TOS-1A. The Ministry also stated that Azerbaijani forces had shelled the 4th Armenian Battalion, stationed in Fuzuli District, and that its forces had attacked the headquarters of an Armenian regiment of the 10th Mountain Rifle Division, stationed in Aghdara. The Armenian MoD stated that Armenian forces had destroyed Azerbaijani outposts and materiel.

1 October

According to the Azerbaijani MoD, clashes continued overnight, with Azerbaijani units shelling Armenian positions, while the ADA stated that the overnight situation had been relatively stable. At approximately 10:00, the Azerbaijani MoD stated that Armenian forces had been shelling Tartar City during the morning. The Armenian MoD stated that Armenian forces shot down an Azerbaijani UAV near Askeran, while the Artsakh MoD stated that Artsakh forces had repelled Azerbaijani advances. About half an hour later, it stated that Artsakh forces had downed an Azerbaijani gunship near Lalatapa, with wreckage falling into Iranian territory; Azerbaijan issued a denial.

At approximately 13:00, the Azerbaijani MoD stated that Jabrayil and Fuzuli Districts were being rocketed from Goris, in Armenia. Approximately half an hour later, it stated that Armenian forces were shelling Çocuq Mərcanlı, Horadiz, and front-line villages in Goranboy, Tartar and Aghdam Districts. At approximately 14:40, the Artsakh MoD stated that Armenian forces had downed two Azerbaijani warplanes and one helicopter; Azerbaijan issued a denial, stating it had not deployed aircraft that day. The Azerbaijani MoD claimed the destruction of Armenian artillery, several Armenian air defense assets and multiple launch rocket systems. At approximately 19:00, the Ministry stated that Armenian forces had fired upon Horadiz from 17:50. At approximately 23:00, the Armenian MoD stated that Azerbaijani forces were shelling Shatvan and Mets Masrik, both in Armenia proper. Approximately half an hour later, Armenia stated it had downed an Azerbaijani UAV in Kotayk Province, in Armenia.

2 October

President and Commander-in-Chief Ilham Aliyev at Central Command Post of the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense during an operational meeting.

According to the Azerbaijani MoD, overnight clashes continued in various areas of the front, and Azerbaijani forces captured and took control of dominant heights around Madagiz in the direction of Aghdara, while the Artsakh MoD stated that the situation had been relatively stable, if tense. At around 09:30, the Azerbaijani MoD stated that municipalities in Agdam District were under intense Armenian artillery fire. At approximately 12:40, it stated that Quzanlı in Agdam was under rocket fire from Nagorno-Karabakh, while around ten missiles were fired from Armenia into Sabirkənd in Shamkir from the Tochka-U; Armenia issued a denial. The Azerbaijani MoD then stated that Armenians had been rocketing Əmirli in Barda, together with Ağdam and Quzanlı in Tovuz District. At approximately 14:00, the Armenian MoD stated that Azerbaijani forces were bombarding Stepanakert. At around 16:40, the Azerbaijani MoD stated that Tartar City and Şıxarx, and Soğanverdilər in Barda District were under Armenian artillery fire. Approximately an hour later, the Ministry stated that Azerbaijani forces had destroyed an Armenian field control post.

3 October

According to the Azerbaijani MoD, the situation along the front remained tense, while the Armenian MoD stated that heavy fighting was underway in the northern and southern directions of the front. At approximately 10:40, the Azerbaijani MoD stated that Tartar City and several municipalities in Tartar, together with municipalities in Agdam, as well as municipalities in Aghjabadi, together with a municipality in Goranboy, had been subjected to intensive Armenian artillery fire overnight. At approximately 12:10, the Armenian Foreign Ministry stated that the Azerbaijani military was using long-range weapons to destroy civilian infrastructure. At around 19:40, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev announced that the Azerbaijani forces had taken control of Suqovuşan. He also announced that Azerbaijani forces had taken control of Talış in Tartar, several settlements in Jabrayil, and Aşağı Əbdürrəhmanlı in Fuzuli.

4 October

Shelling of Stepanakert on October 4, 2020.

According to the Armenian MoD, the overnight situation along the front was relatively stable, but tense. At approximately 09:00, the Azerbaijani MoD stated that Armenian forces were rocketing Tartar City and Horadiz. At around 10:30, the Ministry stated that Armenian forces were shelling Fuzuli District, while rocketing Agdam and Tartar Districts, while the Artsakh MoD stated that Azerbaijani forces were shelling Stepanakert. Approximately half an hour later, Ganja came under bombardment. The Armenian MoD denied that this came from its territory, while Artsakh took responsibility, stating that Armenian forces had targeted and destroyed the Ganja military airbase on Ganja International Airport; Azerbaijan issued a denial. Subsequently, both a correspondent reporting from the scene for a Russian media outlet and the airport director denied that the airport, which was not operational since March due to the COVID-19 pandemic, had been shelled. At approximately 14:00, Azerbaijan claimed that Azerbaijani forces had severely wounded the President of Artsakh during a visit to the front; Artsakh issued a denial. At around 16:00, the Azerbaijani MoD stated that the Armenian forces were shelling Sarıcalı in Aghjabadi, several settlements in Agdam District, and Şahvəlilər in Barda Districts. Approximately 40 minutes later, Azerbaijani President Aliyev announced that Azerbaijani forces had taken control of the city of Jabrayil, as well as several settlements in Jabrayil District. At around 17:80, the Armenian MoD released footage apparently showing Azerbaijani soldiers leaving Mataghis. At approximately 22:40, the Azerbaijani MoD stated that Armenian forces had rocketed Tartar City and Mingachevir, the latter housing a water reservoir, which Azerbaijan claimed that Armenia regards as a military target; both Armenia and Artsakh issued denials. Around an hour later, the Azerbaijani authorities stated that Armenian forces had fired two medium-range missiles at Khizi and Absheron Districts.

5 October

A destroyed bus stop in Jabrayil, 2014. The Azerbaijani president announced that Azerbaijan had taken control of the city on 4 October.

According to the Armenian MoD, the clashes continued with varying intensity overnight, and Azerbaijani forces launched an offensive from the south. At approximately 10:00, the Azerbaijani MoD released radar-recorded footage apparently showing rockets being fired from Jermuk, Kapan, and Berd, in Armenia. The Armenian MoD stated that Azerbaijani forces were firing rockets at Stepanakert. Approximately one hour later, the Azerbaijani MoD stated that Armenian forces were shelling the cities of Beylagan, Barda and Tartar City. At approximately midday, the Azerbaijani MoD stated that Armenian forces were shelling the cities of Horadiz and Tartar, as well as villages in Tartar, Aghjabadi, Goranboy and Goygol Districts. Azerbaijani authorities stated that Armenian forces were attacking Ganja, Barda, Beylagan and other Azerbaijani cities with missiles and rockets, while the Azerbaijani MoD stated that Ganja had come under fire from Berd, Armenia. At approximately 16:50, the Azerbaijani MoD stated that Armenian forces were shelling the cities of Aghjabadi and Beylagan. At approximately 18:00, the Azerbaijani MoD stated that a battalion of the 1st Armenian Motorized Rifle Regiment, stationed in Hadrut, had fled. At approximately 20:20, the Azerbaijani MoD stated that Armenian forces had again shelled Ganja. Azerbaijan's president stated that Azerbaijani forces had taken control of several villages in Jabrayil. Armenian forces subsequently announced a partial "tactical retreat".

6 October

The clashes continued overnight. The Azerbaijani MoD stated its forces were in control of the entire front, while Artsakh stated that the situation was stable, if tense. The Azerbaijani MoD claimed that Azerbaijani forces had destroyed an Armenian ammunition depot in Ballıca . According to Azerbaijani sources, a school building and a fire engine were hit in Agdam District by Armenian rockets. At approximately 16:30, the Armenian MoD stated that Azerbaijani forces had started a new offensive on the southern front. Around half an hour later, the same Ministry stated that Azerbaijani forces were shelling Stepanakert. At approximately 19:00, the Azerbaijani MoD stated that Armenian forces were shelling Yevlakh, Goranboy and Beylagan Districts. At approximately 22:30, Azerbaijani authorities alleged that Armenia had fired missiles at the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, which the Azerbaijani army had prevented. Shortly after, the Armenian MoD stated that it had repeatedly denied targeting petroleum and gas infrastructure. It then stated that Armenian forces had shelled Tartar City.

7 October

Ghazanchetsots Cathedral in Shusha. The Armenian Apostolic cathedral, a listed cultural and historical monument, was damaged during the conflict.

According to the Azerbaijani MoD, the clashes continued along the entire front overnight. At approximately 10:00, the Azerbaijani MoD stated that the Azerbaijani forces were in control of Jabrayil District. It also released footage apparently showing Azerbaijani forces in Şükürbəyli. Approximately half an hour later, the Ministry stated that Armenian forces were shelling villages in Tartar, Barda, Aghdam, Aghjabadi, Fuzuli and Jabrayil Districts. At approximately midday, it stated that Azerbaijani forces had seized control of new Armenian bases, while the Armenian MoD stated that Azerbaijani forces were shelling Stepanakert. At approximately 15:00, the Azerbaijani MoD stated that Armenian forces were firing upon villages in Tartar and Fuzuli Districts. At approximately 19:30, the President of Artsakh stated that Armenian forces had retaken some positions.

8 October

Clashes continued overnight; according to the Artsakh MoD, the situation was stable but tense. According to the Azerbaijani MoD, in the morning Armenian forces began shelling villages in Goranboy, Tartar, Aghdam, Barda and Aghjabedi Districts, and the city of Barda. At around midday, the Azerbaijani Presidential Office stated that Armenian forces had rocketed Ganja, Barda, Tartar and other cities with Smerch MLRS. Ghazanchetsots Cathedral in Shusha apparently came under repeated bombardment and was seriously damaged. At approximately 13:00, the Azerbaijani MoD stated that Armenian forces had fired a Tochka-U missile at the city of Barda. At approximately 15:00, the Armenian MoD stated that it was repelling Azerbaijani offensives. Subsequently, the Azerbaijani MoD stated that Armenian forces had shelled villages in Goranboy, Tartar, and Aghdam Districts.

9 October

Main article: Battle of Hadrut

Clashes continued overnight; according to the Artsakh MoD, the situation was stable but tense. According to the Azerbaijani MoD, starting in the morning, Armenian forces fired upon Goranboy, Tartar, Barda, and Aghdam Districts and shelled Aghjabadi District and the city of Mingachevir. The Ministry also released footage showing villages in Jabrayil District which its forces had apparently seized control of. The Armenian MoD stated that Azerbaijani forces were bombarding Stepanakert. At approximately 14:00, the Azerbaijani authorities stated that Armenian forces had fired missiles at a mosque in Beylagan and at Goy Imam Mosque in Ganja. At around 16:30, the Azerbaijani MoD stated that Azerbaijani forces had shot down a ballistic missile during flight from Armenia to Mingachevir. At approximately 17:00, the Azerbaijani President announced that Azerbaijani forces had taken control of Hadrut, together with multiple villages; Artsakh issued a denial. During the day, the Azerbaijani MoD released footage apparently showing the setting of Sugovushan and the streets of Talış, again claiming an Azerbaijani presence in the contested villages.

10 October

Further information: 2020 Ganja ballistic missile attacks

File:Rescue teams work at a site hit by a rocket during fighting over the breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh, in the city of Ganja, Azerbaijan, early Oct. 17, 2020.png

Rescue teams in Ganja at a site hit by a missile attack.

Just before 04:00 (00:00 GMT) on October 10, Russia reported that both Armenia and Azerbaijan had agreed on a humanitarian ceasefire after 10 hours of talks in Moscow (the Moscow Statement) and announced that both would enter "substantive" talks. Hostilities were formally halted at 12:00 (08:00 GMT), to allow an exchange of prisoners and the recovery of the dead, facilitated by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Violations of the ceasefire have been persistent, leading to the ICRC halting attempts to recover the dead and exchange wounded and prisoners, as well as prompting fears of a humanitarian crisis.

Armenia and Azerbaijan accused each other of bombarding civilian settlements prior to the ceasefire, with both sides denying the other's accusations. Each side also accused the other of breaking the ceasefire. Clashes broke out soon afterward, with heavy fighting in Hadrut and shelling, with Azerbaijan moving deeper into the conflict zone. Both Artsakh and Azerbaijan accused each other of attacking Hadrut, which saw heavy fighting. At around 23:00, the Azerbaijani MoD stated that Armenian forces were shelling Tartar, while the Armenian MoD stated that Azerbaijani forces were bombarding Stepanakert; Azerbaijan issued a denial.

The third and fourth in a series of ballistic missile attacks on targets in Azerbaijan occurred on 11 and 17 October, including potentially from within Armenia proper, causing mass civilian casualties. A retaliatory Azerbaijani surgical strike followed the third attack. The Azerbaijani president stated that Azerbaijani forces had retaliated for the fourth by seizing control of Fuzuli and nearby villages but also called for immediate international intervention.

Russia, engaging in high-level shuttle diplomacy and seeking to verify the Azerbaijani surgical strike, reiterated its appeal to both sides to end fighting and indicated a readiness to deploy a military observer mission to the front to assist in securing the truce. This was agreed to by Armenia, and conditionally by Azerbaijan. Turkey and Azerbaijan maintained that the Minsk Group had failed to achieve a lasting solution to the conflict and insisted on four-way negotiations that would involve Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, and Turkey.

11 October

Azerbaijani Air Defence Forces shooting down a ballistic missile mid-air.

The situation was reasonably calm, with minor violations. At approximately 02:30, the Azerbaijani MoD stated that Armenian forces had hit Ganja with a Scud missile, fired from Berd, Armenia, killing 10 and injuring 33 civilians; this was officially denied but subsequently confirmed. Azerbaijan also claimed that Armenian forces had fired missiles at the Mingachevir Hydroelectric Power Station. At approximately 18:00, the Azerbaijani MoD stated that Armenian forces were shelling villages in several districts.

12 October

Minor clashes continued, with the Azerbaijani MoD claiming operational advantage; Azerbaijan stated that Armenian forces had tried to retake Hadrut. The Azerbaijani MoD then stated that Armenian forces were shelling several districts. At approximately 15:00, Azerbaijani forces claimed operational control over several villages but had not entered them.

13 October

Fighting resumed in several districts, with Armenian forces apparently shelling several. In the evening, the Azerbaijani MoD claimed parts of Hadrut, but this was limited to neighboring heights and Tağaser, not Hadrut's center.

14 October

Fighting continued; at approximately 09:00, the Azerbaijani MoD stated that Armenian forces were shelling several districts. Azerbaijan claimed control over three villages in Fuzuli and five in Khojavend. Overnight, Azerbaijan claimed to have destroyed OTR-21 Tochka missile launchers situated in two locations in areas of Armenia bordering Kalbajar District that it stated were targeting its cities.

15 October

Ruins of Fuzuli in 2014. On 17 October, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev announced that Azerbaijani forces had taken control of the city.

Fighting continued; the Azerbaijani MoD stated that Armenian forces had shelled a funeral in Tartar, killing four civilians and injuring four, witnessed by a Dozhd correspondent. The Armenian MoD stated Azerbaijan forces were shelling along the front, with the Qirmizi Bazar in Martuni Province being shelled with BM-30 Smerch. The Azerbaijan MOD stated its forces had seized control of Arış in Fuzuli, Doşulu in Jabrayil, and several settlements in Khojavend District.

16 October

Fighting continued overnight. The Armenian MoD reported intense shelling by Azerbaijani forces, including in Şuşakənd in Askeran; while Artsakh authorities stated that the Azerbaijani forces were shelling of Khojavend and nearby settlements. The Azerbaijani MoD stated that Armenian forces were shelling Goranboy, Tartar, Aghdam and Aghjabadi Districts. In the evening, the Azerbaijani MoD stated that the previous day Armenian forces had fired a missile at Ordubad, in Nakhchivan; Armenian authorities issued a denial. Azerbaijan stated it had taken control of settlements in Khojavend District.

17 October

The Armenian MoD stated that Stepanakert and Shusha had been rocketed and shelled at dawn, including with cluster munitions. Overnight, Mingachevir and Ganja in Azerbaijan were attacked, the latter with several Scud missiles.

Azerbaijani authorities subsequently stated that the attack on Ganja had killed at least 13 civilians and injured over 52; the Armenian MoD issued a denial of responsibility and claimed to have downed two Azerbaijani drones in its Syunik Province, subsequently denied by Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijani MOD claimed to have downed an Armenian SU-25, denied by Armenia, and to have retaken Füzuli and several villages. At around 18:15, the Armenian MoD claimed to have downed three Azerbaijani UAVs in Armenia.

In the evening an agreement was reached for a humanitarian ceasefire from midnight.

18 October

On 18 October, Azerbaijani forces took control of Khodaafarin Bridges and the dam nearby.

In the early morning, both sides accused each other of immediately violating the newly agreed ceasefire. The Armenian MoD stated Azerbaijani forces had shelled along the front, launching another offensive along the Aras River and hitting Stepanakert, while the Azerbaijani MoD stated its forces had repelled Armenian attacks in Gadabay and Tovuz Districts, from Armenia's Chambarak and Berd, along the Armenian–Azerbaijani state border. Around an hour later, an "RIA Novosti" correspondent reported an exchange of heavy artillery near Hadrut. At approximately 12:30, the Azerbaijani MoD claimed to have downed an Armenian Su-25 warplane, which it stated had been attacking towards Jabrayil; Armenia issued a denial.

In the evening, Azerbaijani authorities stated that they were willing to transfer the dead through a corridor in Tovuz, Azerbaijan and Tavush, Armenia. The Azerbaijani president stated Azerbaijani forces had captured the Khodaafarin Bridges and Dam. At approximately 19:00, Azerbaijani forces captured Fuzuli.

19 October

Clashes continued overnight, with the Azerbaijani MoD claiming operational superiority; it stated that Armenian forces were shelling Goranboy, Tartar, and Aghdam Districts and firing on Aghjabadi District. At approximately 08:00, the Azerbaijani president announced that Azerbaijani forces had taken several villages in Jabrayil District. Subsequently, the Armenian MoD stated that Azerbaijani forces had started shelling and advancing. At midday, Azerbaijani authorities stated Armenia had fired missiles at the Baku–Novorossiysk pipeline but missed; Armenia issued a denial. The Armenian MoD initially stated that the situation was less tense but subsequently stated that clashes continued along the front.

20 October

Overnight, clashes intensified, specifically near Martakert, Hadrut, and Zəngilan, involving Azerbaijani offensives. At approximately midday, the Azerbaijani MoD stated that Armenian forces were shelling Agdam and Tartar Districts. Around two hours later, the Azerbaijani president announced that Azerbaijani forces had claimed Zəngilan, the administrative center of Zangilan District, and several villages in Zangilan, Fuzuli, Jabrayil, and Khojavend Districts; he renamed Vəng to Çinarlı. Soon after, the Azerbaijani MoD formally released footage showing Zəngilan, and "BBC Russian Service" confirmed Azerbaijan's statements. In turn, the Armenian MoD stated that Azerbaijani forces were retreating along the Aras River; Azerbaijan issued a denial.

21 October

Overnight, clashes further intensified, specifically in Zangilan and Martakert Districts, and near Hadrut. In the morning, Azerbaijan accused Armenia of shelling Tartar; Armenia accused Azerbaijan of shelling Martakert. At approximately 20:30, President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev announced that the Azerbaijani forces had seized control of 22 settlements within Fuzuli, Jabrayil and Zangilan districts.

22 October

Clashes continued overnight with varying intensity, specifically near Martakert, Hadrut, and Zəngilan. The Armenian MoD stated that Khojavend was also shelled overnight by Azerbaijani forces. In turn, the Azerbaijani MoD stated that ballistic missiles were launched from the territory of Armenia to Qəbələ and Kürdəmir at 09:00 local time; Armenia issued a denial. At midday, the Azerbaijani MoD stated that the Azerbaijani forces had shot down an Armenian drone in Nakhchivan. At approximately 17:30, the President of Azerbaijan stated that the Azerbaijani forces had seized control of several villages in Fuzuli and Jabrayil districts. In addition, he stated that Azerbaijani forces had claimed Ağbənd in Zangilan District, releasing confirmary footage. According to Aliyev, with this, Azerbaijani forces had secured control over the Azerbaijan–Iran border. Armenia issued a denial and stated that heavy clashes took place near Qacar in Fuzuli. Around an hour later, the Armenian MoD stated that intense clashes occurred along the entire front, especially in Martuni Province.

23 October

Overnight, the clashes continued, specifically near Martakert, Hadrut, and Qubadlı. At approximately 09:00, the Artsakh authorities stated that Azerbaijani forces had rocketed several villages in Martuni Province using BM-30 Smerch. Azerbaijan issued a denial; it stated that Armenian forces had intensively shelled villages in Tartar, Aghdam and Aghjabadi Districts. In the evening, the Azerbaijani president stated that Azerbaijani forces had claimed several villages in Khojavend, Fuzuli, Zangilan, and Gubadly Districts. The Azerbaijani MoD also released confirmary footage from one the villages claimed. Shortly after, Artsakh authorities stated that Azerbaijani forces were attacking Laçın, as well as shelling Khojavend and Martakert. In the night, the Artsakh authorities stated that the Azerbaijani forces were shelling Stepanakert; Azerbaijan issued a denial.

24 October

Overnight, the clashes continued, specifically near Qubadlı. At approximately midday, the Azerbaijani MoD stated that the Armenian forces were shelling Lachin District from the territory of Armenia; Armenia issued a denial and stated that Laçın was under Artsakh control. In the evening, the Azerbaijani MoD stated that the Armenian forces attempted to attack the Azerbaijani positions in Zangilan from Syunik Province of Armenia. At about 19:30, the Artsakh authorities stated that the Azerbaijani forces were shelling Khojavend.

Non-military actions taken by Armenia and Azerbaijan

Restrictions have been reported on the work of international journalists in Azerbaijan during the conflict, with no corresponding restrictions reported in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Armenia

A pro-military billboard in Republic Square, Yerevan on 7 October.

On 28 September, Armenia banned men aged over 18 listed in the mobilization reserve from leaving the country. The next day, it postponed the trial of former President Robert Kocharyan and other former officials charged in the 2008 post-election unrest case, owing to one of the defendants, the former Defence Minister of Armenia, Seyran Ohanyan, going to Artsakh during the conflict.

On 1 October, TikTok was inaccessible in Armenia. On the same day, the Armenian National Security Service (NSS) stated that it had arrested and charged a former high-ranking Armenian military official with treason on suspicion of spying for Azerbaijan. Three days later, the NSS stated that it had arrested several foreign citizens on suspicion of spying. Protesting Israeli arms sales to Azerbaijan, Armenia has recalled its ambassador to Israel.

On 8 October, the Armenian President, Armen Sarkissian, dismissed the director of the NSS. Subsequently, the Armenian government toughened the martial law and prohibited criticizing state bodies and "propaganda aimed at disruption of the defense capacity of the country." On the same day, the Armenian MoD canceled a Novaya Gazeta correspondent's journalistic accreditation, officially for entering Nagorno-Karabakh without accreditation. On 9 October, Armenia tightened its security legislation. On 21 October, the Armenian Cabinet of Ministers temporarily banned the import of Turkish goods, the decision will come into force on December 31. The following day, the Armenian parliament passed a law to write off the debts of the Armenian servicemen wounded during the clashes and the debts of the families of those killed.

Azerbaijan

Azerbaijani flag in Jafar Jabbarly Square near the 28 May station in Baku on 10 October.

On 27 September, Azerbaijani authorities restricted internet access shortly after the clashes began. According to an official statement, this was done to prevent Armenian provocations. The National Assembly of Azerbaijan declared a curfew in Baku, Ganja, Goygol, Yevlakh and a number of districts from midnight on 28 September, under the Interior Minister, Vilayet Eyvazov. Azerbaijan Airlines announced that all airports in Azerbaijan would be closed to regular passenger flights until 30 September. The Military Prosecutor's Offices of Fizuli, Tartar, Karabakh and Ganja began criminal investigations of war and other crimes.

Also on 28 September, the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, issued a decree authorising a partial mobilization in Azerbaijan.

On 8 October, Azerbaijan recalled its ambassador to Greece for consultations, following allegations of Armenians from Greece arriving in Nagorno-Karabakh to fight against Azerbaijan.

On 12 October, the Prosecutor General's Office of the Republic of Azerbaijan launched a criminal case against a journalist for his reporting. Three days later, the Azerbaijani State Security Service (SSS) warned against potential sabotage.

On 17 October, the Azerbaijani MoFA stated that member of the Russian State Duma from the ruling United Russia, Vitaly Milonov, was declared persona non grata in Azerbaijan for visiting Nagorno-Karabakh without permission from the Azerbaijani government. On 24 October, by recommendation of the Central Bank of Azerbaijan, the member banks of the Azerbaijani Banks’ Association unanimously adopted a decision to write off the credits of the military servicemen and civilians who sustained damage during the conflict.

Casualties, equipment losses and infrastructure damage

Main article: Casualties of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

Civilian and military casualties have been high, officially in the hundreds and possibly in the low thousands, with casualty claims not having been independently verified. Civilian areas, including major cities, have been hit, including Azerbaijan's second-largest city, Ganja, and the region's capital, Stepanakert, with many buildings and homes destroyed. The Ghazanchetsots Cathedral has also been damaged.

Casualties

Civilians

According to Armenian sources, on 27 September, two civilians were killed by Azerbaijani shelling in Martuni Province, with approximately a dozen injured in Stepanakert; the Azerbaijani MoD denied these claims. On 10 October, Armenian media reported the killing of two civilians in Hadrut, a mother and his son with a disability, according to Armenia the killing would have been carried out by Azerbaijani infiltrators. By 17 October, Armenian authorities reported 40 Armenian civilians were killed in the conflict.

According to Azerbaijani sources, the Armenian military has targeted densely populated areas containing civilian structures. As of 21 October, the Prosecutor General's Office of the Republic of Azerbaijan stated that during the clashes, as a result of reported shelling by Armenian artillery and rocketing, 65 people had been killed, while 297 people had been hospitalized.

As of 23 October, the Armenian authorities has stated that te conflict had displaced more than half of Nagorno-Karabakh's population or approximately 90,000 people.

Seven journalists have been injured. On 1 October, two French journalists from Le Monde covering the clashes in Khojavend were injured by Azerbaijani shellfire. A week later, three Russian journalists reporting in Shusha were seriously injured by an Azerbaijani attack. On 19 October, an Azerbaijani AzTV journalist received shrapnel wounds from Armenian shellfire in Aghdam District.

Military

Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Vice-president Mehriban Aliyeva during a meeting with the wounded Azerbaijani servicemen.

Since the beginning of the clashes the government of Azerbaijan has not revealed the number of its military casualties. However, Armenian and Artsakh authorities have claimed 6,309 Azerbaijani soldiers and Syrian mercenaries were killed. On 6 October, the Azerbaijani MoD denied an Armenian MoD claim of 200 deaths after the alleged defeat of an Azerbaijani unit. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights documented the death of at least 170 Syrian fighters or mercenaries fighting for Azerbaijan.

As of 21 October, Artsakh authorities reported the deaths of 927 servicemen, while the Azerbaijani authorities claimed more than 2,300 Armenian servicemen were killed or wounded as of 30 September. The main age of Armenian casualties is estimated to be approximately 20 years old.

Infrastructure damage

Ghazanchetsots Cathedral in Shusha has been damaged. On 19 October, strong fire broke out in a cotton plant in Azad Qaraqoyunlu, Tartar District as a result of the Armenian artillery shelling, with several large hangars of the plant getting completely burned down. An Armenian-backed Nagorno-Karabakh Human Rights Ombudsman report noted 5,800 private properties destroyed and 520 private vehicles, with damage to 960 items of civilian infrastructure, and industrial and public and objects The Prosecutor General's Office of the Republic of Azerbaijan reported 1,941 private houses, 382 civilian facilities, and 90 multi-storey residential buildings being damaged.

Equipment losses

By 7 October Azerbaijan claimed to have destroyed about 250 tanks and other armored vehicles; 150 other military vehicles; 11 command and command-observation posts; 270 artillery units and MLRSs, including a BM-27 Uragan; 60 Armenian anti-aircraft systems, including 4 S-300 and 25 9K33 Osas; 18 UAVs and 8 arms depots. destroyed. As of 16 October, the Azerbaijani President stated that the Armenian losses were at US$2 billion. In turn an Azerbaijani helicopter was stated to have been damaged, but its crew had apparently returned it to Azerbaijani-controlled territory without casualties. Later it was reported that on 12 October Azerbaijan had destroyed one Tochka-U missile launcher. On 14 October Azerbaijan stated it had further destroyed five T-72 tanks, three BM-21 Grad rocket launchers, one 9K33 Osa missile system, one BMP-2 vehicle, one KS-19 air defense gun, two D-30 howitzers and several Armenian army automobiles. On the same day Azerbaijan announced the destruction of three R-17 Elbrus tactical ballistic missile launchers that had been targeting Ganja and Mingachevir.

Armenian and Artsakh authorities initially claimed the downing of four Azerbaijani helicopters and the destruction of ten tanks and IFVs, as well as 15 drones. Later the numbers were revised to 36 tanks and armored personnel vehicles destroyed, two armored combat engineering vehicles destroyed and four helicopters and 27 unmanned aerial vehicles downed all within the first day of hostilities. They released footage showing the destruction or damage of five Azerbaijani tanks. Over the course of 2 October, the Artsakh Defence Army claimed the destruction of 39 Azerbaijani military vehicles, including a T-90 tank; four SU-25 fighter-bombers; three Mi-24 attack helicopters; and 17 UAVs.

Analysis

Analysts believe that the 2020 conflict was likely initiated by Azerbaijan; its military is better prepared and it intends to reclaim de jure Azerbaijani territory. Complex geopolitics involving Russia and Turkey have come into play. Drone warfare and propaganda have featured prominently, with national sentiments and stereotypes driving the conflict. While Azerbaijan's intended goals were likely strategically limited, concerns exist that direct confrontations between Armenia and Azerbaijan could result in an all-out, devastating multi-front war that could spread beyond the region; a strategic pipeline with major Western investment transports Azerbaijan's Caspian Sea crude oil to Turkey and then on to Western markets.

Azerbaijan's intended goals

Most of Azerbaijan's successful advances have concentrated in the areas that are located along the Aras River, which has a less mountainous terrain in contrast to the region's northern and central territories.

In a 27 September interview, regional expert Thomas de Waal stated that it was highly unlikely that hostilities were initiated by the Armenian side as they were already in possession of the territory and were incentivized to normalize the status quo, while "for various reasons, Azerbaijan calculates that military action will win it something". One analyst in the journal Foreign Policy predicted that Azerbaijan would have great difficulty in trying to occupy the entire area of Nagorno-Karabakh due to the extremely inaccessible mountainous terrain controlled by Armenian troops. In addition, he opined that the readiness of the Azerbaijani army was very poor, with morale low, its structure corrupt and inefficient, and a desertion rate as high as 20 percent. Furthermore, despite large investments in the purchase of military equipment from oil profits, the Azerbaijani army was said to lack adequate training for the use of new equipment. The suspected immediate goal of the Azerbaijani offensive was to capture the districts of Fuzuli and Jabrayil in southern Nagorno-Karabakh, where the terrain is less mountainous and more favorable for offensive operations. According to Russian military expert Mikhail Khodarenok, Azerbaijan had carefully planned and prepared the offensive operation; however, he added that the Azerbaijani army did not appear to complete its initial objectives during the first five days of the clashes, taking neither Fuzuli nor Mardakert. Similarly, political scientist Arkady Dubnov from the Carnegie Moscow Center believes that Azerbaijan launched the offensive to improve Azerbaijan's position in a suitable season for hostilities in the terrain. Russian political columnist Alexander Budberg stated that Azerbaijan was, in attempting to recover 20% of its territory, better prepared for the conflict and likely to advance slowly and carefully, with the possibility that the operation would be suspended if pressure on Baku became too intense.

Status of respective militaries

Azerbaijan has consistently spent more on its military budget than Armenia, permitting it to purchase advanced weapons systems, mainly from Israel, Russia and Turkey. Azerbaijan has superior tanks, armored personnel carriers, and infantry fighting vehicles. It has amassed a large fleet of Turkish and Israeli-supplied state-of-the-art drones. The Armenian military and Artsakh forces mainly rely on older Soviet-era weapon systems. Armenia has its own indigenously-produced drones, but they are generally greatly inferior to the drones Azerbaijan possesses. Azerbaijan has a quantitative advantage in artillery systems, particularly self-propelled guns and long-range multiple rocket launchers. Armenia has a minor advantage in tactical ballistic missiles. Azerbaijan has a larger fleet of manned combat aircraft than Armenia, though both sides have so far largely refrained from using them. If both countries go to war, it would nonetheless be waged with Russian and Turkish-supplied 21st century heavy weapons, potentially causing more death and destruction than in the 1990s.

Turkey and Russia

See also: Russia–Turkey proxy conflict

Russia has maintained good relations with Azerbaijan and has sold weapons to both parties; however, Russia possesses a military base in Armenia as part of a military alliance with Armenia, and thus is obligated by treaty to defend Armenia in the case of a war. Like in Syria and in Libya's ongoing civil war, Russia and NATO-member Turkey therefore have opposing interests. Turkey, driven by President Erdogan's ambitions to improve his popularity and divert attention from his country's economic issues, appears to be using the conflict to attempt to leverage its influence in the South Caucasus along its eastern border, using both military and diplomatic resources to extend its sphere of influence in the Middle East, and to marginalize the influence of Russia, another regional power. Russia has historically pursued a policy of maintaining neutrality in the conflict, and Armenia has yet to request aid. According to the director of the Russia studies program at the CNA, Russia is unlikely to intervene militarily unless Armenia incurs drastic losses. However, the 14 October Azerbaijani strike within Armenian territory has threatened to bring the mutual defense pact to the fore.

War crimes

On 4 October, the Armenian government stated Azerbaijan had deployed cluster munitions against residential targets in Stepanakert; an Amnesty International investigator condemned this. In an Amnesty International report, the cluster bombs were identified as an "Israeli-made M095 DPICM cluster munitions that appear to have been fired by Azerbaijani forces." The next day, Armenian Minister of Foreign Affairs Zohrab Mnatsakanyan stated to Fox News that the targeting of civilian populations in Nagorno-Karabakh by Azerbaijani forces was tantamount to war crimes and called for an end to the "aggression".

During an on-site investigation in Nagorno-Karabakh in October 2020, Human Rights Watch documented four incidents in which Azerbaijan used Israeli-made cluster munitions against civilian areas of Nagorno-Karabakh. The HRW investigation team did not find any sort of military sites in the residential neighborhoods where the cluster munitions were used and condemned its use against civilian populated areas. Stephen Goose, arms division director at Human Rights Watch and chair of the Cluster Munition Coalition, stated that "the continued use of cluster munitions – particularly in populated areas – shows flagrant disregard for the safety of civilians.” He then added that "the repeated use of cluster munitions by Azerbaijan should cease immediately as their continued use serves to heighten the danger for civilians for years to come." The HRW investigation team also noted that numerous civilian buildings and infrastructure, such as children's playgrounds, business, and homes, were heavily damaged due to shelling.

On 15 October, a video surfaced of two captured Armenians being executed by Azerbaijani soldiers; Artsakh authorities identified one as a civilian. Bellingcat analysed the videos and concluded that the footage was real and that both executed were Armenian combatants captured by Azerbaijani forces between 9 and 15 October and later executed. The BBC also investigated the videos and confirmed that the videos were from Hadrut and were filmed some time between October 9–15. A probe has been launched by Armenia's human rights defender, Arman Tatoyan, who shared the videos with European Court of Human Rights and who will also show the videos to the UN human rights commissioner, the Council of Europe and other international organizations.

On October 19, Armenia's human rights defender reported about another war crime committed by Azerbaijani side where they have beheaded an Armenian soldier, posted the picture on social media and called his brother taunted him.

Drone warfare

Azerbaijan has made highly effective use of drones, including the Bayraktar TB2, and sensors, in a "new, more affordable type of air power", indicating the future of warfare. Azerbaijani drones have been used to carry out precise strikes and as reconnaissance aircraft, relaying the coordinates of targets they spot to Azerbaijani artillery. It had previously been assumed that drones would not play a major role in conflicts between nations due to their vulnerability to anti-aircraft fire. While this might be true for major powers with air defences, it appears to be less true for smaller powers. The use of drones in this conflict has showcased their potential in enabling small countries that lack large fleets of manned aircraft to conduct effective air campaigns. Close air support can be provided by specialized suicide drones, such as IAI Harop, rendering tanks vulnerable and suggesting changes are required to armored warfare doctrine.

Propaganda war

Billboards in Yerevan have been displaying footage released by the Armenian Ministry of Defence since the beginning of the conflict.

Both sides have engaged in extensive propaganda campaigns through the use of official mainstream and social media accounts magnified online, including in Russian media. The ability of drones to record their kills has enabled a highly effective Azerbaijani propaganda campaign. In Baku, digital billboards have broadcast high-resolution footage of missiles striking Armenian soldiers, tanks, and other materiel. Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev told Turkish television that Azerbaijani-operated drones had reduced the number of Azerbaijan's casualties, stating, “These drones show Turkey's strength" and "empowers" Azerbaijanis.

National sentiments

Further information: Anti-Armenian sentiment in Azerbaijan and Anti-Azerbaijani sentiment in Armenia

While Armenians and Azerbaijanis trained side by side under Soviet rule, the collapse of the Soviet Union contributed to racialization and fierce nationalism, causing both Armenians and Azerbaijanis to stereotype each other, shaping respective sociopolitical discourses. During and after the Nagorno-Karabakh War anti-Azerbaijani sentiment grew in Armenia, leading to harassment of Azerbaijanis there. The incitement of hatred against Armenians and promotion of hate speech is one of the main challenges of creating the necessary conditions to enhance the peace process, as well as to establish an atmosphere of confidence between the people of the conflicting sides.

Cyber attacks

Hackers from Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as their allied countries have actively participated in cyberwarfare, with Azerbaijani hackers targeting Armenian websites and posting Aliyev's statements, and Greek hackers targeting Azerbaijani governmental websites.

Official statements

The Armenian ambassador to the United States Varuzhan Nersesyan has invited US intervention in the conflict, as has his Azerbaijani counterpart Elin Suleymanov.

Armenia and Artsakh

File:NA moment silence.jpg

President of the National Assembly Ararat Mirzoyan (second from left) leads a moment of silence honoring Armenian soldiers and civilians who perished in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

On 27 September, the Prime Minister of Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan, accused the Azerbaijani authorities of a large-scale provocation. The Prime Minister stated that the "recent aggressive statements of the Azerbaijani leadership, large-scale joint military exercises with Turkey, as well as the rejection of OSCE proposals for monitoring" indicated that the aggression was pre-planned and constituted a major violation of regional peace and security. The next day, Armenia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) issued a statement, noting that the "people of Artsakh were at war with the Turkish–Azerbaijani alliance".

The same day, the Armenian Ambassador to Russia, Vardan Toganyan, did not rule out that Armenia may turn to Russia for fresh arms supplies. On 29 September, Prime Minister Pashinyan stated that Azerbaijan, with military support from Turkey, was expanding the theater into Armenian territory. On 30 September, Pashinyan stated that Armenia was considering officially recognizing the Republic of Artsakh as an independent territory. The same day, the Armenian MoFA stated that the Turkish Air Force had carried out provocative flights along the front between the forces of the Republic of Artsakh and Azerbaijan, including providing air support to the Azerbaijani army.

On 1 October, the President of Artsakh, Arayik Harutyunyan, stated that Armenians needed to prepare for a long-term war. Two days later, the Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) Foreign Ministry called on the international community to recognize the independence of the Republic of Artsakh in order to restore regional peace and security.

On 6 October, the Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stated that the Armenian side was prepared to make concessions, if Azerbaijan was ready to reciprocate.

On 9 October, Armen Sarkissian demanded that international powers, particularly, the US, Russia and NATO, do more to stop Turkey's involvement in the war and warned that Ankara is creating “another Syria in the Caucasus”.

On 21 October, Nikol Pashinyan stated that "it is impossible to talk about a diplomatic solution at this stage, at least at this stage”, since the compromise option is not acceptable for Azerbaijan, while the Armenian side stated many times that it is ready to resolve the issue through compromises. Pashinyan said that "to fight for the rights of our people means, first of all, to take up arms and commit to the protection of the rights of the homeland".

Azerbaijan

Meeting of the Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev with the country's Security Council on 27 September.

The day before the conflict, on 26 September, according to the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defence, the Armenian military violated the ceasefire 48 times along the Line of Contact. Azerbaijan stated that the Armenian side attacked first, prompting an Azerbaijani counter-offensive.

On 27 September, Azerbaijan accused Armenian forces of a "willful and deliberate" attack on the front line and of targeting civilian areas, alleging a "gross violation of international humanitarian law". On 28 September, it stated that Armenia's actions had destroyed the peace negotiations through an act of aggression, alleged that a war had been launched against Azerbaijan, mobilized the people of Azerbaijan, and declared a Great Patriotic War. It then stated that the deployment of the Armenian military in Nagorno-Karabakh constituted a threat to regional peace and accused Armenia of propagandising, adding that the Azerbaijani military was operating according to international law. The Azerbaijani authorities issued a statement accusing the Armenian military of purposefully targeting civilians, including women and children. The Azerbaijani Minister of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) denied any claims of Turkish involvement, while admitting military-technical cooperation with Turkey and other countries.

On 29 September, the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, spoke about Azerbaijan's territorial integrity. Aliyev stated that the Armenian occupation and aggression had led to the destruction of infrastructure and mosques, caused the Khojaly massacre, and resulted in cultural genocide, insulting the Muslim world and being tantamount to state-backed Islamophobia and anti-Azerbaijani sentiment. Azerbaijani authorities issued a joint statement on alleged war crimes against civilians by Armenia. The Azerbaijani MoFA demanded that Armenia stop shelling civilians and called on international organizations to ensure Armenia followed international law. The Azerbaijani Ambassador to Russia denied reports of mercenaries brought in from Turkey by Azerbaijan, and the First Vice-President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Mehriban Aliyeva, stated that Azerbaijan had never laid claim to others' territory nor committed crimes against humanity.

On 3 October, Aliyev stated that Armenia needed to leave Azerbaijan's territory (in Nagorno-Karabakh) for the war to stop. The next day, Aliyev issued an official statement that Azerbaijan was "writing a new history", describing Karabakh as an ancient Azerbaijani territory and longstanding home to Azerbaijanis, and noting that Armenians had occupied Azerbaijan's territory, destroying its religious and cultural heritage, for three decades. He added that Azerbaijan would restore its cities and destroyed mosques and accused Armenia of distorting history.

Two days later, Azerbaijan stated that Armenia had deployed cluster munitions against cities. On 7 October, Azerbaijan officially notified members of the World Conference on Constitutional Justice, the Conference of European Constitutional Courts, the Association of Asian Constitutional Courts and similar organizations that it had launched the operation in line with international law to re-establish its internationally recognized territorial integrity and for the safety of its people. On 8 October, Aliyev accused the Armenian Armed Forces of committing war crimes through the firing of ballistic missiles at civilian settlements. He also accused Armenia of ethnic discrimination on account of the historical expulsion or self-exile of ethnic minority communities, highlighting its mono-ethnic population.

On 10 October, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov stated that the truce signed on the same day was temporary. Despite this, Aliyev stated that both parties were now attempting to determine a political resolution to the conflict. The next day, Azerbaijani authorities stated that Armenia was conducting an act of genocide, emphasizing the Khojaly massacre.

On 21 October, President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, stated that Azerbaijan did not ruled out the introduction international observers and peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh, but will put forward some conditions when the time comes. He then added that Azerbaijan did not agree for a referendum in Nagorno-Karabakh, but didn't exclude the cultural autonomy of Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, and reaffirmed that the Azerbaijan considers Armenians living in Nagorno-Karabakh as their citizens, promising security and rights.

Allegations of third-party involvement

Because of the geography, history, and sensitivities of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, accusations, allegations, and statements have been made of involvement by third-party and international actors, including in media reports and by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR). Evidence of the presence of Syrian fighters in Azerbaijan is increasing.

Turkey and Syrian National Army

See also: Azerbaijan–Turkey relations

Prior to the beginning of the conflict, Turkey's upped rhetoric against Armenia, as well as its recruitment of several hundred Syrian refugees had been reported the previous week by Syrian commentators, activists and others on social media, circulated among Syrian refugees, dissidents and others who monitor Syria. Detailed reporting on the evidence of Syrian fighters in Azerbaijan exists, as well as apparent Turkish military involvement, causing international concern. Two days into the conflict, several Syrian National Army (SNA) members and the SOHR alleged that a private Turkish security company was recruiting Syrians to fight in Artsakh; Azerbaijan and Turkey issued denials. A report in The Times partially confirmed Turkish involvement in sending 200 Syrian fighters to support Azerbaijani forces; a Turkish-based source reported that these were acting independently of the SNA. Emmanuel Macron accused Turkey of dispatching Syrian "jihadists" to Nagorno-Karabakh via Gaziantep while Russia expressed concern over "illegal armed units" from Syria and Libya being present in the conflict zone. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad reiterated Macron's concerns. On 3 October, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan claimed that Syrian fighters, together with Turkish army specialists, were involved, along with circa 150 senior Turkish military officers, allegedly directing military operations. The National Security Service of Armenia presented intercepts, allegedly between the Turkish and Azerbaijani military, and between the Azerbaijani military and mercenaries. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stated that Turkey's involvement in the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia has increased the risk in the region, inflaming the situation by arming the Azerbaijanis.

On 2 October, Russian investigative newspaper Novaya Gazeta reported 700–1,000 militants had apparently been sent to Azerbaijan and detailed their transport and recruitment itinerary, referring to the Hamza Division and the Samarkand and Nureddin Zinki Brigades. The Georgian State Security Service stated news about the passage of Syrian fighters from Turkey through Georgia to Azerbaijan was disinformation. On 3 October, Elizabeth Tsurkov, an American expert on Syria, reported on videos of Arabic-speaking foreigners, who she identified as likely Syrian mercenaries in Horadiz, urging compatriots to join them. Subsequently, Tsurkov detailed the recruitment, by the Hamza Division and Sultan Murad and Sultan Suleyman Shah Brigades, of at least a thousand mercenaries to Azerbaijan, including civilians with no fighting experience who had been informed they would be guarding oil facilities but were then sent to the front. On 5 October, Russian News Agency RIA Novosti stated that 322 Syrian mercenaries were in the conflict zone and that 93 had been killed, while 430 from Syria had already arrived. On 6 October, Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service alleged that several thousand fighters from Middle East terrorist organizations had arrived in Nagorno-Karabakh to fight for Azerbaijan, specifically from Jabhat al-Nusra (al-Qaeda branch), Firkat Hamza, and the Sultan Murad Division, claiming all were linked to the Islamic State (ISIL). On 7 October, Asia Times reported that mercenaries allegedly signed up to go to Azerbaijan for US$1,500 a month. Kommersant states that during the first week of October up to 1300 Syrian militants and 150 Libyan mercenaries deployed to Azerbaijan.

On 16 October, Kommersant provided details of Turkish military involvement. Turkish servicemen had apparently remained in Azerbaijan after joint military drills this summer, to coordinate and direct the planning and conducting of the operations. Six hundred servicemen had stayed on, including a tactical battalion of 200 people, 50 instructors in Nakhchivan, 90 military advisers in Baku, 120 flight personnel at the airbase in Qabala; 20 drone operators at Dollyar Air Base, 50 instructors at the aviabase in Yevlakh, 50 instructors in the 4th Army Corps in Perekeshkul and 20 others at the naval base and Azerbaijan Higher Military Academy in Baku. According to the source, forces included 18 Turkish infantry fighting vehicles, one multiple launch rocket system, 10 vehicles and up to 34 aircraft, including 6 warplanes, 8 helicopters and up to 20 military intelligence drones. On 17 October, the Armenian National Security Service stated that Azerbaijan is smuggling in a significant amount of ammunition, mercenaries and terrorists from Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The SOHR confirmed a total of 320 Syrian fighters in Azerbaijan, primarily of Syrian-Turkmen descent from the Sultan Murad Division, and initially stated that they had not participated in the clashes. It stated that Arab-majority Syrian rebel groups had in fact refused to send their fighters to Azerbaijan. On 1 October 2020, the SOHR confirmed the deaths of 28 Syrian fighters and nearly 60 injured or missing. On 20 October, the SOHR stated that at least 170 pro-Turkey Syrian rebel fighters, who were among more than 2,050 combatants, had been killed in clashes. An unidentified SNA leader, the Jesr Press and a The Guardian article confirmed the deaths of dozens of Syrian fighters. On 14 October, The Washington Post reported the deaths in Karabakh of more than 50 Syrian mercenaries, most of them hired by Turkey. Prime Minister Pashinyan in an interview given to French newspaper Le Figaro claimed that 30 percent of those Azerbaijanis killed in hostilities were foreign mercenaries.

Canada has suspended the export of its drone technology to Turkey over concerns that it is using the technology in the conflict.

Armenian diaspora fighters and Kurdish militias

See also: Armenian–Kurdish relations

Before the conflict, Turkish sources alleged that YPG and PKK members from Iraq and Syria were transferred to Nagorno-Karabakh in order to train Armenian militias against Azerbaijan, and on 30 September, Turkish sources alleged that approximately 300 PKK militants were transported to Nagorno-Karabakh via Iran. However, according to a Washington Post commentator, these claims may be doubted, due to Turkey having previously issued questionable statements regarding PKK and YPG activities. A Jerusalem Post commentator wrote that the Daily Sabah's suggestions of PKK/YPG involvement in Karabakh were designed to create a justification for Turkey to claim the PKK was threatening its 'security' so that it could invade, noting that Turkey had used this same excuse to attack northern Iraq and Syria.

On 28 September, the Azerbaijani MoD alleged that among the Armenian casualties were mercenaries of Armenian origin from Syria and a variety of Middle East countries. On the same day, the Turkish Minister of Defence stated that Armenia must "send back the mercenaries and terrorists it brought from abroad". Two days later, Azerbaijani authorities asked the international community to "adequately respond to the use of terrorist forces by Armenia". The SOHR also stated that Armenian-born Syrian fighters were being transported to Armenia to fight against Azerbaijan. On 4 October, the Turkish MoD demanded that PKK-YPG "terrorists", allegedly cooperating with Armenians in targeting civilians, vacate the region. The next day, Azerbaijani authorities stated that Armenia had widely employed foreign terrorist forces and mercenaries against it, with there being evidence of people of Armenian origin from the Middle East, especially Syria and Lebanon, and subsequently Russia, Georgia, Greece, the United Arab Emirates, and other countries. A Novaya Gazeta report, citing Lebanese Ministry of Internal Affairs intelligence, stated around 500 lethnic Armenian Lebanese had travelled to fight in Nagorno-Karabakh.

On 6 October, the Azerbaijani State Security Service (SSS) claimed, citing intercepts, that Armenia had employed foreign mercenaries, including members of Kurdish militant groups whom Armenia had brought from Iraq and Syria, to fight Azerbaijan. On the same day, Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service alleged that there were Kurdish extremist groups fighting on the Armenian side.

Arms supplies

Israel

Israel, a major trading partner and weapons supplier for Azerbaijan, is reported to have continued to ship weapons, especially drones, during the conflict.

Russia, Iran and Georgia

During the conflict, Azerbaijani and Iranian media reported that Russian weaponry and military hardware were being transported to Armenia via Iran. On 29 September, the Iranian Foreign Ministry denied these claims. The next day, Azerbaijani government-affiliated media outlets shared footage reportedly showing the materiel being transported. Azerbaijani MP Sabir Rustamkhanli alleged that Iran was engaged in transporting weapons from various countries to Armenia. Subsequently, in the Azerbaijani Parliament, Rustamkhanli suggested opening an Azerbaijani embassy in Israel. The Chief of Staff of the President of Iran, in a phone call with the Deputy Prime Minister of Azerbaijan, denied the claims and stated that they were aimed at disrupting both countries' relations. Iranian state-affiliated media stated that trucks depicted in the footage consisted of shipments of Kamaz trucks that the Armenian government had previously purchased from Russia.

Azerbaijan's president initially stated that Georgia had not allowed the transportation of weapons through its territory and thanked Georgia, as a partner and friend. However, in a subsequent interview, he alleged that Armenia was misusing one of its Il-76 cargo planes for civil flights, to secretly transport fighters and Kornet anti-tank missiles from Russia through Georgian airspace into Armenia. Georgia responded by stating that its airspace was closed to all military and military cargo flights but not for civil and humanitarian ones.

Serbia

Azerbaijan has claimed that Armenia is employing Serbian weapons, alleged to have been transported via Georgia. In response, the President of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, stated that Serbia considers both Armenia and Azerbaijan to be friends and "brotherly nations", insisting that Serbian weapons were not being used in Nagorno-Karabakh.

International reactions

OSCE Minsk Group

On 2 October 2020, the OSCE Minsk Group, responsible for mediating the peace process in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict since 1992, condemned the fighting and called on those involved in the conflict to respect their obligations to protect civilians. The Minsk Group stated that participation by "external parties" was working against the peace process. The group called for an immediate ceasefire, and "substantive negotiations, in good faith and without preconditions".

Supranational and regional organizations

President of the European Council Charles Michel called for a bilateral cessation of hostilities, as did the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) on 1 October 1 and 5 October, and Secretary-General of the United Nations António Guterres followed by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Following a closed council meeting, the Security Council issued a statement. It condemned the use of force and reiterated the Secretary-General's call to immediately cease fighting, deescalate tensions and return to meaningful negotiations. It further expressed concern at "large scale military actions", regret at the death toll and impact on civilian populations, and complete support for the "central role" of the OSCE, urging both sides to cooperate towards an urgent return of dialogue without setting preconditions. On 18 October, the UN Secretary-General again called on Armenia and Azerbaijan to respect the humanitarian truce and condemned attacks on civilians. Similarly, Secretary General of NATO, Jens Stoltenberg, expressed deep concern for the escalation of hostilities and called for the sides to immediately halt fighting and progress towards a peaceful resolution, urging NATO-member Turkey to use its influence to that end. Stoltenberg expressed NATO's neutrality and said that both "Armenia and Azerbaijan have been valued NATO partners for more than 25 years". NATO and the European Union (EU) have refused to publicly criticize Turkey's involvement in the conflict.

Secretary General of the Organization of American States Luis Almagro demanded that Azerbaijan cease hostilities, whereas the Turkic Council demanded an unconditional withdrawal of Armenia from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation initially condemned Armenian "provocations" and subsequently expressed concern regarding Armenia's violations of the 10 October humanitarian ceasefire and conditional solidarity with the Republic of Azerbaijan, highlighting the OIC stance and that of the UNSC and urging a political solution to the conflict, and affirming respect for Azerbaijan's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and internationally recognized borders.

Humanitarian organizations

On 23 October 2020, "Genocide Watch" international humanitarian organisation published "Genocide Emergency: Azerbaijan in Artsakh" report on its website, stating that it considers Azerbaijan to be at Stage 9 (extermination) and Stage 10 (denial) of genocide.

Countries

Russia

Being a co-chair of OSCE Minsk Group, Russia's main role in this conflict is that of a mediator. On 2 October, along with the other two co-chairs of the Group, France and the US, it called for immediate cessation of hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh, and asked both sides to continue negotiations without preconditions. On 6 October the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and his Iranian counterpart Mohammad Javad Zarif expressed concern about the involvement of Syrian and Libyan fighters in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, with the possible support of Turkey. Both Russia and Armenia are part of a mutual defence pact. However, on October 8 President Vladimir Putin expressed that the fighting is not happening on the territory of Armenia and therefore Russia would not intervene in the current conflict. He also affirmed Russia's good relations with both Armenia and Azerbaijan. On 9 October, Lavrov mediated a ceasefire after 10 hours of talks between Armenian and Azerbaijani Foreign Ministers in Moscow. The ceasefire was quickly broken. On 22 October, Putin indicated that the root of the conflict lines in interethnic clashes between Armenians and Azerbaijanis in the 1980s, and specifically referred to the massacre of Armenians in Sumgait.

United States

On 27 September 2020, United States president Donald Trump said his administration was "looking at [the conflict] very strongly" and that it was seeing whether it could stop it. Presidential candidate and former Vice President Joe Biden demanded that Turkey "stay out" of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In a letter to U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Senate Foreign Relations Committee ranking member Bob Menendez, Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer, and several other lawmakers called for the Trump administration to immediately suspend U.S. military aid to Azerbaijan, sent through Pentagon’s "building partner assistance program." Eliot Engel, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, called the influence of third party actors like Turkey "troubling". On 15 October 2020, Pompeo urged both sides to respect the humanitarian ceasefire and stated, "We now have the Turks, who have stepped in and provided resources to Azerbaijan, increasing the risk, increasing the firepower that's taking place in this historic fight... The resolution of that conflict ought to be done through negotiation and peaceful discussions, not through armed conflict, and certainly not with third party countries coming in to lend their firepower to what is already a powder keg of a situation."

Turkey

Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and the Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu on 6 October.

The governments of Turkey and Pakistan expressed support for Azerbaijan. Turkey blamed Armenia for violating the ceasefire and Turkish President Erdogan initially urged Azerbaijan to persist with its campaign until it had retaken all territory lost in the Nagorno-Karabakh War. Erdogan criticized the failed activities of the OSCE Minsk Group in the last 25 years as "stalling tactics" preventing a diplomatic solution. Further, Turkey issued a statement on 1 October dismissing the joint demands from France, Russia, and the United States calling for a ceasefire. Northern Cyprus, a self-declared state recognized only by Turkey, expressed support for Azerbaijan.

Others

Syria's Assad blamed Turkey for the conflict, while Greek foreign minister Nikos Dendias, on a visit to Yerevan on 16 October 2020, earned that it was critical to end foreign interference, warning that Turkey's intervention was raising serious international concerns.

Israeli President Reuven Rivlin expressed sorrow at the resumption of violence and loss of life, stating that Israel's long-standing cooperation and relations with Azerbaijan was not for offensive purposes, adding that Israel was interested in promoting relations with Armenia and was prepared to offer humanitarian aid. Israeli Defence Minister Benny Gantz accused Turkey of disrupting peace efforts in the region and called for international pressure on Turkey to dissuade "direct terrorism". Israel declined to comment on the possibility it halting support for Azerbaijan.

Hungary stated it backed Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, adding it supports the reduction of tensions in the escalating conflict and a negotiated OSCE Minsk Group solution. Ukraine stated that it supports Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, would not provide military assistance to either state, and wanted to avoid an ethnic conflict between its own Armenian and Azerbaijani communities. Iran stated that no military solution to the conflict existed and expressed support for Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, emphasizing the need for a ceasefire and political dialogue and expressing concern over the conflict. Albania stated that it supports territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and called both sides to solve conflict with peaceful negotiations.

Representatives of countries, including Argentina, Canada, Chile, China, Croatia, Estonia, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, the United States, Uruguay, and the Holy See, have called for a peaceful resolution to the conflict. Afghanistan called for an end to Armenian occupation in Nagorno-Karabakh while calling for a cease-fire, urging the parties involved to resolve the long-standing crisis peacefully. Bosniak member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina Šefik Džaferović and the leader of the Party of Democratic Action, Bakir Izetbegović, voiced support for Azerbaijan, condemning Armenia and comparing the situation with the 1992-1995 Bosnian War. Cyprus condemned Azerbaijan for breaching the ceasefire and for any escalating actions, calling for a return to peaceful negotiations.

The unrecognized or partially recognized countries of Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia recognize the independence of the Republic of Artsakh and have expressed support for it.

Minorities abroad

Armenians

Pro-Armenian protest in the United States, 10 October 2020.

Ethnic Armenian population around the world have lobbied for peace negotiations. On 1 October, the South Ossetian Armenian community condemned Azerbaijan's actions for attacking Artsakh's cities with Turkey's support and urged recognition of Artsakh's independence. The next day, Armenians in Samtskhe–Javakheti, in Georgia, expressed concern and their intention to send aid. Subsequently, Georgia closed its border with Armenia, indicating frustration within Georgia's Armenian minority. Croatia's Armenian diaspora's leader asked for support against what she described as a genocide against the Armenians. On 5 October, Armenian Americans protested outside the Los Angeles (LA) CNN building, calling for more accurate coverage. On 11 October, the LA community held a 100,000-person strong protest march to the Turkish Consulate, in tandem with smaller protests in Washington, San Francisco, New York City, Boston and elsewhere in the United States. LA's mayor expressed support for Armenia and the city's Armenian community by lighting up City Hall with the Armenian flag's colours. A protest was held in Orange Country during President Trump's pre-election rally calling on him to sanction Turkey and Azerbaijan; Trump praised them by saying, "the people from Armenia have great spirit for their country". Protests have occurred all over Europe demanding recognition of Artsakh's independence, with the largest rallies held in Paris, France and in front the Council of the European Union in Brussels, Belgium. Armenian communities have also protested globally, notably in Argentina, Australia, Canada, and Uruguay.

Azerbaijanis

Turks and Azerbaijanis demonstrating in support of Azerbaijan in Turkey.

On 1 October, Ali Khamenei's representatives in four provinces (Ardabil, East Azerbaijan, West Azerbaijan and Zanjan) stated that Nagorno-Karabakh belonged to Azerbaijan, that there was a need to return the territory, and that Azerbaijan's government had acted in accordance with the law. The next day, several protests erupted in Iranian cities, including the capital Tehran and Tabriz, in support of Azerbaijan. Iranian Azerbaijani demonstrators chanted pro-Azerbaijan slogans. The local security forces intervened, detaining at least 38 people. The same day, around 50 Azerbaijani representatives from the 5,000-strong community in Moldova expressed their support for Azerbaijan in the capital Chișinău. On 3 October, Azerbaijanis in Georgia indicated a readiness to fight for Azerbaijan and the desire that Azerbaijan retake Nagorno-Karabakh. On 16 October, Azerbaijanis, Iranian Azerbaijanis, and Turks living in the United Kingdom gathered in front of Amnesty International's London headquarters and held a protest rally, condemning the shelling of residential areas and civilians in Ganja, Mingachevir, Tartar, and other regions. The next day, Azerbaijani Americans held a rally in Chicago, condemning the missile attacks on Ganja. The following day, British Azerbaijanis commemorated those killed during the attacks in front of the Azerbaijani embassy in London. while Georgian Azerbaijanis held a rally in front the Parliament Building in Tbilisi. On the same day, Russian Azerbaijanis dedicated part of the entrance door of Azerbaijan's embassy to Russia in Moscow to the memory of the victims of the 17 October attack. Protests erupted in Tabriz, with many Iranian Azerbaijanis chanting pro-Azerbaijani slogans and protesting Iran's alleged arms support to Armenia via the Nordooz border crossing. Iranian security forces intervened, detaining over 200 people.

Sports

Due to the conflict, UEFA announced that the 2020–21 UEFA Nations League C home matches of Armenia and Azerbaijan would no longer be hosted in the countries; instead Armenia will play their designated "home" game in Tychy, Poland; while Azerbaijan will play in Elbasan, Albania.

See also

• 2014 Armenian–Azerbaijani clashes

External links

• Media related to 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war at Wikimedia Commons
• Watch: Azerbaijan and Armenia leaders speak exclusively to Euronews