Chinese Indonesians

Chinese Indonesian
印度尼西亞華人
印度尼西亚华人
Yìndùníxīyà Huárén

Regions with significant populations
Jakarta (460,000), West Kalimantan (352,900), East Java (191,000), Riau (176,900), Central Java (165,500), West Java (163,300), Bangka-Belitung (103,700), Banten (90,000)
Languages
Indonesian, Mandarin, Hakka, Min Nan (Hokkien, Teochew), Hsinghua, Cantonese, and other local and Chinese dialects
Religion
Predominantly Buddhism, Confucianism with Taoism. Minority Christianity and Islam.
Related ethnic groups
Overseas Chinese

Chinese Indonesians (simplified Chinese: 印度尼西亚华人; traditional Chinese: 印度尼西亞華人; pinyin: Yìndùníxīyà Huárén, Hakka: Thong ngin, Min: Teng lang, Indonesian: Tionghoa Indonesia, or Cina) are ethnically Chinese people living in Indonesia, as a result of overseas Chinese migration.

Chinese Indonesian people are diverse in their origins, timing and circumstances of immigration to Indonesia, and level of ties to China. Many trace their origins to the southern parts of China, such as Fujian, Guangdong and Hainan provinces.

Broadly speaking, there were three waves of immigration of ethnic Chinese to Southeast Asia in general and Indonesia in particular. The first wave was spurred by trading activities dating back to the time of Zheng He's voyage in the early 15th century, the second wave around the time of the Opium War, and the third wave around the first half of the 20th century.

Chinese Indonesians whose ancestors immigrated in the first and second waves, and have thus become creolised or huan-na (in Hokkien) by marriage and assimilation, are called mainly amongst themselves Peranakan Chinese The more recent Chinese immigrants and those who are still culturally Chinese are called Cina Totok.

Most Chinese who migrated to Indonesia came as traders or labourers. Colonial policies made it difficult for Chinese to acquire land, and the only region with a significant Chinese farmer population was West Kalimantan. The largest populations of Chinese Indonesians today are in the cities of [[Jakarta, Surabaya, Medan, Pekan Baru, Semarang, Pontianak, Makassar, Palembang,Bangka, Belitung and Bandung.

History

Pre-colonial interaction

There was little direct Chinese involvement in what is now Indonesia before the fifteenth century. Trade to that point between China and the Indonesian archipelago was in the hands of Indonesians, rather than Chinese. The standard word for a Chinese trading vessel, junk, is derived from the Javanese word jong, which described large teak vessels that trekked north from Southeast Asia to southern China. Chinese sources, however, are useful external sources of information on early Indonesia, including the records of some emissaries such as Fa Hien, a Buddhist monk who passed the region in the fifth century CE on his way to India. Some smaller kingdoms of Indonesia, notably some early pre-Sriwijaya Sumateran and China had some trade-based relationships that thrived during the Tang dynasty.

Though most of the present Chinese Indonesians are not Muslims and of Han ancestry, some of the earliest Islamic evangelists in Java of the Javanese-Sundanese Islamic origin-myth (Wali Songo, or the Nine Ambassadors) are claimed to be of Chinese ancestry, specifically the Hui. According to controversial claims by author Slamet Mulyadi, at least four of those nine were Chinese or of Chinese descent: Sunan Ampel, Sunan Bonang (son of Ampel and a Chinese woman), Sunan Kalijaga, and Sunan Gunungjati. <This shouldn't actually be ironic since those Islamic evangelists are actually Hui Chinese, a Chinese ethnic group who is Islamic. In contrast, most of the present Chinese Indonesians are mainly not Hui Chinese. Rather, they are mostly Han Chinese, another Chinese ethnic group which is the majority ethnic group in mainland China, coming from Fujian, Guangdong, etc.> There is a theory that Chinese traders were among the first to bring Islam to Indonesia, including those who came to Semarang under the leadership of Admiral Zheng He, or Sam Po Kong, in the fifteenth century as Zheng He himself was a Muslim from the Hui minority ethnic group in China, though he was aHanafi, not a Sufi Sunni as Javanese were. The mainstream discourse and archeological evidence proves the documented and oral accounts of Indian, perhaps also Persian and Arabs among them, Gujarati traders and merchants, long familiar with Java, introduced Sufism there and to the Malaysian Peninsula, as discussed below.

Mulyadi's and others' "hagiography of "Zheng He Islamic Origin tale" is a rather sophistic argument is flaed, primarily as it does not correlate with historical document nor archeological evidence and secondly weighs heavily on the long-disproven "Wali Songo (nine Saints)" origin myth as a factual account of events. Archeological data, documentation, and Islamic correspondence and prove the well-known public-knoweldge narrative of Islam arriving from Gujarat traders who were Arab, Indian and Persian- the earliest Muslim grave in Java dates from 1297m, and in the Majapahit burial plot within Trowulan graves of the highest strata of nobility are Muslim, dating from around 1368-90 (predating Zheng He in the Demak area by at least 100 years)

Since the voyages of Zheng He, Chinese considered the unknown region as an attractive trading partner. Indonesia had many exotic consumable goods China and Chinese enjoyed, notably: pepper, cardamom, cinnamon, slaves, camphor wood (prized for wardrobes and chests as it is a natural insect (moth) repellent), sandal wood, agar wood, various essential oils, pearls, gemstones, tin, teak (prized for ship-building as it resists marine parasites) and many other desired goods too numerous too list here, wqhich were traded or bartered mainly for Chinese silks, cotton, crockery, ceramics ad very probably rugs and other furnishings those with means would enjoy.

Dutch colonial era

Favored position under the Dutch

The largest waves of Chinese migration happened during early to middle Dutch colonial era (sixteenth to nineteenth centuries) seeking to find new opportunities of trade.

Race relations between the Chinese Indonesians and native Indonesians (pribumi) have always been problematic, and remain so up to the present. Some commentators trace this to the Dutch era when colonial policy favored the ethnic Chinese, and in so doing established their economic dominance over the region. For example, there were restaurants which would admit Chinese and Dutch, but not native Indonesians

The caste system established by the Dutch also made it disadvantageous for ethnic Chinese to assimilate into the native population. Assimilation would mean being placed in the lowest estate together with the natives. Ethnic Chinese, together with Arabs and other "foreign orientals" were members of the second estate, who shared the same status and protection of property under law as the Dutch. The first estate was reserved for Europeans.

As such, the Dutch were among the early practitioners of a classic colonial strategy practiced in many other times and places by displacing and destroying native systems of authority through favoring specific ethnic or religious minorities. They become props of colonial rule and a buffer between itself and the majority indigenous population. (France and Britain would eventually use the local Christian and Jewish communities in the Arab world in the same way.)

Having the favor of the Dutch and being considered by "intelligent, diligent, and capable of overseeing Dutch plantations", most ethnic Chinese supported colonial rule. Indeed, in the early years of the Dutch East Indies, the ethnic Chinese actively strengthened Dutch domination in the region. Souw Beng Kong, the Kapitan Cina ("Captain of the Chinese") of Banten, for example, organized a large-scale immigration of bonded-labour Chinese under his rule to Batavia in the seventeenth century. This significantly destabilized the regional economy and facilitated Dutch conquest of the Sultanate of Banten.

As a reward, Souw was made the first Kapitein der Chinezen of Batavia in 1619. His successors and later, the Majoors der Chinezen, were given landed fiefdoms and the Dutch-invented hereditary title of Sia by the colonial government.

Among them, these self-anointed aristocratic Peranakan families controlled a great deal of Java's land and wealth, confiscated by the Dutch from the native (pribumi) aristocracy. Through the officership system they governed the Peranakan and ethnic Chinese populations of Batavia. The system was later extended to other centers of Dutch power in Java and the rest of the archipelago. Deprived of land, the aristocracy was lacked the economic resources (income via agricultural, livestock and timber products, alluvial and subterranean mineral resources, most particularly gold and gemstones) vital to fund their kingdoms, princedoms and dukedoms. Essentially bankrupted by theft of their land and forced transition to Chinese ownership, the aristocracy was hamstrung to raise military force against the usurpers.

Both the Dutch and the Chinese participated in the trade of thousands of Javanese slaves. The Chinese controlled the Asian slave trade from the end of the eighteenth-century

Massacre of 1740

In their position, the Chinese often did not receive friendly attitudes from the Dutch. In the early decades of the eighteenth century, tensions began to build. In some ways, it resulted from the fact that having settled in and around Batavia ever since its foundation, the Chinese had come to be a major element in its economic life.

Chinese workers were greatly involved in building Batavia and cultivating the adjacent agricultural areas. The Dutch East India Company (VOC) became increasingly dependent on the Chinese traders, who were arriving in growing numbers, for access to Java's more populous interior, and thus the Chinese became the compradore- the middleman.

Dutch and Chinese needed each othe, however soon Dutch colonists came to increasingly resent the situation of the Chinese being their effective social equals and economic rivals. The Chinese traders, like the Dutch ones, were tax-payers - which was an economic burden but also conferred considerable privileges (a phenomenon comparable to the later resentment of French settlers in Algeria to local Christians and Jews being legally their equals).

What set off a cataclysm of hatred and bloodshed was not only cliquish Chinese trading but the other major branch of their economic activity on Java: agricultural work carried out by poor Chinese coolies who were imported and employed by rich Chinese entrepreneurs. Such coolies were, for example, the dominant part of the labor force employed in the sugar plantations at the Ommelanden of Batavia, a major field of economic activity.

The importation of ever more coolies caused an enormous increase in the Chinese population in the VOC-ruled area of Batavia and its environs, and they came to constitute nearly half of the total population just before 1740. Already in 1690, the colonial authorities had imposed severe limitations on further immigration from China. This did not have, however, the effect of stopping the importation of more coolies. Rather, Chinese bondsman continued to illegally import Chinese coolles through the payment of bribes to the authorities, or through landing their coolies beyond official ports and were all the more dependent on their employers (usually Chinese themselves) and susceptible to lucrative exploitation.

From about 1720 the sugar market went through a deepening crisis, with the markets in Europe becoming saturated, and the plantations of Java facing sharp competition from cheaper Brazilian sugar. Many of the sugar planters went bankrupt, and the authorities took no step to alleviate the situation of the workers thrown out of their jobs - with the result being bands of unemployed, hungry and desperate coolies turning to brigandage.

Belatedly, at July, 1740 the colonial authorities, c.q. Adriaan Valckenier and Gustaaf Willem van Imhoff decreed that all the coolies of the Ommelanden were to be transferred to Dutch-run plantations at Galle in Southern Ceylon. That might or might not have been the true intention, but rumors rife among the coolies were that the Dutch actually intended to throw them overboard once out of sight of the shore. Instead of boarding the ships, the coolies burst into an all-out revolt, with roaming bands robbing and killing in the countryside and some even attempting to attack Batavia itself.

There is no evidence that the better off Chinese living inside the walled area of Batavia, some five thousand in number, were planning to join the rebellious coolies outside. However, many of the Dutch had good information through their Chinese spies there was definitely secret communication between the two parties, enough to arouse extreme suspicion. On October 9, 1740, the order was issued to search the houses of all the Chinese residents in Batavia. The Chinese rebelled, and the situation rapidly deteriorated into a three-day long massacre - with Chinese being massacred in their homes, and earlier captured Chinese being killed out of hand in prisons and hospitals.

A preacher fanned the flames from the pulpit, declaring that the killing of Chinese was "God's Will", and the colonial government itself reportedly posted a bounty for decapitated Chinese heads. The number of victims in these three days is variously estimated at between five thousand and ten thousand. The name Kali Angke (Chinese: 紅溪; literally, "Red River") is said to date from that time, recalling the blood flowing into the river.

Afterwards, the "restoration of order" was proclaimed, with surviving Chinese henceforth ghettoized in specific quarters of Batavia and other Dutch-ruled cities. The Chinese area of Batavia was designated Glodok, where many Chinese still live in present-day Jakarta.

Following the massacre, the Dutch Governor-General Adriaan Valckenier was arrested and required to account for himself to the Heeren XVII ("Seventeen Lords", the VOC directors in Amsterdam). He died in prison, however, and all charges against him were declared "annulled by death".

The affair continued to crop up in later periods, especially in times of tension.

Cultuur Stelslel and Increased Immigration

Even such bloody events did not put an end to the continued Chinese emigration to the Indies, where economic opportunities not available in China itself outweighed the dangers of discrimination or persecution.

Earlier Chinese immigrants had much closer ties toward mainland China. This was manifested in their strong desire to return home and consideration of the Indies as yet another temporary settlement.

Attitudes started changing from the middle eighteenth century when the Qing emperor of the time, Qian Long, considered these expatriates to be "turncoats" and thereby a threat to China. Still, while Emperor Qian Long adopted a general "closed-door policy", there was no evidence that Chinese expatriates were banned from returning to their original homeland.

Many of them, however, found the Indies an increasingly attractive abode. The hostile and oppressive Manchu government of the Qing dynasty brought even more migrants from China. Lured by more comfortable lives, these economically motivated immigrants no longer associated themselves with mainland China. The termed themselvesCina Babas or Peranakans. Some Cina Babas intermarried with indigenous Indonesian (pribumis), often the slave-girl of a coolie.

Most, however, identified themselves as Dutchmen, embraced Christianity, generally enjoyed higher education and social status, and mimicking Western lifestyles considered themselves the more refined. They got to be called Qiao Sheng (literally, "foreign-born"). Beginning in the late Nineteenth Century, most of the Dutch-invented aristocratic "Sia" families underwent rapid westernization. By the early decades of the twentieth century, many of them—especially those domiciled around Batavia—had become "more Dutch than the Dutch themselves". The Sias were consequently some of the strongest proponents of colonial rule.

Those who still maintained ties toward China, whose main belief was Confucianism, or who still maintained "purity" were considered derisively: Cina Totoks. Cina Babas and Qiao Shengs were unfilial and typically shunned Chinese tradition.

These three groups of Chinese Indonesians had starkly different views and tendencies. At the time:

• Qiao Shengs were more inclined toward the Dutch;
• Cina Totoks were more inclined toward mainland China;

and

• Cina Babas were more toward the indigenous population of the Indies.

Cultuur Stelsel was a hugely and economically lucrative but socially disastrous Dutch program the Dutch invented to essentially bail both the VOC and te Netherlands out of war-induced bankruptcy. Summarily Cultuur Stelsel was forced work on plantations growing cash-crops, on lands requisitioned from native rulers and landlords and gifted to pliant Chinese, who would run the plantations and collect taxes down to individual village inhabitant level. Chinese alone were granted the exclusive right to garner taxes, run toll-roads and toll-gates, run pawn-shops, opium dens, gambling dens, inns, public houses and so forth.

The single most lucrative trade product for the Dutch was opium and opium farming. Opium farms could only be operated by government license, auctioned off to the highest bidder and were without exception Chinese. Chinese then installed their family or clan members as part of a vested-interest kongsi for the licenses for running opium dens, or bureaucratic positions of Opium Inspector and other such lucrative business-related activities. Chiense predation on the native soon had even the Dutch repulsed. Groneman's Een Ketjoegeshienis (A Bandit's Tale) was a scathing attack on both the Chiense and the Dutch Opium Farming system written concerning the "harsh exploitation by Europeans and Chinese" of the "refined and reitiring Javanese". In the novel and scores f newspapres hpublished between 1882 and 1890, he underscored the relationship beyween Javanese poverty, the breakdown of stable society as witnessed by the rise in crime, banditry and the "destructive influence of the Chinese in the village". The main character is a Javanese aristocrat with a compulsion to gamble and his two opium addicted wives, and drew from evidently common real-life examples. Groneman's villains were the Chinese opium farm agents, pawn-shop operators and loan sharks weokerers who poisoned village society with opium and drained the rural economy dry. Symbolic of all that was bad about Chinese and their presence was the opium den, "that spiders web of our pernicious ally, who like a gigantic spider lures and traps the poor Javanese, then seizes him, clutches him and binds him an sucks him until he is tortured to death"

Groneman was alarmed at the growth of Java's Chinese population and that a colonial government: "could not continue to permit or encourage for its' own proft such exploiktation and expect the everlasting gratitude of its charges". Groneman viewed the Javanese were no match for the "hard-working, bright, ever-adaptable and highly self-interested Chinese". Gronemman argued if Holland did not act to limit Chinese immigration and more importantly dismantle the institutions that gave the Chinese such substantial influence, then "Java, following a not yet determinable interim, shall become a Chinese colony, in the beginning perhaps still administered by Europeans and manned by Javanese slaves in the service of the Chinese race". This was one of his key recurring articles published in De Locomotief, a Semarang daily newspaper.

The editor Brooshooft was similarly disgusted by the Chinese predation on the native Indonesian. Brooshooft described in great detail the various means Chinese opium farms went about protecting their own interests, including "its' own clandestine trading, the role of the mata-mata [sic: spies] and the Chinese Inspection Committees, the farm subsidy of the native police and priyayi corps, abuses of the police roll and the illegal patungan trade and illegal dens.

Following European outrage when the full enormity of the situation had been exposed the the British and Dutch public (as much the same situation occurred in British Malaya", the Dutch sought to dismantle the Chinese opium monopoly and replace it with the Regie Opium system- which the Chinese resisted with all means possible. Dutch opinion against the Chinese had turned full swing, and now CHiense were seen as an aggressive, self-interested fifth column within the colony, who must be curtailed at all costs. Soon Chinese would require a pass simply to visit from one town to another, so that Dutch could monitor their activities. However, the Chinese in the face of the Regie opium system soon turned to smuggling opium from Malaya and Singapore, as the Regie opium was ten times the market value of Singapore opium, thus beginning the Chinese in Indonesia long running affinity for smuggling.

Changing Dutch policies and decline of the Sia aristocracy

By the 1920s and 1930s, the long standing hold over the economy of the old Sia families, Qiao Sheng par excellence, was systematically destroyed by the very Dutch colonial government they supported . Following Queen Wilhelmina's speech to the Estates General (the Dutch Parliament) in which she insisted that a "moral debt" was owed to the people of the East Indies, the colonial government implemented its so-called "social policy". This was aimed at ending feudalism in Java and breaking up the large estates of the Peranakan pretender aristocracy.

It was the Chinese Sias, more than the native aristocracy, who suffered from this measure. The native aristocracy did not own much land, due to the fact that the Dutch had generations prior forcibly confiscated and split the former Kingdom of Majapahit into four. The Dutch, to remedy the unfavourabale and indeed racist treatment of the natives, initiated a program of civil service employment for suitably pliable upper middle-class semi-aristocratic families, known as priyayi.

Dutch compulsory acquisition of Peranakan fiefdoms destroyed many of the older Chinese landowning families. While some successfully managed to get into business, most former Sias—their title becoming obsolete by the 1940s—were swamped in economic power by Totok Chinese. This latter group remains, even today, the most powerful economic group in Indonesia.

Concomittant with the decline of the feudal-type Sias, Chinese Indonesians underwent a process of modernization and of building up Western-type political and social institutions. Chinese Indonesians built the first of their schools in Surabaya in the 1920s—one of the first non-Western schools in Java—and by the 1960s, many Chinese schools had been established in the major cities. The first Chinese newspapers were also printed during this era, and several Chinese political parties were established. These parties ranged from those who saw themselves as part of the Indonesian nationalist movement, and those who felt that Chinese Indonesians were still Chinese citizens - a question that was left unresolved for many decades.

Nationalism and revolution (1900–1945)

Reflections of Chinese mainland politics

Later waves of migrants still maintained ties to China, mainly by supporting Chinese nationalistic movements to overthrow the Qing dynasty. Although the support was mainly monetary, some Chinese Indonesians were actively involved in the inside politics, especially so during the Sun Yat Sen era. Cina Totoks were particularly active.

Although the Chinese Communists were largely unsupported at first, from the 1930s on the Communists' effort to drive the Japanese occupants out of China gained the support of many Cina Totoks and even some Qiao Shengs. Thus, Indonesian Chinese manifestations of support towards mainland China became divided into two camps, parallel with the civil war sides in China itself: Nationalistic (Kuomintang or Guómín Dǎng) and Communistic (Gòngchǎn Dǎng).

Sympathy for Indonesian nationalism

At the turn of the 20th century, however, Cina Babass were increasingly assimilated into Indonesian culture. Younger generations of Cina Totoks still tried to maintain ties with China.

Although the Dutch had given the Chinese Indonesians a special status, they were becoming increasingly oppressive and discriminative against all Chinese Indonesians. So, all three groups - Qiao Shengs, Cina Babas, and Cina Totoks - were more and more cooperative toward the Indonesian national movement, especially in providing monetary support.

This belated Chinese nationalist sentiment argument is thoroughly disputed as Indonesian Nationalism was from inception inter-twined with a total loathing for the imported Chinese who had so cruelly oppressed the native Javanese through the highly lucrative Dutch taxation on opium farming. In 1909 the Javanese aristocrat Tirtoadisuryo established the Sarekat Dangang Islam precisely and explicitly for the purpose assisting native traders ward off Chinese competition: "as the new movement blossomed into a popular mass movement called Sarekat Islam, Sinophobia took root alongside other powerful feelings in the germination of Indonesian nationalism"

Thus as Indonesian Nationalism, born solely from native roots and incorporated from earliest inception Sinophobia and "Netherlander-phobia" as essential elements of dogma, and that Chinese were striving to retain control of their lucrative opium farms it can be plainly seen as completely counter-intuitive and paradoxical Chinese would support a movement which openly demanded the Chinese be expelled, punished, be stripped of their ill-gotten wealth or all three. Much documentary evidence amply illustrates overwhelming Chinese support for Dutch paramilitary attempts via the Chung Hwa Hui to crush the Independence movement thereby incurring long-standing enmity of the Indonesian native. Ee Hoe Hean Club, Chung Hwa Hui, Kong Diji Hing and Kong Gi were all major anti-SI (Sarekat Indonesia) Movements- which were 100% Chinese funded with solely Chinese membership (such as Tan Kah Kee and Lim Bo Seng) to oppose Native political aspirations Independence and funded Dutch anti-Japanese intelligence movements as well as Force 136 and Special Operations Australia including harbouring elements of the Z Special Unit in both former British Malaya as well as Java itself.

Chinese under Japanese Rule

Pramoedya Ananta Toer stated “With the arrival of the Japanese just about everyone was full of hope, except for those who had worked in the service of the Dutch.” The Chinese would ironically be forced into a similar position to under the Dutch where they would have to pay protection money to the Japanese to spare them from native anger. For instance, the first Indonesian Nationalist group movement- Sarekat Islam (Islamic Union) was established by native Indonesian traders with solely a native (pribumi) constituency to protect native business interest in Surabaya, to specifically contain and hopefully crush unfair Chinese competition and monopolization in the batik and clove industry.

The Dutch colonial political intelligence apparatus, Algemene Recherche own intelligence bulletin Politiek Aktionelle Overzichten (Political Actions Overview) which was funded and printed by wealthy Chinese businessmen, both peranakan and totak(but stilll cina to the native pribumi) under the Chung Hwa Hui established by Chinese to counter both the threat of Japanese business expansion in Java and check nationalist political expression. This 'Algemene Recherche was responsible for the jailing of Sukarno and Hatta in 1924. The Japanese Kenpeitai and the Japanese military intelligence apparatus, Sambobu Tokubetsu Han, later known as Beppan under Motoshige and later Lt Gen Imamura used the apparatus to track the Chinese funders of the Kuomintang, whom the Japanese were fighting in Manchuria, and sentenced such Chinese to death.

Japanese immediately upon conquest removed any and all Chinese and Eurasians from any administrative or bureaucratic office. The Dutch colonial control apparatus was to be completely destroyed- Chinese, Dutch and Eurasian Kapitans and Residentie were unceremoniously expelled, most ending in POW camps. During the military occupancy- under Japan's vision for Indonesia- the oppressed native or and establishment of the native-only bureaucracy and administration of Hokokai Jawa, the ruling Gunseikan explicitly stated in pamphleteer and radio broadcaster the Japanese considered the Chinese as parasites of the gyu sen- the native. Government business licenses won by highest bid, and monpolised for generations by the Chinese, such as pawn-shops, gambling dens, and opium dens were immediately banned.

Of all Japanese youth corps and militias, there was one sole exception to the Japanese rule of native membership only, and strictly limited to some parts of Java alone- the Keibotai which was established to assist police and law & order in local neighborhoods. Its membership reached 12,000, compared to the native-only Keibodan which exceeded 1,280,000. Jawa Boei Giyugun Kanbu Renseitai officer training school was established to school solely Javanese officers of the Heiho. The Heiho, Peta, Seinendan, Hizbollah, Fujinkai, Barisan Pelopor, Masjumi, Pemuda and the Igo Kinmutai were exclusively native by design. Japanese distrusted the Chinese in extreme and did not provide any military training to them.

The native-only PuTeRa armed group was notably hostile to any Chinese inclusion in Nationalist endeavours Outside Java, the Japanese had no use at all for any Chinese and actively encouraged forced reclamation of Chinese ill-gotten businesses in a program of Reklamasi. In Java, many Chinese were expelled as Romusha, those that remained were under constant surveillance by the Daidancho element, who were strictly native, of the Heiho and Gyugan, under orders of the Gunseikan and Beppan.

In 1944, the Japanese forced the Chinese to disgorge their business monopoly to include native Indonesian partners under a system of military command economy, hereby smalelr businesses would be incorporated into guilds known as kuimai. Few Chinese Indonesians were involved in Indonesian politics aside from to bolster their business privileges and monopolies as per their groups Chung Hwa Hui. Cina Totoks typically set up specific Chinese political parties which aimed at an Indonesia-China alliance and established newspapers. Cina Babas and Qiao Shengs typically joined nationalist parties jointly with pribumis. Some of them, serving as officers in the Dutch Army.

On 10 November 1928, the Chinese weekly Sin Po published what is now known as Indonesia Raya, Indonesia's national anthem.

They were also among the pioneers of Indonesian newspapers, although the Javanese langauge Pos Jawa followed by the Sarekat ISlam bulletin of 1912 predated any and all Chinese newspapers. In their fledgling publishing companies, they published their own political ideas along with contributions from other Indonesian writers. In November 1928, the Chinese weekly Sin Po (Chinese: 新報; pinyin: xīn bào) was the first paper to openly publish the text of the national anthem Indonesia Raya. On occasion, those involved in such activities ran a concrete risk of imprisonment, as the Dutch colonial authorities banned nationalistic publications and activities.

Chinese Indonesians were not active in supporting the independence movement during the 1940s Japanese occupation, when the all but the Overseas Chinese Association (Chinese: 華僑中會; pinyin: Huáqiáo Zhōnghuì) were banned by the Japanese military authorities. Some claimed to be notable pro-independence activists were actually Partai Tionghoa Indonesia lawyers and known communist activists Siauw Giok Tjhan and Liem Koen Hian, but sadly he died as a People's Republic of China citizen (Kusuma,2004:27). Also sadly that Yap Tjwan Bing, the sole Chinese member of Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia, who fled a Sukarno purge and in 1960's became a US citizen.

It should be noted that the sole Chinese included in the PPKI Independence Preparation Committee Indonesia was imposed by the Japanese Gunseikan and was highly unpopular among the Masjumi, Pemuda and Kaigun.

Indonesian National Revolution

"BPUPKI" ("Body for Investigating Preparation Attempts of Indonesia's Independence", Badan Penyelidik Usaha-usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia) — had been originally set up under the Japanese and with their backing - but it outlived their rule and had a central role in proclaiming the Indonesian Declaration of Independence at 17 August 1945 - making clear that the return of Dutch colonial rule was unacceptable.

Note: this is patently false. There was only one Chinese, the pharmacist Yap Tjwan Bing who was installed by the Japanese, later was expelled from Indonesia.

During the Indonesian National Revolution, many Chinese Indonesians supported the Independence movement. BPUPKI's membership included six ethnic Chinese members who contributed to the drafting of the Indonesian Constitution in 1945.

Note: this is patently false. The natives only drafted the 1945 Constitution, specifically the Panitia Sembilian: being Sukarno (ketua), Hatta, Achmad Subarjo, Muhammad Yamin, Wachid Hasyim, Abdul Kahar Muzakir, Abikusno Cokrosuyoso, Agus Salim, AA Maramis as well proven by Hatta and Sukarno's own comments and recollections.

There was discussion on the formation of all-Chinese Indonesian units in the Revolution, similar to the formation of the all-Japanese American Nisei units in World War II. This suggestion was ultimately rejected, and the ethnic Chinese were urged instead to join their local pro-Independence groups.

Note: this did not occur and there is no evidence to support this claim. The only Japanese militia to involve Chinese was the unarmed Kebeiton neighborhood watch program in Surabaya, Malang, Boyoali and Surakarta, which totaled membership of less than 12,000.

Due to the lack of such clearly-defined ethnic unit, the precise number of Chinese Indonesians who took part in the Indonesian National Revolution, and their percentage of the Chinese Indonesian community as a whole, remains disputed. It is a sensitive issue due to it sometimes being linked to the post-war status of Chinese Indonesians and their equal status (or lack of one) in the Indonesia created by that war.

In 1946, the Consul General of the Chiang Kai Tek Kuo Min Tang Republic of China, Chiang Chia Tung, expressed in Malang the ROC's support for Indonesia's independence.

Post-independence unrest (1945–1965)

During the 1945–1950 National Revolution to secure independence from the Dutch, few Chinese Indonesians were involved in the Indonesian Republican army. At that time, the economy plummeted and the taxes increased dramatically. Everyday goods, such as soap and cutlery, were rare; much and had been confiscated by the Japanese and Dutch for their own armies. Chinese Indonesians contributed in the smuggling of these goods. However, smuggling became increasingly difficult as the Dutch continued to re-establish their foothold in Indonesia and armed conflicts were inevitable.

Following independence, the Japanese and Dutch companies were deserted. The new government sold the companies at very cheap prices, and Chinese Indonesians quickly assimilated these companies. However, many pribumis sought to curb this effort, and they were successful in accusing Chinese Indonesians of unpatriotic ways during the war (as they were rarely involved in armed conflicts). The fledgling Indonesian government forced many to relinquish acquired properties. This would be the first of many Chinese Indonesian restrictions on personal rights (see list). Political activity was greatly reduced, but not eliminated.

Discrimination worsened as the economy became increasingly dominated by Chinese Indonesians. The pribumi decried the government's lackluster effort to provide a level playing field and sought even more aggressive predicaments. This further escalated the tension of the already uneasy relationship between pribumis and Chinese Indonesian, as pribumis always considered Chinese Indonesians as the agents of the colonials. The tendency of Chinese Indonesians to flock together in Pecinaan or Chinatowns, segregated from the pribumis, exacerbated the situation.

In 1959, responding to rural native pressure the Ministry of Trade revoked all licenses held by Aliens. Failure of alien Chinese (Chinese nationals- in other words, Chinese who refused to surrender Chinese citizenship for Indonesian) to obey the regulation lead to Decree December 1959 empowering regional military commanders to forcibly remove Chinese from the places of residency for claimed "security reasons". On August 17, 1959 Sukarno gave a Manipoli speech arguing for revival of social justice and the "re-tooling" of Indonesia from the "vulture capitalists of our own nation" and "foreign non-Dutch capital which illegally gives support to contra-revolution, or carries out acts of economic sabotage", explicitly outlining Chinese in his designs. The 1959 order to West Java Military Command Area commander Kokasih gave Kokasih srtonger powers to forcibly evict unco-operative Chinese.

Although the Chinese government had ratified the Dual Nationality Treaty of 1955, the document was not a valid instrument as the Indonesian had not ratified it by 1959. The treaty was highly controversial at the time as native capitalists from 1956 demanding increasing controls against the alien Chinese traders and did not want a treaty which would create legal obstruction to weaken the position of alien competitors (Chinese).

The 1959 decree against alien run businesses in rural Indonesia was the first step to scrapping the hated 1955 Dual Nationality Decree. Commencing 1959, the Army began moves to investigate the Chinese involvement in the China-funded Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI). China threatened to punish Indonesia's Military Decree 1959 by calling on Singapore's communist block dock workers to boycott Indonesian goods. Following Kokasih's forced relocation of Chinese from rural villages, the Chinese embassy began a deliberate obstructive campaign, the Chinese embassy went so far as to distribute printed instructions (in Chinese) encouraging Chinese to disobey Indonesian law until Peking could "solve the problem". A copy fell into military hands, was immediately translated and published by a national paper, causing mass outrage. This was followed by Kokasih's sponsored 1959 decree which banned any Chinese embassy official from Central Java.

Even greater hostility arose between the natives an Chinese as natives were esepcially wary of Chin's historical dumping of low-cost goods via Singapore and Hong Kong onto the Indonesian market, thus ruining Indonesian native businesses and this renewed increasingly aggressive maneuvering to gain a Chinese economic advantage.

On 10 December 1959, Beijing launched a program asking all Chinese to return home "mother China's warm bosom". As mainly older Chinese left, inflation struck Indonesia. The Chinese, in near total monopolistic control of the consumer economy, began to hoard scarce consumer goods and trade their local currency on the black market for foreign exchange in Singapore and Hong Kong, (eerily reminiscent of 1998). A steep rise in local goods was the immediate effect and harmed the native Indonesians far more severely than the Chinese, who were comparatively wealthier and thus easily absorb cost rises.

The Indonesian government fearing capital flight imposed a regulation that stated Chinese could not leave with more than USD $30 foreign exchange and the clothing or goods they carry themselves.

The Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission vice-Chairman Fang Fang then effectively poured petrol on the embers, and provocatively claimed the anti-Chinese movement in Indonesia was cold war strategy by US Imperialists manipulating a "handful of bourgeoisie elements (explicitly implying the army)" to "undermine the patriotic democratic forces in their own nation". Fang-Fang's comments immediately incensed the military and the Islamic Asmjumi and thus the military stepped up the campaign to expel Chinese nationals.

In 1964 the Bank of China offered to had over all assets to Sukarno. It was widely believed the Bank of China lent money to Chinese businessmen on the provision they contribute money to PKI. This amounted to over 15 million dollars per annum, a huge sum at the time. During 1965, the PKI became increasingly vocal in calling for the resignation of "Bureaucratic capitalists"- a thinly disguised attack on the Officer corps. In P'eng Chen's speech where he outlined PKI's "resolute struggle" against the "seven devils in rural areas" and "feudalism, compradore capitalism and bureaucratic capitalism" was the rag to the bull- this speech now aligned Chinese and Chinese nationals to the PKI and PKI opposition and conflict to the Army (ABRI at the time). The PKI was seen as strongly pro-Chinese as the CCP had endorsed Aidit's revisionist strategy and sent notes of congratulation.

Following the abortive Gstapu communist coup, endorsed by China and Bulgaria, the PKI attempted Maoist armed resistance in the countryside, in 1966. The BArI had good intelligence Chinese were sheltering wanted PKI terrorists. On October 16 the military surrounded and searched the Chinese Commercial Consul office and the Indonesian Foreign Ministry under Minister Subiando lodged a formal complaint that Chinese Embassy had refused to fly its flag at half mast for the killed generals of the Gestapu coup attempt. In 1966 the CCP later endorsed the PKI's assessment of a revolutionary Maoist action. Thus the Chinese government had effectively declared support for guerrilla war against the ABRI.

In 1959, President Soekarno approved PP 10/1959, a directive that forced Chinese Indonesians to close their businesses in rural areas and relocate to urban areas. The C In protest, many Cina Totoks returned to either mainland China, Hong Kong, or Taiwan, only to find that they were not welcomed there either. Ironically, they were not regarded as "pure Chinese", regardless of their effort of maintaining a "pure Chinese breed". The unfortunate news of the early migrants was widespread among the Chinese Indonesians. They soon found themselves as neither Indonesian nor Chinese. Some decided to move to some other places, like Singapore or Malaysia.

Group divisions among Cina Babas, Qiao Shengs, and Cina Totoks were blurred because Soeharto treated them alike. They were all forced to change their names to Indonesian sounding ones.

As more and more discrimination and enmity accumulated, Chinese Indonesians increasingly identified themselves as a separate group and did not like to be referred to as "Indonesians". Although younger generations did not as strictly follow traditions as the older ones did, they still felt they were different from Indonesians. Chua noes the Chinese were "disliked, unwanted and grudgingly accepted as necessary".

During this era, younger generations adopted western culture more and more as they perceived it as being more superior. They were more aligned toward western countries such as the United States or the United Kingdom. The westernization became popular as many parents sent their children abroad to western countries.

The Jakarta riot of 1998 targeted many Chinese Indonesians. The riot itself drew condemnations from Chinese speaking countries. Suharto was allegedly the mastermind of this riot, but it misfired. Suffering from lootings and arsons, many Chinese Indonesians fled from Indonesia. Ironically, they found western countries were more accepting than Indonesia, their country of birth. Even after the riot subsided, many of them did not want to return.

Those who decided to stay in Indonesia found relief when Suharto stepped down as president. They hoped that the new president would restore their status and end the enmity of centuries long.

Early in the reformation era, the government focused on stabilizing the economy and security. Discrimination was still rampant. However, Chinese Indonesians gained courage to express themselves in limited ways, which were otherwise impossible in the Soeharto era for fear of his heavy-handed tactics. Unfortunately, there were still many officers loyal to Soeharto who enforced the discriminatory laws. It was not for the sake of ideology, but rather for their own benefits.

Assimilation into the New Order (1965–1998)

In the 1960s, many government regulations, such as PP 10/1959, restricted Chinese Indonesians from the rural areas and forced many to relocate to big cities.

President Suharto became a strong advocate for Chinese assimilation rather than integration. As part of 1967's 'Basic Policy for the Solution of the Chinese Problem' and other measures, all but one Chinese-language papers were closed, all Chinese religious expressions had to be confined to their homes, Chinese-language schools were phased out, Chinese script in public places was banned, and Chinese were encouraged to take on Indonesian-sounding names. Most of this legislation were revoked following Suharto's resignation in 1998.

The Suharto era Domestic Investment law was specifically reanimate Chinese domestic capital as only Chinese businesses had the required financial resources and thus were- even as aliens eligible for subsidized credits. Thus Chinese were given security to invest in Indonesia, while benefits as stipulated by he Law were out of reach for pribumi businessmen. Bambang Subiyanto notes:

the most important event fostering the CHinese was the special credit scheme masterminded by Suharto through which state banks willingly gave Chinese businessmen highly subsidized special credits below the market rate to be usd ofor huge investments"

Chua details at length the shady business practices esepcially of massive bribes the Chinese paid under the Suharto New order government and hence Chinese alleged vaunted business skills, actually were the result of Suharto protectionism: favoured businesses were artificially protected from import, government departments and businesses issued contracts without bidding, state banks gave chap loans at highly subsidized rates with very generous repayment option, close Chinese cronies gained the opportunity to extract gold or timber, government bestowed permits to take over land, cronies were designated as obligatory partner in foreign joint-venture When dealing with state enterprises they were able to purchase inputs at artificially low prices, benefited from extra low taxes or tax holidays. Thus the Chinese were wholly implicated of their own free accord in the KKNP- korupsi, kolusi, nepotisme the new kongsi the Chinese cukong

Political pressures in the 1970s and 1980s restricted the role of the Chinese Indonesian in politics, academics, and the military. As a result, they were thereafter constrained professionally to becoming entrepreneurs and professional managers in trade, manufacturing, and banking. In the 1970s, following the failed alleged Communist coup attempt in 1965, there was a strong sentiment against the Chinese Indonesians, who were accused of being Communist collaborators.

Most Chinese Indonesians are not Muslim, further generating negative sentiments from the mostly Muslim natives.

Various government policies banned Chinese language teaching, speaking, and publication. Established schools and colleges run by Chinese Indonesian foundations were nationalized and their facilities seized without compensation. They were converted to state or pribumi-run schools such as Universitas Res Publica, which became Universitas Trisakti.. Those Chinese Indonesians who could not stand the discrimination fled. The Totoks returned to mainland China—only to be consequently trapped in the Cultural Revolution — and the Peranakans, to the old masters' country, the Netherlands.

In 1998, preceding the fall of Suharto's 32-year presidency, large riots targeted the Chinese Indonesians in another series of pogroms. Chinese homes were looted and burned, and many Chinese people were raped or killed. The events in 1998 were significant because unlike earlier pogroms against Chinese Indonesians, due to the Internet, this incident spread worldwide in real-time, and aroused the interest and feelings of the ethnic Chinese around the world,leading to demonstrations against Indonesia in many countries with significant Chinese populations and protests to the government of Indonesia. After the tragedy, a large number of Chinese Indonesians fled to other countries, such as the USA, Australia, Singapore, and the Netherlands.

A Chua has concluded that market dominant minorities (in this case Chinese) "do not really want democracy due to its potential to be inimical to their interests and to cause ethnic hatred"

Because of discrimination and mass unpopularity, most Chinese Indonesians were not politically active and could not lobby for legislation to protect their own interests, despite their economic affluence. The situation is different in neighboring Malaysia where the overseas Chinese have been both politically and economically active despite being a minority in a similar environment — better off economically in a Muslim majority country (though they are minority only by a small margin).

According to Amien Rais:

We must respect the economic achievements of our Chinese brothers... but at the same time we must tell them frankly we would like a fairer distribution of the national wealth. I can say that 95% or more of Chinese love Indoneisa- only a small percentage are absorbed with economic greediness. They had become parasites.

According to Anthony Salim the Chinese are: "in very good shape, contrary to what people say", and stressed how important it was to be identified as a Chinese for business deals within ASEAN, as CHinese prefer to business amongst their own ethnicity.

Despite laws and public opinion against the Chinese Indonesians, many have succeeded in fields other than business, most notably in the sport of badminton, the most popular competitive sport in Indonesia. Indonesian athletes dominated the sport from the 1960s to the 1990s. Many of the beloved players and coaches are Chinese Indonesians, such as Tan Joe Hok, Rudy Hartono, Christian Hadinata, Tjun Tjun, Johan Wahjudi, Ade Chandra, Liem Swie King, Ivana Lie, Verawaty, Susi Susanti, Alan Budikusuma, Ardy Wiranata, and Heryanto Arbi.

BJ Habibie is unconvinced of any Chinese importance to Indonesia, noting German and American businesses are far more capable, more experienced, adaptive and have far greater capital. Famously he stated, "If the Chinese community doesn't come back...do you really think we will then die? Their place will be taken over by others".

Reformasi and beyond (1998–present)

File:Mega-Hasyim-CH.jpg

For decades, the use of Chinese characters was banned in Indonesia. But in 2004, even presidential candidates, such as Megawati Sukarnoputri and Hasyim Muzadi, used them in their campaign posters for the presidential election.

After Abdurrahman Wahid was elected president in 1999, he quickly abolished some of the discriminatory laws in efforts to improve race relationships. Wahid released Presidential Decree 6 of 2000—which repealed Presidential Instruction 14 of 1967 on Chinese Religion, Beliefs, and Traditions—and allowed Chinese religion and traditions be practiced freely without the need of a permit. Two years later, President Megawati Sukarnoputri declared that Chinese New Year (known as Imlek in Indonesia) would be marked as a national holiday beginning in 2003.

The teaching of Chinese language was once again permitted following a presidential instruction by B. J. Habibie in 1998. Furthermore, it removed the requirement for ethnic Chinese to produce certificates of citizenship when registering for school or making official applications. Following the removal of the 1978 ban on public display of Chinese characters in 2001, demand for Chinese-language courses increased. To meet the demand, China has sent language instructors who would be teaching at several provinces and universities.

Chinese Indonesians also reentered the political scene. Economist Kwik Kian Gie was appointed Coordinating Minister of Economics under the Wahid administration and State Minister of National Development Planning under the Sukarnoputri administration. In 2004 Yudhoyono administration appointed Mari Elka Pangestu as the Minister of Trade of Indonesia. She is the first female Indonesian Chinese to hold a cabinet position in Indonesia. Although political parties such as the Chinese Indonesian Reform Party (Partai Reformasi Tionghoa Indonesia) and the Indonesian Bhinneka Tunggal Ika Party (Partai Bhinneka Tunggal Ika Indonesia) failed to garner much support in the 1999 and 2004 elections, there have been numerous candidates of Chinese descent for political offices. Between 1999 and 2004, the number of candidates standing in national election increased from fewer than 50 to almost 150, and several candidates have won offices in local elections in recent years. Of the 58 candidates of Chinese descent who ran for office in the 2009 legislative election as representatives from Jakarta, two won seats in People's Representative Council.

Chinese languages were banned from 1965 to 1994 in Indonesian television, but its use did not come until years later. In November 2000, Metro TV would become the first to broadcast news in Mandarin to local television stations since broadcasting began in Indonesia. Radio Cakrawala in Jakarta also added music and news programming in Mandarin at the same time. The station had previously played Mandarin pop songs that were rerecorded with Indonesian lyrics.

According to Citizenship Law 12 of 2006, the distinction between Indonesian natives (pribumi) and non-natives were abolished, and only the distinction between Indonesian nationals (Warga Negara Indonesia, WNI) and foreign national (Warga Negara Asing, WNA) remained. During Chinese New Year celebrations in 2007, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono reaffirmed his commitment to replacing the term Cina with Tionghoa (Chinese: 中華; pinyin: Zhōnghuá) for peoples of Chinese descent and Tiongkok (Chinese: 中國; pinyin: Zhōngguó) to describe the People's Republic of China in order to avoid the term's negative connotations. The changes were also reflected on articles published by the newspaper Suara Pembaruan.

Geographic distribution

Origins

Most Chinese Indonesians originate from what are now Guangdong and Fujian provinces and are usually categorized into four dialect groups. However, several variations of the dialects existed within each group.

Most Chinese Indonesians are descended from Chinese ethnic groups, originally from the south-eastern part of China. These ethnic groups include:

• Hakka
• Hainanese
• Hokkien (Min Nan speakers)
• Cantonese
• Hokchia
• Teochew

Ethnic concentrations

• Peranakan - Jakarta, Java, Makassar
• Hakka - Aceh, North Sumatra, Batam, South Sumatra, Bangka-Belitung, Lampung, Java, West Kalimantan, South Sulawesi, Ambon and Jayapura.
• Hainan - Riau (Pekanbaru and Batam), and Manado.
• Hokkien - North Sumatra, Bagansiapiapi, Pekanbaru, Padang, Jambi, South Sumatra, Bengkulu, Java, Bali (especially in Denpasar and Singaraja), Banjarmasin, Kutai, Sumbawa, Manggarai, Kupang, Makassar, Kendari, Central Sulawesi, Manado, and Ambon.
• Cantonese - Jakarta, Makassar and Manado.
• Hokchia - Java (especially in Bandung, Cirebon, and Surabaya), Banjarmasin
• Teochew - North Sumatra, Riau, South Sumatra, and West Kalimantan (especially in Pontianak and Ketapang).

Emigration

Many Chinese Indonesian families left the country after the Jakarta riots of May 1998.

Those who arrived in the United States applied for political asylum, some of which were denied by U.S. immigration judges after several years in the application process. Two cases eventually reached the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. In the 2004 case Sael v. Ashcroft, the court found the couple Taty Sael and Orville Wright Manariangkuba eligible for political asylum after citing the existence of anti-Chinese violence and of laws that prohibit Chinese schools and institution. The following year, the court granted Marjorie Lolong eligibility for asylum after finding that she is "a member of [women and Christian] sub-groups that are at a substantially greater risk of persecution than the [ethnic Chinese] group as a whole". The immigration judge cancelled Lolong's removal order; however, the Board of Immigration Appeals later overturned it. In a second appeal, the court made an en banc statement that it understood the "decision to preclude a general grant of asylum to Indonesian Chinese Christians" because Lolong had not proven that the Indonesian government was "unable or unwilling to control the groups responsible for the violence". The court upheld the board's decision and reversed its findings in the original case.

Culture

Society

The economic activities and wealth of the Chinese community in Indonesia is very diverse; many are labourers and small-scale merchants, and others are businessmen. Most are identified as ethnic Chinese in official documents, but many are not, for a variety of reasons. In many parts of Indonesia, however, they are represented among the wealthier classes out of proportion with their small numbers.

According to a survey of corporations listed on the Jakarta Stock Exchange, the Chinese Indonesian community was thought to own or operate a large fraction of major Indonesian corporations. This is a result of a long government restriction for Chinese Indonesians from going into academia, public service, and other governmental occupations.

Some, however, believe that this overestimates the influence of Chinese Indonesians on the economy: for example, despite being considered to be under control of Chinese Indonesians in research, the Salim Group is actually controlled by Liem Sioe Liong, two pribumi relatives of then President Suharto, and Ibrahim Risaid, an Acehnese associate of one of Suharto's cousins.

Such simplifications fuel the stereotype that Chinese Indonesian people are extremely wealthy, a common perception in Indonesian society. In part, as a result of this perceived dominance of the economy, the Chinese Indonesian community has frequently been viewed with suspicion by indigenous (Pribumi) Indonesians.

Language

Some of the ethnic Chinese also speak Mandarin and other Chinese dialects. In Medan, on Sumatra Island, many Chinese speak Hokkien. In Kalimantan, the Chinese ethnic community speak Teochew in Pontianak and Hakka (Khe) in Singkawang.

However, the presence of the Chinese language in Indonesia deserves special note. Unlike other local/ethnic languages ("bahasa daerah"), the use of Chinese was prohibited following the Overthrow of Sukarno . As a result, schools did not offer Chinese language courses. The political, legal, and social stigma associated with Chinese language usage and the difficulty of finding Chinese language materials eventually resulted in most of the younger Chinese generation in big cities like Jakarta, Bandung, and Solo losing their parents' language. Only during the term of President Abdurrahman Wahid did international schools began offering English and Mandarin Chinese courses. Because of these changes, the use of Chinese language materials has seen a resurgence and some TV and radio services were able to start broadcasting material in Chinese again, like in the 1950s and early 1960s.

Religion

File:Cheng Hoo1.jpg

Surabaya's Muhammad Cheng Hoo Mosque is the first mosque in Indonesia to be built with Chinese architecture. It was designed after Beijing's Niujie Mosque.

Chinese Indonesians are members of five state recognized religions: Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Buddhism and Confucianism.

According to the 2000 census, an estimated 60% of Buddhism followers were ethnic Chinese. Although there is no official data, anecdotal evidence suggests that Chinese Buddhists have become more Christian as they increased the standards of education. Along with it, with ever increasing promotion of Christianity gospel amongst Chinese youngsters, it somehow creates a kind of trend to be a Christian. Apart from it, it is now expected that the number of Buddhism followers would decrease by statistics as Confucianism has now been openly recognized by the country. During the New Order era, Confucianism has been suppressed and hence went into camouflage under Buddhism religion to avoid persecution from the government. The number of these camouflaging Confucianism followers can now be more accurately reflected in statistics.

Large numbers of Chinese began converting to Christianity during the 1950s and 1960s. By 2006, it was estimated that 70 percent of the Chinese population belonged to the two denominations of Christianity in Indonesia. Chinese businessman Tee Siem Tat and wife Sie Djoen Nio founded the Muria Christian Church of Indonesia in 1925.

The Chinese Muslim Association of Indonesia (Indonesian: Persatuan Islam Tionghoa Indonesia), founded in 1961, had to change the meaning of its acronym during Suharto's presidency to remain ethnically neutral. According to teh Surabaya Cheng Poo mosque, there are less than 6000 Chinese practicing Muslims. THis constitutes less than %1 of all Chinese

Institutions

Several organizations took advantage of reformasi policies and began working publicly to end racism and ethnic bias. Three organizations have been identified promoters of cultural and political equality post-Suharto:

• Indonesian Chinese Association (Indonesian: Perhimpunan Indonesia Tionghoa, INTI)
• Indonesian Chinese Social Association (Indonesian: Paguyuban Sosial Marga Tionghoa Indonesia, PSMI)
• Homeland Solidarity (Indonesian: Solidaritas Nusa Bangsa, SNB)

See also

• Demographics of Indonesia
• Indonesian laws affecting Chinese Indonesians
• Indonesian-sounding names adopted by Chinese Indonesians
• Jakarta Riots of May 1998
• List of Chinese Indonesians
• Malaysian Chinese
• Overseas Chinese
• Peranakan

References

• Johnston, Tim (2005-03-03). "Chinese diaspora: Indonesia". BBC. Retrieved 2009-01-30.
• Dipa Arif, "Un Sino-Indonésien catholique face aux musulmans", Cahiers de l'Orient n°92, winter, 2008
• Mark Ländler, "Indonesia's Ethnic Chinese Feel Their Neighbors' Wrath," New York Times, May 16, 1998
• Ong Hok Ham. "Riwayat Tionghoa Peranakan di Jawa (Story of Chinese Descendant in Java): A Collection of Ong Hok Ham's Articles in Star Weekly 1958-1960". Komunitas Bambu. 2005
• "Correcting the myth about the dominance of ethnic Chinese in Indonesian business," Business World (Philippines), 8 January 1999
• The Myth of Chinese Domination, By George J. Adijondro ([2])
• Indonesia Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998 by the U.S. Department of State [3].
• INDONESIA: Five years after May 1998 [4]
• Interview of Jusuf Kalla: Businessmen will be Treated Differently (In Indonesian).
• Protests of some Indonesian Chinese Organizations in the US towards racist remark of VP Kalla.
• Khoon Choy, Lee; A Fragile Nation: The Indonesian Crisis (Chapter 9).
• Khoon Choy, Lee; Indonesia, between myth and reality.
• Christine Susanna Tjhin, Minority participation and democratization, The Jakarta Post - September 3, 2004.
• Christine Susanna Tjhin, More Chinese Indonesians become actively engaged in politics, The Jakarta Post - March 29, 2004.
• Graaf, H. J. de (Hermanus Johannes), 1899-(?), "Chinese Muslims in Java in the 15th and 16th centuries : the Malay Annals of Semarang and Cerbon / translated and provided with comments by H.J. de Graaf and Th. G.Th. Pigeaud; edited by M.C. Ricklefs. Publisher: [Melbourne] : Monash University, 1984. Description: xiii, 221 p. : folded map ; 21 cm. ISBN 0867464194 : Series: Monash papers on Southeast Asia ; no. 12
• "Landmark Legal Decision May Open U.S. Border to Chinese from Indonesia" by Jemma Purdey, Ph.D. - 2/1/2005
• Kusuma,RMAB, "Lahirnya UUD 1945".Publisher:Badan Penerbit Fakultas Hukum Universitas Indonesia, 2004. ISBN 979-8972-28-7

Further reading

• Hoon, Chang-Yau (2006). "Reconceptualising Ethnic Chinese Identity in Post-Suharto Indonesia" (PDF). Ph.D. thesis. University of Western Australia. Retrieved 4 February 2009. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
• Purdey, Jemma (2002). "Anti-Chinese Violence in Indonesia, 1996–1999" (PDF). Peer reviewed Ph.D. thesis. University of Melbourne. Retrieved 4 February 2009. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)

External links

• Perhimpunan Indonesia Tionghoa (INTI), official website of the Chinese Indonesian Association.
• Solidaritas Nusa Bangsa