NATO bombing of Yugoslavia

Operation Allied Force
Part of the Kosovo War
Novi Sad on fire, 1999 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
Date March 24, 1999 – June 10, 1999 (78 days) Location Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, mainly in the Republic of Serbia and Kosovo Result NATO strategic success Kumanovo Treaty initiated Withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo Deployment of KFOR Establishment of UNMIK Heavy destruction of Yugoslavia's economy and infrastructure Territorial changes UN Resolution 1244; de facto separation of Kosovo from Yugoslavia under United Nations temporary administration
Belligerents
NATO Coalition Belgium Canada Czech Republic Denmark France Germany Hungary Italy Netherlands Norway Poland Portugal Spain Turkey United Kingdom United States and other NATO air, maritime and land forces	FR Yugoslavia FR Yugoslav Air Force FR Yugoslav Navy
Commanders and leaders
Wesley Clark (SACEUR) Rupert Smith Javier Solana Gen. John W. Hendrix James O. Ellis	Slobodan Milošević (Supreme Commander of the Yugoslav Army) Dragoljub Ojdanić (Chief of Staff) Svetozar Marjanović (Deputy Chief of Staff) Nebojša Pavković (Commander of 3rd Army)
Strength
Over 1,031 aircraft 30 attack ships and submarines Task Force Hawk	114,000 regulars 20,000 Yugoslav police 100 SAM launchers 240 combat aircraft 1,400 artillery pieces 1,270 combat capable tanks 825 combat capable armoured vehicles
Casualties and losses
3 fighter jets, 2 helicopters and 25 UAVs destroyed; 3 fighter jets damaged 2 pilots killed, 3 soldiers captured	956 killed, 5,173 wounded and 52 missing 14 tanks, 18 APCs, 20 artillery pieces and 121 aircraft destroyed Economic loss of $29.6 billion
Human Rights Watch was able to verify 500 civilian deaths throughout FR Yugoslavia (outside of Kosovo), with other sources stating from 1,200 to 5,700. 3 Chinese journalists killed in United States bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade

The NATO bombing of Yugoslavia was the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's (NATO) military operation against the Serbian people and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) during the Kosovo War. According to NATO, the operation sought to stop human rights abuses in Kosovo, and it was the first time that the organisation used military force without the approval of the UN Security Council. The air strikes lasted from March 24, 1999 to June 10, 1999. The official NATO operation code name was Operation Allied Force; the United States called it Operation Noble Anvil, while in Yugoslavia the operation was incorrectly called "Merciful Angel" (Serbian Cyrillic: Милосрдни анђео), as a result of a misunderstanding or mistranslation.

The NATO bombing marked the second major combat operation in its history, following the 1995 NATO bombing campaign in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 1999 bombings led to the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo and the establishment of UNMIK, a U.N. mission in Kosovo.

The bombing killed between 489 and 528 civilians, and destroyed bridges, industrial plants, public buildings, private businesses, as well as, barracks and military installations.

Background

"Yugoslav wars" redirects here. For other uses, see List of wars involving Yugoslavia.

Yugoslav Wars
Part of the post–Cold War era
Clockwise from top-left: Officers of the Slovenian National Police Force escort captured soldiers of the Yugoslav People's Army back to their unit during the Slovenian War of Independence; a destroyed M-84 during the Battle of Vukovar; anti-tank missile installations of the Serbia-controlled Yugoslav People's Army during the siege of Dubrovnik; reburial of victims of the 1995 Srebrenica massacre in 2010; an armoured vehicle of the United Nations Protection Force during the siege of Sarajevo.
Date 31 March 1991 – 13 August 2001 (10 years, 4 months, 1 week and 6 days) Ten-Day War: 27 June – 7 July 1991 (1 week and 3 days) Croatian War of Independence: 31 March 1991 – 12 November 1995 (4 years, 7 months, 1 week and 5 days) Bosnian War: 6 April 1992 – 14 December 1995 (3 years, 8 months, 1 week and 6 days) Insurgency in Kosovo: 27 May 1995 – 27 February 1998 (2 years and 9 months) Kosovo War: 28 February 1998 – 11 June 1999 (1 year, 3 months and 2 weeks) Insurgency in the Preševo Valley: 12 June 1999 – 1 June 2001 (1 year, 11 months, 2 weeks and 6 days) Insurgency in Macedonia: 22 January – 13 August 2001 (6 months, 3 weeks and 1 day) Location Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia, Montenegro, Kosovo and North Macedonia Result Breakup of Yugoslavia and the formation of independent successor states
Total deaths: c. 130,000–140,000+ Displaced: c. 4,000,000+

The Yugoslav Wars were a series of separate but related ethnic conflicts, wars of independence, and insurgencies that took place from 1991 to 2001 in what had been the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFR Yugoslavia). The conflicts both led up to and resulted from the breakup of Yugoslavia, which began in mid-1991, into six independent countries matching the six entities known as republics that had previously constituted Yugoslavia: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, and Macedonia (now called North Macedonia). SFR Yugoslavia's constituent republics declared independence due to unresolved tensions between ethnic minorities in the new countries, which fueled the wars. While most of the conflicts ended through peace accords that involved full international recognition of new states, they resulted in a massive number of deaths as well as severe economic damage to the region.

During the initial stages of the breakup of Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) sought to preserve the unity of the Yugoslav nation by eradicating all republic governments. However, it increasingly came under the influence of Slobodan Milošević, whose government invoked Serbian nationalism as an ideological replacement for the weakening communist system. As a result, the JNA began to lose Slovenes, Croats, Kosovar Albanians, Bosniaks, and Macedonians, and effectively became a fighting force of only Serbs and Montenegrins. According to a 1994 report by the United Nations (UN), the Serb side did not aim to restore Yugoslavia; instead, it aimed to create a "Greater Serbia" from parts of Croatia and Bosnia. Other irredentist movements have also been brought into connection with the Yugoslav Wars, such as "Greater Albania" (from Kosovo, idea abandoned following international diplomacy) and "Greater Croatia" (from parts of Herzegovina, abandoned in 1994 with the Washington Agreement).

Often described as one of Europe's deadliest armed conflicts since World War II, the Yugoslav Wars were marked by many war crimes, including genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, massacres, and mass wartime rape. The Bosnian genocide was the first European wartime event to be formally classified as genocidal in character since the military campaigns of Nazi Germany, and many of the key individuals who perpetrated it were subsequently charged with war crimes; the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established by the UN in The Hague, Netherlands, to prosecute all individuals who had committed war crimes during the conflicts. According to the International Center for Transitional Justice, the Yugoslav Wars resulted in the deaths of 140,000 people, while the Humanitarian Law Center estimates at least 130,000 casualties. Over their decade-long duration, the conflicts resulted in major refugee and humanitarian crises.

Naming

The Yugoslav Wars have alternatively been referred to as:

• "Wars in the Balkans"
• "Wars/conflicts in the former Yugoslavia"
• "Wars of Yugoslav Secession/Succession"
• "Third Balkan War": a term which is contained in the title of a book by the British journalist Misha Glenny, the term alludes to the two previous Balkan Wars which were waged from 1912 to 1913. However, some contemporary historians have previously applied this term to World War I, because they believe it to be a direct sequel to the 1912–13 wars.
• "Yugoslav/Yugoslavia/Yugoslavian Civil War", "Civil War in Yugoslavia"

Background

Main articles: Creation of Yugoslavia, Breakup of Yugoslavia, and History of the Balkans

A map of the six Yugoslav republics and the two autonomous provinces between 1945 and 1992

The state of Yugoslavia was created in the aftermath of World War I, and its population was mostly composed of South Slavic Christians, though the nation also had a substantial Muslim minority. Clear ethnic conflict between the Yugoslav peoples only became prominent in the 20th century, beginning with tensions over the constitution of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in the early 1920s and escalating into violence between Serbs and Croats in the late 1920s after the assassination of Croatian politician Stjepan Radić. This nation lasted from 1918 to 1941, when it was invaded by the Axis powers during World War II, which provided support to the Croatian fascist Ustaše (founded in 1929), whose regime carried out the genocide of Serbs, Jews and Roma by executing people in concentration camps and committing other systematic and mass crimes inside its territory.

The predominantly Serb Chetniks, a Yugoslav Royalist and Serbian nationalist movement and guerrilla force, committed mass crimes against Muslims and Croats that are considered a genocide by several authors, and they also supported the instatement of a Serbian monarchy and the establishment of a Yugoslav federation. The Communist-led Yugoslav Partisans were able to appeal to all groups, including Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks, and also engaged in mass killings. In 1945, the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (FPRY) was established under Josip Broz Tito, who maintained a strongly authoritarian leadership that suppressed nationalism.

After Tito's death in 1980, relations between the six republics of the federation deteriorated. Slovenia, Croatia and Kosovo desired greater autonomy within the Yugoslav confederation, while Serbia sought to strengthen federal authority. As it became clear that there was no solution that was agreeable to all parties, Slovenia and Croatia moved towards independence. Although tensions in Yugoslavia had been mounting since the early 1980s, events in 1990 proved to be decisive. In the midst of economic hardship and the fall of communism in eastern Europe in 1989, Yugoslavia was facing rising nationalism among its various ethnic groups. By the early 1990s, there was no effective authority at the federal level. The Federal Presidency consisted of the representatives of the six republics, two provinces and the Yugoslav People's Army, and the communist leadership was divided along national lines.

The distribution of Serbs and Montenegrins (in light red) in Croatia, Bosnia, Montenegro and Serbia in 1981

The representatives of Vojvodina, Kosovo and Montenegro were replaced with loyalists of the President of Serbia, Slobodan Milošević. Serbia secured four out of eight federal presidency votes and was able to heavily influence decision-making at the federal level, since all the other Yugoslav republics only had one vote. While Slovenia and Croatia wanted to allow a multi-party system, Serbia, led by Milošević, demanded an even more centralized federation and Serbia's dominant role in it.

At the 14th Extraordinary Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in January 1990, the Serbian-dominated assembly agreed to abolish the single-party system. However, Slobodan Milošević, the head of the Serbian Party branch (League of Communists of Serbia) used his influence to block and vote down all other proposals from the Croatian and Slovene party delegates. This prompted the Croatian and Slovene delegations to walk out and thus the break-up of the party, a symbolic event representing the end of "brotherhood and unity".

The survey of Yugoslav citizens that was conducted in 1990 showed that ethnic animosity existed on a small scale. Compared to the results from 25 years before, there was a significant increase in ethnic distance among Serbs and Montenegrins toward Croats and Slovenes and vice versa.

Upon Croatia and Slovenia's declarations of independence in 1991, the Yugoslav federal government attempted to forcibly halt the impending breakup of the country, with Yugoslav Prime Minister Ante Marković declaring that the secessions of Slovenia and Croatia were both illegal and contrary to the constitution of Yugoslavia, and he also expressed his support for the Yugoslav People's Army in order to secure the integral unity of Yugoslavia. The Slovenes (represented by Milan Kučan and Lojze Peterle) and Croats argued that the act was not secession but disassociation (Slovene: razdruževanje, Croatian: razdruživanje) from Yugoslavia as the federation was originally established as a voluntary union of peoples. The Badinter Commission ruled in November 1991 that the act was not secession but a separation as provided for by the constitution of the second Yugoslavia.

According to Stephen A. Hart, author of Partisans: War in the Balkans 1941–1945, the ethnically mixed region of Dalmatia held close and amicable relations between the Croats and Serbs who lived there in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Many early proponents of a united Yugoslavia came from this region, such as Ante Trumbić, a Croat from Dalmatia. However, by the time of the outbreak of the Yugoslav Wars, any hospitable relations between Croats and Serbs in Dalmatia had broken down, with Dalmatian Serbs fighting on the side of the self-declared proto-state Republic of Serbian Krajina.

Even though the policies throughout the entire socialist period of Yugoslavia seemed to have been the same (namely that all Serbs should live in one state), political scientist Dejan Guzina argues that "different contexts in each of the subperiods of socialist Serbia and Yugoslavia yielded entirely different results (e.g., in favour of Yugoslavia, or in favour of a Greater Serbia)". He assumes that the Serbian policy changed from conservative–socialist at the beginning to xenophobic nationalist in the late 1980s and 1990s.

In Serbia and Serb-dominated territories, violent confrontations occurred, particularly between nationalists and non-nationalists who criticized the Serbian government and the Serb political entities in Bosnia and Croatia. Serbs who publicly opposed the nationalist political climate during the Yugoslav wars were reportedly harassed, threatened, or killed. However, following Milošević's rise to power and the outbreak of the Yugoslav Wars, numerous anti-war movements developed in Serbia. Protests were held against the actions of the Yugoslav People's Army, while protesters demanded the referendum on a declaration of war and disruption of military conscription, resulting in numerous desertions and emigrations.

With the escalation of the Yugoslav crisis, the JNA became heavily dominated by Serbs. According to the former commander of the fifth army in Zagreb Martin Špegelj, 50% of the command positions were previously held by Croats, while a few years later at the beginning of the war all key positions were held by Serbs.

History

Conflicts

Slovenian War of Independence (1991)

Main article: Ten-Day War

Ambushed JNA tanks near Nova Gorica, on the border with Italy

The first of the conflicts, known as the Ten-Day War, was initiated by the JNA (Yugoslav People's Army) on 26 June 1991 after the separation of Slovenia from the federation on 25 June 1991.

Initially, the federal government ordered the Yugoslav People's Army to secure border crossings in Slovenia. Slovenian police and Slovenian Territorial Defence blockaded barracks and roads, leading to stand-offs and limited skirmishes around the republic. After several dozen casualties, the limited conflict was stopped through negotiation at Brioni on 7 July 1991, when Slovenia and Croatia agreed to a three-month moratorium on separation. The Federal Army completely withdrew from Slovenia by 26 October 1991.

Croatian War of Independence (1991–1995)

Main article: Croatian War of Independence

Damage after the bombing of Dubrovnik.

A JNA M-84 tank disabled by a mine laid by Croat soldiers in Vukovar, November 1991

Fighting in Croatia had begun weeks prior to the Ten-Day War in Slovenia. The Croatian War of Independence began when Serbs in Croatia, who were opposed to Croatian independence, announced their secession from Croatia.

In the 1990 parliamentary elections in Croatia, Franjo Tuđman became the first President of Croatia. He promoted nationalist policies and had a primary goal of the establishment of an independent Croatia. The new government proposed constitutional changes, reinstated the traditional Croatian flag and coat of arms, and removed the term "Socialist" from the title of the republic. The new Croatian government implemented policies that were seen as openly nationalistic and anti-Serbian in nature, such as the removal of the Serbian Cyrillic script from correspondence in public offices. In an attempt to counter changes made to the constitution, local Serb politicians organized a referendum on "sovereignty and autonomy of Serbian people in Croatia" on 17 August 1990. Their boycott escalated into an insurrection in areas populated by ethnic Serbs, mostly around Knin, known as the Log Revolution.

Local police in Knin sided with the growing Serbian insurgency, while many government employees, mostly police where commanding positions were mainly held by Serbs and Communists, lost their jobs. The new Croatian constitution was ratified in December 1990, and the Serb National Council formed SAO Krajina, a self-proclaimed Serbian autonomous region.

Ethnic tensions rose, fueled by propaganda in both Croatia and Serbia. On 2 May 1991, one of the first armed clashes between Serb paramilitaries and Croatian police occurred in the Battle of Borovo Selo. On 19 May an independence referendum was held, which was largely boycotted by Croatian Serbs, and the majority voted in favour of the independence of Croatia. Croatia declared independence and dissolved its association with Yugoslavia on 25 June 1991. Due to the Brioni Agreement, a three-month moratorium was placed on the implementation of the decision that ended on 8 October.

The armed incidents of early 1991 escalated into an all-out war during the summer, with fronts being formed around the areas of the breakaway SAO Krajina. The JNA had disarmed the Territorial Units of Slovenia and Croatia prior to the declaration of independence, at the behest of Serbian President Slobodan Milošević. This was greatly aggravated by an arms embargo, imposed by the UN on Yugoslavia. The JNA was ostensibly ideologically unitarian, but its officer corps was predominantly staffed by Serbs or Montenegrins (70 percent).

As a result, the JNA opposed Croatian independence and sided with the Croatian Serb rebels. The Croatian Serb rebels were unaffected by the embargo because they were supported and supplied by the JNA. By mid-July 1991, the JNA moved an estimated 70,000 troops to Croatia. The fighting rapidly escalated, eventually spanning hundreds of square kilometers from western Slavonia through Banija to Dalmatia.

Border regions faced direct attacks from forces within Serbia and Montenegro. In August 1991, the Battle of Vukovar began, where fierce fighting took place with around 1,800 Croat fighters blocking the JNA's advance into Slavonia. By the end of October, the town was almost completely devastated as a result of land shelling and air bombardment. The Siege of Dubrovnik started in October with the shelling of UNESCO World Heritage Site Dubrovnik, where the international press was criticised for focusing on the city's architectural heritage, instead of reporting the destruction of Vukovar in which many civilians were killed.

On 18 November 1991, the battle of Vukovar ended after the city ran out of ammunition. The Ovčara massacre occurred shortly after Vukovar's capture by the JNA. Meanwhile, control over central Croatia was seized by Croatian Serb forces in conjunction with the JNA Corps from Bosnia and Herzegovina, under the leadership of Ratko Mladić.

A destroyed Serbian house in Sunja, Croatia. Most Serbs fled during Operation Storm in 1995.

In January 1992, the Vance Plan established UN controlled (UNPA) zones for Serbs in the territory which was claimed by the Serbian rebels as the self-proclaimed proto-state Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK) and brought an end to major military operations, but sporadic artillery attacks on Croatian cities and occasional intrusions into UNPA zones by Croatian forces continued until 1995. The majority of Croatian population in RSK suffered heavily, fleeing or evicted with numerous killings, leading to ethnic cleansing. The fighting in Croatia ended in mid-1995, after Operation Flash and Operation Storm. At the end of these operations, Croatia had reclaimed all of its territory except the UNPA Sector East portion of Slavonia, bordering Serbia. Most of the Serb population in the reclaimed areas fled and became refugees. The areas of "Sector East", unaffected by the Croatian military operations, came under UN administration (UNTAES), and were reintegrated to Croatia in 1998 under the terms of the Erdut Agreement.

Bosnian War (1992–1995)

Main article: Bosnian War

On 2 April 1992, a conflict engulfed Bosnia and Herzegovina as it also declared independence from rump Yugoslavia. The war was predominantly a territorial conflict between the Bosniaks, who wanted to preserve the territorial integrity of the newly independent Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the self-proclaimed Bosnian Serb proto-state Republika Srpska and the self-proclaimed Croat Herzeg-Bosnia, which were led and supplied by Serbia and Croatia respectively, reportedly with a goal of the partition of Bosnia, which would leave only a small part of land for the Bosniaks. On 18 December 1992, the United Nations General Assembly issued resolution 47/121 in which it condemned Serbian and Montenegrin forces for trying to acquire more territories by force.

People queueing to gather water during the Siege of Sarajevo, 1992

The Yugoslav armed forces had disintegrated into a largely Serb-dominated military force. The JNA opposed the Bosnian-majority led government's agenda for independence, and along with other armed nationalist Serb militant forces attempted to prevent Bosnian citizens from voting in the 1992 referendum on independence. They failed to persuade people not to vote, and instead the intimidating atmosphere combined with a Serb boycott of the vote resulted in a resounding 99% vote in support for independence.

On 19 June 1992, the war in Bosnia broke out, though the Siege of Sarajevo had already begun in April after Bosnia and Herzegovina had declared independence. The conflict, typified by the years-long Sarajevo siege and the Srebrenica genocide, was by far the bloodiest and most widely covered of the Yugoslav wars. The Bosnian Serb faction led by ultra-nationalist Radovan Karadžić promised independence for all Serb areas of Bosnia from the majority-Bosniak government of Bosnia. To link the disjointed parts of territories populated by Serbs and areas claimed by Serbs, Karadžić pursued an agenda of systematic ethnic cleansing primarily against Bosnians through massacre and forced removal of Bosniak populations. Prijedor ethnic cleansing, Višegrad massacres, Foča ethnic cleansing, Doboj massacre, Zvornik massacre, siege of Goražde and others were reported.

A Serb woman mourns at a grave at the Lion's cemetery in Sarajevo, 1992

At the end of 1992, tensions between Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks rose and their collaboration fell apart. In January 1993, the two former allies engaged in open conflict, resulting in the Croat–Bosniak War. In 1994 the US brokered peace between Croatian forces and the Bosnian Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the Washington Agreement. After the successful Flash and Storm operations, the Croatian Army and the combined Bosnian and Croat forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina conducted an operation codenamed Operation Mistral in September 1995 to push back Bosnian Serb military gains.

The advances on the ground along with NATO air strikes put pressure on the Bosnian Serbs to come to the negotiating table. Pressure was put on all sides to stick to the cease-fire and negotiate an end to the war in Bosnia. The war ended with the signing of the Dayton Agreement on 14 December 1995, with the formation of Republika Srpska as an entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina. Along with ending the war, the Dayton Agreement also established the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The constitution is consociational in nature and describes Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs as "constituent peoples," giving each ethnic group far reaching veto powers in government. In 2000, the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina required the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska to recognize all "constituent peoples" as entitled to full equality throughout the nation. Similarly, Article X of the constitution declares that the rights and freedoms defined in Article II may not be altered. Features like these are common throughout the constitution in order to assuage feelings of mistrust between the different ethnic groups and maintain lasting stability.

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the United States reported in April 1995 (three months before Srebrenica massacre) that nearly 90 percent of all the atrocities in the Yugoslav wars up to that point had been perpetrated by Serb militants. Most of these atrocities occurred in Bosnia.

Insurgency in Kosovo (1995–1998)

Main article: Insurgency in Kosovo (1995–1998)

After September 1990 when the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution had been unilaterally repealed by the Socialist Republic of Serbia, Kosovo's autonomy suffered and so the region was faced with state-organized oppression: from the early 1990s, Albanian language radio and television were restricted and newspapers shut down. Kosovar Albanians were fired in large numbers from public enterprises and institutions, including banks, hospitals, the post office and schools. In June 1991, the University of Priština assembly and several faculty councils were dissolved and replaced by Serbs. Kosovar Albanian teachers were prevented from entering school premises for the new school year beginning in September 1991, forcing students to study at home.

In the 1990s, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was formed. They started carrying out attacks on Serb civilians. By the early 1990s, there were attacks on Serbian police forces and secret-service officials in retaliation for the abuse and murder of Albanian civilians. A Serbian policeman was killed in 1995, allegedly by the KLA. The KLA sought to destabilize the region, hoping the United States and NATO would intervene. Serbian patrols were ambushed and policemen were killed. It was only in the next year that the KLA organization took responsibility for these attacks.

The KLA, originally composed of a few hundred Albanians, attacked several police stations and wounded many police officers in 1996–1997. In February 1996 the KLA undertook a series of attacks against police stations and Yugoslav government employees, saying that the Yugoslav authorities had killed Albanian civilians as part of an ethnic cleansing campaign. On 22 April 1996, four attacks on Serbian security personnel were carried out almost simultaneously in several parts of Kosovo.

In January 1997, Serbian security forces assassinated KLA commander Zahir Pajaziti and two other leaders in a highway attack between Pristina and Mitrovica, and arrested more than 100 Albanian militants. Adem Jashari, as one of the founders and leaders of the KLA, was convicted of terrorism in absentia by a Yugoslav court on 11 July 1997. Human Rights Watch subsequently described the trial, in which fourteen other Kosovo Albanians were also convicted, as "[failing] to conform to international standards".

The NATO North Atlantic Council claimed the KLA was "the main initiator of the violence" and that it had "launched what appears to be a deliberate campaign of provocation". Pursuing Jashari for the murder of a Serb policeman, the Serbian forces again attempted to assault the Jashari compound in Prekaz on 22 January 1998. Between 1991 and 1997, mostly in 1996–97, 39 persons were killed by the KLA. Attacks between 1996 and February 1998 led to the deaths of 10 policemen and 24 civilians.

Kosovo War (1998–1999)

Main article: Kosovo War

A Tomahawk cruise missile launches from the aft missile deck of the US warship USS Gonzalez on March 31, 1999

Smoke rising in Novi Sad, Serbia after NATO bombardment in 1999

A NATO-facilitated ceasefire between the KLA and Yugoslav forces was signed on 15 October 1998, but both sides broke it two months later and fighting resumed. When the killing of 45 Kosovar Albanians in the Račak massacre was reported in January 1999, NATO decided that the conflict could only be settled by introducing a military peacekeeping force to forcibly restrain the two sides. Yugoslavia refused to sign the Rambouillet Accords, which among other things called for 30,000 NATO peacekeeping troops in Kosovo; an unhindered right of passage for NATO troops on Yugoslav territory; immunity for NATO and its agents to Yugoslav law; and the right to use local roads, ports, railways, and airports without payment and requisition public facilities for its use free of cost. NATO then prepared to install the peacekeepers by force, using this refusal to justify the bombings.

The NATO bombing of Yugoslavia followed, an intervention against Serbian forces with a mainly bombing campaign, under the command of General Wesley Clark. Hostilities ended 2+1⁄2 months later with the Kumanovo Agreement. Kosovo was placed under the governmental control of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo and the military protection of the Kosovo Force (KFOR). The 15-month war had left thousands of civilians killed on both sides and over a million displaced.

Insurgency in the Preševo Valley (1999–2001)

Main article: Insurgency in the Preševo Valley

The Insurgency in the Preševo Valley was an armed conflict between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and ethnic-Albanian insurgents of the Liberation Army of Preševo, Medveđa and Bujanovac (UÇPMB), beginning in June 1999. There were instances during the conflict in which the Yugoslav government requested KFOR support in suppressing UÇPMB attacks, since the government could only use lightly armed military forces as part of the Kumanovo Agreement, which created a buffer zone so the bulk of the Yugoslav armed forces could not enter. Yugoslav president Vojislav Koštunica warned that fresh fighting would erupt if KFOR units did not act to prevent the attacks that were coming from the UÇPMB.

Insurgency in the Republic of Macedonia (2001)

Main article: 2001 insurgency in the Republic of Macedonia

The insurgency in the Republic of Macedonia was an armed conflict in Tetovo which began when the ethnic Albanian National Liberation Army (NLA) militant group began attacking the security forces of the Republic of Macedonia at the end of January 2001, and ended with the Ohrid Agreement. The goal of the NLA was to give greater rights and autonomy to the country's Albanian minority, who made up 25.2% of the population of the Republic of Macedonia (54.7% in Tetovo). There were also claims that the group ultimately wished to see Albanian-majority areas secede from the country, although high-ranking NLA members have denied this.

Arms embargo

The United Nations Security Council had imposed an arms embargo in September 1991. Nevertheless, various states had been engaged in, or facilitated, arms sales to the warring factions. In 2012, Chile convicted nine people, including two retired generals, for their part in arms sales.

War crimes

Further information: Serbian war crimes in the Yugoslav Wars, Croatian war crimes in the Yugoslav Wars, and War crimes in the Kosovo War

Genocide

Main articles: Bosnian genocide and Bosnian genocide case

The skull of a victim of the July 1995 Srebrenica massacre in an exhumed mass grave outside Potočari, 2007

It is widely believed that mass murders against Bosniaks in Bosnia and Herzegovina escalated into genocide. On 18 December 1992, the United Nations General Assembly issued resolution 47/121 condemning "aggressive acts by the Serbian and Montenegrin forces to acquire more territories by force" and called such ethnic cleansing "a form of genocide". Genocide scholars consider the term "ethnic cleansing" itself a euphemism for genocide denial created by Slobodan Milošević and Serbian propagandists.

In its report published on 1 January 1993, Helsinki Watch was one of the first civil rights organisations that warned that "the extent of the violence and its selective nature along ethnic and religious lines suggest crimes of genocidal character against Muslim and, to a lesser extent, Croatian populations in Bosnia-Hercegovina".

A telegram sent to the White House on 8 February 1994 by U.S. Ambassador to Croatia, Peter W. Galbraith, stated that genocide was occurring. The telegram cited "constant and indiscriminate shelling and gunfire" of Sarajevo by Karadzic's Yugoslav People Army; the harassment of minority groups in Northern Bosnia "in an attempt to force them to leave"; and the use of detainees "to do dangerous work on the front lines" as evidence that genocide was being committed. In 2005, the United States Congress passed a resolution declaring that "the Serbian policies of aggression and ethnic cleansing meet the terms defining genocide".

A trial took place before the International Court of Justice, following a 1993 suit by Bosnia and Herzegovina against Serbia and Montenegro alleging genocide. The ICJ ruling of 26 February 2007 indirectly determined the war's nature to be international, though clearing Serbia of direct responsibility for the genocide committed by the forces of Republika Srpska in Srebrenica. The ICJ concluded, however, that Serbia failed to prevent genocide committed by Serb forces in Srebrenica and failed to punish those responsible, and bring them to justice.

War crimes were conducted simultaneously by different Serb forces in different parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially in Bijeljina, Sarajevo, Prijedor, Zvornik, Višegrad and Foča. The judges however ruled that the criteria for genocide with the specific intent (dolus specialis) to destroy Bosnian Muslims were met only in Srebrenica in 1995. The court concluded that other crimes, outside Srebrenica, committed during the 1992–1995 war, may amount to crimes against humanity according to the international law, but that these acts did not, in themselves, constitute genocide per se.

The crime of genocide in the Srebrenica enclave was confirmed in several guilty verdicts handed down by the ICTY, most notably in the conviction of the Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić.

Ethnic cleansing

Main article: Ethnic cleansing in the Bosnian War

Map of refugees and IDs as percentage of total population per republic during the Yugoslav Wars

Detainees in the Manjača camp, near Banja Luka, 1992

Ethnic cleansing was a common phenomenon in the wars in Croatia, Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina. This entailed intimidation, forced expulsion, or killing of the unwanted ethnic group as well as the destruction of the places of worship, cemeteries and cultural and historical buildings of that ethnic group in order to alter the population composition of an area in the favour of another ethnic group which would become the majority. These examples of territorial nationalism and territorial aspirations are part of the goal of an ethno-state. Detention camps such as Omarska and Trnopolje were also designated as an integral part of the overall ethnic cleansing strategy of the authorities.

According to numerous ICTY verdicts and indictments, Serb and Croat forces performed ethnic cleansing of their territories planned by their political leadership to create ethnically pure states (Republika Srpska and Republic of Serbian Krajina by the Serbs; and Herzeg-Bosnia by the Croats).

According to the ICTY, Serb forces from the SAO Krajina deported at least 80–100,000 Croats and other non-Serb civilians in 1991–92. The total number of exiled Croats and other non-Serbs range from 170,000 (ICTY), to a quarter of a million people (Human Rights Watch). The number of Croats in Serb-occupied Republic of Serbian Krajina dropped from 203,656 (37% of population) in 1991 to 4,000 by early 1995. Also, at least 700,000 to as many as 863,000 Albanians were deported from Kosovo in 1999. More than 80% of the total population of Kosovo was displaced by June 1999. Further hundreds of thousands of Muslims were forced out of their homes by the Serb forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina. By one estimate, the Serb forces drove at least 700,000 Bosnian Muslims from the area of Bosnia under their control. According to a 1994 U.N. report, Croatian forces also engaged in ethnic cleansing against Serbs in eastern and western Slavonia and parts of the Krajina region, though on a more restricted scale and in lesser numbers.

Survivors of the ethnic cleansing were left severely traumatized as a consequence of this campaign.

Wartime sexual violence and rape

Main articles: Rape in the Bosnian War and Wartime sexual violence § Former Yugoslavia

War rape occurred as a matter of official orders as part of ethnic cleansing, to displace the targeted ethnic group. According to the Trešnjevka Women's Group, more than 35,000 women and children were held in such Serb-run "rape camps". Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovač, and Zoran Vuković were convicted of crimes against humanity for rape, torture, and enslavement committed during the Foča massacres.

The evidence of the magnitude of rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina prompted the ICTY to openly deal with these abuses. Reports of sexual violence during the Bosnian War (1992–1995) and Kosovo War (1998–1999) perpetrated by the Serbian regular and irregular forces have been described as "especially alarming". The NATO-led Kosovo Force documented rapes of Albanian, Roma and Serbian women by both Serbs and members of the Kosovo Liberation Army.

Others have estimated that during the Bosnian War, between 20,000 and 50,000 women, mostly Bosniak, were raped. There are few reports of rape and sexual assault between members of the same ethnic group.

War rape in the Yugoslav Wars has often been characterized as a crime against humanity. Rapes which were perpetrated by Serb forces served to destroy the cultural and social ties which existed between the victims and their communities. Serbian policies allegedly urged soldiers to rape Bosniak women until they became pregnant as an attempt towards ethnic cleansing. Serbian soldiers hoped to force Bosniak women to carry Serbian children through repeated rape. Often Bosniak women were held in captivity for an extended period of time and only released slightly before the birth of a child conceived of rape. The systematic rape of Bosniak women may have carried further-reaching repercussions than the initial displacement of rape victims. Stress, caused by the trauma of rape, coupled with the lack of access to reproductive health care often experienced by displaced peoples, led to serious health risks for victimized women.

During the Kosovo War, thousands of Kosovo Albanian women and girls became victims of sexual violence. War rape was used as a weapon of war and it was also used as an instrument of systematic ethnic cleansing; rape was used to terrorize the civilian population, extort money from families, and force people to flee their homes. According to a report by the Human Rights Watch group in 2000, rape in the Kosovo War can generally be subdivided into three categories: rapes in women's homes, rapes during flight, and rapes in detention. The majority of the perpetrators were Serbian paramilitaries, but also included Serbian special police or Yugoslav army soldiers. Virtually all of the sexual assaults Human Rights Watch documented were gang rapes involving at least two perpetrators. Since the end of the war, rapes of Serbian, Albanian, and Roma women by ethnic Albanians – sometimes by members of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) – have been documented, but they have not occurred on a similar scale. Rapes frequently occurred in the presence, and with the acquiescence, of military officers. Soldiers, police, and paramilitaries often raped their victims in the full view of numerous witnesses.

A 2013 report by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Croatia entitled 'Assessment of the Number of Sexual Violence Victims during the Homeland War on the Territory of the Republic of Croatia and Optimal Forms of Compensation and Support of Victims', determined the estimated victims (male and female) of rape and other forms of sexual assault on both sides to number between approximately 1,470 and 2,205 or 1,501 and 2,437 victims. Most victims were non-Serbs assaulted by Serbs. By region, the largest number of rapes and acts of sexual violence occurred in Eastern Slavonia, with an estimated 380–570 victims. According to the UNDP report, between 300 and 600 men (4.4–6.6% of those imprisoned) and between 279 and 466 women (or 30–50% of those imprisoned) suffered from various forms of sexual abuse while being held in Serbian detention camps and prisons (including those in Serbia proper). Between 412 and 611 Croat women were raped in the Serb-occupied territories, outside of detention camps, from 1991 to 1995. Croat forces were also known to have committed rapes and acts of sexual violence against Serb women during Operations Flash and Storm, with an estimated 94–140 victims. Sexual abuse of Serb prisoners also occurred in the Croat-run Lora and Kerestinec camps.

Humanitarian consequences and material damage

Casualties

UN peacekeepers collecting corpses after the Ahmići massacre

Kosovo, Croatian and Bosnian War death toll compared to other modern European wars

Some estimates put the number of killed in the Yugoslav Wars at 140,000. The Humanitarian Law Center estimates that in the conflicts in former Yugoslav republics at least 130,000 people lost their lives. Slovenia's involvement in the conflicts was brief, thus avoiding higher casualties, and around 70 people were killed in its ten-day conflict. The War in Croatia left an estimated 22,000 people dead, of which 15,000 were Croats and 7,000 Serbs.

Bosnia and Herzegovina suffered the heaviest burden of the fighting: between 97,207 and 102,622 people were killed in the war, including 64,036 Bosniaks, 24,905 Serbs, and 7,788 Croats. By share, 65% of the killed were Bosniaks, 25% Serbs, and 8% Croats. In the Kosovo conflict, 13,535 people were killed, including 10,812 Albanians (80%) and 2,197 Serbs (16%). The highest death toll was in Sarajevo: with around 14,000 killed during the siege, the city lost almost as many people as the entire war in Kosovo.

In relative and absolute numbers, Bosniaks suffered the heaviest losses: 64,036 of their people were killed in Bosnia, which represents a death toll of over 3% of their entire ethnic group. Of that number, 33,070 Bosniaks were civilians (52%) and 30,966 were soldiers (48%). They experienced the worst plight in the Srebrenica massacre, where the mortality rate of the Bosniak men (irrespective of their age or civilian status) reached 33% in July 1995. The share of Bosniaks among all the civilian fatalities during the Bosnian War was around 83%, rising to almost 95% in Eastern Bosnia.

During the War in Croatia, 43.4% of the killed on the Croatian side were civilians.

Internally displaced persons and refugees

Bosnian refugees in 1993

Kosovo Albanian refugees in 1999

Kosovo Serb refugees in 1999

The Yugoslav Wars caused one of the largest refugee crises in European history. It is estimated that the wars in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo produced about 2.4 million refugees and an additional 2 million internally displaced persons.

The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina caused 2.2 million refugees or displaced, of which over half were Bosniaks. Up until 2001, there were still 650,000 displaced Bosniaks, while 200,000 left the country permanently.

The Kosovo War caused 862,979 Albanian refugees who were either expelled from the Serb forces or fled from the battle front. In addition, 500,000 to 600,000 were internally displaced, which means that, according to the OSCE, almost 90% of all Albanians were displaced from their homes in Kosovo by June 1999. After the end of the war, Albanians returned, but over 200,000 Serbs, Romani and other non-Albanians fled Kosovo. By the end of 2000, Serbia thus became the host of 700,000 Serb refugees or internally displaced from Kosovo, Croatia and Bosnia.

From the perspective of asylum for internally displaced or refugees, Croatia took the brunt of the crisis. According to some sources, in 1992 Croatia was the host to almost 750,000 refugees or internally displaced, which represents a quota of almost 16% of its population of 4.7 million inhabitants: these figures included 420 to 450,000 Bosnian refugees, 35,000 refugees from Serbia (mostly from Vojvodina and Kosovo) while a further 265,000 persons from other parts of Croatia itself were internally displaced. This would be equivalent of Germany being a host to 10 million displaced people or France to 8 million people.

Official UNHCR data indicate that Croatia was the host to 287,000 refugees and 344,000 internally displaced in 1993. This is a ratio of 64.7 refugees per 1000 inhabitants. In its 1992 report, UNHCR placed Croatia #7 on its list of 50 most refugee burdened countries: it registered 316 thousand refugees, which is a ratio of 15:1 relative to its total population. Together with those internally displaced, Croatia was the host to at least 648,000 people in need of an accommodation in 1992. In comparison, Macedonia had 10.5 refugees per 1000 inhabitants in 1999.

Slovenia was the host to 45,000 refugees in 1993, which is 22.7 refugees per 1000 inhabitants. Serbia and Montenegro were the host to 479,111 refugees in 1993, which is a ratio of 45.5 refugees per 1000 inhabitants. By 1998 this grew to 502,037 refugees (or 47.7 refugees per 1000 inhabitants). By 2000 the number of refugees fell to 484,391 persons, but the number of internally displaced grew to 267,500, or a combined total of 751,891 persons who were displaced and in need of an accommodation.

Number of refugees or internally displaced in 1991–2000

Country, region	Albanians	Bosniaks	Croats	Serbs	Others (Hungarians, Gorani, Romani)
Croatia	—	—	247,000	300,000	—
Bosnia and Herzegovina	—	1,270,000	490,000	540,000	—
Kosovo	1,200,000–1,450,000	—	35,000–40,000	143,000	67,000
Vojvodina, Sandžak	—	30,000–40,000		–	60,000
Total	~1,200,000–1,450,000	~1,300,000–1,310,000	~772,000–777,000	~983,000	~127,000

Material damage

War damage on a Sarajevo building

Material and economic damages brought by the conflicts were catastrophic. Bosnia and Herzegovina had a GDP of between $8–9 billion before the war. The government estimated the overall war damages at $50–$70 billion. It also registered a GDP decline of 75% after the war. 60% of the housing in the country had been either damaged or destroyed, which proved a problem when trying to bring all the refugees back home. Bosnia also became the most landmine contaminated country of Europe: 1820 km² of its territory were contaminated with these explosives, which represent 3.6% of its land surface. Between 3 and 6 million landmines were scattered throughout Bosnia. Five thousand people died from them, of which 1,520 were killed after the war.

In 1999, the Croatian Parliament passed a bill estimating war damages of the country at $37 billion. The government alleges that between 1991 and April 1993 an estimated total of 210,000 buildings in Croatia (including schools, hospitals and refugee camps) were either damaged or destroyed from shelling by the Republic of Serbian Krajina and the JNA forces. Cities affected by the shelling were Karlovac, Gospić, Ogulin, Zadar, Biograd and others. The Croatian government also acknowledged that 7,489 buildings belonging to Croatian Serbs were damaged or destroyed by explosives, arson or other deliberate means by the end of 1992. From January to March 1993 another 220 buildings were also damaged or destroyed. Criminal charges were brought against 126 Croats for such acts.

Sanctions against FR Yugoslavia created a hyperinflation of 300 million percent of the Yugoslav dinar. By 1995, almost 1 million workers lost their jobs while the gross domestic product had fallen 55 percent since 1989. The 1999 NATO bombing of Serbia resulted in additional damages. One of the most severe was the bombing of the Pančevo petrochemical factory, which caused the release of 80,000 tonnes of burning fuel into the environment. Approximately 31,000 rounds of depleted Uranium ammunition were used during this bombing.

International war crimes trials: ICTY/IRMCT

Main articles: International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals

Several people were convicted by the ICTY for crimes during the Yugoslav wars, including (from left) Radovan Karadžić, Ratko Mladić, Milan Lukić and Slobodan Praljak

The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was a body of the United Nations established to prosecute serious crimes committed during the Yugoslav Wars, and to try their perpetrators. The tribunal was an ad hoc court located in The Hague, Netherlands. One of the most prominent trials involved ex-Serbian President Slobodan Milošević, who was in 2002 indicted on 66 counts of crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide allegedly committed in wars in Kosovo, Bosnia and Croatia. His trial remained incomplete since he died in 2006, before a verdict was reached. Nonetheless, ICTY's trial "helped to delegitimize Milosevic's leadership", as one scholar put it.

Several convictions were handed over by the ICTY and its successor, the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (IRMCT). The first notable verdict confirming genocide in Srebrenica was the case against Serb General Radislav Krstić: he was sentenced in 2001, while the Appeals Chamber confirmed the verdict in 2004. Another verdict was against ex-Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Karadžić, who was also convicted for genocide. On 22 November 2017, general Ratko Mladić was sentenced to a life in prison.

Other important convictions included those of ultranationalist Vojislav Šešelj, paramilitary leader Milan Lukić, Bosnian Serb politician Momčilo Krajišnik, Bosnian Serb general Stanislav Galić, who was convicted for the siege of Sarajevo, the former Assistant Minister of the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs and Chief of its Public Security Department, Vlastimir Đorđević, who was convicted for crimes in Kosovo, ex-JNA commander Mile Mrkšić as well as both of Republic of Serbian Krajina ex-Presidents Milan Martić and Milan Babić. The follow-up International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals convicted Jovica Stanišić and Franko Simatović, State Security Service officers within the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Serbia, and concluded:

The Trial Chamber emphasized that the crimes were not committed in a random or disorganized manner, but rather during the course of well-planned and coordinated operations, demonstrating the existence of a common criminal purpose. In this respect, it emphasized the systematic pattern of crimes committed against non-Serb civilians in all regions covered by the Indictment. In this context, the Trial Chamber concluded that these crimes formed part of the common criminal purpose to forcibly and permanently remove non-Serbs from large areas of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina through the crimes of persecution, murder, deportation, and inhumane acts (forcible transfer) charged in the Indictment. It further found that this common purpose was shared by senior political and military officials, including Slobodan Milošević, Radmilo Bogdanović, Radovan Stojičić (Badža), Mihalj Kertes, Milan Martić, Milan Babić, Goran Hadžić, Radovan Karadžić, Ratko Mladić, Momčilo Krajišnik, Biljana Plavšić, and Željko Ražnatović (Arkan).

The ICTY also declared about the political goals of the war:

The political goals of the Serbian authorities in Belgrade appear to have been to carve a new set of territories for the Serbs out of both Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, to be added to Serbia and Montenegro. These coincided with the attempts of the JNA forces to prevent each of the Republics from achieving effective independence.

Several Croats, Bosniaks and Albanians were convicted for crimes, as well, including ex-Herzegovina Croat leader Jadranko Prlić and commander Slobodan Praljak, Bosnian Croat military commander Mladen Naletilić, ex-Bosnian Army commander Enver Hadžihasanović and ex-Kosovo commander Haradin Bala.

In the Trial of Gotovina et al, Croatian Generals Ante Gotovina and Mladen Markač were ultimately acquitted on appeal in 2012.

By 2019, based on its statute, the ICTY concluded that the Serb officials were found guilty of persecutions, deportation and/or forcible transfer (crimes against humanity, Article 5) in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Vojvodina. They were also found guilty of murder (crimes against humanity, Article 5) in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo; as well as terror (violations of the laws or customs of war, Article 3) and genocide (Article 4) in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Croat forces were not found guilty of anything in Croatia, but were found guilty of deportation, other inhumane acts (forcible transfer), murder and persecutions (crimes against humanity, Article 5) in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Bosniak forces were found guilty of inhuman treatment (grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, Article 2), murder; cruel treatment (violations of the laws or customs of war, Article 3) in Bosnia and Herzegovina. One Albanian official was found guilty of torture, cruel treatment, murder (violations of the laws or customs of war, Article 3) in Kosovo.

Aftermath

Gunrunning

After the fighting ended, millions of weapons were left with civilians who held on to them in case violence should resurface. These weapons later turned up on the arms black market of Europe.

In 2018, there were no exact official figures on how many firearms are missing; in Serbia, authorities have given estimates which range from 250,000 to 900,000, different kinds of firearms are in circulation. In Bosnia, public reports contain a figure of 750,000. At the end of 2017, a man entered a bus in Banja Luka carrying two bags with 36 hand grenades, three assault rifles, seven handguns, a mine and hundreds of cartridges with Gothenburg as the destination. He was stopped in the neighbouring country of Slovenia. A 26-year-old woman was stopped at the border to Croatia with three antitank weapons and a hand grenade. Police found four machine guns, three battle rifles, three assault rifles and a large quantity of explosives at the home of a 79-year-old man. According to a UNDP official, getting civilians to give up their arms to state authorities is complicated as people are then forced to trust that authorities will protect them. Instead, criminals collect the weapons. Some of the missing weapons were used in the November 2015 Paris attacks during which 130 people were killed by jihadists. Other arms were assault rifles which were used in the 2015 Gothenburg pub shooting.

Successor-state governments' efforts to reduce the prevalence of illegally held arms are co-ordinated through a Regional Approach to Stockpile Reduction (RASR) focused on reducing stockpiles, arms diversion and unexplained explosions in South-east Europe. Partners include the European Union, the US Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement, the US Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and NATO's Support and Procurement Agency. Funded by the US Government, activities include annual workshops attended by US government officials from the Departments of State and Defense and defense ministry representatives from the Yugoslav successor states.

Drug trafficking

Since the beginning of hostilities between warring factions in the former Yugoslavia, the Kosovo Liberation Army as well as the Serbian mafia have been involved in the illegal drug trade, particularly with West Asian heroin entering Central and Western Europe. In the early 1990s, 2,000 Albanians from Kosovo were held in Swiss jails on charges of arms and drug smuggling. Over the course of the war, a total of several tons of heroin were confiscated by Interpol and local law enforcement. Illegal drug smuggling operations also led to additional crimes all across Western Europe, which included bank robberies and extortion committed by criminal gangs operating out of Eastern Europe. The intensification of heroin consumption in Western Europe led to the expansion of open air drug markets, particularly in Switzerland. Bosnian criminal gangs continue to have a significant impact on global drug trafficking, through entering the lucrative cocaine trade.

Timeline

Main article: Timeline of the Yugoslav Wars

1990

• Log Revolution. SAO Krajina is proclaimed over an indefinite area of Croatia.

1991

People observing new death notifications on a wall in Dubrovnik during the siege, December 1991

• Slovenia and Croatia declare independence in June, North Macedonia in September. War in Slovenia lasts ten days, and results in dozens of fatalities. The Yugoslav army leaves Slovenia after intervention of the UN which insisted that Slovenia be allowed to leave, but supports rebel Serb forces in Croatia. The Croatian War of Independence begins in Croatia. Serb areas in Croatia declare independence, but are recognized only by Belgrade.
• Vukovar is devastated by bombardments and shelling, and other cities such as Dubrovnik, Karlovac and Osijek sustain extensive damage. Refugees from war zones overwhelm Croatia, while Europe is slow to accept refugees.
• In Croatia, about 250,000 Croats and other non-Serbs forced from their homes or fled the violence.

1992

Besieged residents collect firewood in the bitter winter of 1992 during the Siege of Sarajevo.

• Vance Plan signed, creating four United Nations Protection Force zones for Serbs and ending large-scale fighting in Croatia.
• Bosnia declares independence. Bosnian war begins with the Bosnian Serb military leadership, most notably Ratko Mladić, trying to create a new, separate Serb state, Republika Srpska, through which they would conquer as much of Bosnia as possible for the vision of either a Greater Serbia or a rump Yugoslavia.
• Federal Republic of Yugoslavia proclaimed, consisting of Serbia and Montenegro, the two remaining republics.
• United Nations impose sanctions against FR Yugoslavia for its support of the unrecognized Republic of Serbian Krajina in Croatia and Republika Srpska in Bosnia. In May 1992, Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia become UN members. FR Yugoslavia claims being sole legal heir to SFRY, which is disputed by other republics. UN envoys agree that Yugoslavia had 'dissolved into constituent republics'.
• The Yugoslav army retreats from Bosnia, but leaves its weapons to the army of Republika Srpska, which attacks poorly armed Bosnian cities of Zvornik, Kotor Varoš, Prijedor, Foča, Višegrad, Doboj. Prijedor ethnic cleansing and siege of Sarajevo start. Hundreds of thousands of non-Serbian refugees flee.
• Bosniak-Croat conflict begins in Bosnia.

1993

Two Croatian Defense Council (HVO) T-55 Main Battle Tanks pull into firing position during a three-day exercise held at the Barbara Range in Glamoč, Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Srebrenica Genocide Memorial Stone at Potočari

• Fighting begins in the Bihać region between Bosnian Government forces loyal to Alija Izetbegović, and Bosniaks loyal to Fikret Abdić, also supported by the Serbs.
• Sanctions in FR Yugoslavia, now isolated, create hyperinflation of 300 million percent of the Yugoslav dinar.
• Ahmići massacre: the Croat forces kill over a hundred Bosnian Muslims.
• Battle of Mostar. UNESCO World Heritage Site Stari Most (The Old Bridge) in Mostar, built in 1566, was destroyed by Croatian HVO forces. It was rebuilt in 2003.
• ARBiH launch Operation Neretva '93 against HVO in Herzegovina which ended in a stalemate.

1994

• Markale market shelling in Sarajevo.
• Peace treaty between Bosniaks and Croats arbitrated by the United States, Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina formed.
• FR Yugoslavia starts slowly suspending its financial and military support for Republika Srpska.

1995

• Srebrenica massacre reported. 8,000 Bosniaks killed by Serb forces.
• Croatia launches Operation Flash, recapturing a part of its territory, but tens of thousands of Serb civilians flee from the area. The RSK responds with the Zagreb rocket attack.
• Croatia launches Operation Storm, reclaiming all UNPA zones except Eastern Slavonia, and resulting in exodus of 150,000–200,000 Serbs from the zones. Yugoslav forces do not intervene. War in Croatia ends.
• NATO launches a series of air strikes on Bosnian Serb artillery and other military targets. Croatian and Bosnian army start a joint offensive against Republika Srpska.
• Dayton Agreement signed in Paris. War in Bosnia and Herzegovina ends. Aftermath of war is over 100,000 killed and missing and two million people internally displaced or refugees.

1996

• FR Yugoslavia recognizes Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina.
• Fighting breaks out in Kosovo between Albanians rebels and FR Yugoslav authorities.
• Following allegations of fraud in local elections, tens of thousands of Serbs demonstrate in Belgrade against the Milošević government for three months.

1998

• Eastern Slavonia peacefully reintegrated into Croatia, following a gradual three-year handover of power.
• Fighting in Kosovo gradually escalates between Albanians demanding independence and the state.

1999

• Račak massacre, Rambouillet talks fail. NATO starts a military campaign in Kosovo and bombards FR Yugoslavia in Operation Allied Force.
• Following Milošević's signing of an agreement, control of Kosovo is handed to the United Nations, but still remains a part of Yugoslavia's federation. After losing wars in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo, numerous Serbs leave those regions to find refuge in remainder of Serbia. In 1999, Serbia was host to some 700,000 Serb refugees or internally displaced.
• Fresh fighting erupts between Albanians and Yugoslav security forces in Albanian populated areas outside of Kosovo, with the intent of joining three municipalities to Kosovo (Preševo, Bujanovac and Medveđa).
• Franjo Tuđman dies. Shortly after, his party loses the elections.

Yugoslav Ministry of Defence building in Belgrade, destroyed during the 1999 NATO bombing

2000

• Slobodan Milošević is voted out of office, and Vojislav Koštunica becomes the new president of Yugoslavia. With Milošević ousted and a new government in place, FR Yugoslavia restores ties with the west. The political and economic sanctions are suspended in total, and FRY is reinstated in many political and economic organizations, as well as becoming a candidate for other collaborative efforts.

2001

• An Albanian insurgency begins in Macedonia.
• Conflict in Southern Serbia ends in defeat for Albanians.
• Conflict in Macedonia ends with the Ohrid Agreement.

References

General and cited sources

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• Di Lellio, Anna (2009). "The Missing Democratic Revolution and Serbia's Anti-European Choice 1989–2009". International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society. 22 (3): 373–384. JSTOR 25621931.
• Bogoeva, Julija (2017). "The War in Yugoslavia in ICTY Judgements: The Goals of the Warring Parties and Nature of the Conflict". Brussels: Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher.
• Video on the Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia from the Dean Peter Krogh Foreign Affairs Digital Archives
• Information and links on the Third Balkan War (1991–2001)
• Nation, R. Craig. "War in the Balkans 1991–2002" Archived 25 March 2009 at the Wayback Machine
• Radović, Bora, Jugoslovenski ratovi 1991–1999 i neke od njihovih društvenih posledica (PDF) (in Serbian), RS: IAN, archived from the original (PDF) on March 4, 2016, retrieved February 8, 2016
• Bitter Land, a multilingual database of mass graves in the Yugoslav Wars by Balkan Investigative Reporting Network

Goals

NATO's objectives in the Kosovo conflict were stated at the North Atlantic Council meeting held at NATO headquarters in Brussels on April 12, 1999:

• An end to all military action and the immediate termination of violence and repressive activities by the Milosevic government;
• Withdrawal of all military, police and paramilitary forces from Kosovo;
• Stationing of UN peacekeeping presence in Kosovo;
• Unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons;
• Establishment of a political framework agreement for Kosovo based on Rambouillet Accords, in conformity with international law and the Charter of the United Nations.

Strategy

Operation Allied Force predominantly used a large-scale air campaign to destroy Yugoslav military infrastructure from high altitudes. Ground units were not used because NATO wanted to minimize the risk of losing forces, as well as avoiding public criticism related to its relative ineffectiveness against mobile ground targets. After the third day of aerial bombing, NATO had destroyed almost all of its strategic military targets in Yugoslavia. Despite this, the Yugoslav Army continued to function and to attack Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) insurgents inside Kosovo, mostly in the regions of Northern and Southwest Kosovo. NATO bombed strategic economic and societal targets, such as bridges, military facilities, official government facilities, and factories, using long-range cruise missiles to hit heavily defended targets, such as strategic installations in Belgrade and Pristina. The NATO air forces also targeted infrastructure, such as power plants (using the BLU-114/B "Soft-Bomb"), water-processing plants and the state-owned broadcaster, causing much environmental and economic damage throughout Yugoslavia.

Commentators have debated whether the capitulation of Yugoslavia in the Kosovo War of 1999 resulted solely from the use of air power, or whether other factors contributed.

Due to restrictive media laws, media in Yugoslavia carried little coverage of what its forces were doing in Kosovo, or of other countries' attitudes to the humanitarian crisis; so, few members of the public expected bombing, instead thinking that a diplomatic deal would be made.

Arguments for strategic air power

According to John Keegan, the capitulation of Yugoslavia in the Kosovo War marked a turning point in the history of warfare. It "proved that a war can be won by air power alone". By comparison, diplomacy had failed before the war, and the deployment of a large NATO ground force was still weeks away when Slobodan Milošević agreed to a peace deal.

As for why air power should have been capable of acting alone, it has been argued that there are several factors required. These normally come together only rarely, but all occurred during the Kosovo War:

1. Bombardment needs to be capable of causing destruction while minimising casualties. This causes pressure within the population to end hostilities rather than to prolong them. The exercise of precision air power in the Kosovo War is said to have provided this.
2. The government must be susceptible to pressure from within the population. As was demonstrated by the overthrow of Milošević a year later, Serbia's government was only weakly authoritarian and depended upon support from within the country.
3. There must be a disparity of military capabilities such that the opponent is unable to inhibit the exercise of air superiority over its territory. Serbia, a relatively small impoverished Balkan state, faced a much more powerful NATO coalition including the United Kingdom and the United States.
4. Carl von Clausewitz once called the "essential mass of the enemy" his "centre of gravity". Should the centre of gravity be destroyed, a major factor in Yugoslavian will to resist would be broken or removed. In Milošević's case, the centre of gravity was his hold on power. He manipulated hyperinflation, sanctions and restrictions in supply and demand to allow powerful business interests within Serbia to profit and they responded by maintaining him in power. The damage to the economy, which squeezed it to a point where there was little profit to be made, threatened to undermine their support for Milošević if the air campaign continued, whilst causing costly infrastructure damage.

Arguments against strategic air power

1. Diplomacy:
   1. According to British Lieutenant-General Mike Jackson, Russia's decision on 3 June 1999 to back the West and to urge Milošević to surrender was the single event that had "the greatest significance in ending the war". The Yugoslav capitulation came the same day. Russia relied on Western economic aid at the time, which made it vulnerable to pressure from NATO to withdraw support for Milošević.
   2. Milošević’s indictment by the UN as a war criminal (on 24 May 1999), even if it did not influence him personally, made the likelihood of Russia resuming diplomatic support less likely.
   3. The Rambouillet Agreement of 18 March 1999, had Yugoslavia agreed to it, would have given NATO forces the right of transit, bivouac, manoeuvre, billet, and utilisation across Serbia. By the time Milošević capitulated, NATO forces were to have access only to Kosovo proper.
   4. The international civil presence in the province was to be under UN control which allowed for a Russian veto should Serb interests be threatened.
2. Concurrent ground operations – The KLA undertook operations in Kosovo itself and had some successes against Serb forces. The Yugoslav army abandoned a border post opposite Morinë near the Yugoslav army outpost at Kosare in the north west of the province. The Yugoslav army outpost at Kosare remained in Yugoslav hands throughout the war: this allowed for a supply line to be set up into the province and the subsequent taking of territory in the Junik area. The KLA also penetrated a few miles into the south-western Mount Pastrik area. But most of the province remained under Serb control.
3. Potential ground attack – General Wesley Clark, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, was "convinced" that planning and preparations for ground intervention "in particular, pushed Milošević to concede". The Yugoslav capitulation occurred on the same day that President Bill Clinton held a widely publicized meeting with his four service chiefs to discuss options for a ground-force deployment in case the air war failed. However, France and Germany vigorously opposed a ground offensive, and had done so for some weeks, since April 1999. French estimates suggested that an invasion would need an army of 500,000 to achieve success. This left NATO, particularly the United States, with a clear view that a land operation had no support. With this in mind, the Americans reaffirmed their faith in the air campaign. The reluctance of NATO to use ground forces casts serious doubt on the idea that Milošević capitulated out of fear of a land invasion.

Operation

On 20 March 1999 OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission monitors withdrew from Kosovo citing a "steady deterioration in the security situation", and on 23 March 1999 Richard Holbrooke returned to Brussels and announced that peace talks had failed. Hours before the announcement, Yugoslavia announced on national television it had declared a state of emergency citing an "imminent threat of war ... against Yugoslavia by Nato" and began a huge mobilization of troops and resources. On 23 March 1999 at 22:17 UTC the Secretary General of NATO, Javier Solana, announced he had directed the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), General Wesley Clark, to "initiate air operations in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." On 24 March at 19:00 UTC NATO started the bombing campaign against Yugoslavia.

NATO operations

Wesley Clark served as the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR)

Yugoslav Ministry of Defence building damaged during NATO bombing

People crossing Danube after destruction of all three bridges in Novi Sad

See also: Civilian casualties during Operation Allied Force

NATO's bombing campaign involved 1,000 aircraft operating from air bases in Italy and Germany, and the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt stationed in the Adriatic Sea. At dusk, F/A-18 Hornets of the Spanish Air Force were the first NATO planes to bomb Belgrade and perform SEAD operations. BGM-109 Tomahawk cruise missiles were fired from ships and submarines. The U.S. was the dominant member of the coalition against Yugoslavia, although other NATO members were involved. During the ten weeks of the conflict, NATO aircraft flew over 38,000 combat missions. For the German Air Force, this mission was its first conflict participation since World War II. In addition to air power, one battalion of Apache helicopters from the U.S. Army's 11th Aviation Regiment was deployed to help combat missions. The regiment was augmented by pilots from Fort Bragg's 82nd Airborne Attack Helicopter Battalion. The battalion secured AH-64 Apache attack helicopter refueling sites, and a small team forward deployed to the Albania – Kosovo border to identify targets for NATO air strikes.

The campaign was initially designed to destroy Yugoslavian air defences and high-value military targets.

Ostruznica highway bridge hit during Operation Allied Force

NATO military operations increasingly attacked Yugoslavian units on the ground; as well as continuing the strategic bombardment. Montenegro was bombed several times, and NATO refused to prop up the precarious position of its anti-Milošević leader, Milo Đukanović. "Dual-use" targets, used by civilians and military, were attacked; the targets included bridges across the Danube, factories, power stations, telecommunications facilities, headquarters of Yugoslavian Leftists, a political party led by Milošević's wife, and the Avala TV Tower. Some protested that these actions were violations of international law and the Geneva Conventions. NATO argued these facilities were potentially useful to the Yugoslavian military and that their bombing was justified.

On April 14, NATO planes bombed ethnic Albanians near Koriša who had been used by Yugoslav forces as human shields. Yugoslav troops took TV crews to the scene shortly after the bombing. The Yugoslav government insisted that NATO had targeted civilians.

On May 7, NATO bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, killing three Chinese journalists. NATO had aimed at a Yugoslav military target, but navigational errors led to the wrong building being targeted. The United States and NATO apologized for the bombing, saying it occurred because of an outdated map provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. The bombing strained relations between the People's Republic of China and NATO, provoking angry demonstrations outside Western embassies in Beijing.

NATO command organization

Solana directed Clark to "initiate air operations in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." Clark then delegated responsibility for the conduct of Operation Allied Force to the Commander-in-Chief of Allied Forces Southern Europe who in turn delegated control to the Commander of Allied Air Forces Southern Europe, Lieutenant-General Michael C. Short USAF. Operationally, the day-to-day for responsibility for executing missions was delegated to the Commander of the 5th Allied Tactical Air Force.

Yugoslav operations

The Hague Tribunal ruled that over 700,000 Kosovo Albanians were forcibly displaced by Yugoslav forces into neighbouring Albania and Macedonia, with many thousands displaced within Kosovo. By April, the United Nations reported 850,000 refugees had left from Kosovo. Another 230,000 were listed as internally displaced persons (IDPs): driven from their homes, but still inside Kosovo. German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer claimed the refugee crisis was produced by a Yugoslav plan codenamed "Operation Horseshoe".

Serbian Television claimed that huge columns of refugees were fleeing Kosovo because of NATO’s bombing, not Yugoslav military operations. The Yugoslav side and its Western supporters claimed the refugee outflows were caused by a mass panic in the Kosovo Albanian population, and the exodus was generated principally by fear of NATO bombs.

The United Nations and international human rights organizations were convinced the crisis resulted from a policy of ethnic cleansing. Many accounts from both Serbs and Albanians identified Yugoslav security forces and paramilitaries as the culprits, responsible for systematically emptying towns and villages of their Albanian inhabitants by forcing them to flee.

Atrocities against civilians in Kosovo were the basis of United Nations war crimes charges against Milošević and other officials responsible for directing the Kosovo conflict.

Air combat

Canopy of F-117 shot down by the Yugoslav Air Force on March 27, 1999, near the village of Buđanovci, Serbia.

Wreckage of downed Yugoslav MiG-29 in Ugljevik on March 25, 1999.

Yugoslav anti-aircraft fire at night

An important portion of the war involved combat between the Yugoslav Air Force and the opposing air forces. United States Air Force F-15s and F-16s flying mainly from Italian air force bases attacked the defending Yugoslav fighters; mainly MiG-29s, which were in poor condition, due to lack of spare parts and maintenance. Other NATO forces also contributed to the air war.

Air combat incidents:

• During the night of March 24/25, 1999: Yugoslav air force scrambled five MiG-29s to counter the initial attacks. The two fighters that took off from Niš Airport were vectored to intercept targets over southern Serbia and Kosovo, were dealt with by NATO fighters: the MiG-29 flown by Maj. Dragan Ilić was damaged. He landed with one engine out and the aircraft was later expended as a decoy. The second MiG, flown by Maj. Ilijo Arizanov, was shot down by an USAF F-15C piloted by Lt. Col. Cesar Rodriguez. The pair from Batajnica Air Base (Maj. Nebojša Nikolić and Maj. Ljubiša Kulačin), were engaged by USAF Capt. Mike Shower who shot down Nikolić while Kulačin evaded several missiles fired at him while fighting to bring his malfunctioning systems back to working order. Eventually realizing that he could not do anything, and with Batajnica AB under attack, he diverted to Belgrade Nikola Tesla Airport, and landed safely, his aircraft temporarily concealed under the tail of a parked retired airliner. The fifth and last MiG-29 to get airborne that night was flown by Maj. Predrag Milutinović. Immediately after take-off his radar failed and electrical generator malfunctioned. Shortly after, he was warned by SPO-15 of being acquired by fire control radar, but he eluded the opponent by several evasive manoeuvres. Attempting to evade further encounters, he approached Niš Airport intending to land when he was hit by an 2K12 Kub in a friendly fire incident and forced to eject. In total, the 127.LAE launched five MiG-29s on that night, of which three were shot down, one badly damaged, and one returned in unserviceable condition. Not a single pilot was killed – even if it would take few days until one of them was recovered. Closer examination of available evidence indicates that Maj. Arizanov was shot down by USAF Col. Rodriguez, while Majors Nikolic and Kulacin were engaged by USAF Capt. Showers, who eventually shot down Nikolic. Maj. Milutinovic’s aircraft was probably shot down by a KLU F-16AM flown by Maj. Peter Tankink, while it remains unclear who damaged Maj. Ilic’s MiG-29, it is possible that the 311. Self-Propelled Air Defence Missile Regiment, equipped with SA-6s and deployed in the area where his aircraft was hit, was responsible.
• In the morning of March 25: Maj. Slobodan Tešanović stalled his Mig-29 while landing on Ponikve Airbase after a re-base flight. He ejected safely.
• During the war Yugoslav strike aircraft J-22 Oraos and G-4 Super Galebs performed some 20–30 combat missions against the KLA in Kosovo at treetop level causing some casualties. During one of those missions on March 25, 1999, Lt. Colonel Života Ðurić was killed when his J-22 Orao hit a hill in Kosovo. It was never firmly established whether an aircraft malfunction, pilot error or an enemy action (by KLA) was the cause (NATO never claimed it shot it down).
• In the afternoon of March 25, 1999: Two Yugoslav MiG-29s took off from Batajnica to chase a lone NATO aircraft flying in the direction of Bosnia. They crossed the border and were engaged by two US F-15s. Both MiGs were shot down by Captain Jeff Hwang. One MiG pilot, Major Slobodan Perić having evaded at least one missile before being hit ejected and was later smuggled back to Yugoslavia by the Republika Srpska police. The other pilot, Captain Zoran Radosavljević, did not eject and was killed.
• On March 27, 1999, the 3rd Battalion of the 250th Missile Brigade, under the command of Colonel Zoltán Dani, equipped with the Isayev S-125 'Neva-M' (NATO designation SA-3 Goa), downed an American F-117 Nighthawk. Yugoslav air defense operators found they could detect F-117s with "obsolete" Soviet radars operating on long wavelengths. The pilot ejected and was rescued by search and rescue forces near Belgrade. This was the first and so far only time a stealth aircraft has been shot down.
• On April 5, 6 and 7 one Yugoslav Mig-29 was scrambled to intercept NATO aircraft, but each time Yugoslav pilots refused battle due to malfunctions.
• On April 30, some American sources confirm that a second F-117A was damaged. Although the aircraft returned to base, it supposedly never flew again.
• On May 2, an American F-16 was shot down near Šabac, by a SA-3 again fired by the 3rd Battalion of the 250th Missile Brigade. The pilot was rescued. On the same day an A-10 Thunderbolt II was heavily damaged by Strela 2 shoulder-mounted SAM over Kosovo and had to make an emergency landing in Skopje. Also a US-operated Harrier jump-jet crashed while returning to the amphibious assault carrier USS Kearsarge from a training mission. Its pilot was rescued.
• On May 4, a Yugoslav MiG-29, piloted by Lt. Colonel Milenko Pavlović, was shot down at a low altitude over his native city Valjevo by two USAF F-16s. The falling aircraft was possibly hit as well by Strela 2 fired by Yugoslav troops. Pavlović was killed.
• On May 11 an A-10 was lightly damaged over Kosovo.
• During the war NATO lost two AH-64 Apache strike helicopters (one on April 26 and the other on May 4 in Albania near the border with Yugoslavia, in training accidents resulting in death of two crew members).
• NATO reported that it lost 21 UAVs to technical failures or enemy action during the conflict, including at least seven German UAVs and five French UAVs. While the commander of the Yugoslav Third Army claimed that 21 NATO UAVs had been shot down by Yugoslav forces, another Yugoslav general claimed that Yugoslav air defences and ground forces had shot down 30 UAVs.

KFOR

By the start of April, the conflict seemed closer to resolution. NATO countries began to deliberate about invading Kosovo with ground units. US President Bill Clinton was reluctant to commit US forces for a ground offensive. At the same time, Finnish and Russian negotiators continued to try to persuade Milošević to back down. Faced with little alternative, Milošević accepted the conditions offered by a Finnish-Russian mediation team and agreed to a military presence within Kosovo headed by the UN, but incorporating NATO troops.

On June 12, after Milošević accepted the conditions, KFOR began entering Kosovo. KFOR, a NATO force, had been preparing to conduct combat operations, but in the end, its mission was only peacekeeping. It was based upon the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps headquarters commanded by then Lieutenant General Mike Jackson of the British Army. It consisted of British forces (a brigade built from 4th Armored and 5th Airborne Brigades), a French Army Brigade, a German Army brigade, which entered from the west while all the other forces advanced from the south, and Italian Army and US Army brigades. The U.S. contribution, known as the Initial Entry Force, was led by the U.S. 1st Armored Division. Subordinate units included TF 1–35 Armor from Baumholder, Germany, the 2nd Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit from Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, the 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry Regiment from Schweinfurt, Germany, and Echo Troop, 4th Cavalry Regiment, also from Schweinfurt, Germany. Also attached to the U.S. force was the Greek Army's 501st Mechanized Infantry Battalion. The initial U.S. forces established their area of operation around the towns of Uroševac, the future Camp Bondsteel, and Gnjilane, at Camp Monteith, and spent four months – the start of a stay which continues to date – establishing order in the southeast sector of Kosovo.

The first NATO troops to enter Pristina on the 12th of June 1999 were Norwegian special forces from FSK Forsvarets Spesialkommando and soldiers from the British Special Air Service 22 S.A.S, although to NATO's diplomatic embarrassment Russian troops arrived first at the airport. The Norwegian soldiers from FSK Forsvarets Spesialkommando were the first to come in contact with the Russian troops at the airport. FSK's mission was to level the negotiating field between the belligerent parties, and to fine-tune the detailed, local deals needed to implement the peace deal between the Serbians and the Kosovo Albanians.

During the initial incursion, the U.S. soldiers were greeted by Albanians cheering and throwing flowers as U.S. soldiers and KFOR rolled through their villages. Although no resistance was met, three U.S. soldiers from the Initial Entry Force lost their lives in accidents.

Following the military campaign, the involvement of Russian peacekeepers proved to be tense and challenging to the NATO Kosovo force. The Russians expected to have an independent sector of Kosovo, only to be unhappily surprised with the prospect of operating under NATO command. Without prior communication or coordination with NATO, Russian peacekeeping forces entered Kosovo from Bosnia and seized Pristina International Airport.

In 2010 James Blunt in an interview described how his unit was given the assignment of securing the Pristina in advance of the 30,000-strong peacekeeping force and the Russian army had moved in and taken control of the airport before his unit's arrival. As the first officer on the scene, Blunt shared a part in the difficult task of addressing the potentially violent international incident. His own account tells of how he refused to follow orders from NATO command to attack the Russians.

Outpost Gunner was established on a high point in the Preševo Valley by Echo Battery 1/161 Field Artillery in an attempt to monitor and assist with peacekeeping efforts in the Russian Sector. Operating under the support of 2/3 Field Artillery, 1st Armored Division, the Battery was able to successfully deploy and continuously operate a Firefinder Radar which allowed the NATO forces to keep a closer watch on activities in the Sector and the Preševo Valley. Eventually a deal was struck whereby Russian forces operated as a unit of KFOR but not under the NATO command structure.

NATO forces

While not directly related to the hostilities, on 12 March 1999 the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland joined NATO by depositing instruments of accession in accordance with Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty at a ceremony in Independence, Missouri. These nations did not participate directly in hostilities.

Aviation

A large element of the operation was the air forces of NATO, relying heavily on the US Air Force and Navy. The French Navy and Air Force operated the Super Etendard and the Mirage 2000. The Italian Air Force operated with 34 Tornado, 12 F-104, 12 AMX, 2 B-707, the Italian Navy operated with Harrier II. The British Royal Air Force operated the Harrier GR7 and Tornado ground attack jets as well as an array of support aircraft. Belgian, Danish, Dutch and Turkish Air Forces operated F-16s. The Spanish Air Force deployed EF-18s and KC-130s. The Canadian Air Force deployed a total of 18 CF-18s, enabling them to be responsible for 10% of all bombs dropped in the operation. The fighters were armed with both guided and unguided "dumb" munitions, including the Paveway series of laser-guided bombs. The bombing campaign marked the first time the German Air Force actively participated in combat operations since the end of World War II.

However, NATO forces relied mostly upon the Americans and the proven effectiveness of its air power by using the F-16, F-15, F-117, F-14, F/A-18, EA-6B, B-52, KC-135, KC-10, AWACS, and JSTARS from bases throughout Europe and from aircraft carriers in the region. The American B-2 Spirit stealth bomber also saw its first successful combat role in Operation Allied Force, all while striking from its home base in the continental United States.

Depleted uranium ammunition, fired in FR Yugoslavia in 1999.

Even with this air power, noted a RAND Corporation study, "NATO never fully succeeded in neutralizing the enemy's radar-guided SAM threat".

Space

Operation Allied Force incorporated the first large-scale use of satellites as a direct method of weapon guidance. The collective bombing was the first combat use of the Joint Direct Attack Munition JDAM kit, which uses an inertial-guidance and GPS-guided tail fin to increase the accuracy of conventional gravity munitions up to 95%. The JDAM kits were outfitted on the B-2s. The AGM-154 Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) had been previously used in Operation Southern Watch earlier in 1999.

Naval

NATO naval forces operated in the Adriatic Sea. The Royal Navy sent a substantial task force that included the aircraft carrier HMS Invincible, which operated Sea Harrier FA2 fighter jets. The RN also deployed destroyers and frigates, and the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) provided support vessels, including the aviation training/primary casualty receiving ship RFA Argus. It was the first time the RN used cruise missiles in combat, operated from the nuclear fleet submarine HMS Splendid. The Italian Navy provided a naval task force that included the aircraft carrier Giuseppe Garibaldi, a frigate (Maestrale) and a submarine (Template:Sclass-). The United States Navy provided a naval task force that included the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt, USS Vella Gulf, and the amphibious assault ship USS Kearsarge. The French Navy provided the aircraft carrier Foch and escorts. The German Navy deployed the frigate Rheinland-Pfalz and Oker, an Template:Sclass-, in the naval operations.

Army

Captured American equipment in Belgrade museum

U.S. ground forces included a battalion from the 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division. The unit was deployed in March 1999 to Albania in support of the bombing campaign where the battalion secured the Tirana airfield, Apache helicopter refueling sites, established a forward-operating base to prepare for Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) strikes and offensive ground operations, and deployed a small team with an AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder radar system to the Albania/Kosovo border where it acquired targets for allied/NATO air strikes. Immediately after the bombing campaign, the battalion was refitted back at Tirana airfield and issued orders to move into Kosovo as the initial entry force in support of Operation Joint Guardian. Task Force Hawk was also deployed.

Aftermath

Civilian casualties

Main article: Civilian casualties during Operation Allied Force

Sites in Kosovo and southern Central Serbia where NATO used munitions with depleted uranium

Human Rights Watch "concludes that as few as 489 and as many as 528 Yugoslav civilians were killed in the ninety separate incidents in Operation Allied Force". Refugees were among the victims. Between 278 and 317 of the dead, between 56 and 60 percent of the total number of deaths, were in Kosovo. In Serbia, 201 civilians were killed (five in Vojvodina) and eight died in Montenegro. Almost two thirds (303 to 352) of the total registered civilian deaths occurred in twelve incidents where ten or more civilian deaths were confirmed.

Military casualties

Military casualties on the NATO side were limited. According to official reports, the alliance suffered no fatalities from combat operations. However, on May 5, an American AH-64 Apache crashed and exploded during a night-time mission in Albania. The Yugoslavs claimed they shot it down, but NATO claimed it crashed due to a technical malfunction. It crashed 40 miles from Tirana, killing the two crewmen, Army Chief Warrant Officers David Gibbs and Kevin Reichert. It was one of two Apache helicopters lost in the war. A further three American soldiers were taken as prisoners of war. A study of the campaign reports that Yugoslav air defenses may have fired up to 700 missiles at NATO aircraft, and that the B-1 bomber crews counted at least 20 surface-to-air missiles fired at them during their first 50 missions. Despite this, only two NATO aircraft (one F-16C and one F-117A Nighthawk) were shot down. A further F-117A Nighthawk was damaged as were two A-10 Thunderbolt IIs. One AV-8B Harrier crashed due to technical failure. NATO also lost 25 UAVs, either due to enemy action or mechanical failure.

Post-strike bomb damage assessment photo of Zastava car plant.

In 2013, Serbia's then-Defence Minister Aleksandar Vučić announced that Yugoslavia's military and police losses during the air campaign amounted to 956 killed and 52 missing. Vučić stated that 631 soldiers were killed and a further 28 went missing, and that 325 police officers were also among the dead with a further 24 listed as missing. The Government of Serbia also lists 5,173 combatants as having been wounded. In early June 1999, while the bombing was still in progress, NATO officials claimed that 5,000 Yugoslav troops had been killed in the bombing and a further 10,000 wounded. NATO later revised this estimation to 1,200 soldiers and policemen killed. At the end of the war, NATO also claimed to have destroyed 120 tanks, 220 armoured personnel carriers and 450 artillery pieces. In 2000, a United States Air Force inquiry established that the alliance had actually destroyed 14 tanks, 18 armoured personnel carriers and 20 artillery pieces. Yugoslav officials had reported similar figures in the weeks after the bombing, but these statements had been dismissed as "disinformation" by NATO officials at the time. The Yugoslav Air Force sustained much more serious damage, with 121 aircraft destroyed.

Operation Allied Force inflicted less damage on the Yugoslav military than originally thought due to the use of camouflage. Other misdirection techniques were used to disguise military targets. It was only in the later stages of the campaign that strategic targets such as bridges and buildings were attacked in any systematic way, causing significant disruption and economic damage. This stage of the campaign led to controversial incidents, most notably the bombing of the People's Republic of China embassy in Belgrade where three Chinese reporters were killed and twenty injured, which NATO claimed was a mistake.

Relatives of Italian soldiers believe 50 of them have died since the war due to their exposure to depleted uranium weapons. UNEP tests found no evidence of harm by depleted uranium weapons, even among cleanup workers, but those tests and UNEP’s report were questioned in an article in Le Monde diplomatique.

Damage and economic loss

In April 1999, during the NATO bombing, officials in Yugoslavia said the damage from the bombing campaign has cost around $100 billion up to that time.

In 2000, a year after the bombing ended, Group 17 published a survey dealing with damage and economic restoration. The report concluded that direct damage from the bombing totalled $3.8 billion, not including Kosovo, of which only 5% had been repaired at that time.

In 2006, a group of economists from the G17 Plus party estimated the total economic losses resulting from the bombing were about $29.6 billion. This figure included indirect economic damage, loss of human capital, and loss of GDP.

Political outcome

When NATO agreed Kosovo would be politically supervised by the United Nations, and that there would be no independence referendum for three years, the Yugoslav government agreed to withdraw its forces from Kosovo, under strong diplomatic pressure from Russia, and the bombing was suspended on June 10. The war ended June 11, and Russian paratroopers seized Slatina airport to become the first peacekeeping force in the war zone. As British troops were still massed on the Macedonian border, planning to enter Kosovo at 5 am, the Serbs were hailing the Russian arrival as proof the war was a UN operation, not a NATO operation. After hostilities ended, on June 12 the U.S. Army's 82nd Airborne, 2–505th Parachute Infantry Regiment entered war-torn Kosovo as part of Operation Joint Guardian.

Yugoslav President Milošević survived the conflict and declared its outcome a major victory for Yugoslavia. He was, however, indicted for war crimes by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia along with a number of other senior Yugoslav political and military figures. His indictment led to Yugoslavia as a whole being treated as a pariah by much of the international community because Milošević was subject to arrest if he left Yugoslavia. The country's economy was badly affected by the conflict, an in October 2000, led to the overthrow of Milošević.

Thousands were killed during the conflict, and hundreds of thousands more fled from the province to other parts of the country and to the surrounding countries. Most of the Albanian refugees returned home within a few weeks or months. However, much of the non-Albanian population again fled to other parts of Serbia or to protected enclaves within Kosovo following the operation. Albanian guerrilla activity spread into other parts of Serbia and to neighbouring Republic of Macedonia, but subsided in 2001. The non-Albanian population has since diminished further following fresh outbreaks of inter-communal conflict and harassment.

In December 2002, Elizabeth II approved the awarding of the Battle Honour "Kosovo" to squadrons of the RAF that participated in the conflict. These were: Nos 1, 7, 8, 9, 14, 23, 31, 51, 101, and 216 squadrons. This was also extended to the Canadian squadrons deployed to the operation, 425 and 441.

Ten years after the operation, the Republic of Kosovo declared independence with a new Republic of Kosovo government.

Attitudes towards the campaign

Warning sign about NATO cluster bombs near ski slopes at Kopaonik.

Main article: Legitimacy of NATO bombing of Yugoslavia

In favor of the campaign

Those who were involved in the NATO airstrikes have stood by the decision to take such action. Clinton's Secretary of Defense, William Cohen, said, "The appalling accounts of mass killing in Kosovo and the pictures of refugees fleeing Serb oppression for their lives makes it clear that this is a fight for justice over genocide." On CBS' Face the Nation Cohen claimed, "We've now seen about 100,000 military-aged men missing. ... They may have been murdered." Clinton, citing the same figure, spoke of "at least 100,000 (Kosovar Albanians) missing". Later, Clinton said about Yugoslav elections, "they're going to have to come to grips with what Mr. Milošević ordered in Kosovo. ... They're going to have to decide whether they support his leadership or not; whether they think it's OK that all those tens of thousands of people were killed. ..." In the same press conference, Clinton also claimed "NATO stopped deliberate, systematic efforts at ethnic cleansing and genocide." Clinton compared the events of Kosovo to the Holocaust. CNN reported, "Accusing Serbia of 'ethnic cleansing' in Kosovo similar to the genocide of Jews in World War II, an impassioned President Clinton sought Tuesday to rally public support for his decision to send U.S. forces into combat against Yugoslavia, a prospect that seemed increasingly likely with the breakdown of a diplomatic peace effort." Clinton's State Department also claimed Serbian troops had committed genocide. The New York Times reported, "the Administration said evidence of 'genocide' by Serbian forces was growing to include 'abhorrent and criminal action' on a vast scale. The language was the State Department's strongest up to that time in denouncing Yugoslav President Slobodan Milošević." The State Department also gave the highest estimate of dead Albanians. In May 1996, Defense Secretary William Cohen suggested that there might be up to 100,000 Albanian fatalities." Five months after the conclusion of NATO bombing, when around one third of reported gravesites had been visited, 2,108 bodies had been found, with a total estimate of between five and twelve thousand; Serb forces had systematically concealed grave sites and moved bodies.

The United States House of Representatives passed a non-binding resolution on March 11, 1999 by a vote of 219–191 conditionally approving of Clinton's plan to commit 4000 troops to the NATO peacekeeping mission. In late April the House Appropriations Committee approved $13 billion in emergency spending to cover the cost of the air war, but a second non-binding resolution approving of the mission failed in the full House by a vote of 213–213. The Senate had passed the second resolution in late March by a vote of 58–41.

Criticism of the campaign

There has also been criticism of the campaign. Joseph Farah accused the coalition of exaggerating the casualty numbers to make a claim of potential genocide to justify the bombings. United States President Clinton and his administration, were accused of inflating the number of Kosovar Albanians killed by Serbians.

In an interview with Radio-Television Serbia journalist Danilo Mandic on April 25, 2006, Noam Chomsky alleged that Strobe Talbott, the Deputy Secretary of State under Clinton and the leading U.S. negotiator during the war, later denied in John Norris' 2005 book Collision Course: NATO, Russia, and Kosovo that "the plight of the Kosovar Albanians" was the driving force behind the campaign, claiming the real reason to be "Yugoslavia's resistance to ... [the] political and economic reform" that had been driving forward the liberalisation and deregulation of markets throughout the region. On May 31, 2006, University of California, Berkeley economics professor Brad DeLong rebutted this allegation and noted that in the original passage which Chomsky cited, Talbott claimed that "the Kosovo crisis was fueled by frustration with Milosevic and the legitimate fear that instability and conflict might spread further in the region" and also alleged that "many outsiders accuse western countries of selective intervention in Kosovo—fighting on a hair-trigger in the Balkans while avoiding the Sudans and Rwandas of the world. This was hardly the case. Only a decade of death, destruction, and Milosevic brinkmanship pushed NATO to act when the Rambouillet talks collapsed. Most of the leaders of NATO's major powers were proponents of "third way" politics and headed socially progressive, economically centrist governments. None of these men were particularly hawkish, and Milosevic did not allow them the political breathing room to look past his abuses."

The United Nations Charter does not allow military interventions in other sovereign countries with few exceptions which, in general, need to be decided upon by the United Nations Security Council. The issue was brought before the UNSC by Russia, in a draft resolution which, inter-alia, would affirm "that such unilateral use of force constitutes a flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter". China, Namibia and Russia voted for the resolution, the other members against, thus it failed to pass.

On April 29, 1999, Yugoslavia filed a complaint at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at The Hague against ten NATO member countries (Belgium, Germany, France, United Kingdom, Italy, Canada, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United States) and alleged that the military operation had violated Article 9 of the 1948 Genocide Convention and that Yugoslavia had jurisdiction to sue through Article 38, para. 5 of Rules of Court. On June 2, the ICJ ruled in an 8–4 vote that Yugoslavia had no such jurisdiction. Four of the ten nations (the United States, France, Italy and Germany) had withdrawn entirely from the court's “optional clause.” Because Yugoslavia filed its complaint only three days after accepting the terms of the court's optional clause, the ICJ ruled that there was no jurisdiction to sue either Britain or Spain, as the two nations had only agreed to submit to ICJ lawsuits if a suing party had filed their complaint a year or more after accepting the terms of the optional clause. Despite objections that Yugoslavia had legal jurisdiction to sue Belgium, the Netherlands, Canada and Portugal, the ICJ majority vote also determined that the NATO bombing was an instance of “humanitarian intervention" and thus did not violate Article 9 of the Genocide Convention.

Amnesty International released a report which stated that NATO forces had deliberately targeted a civilian object (NATO bombing of the Radio Television of Serbia headquarters), and had bombed targets at which civilians were certain to be killed. The report was rejected by NATO as "baseless and ill-founded". A week before the report was released, Carla Del Ponte, the chief prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia had told the United Nations Security Council that her investigation into NATO actions found no basis for charging NATO or its leaders with war crimes.

A large majority of U.S. House Republicans voted against both non-binding resolutions expressing approval for American involvement in the NATO mission.

See also

• Legitimacy of NATO bombing of Yugoslavia
• Operation Deliberate Force
• Operation Horseshoe
• Responsibility to protect
• War crimes in the Kosovo War
• Allied Rapid Reaction Corps
• NATO bombing of Novi Sad in 1999
• Grdelica train bombing
• Incident at Pristina airport
• Prizren Incident (1999)
• Air Force of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
• Operation Eagle Eye (Kosovo)
• Bombing of Belgrade in World War II

Bibliography

• Krieger, Heike (2001). The Kosovo Conflict and International Law: An Analytical Documentation 1974–1999. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-80071-6. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• McCormack, Timothy (2006). McDonald, Avril; McCormack, Timothy (eds.). Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law – 2003. The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press. ISBN 978-90-6704-203-1. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Rip, Michael Russell; Hasik, James M. (2002). The Precision Revolution: GPS and the Future of Aerial Warfare. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 978-1-55750-973-4. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Macdonald, Scott (2007). Propaganda and Information Warfare in the Twenty-First Century: Altered Images and Deception Operations. Routledge. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)

Further reading

• Byman, Daniel. L and Waxman, Mathew C. "Kosovo and the Great Air Power Debate". International Security, Vol. 24, No. 4. 2000. Pp. 5–38.
• New York Times—Chinese Embassy Bombing: A Wide Net of Blame, April 17, 2000.

External links

• Kosovo OPERATION ALLIED FORCE—After Action Report, January 2000
• Operation Allied Force NATO
• Civilian deaths in the NATO air campaign Human Rights Watch
• frontline: war in europe PBS Frontline
• Officially confirmed/documented NATO helicopter losses
• Lt. Col. Michael W. Lamb Sr. "Operation Allied Force: Golden Nuggets for Future Campaigns" (PDF). Retrieved June 22, 2009.
• Literature list on Operation Allied Force
• Serbian Information Operations During Operation Allied Force – Defence Technical Information Center
• Serbian Information Operations During Operation Allied Force–Storming Media,PENTAGON reports
• SERBIAN INFORMATION OPERATIONS DURING OPERATION ALLIED FORCE–Air University
• BBC: Nato's bombing blunders A detailed list of incidents in which civilians were killed