Russian invasion of Ukraine

Russian invasion of Ukraine
Part of the Russo-Ukrainian War (outline)
Map of Ukraine as of 9 July 2024 (details):   Continuously controlled by Ukraine   Occupied by Russia   Regained from Russia
Date 24 February 2022 – present (2 years, 4 months, 2 weeks and 1 day) Location Ukraine, Russia, Black Sea Status Ongoing (list of engagements · territorial control · timeline of events)
Belligerents
Russia Donetsk PR Luhansk PR Supported by: Belarus	Ukraine
Commanders and leaders
Vladimir Putin Aleksandr Dvornikov Gennady Zhidko Sergey Surovikin Valery Gerasimov	Volodymyr Zelenskyy Oleksandr Syrskyi Valerii Zaluzhnyi
Units involved
Order of battle	Order of battle
Strength
Pre-invasion at border: 169,000–190,000 Pre-invasion total: 900,000 military 554,000 paramilitary In February 2023: 300,000+ active personnel in Ukraine	Pre-invasion total: 196,600 military 102,000 paramilitary July 2022 total: up to 700,000 September 2023 total: over 800,000
Casualties and losses
Reports vary widely, see § Casualties for details.

Russia invaded Ukraine on 24 February 2022. Internationally considered an act of aggression, the invasion has triggered Europe's largest refugee crisis since World War II, with more than 4.5 million Ukrainians leaving the country and a quarter of the population displaced.

The invasion marked a major escalation of the Russo-Ukrainian War, which began following the 2014 Ukrainian Revolution of Dignity. Russia subsequently annexed Crimea, and Russian-backed separatists seized part of the south-eastern Donbas region of Ukraine, sparking a war there. In 2021, Russia began a large military build-up along its border with Ukraine, amassing up to 190,000 troops along with their equipment. In a broadcast shortly before the invasion, Russian president Vladimir Putin espoused irredentist views, questioned Ukraine's right to statehood, and falsely accused Ukraine of being dominated by neo-Nazis who persecute the ethnic Russian minority. Putin said that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), by expanding eastward since the early 2000s, had threatened Russia's security – a claim disputed by NATO – and demanded Ukraine be barred from ever joining the alliance. The United States and others accused Russia of planning to attack or invade Ukraine, which Russian officials repeatedly denied as late as 23 February 2022.

On 21 February 2022, Russia recognised the Donetsk People's Republic and the Luhansk People's Republic, two self-proclaimed statelets in Donbas controlled by pro-Russian separatists. The following day, the Federation Council of Russia authorised the use of military force abroad, and overt Russian troops entered both territories. The invasion began on the morning of 24 February, when Putin announced a "special military operation" to "demilitarise and denazify" Ukraine. Minutes later, missiles and airstrikes hit across Ukraine, including the capital Kyiv, shortly followed by a large ground invasion from multiple directions. In response, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy enacted martial law and general mobilisation.

Multi-pronged offensives were launched from Russia, Belarus, and the two occupied territories of Ukraine (Crimea and Donbas). The four major offensives are the Kyiv offensive, the Northeastern Ukraine offensive, the Eastern Ukraine offensive, and the Southern Ukraine offensive. Russian aircraft and missiles also struck western parts of Ukraine. Russian forces have approached or besieged key settlements, including Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Kherson, Kyiv, Mariupol, and Sumy, but met stiff Ukrainian resistance and experienced logistical and operational challenges that hampered their progress. Three weeks after launching the invasion, the Russian military had more success in the south, while incremental gains or stalemates elsewhere forced them into attrition warfare, resulting in mounting civilian casualties. In late March 2022, Russian forces withdrew from the Kyiv region with the declared aim to refocus on Donbas, leaving behind devastated settlements and growing evidence of atrocities against civilians.

The invasion has been widely condemned internationally. The United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution which condemned it and demanded a full withdrawal. The International Court of Justice ordered Russia to suspend military operations and the Council of Europe expelled Russia. Many countries imposed new sanctions, which have affected the economies of Russia and the world, and provided humanitarian and military aid to Ukraine. Protests occurred around the world; those in Russia have been met with mass arrests and increased media censorship, including banning the terms "war" and "invasion". Numerous companies withdrew their products and services from Russia and Belarus, and Russian state-funded media were banned from broadcasting and removed from online platforms. The International Criminal Court opened an investigation into allegations of Russian military war crimes in Ukraine.

Background

Post-Soviet context and Orange Revolution

Further information: Orange Revolution

See also: Russia–Ukraine relations and Ukraine–European Union relations

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union (USSR) in 1991, Ukraine and Russia maintained close ties. In 1994, Ukraine agreed to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon state, and former Soviet nuclear weapons in Ukraine were dismantled. In return, Russia, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US) agreed to uphold the territorial integrity of Ukraine through the Budapest Memorandum. In 1999, Russia was one of the signatories of the Charter for European Security, which "reaffirmed the inherent right of each and every participating State to be free to choose or change its security arrangements, including treaties of alliance, as they evolve". In the years after the Soviet Union's collapse, several former Eastern Bloc countries joined NATO, partly in response to regional security threats such as the 1993 Russian constitutional crisis, the War in Abkhazia (1992–1993) and the First Chechen War (1994–1996). Russian leaders described this expansion as a violation of Western powers' informal assurances that NATO would not expand eastward.

Protestors in Kyiv during the Orange Revolution, November 2004

The 2004 Ukrainian presidential election was controversial. During the election campaign, the pro-European integration opposition candidate Viktor Yushchenko was poisoned by TCDD dioxin; he later implicated Russian involvement. In November, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych was declared the winner, despite allegations of vote-rigging by election observers. During a two-month period which became known as the Orange Revolution, large peaceful protests successfully challenged the outcome. After the Supreme Court of Ukraine annulled the initial result due to widespread electoral fraud, a second round re-run was held, bringing to power Yushchenko as president and leaving Yanukovych in opposition. According to analyst Anthony Cordesman, Russian military officers viewed the Orange Revolution, and other pro-democracy colour revolutions within the post-Soviet states, as being instigated by Western countries to undermine Russia's national security. Russian president Vladimir Putin described the 2011–2013 Russian protests as an attempt to transfer the Orange Revolution to Russia. Rallies in favour of Putin during this period were called "anti-Orange protests".

At the 2008 Bucharest summit, Ukraine and Georgia sought to join NATO. The response among NATO members was divided; Western European countries opposed offering Membership Action Plans (MAP) to avoid antagonising Russia, while US president George W. Bush pushed for their admission. NATO ultimately refused to offer Ukraine and Georgia MAPs, but also issued a statement agreeing that "these countries will become members of NATO". Putin voiced strong opposition to Georgia and Ukraine's NATO membership bids. On 7 February 2019, the Verkhovna Rada, Ukraine's parliament, voted to amend the constitution to state that the country's long-term ambition was to join the European Union (EU) and NATO. However, in the months prior to the 2022 invasion, the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO remained remote.

Euromaidan, Revolution of Dignity, and the War in Donbas

Main articles: Euromaidan, Revolution of Dignity, and War in Donbas

See also: 2014 pro-Russian unrest in Ukraine, Annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation, and Russian nationalism

Euromaidan protests in Kyiv, December 2013

In 2009, Yanukovych announced his intent to again run for president in the 2010 Ukrainian presidential election, which he subsequently won. In November 2013, he announced he would not sign the EU–Ukraine Association Agreement, despite overwhelming support for the treaty within the Verkhovna Rada, instead choosing closer ties to Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union. Russia had put pressure on Ukraine to reject the agreement. This triggered a wave of pro-EU protests known as Euromaidan, which widened in scope to oppose widespread government corruption, police brutality, and repressive anti-protest laws. In February 2014, clashes in Kyiv between protesters and Berkut special police resulted in the deaths of 100 protesters and 13 policemen; most of the victims were shot by police snipers. On 21 February 2014, Yanukovych and parliamentary opposition leaders signed an agreement calling for an interim government and early elections. The following day, Yanukovych fled Kyiv and later Ukraine; parliament subsequently voted to remove him from office. Leaders in Russian-speaking eastern Ukraine declared continuing loyalty to Yanukovych, leading to pro-Russian unrest.

Ukraine, with Crimea and two self-proclaimed separatist republics in Donbas

The unrest was followed by the annexation of Crimea by Russia in March 2014 and the war in Donbas, which started in April 2014 with the formation of two Russia-backed separatist quasi-states: the Donetsk People's Republic and the Luhansk People's Republic. Russian troops were involved in the conflict. The Minsk agreements were signed in September 2014 and February 2015 in a bid to stop the fighting, although ceasefires repeatedly failed. A dispute emerged over the role of Russia: Normandy Format members France, Germany, and Ukraine saw Minsk as an agreement between Russia and Ukraine, whereas Russia insisted Ukraine should negotiate directly with the two separatist republics. In 2021, Putin refused offers from Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy for high-level talks, and the Russian government subsequently endorsed an article by former president Dmitry Medvedev arguing it was pointless to deal with Ukraine while it remained a "vassal" of the US.

The annexation of Crimea led to a new wave of Russian nationalism, with large parts of the Russian neo-imperial movement aspiring to annex more Ukrainian land, including the unrecognised Novorossiya. Analyst Vladimir Socor argued that Putin's 2014 speech after the annexation of Crimea was a de facto "manifesto of Greater-Russia Irredentism". In July 2021, Putin published an essay titled "On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians", in which he reaffirmed his view that Russians and Ukrainians were "one people". American historian Timothy D. Snyder described Putin's ideas as imperialism, while British journalist Edward Lucas called it historical revisionism. Other observers regarded the Russian leadership as having a distorted view of modern Ukraine and its history. Ukraine and other European countries neighbouring Russia accused Putin of irredentism and of pursuing aggressive militaristic policies.

Prelude

Main article: Prelude to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine

Rise in tensions (March 2021 – February 2022)

US paratroopers of 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment depart Italy's Aviano Air Base for Latvia, 23 February 2022. Thousands of US troops were deployed to Eastern Europe amid Russia's military build-up.

From March to April 2021, Russia commenced a major military build-up near the Russo-Ukrainian border. It was followed by a second build-up between October 2021 to February 2022 in both Russia and Belarus. During these developments, the Russian government repeatedly denied it had plans to invade or attack Ukraine; those who issued the denials included government spokesman Dmitry Peskov on 28 November 2021, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov on 19 January 2022, Russian ambassador to the US Anatoly Antonov on 20 February 2022, and Russian ambassador to the Czech Republic Alexander Zmeevsky on 23 February 2022.

Putin's chief national security adviser, Nikolai Patrushev, who believed that the West has been in an undeclared war with Russia for years, was a leading figure behind Russia's updated national security strategy, published in May 2021. It stated that Russia may use "forceful methods" to "thwart or avert unfriendly actions that threaten the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation."

In early December 2021, following Russian denials, the US released intelligence of Russian invasion plans, including satellite photographs showing Russian troops and equipment near the Russo-Ukrainian border. The intelligence reported the existence of a Russian list of key sites and individuals to be killed or neutralised upon invasion. The US continued to release reports that accurately predicted the invasion plans.

Russian accusations and demands

Further information: Russian opposition to Ukrainian NATO membership

See also: Disinformation in the 2021–2022 Russo-Ukrainian crisis and Humanitarian situation during the war in Donbas

On 10 January 2022, Ukrainian deputy prime minister Olha Stefanishyna and NATO secretary-general Jens Stoltenberg spoke to media about the prospect of a Russian invasion.

In the months preceding the invasion, Russian officials accused Ukraine of inciting tensions, Russophobia, and the repression of Russian speakers in Ukraine. They also made multiple security demands of Ukraine, NATO, and non-NATO allies in the EU. These actions were described by commentators and Western officials as attempts to justify war. On 9 December 2021, Putin said that "Russophobia is a first step towards genocide". Putin's claims were dismissed by the international community, and Russian claims of genocide were widely rejected as baseless. Scholars of genocide and Nazism said that Putin was abusing the term genocide and his claims were "factually wrong". Ukrainian president Zelenskyy declared that 16 February, a speculated date for the invasion, would be a "Day of Unity".

Putin questioned the legitimacy of the Ukrainian state. In a 21 February speech, he repeated an inaccurate claim that "Ukraine never had a tradition of genuine statehood" and incorrectly described the country as having been created by Soviet Russia. Putin falsely accused Ukrainian society and government of being dominated by neo-Nazism, invoking the history of collaboration in German-occupied Ukraine during World War II, and echoing a nationalistic antisemitic conspiracy theory which casts Russian Christians, rather than Jews, as the "true" victims of Nazi Germany. While Ukraine has a far-right fringe, including the neo-Nazi Azov Battalion and Right Sector, experts have described Putin's rhetoric as greatly exaggerating the influence of far-right groups within Ukraine; there is no widespread support for the ideology in the government, military, or electorate. Ukrainian president Zelenskyy, who is Jewish, rebuked Putin's allegations, stating that his grandfather had served in the Soviet army fighting against the Nazis. The US Holocaust Memorial Museum and Yad Vashem condemned the abuse of Holocaust history and the use of comparisons with Nazi ideology for propaganda.

Putin and his long-time confidant Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu

During the second build-up, Russia issued demands to the US and NATO, including a legally binding arrangement preventing Ukraine from ever joining NATO, and the removal of multinational forces stationed in NATO's Eastern European member states. Russia threatened an unspecified military response if NATO continued to follow an "aggressive line". These demands were widely interpreted as being non-viable; new NATO members in Central and Eastern Europe had joined the alliance because their populations broadly preferred to move towards the safety and economic opportunities offered by NATO and the EU, and their governments sought protection from Russian irredentism. The demand for a formal treaty preventing Ukraine from joining NATO was also seen as unviable by Western officials, as it would contravene the treaty's "open door" policy, although NATO showed no desire to accede to Ukraine's requests to join.

Alleged clashes (17–21 February 2022)

Further information: Timeline of the war in Donbas (2022)

Fighting in Donbas escalated after 17 February 2022. The Ukrainians and the Russian separatists accused one another of firing into their respective territories. On 18 February, the Donetsk and Luhansk people's republics ordered all civilians to leave their capitals, although observers noted that full evacuations would take months. Ukrainian media reported a sharp increase in artillery shelling by the Russian-led militants in Donbas as an attempt to provoke the Ukrainian army.

In the days leading up to the invasion, the Russian government intensified a disinformation campaign intended to mute public criticism. Russian state media promoted fabricated videos—many amateur in quality—that purported to show Ukrainian forces attacking Russians in Donbas; evidence showed that the claimed attacks, explosions, and evacuations were staged by Russia. On 21 February, the head of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) said that Russian forces had killed five Ukrainian "saboteurs" that crossed into Russian territory, capturing one Ukrainian serviceman and destroying two armoured vehicles. The claim was denied by Ukraine and drew warnings that Russia was seeking further justification to start an invasion. The Sunday Times described it as "the first move in Putin's war plan."

Escalation (21–23 February 2022)

Putin's address to the nation on 21 February (English subtitles available)

On 21 February, Putin announced that the Russian government would recognise the Donetsk and Luhansk people's republics. The same evening, Putin directed that Russian troops be deployed into Donbas, in what Russia referred to as a "peacekeeping mission". The 21 February intervention in Donbas was condemned by several members of the UN Security Council; none voiced support. On 22 February, video footage shot in the early morning showed Russian armed forces and tanks moving in the Donbas region. The Federation Council unanimously authorised the use of military force outside Russia.

In response, Zelenskyy ordered the conscription of army reservists; The following day, Ukraine's parliament proclaimed a 30-day nationwide state of emergency and ordered the mobilisation of all reservists. Russia began to evacuate its embassy in Kyiv. The websites of the Ukrainian parliament and government, along with banking websites, were hit by DDoS attacks, widely attributed to Russian-backed hackers. Chinese military attackers were also alleged to have conducted a massive cyberwarfare espionage programme on the eve of the invasion, including on nuclear infrastructure, pointing to advanced Chinese knowledge.

On the night of 23 February, Zelenskyy gave a speech in Russian in which he appealed to the citizens of Russia to prevent war. He also refuted Russia's claims about the presence of neo-Nazis in the Ukrainian government and said that he had no intention of attacking the Donbas region. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said on 23 February that the separatist leaders in Donetsk and Luhansk had sent a letter to Putin stating that Ukrainian shelling had caused civilian deaths and appealing for military support from Russia.

In response, Ukraine requested an urgent UN Security Council meeting. Half an hour into the emergency meeting, Putin announced the start of military operations in Ukraine. Sergiy Kyslytsya, the Ukrainian representative, subsequently called on the Russian representative, Vasily Nebenzya, to "do everything possible to stop the war" or relinquish his position as president of the UN Security Council; Nebenzya refused.

Declaration of military operations

On 24 February, Putin announced that he had made the decision to launch a "special military operation" in eastern Ukraine. In his pre-invasion speech, Putin said there were no plans to occupy Ukrainian territory and that he supported the right of the Ukrainian people to self-determination. He said the purpose of the "operation" was to "protect the people" in the predominantly Russian-speaking region of Donbas who, according to him, "for eight years now, [had] been facing humiliation and genocide perpetrated by the Kyiv regime".

Putin said that Russia sought the "demilitarisation and denazification" of Ukraine. Within minutes of Putin's announcement, explosions were reported in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odessa, and the Donbas region. An alleged leaked report from within the FSB claimed that the intelligence agency was not warned about Putin's plan to invade Ukraine. Immediately following the attack, Zelenskyy announced the introduction of martial law in Ukraine. The same evening, he ordered a general mobilisation of all Ukrainian males between 18 and 60 years old who were prohibited from leaving the country. Russian troops entered Ukraine from the north in Belarus (towards Kyiv); from the northeast in Russia (towards Kharkiv); from the east in the DPR and the Luhansk People's Republic; and from the south in Crimea. Russian equipment and vehicles were marked with a white Z military symbol (a non-Cyrillic letter), believed to be a measure to prevent friendly fire.

Invasion and resistance

Further information: List of military engagements during the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine and Timeline of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine

See also: Order of battle for the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine

An animated map of the invasion from 24 February to 9 April

The invasion began on 24 February after Putin's declaration of his intended military intervention. The full military operation consisted of infantry divisions supported by armored units and air support in Eastern Ukraine, along with dozens of missile attacks across both Eastern Ukraine and Western Ukraine. Ostensibly, the main infantry and tank division attacks were launched at four spearhead incursions, creating a Northern front (launched towards Kyiv), a Southern front (originating in Crimea), a Southeastern front (launched at the cities of Luhansk and Donbas), and an Eastern front.

All four incursions crossed into Ukraine and approximately 100–200 kilometres beyond Ukrainian borders while occupying Ukrainian territory and encircling main cities. By 20 March, the four incursion fronts had formed a perimeter significantly within the entire border of Eastern Ukraine and started to extensively consolidate lines of communication and support between all four fronts within Ukraine while besieging Mariupol, Kyiv, Donbas, Luhansk, and other cities. An extensive missile bombardment campaign was also conducted with dozens of missile strikes across Ukraine, reaching as far west as Lviv.

On 25 March, the Russian Defense Ministry announced the "first stage" of what they referred as the "military operation in Ukraine" was generally complete, with Ukrainian military forces suffering serious losses, and the Russian military would now be concentrating on the "liberation of Donbas". The invasion was conducted on four fronts, and by 8 April 2022 General Alexander Dvornikov was placed in charge of military operations during the invasion:

• Along an axis towards western Kyiv from Belarus (a northern front), conducted by the Russian Eastern Military District, comprising the 29th, 35th, and 36th Combined Arms Armies
• An axis towards eastern Kyiv from Russia by the Central Military District (a northeastern front), comprising the 41st Combined Arms Army and 2nd Guards Tank Army
• An axis towards Kharkiv by the Western Military District (an eastern front), with the 1st Guards Tank Army and 20th Combined Arms Army
• A southern front (originating in occupied Crimea and Russia's Rostov oblast) with an eastern axis towards Odesa and a western area of operations toward Mariupol, by the Southern Military District, including the 58th, 49th, and 8th Combined Arms Army, the latter also commanding the 1st and 2nd Army Corps of the Russian separatist forces in Donbas

By 7 April, Russian troops deployed to the Northern front conducted by the Russian Eastern Military District, comprising the 29th, 35th, and 36th Combined Arms Armies, were retracted from the Kyiv offensive for apparent resupply and subsequent redeployment to the Donbas region to reinforce the southern and the eastern fronts for a renewed invasion front of southeastern Ukraine.

Southern front: 24 February to present

Main articles: Southern Ukraine offensive, Siege of Mariupol, Battle of Enerhodar, and Kramatorsk railway station attack

Destroyed Russian BMP-3 near Mariupol, 7 March

On 24 February, Russian forces took control of the North Crimean Canal, allowing Crimea to obtain water from the Dnieper, previously cut off since 2014. On 26 February, a siege of Mariupol began as the attack moved east towards the city, while simultaneously linking the front with separatist-held regions in Donbas. En route to Mariupol, Russian forces entered Berdiansk before capturing it the following day. On 1 March, Russian forces started preparing to resume their attack on Melitopol and other nearby cities, initiating a battle. Ivan Fedorov, the mayor of Melitopol, later announced that Russian forces had occupied the city. On the morning of 25 February, Russian units from the DPR advanced towards Mariupol and encountered Ukrainian forces near the village of Pavlopil, where they were defeated. By the evening, the Russian Navy reportedly began an amphibious assault on the coastlines of the Sea of Azov 70 kilometres (43 mi) west of Mariupol. A US defence official said that Russian forces might be deploying thousands of marines from this beachhead.

Another group Russian forces advanced north from Crimea, with the Russian 22nd Army Corps approaching the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant on 26 February. On 28 February, they began a siege at Enerhodar in an attempt to take control of the nuclear power plant. A fire was started at the plant during the battle. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) subsequently clarified that essential equipment had not been damaged. By 4 March, the nuclear power plant fell under Russian control. Despite reports of fires, the power plant recorded no radiation leaks. A third Russian attack group from Crimea moved northwest, where they captured bridges over the Dnieper. On 2 March, Russian troops won a battle at Kherson and captured the city, becoming the first major Ukrainian city to be captured by Russian forces during the invasion. Russian troops then advanced to Mykolaiv and attacked the city two days later, but were later repelled by Ukrainian forces. Also on 2 March, Ukrainian forces initiated a counteroffensive on Horlivka, which had been mainly controlled by the DPR since 2014. Following a renewed missile attack on 14 March in Mariupol, the Ukrainian government claimed more than 2,500 deaths in the city.

By 18 March, Mariupol was completely encircled and fighting reached the city centre, hampering civilian evacuation efforts. On 20 March, an art school in the city, which was sheltering around 400 people, was destroyed by a Russian bombing. The same day, as Russian forces continued their siege of the city, the Russian government demanded a full surrender, which several Ukrainian government officials refused. On 24 March, Russian forces entered central Mariupol as part of the second phase of the invasion. The city administration alleged the Russians were trying to demoralise residents by publicly shouting claims of Russian victories, including statements that Odessa had been captured. On 27 March, Ukraine's deputy prime minister, Olha Stefanishyna, stated that "[Mariupol's inhabitants] don't have access to water, to any food supplies, to anything. More than 85 percent of the whole town is destroyed," and that Russia's objectives have "nothing to do with humanity". In a telephone conversation between Putin and Macron on 29 March, Putin stated that the bombardment of Mariupol would only end when Ukrainian troops fully surrendered Mariupol, given the advanced state of devastation in the nearly overtaken city.

On 1 April, a rescue effort by the United Nations (UN) to transport hundreds of civilian survivors out of Mariupol with 50 allocated buses was impeded by Russian troops, who refused them safe passage into the city while peace talks continued in Istanbul. On 3 April, following the retraction of Russian forces from Kyiv at the end of phase one of the military invasion, Russia began to expand their attack on Southern Ukraine further west with increased bombardment and strikes against Odesa, Mykolaiv, and the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. A Russian missile attack on Kramatorsk railway station in the city of Kramatorsk took place on 8 April 2022, attacking a civilian target using a cluster bomb. According to reports, at least 52 people were killed and 87 to 300 people were injured.

Eastern front: 24 February to present

Main articles: Eastern Ukraine offensive, Battle of Kharkiv (2022), and Attack on Belgorod

Russian bombardment on the outskirts of Kharkiv, 1 March

In the east, Russian troops attempted to capture Kharkiv, less than 35 kilometres (22 mi) from the Russian border. During the fighting, Russian tanks were met with strong Ukrainian resistance. On 28 February, the city was targeted by missile attacks which killed several people. On 1 March, Denis Pushilin, the head of the DPR, announced that DPR forces had almost completely surrounded the city of Volnovakha. On 2 March, Russian forces were repelled from Sievierodonetsk during an attack against the city. On 17 March, Izium was reportedly captured by Russian forces, although fighting continued. On 25 March, the Russian defense ministry stated that Russia was prepared to enter the second phase of military operations in seeking to occupy major Ukrainian cities in Eastern Ukraine. On 31 March, the Ukrainian military confirmed Izium was under Russian control. On 31 March, PBS News reported that Kharkiv was attacked by renewed shelling and missile attacks, at levels equalling or exceeding previous levels of shelling, on the day on which peace talks were to resume with Russia in Istanbul.

Amid the heightened Russian shelling of Kharkiv on 31 March 2022, Russia reported a helicopter strike against an oil supply depot approximately 35 kilometres (22 mi) north of the border in Belgorod and accused Ukraine of the attack. Ukraine, however, denied responsibility for the attack. By 7 April, the renewed massing of Russian invasion troops and tank divisions around the towns of Izium, Sloviansk and Kramatorsk brought Ukrainian government officials to advise all remaining residents living near the eastern border of Ukraine to evacuate their cities and escape to the western parts of Ukraine within the next 2-3 days in the absence of the timely arrival of arms and munitions previously promised to Ukraine by this time.

Northeastern front: 24 February to 7 April

Main articles: Northeastern Ukraine offensive and Battle of Sumy

Russian forces advanced into Chernihiv Oblast on 24 February and besieged its administrative capital. The following day, the oblast's second largest city, Konotop, which is 90 kilometres (56 mi) from the Russian border, was attacked and captured by Russian forces. A separate advance was made into Sumy Oblast on the same day, where the city of Sumy, just 35 kilometres (22 mi) from the Russo-Ukrainian border was attacked by Russian units. The Russian advance bogged down in urban fighting, and Ukrainian forces were successful in holding the city. According to Ukrainian sources, more than 100 Russian armoured vehicles were destroyed and dozens of soldiers were captured. Okhtyrka also came under attack, where Russian forces were spotted deploying thermobaric weapons.

In an assessment of the campaign on 4 March, Frederick Kagan wrote that the Sumy axis was currently "the most successful and dangerous Russian avenue of advance on Kyiv", and commented that the geography favoured mechanised advances as the terrain "is flat and sparsely populated, offering few good defensive positions". Russian forces have made several deep advances along axes from the Sumy area, winning several battles in the process. Travelling along highways, Russian forces reached Brovary, an eastern suburb of Kyiv, on 4 March.The Pentagon confirmed on 6 April that the Russian army left Chernihiv Oblast, while Sumy Oblast remained contested. Governor Zhyvytskyi stated on 7 April that all Russians troops left Sumy Oblast. He added that the territory of the region was still unsafe due to rigged explosives and other ammunition left behind by Russian troops.

Northern front: 24 February to 7 April

See also: Kyiv offensive (2022), Siege of Chernihiv, and Bucha massacre

Military control around Kyiv on 2 April 2022

Russian efforts to capture Kyiv included a main probative spearhead front striking south from Belarus on 24 February along the west bank of the Dnipro River, with the apparent aim of encircling the city from the west; the probative spearhead front was fully retracted by 7 April for resupply and redeployment for the active southeastern fronts of the second phase of the Russian invasion. The spearhead front initiated on 24 February for Kyiv was supported by two separate axes of attack from Russia along the east bank of the Dnipro: the western at Chernihiv, and the eastern at Sumy. The eastern axes of attack likely intended to encircle Kyiv from the northeast and east.

On the first day of the invasion, Russian forces advancing towards Kyiv from Belarus gained control of the ghost towns of Chernobyl and Pripyat. Following their breakthrough at Chernobyl, Russian forces were held at Ivankiv, a northern suburb of Kyiv. Russian Airborne Forces attempted to seize two key airfields around Kyiv, launching an airborne assault on Antonov Airport, followed by a similar landing at Vasylkiv, near Vasylkiv Air Base to the south of Kyiv, on 26 February.

These attacks appeared to have been an attempt by Russia to seize Kyiv rapidly, with Spetsnaz infiltrating into the city supported by airborne operations and a rapid mechanised advance from the north. The attacks were unsuccessful. During its initial assaults on Kyiv, Russia reportedly made several attempts to assassinate Volodymyr Zelenskyy using Wagner Group mercenaries and Chechen forces. The Ukrainian government said these efforts were partially thwarted by anti-war officials within Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB), who shared intelligence of the plans.

File:Russian military weapons destroyed and seized by the Armed Forces of Ukraine.jpg

Russian military vehicles destroyed in Bucha, Kyiv Oblast, 1 March

By early March, further Russian advances along the west side of the Dnipro were limited, after suffering setbacks from Ukrainian defence. As of 5 March, a large Russian convoy, reportedly 64 kilometres (40 mi) in length, had made little progress toward Kyiv. The London-based think tank Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) assessed the Russian performance from the north and east as "stalled". Advances along the Chernihiv axis had largely halted as a siege of the city began. Russian forces also continued advancing from the northwest of Kyiv, capturing Bucha, Hostomel, and Vorzel by 5 March, though Irpin remained contested as of 9 March. By 11 March, it was reported that the lengthy convoy had largely dispersed, taking up positions that offered tree cover. Rocket launchers were also identified. On 16 March, Ukrainian forces began a counter-offensive to repel Russian forces approaching Kyiv from several surrounding cities.

By 20 March, the Russian military appeared to be waging a rapid invasion to achieve its apparent primary goal of the seizure of Kyiv, along with the occupation of Eastern Ukraine and the displacement of the Ukrainian government. Russian forces quickly became stalled while approaching Kyiv due to several factors, including the disparity in morale and performance between Ukrainian and Russian forces, the Ukrainian use of sophisticated man-portable weapons provided by Western allies, poor Russian logistics and equipment performance, the failure of the Russian Air Force to achieve air superiority, and Russian military attrition during their siege of major cities. Unable to achieve a quick victory in Kyiv, Russian forces switched strategies and began using standoff weapons, indiscriminate bombing, and siege warfare.

On 25 March, the Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kyiv resulted in several towns, including Makariv, being retaken to the east and west of Kyiv. As part of a general retreat of Russian forces north of Kyiv, as well as attacks on Russian formations by the Ukrainian military, Russian troops in the Bucha area retreated north by the end of March. Ukrainian forces entered the city on 1 April. Ukraine claimed to recapture the entire region around Kyiv, including Irpin, Bucha, and Hostomel, by 2 April, with evidence of war crimes being uncovered in Bucha. On 6 April, NATO secretary general Jens Stoltenberg said that the Russian "retraction, resupply, and redeployment" of their troops from the Kyiv area should be interpreted as an expansion of Putin's plans for his military actions against Ukraine, by redeploying and concentrating his forces on Eastern Ukraine and Mariupol within the next two weeks, as a precursor to the further expansion of Putin's actions against the rest of Ukraine.

Western Ukraine

On 14 March, Russian forces conducted multiple cruise missile attacks on a military training facility in Yavoriv, Lviv Oblast, close to the Polish border. Local governor Maksym Kozytskyy reported that at least 35 people had been killed in the attacks. On 18 March, Russia expanded the attack to Lviv, with Ukrainian military officials saying initial information suggested that the missiles which hit Lviv were likely air-launched cruise missiles originating from warplanes flying over the Black Sea.

Air conflict

On 24 February, Russian forces attacked the Chuhuiv air base, which housed Bayraktar TB2 drones. The attack caused damage to fuel storage areas and infrastructure. The next day, the Millerovo air base was attacked by Ukrainian military forces using OTR-21 Tochka missiles. According to Ukrainian officials, this destroyed several Russian Air Force planes and set the airbase on fire. In the Zhytomyr Airport attack on 27 February, it was reported that Russia used 9K720 Iskander missile systems, located in Belarus, to attack the civilian Zhytomyr Airport. Russia lost at least ten aircraft on 5 March. On 6 March, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine reported that 88 Russian aircraft had been destroyed since the war began. However, an anonymous senior US defence official told Reuters on 7 March that Russia still had the "vast majority" of its fighter jets and helicopters that had been amassed near Ukraine available to fly. After the first month of the invasion, Justin Bronk, a British military observer, counted the Russian aircraft losses at 15 fixed-wing aircraft and 35 helicopters, but noted that the true total was certainly higher.

On 13 March, Russian forces conducted multiple cruise missile attacks on a military training facility in Yavoriv, Lviv Oblast, close to the Polish border. Local governor Maksym Kozytskyy reported that at least 35 people had been killed in the attacks. The poor performance of the Russian Air Force has been attributed by The Economist to Russia's inability to suppress Ukraine's medium ranged surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries, Russia's lack of precision-guided bombs, together with Ukrainian mid-range SAM sites that force planes to fly low, making them vulnerable to Stinger and other shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles, and lack of training and flight hours for Russian pilots rendering them inexperienced for the type of close ground support missions typical of modern air forces.

"Russian warship go fuck yourself!", billboard in Russian language in Dnipro, Ukraine

Civilians in Kyiv preparing Molotov cocktails, 26 February

Naval conflict

Ukraine lies on the Black Sea, which only has access through the Turkish-held Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits. On 28 February, Turkey invoked the 1936 Montreux Convention and sealed off the straits to Russian warships not registered as having Black Sea home bases and not returning to their ports of origin. This prevented the passage of four Russian naval vessels through the Turkish Straits.

On 24 February, the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine announced that an attack on Snake Island by Russian Navy ships had begun. The cruiser Moskva and patrol boat Vasily Bykov bombarded the island with their deck guns. When the Russian warship identified itself and instructed the Ukrainian soldiers stationed on the island to surrender, their response was "Russian warship, go fuck yourself!" After the bombardment, a detachment of Russian soldiers landed and took control of Snake Island.

Russia stated on 26 February that US drones were supplying intelligence to the Ukrainian navy to help target Russian warships in the Black Sea, which the US denied.

By 3 March, the Ukrainian frigate Hetman Sahaidachny, the flagship of the Ukrainian navy, was scuttled in Mykolaiv to prevent its capture by Russian forces. On 14 March, the Russian source RT reported that the Russian Armed Forces had captured about a dozen Ukrainian ships in Berdiansk, including the Polnocny-class landing ship Yuri Olefirenko.

On 24 March, Ukrainian officials said that a Russian landing ship docked in Berdiansk – initially reported to be the Orsk and then its sister ship, the Saratov – was destroyed by a Ukrainian rocket attack.

Popular resistance

Ukrainian civilians resisted the Russian invasion, volunteering for territorial defence units, making Molotov cocktails, donating food, constructing barriers such as Czech hedgehogs, and helping to transport refugees. Responding to a call from Ukraine's transportation agency, Ukravtodor, civilians dismantled or altered road signs, constructed makeshift barriers, and blocked roadways. Social media reports showed spontaneous street protests against Russian forces in occupied settlements, often evolving into verbal altercations and physical standoffs with Russian troops.

In some instances, people physically blocked Russian military vehicles, sometimes forcing them to retreat. The Russian soldiers' response to unarmed civilian resistance varied from reluctance to engage the protesters to firing into the air or directly into crowds. There have been mass detentions of Ukrainian protesters, and Ukrainian media reported forced disappearances, mock executions, hostage-taking, extrajudicial killing, and sexual violence perpetrated by the Russian military.

Foreign military involvement

See also: List of foreign aid to Ukraine during the Russo-Ukrainian War

  Russia

  Ukraine

  Countries that have supplied Ukraine with military equipment during the 2022 invasion

  Russia

  Ukraine

  Countries sending any aid, including humanitarian aid, to Ukraine

Since 2014, the UK, US, EU, and NATO have provided mostly non-lethal military aid to Ukraine. Lethal military support was limited, with the US beginning to sell weapons including Javelin anti-tank missiles starting in 2018, and Ukraine agreeing to purchase TB2 combat drones from Turkey in 2019. As Russia began building up its equipment and troops on Ukraine's borders, in January 2022, the US started approving some of the NATO member states to transfer their US-produced weapons to Ukraine. The UK also began supplying NLAW and Javelin anti-tank weapons. Following the invasion, NATO member states, including Germany, agreed to supply weapons, but NATO as an organisation did not. NATO and its member states also refused to send troops into Ukraine as this would risk a larger-scale war, a decision which some experts have labelled as a policy of appeasement.

On 26 February, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced that he had authorised $350 million in lethal military assistance, including anti-armor and anti-aircraft systems. The next day the EU stated that it would purchase €450 million (US$502 million) in lethal assistance and an additional €50 million ($56 million) in non-lethal supplies to be supplied to Ukraine, with Poland acting as a distribution hub. During the first week of the invasion, NATO member states supplied more than 17,000 anti-tank weapons to Ukraine; by mid-March, the number was estimated to be more than 20,000.

EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell stated that the EU intended to supply Ukraine with fighter jets. Bulgaria, Poland, and Slovakia had MiG-29s, and Slovakia also had Su-25s, aircraft which Ukraine already flew and which could be transferred without pilot training. However, the planes' owners were reluctant to donate weapons critical for their own territorial defences, and feared that Russia could view it as an act of war if jets fly from their air bases to fight over Ukraine.

Anatoly Bibilov, president of Georgia's breakaway state South Ossetia, announced on 26 March that troops from South Ossetia had been sent to Ukraine. Later, it was clarified that Bibilov was referring to Ossetians with Russian citizenship or who serve in the Russian military at the fourth military base of the 58th Russian Army, deployed in South Ossetia. Redeployment of troops from the base started on 16 March.

Foreign volunteers

See also: International Legion of Territorial Defense of Ukraine

Ukraine has been actively seeking volunteers from other countries. On 1 March, Ukraine temporarily lifted visa requirements for foreign volunteers who wished to join the fight against Russian forces. The move came after Zelenskyy created the International Legion of Territorial Defense of Ukraine and called on volunteers to "join the defense of Ukraine, Europe and the world." Ukraine's foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba stated that as of 6 March, approximately 20,000 foreign nationals from 52 countries have volunteered to fight. Most of these volunteers joined the newly created International Legion of Territorial Defense of Ukraine.

On 3 March, Russian Defense Ministry spokesman Igor Konashenkov warned that mercenaries are not entitled to protection under the Geneva Conventions, and foreign fighters that have been captured will not be given prisoner of war status and will be prosecuted as criminals. On 11 March, Moscow announced that 16,000 volunteers from the Middle East were ready to join other pro-Russian foreign fighters alongside the Donbas separatists. A video uploaded online showed armed Central African paramilitaries calling to arms to fight in Ukraine with Russian troops.

There has also been an inflow of over 66,200 Ukrainian men to Ukraine, returning from abroad to fight.

Casualties and humanitarian impact

Casualties

Further information: Casualties of the Russo-Ukrainian War

See also: List of Russian generals killed during the 2022 invasion of Ukraine and List of journalists killed during the Russo-Ukrainian War

Breakdown	Casualties	Time period	Source
Civilians	7,433–7,660+ killed	24 February – 8 April 2022	Ukrainian government
	1,766+ killed, 2,383+ wounded	24 February – 8 April 2022	United Nations
Ukrainian forces (UAF, NGU)	1,300 killed	24 February – 12 March 2022	Ukrainian government
	2,000–4,000 killed	24 February – 9 March 2022	US estimate
	14,000 killed, 16,000 wounded	24 February – 25 March 2022	Russian government
Russian Armed Forces	1,351 killed, 3,825 wounded	24 February – 25 March 2022	Russian government
Donetsk PR forces	979 killed, 4,265 wounded	26 February – 7 April 2022	Donetsk PR
Luhansk PR forces	500–600 killed	24 February – 5 April 2022	Russian government
Russian and allied forces (RAF, Rosgvardiya, PMC Wagner, DPR & LPR)	30,000–40,000 casualties	24 February – 23 March 2022	NATO estimate
	10,000+ killed	24 February – 30 March 2022	US estimate
	19,300 losses	24 February – 10 April 2022	Ukrainian government

With respect to Russian military losses, Ukrainian estimates tended to be high, while Russian estimates of their own losses tended to be low. Combat deaths can be inferred from a variety of sources, including satellite imagery and video image of military actions. According to a researcher at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University in Sweden, regarding Russian military losses, Ukraine's government was engaged in a misinformation campaign aimed to boost morale and Western media was generally happy to accept its claims, while Russia was downplaying its own casualties. Ukraine also tended to be quieter about its own military fatalities. According to BBC News, Ukrainian claims of Russian fatalities were possibly including the injured as well. Analysts warned about accepting the Ukrainian claims as fact, as Western countries were emphasizing the Russian military's toll, while Russia wanted to downplay its losses.

The number of civilian and military deaths is impossible to determine with precision given the fog of war. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) considers the number of civilian casualties to be considerably higher than the one the United Nations are able to certify.

Prisoners of war

Over a thousand prisoneres of war have been captured. In the initial stages of the invasion, on 24 February, Oksana Markarova, Ukraine's ambassador to the US, stated that a platoon of the 74th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade from Kemerovo Oblast surrendered, saying they were unaware that they had been brought to Ukraine and tasked with killing Ukrainians. Russia claimed to have captured 572 Ukrainian soldiers by 2 March 2022, while Ukraine claimed 562 Russian soldiers were being held as prisoners as of 20 March, with 10 previously reported released in prisoner exchanges for five Ukrainian soldiers and the mayor of Melitopol. Subsequently, the first large prisoner exchange took place on 24 March, when 10 Russian and 10 Ukrainian soldiers, as well as 11 Russian and 19 Ukrainian civilian sailors, were exchanged. On 1 April, 86 Ukrainian servicemen were exchanged for an unknown number of Russian troops.

Treatment of prisoners is a complicated issue. On 8 March, a Ukrainian defence reporter with The Kyiv Independent announced that the Ukrainian government was working towards having Russian POWs work to help revive the Ukrainian economy, in full compliance with international law.

A video allegedly showing a Ukrainian soldier killing a Russian prisoner prompted concerns about the arbitrary executions of prisoners of war.

Refugees

Main article: Ukrainian refugee crisis

File:Ukrainian civilians and soldiers take shelter under a bridge in Kyiv.jpg

Ukrainian refugees sheltering beneath a bridge in Kyiv, 5 March

Refugee children and babies in a basement in Kyiv, 1 March

The war has caused the largest refugee and humanitarian crisis within Europe since the Yugoslav Wars in the 1990s; the UN has described it as the fastest growing such crisis since World War II. Because of the continued military build-up in Russia along the Ukrainian border, many neighbouring governments and aid organisations had been preparing for a mass displacement event in the weeks before the invasion. In December 2021, the Ukrainian defence minister estimated that an invasion could force three to five million people to flee their homes.

In the first week of the invasion, the UN reported over a million refugees had fled Ukraine; this subsequently rose to over 4.4 million by 9 April. Most refugees were women, children, the elderly, or people with disabilities. As of 16 March, another 6.5 million people were displaced inside Ukraine. By 20 March, a total of ten million Ukrainians had fled their homes, making it the fastest growing refugee crisis in the contemporary era. Most male Ukrainian nationals aged 18 to 60 were denied exit from Ukraine as part of mandatory conscription, except if they were responsible for the financial support of three or more children, single fathers, or were the parent/guardian of children with disabilities. Many Ukrainian men, including teenagers, in any case opted to remain in Ukraine to join the resistance.

According to the UN High Commission for Refugees, as of 6 April, the number of refugees in Poland were 2,490,447, 654,825 in Romania, 399,039 in Moldova, 398,932 in Hungary, 202,417 in Slovakia, and 17,317 in Belarus. Russia reported it had received over 550,000 refugees as of 8 April. As of 17 March, over 270,000 refugees had arrived in the Czech Republic. Turkey has been another significant destination, registering more than 58,000 Ukrainian refugees as of 22 March. The EU invoked the Temporary Protection Directive for the first time in its history, granting Ukrainian refugees the right to live and work in the EU for up to three years.

Thousands of refugees arriving in Russia appear to have been forcibly relocated using 'filtration centers', invoking the memory of Soviet era population transfers and prior Russian use of such centers in the Chechen War of Independence to suppress evidence of war crimes. As of 8 April, Russia evacuated approximately 121,000 Mariupol citizens to Russia, with some allegedly been sent to work there. Ukrainian officials claimed thousands have been dispatched to Taganrog. RIA Novosti, a Russian state media outlet, reported that some Mariupol residents have been evacuated to Donetsk, Ryazan, and Yaroslavl.

A second refugee crisis created by the invasion and by the Russian government's crackdown has been the flight of more than 200,000 Russian political refugees, the largest exodus from Russia since the October Revolution on 1917, to countries like the Baltic states, Georgia, and Turkey. Some of these have faced discrimination for being Russian.

Legal implications

Legality

Main article: Legality of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine

The invasion of Ukraine violated the Charter of the United Nations and constituted a crime of aggression according to international criminal law, raising the possibility of prosecution under universal jurisdiction. The invasion violated the Rome Statute, which prohibits "the invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State or part thereof". Ukraine did not ratify the Rome Statute and Russia withdrew its signature in 2016.

Human rights violations

International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine

Main article: International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine

On 4 March 2022, the United Nations Human Rights Council voted 32–2, with 13 abstentions, to create the International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, an independent international committee of three human rights experts with a mandate to investigate alleged violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law in the context of the invasion.

War crimes and crimes against humanity

Main article: War crimes in the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine

Executed people with wrists bound in plastic restraints, in a basement in Bucha

A children's hospital in Mariupol after Russian airstrike

Russian authorities have been accused of carrying out wartime actions, including war crimes and possibly crimes against humanity, in violation of international law. The Russian military attracted charges of indiscriminate attacks in densely populated areas exposing the civilian population to unnecessary and disproportionate harm. The Russian forces used cluster munitions – a type of weapon that is prohibited by most states because of its immediate and long-term danger to civilians – and fired other explosive weapons with wide-area effects including air-dropped bombs, missiles, heavy artillery shells and multiple launch rockets. The result of the Russian forces' attacks was damage or destruction of civilian buildings including houses, hospitals, schools and kindergartens as well as nuclear power plants and cultural properties such as historic buildings and churches. As of 25 March, the attacks had resulted in the death of at least 1,035 civilians and the wounding of at least 1,650.

There were allegations of forced deportations of thousands of civilians from Russian-occupied Mariupol to Russia, sexual assaults and deliberate killing of Ukrainian civilians by members of the Russian forces. At the end of March, Ukrainian forces recaptured the town of Bucha, located north of Kyiv. Afterwards, evidence emerged of possible war crimes committed by Russian troops, including torture and beheadings, and deliberate killings of civilians. The UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine documented in the first month of the invasion the arbitrary detention in Russian-occupied territories of 21 journalists and civil society activists, and 24 public officials and civil servants. The Monitoring Mission has also expressed concern about reports and videos of ill-treatment, torture, and public humiliation of civilians and prisoners of war in territory controlled by the Government of Ukraine, allegedly committed by police officers and members of the territorial defense.

On 2 March, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) opened a full investigation into past and present allegations of war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide committed in Ukraine by any person from 21 November 2013 onwards, set up an online method for people with evidence to initiate contact with investigators, and sent a team of investigators, lawyers and other professionals to Ukraine to begin collecting evidence. Neither Ukraine nor Russia are parties to the Rome Statute, the legal basis of the ICC, but Ukraine has accepted the ICC's jurisdiction by signing in 2013 and 2014 two declarations to that effect. Two other independent international agencies are also investigating violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law in the area: the International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, established by the United Nations Human Rights Council on 4 March 2022, and the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, deployed by OHCHR. The latter started monitoring human rights violations by all parties in 2014 and employs nearly 60 UN human rights monitors. In late March, Prosecutor General of Ukraine Iryna Venediktova stated that the Ukrainian prosecutors had collected evidence for 2500 "possible war crimes cases" and "several hundred suspects." On 7 April, the United Nations suspended Russia from the UN Human Rights Council.

Legal proceedings

Further information: Legality of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine

International Criminal Court

Main article: International Criminal Court investigation in Ukraine

On 27 February, Ukrainian foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba called for the International Criminal Court (ICC) to investigate the Okhtyrka kindergarten bombing. On 28 February, Karim Ahmad Khan, the chief prosecutor of the ICC, said he planned to investigate allegations of war crimes in Ukraine "as rapidly as possible" following the ICC's preliminary examination of the case. Thirty-nine states officially referred the situation in Ukraine to the ICC. On 3 March, Khan announced that evidence was being collected of alleged war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide committed by individuals of all sides during the invasion, and that a full investigation would be opened. Russia is not party to the ICC's Rome Statute, or founding treaty, and therefore does not recognize its authority.

International Court of Justice

Main article: Ukraine v. Russian Federation (2022)

Ukraine filed a lawsuit against Russia before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), accusing Russia of violating the 1948 Genocide Convention (to which both Ukraine and Russia are parties) by falsely claiming genocide as a pretext for invading Ukraine. The International Association of Genocide Scholars supported Ukraine's request. Ukraine asked the ICJ to adopt provisional measures, an order directing Russia to halt its offensive in Ukraine. The ICJ granted Ukraine's request to expedite the proceedings. Russian representatives refused to appear at a court hearing at the Peace Palace in The Hague. On 16 March, the ICJ ordered Russia, as a provisional measure, to "immediately suspend the military operations that it commenced on 24 February 2022 in the territory of Ukraine". The decision was taken after a 13–2 vote, with the Russian and Chinese judges in opposition. It is binding on Russia, but the ICJ has no means to enforce it.

Universal jurisdiction

Main article: Universal jurisdiction investigations of war crimes in Ukraine

Domestic investigations of potential war crimes committed by Russian forces in Ukraine were opened, under the principle of universal jurisdiction, in countries including Estonia, Germany, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland.

Peace efforts

Main article: 2022 Russia–Ukraine peace negotiations

In the first government delegation to Ukraine since the beginning of the invasion, the prime ministers of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia met with Zelenskyy in Kyiv on 15 March.

On 28 February, Ukrainian and Russian negotiators began talks in Belarus aimed at a ceasefire and ensuring humanitarian corridors for the evacuation of civilians. After three rounds of talks, no deal was reached. On 5 March, Russia declared a five-and-a-half-hour ceasefire in Mariupol and Volnovakha, to open humanitarian corridors for civilians to evacuate. Ukraine blamed Russian forces for repeatedly breaking the ceasefire by shelling the two cities; the Russian defence ministry stated the firing came from inside both cities against Russian positions. The International Committee of the Red Cross declared that the effort to evacuate civilians had failed.

On 7 March, as a condition for ending the invasion, the Kremlin demanded Ukraine's neutrality, recognition of Crimea, which was annexed by Russia in 2014, as Russian territory, and recognition of the self-proclaimed separatist republics of Donetsk and Luhansk as independent states. The same day, Russia declared a temporary ceasefire in Kyiv, Sumy, and two other cities, starting from 10:30 Moscow Time (UTC+3). On 8 March, Zelenskyy suggested a direct meeting with Putin to end the invasion and expressed willingness to discuss Putin's demands. Zelenskyy said he was ready for dialogue, but "not for capitulation". He proposed a new collective security agreement for Ukraine with the US, Turkey, France, Germany, and Russia as an alternative to the country joining NATO. Zelenskyy's Servant of the People party said that Ukraine would not give up Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk. However, Zelenskyy said that Ukraine was considering giving the Russian language protected minority status.

On 10 March, Foreign Ministers Sergey Lavrov and Dmytro Kuleba met for talks in Antalya, Turkey, with Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu as a mediator within the scope of the Antalya Diplomacy Forum, in the first high-level contact between the two sides since the beginning of the invasion. On 15 March, during the fourth round of talks, Zelenskyy suggested that Ukraine would accept not pursuing membership of NATO. On 17 March, the Financial Times reported that a 15-point plan negotiated with Russia was identified by Zelenskyy as offering a more "realistic" possibility for ending the war than previous talks. Mykhailo Podolyak, continuing as the chief negotiator for the Ukrainian peace delegation, indicated that peace negotiations of a 15-point plan would involve the retraction of Russian forces from their advanced positions in Ukraine, along with international guarantees for military support and alliance in case of renewed Russian military action, in return for Ukraine not pursuing further affiliation with NATO.

On 17 March, Çavuşoğlu was the first foreign minister to visit Ukraine after the start of the invasion. In a joint meeting with Kuleba, he reiterated support for Ukraine and revealed plans for a collective security agreement for Ukraine involving the US, Russia, UK, France, Germany, and Turkey, and called for leaders of both countries to meet in person, stating that the "hopes for ceasefire have increased". Shortly afterwards, French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian reportedly received intelligence that the Russians might be disingenuous and warned that Russia was only "pretending to negotiate", in line with a strategy it has used elsewhere.

On 20 March, Turkish presidential spokesman İbrahim Kalın said the two sides were getting closer on four key issues. He cited Russia's demand for Ukraine to renounce ambitions to join NATO, demilitarisation, what Russia has referred to as "denazification", and the protection of the Russian language in Ukraine, with the issues of Crimea and Donbas being the most pressing of the negotiations. However, that same day, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said that no significant progress had been made in peace talks, accusing Ukraine of stalling the talks by making proposals unacceptable for Russia. In response, Ukraine reiterated its willingness to negotiate but stated it would not accept Russian ultimatums. On 22 March, UN Secretary-General António Guterres said that "elements of diplomatic progress" were coming into view "on several key issues" and that an immediate cease-fire was possible; he urged the parties involved to cease hostilities immediately and enter into serious negotiations as the war was "unwinnable" on the battlefield.

On 28 March, Zelenskyy confirmed that a renewal of peace talk negotiations with Russia would start in Istanbul on 29 March, with the intention of discussing Ukrainian neutrality towards Russia along with the repudiation of any claims for Ukrainian NATO membership in the future. On 29 March, Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas indicated agreement with Le Drian that any Russian offers of peaceful negotiation about Ukraine or withdrawal from Kyiv should be met with diplomatic skepticism, based on a history of unreliability by Russia in similar peace negotiations with other countries.

Media depictions

See also: Disinformation in the 2021–2022 Russo-Ukrainian crisis and Media portrayal of the Ukrainian crisis

Throughout the invasion, messages, videos, photos, and audio recordings were shared across social media, news sites, and by friends and families of Ukrainian and Russian citizens. While many were authentic, first-hand images of the conflict, others were images and videos of past conflicts and events or were otherwise misleading. Some of these were created to spread disinformation or propaganda.

Observers have criticised Western media's portrayal of Ukraine's suffering as somewhat different from the suffering in wars in countries like Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Iraq, Libya, Palestine, Syria, and Yemen. In China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Africa, the Arab world, and Latin America, social media users showed sympathy for Russian narratives due more to cynicism toward US foreign policy rather than support for the invasion.

Censorship

See also: Media freedom in Russia and Putinism

Russian state-controlled media systematically downplays both civilian and military losses, denouncing reports of attacks on civilians as "fake" or blaming Ukrainian forces.

The Russian censorship apparatus Roskomnadzor ordered the country's media to employ information only from Russian state sources or face fines and blocks, and ordered media and schools to describe the war as a "special military operation", in line with Putin's speech on 24 February 2022. As the Russian government has avoided referring to the Russian invasion of Ukraine as a war or an invasion, stories that describe the event as an "assault", "invasion", or a "declaration of war" were ordered to be deleted. Roskomnadzor launched an investigation against several independent Russian media outlets for publishing information about the war or civilian casualties. The regulator threatened to block access to the Russian Wikipedia in Russia, and fine Wikipedia up to four million rubles (US$50,000), over its article on the invasion for reporting casualties among the Russian military personnel and Ukrainian civilians.

Roskomnadzor imposed partial restriction on access to Facebook on 25 February, as Facebook had refused a Russian demand to stop fact-checking the posts made by four state-owned media organisations: Zvezda, RIA Novosti, Lenta.ru, and Gazeta.Ru. On 26 February, Facebook announced that it would ban Russian state media from advertising and monetising content on its platform. Facebook also uncovered a Russian disinformation campaign using fake accounts, and attempts to hack the accounts of high-profile Ukrainians. On 27 February, European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen announced an EU-wide ban of Russia's state-sponsored RT and Sputnik news channels following the decision of Poland and Estonia days earlier.

On 3 March, Echo of Moscow's board of directors voted to close the station down. On 4 March, Roskomnadzor blocked access to several foreign media outlets, including BBC News Russian, Voice of America, RFE/RL, Deutsche Welle, and Meduza, as well as Facebook and Twitter. Russian authorities also blocked access to Echo of Moscow and Dozhd (TV Rain), Russia's last independent TV station, claiming that they were spreading false information on the Russian military and calling for violence. Novaya Gazeta, an independent newspaper critical of the Russian government, suspended its activity until the end of the conflict after having received warnings from Roskomnadzor.

Putin signed into law a bill introducing prison sentences of up to 15 years for those who publish "fake news" about the Russian military and its operations, leading to some media outlets to stop reporting on Ukraine; he also signed into law a bill that would allow fines or prison sentences of up to three years for those calling for sanctions. On 11 March, Mark Bernstein, a top Russian Wikipedia editor, was detained by the Belarusian security service GUBOPiK on charges of violating the "fake news" law after being doxxed on Telegram.

Bolstering support against the invasion by Ukraine

Ukrainian officials have used social media to bolster support against the invasion and to spread information to the world and their citizens. Targeted posts and videos have also been used for recruitment drives for international aid and soldiers. Some have highlighted the Ukrainian officials' methods as beneficial, by flooding the world with their messages. Several academics, including Professors Rob Danish and Timothy Naftali, have highlighted Zelenskyy's speaking ability and his ability to manipulate social media to spread information and draw upon feelings of shame and concern while building kinship with the viewer. Additional real time information about the invasion has been spread by online activists, journalists, politicians, and members of the general population, both from within and from outside Ukraine.

Propaganda

Russian state propaganda

Putin and Konstantin Ernst, chief of Russia's main state-controlled TV station Channel One.

Russian state-controlled media, such as Russia-24, Russia-1, and Channel One, and pro-Kremlin TV pundits like Vladimir Solovyov mostly followed the government's narrative on the war. On 28 February, RIA Novosti published and then took down an article incorrectly saying that Russia had won the Russo-Ukrainian War and that "Ukraine has returned to Russia". On 14 March, Marina Ovsyannikova, an editor for Russia's Channel One, interrupted the state television's live broadcast to protest against the Russian invasion of Ukraine, carrying a poster stating in a mix of Russian and English: "Stop the war, don't believe the propaganda, here you are being lied to." RT, a Russian state-controlled television network, was officially banned in the European Union and suspended by television service providers in several other countries. Russian state-linked channels such as RT and Sputnik were also blocked by YouTube across Europe to prevent Russian disinformation. Many RT journalists resigned from RT following Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

Russian teachers received detailed instructions on how to talk to students about the invasion of Ukraine. The Mayakovsky Theatre in Moscow received a government email "to refrain from any comments on the course of military actions in Ukraine", warning that any negative comments would be "regarded as treason against the Motherland". The "Z" symbol has been used by the Russian government as a pro-war propaganda tool and by Russian civilians as a sign of support for the invasion.

According to The Guardian's Pjotr Sauer, one reason many Russians still support Putin and the "special military operation" in Ukraine has to do with the propaganda and disinformation being disseminated by the Russian government. Polls conducted by the Levada Center between 17 and 21 February found that 60% of respondents blamed the US and NATO for escalating tensions, while only 4% blamed Russia. Similarly, a telephone survey conducted by independent researchers from 28 February to 1 March found that 58% of Russian respondents approved of the military operation. However, a series of four online polls by Alexei Navalny's Anti-Corruption Foundation found that between 25 February and 3 March, the share of respondents in Moscow who considered Russia an "aggressor" increased from 29% to 53%, while the share of those who considered Russia a "peacemaker" fell by half from 25% to 12%.

Some observers noted what they described as a "generational struggle" among Russians over perception of the war, with younger Russians generally opposed to the war and older Russians more likely to accept the narrative presented by state-controlled media in Russia. Kataryna Wolczuk, an associate fellow of Chatham House's Russia and Eurasia programme, said, "[Older] Russians are inclined to think in line with the official 'narrative' that Russia is defending Russian speakers in Ukraine, so it's about offering protection rather than aggression." Russia's opposition politician Alexei Navalny said the "monstrosity of lies" in the Russian state media "is unimaginable. And, unfortunately, so is its persuasiveness for those who have no access to alternative information."

On 12 March, YouTube announced it was blocking an unspecified number of Russian state-backed media, including RT and Sputnik, citing its policy that prohibits content that "denies, minimizes, or trivializes well-documented violent events." On 18 March, the British media regulator Ofcom revoked RT's broadcasting licence. On 2 April, Axios reported that Putin's approval rating inside of Russia had risen to 83% a month after the invasion, from a 69% approval rating as measured prior to the invasion during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Mediazona, a Russian independent media outlet, reported that the FSB had fabricated a video of a woman accusing Ukraine of war crimes in Mariupol. Mediazona also shared screenshots of what it said were emails from the FSB to media outlets, instructing them to not say where the video came from.

Main article: What Russia should do with Ukraine

In an op-ed published in Russian state outlet RIA Novosti, Timofei Sergeytsev openly advocated the "purification" of Ukrainians, blurring the lines between the Ukrainian government, military, and civilians, then the cultural genocide of Ukraine through the obliteration of the Ukrainian name and culture, and finally the reeducation of the remaining civilians together with a strict regime of censorship in order to incorporate them in a greater Russia.

Alexei Navalny tweeted in April 2022 that "warmongers" among Russian state media personalities "should be treated as war criminals."

Ukrainian propaganda

Propaganda was used in Ukraine mainly to raise awareness in Europe to provide support and military aid to Ukraine, and to urge the implementation of a no-fly zone over Ukrainian territory. In one example, a graphic and openly doctored video depicting the bombing of Paris was spread online in mid-March by multiple government accounts and local news outlets, including the Kyiv Post.

Propaganda in other countries

Chinese diplomats, government agencies, and state-controlled media in China have used the war as an opportunity to deploy anti-American propaganda, and they have amplified conspiracy theories created by Russia, such as the false claims that public health facilities in Ukraine are "secret US biolabs". Such conspiracy theories have also been promoted by Cuban state media.

Russian propaganda has also been repeated by the state-controlled outlets of other countries such as Serbia and Iran. In Iran, the state media criticised the British embassy in Tehran after it raised the Ukrainian flag in support of Ukraine. Reports from Sputnik have been actively republished by Iran's pro-regime media. In Latin America, RT Actualidad is a popular channel that has spread disinformation about the war. Authorities in Vietnam have instructed reporters not to use the word "invasion" and to minimize coverage of the war. In South Africa, the governing African National Congress published an article in its weekly newsletter ANC Today endorsing the notion that Russia had invaded Ukraine to denazify it.

Although the Indonesian government condemned Russia's invasion, pro-Russian propaganda was spread by social media users and some academics. A study performed by Airlangga University revealed that 71% of Indonesian netizens supported the invasion. This support was due to affection for Putin's strongman leadership, as well as anti-US and anti-Western political alignments. Many Indonesians disliked Zelenskyy due to seeing him as a weak leader and a "comedian" not worthy to rule a country. Additionally, many supported Russia due to positive reports of Ramzan Kadyrov and claims of the Azov Battalion covering their bullets with lard to be used against Chechen troops in the invasion.

Sanctions and ramifications

Main articles: International sanctions during the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine and Economic impact of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine

Further information: 2021–2022 global energy crisis, 2022 food crises, and Russia in the European energy sector

US president Joe Biden's statements and a short question and answer session on 24 February 2022

Western countries and others imposed limited sanctions on Russia when it recognised the independence of Donbas. With the commencement of attacks on 24 February, a large number of other countries began applying sanctions with the aim of crippling the Russian economy. The sanctions were wide-ranging, targeting individuals, banks, businesses, monetary exchanges, bank transfers, exports, and imports. The sanctions included cutting off major Russian banks from SWIFT, the global messaging network for international payments, although there would still be limited accessibility to ensure the continued ability to pay for gas shipments. Sanctions also included asset freezes on the Russian Central Bank, which holds $630 billion in foreign-exchange reserves, to prevent it from offsetting the impact of sanctions and implicated the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline. By 1 March, the total amount of Russian assets being frozen by sanctions amounted to $1 trillion.

Kristalina Georgieva, the managing director of the International Monetary Fund, warned that the conflict posed a substantial economic risk for the region and internationally. She added that the Fund could help other countries impacted by the conflict, complementary to a $2.2 billion loan package being prepared to assist Ukraine. David Malpass, the president of the World Bank Group, said that the conflict would have far-reaching economic and social effects, and reported that the bank was preparing options for significant economic and fiscal support to Ukrainians and the region. Economic sanctions affected Russia from the first day of the invasion, with the stock market falling by up to 39% (RTS Index). The Russian ruble fell to record lows, as Russians rushed to exchange currency. Stock exchanges in Moscow and St. Petersburg were suspended until at least 18 March, making it the longest closure in Russia's history. On 26 February, S&P Global Ratings downgraded the Russian government credit rating to "junk", causing funds that require investment-grade bonds to dump Russian debt, making further borrowing very difficult for Russia. Nord Stream 2 would have doubled the annual capacity of Nord Stream to 110 billion m³ (3.9 trillion cu ft) and thereby decreased the price.]]The National Bank of Ukraine suspended currency markets, announcing that it would fix the official exchange rate. The central bank also limited cash withdrawals to 100,000 hryvnia per day and prohibited withdrawal in foreign currencies by members of the general public. The PFTS Ukraine Stock Exchange stated on 24 February that trading was suspended due to the emergency events.

Reactions

Further information: Government and intergovernmental reactions to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, Non-government reactions to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, Protests against the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, 2022 anti-war protests in Russia, 2022 protests in Russian-occupied Ukraine, and 2022 boycott of Russia and Belarus

UN General Assembly Resolution ES-11/1 vote condemning the invasion of Ukraine and demanding a complete withdrawal of Russian troops.

  In favour

  Against

  Abstained

  Absent

  Non-member

The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine received widespread international condemnation from governments and intergovernmental organisations, with reactions including new sanctions imposed on Russia, which triggered widespread economic effects on the Russian and world economies. NATO, though it refused to intervene militarily in Ukraine, increased military deployments on its eastern flank. The European Union financed and delivered military equipment to Ukraine. The bloc also implemented various economic sanctions, including a ban on Russian aircraft using EU airspace, a SWIFT ban on certain Russian banks, a ban on certain Russian media outlets. In multiple waves, it also sanctioned various areas of Russian industry, including iron, steel, coal, and high-tech goods. Non-government reactions to the invasion included widespread boycotts of Russia and Belarus in the areas of entertainment, media, business, and sport.

Protest by Russians living in the Czech Republic, 26 March 2022. The white-blue-white flag is a symbol of anti-war protests in Russia.

There were also immediate worldwide protests against the invasion and daily protests in Russia itself. As well as the demonstrations, petitions and open letters were published in opposition to the war, and public figures, both cultural and political, released statements against the war. The protests were met with widespread repression by the Russian authorities. According to OVD-Info, at least 14,906 people were detained from 24 February to 13 March 2022. Human rights organisations and reporters raised concerns of police brutality during the arrests and OVD-Info reported several cases of protestors being tortured under detention. The Russian government cracked down on other forms of opposition to the war, including introducing widespread censorship measures and repression against people who signed anti-war petitions.

In some parts of Ukraine that were newly occupied by Russian armed forces, protests against the occupants took place.

See also

• Timeline of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine
• List of interstate wars since 1945
• List of ongoing armed conflicts
• List of military engagements during the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine
• Post-Soviet conflicts – Armed conflict taking place in former territories of the Soviet UnionPages displaying short descriptions of redirect targets
  • Russo-Georgian War – 2008 conflict between Russia and Georgia
  • Transnistria War – 1990–1992 conflict between Moldova and Russian-backed self-proclaimed Transnistria
• Second Cold War – Term referring to heightened tensions in the 21st century
• World War III – Hypothetical future global conflict

Further reading

• Wood, Elizabeth A.; Pomeranz, William E.; Merry, E. Wayne; Trudolyubov, Maxim (15 December 2015). Roots of Russia's War in Ukraine. Columbia University Press. ISBN 978-0-231-80138-6. OCLC 1008637056.
• D'Anieri, Paul (31 October 2019). Ukraine and Russia: From Civilized Divorce to Uncivil War. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-108-48609-5.
• Smith, Christopher M. (15 March 2022). Ukraine's Revolt, Russia's Revenge. Brookings Institution Press. ISBN 978-0-8157-3925-8. OCLC 1287616684.
• Menon, Rajan; Rumer, Eugene B. (6 February 2015). Conflict in Ukraine: The Unwinding of the Post-Cold War Order. MIT Press. ISBN 978-0-262-53629-5. OCLC 1029335958.

External links

• Media related to 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine at Wikimedia Commons
• Russia invades Ukraine live updates. CNN.
• Ukraine live updates. BBC News.
• Video of aftermath, including injured pregnant woman being carried, after Russian airstrike on hospital in Mariupol, Ukraine. Sky News, March 9, 2022
• Russia invades Ukraine. Reuters, 10 March 2022
• Video archive by RFE/RL
• Tracking Social Media Takedowns and Content Moderation During the 2022 Russian Invasion of Ukraine (updated weekly)