1948 Palestinian expulsion from Lydda and Ramle

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An aerial view of Lydda, Palestine, 1932.

The exodus from Lydda and Ramla, also known as the Lydda death march,[1] took place in July 1948 during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, when 50,000-70,000[2] Palestinians fled or were expelled from the cities when Israeli troops moved in.[3] According to an Israeli army report, the expulsions, the order for which was signed by Yitzhak Rabin,[4]averted an Arab threat to Tel Aviv, and thwarted an Arab Legion advance by clogging the roads with refugees.[5]

Ramla's residents were mostly bussed to Al-Qubab, from where they walked to Arab Legion lines in Latrun and Salbit.[6] The people of Lydda had no transport: they walked six kilometers (four miles) to Beit Nabala, then 11 kilometers (seven miles) to Barfiliya, in temperatures of 30-35 °C (86-95 °F), carrying whatever possessions they could take with them.[6][7] From there, the Arab Legion helped most of them reach a refugee camp in Ramallah some 50 kilometers (30 miles) away.[8]

Around 290-450 Palestinians and 9-10 Israeli soldiers were killed during the conquest of Lydda;[9] the death toll in Ramla is unknown but presumed much lower because the city surrendered immediately. The number of refugees who died during the march is also unknown: figures range from "a handful, and perhaps dozens," to 355, primarily from exhaustion and dehydration, though eyewitnesses also said refugees were killed for refusing to hand over their valuables to Israeli soldiers.[10]

The expulsions accounted for one-tenth of the overall Arab exodus from Palestine, an event commemorated in the Arab world, along with the anniversary of the creation of Israel, as al-Nakba (lit. "the catastrophe").[7]

Background

General

See also: 1947–1948 Civil War in Mandatory Palestine, 1948 Arab-Israeli War, and 1948 Palestinian exodus

In the immediate aftermath of the 1947 United Nations' approval of the Partition plan, expression of discontent amongst the Arab community of the Mandate grew leading to violent breakouts. Murders, reprisals, and counter-reprisals came one after the other, killing dozens of victims on both sides in the process. Abd al-Kader al-Husseini arranged a Palestinian blockade[citation needed] on the 100,000 Jewish residents of Jerusalem, and hundreds of the Jewish Haganah members who tried to bring supplies to the city were killed. The Jewish population was under strict orders to hold their dominions at all costs. By April, however, the Israeli armed forces had moved onto the offensive and begun gaining territory, resulting in the flight or expulsion of up to 300,000 Palestinians over the course of the next few months.[11]

The situation caused the U.S. to retract their support for the Partition plan[citation needed], thus encouraging the Arab League to believe that the Palestinians, now reinforced by the Arab Liberation Army, could put an end to the partition plan which was widely rejected in the Arab World. On 14 May 1948, David Ben-Gurion declared the independence of the state of Israel, an event followed by several Arab states' armies attacking the Jewish state the following day.

Operation Danny

Further information: Operation Danny
File:Palestine-20-48.png
British Mandate of Palestine in 1947, showing the locations of Lydda and Ramla. Orange marks the Jewish settlements in the area.

Operation Danny was an Israeli operation carried out over a ten-day period between July 8, 1948, the end of the first truce in the Arab-Israeli war, and July 18, the start of the second truce.[12] The period is known in Israeli historiography as the Ten Days.[13]

The objective of the operation was to relieve the Jewish population and forces in Jerusalem during the Arab blockade of the city; secure the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem road; and neutralize the perceived threat to Tel Aviv from the Arab Legion, which had forward units just 20 kilometers away in Lydda and Ramla.[14]

Lydda and Ramla, part of the British Mandate of Palestine since World War I, had been assigned to the proposed Arab state in the United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine in 1947.[15][16]

Earlier attacks on Lydda and Ramla

There had been attacks on the cities before July 1948. Arab militia had been attacking Jewish traffic on roads near the cities. The Haganah had launched a retaliatory strike on December 10, 1947, killing two guards in a parking lot, and destroying 15 empty Arab vehicles.[17] On February 18, 1948, the Irgun had detonated a bomb in Ramla's market, killing seven and injuring 24.[18] Also in February, the Irgun had killed nine Arab men and one woman in Abu al-Fadl, near Ramla.[19] There were further Israeli ground attacks on Ramla on the nights of May 21-22 and 24-25, and on May 30, the IDF bombed both towns, killing three and injuring 11.[20][21]

As a result of the attacks, and because the electricity and water supplies kept failing and there was a shortage of fuel, Arab morale fell, leading to a mass flight of women, children, and the elderly from Ramla. Arab militiamen on the city's outskirts tried to prevent young men from leaving.[21]

Israel's Kiryati Brigade, which was responsible for protecting Tel Aviv, reported in May that the Arabs had a substantial force in the Lydda-Ramla area, which the Israelis saw as a threat to Tel Aviv. Benny Morris writes that, in fact, the Arab Legion, King Abdullah of Transjordan's troops, had only 120-150 soldiers stationed in the towns, but Israel's prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, had developed what Morris calls an obsession with the fate of Lydda and Ramla, seeing them as threats not only to Tel Aviv, but also to Jerusalem. He repeatedly wrote in his diary that they had to be "destroyed"; on June 16, he told the Cabinet of the need to remove these "two thorns": "We haven't succeeded in Latrun, and there remain the two thorns: Lod and Ramla. This is a serious flaw in our current status. If the war resumes, we won't destroy the Egyptian or Syrian nations, but if we fail and fall, they'll destroy us; and this is why we can't let them return to the places they desert."[22]

Numbers of residents and refugees in the towns

The presence of so many refugees in the towns did not help residents' morale. In July 1948, there were 50,000-70,000 in both towns together, around 20,000 of whom were refugees from Jaffa and elsewhere. Morris writes that refugees had made their way to Lydda and Ramla because they lay outside the Jewish state proposed by the UN, and because King Abdullah's troops were there, implying that the towns were under his protection. The presence of the refugees caused chaos: they had no money or food, and would make foraging raids outside the towns to gather wheat and vegetables, risking IDF attacks.[21]

Spiro Munayyer, who worked in Lydda at the telephone exchange, and who became a paramedic, wrote:

Life in the city became untenable. The alleys and streets were teeming with people and strewn with rubbish; although the city employed additional sanitation crews, the streets were so clogged with people that the workers were unable to perform their jobs.[23]

Capture of Lydda and Ramla

July 9–10: Air attacks on the towns

Israel's prime minister, David Ben-Gurion (1886–1973) warned Israeli troops before the attacks on Lydda and Ramla that there should be no uprooting of Arab residents without explicit orders. He was later accused by Yitzhak Rabin of having issued the expulsion order himself.[24]

At the start of Operation Danny, David Ben-Gurion, the Israeli prime minister, issued a warning to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF):

Outside the time of the actual fighting, it is forbidden to destroy, burn or demolish Arab cities and villages, to expel Arab inhabitants from villages, neighbourhoods and cities, and to uproot inhabitants from their places without special permission or explicit order from the Defence Minister in each specific case. Anyone violating this order will be put on trial.[24]

Israeli historian Benny Morris writes that Ben-Gurion and the IDF were left largely to their own devices to decide how the Arabs in towns they conquered were to be treated; as a result, their policy was haphazard and circumstantial, depending in part on the location but also on the religion and ethnicity of the town. The Arabs of Western and Lower Galilee, mainly Christian and Druze, were allowed to stay in place, but Lydda and Ramla, mainly Muslim, were almost completely emptied.[24]

The IDF had assembled an enormous force for its attacks on the towns, its largest until that point: two Palmach brigades, Harel and Yiftah, which meant five battalions in all; the 8th Armored Brigade (82nd and 89th Battalions); and several battalions of Kiryati and Alexandroni infantrymen. They also had thirty artillery pieces.[25]

The bombing and shelling of the cities began on the night of July 9-10, designed to capitalize on the low morale in the towns and induce panic and flight, and it seemed to work: at 11:30 hours on the morning of July 10, Operation Danny headquarters (Danny HQ) told the IDF that there was a "general and serious flight from Ramla," advising that, "[t]here is great value in continuing the bombing."[26] That afternoon, Danny HQ told one of its brigades to facilitate the flight of women, children, and the elderly, but to detain men of military age.[27]

Spiro Munayyer writes in the Journal of Palestine Studies that a serjeant with the British army, a Scotsman who was helping to defend Lydda, told him — based only on an educated hunch — that the city would fall at noon the next day.[28]

July 11: Moshe Dayan raid on Lydda

File:John Glubb Pasha.jpg
Glubb Pasha (1897–1986), the British soldier who led the Arab Legion, told King Abdullah of Jordan that Lydda and Ramla could not be held.[29]

Glub Pasha, the British soldier who led the Arab Legion, wrote later that he had made it clear to King Abdullah of Jordan and the Jordanian government that the Legion could not hold Lydda and Ramla. As a result, Abdullah ordered the Legion to assume a defensive position only; the Legionnaires already in Lydda withdrew during the night of July 11-12.[29]

During the late afternoon of July 11, the 89th (armored) Battalion, led by Lt. Col. Moshe Dayan, moved into Lydda, driving from east to west, and spraying machine-gun fire at anything that moved.[30]

Israeli commander Moshe Dayan (1915-1981) was reported by the New York Herald Tribune as having led a jeep commando column into Lydda "blasting at everything that moved."[31]

Kenneth Bilby, a correspondent for the New York Herald Tribune who was in the city at the time, wrote, "Moshe Dayan led a jeep commando column into the town ... with rifles, Stens, and sub-machine guns blazing. It coursed through the main streets, blasting at everything that moved ... the corpses of Arab men, women, and even children were strewn about the streets in the wake of this ruthlessly brilliant charge."[31]

One of Dayan's solders, "Gideon," spoke of his ambivalence about the raid:

[My] jeep made the turn and here at the ... entrance to the house opposite stands an Arab girl, stands and screams with eyes filled with fear and dread. She is all torn and dripping blood — she is certainly wounded. Around her on the ground lie the corpses of her family. Still quivering, death has not yet redeemed them from their pain. Next to her is a bundle of rags — her mother, hand outstretched trying to draw her into the house. And the girl understands nothing ... Did I fire at her? ... But why these thoughts, for we are in the midst of a battle, in the midst of conquest of the town. The enemy is at every corner. Everyone is an enemy. Kill! Destroy! Murder! Otherwise you will be murdered and will not conquer the town. What [feeling] did this lone girl stir within you? Continue to shoot! Move forward! ... Where does this desire to murder come from? What, because your friend ... was killed or wounded, you have lost your humanity and you kill and destroy? Yes! ... I kill every one who belongs to the enemy camp: man, woman, old person, child. And I am not deterred.[32]

The raid lasted 47 minutes, leaving dozens of Arabs dead: up to 200, according to Morris, or 40, according to the IDF's Third Battalion intelligence. Six died and 21 were wounded on the Israeli side.[33]

On the same day, the Israeli air force dropped leaflets onto the towns: "You have no chance of receiving help. We intend to conquer the towns. We have no intention of harming persons or property. [But] whoever attempts to oppose us-will die. He who prefers to live must surrender."[7] That evening, 300-400 soldiers from the Yiftah Brigade's Third Battalion entered Lydda.

July 12: Alleged "uprising" and "massacre," Lydda

Community leaders in Lydda and Ramla were advised to surrender. Ramla residents were told to go to Barriya, and people in Lydda to Jimzo, and to hold a white flag aloft. Isma'in Nakhas, Haret Haji, Hussam al Khairi, and Imada Khouri signed the surrender documents on behalf of Ramla on the morning on July 12.[34] The Kiryati Brigade's 42nd Battalion mortared the city, then entered it, imposing a curfew.[35]

No formal surrender was announced in Lydda, though people gathered in the streets waving white flags. According to a contemporaneous, unsigned IDF account: "Groups of old and young, women and children streamed down the streets in a great display of submissiveness, bearing white flags, and entered of their own free will the detention compounds we arranged in the mosque and church — Muslims and Christians separately." The buildings soon filled up, and women and children were released, leaving several thousand men inside.[36]

On July 12, at 11:30 hours, two or three Arab Legion armoured cars, led by Lt. Hamadallah al-Abdullah from the Jordanian 1st Brigade, entered the city; Morris writes that they were lost, or on reconnaissance, or were looking for a missing officer, and that they retreated after a brief firefight with Israeli troops.[37] Spiro Munayyer writes that the Jordanians were rescuing a unit of theirs that had been using the Lydda police station as a base, and they retreated as soon as they had the men on board.[38]

The exchange of gunfire led some townspeople to believe the Legion had arrived to defend them, and those still armed started to engage in sniper fire against the Israelis. Morris writes that Kadish, Sela, and Golan (2000) say the townsfolk had "thousands of weapons," citing the Third Battalion's commander, Moshe Kelman, but Morris argues that this is "nonsense," and that only a few dozen townspeople took part in what turned out to be a brief firefight.[39]

Brief or not, the Israeli soldiers were unnerved by it: there were only 300-400 of them to quell tens of thousands, and they thought the locals had surrended.[40]

In response, Moshe Kalman ordered troops to shoot at "any clear target," and at anyone "seen on the streets."[41] Spiro Munayyer writes that, at noon, there was suddenly a "crescendo of bullets and explosions in all parts of the city"; people started "running helter-skelter, screaming with fear."[42] Residents ran out of their homes, fearing that a massacre was in progress, and were shot. Israeli soldiers threw grenades into houses they suspected snipers were hiding in.[7] At 13:15 hours, Yiftah HQ told Danny HQ: "Battles have erupted in Lydda. We have hit an armoured car with a two-pounder [gun] and killed many Arabs. There are still exchanges of fire in the town. We have taken many wounded.[43]

The shooting lasted until 13:30 hours. Morris writes that both Israeli and Arab historians describe the events as an "uprising," for different reasons, but he argues that the ratio of Arab to Israeli casualties — 250-400 Arab dead against 3-4 Israelis — is not consistent with using the words "battle" or "uprising.[44] The Palmach reported around 250 Arabs killed and an unknown number wounded. Palestinian historian Aref al-Aref places the Palestinian death toll at 400,[45] while Nimr al-Khatib, who describes the day as an "uprising," writes that 1,700 were killed; Morris regards the latter as an exaggeration.

There is no disagreement among historians and eyewitnesses that the killing was indiscriminate.[46] George Habash, who later founded the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, was in Lydda during the seige. A second-year medical student, he went to its clinic to help the injured. On his way through the town, he said he saw: "terrible sights: Dozens of bodies lay in pools of blood, old and young had been shot. Among the dead, I recognized one elderly man, a neighbor who had a small falafel shop and who had never carried a gun."[47] According to Yoav Gelber, the "killings of 250 Arabs" that occured "during the occupation of Lydda" was a "bloodiest massacre" than Deir Yassin massacre.[48]

Dahmash mosque deaths

At some point during the afternoon of July 12, there was shooting in the Dahmash mosque, where thousands of male Muslim detainees were being held. Christians had been taken either to the church or to the Greek Orthodox monastery nearby, leaving the Muslims inside the mosque in fear of a massacre.[49]

Morris writes that some of the detainees tried to break out, hearing the shooting and fearing they were to be killed. He writes that the IDF threw grenades and fired bazooka rockets into the mosque compound. Kadish, Golan, and Sela (2000) write that there was no "massacre," as it has come to be known in the Arab world, but a battle that took place between armed Arab and Palmach troops, though Morris writes that Kadish et al acknowledge that unarmed civilians were killed, including women, children, and the elderly.[50]

Spiro Munayyer writes that people sought refuge in the mosque when they heard the shooting in the town. He said his fellow paramedics told him they had carried out 93 bodies.[49]

Expulsion

Further information: 1948 Palestinian exodus and Causes of the 1948 Palestinian exodus

July 12: Decision to expel

Yitzhak Rabin (1922-1995) signed the expulsion order.
File:Yigal alon.jpg
Yigal Allon (1918-1980) attended the July 12 meeting with David Ben-Gurion and Yitzhak Rabin.
Yigael Yadin (1917-1984), chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces, also attended the July 12 meeting.

Morris writes that the resistance of the snipers in Lydda sealed the townpeople's fate. A meeting was held at Operation Danny headquarters, attended by David Ben-Gurion, Israel's first prime minister; Generals Yigael Yadin and Zvi Ayalon of the IDF; Yisrael Galilee, formerly of the Haganah National Staff; and Yigal Allon and his deputy Yitzhak Rabin, who led Operation Danny. Rabin was commander at the time of the Harel Brigade, which had been assigned to eliminate Arab Legion bases along the road from Jerusalem to Tel Aviv.[51]

At one point, Morris writes, Ben-Gurion, Allon, and Rabin left the room. Allon asked what was to be done with the Arab population. Ben-Gurion is reported by Michael Bar-Zohar, citing Yitzhak Rabin as his source, to have waved his hand and said, "garesh otam" — "expel them."[52]

Rabin himself wrote in his memoirs in 1979:

While the fighting was still in progress, we had to grapple with a troublesome problem ... the fate of the civilian population of Lod (Lydda) and Ramle (Ramla), numbering some 50,000.

Not even Ben-Gurion could offer any solution, and during the discussions at operational headquarters, he remained silent, as was his habit in such situations. Clearly, we could not leave Lod's hostile and armed populace in our rear, where it could endanger the supply route to Yiftah [another brigade], which was advancing eastward.

We walked outside, Ben-Gurion accompanying us. Allon repeated his question: What is to be done with the population? B.G. waved his hand in a gesture which said, "Drive them out!"

Allon and I held a consultation. I agreed that it was essential to drive the inhabitants out. We took them on foot toward the Bet Horon Road, assuming that the legion would be obliged to look after them, thereby shouldering logistic difficulties which would burden its fighting capacity, making things easier for us.

"Driving out" is a terms with a harsh ring. Psychologically, this was one of the most difficult actions we undertook. The population of Lod did not leave willingly. There was no way of avoiding the use of force and warning shots in order to make the inhabitants march the 10 to 15 miles to the point where they met up with the legion.[51]

Rabin's reference to the expulsions was removed from his memoirs by an Israeli censorship board composed of five Cabinet members, headed by Justice Minister Shmuel Tamir. Peretz Kidron, an Israeli journalist who translated the memoirs from Hebrew into English, passed the censored excerpt to The New York Times, which published it on October 23, 1979.[51][53]

Yigal Allon denied Rabin's version of events in the same New York Times article; he said that he (Allon) gave no order to expel, and neither requested nor received permission from Ben-Gurion to do so.[51]

Arieh Itzchaki, former director of the IDF General Staff/History Branch archive, writes that Ben-Gurion made only the hand gesture, but did not actually say "expel them." It was Allon and Rabin who made the decision to go ahead with the expulsions, according to Itzchaki.[54]

Historian Yoav Gelber also takes issue with Rabin's account. Ben-Gurion was known, he writes, for clearly formulating his policies, not for announcing them with a wave of his hand. Gelber cites Ben-Gurion's apparent agreement with Bechor-Shalom Sheetrit and Moshe Sharett (see below) not to force the expulsion of residents, as evidence that expulsion was not his intention, rather than as evidence of Ben-Gurion's duplicity, as Benny Morris implies. Gelber attributes the expulsions to Yigal Allon, who was known for his "scorched earth policy": wherever Allon was in charge of Palmach or IDF troops, Gelber writes, no Palestinians remained.[55]

Expulsion orders

Lydda

During the brief battle between the snipers in Lydda and the Israeli troops, Danny HQ issued the expulsion order to Yiftah Brigade HQ and 8th Brigade HQ, at 13:30 hours on 12 July, and to Kiryati Brigade at around the same time:

1. The inhabitants of Lydda must be expelled quickly without attention to age. They should be directed towards Beit Nabala. Yiftah [Brigade HQ] must determined the method and inform Dani HQ and 8th Brigade HQ.

2. Implement immediately.[56][57]

Ramla

Michael Prior writes that a similar expulsion order was issued for the city of Ramla. Israeli historians between the 1950s and 1970s tried to differentiate it from Lydda, he writes, insisting that the residents of Ramla had violated the terms of surrender, with Benny Morris writing that they "were happy at the possibility given them of evacuating."[58] In a letter to the editor at Commentary, historian Efraim Karsh writes that there was no expulsion from Ramla.[59]

In the Haganah archives, Morris found a cable from Kiryati Brigade HQ to Zvi Aurback, its officer in charge of Ramla:

1. In light of the deployment of 42nd Battalion out of Ramle - you must take [over responsibility] for the defence of the town, the transfer of prisoners [to PoW camps] and the emptying of the town of its inhabitants.

2. You must continue the sorting out of the inhabitants, and send the army-age males to a prisoner of war camp. The old, women and children will be transported by vehicle to al Qubab and will be moved across the lines - [and] from there continue on foot.."[60]

Sharett – Ben Gurion guidelines

Bechor-Shalom Sheetrit (1895–1967), Israeli minister for minority affairs, tried to stop the expulsions.[61]

Morris writes that most of the able-bodied young men in Lydda were held in detention centres in the cities, including the mosques and churches. The streets were littered with bodies, and a curfew was in place. Two companies from Kiryati's 42nd Battalion were sent during the night of July 12–13 to reinforce the Third Battalion, which was reportedly shocked and demoralized by the killing.[7]

The Israeli cabinet reportedly knew nothing about the expulsion plan, until Bechor-Shalom Sheetrit, minister for minority affairs — who was responsible for the welfare of the Arab citizens — appeared unannounced in Lydda on July 12. He was allegedly shocked when he saw that troops were organizing expulsions. Kiryati brigade commander Ben-Gal told him that the IDF was about to take men of military age in Ramla prisoner, and that the rest of the men, as well as the women and children, were to be "taken beyond the border and left to their fate." The same was to happen in Lydda, Sheetrit said he was told.[61]

File:SHARRET1.JPG
Moshe Sharett (1894–1965), then foreign minister, drew up guidelines with Ben Gurion to rule out forced expulsion. Ben Gurion did not tell Sharett that he had already agreed to it.[7]

Sheetrit returned to Tel Aviv for a meeting with Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett, who later met with Ben Gurion to agree on guidelines for how the residents of Lydda and Ramla were to be treated, though Morris writes that Ben Gurion apparently failed to tell Sharett that he himself was the source of the deportation orders. The men agreed that the townspeople should be told anyone who wanted to leave could do so, but that anyone who stayed was responsible for himself and would not be given food. Women and children were not to be forced to leave, and the monasteries and churches must not be damaged.[7] These guidelines were passed to Operation Danny HQ at 23:30 hours on July 12:

1. All are free to leave, apart from those who will be detained.

2. To warn that we are not responsible for feeding those who remain.

3. Not to force women, the sick, children and the old to go/walk [lalechet: Morris adds that this word was ambiguous, and may have left troops thinking it was all right to expel these people so long as they were not made to walk].

4. Not to touch monasteries and churches.

5. Searches without vandalism.

6. No robbery.[7]

Regarding point 4, Morris notes that neither the original guidelines from Sharett and Ben Gurion, nor the summary from Operation Danny HQ, said that mosques should be left untouched along with monasteries and churches, but he adds that this may have been a simple oversight.[62]

The guidelines convinced Sharett that he had managed to avert the expulsions. He failed to realize that, even as he was discussing the issue in Tel Aviv, they had already begun.[7]

Forced versus voluntary departure

Morris writes that, by July 13, the wishes of the IDF and those of the residents of Ramla and Lydda had dovetailed. Over the previous two days, the townspeople had undergone aerial bombardment, raids from troops on the ground, had been told to surrender or die, had seen grenades thrown into their homes and hundreds of residents killed, had been living under a curfew, and the able-bodied men had been rounded up and were being held by the thousands in the church and mosque. The residents almost certainly concluded that living under Israeli rule was not sustainable.[7] The important thing, wrote Spiro Munayyer, was to get out of the city.[63]

On July 13, representatives of the Lydda residents asked the IDF for permission for the townspeople to leave, Morris writes, though a minority insisted they wanted to stay. A deal was reached with Shmarya Gutman of the IDF that the residents would agree to leave in exchange for the release of the detainees; according to Guttman's own account, he went to the mosque himself and told the detainees they were free to join their families.[64]

Notwithstanding that an agreement may have been reached, Morris writes that most of the troops understood that what followed was an act of deportation, not a voluntary exodus. Operation Danny HQ told the IDF General Staff/Operations at noon on July 13 that "[the troops in Lydda] are busy expelling the inhabitants [oskim begeirush hatoshavim]," and told the HQs of Yiftah, Kiryati, and 8th Brigades at the same time that the "eviction/evacuation [pinui]" of the residents was underway.[7]

July 12: The march

Palestinian refugees in 1948

An officer with Kiryati's 42nd Battalion said that the expulsions from Ramla began at 17:30 hours on July 12. Ramla residents were carried in trucks along the Jerusalem Road until they were 700 metres from Al-Qubab; they then walked to Beit Shanna and Salbit.[7]

Morris writes that Lydda residents were made to walk all the way, possibly because of the earlier sniper fire, or perhaps simply because there were no vehicles, or because the Third Battalion was unconcerned about their fate. Whatever the reason, Lydda residents had to walk 6-7 kilometers to Beit Nabala, then 10-12 kilometers to Barfiliya, along dusty roads in temperatures of 30-35C, carrying their young children and whatever possessions they were able to leave with, either in carts pulled by animals, or on their backs.[7]

Reports of how many died vary. Many of them were elderly people and young children who died from the heat and exhaustion.[51] Morris has written that it was a "handful and perhaps dozens," and "quite a few."[65] He attributes a figure of 335 to Nimr al Khatib, but regards it as an exaggeration. British historian Martin Gilbert writes that it was an estimated 355.[66] Walid Khalidi gives a figure of 350, citing an estimate from Palestinian historian Aref al-Aref.[67]

A Palestinian refugee camp in 1948. While the location is not indicated, the tent structures are typical of the temporary housing available to Palestinian refugees, like those from Lydda and Al-Ramla, in the wake of their displacement during the 1948 war.

The Arab Legion's Fourth Regiment reported that, "Some 30,000 women and children from among the inhabitants of Lydda, Ramla, and the area are dispersed among the hills, suffering from hunger and thirst to a degree that many of them have died."[68] They were picked up by the Legion and driven to Ramallah.[69] Father Oudeh Rantisi, one of the survivors, wrote about some the deaths he witnessed along the way, such as a baby falling from his mother's arms and accidentally being crushed by a cart, as a result of the general crowding and anxiety of those trying to enter a farm to get food and water:

When we entered this gate, we saw Jewish soldiers spreading sheets on the ground and each who passed there had to place whatever they had on the ground or be killed. I remember that there was a man I knew from the Hanhan family from Lod who had just been married barely six weeks and there was with him a basket which contained money. When they asked him to place the basket on the sheet he refused — so they shot him dead before my eyes. Others were killed in front of me too, but I remember this person well because I used to know him ...

Hundreds lost their lives due to fatigue and thirst. It was very hot during the day and there was no water. I remember that when we reached an abandoned house, they tied a rope around my cousin's child and sent him down into the water. They were so thirsty they started to suck the water from his clothes ... The road to Ramallah had become an open cemetery.[70][71]

Another refugee, Raja e-Basailah, describes how, after making it to the Arab village of Ni'ilin, he pushed himself through the crowds for some water to take back to his mother and a close friend. He hid the water from others who were begging for it, and describes being haunted for years afterward by his "hard-hearted" denial of their needs. Because he was blind, Basailah could only hear what was happening. He recalls the exclamations of others that, "some of those who lay dead had their tongues sticking out covered with dust and down," and how someone saw, "a baby still alive on the bosom of a dead woman, apparently the mother ..."[15]

Allegations of looting

George Habash of the PFLP (1926-2008), a second-year medical student at the time, said he saw a refugee killed for refusing to hand over money.[47]

Although the Sharett-Ben Gurion guidelines specified that there was to be no robbery, numerous sources spoke of widespread looting of the towns, and of the refugees during the expulsions.

The Economist published a report on August 21 that year, saying that residents were not allowed to take much with them: "The Arab refugees were systematically stripped of all their belongings before they were sent on their trek to the frontier. Household belongings, stores, clothing, all had to be left behind."[72]

Spiro Munayyer, a paramedic and member of Lydda's resistance movement, writes that: "The occupying soldiers had set up roadblocks on all the road leading east and were searching the refugees, particularly the women, stealing their gold jewelry from their necks, wrist and fingers and whatever was hidden in their clothes, as well as money and everything else that was precious and light enough to carry."[73]

George Habash, founder of the PFLP, had been studying medicine in Beirut, but when he heard that Jaffa had fallen to the Israelis, he returned to Lydda, his hometown, to be with his family, only to find himself expelled with them. He told A. Clare Brandabur:

The Israelis were rounding everyone up and searching us. People were driven from every quarter and subjected to complete and rough body searches. You can’t imagine the savagery with which people were treated. Everything was taken — watches, jewelry, wedding rings, wallets, gold. One young neighbor of ours, a man in his late twenties, not more, Amin Hanhan, had secreted some money in his shirt to care for his family on the journey. The soldier who searched him demanded that he surrender the money and he resisted. He was shot dead in front of us. One of his sisters, a young married woman, also a neighbor of our family, was present: she saw her brother shot dead before her eyes. She was so shocked that, as we made our way toward Birzeit, she died of shock, exposure, and lack of water on the way."[47]

Benny Morris writes that Aharon Cohen, director of Mapam's Arab Department, complained to General Allon months after the deportations that troops had been ordered to remove from residents every watch and piece of jewellery, and all their money, so that they would arrive at the Arab Legion without resources, thereby increasing the burden of looking after them. Allon replied that he knew of no such order, but conceded it as a possibility.[7]

A British teacher in Amman, who investigated the condition of the refugees in late July, said she had heard the same story of refugees initially being allowed to leave with some valuables, only to have them removed on the outskirts of the town. Some residents were so exhausted after walking three days in the heat that they had to throw away whatever possessions they were carrying just to survive, or so that they could carry their children instead.[7]

The city itself was also looted. Fouzi El-Asmar, a child at the time, was able to sneak back into Lydda after the expulsions. He wrote:

I was shocked on this visit by the sight of this large city completely deserted, the houses open, the shops broken into and the remaining merchandise rotting. We were afraid of the trucks which were working every day without a break. The men who had come with the trucks would go into house after house and take out any article of value such as beds, mattresses, cupboards, kitchenware, glassware, couches, draperies and other such effects.[74]

Treatment of residents

One of the Brigade commanders, Lt. Col. Schmuel "Mula" Cohen, wrote of the attacks on Lydda and the expulsions that, "the cruelty of the war here reached its zenith," and that the conquest of a city regarded as a key enemy base "gave rise to vengeful urges" among Israeli troops.[7]

Yoav Gelber writes that, by the end of the Ten Days campaign, between July 8 and 18, the attitude of the IDF became harsh and unforgiving. They blamed the Palestinians for everything that had happened to the Jews since the Arab states attacked the new Israeli state on May 15.[75]

Part of the reason for the alleged atrocities, which were not confined to Lydda, was that central control over the Jewish fighters was still weak, according to Stuart Cohen. Only Yigal Allon, commander of the IDF, made it standard practice to issue written orders to commanders, including that violations of the laws of war would be punished. Otherwise, trust was placed, and sometimes misplaced, in what Cohen calls intuitive troop decency. Allegations of indiscriminate killing, rape, expulsions, and looting were rife, he writes, which outraged sections of the Israeli government, but criminal convictions were rare. Cohen adds that, despite the alleged war crimes, the humanity and morality of the vast majority of IDF troops ensured that they functioned, on the whole, with decency and civility.[76]

Some soldiers refused to take part in the events at Lydda. Yitzhak Rabin wrote in his memoirs that, "Soldiers of the Yiftach brigade included youth movement graduates, who had been inculcated with values such as international fraternity and humaneness. The eviction action went beyond the concepts they were used to. There were some fellows who refused to take part in the expulsion action. Prolonged propaganda activities were required after the action, to remove the bitterness of these youth movement groups, and explain why we were obliged to undertake such harsh and cruel action.[53]

Morris writes that the shootings and subsequent looting of the town — described by the Israelis as "commandeering enemy property"[77] — undermined the morale of the Israeli Third Battalion to the point where they had to be withdrawn during the night of July 13-14, and sent for a day to Ben Shemen for kinus heshbon nefesh, a conference to encourage soul-searching.[7]

Aftermath

In Ramallah, Amman, and elsewhere

King Abdullah of Jordan (1882-1951) became the target of Palestinian anger at the failure to defend Lydda and Ramla.[29]

Tens of thousands of Palestinians from Lydda and Ramla poured into Ramallah. For the most part, they had no money, property, food, or water, and represented a health risk, not only to themselves. The Ramallah city council asked King Abdullah to remove them.[78] United Nations official Count Folke Bernadotte, who visited the refugee camp there, said that he had never seen a more ghastly sight.[79]

Some of the refugees reached Amman, and all over the area there were angry demonstrations against Abdullah and the Arab Legion for their failure to defend the cities. People spat at Glubb Pasha as he drove through the West Bank. The Palestinians drove out the Jordanian governor of Nablus; the Iraqi army had to use force to quell the protests.[80]

Alec Kirkbride, the British ambassador in Amman, describes one protest in the city on July 18:

A couple of thousand Palestinian men swept up the hill toward the main [palace] entrance ... screaming abuse and demanding that the lost towns should be reconquered at once ... The king appeared at the top of the main steps of the building; he was a short, dignified figure wearing white robes and headdress. He paused for a moment, surveying the seething mob before, [then walked] down the steps to push his way through the line of guardsmen into the thick of the demonstrators. He went up to a prominent individual, who was shouting at the top of his voice, and dealt him a violent blow to the side of the head with the flat of his hand. The recipient of the blow stopped yelling ... the King could be heard roaring: so, you want to fight the Jews, do you? Very well, there is a recruiting office for the army at the back of my house ... go there and enlist. The rest of you, get the hell down the hillside!" Most of the crowd got the hell down the hillside.[81]

During a meeting in Amman on July 12-13 of the Political Committee of the Arab League, delegates — particularly from Syria and Iraq — accused Glubb or serving British, or even Jewish, interests, with his claims of troop and ammunition shortages mere excuses. Egyptian journalists accused him of giving Lydda and Ramla to the Jews. King Abdullah eventually did the same, deciding it was safer to accuse Glubb. Abdullah wanted Glubb's resignation, but London asked him to stay on to fight the war. Britain's popularity with the Arabs reached an all-time low.[82]

In Lydda and Ramla

In Lydda itself, corpses littered the streets and the Lydda-Ramla road, posing a health risk and a political problem. The Red Cross was due to visit Ramla on or around July 12, but the new governor of the town, from the Israeli's Kiryati Brigade, issued an order to have the visit delayed. It was rescheduled for 15:00 hours on July 14; Danny HQ ordered the Kiryati to "evacuate all the refugees [and] to get rid of the corpses" by that time. The order seems not to have been carried out: on July 15, Dr. Klaud Dreyer of the IDF medical corps complained that there were still unburied corpses in Lydda and in the field around it, which constituted a health hazard and a "moral and aesthetic issue." He asked IDF General Staff/Operations to commandeer trucks to fix the problem, and "some tens of [Arab] civilians from the towns themselves."[83]

Artistic representations

Ismail Shammout's Where to ..?

The Palestinian artist Ismail Shammout was 19 years old when he left Lydda in the exodus. Shammout portrayed his experience and that of other Palestinian refugees in the piece Where to ..? (1953).

The oil painting on canvas is considered his best known work and enjoys iconic status among Palestinians. In the foreground, it depicts a life-size image of an elderly man dressed in rags carrying a walking stick in his left hand while his right hand grasps the wrist of a crying child. A sleeping toddler on his shoulder is resting his cheek upon the old man's head. Just behind them is a third child crying and walking alone. In the background there is a skyline of an Arab town with a minaret, while in the middle ground there is a withered tree.

Israeli poet Natan Alterman's Al Zot became an icon of the assault on Lydda.[77]

A visual of the painting and a discussion of its symbolic dimensions and iconic status are included in Israeli art historian Gannit Ankori's work Palestinian Art (2006).[84]

Israeli poet Nathan Alterman described the actions in Lydda in a poem, Al Zot ("On This"), published in Davar on November 21, 1948. It became something of an icon of the events; David Ben Gurion said it should be read out to all IDF troops: "Let us sing then also about 'delicate incidents'/For which the true name, incidentally, is murder ..."[77]

See also

References

  1. ^ Holmes, Richard et al. The Oxford Companion to Military History, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 64.
  2. ^ Morris 2004, p. 425 writes that, in July 1948 before the Israeli invasion, Lydda and Ramla had a population of 50,000-70,000, 20,000 of whom were refugees from Jaffa and the surrounding area; all were expelled, except for a few who were retained to work, or who managed to sneak back in.
  3. ^ [1] Morris, 2003, pp. 176-177; also see Tolan, Sandy; Prior, 1999, p. 205; Peretz Kidron: Truth Whereby Nations Live. In Said and Hitchens, 1998, pp. 90-93.
  4. ^ Benny Morris writes that there are two versions of the expulsion order, one referring to Lydda, Beith Naballah, and 8th Brigade by codenames; and a second one that uses no codenames and is signed Yitzhak, R.: see IDFA 922/75//12237 and 922/75//1234, cited in Morris 2004, p. 429, and footnote 89, p. 454. The date and time of the expulsion order is July 12, 1948, 13:30 hours: Morris 2004, footnote 88, p. 454.
  5. ^ Gilbert, 2008, pp. 218-219.
  6. ^ a b Morris 2004, p. 432.
  7. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q Morris, Benny. "Operation Dani and the Palestinian Exodus from Lydda and Ramle in 1948", Middle East Journal, Vol.40, No.1 (Winter, 1986), pp. 82-109.
  8. ^ Gilbert, 2008, pp. 218-219, and Rantisi (1990), p.25.
  9. ^ The Palestinian death toll in Lydda is, according to Morris 2004, p. 426: 1. July 11: Six dead and 21 wounded on the Israeli side, and "dozens of Arabs (perhaps as many as 200)" during the raid led by Moshe Dayan. Third Battalion intelligence puts the figure at 40 Arabs dead. 2. On July 12, Israeli troops were ordered to shoot at anyone seen on the streets: during that incident, 3-4 Israelis were killed and around a dozen wounded. On the Arab side, 250 dead and many wounded.
  10. ^
    • In The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949 (1989), Benny Morris writes that "all the Israelis who witnessed the events agreed that the exodus, under a hot July sun, was an extended episode of suffering for the refugees, especially from Lydda. Some were stripped by soldiers of their valuables as they left town or at checkpoints along the way... Quite a few refugees died - from exhaustion, dehydration and disease" (p. 204-211). In The Road to Jerusalem: Glubb Pasha, Palestine and the Jews (2003), he writes that "a handful, and perhaps dozens, died of dehydration and exhaustion" (p. 177). In his 2004 revised edition of The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949, he writes that "Quite a few refugees died on the road east", attributing a figure of 335 dead to Nimr al Khatib, which he describes as "hearsay" (p. 433).
    • Martin Gilbert (2008, pp. 218-219) writes: "On the eastward march into the hills, and as far as Ramallah, in the intense heat of July, an estimated 355 refugees died from exhaustion and dehydration. 'Nobody will ever know how many children died,' Glubb Pasha commented.
    • In the introduction to Spiro Munayyer's "The Fall of Lydda", Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 27, No. 4, pp. 80-98, 1998, Walid Khalidi gives a figure of 350 dead citing an estimate from Aref al-Aref. According to Henry Laurens, Arif al-'Arif's figures break down as follows: 'the number of Arab dead at Lydda at the time of the events of the 12th of July rises to 426, of who 176 (were killed) in the mosque. The total number of dead rises to 1,300: 800 during fighting in the city, the remainder in the exodus'. Henry Laurens, La Question de Palestine, Fayard, Paris, 2007 p.145.
    • In The Politics of Denial: Israel and the Palestinian Refugee Problem (Pluto Press 2003, p. 47) Nur Masalha writes that 350 died.
    • A number of eyewitnesses spoke of seeing refugees killed for refusing to hand over their belongings e.g.
  11. ^ Morris 2001, pp. 255-256.
  12. ^ Pappé (2006), p. 156.
  13. ^ Morris 2004, p. 414.
  14. ^ Morris 2004, p. 424.
  15. ^ a b Sa'di and Abu-Lughod, 2007, pp. 91-92.
  16. ^ Monterescu and Rabinowitz, 2007, pp. 16-17.
  17. ^ "Report on Ramle Operation," undated, probably December 11, 1944, IDFA 922/75/1213, cited in Morris 2004, p. 424.
  18. ^ "Nai'aim (Na'aman)" to his HIS-AD, "The Bomb in Ramle," February 24, 1948; two reports with the same heading, both in HA 105/358; and Haaretz, February 19, 1948, cited in Morris 2004, p. 424.
  19. ^ "Nai'im" to HIS-AD, "Murder of Arabs in Rhovot," February 24, 1948, HA 105/358, cited in Morris 2004, p. 424.
  20. ^ Death toll from HIS-AD, May 31, 1948, intercepted messages from the mayors of Ramla and Lydda to the "heads of the Egyptian army etc," HA 105/92 aleph, cited in Morris 2004, p. 424.
  21. ^ a b c Morris 2004, pp. 424-425.
  22. ^ Ben-Gurion, David. "War Diary", Volume 2, Israel Defense Ministry Publications, 1982, Cabinet meeting, June 16, 1948, p. 525; see Morris 2004, pp. 424-425.
  23. ^ Munayyer, Spiro. (1998) The fall of Lydda. Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 27, No. 4, pp. 80–98:87.
  24. ^ a b c Morris 2004, p. 415
  25. ^ Morris, Benny. 1948: The First Arab-Israeli War. Yale University Press, 2008, p. 286.
  26. ^ Danny HQ to IDF/General Staff, July 10, 1948, IDFA 922/75//1235, cited in Morris 2004, p. 425.
  27. ^ "Malka" to "Tziporen," July 10, 1948, 16:00 hours, IDFA 922/75//1237, cited in Morris 2004, p. 425.
  28. ^ Munayyer 1998, p. 92.
  29. ^ a b c Glubb, John Bagot. Soldier. pp. 142-3, cited in Morris, Benny. 1948: The First Arab-Israeli War. Yale University Press, 2008, p. 286; also see Morris 2008, p. 289.
  30. ^ Morris 2004, p. 424.
  31. ^ a b Bilby, Kenneth. New Star in the East, New York, 1950, p. 43, cited in Other death march reports, The Link, July-August 2000, Volume 33, Issue 3.
  32. ^ A. Kadish, A. Sela, A. Golan (2000), The Occupation of Lydda, July 1948, Tel Aviv: Israel Ministry of Defense and Hagana Historical Archive (Hebrew), cited in Morris 2004, p. 426, and Morris 2008, p. 289.
  33. ^ A. Kadish, A. Sela, A. Golan (2000), p. 36, cited in Morris 2004, p. 426. Morris writes that it is not clear whether the Third Battalion meant 40 Arab dead in all, or 40 killed by them specifically. Morris cites the original report: 3rd Battalion Intelligence, "Comprehensive Report of Third Battalion Activities from Friday 9.7 until Sunday 18.7, July 19. 1848, IDFA 922/75//1237.
  34. ^ Telephone message from Danny HQ, July 12, 1948, 10:30 a.m., IDFA 922/75//1237, cited in Morris 2004, p.427.
  35. ^ Morris 2004, p. 427.
  36. ^ Unsigned printed page describing events in Lydda, July 11-12, 1948, IDFA 922/75/1237, cited in Morris 2004, p. 427.
  37. ^ 1st Battalion HQ to chief of staff, Arab Legion, "Following are the memoirs of 1st Battalion Officer Arshid Marshud on the Battles of the 1st Battalion in Palestine, December 9, 1948, IDFA 922/75//693, cited in Morris 2004, p. 427.
  38. ^ Munayyer 1998, p. 95.
  39. ^ Morris 2004, footnote 78, p. 453.
  40. ^ Tal, David. War in Palestine, 1948: Strategy and Diplomacy. Routledge, 2004, p. 311.
  41. ^ Morris 2004, p. 427.
  42. ^ Munayyer 1998, p. 94.
  43. ^ Yiftah HQ to Danny HQ, 13:15 hours, July 12, 1948, IDFA 922/75/1237, cited in Morris 2004, pp. 427-428.
  44. ^ Morris 2004, p. 428; also see Sefer Hapalmach II, p. 565 and PA, pp. 142-163, "Comprehensive Report of the Activities of the Third Battalion from 9 July until 18 July," Third Battalion/Intelligence, July 19, 1948, cited in Morris 1986, p. 88. Morris 1986 reports that Operation Mickey HQ reported four Israelis dead and 14 wounded; other sources reported two or three dead. See footnote 24, p. 89. Tal (2004) writes that two Israelis died. Note that Morris 1986 cites the Palmach as saying the action lasted from 11:30 until 14:00 hours. In Morris 2004, p. 428, it is described as having ended by 13:30 hours.
  45. ^ Orren, p. 110 cited in Morris 1986, p. 89.
  46. ^ Morris 2004, p. 427 reports the order to shoot "any clear target" or anyone "seen on the streets," citing Book of the Palmah II, 571 and 717; and Third Battalion/Intelligence, "Comprehensive Report of the Activities of the Third Battalion from Friday 9.7 until Sunday 18.7," IDFA 922/75//1237. See also Tal, David. War in Palestine, 1948, p. 311.
  47. ^ a b c Brandabur, A. Clare. Reply To Amos Kenan's "The Legacy of Lydda" and An Interview With PFLP Leader Dr. George Habash, Peuples & Monde; first published in The Nation, January 1, 1990.
  48. ^ Yoav Gelber, Palestine 1948, Sussex Academic Press, p.318.
  49. ^ a b Munayyer 1998, pp. 93-94.
  50. ^ Morris 2004, p. 428, and footnote 81, p. 453. Morris cites Orren, On the Road, 110; "Avi-Yiftah" (Shmarya Guttman), "Lydda," 456; and an interview with Eldad Avidar in "Al-Nakba" (1998), a documentary produced and directed by Benny Brunner. Also see Mannin, Ethel. The road to Beersheba. H. Regnery Co., 1964, original from the University of Michigan; and Alon Kadish and Avraham Sela, "Myths and historiography of the 1948 Palestine War revisited: the case of Lydda," The Middle East Journal 59.4 (Autumn 2005): p. 617(18).
  51. ^ a b c d e Shipler, David K. "Israel Bars Rabin from Relating '48 Eviction of Arabs," The New York Times, October 23, 1979.
  52. ^ Bar-Zohar, Michael. Benn Gurion, Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1977, Vol II, p. 775, cited in Morris, Benny. "Operation Dani and the Palestinian Exodus from Lydda and Ramle in 1948," Middle East Journal, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Winter, 1986), p. 91. Morris writes that Bar-Zohar cites Yitzhak Rabin as his source.
  53. ^ a b Peretz Kidron: Truth Whereby Nations Live. In Said and Hitchens, 1998, pp. 90-93.
  54. ^ Itzchaki, Arieh. Latrun. Jerusalem: Cana 1982, Vol II, p. 394, cited in Morris, Benny. "Operation Dani and the Palestinian Exodus from Lydda and Ramle in 1948," Middle East Journal, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Winter, 1986), p. 91.
  55. ^ Gelber, Yoav. Palestine, 1948: war, escape and the emergence of the Palestinian refugee problem. Sussex University Press, 2006, p. 162.
  56. ^ Prior, 1999, p. 205.
  57. ^ The IDF Archives holds two nearly identical copies of the expulsion order. According to Morris, 2004, p. 429, 454, Allon later denied that there had been such an order, saying that the order to evacuate the civilian population of Lydda and Ramle came from the Arab Legion (see also Al Hamishmar, 25 Oct. 1979).
  58. ^ Prior, 1999, p. 206.
  59. ^ Efraim Karsh. "Israel's Founding". Commentary. {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |acessdate= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
  60. ^ Kiryati HQ to Aurbach, Tel Aviv District HQ (Mishmar) etc., 14:50 hours, 13 July 1948, HA (=Haganah Archive, Tel Aviv) 80\774\\12 (Zvi Aurbach Papers). See also Kiryati HQ to Hail Mishmar HQ Ramle -Shiloni, 19:15 hours, 13 July 1948, HA 80\774\\12. Cited in Morris (2004), p.429, 454
  61. ^ a b Sheetrit, Bechor. "A report of the minister's visit to Ramle on 12 July 1948," written on July 12 1948, and sent to the Prime Minister and other senior ministers on July 14, Israel State Archives (ISA), FM2564/10, cited in Morris, Benny. "Operation Dani and the Palestinian Exodus from Lydda and Ramle in 1948," Middle East Journal, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Winter, 1986), p. 92.
  62. ^ Morris 1986, footnote 36, p. 93.
  63. ^ Munayyer 1998, p. 94.
  64. ^ Shmarya Guttmann cited in Morris, Benny. "Operation Dani and the Palestinian Exodus from Lydda and Ramle in 1948," Middle East Journal, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Winter, 1986), pp. 95-96. Morris finds Guttman's account subjective and impressionistic, but valuable in terms of understanding what went on in Lydda and Ramla during the crucial period.
  65. ^ Morris 2003, p. 177; 2004, p. 433.
  66. ^ Gilbert 2008, pp. 218-219.
  67. ^ Khalidi, Walid. Introduction to Spiro Munayyer's "The Fall of Lydda", Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 27, No. 4, pp. 80-98, 1998.
  68. ^ Steiger, Arab Legion, p. 206, cited in Morris 2008, pp. 290-1.
  69. ^ Abu Nowar. Jordanian-Israeli War, pp. 206-7, cited in Morris 2008, p. 291.
  70. ^ Benvenisti et al., 2007, pp. 101-102.
  71. ^ Rantisi (1990), pp.24-25.
  72. ^ Pappé (2006), p. 168.
  73. ^ Pappé (2006), p. 168
  74. ^ El-Asmar, Fouzi. "To Be An Arab in Israel", Institute for Palestine Studies, 1978, p. 13.
  75. ^ Gelber, Yoav. Palestine, 1948: war, escape and the emergence of the Palestinian refugee problem. Sussex University Press, 2006, p. 163.
  76. ^ Cohen, Stuart. Israel and Its Army: From Cohesion to Confusion. Taylor & Francis, 2008, p. 139.
  77. ^ a b c Cohen, Stuart. Israel and Its Army: From Cohesion to Confusion. Taylor & Francis, 2008, p. 140.
  78. ^ IDF Intelligence Service/Arab Department, July 21, 1948, cited in Morris 2008, p. 291.
  79. ^ Thomas, 1999, p. 288.
  80. ^ Morris 2008, pp. 290-291.
  81. ^ Kirkbride, From the Wings, p. 48, cited in Morris 2008, p. 291.
  82. ^ Morris 2008, pp. 291-2.
  83. ^ Morris 2004, p. 434.
  84. ^ Ankori, 2006, pp. 48-50.

Bibliography

External links

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